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This	   work	   focuses	   on	   the	   intangible,	   secret	   aspects	   of	   indigenous	   peoples’	  
cultures	  and	  how	  such	  secret	   information	   is	  protected	  by	   indigenous	  guardians	  
or	  holders.	  This	   is	  because	  much	  of	   indigenous	  culture	   is	   imbued	  with	   spiritual	  
significance	  for	  indigenous	  peoples	  and,	  consequently,	  it	  is	  not	  made	  available	  to	  
the	  rest	  of	  the	  community	  and	  the	  world	  at	  large.	  	  
This	   thesis	   examines	   the	   reasons	   why	   it	   is	   important	   to	   preserve	   indigenous	  
cultures	  and	  secret	  practices	  that	  today	  survive	  in	  indigenous	  communities.	  The	  
thesis	   demonstrates	   that	   secrecy	   is	   seen	   as	   essential	   to	   the	   preservation	   of	  
indigenous	   secret	   knowledge.	   Indigenous	   guardians	   are	   responsible	   for	   the	  
preservation	  of	  the	  information,	  and	  they	  commonly	  use	  secrecy	  to	  preserve	  the	  
knowledge	   and,	   when	   they	   share	   it,	   they	   choose	   limited,	   confidential	  
circumstances	  to	  do	  so.	  This	  work	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  make	  reasonable	  
space	  in	  the	  existing	  body	  of	  laws	  which	  have	  so	  far	  failed	  to	  effectively	  protect	  
indigenous	   secret	   practices	   and	   information.	   The	   case	   study	   described	   in	   this	  
thesis	  helps	  understand	  how	  states	  are	  currently	  trying	  to	  listen,	  understand	  and	  
accommodate	   indigenous	   claims	   brought	   forward	   at	   the	   national	   and	  
international	   fora.	  The	  thesis	  reviews	  the	   legal	  protection	  currently	  available	  to	  
indigenous	   secret	   knowledge	   in	   national	   and	   international	   law.	   The	   first	   6	  
chapters	   introduce	   indigenous	   cultures,	   holism	   and	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	  
international	   law,	   and	   chapter	   7	   describes	   the	  New	  Zealand	   case	  Wai	   262	   and	  
the	   recommendations	   given	   by	   the	  Waitangi	   Tribunal.	   The	   remaining	   chapters	  
analyse	  indigenous	  cultures	  and	  intellectual	  property	  laws,	  identifying	  gaps	  in	  the	  
existing	  mechanisms	  for	  protection	  and	  underlining	  why,	  as	  of	  today,	  intellectual	  
property	   law	   does	   not	   guarantee	   adequate	   protection	   to	   indigenous	   secret	  
knowledge.	   The	   last	   chapter	   analyses	   the	   law	   of	   breach	   of	   confidence	   as	   a	  
possible	  instrument	  to	  safeguard	  indigenous	  secret	  information	  and	  the	  duty	  of	  
care	  performed	  by	  indigenous	  guardians	  in	  preserving	  such	  knowledge.	  It	  argues	  
that	   the	   existing	   law	   of	   confidentiality	   can	   usefully	   evolve	   to	   protect	   cultural	  
secret	   information	   as	   a	   growing	   category	   in	   its	   own	   right	   and	   that	   indigenous	  
secret	  information	  can	  find	  protection	  as	  confidential	  information.	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This	  thesis	  is	  about	  indigenous	  peoples’	  secret	  and	  sacred	  knowledge,	  about	  the	  
people	  who	  act	  as	  guardians	  of	  that	  knowledge,	  and	  about	  the	  legal	  support	  for	  
the	   guardians	   and	   the	   legal	   protection	   of	   the	   secret	   status	   of	   that	   knowledge.	  	  
The	  thesis	  will	  try	  to	  explain	  what	   indigenous	  peoples’	  secret	  knowledge	  is,	  the	  
role	   played	   by	   indigenous	   guardians	   to	   keep	   and	   safeguard	   such	   secret	  
knowledge	  and	  how	  the	  law	  can	  help	  the	  custodians	  to	  preserve	  the	  knowledge	  
from	  external	  misuse	   or	   exploitation.	   In	   doing	   so,	   the	   thesis	  will	   address	  what	  
today	   constitutes	   indigenous	   peoples’	   traditional	   knowledge	   and	   cultural	  
expressions,	  how	   important	   culture	   is	   for	   indigenous	  peoples,	  how	  sacred	   it	   is,	  
and	   how	   traditional	   knowledge	   has	   been	   safeguarded	   by	   indigenous	  
communities.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   this	   thesis	   will	   address	   how	   important	  
indigenous	  customary	  law	  is	  for	  the	  safeguarding	  of	  indigenous	  heritage,	  what	  is	  
the	  role	  played	  by	  the	  guardians	  of	  the	  knowledge	  in	  the	  safeguard	  of	  indigenous	  
cultures	  and	  traditions,	  why	   indigenous	  knowledge	   is	   today	  under	   threat,	  what	  
has	   been	   done	   to	   safeguard	   it,	   and	  what	   still	   needs	   to	   be	   done	   to	   effectively	  
succeed	  effectively	   in	   safeguarding	   indigenous	   traditions	   for	   future	  generation.	  
As	   such,	   this	   thesis	   is	  an	  attempt	   to	  put	   together	  all	   the	  existing	   relevant	   legal	  
literature	  related	  to	  indigenous	  peoples’	  intangible	  cultures	  in	  the	  custody	  of	  the	  
guardians	  of	  knowledge.	  	  
	  
The	   thesis	   first	   introduces	   indigenous	  peoples	   and	   the	  historical	   circumstances	  
that	   made	   them	   such	   a	   vulnerable	   minority	   in	   the	   global	   context.	   It	   then	  
addresses	   why	   their	   claims	   and	   desires	   to	   preserve	   their	   heritage	   for	   future	  
generations	   are	   important	   and	   how	   the	   global	   community,	   being	   it	   legal	   or	  
social,	   can	  adjust	   its	   initial	   exclusive	   structure	   to	   include	  peoples	  who	   survived	  
annexation	  and	  near	  annihilation	  to	  remain	  factually	  parts	  of	  our	  global	  society,	  
but	  with	  very	  distinctive	  cultural	  traditions.	  The	  thesis	  aims	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  
participation	   in	   a	   global	   society	   does	   not	   have	   to	   happen	   at	   the	   expense	   of	  
	  
	  
vi	   	  
surrendering	  indigenous	  cultural	  traditions.	  Uniformity	  should	  not	  and	  cannot	  be	  
the	  aim	  of	  any	  civilized	  society.	  
This	  global	  society	  of	  which	  we	  are	  all	  members	  is	  not	  a	  perfect	  one.	  It	  has	  grown	  
out	  of	  great	  wars,	  misunderstandings,	  crimes	  and	  reparations.	  Whether	  we	  like	  it	  
or	   not	   we	   are	   all	   part	   of	   it.	   In	   this	   multicultural	   scenario,	   indigenous	   peoples	  
represent	   our	   past	   and	   part	   of	   our	   present.	   As	   such,	   this	   thesis	   will	   try	   to	  
demonstrate	   that	   indigenous	   claims	   in	   relation	   to	   secret	   knowledge	   are	  
legitimate	  and	  justified,	  and	  they	  require	  a	  response	  from	  both	  the	  national	  and	  
global	   communities.	   This	   thesis	  will	   also	   show	  how	  difficult	   it	   is	   for	   a	  Western	  
legal	   system	   to	   include	   and	   address	   interests	   that	   were	   never	   included	   in	   its	  
initial	   value	   system.	   The	   present	   work	   demonstrates	   that	   such	   ‘reasoning’	   is	  
today	   stronger	   than	   ever	   and	   needs	   structural	   addressing	   through	   the	  
modification	  of	   the	   legal	   system	  and	   the	  consequent	   inclusion	  of	  concepts	  and	  
perspectives	   that	  were	  not	   included	  at	   the	   time	   the	  Western	   legal	   system	  was	  
created.	  This	  thesis	  does	  not	  aim	  to	  divide	  the	  world	  into	  ‘the	  evil	  West’	  and	  the	  
‘good	   indigenous	   peoples’,	   but	   to	   address	   cases	   and	   situations	   involving	  
indigenous	   peoples	   that	   are	   historically,	   ethically,	   morally	   and	   legally	   obvious,	  
and	   to	   show	   a	   possible	   way	   ahead	   in	   which	   indigenous	   issues	   would	   find	  
effective	  protection	  and/or	  solution.	  	  
The	   work	   is	   divided	   in	   two	   parts:	   the	   first	   half	   introduces	   and	   discusses	  
indigenous	  cultures	  and	  secret	  knowledge	  from	  an	  historical	  and	  anthropological	  
perspective;	   it	   defines	   what	   indigenous	   secret	   knowledge	   is	   and	   who	   the	  
guardians	   of	   knowledge	   are	   and	   how	   indigenous	   cultures	   and	   traditions	   are	  
protected	  by	  the	  international	  law	  system.	  The	  case	  study	  on	  Wai	  2621	  connects	  
the	   first	   half	   of	   the	   work	   to	   the	   second	   and	   gives	   a	   clear	   example	   of	   how	  
indigenous	  cultural	  issues	  can	  be	  discussed	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  The	  second	  part	  
is	  dedicated	  to	  the	  International	  Property	  (IP)	  Law	  regime	  and	  the	  law	  on	  Breach	  
of	   Confidence,	   explaining	   why	   the	   IP	   law	   is	   unsuitable	   to	   protect	   indigenous	  
secret	   knowledge,	   and	  why	  breach	  of	   confidence	  might	  be	  used	  by	   indigenous	  
guardians	  to	  safeguarded	  their	  most	  secret	  knowledge.	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Hence,	  chapter	  1	  introduces	  the	  methodology	  and	  the	  historical	  context	  in	  which	  
indigenous	   peoples	   have	   lived	   for	   the	   past	   several	   centuries.	   To	   understand	  
indigenous	  peoples	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  understand	  the	  brutality	  of	  colonization	  and	  
all	  the	  tragedy	  it	  represented	  in	  terms	  of	  cultural	  alienation,	  genocidal	  practices,	  
dispossessions	  from	  traditional	  territories,	  general	  repression	  and	  exclusion.	  In	  a	  
way,	   colonization	   never	   ended.	   Seclusion	   and	   discrimination	   are	   still	   forms	   of	  
colonization	   that	   impede	  members	  of	   a	  minority	   from	  being	  granted	   the	   same	  
consideration	  and	  protection	  as	  any	  other	  member	  of	  the	  society.	  
Chapter	  2	  explains	  what	  culture	  is	  and	  explains	  how	  and	  why	  indigenous	  cultures	  
based	  on	  holism	  differ	  from	  the	  Western	  idea	  of	  ‘culture’.	  This	  sets	  the	  stage	  for	  
chapter	  3,	  which	   introduces	  what	   constitutes	   indigenous	   traditional	   knowledge	  
and	   traditional	   cultural	   expressions.	   It	   is	   generally	   known	   (given	   the	   lack	   of	   a	  
formal	  and	  widely	  accepted	  definition)	  that	  indigenous	  knowledge	  is	  not	  always	  
clearly	   definable	   and	   circumscribable.	   The	   chapter	  will	   explore	  what	   the	  world	  
considers	   indigenous	   secret	   knowledge	  and	  how	   the	   thesis	  will	   use	   indigenous	  
traditional	   knowledge	   and	   cultural	   expressions.	   Chapter	   4	   will	   explain	   who	  
indigenous	  guardians	  are	  and	  what	  their	  role	  entails	   in	  safeguarding	  indigenous	  
cultures	  and	  heritage.	  The	  chapter	  will	  try	  to	  explain	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  role	  
of	  the	  guardians,	  what	  such	  a	  role	  was	  at	  the	  time	  of	  colonization	  and	  what	  that	  
same	   role	   entails	   today.	   This	   chapter	   is	   very	   important	   and	   central	   because	  
guardianship	  and	  secret	  knowledge	  always	  go	  together,	  and	  one	  could	  not	  exist	  
without	   the	  other.	   Chapter	   5	  will	   discuss	   indigenous	  peoples	   and	   international	  
law	   to	   contextualize	   indigenous	   peoples	   in	   the	   international	   fora	   in	   order	   to	  
explain	   what	   has	   today	   been	   achieved	   in	   protecting	   indigenous	   cultures	   and	  
what	   still	   needs	   to	   be	   done	   for	   a	   more	   effective	   protection	   of	   indigenous	  
interests	  and	  expectations.	  The	  chapter	  deliberately	  avoids	  any	  discourse	  on	   IP	  
law	  (TRIPS	  and	  CBD	  included)2	  because	  such	  law	  systems	  will	  be	  amply	  discussed	  
in	   Chapter	   8	   (generally)	   and	   9	   (specifically	   on	   IP,	   indigenous	   secret	   knowledge	  
and	  guardianship).	  
Chapter	   6	   will	   continue	   to	   discuss	   indigenous	   cultures	   by	   connecting	   the	  
international	  human	   rights	   (HR)	  and	   the	   intellectual	  property	   law	  systems	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The	   Agreement	   on	   Trade-­‐Related	   Aspects	   of	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	   (1994)	   and	   the	   Convention	   on	  
Biological	  Diversity	  (1993)	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each	  other	  as	  systems	  which,	  over	  the	  years,	  have	  started	  to	  overlap,	  being	   IP,	  
although	   still	   marginally,	   today	   included	   within	   HR	   laws.	   In	   this	   chapter	   the	  
analysis	  is	  moving	  from	  international	  law	  to	  the	  IP	  legal	  system.	  The	  case	  study	  of	  
Chapter	  7	  will	  analyze	  in	  practice	  how	  New	  Zealand	  is	  responding	  to	  the	  claims	  of	  
indigenous	  custodians	  of	  secret	  knowledge.	  Chapter	  7,	  in	  fact,	  will	  introduce	  and	  
discuss	   a	   very	   important	   case,	   the	   Aotearoa/New	   Zealand	   Waitangi	   Tribunal	  
Report	  on	  the	  Wai	  262	  claim,	  which	  includes	  wide	  discussion,	  considerations	  and	  
recommendations	  about	  indigenous	  traditions,	  secret	  knowledge	  and	  the	  role	  of	  
the	  guardians	   (kaitiaki)	  of	  knowledge.	  Never	  before	   the	   role	  of	   the	  guardian	  of	  
knowledge	  was	  so	  thoroughly	  analyzed	   in	  a	  case	  of	  national	  (and	   international)	  
importance.	   Additionally,	   much	   of	   what	   is	   recommended	   by	   the	   Waitangi	  
Tribunal	   could	   de	   facto	   be	   applied	   to	   indigenous	   circumstances	   happening	   in	  
other	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  	  
Chapters	   8	   and	   9	   will	   specifically	   focus	   on	   indigenous	   peoples’	   traditional	  
knowledge	  and	  the	  world	  intellectual	  property	  law	  system	  to	  demonstrate	  that,	  
although	  significant	  moves	  have	  been	  made	  to	  protect	   indigenous	  cultures,	  the	  
major	   intellectual	   property	   law	   regimes	   still	   represent	   an	  unsuitable	   avenue	   in	  
which	   to	   safeguard	   the	  most	   secret	   knowledge	   held	   by	   indigenous	   guardians.	  
Such	   unsuitability	  will	   consequently	  move	   the	   thesis	   to	   chapter	   10,	  where	   the	  
thesis	   will	   argue	   that	   development	   of	   the	   law	   of	   breach	   of	   confidence	   and	  
privacy	   is	   the	  best	   approach	   to	  protecting	   the	   role	  of	   guardians	   in	  maintaining	  
the	   secrecy	   of	   indigenous	   knowledge.	   In	   recent	   years	   litigation	   for	   breach	   of	  
confidence	   has	   evolved	   so	   that	   secret	   knowledge	   can	   be	   included	   in	   legally	  
protected	  confidential	   information.	  The	  Common	  Law	  system	  is	  the	  best	  option	  
for	   developing	   a	   regime	   flexible	   enough	   to	   protect	   that	   indigenous	   knowledge	  
that	  is	  mostly	  secret	  and	  guarded.	  	  
The	  main	  topic	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  very	  delicate.	  Being	  based	  on	  secrecy,	  it	  
is	   difficult	   to	   address	   something	   whose	   protection	   resides	   in	   its	   secrecy.	   No	  
amount	   of	   books	   or	   legal	   reasoning	   can	   help	   one	   understand	   what	   secret	  
knowledge	   is	   and	   what	   it	   means	   to	   indigenous	   peoples.	   Every	   indigenous	  
community	   in	   the	   world	   has	   a	   different	   understanding	   of	   secrecy	   and	  
guardianship.	   Reducing	   everything	   to	   clear-­‐cut	   definitions	   is	   only	   helpful	   to	   a	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point.	   That	   is	   why	   this	   thesis	   slowly	   moves	   from	   what	   constitutes	   secrecy	   to	  
secrecy	  itself	  as	  a	  characteristic	  that,	  alone,	  should	  become	  enough	  to	  guarantee	  
its	   protection.	   This	   is	   because	   secret	   information	   is	   present	   and	   protected	   in	  
every	  society	  of	  the	  world	  and,	  as	  such,	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  common	  factor	  
that	  brings	  together	  indigenous	  cultures	  with	  mainstream	  societies.	  Contrary	  to	  
what	   is	  argued	  by	  most	  scholars,	   this	   thesis	  will	   try	  progressively	   to	  prove	   that	  
indigenous	  secret	   information	  should	  not	  be	  protected	  because	   it	   is	   indigenous	  
and	  holistic	  but	  because	  it	  is	  secret.	  
	  
Given	   the	   complexity	   of	   any	   research	   involving	   indigenous	   peoples’	   holistic	  
traditions,	  the	  present	  work	  will	  investigate	  indigenous	  peoples’	  knowledge	  and	  
traditions	  using	  a	  comparative	  and	  interdisciplinary	  method.	  	  
There	   is	   today	   a	   great	   abundance	   of	   legal,	   anthropological	   and	   philosophical	  
material	   on	   indigenous	   peoples;	   however,	   very	   rarely	   do	   these	   disciplines	   find	  
place	   in	   the	   same	   text.	   In	   this	   light,	   disciplines	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	   part	   of	   the	  
‘same’	  whole	   they	   try	   to	   describe	   and,	   though	   they	  might	   describe	   the	  whole	  
from	  a	  specific	  perspective	  with	  exclusive	  language,	  they	  still	  remain	  a	  part	  of	  the	  
whole	  they	  represent	  and,	  therefore,	  fundamentally	  interconnected.	  
While	  a	  study	  in	  isolation	  can	  indeed	  guarantee	  the	  integrity	  of	  each	  discipline,	  it	  
rarely	  answers	  all	  the	  questions	  exhaustively,	  and	  provides	  workable	  solutions.	  
As	  Citroni	  and	  Quintana	  Osuna	  state:3	  “…	  if	  we	  are	  to	  try	  to	  understand	  and	  learn	  
from	  indigenous	  peoples,	  we	  should	  do	  it	  through	  a	  multidisciplinary	  approach.	  
Sociologists,	   anthropologists,	   theologians,	   lawyers,	   psychologists,	   artists,	   and	  
obviously	   indigenous	   peoples	   themselves	   can	   help	   us	   to	   have	   a	   better	   idea	   of	  
their	   complexity”.4	  Conscious	   of	   this,	   the	   author	   believes	   that	   all	   disciplines	  
should	   work	   together	   for	   the	   greater	   good.	   Time	   has	   come	   for	   a	   new	  
interdisciplinary	   collaboration	   among	   disciplines	   that	   will	   fill	   the	   obvious	   gaps	  
each	  of	  them	  possess.	  No	  legal	  study	  on	  indigenous	  peoples	  would	  be	  complete	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Gabriella	  Citroni	  and	  KI	  Quintana	  Osuna	  “Reparations	  for	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  in	  the	  Case	  Law	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐
American	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights”	   in	   Federico	   Lenzerini	   (ed)	  Reparations	   for	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   (Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  New	  York,	  2008)	  at	  318.	  
4	  “…	   the	   judicial	   point	   of	   view	   is	   only	   one	   way	   to	   address	   the	   issue.	   	   Therefore,	   judges	   dealing	   with	  
indigenous	   communities	   need	   the	   experience	   of	   those	   others	   that	   could	   help	   them	   to	   render	   a	   well-­‐
grounded	  judgement”	  see	  Gabriella	  Citroni	  and	  KI	  Quintana	  Osuna	  “Reparations	  for	  Indigenous	  Peoples	   in	  
the	   Case	   Law	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights”	   in	   Federico	   Lenzerini	   (ed)	   Reparations	   for	  
Indigenous	  Peoples	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  New	  York,	  2008)	  at	  318.	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without	   the	   invaluable	   support	   of	   anthropologists’	   findings;	   and	   vice	   versa,	   no	  
indigenous	  peoples’	   battle	   can	  be	  won	  without	   the	  help	   of	   legal	   scholars.	   This	  
thesis	  has	  tried	  to	  effectively	  bridge	  the	  existing	  gap	  between	  the	  disciplines	  to	  
present	   a	   harmonious	   and	   coherent	   analysis	   of	   what	   indigenous	   secret	  
knowledge	   is,	  why	  the	  role	  of	   the	  guardians	  should	  be	  safeguarded	   in	  order	   to	  
preserve	   such	   secret	   knowledge	   and	   how	   secret	   information	   can	   be	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This	  chapter	  will	  start	  with	  an	  historical	  and	  philosophical	  overview	  of	  Western	  
thought	  prior	  and	  during	  the	  colonization	  time.	  Such	  historical	  and	  philosophical	  
overview	   represents	   the	   context	   in	   which	   indigenous	   peoples	   were	   met	   and	  
confronted	   from	   a	   Eurocentric	   belief	   and	   perspective.	   It	   is	   also	   essential	   to	  
explain	   and	   justify	   the	   methodology	   of	   the	   present	   work,	   which	   has	   a	  
comparative,	  interdisciplinary	  and	  culturally	  relativist	  approach	  to	  the	  subject	  of	  
sacred	  and	  secret	  knowledge	  held	  by	  indigenous	  peoples.	  	  
In	   order	   to	   analyse	   the	   issues	   surrounding	   the	   safeguard	   of	   indigenous	  
sacred/secret	   traditions,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  explain	  who	   indigenous	  peoples	  are,	  
what	  indigenous	  culture	  is	  and	  how	  it	  differs	  from	  other	  forms	  of	  culture.	  
All	  the	  argumentation	  used	  in	  this	  chapter	  serve	  the	  purpose	  to	  prove	  that,	  when	  
analysing	   indigenous	   traditions,	  cultural	   relativism	  and	   interdisciplinary	  analysis	  
represent	  a	  necessary	  methodology	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  discrimination	  and	  guarantee	  
respect	  for	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  indigenous	  peoples’	  values.	  
	  
1.1	  -­‐	  Colonization:1	  Historical	  and	  Philosophical	  Issues	  
	  
The	  word	  ‘colonization’	  comes	  from	  the	  Latin	  verb	  colo,	  whose	  past	  is	  cultus	  and	  
whose	   future	  participle	   is	  culturus.	   Colonization	   shares	  with	   ‘culture’	   and	   ‘cult’	  
(religion)	   the	  same	  origin.	  All	   three	  words	   include	  a	  constellation	  of	  values	  and	  
practices,	   which	   include	   “occupying	   the	   land,	   cultivating	   the	   earth,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  “Colonialism	  is	  a	  practice	  of	  domination,	  which	  involves	  the	  subjugation	  of	  one	  people	  to	  another.	  …	  the	  
term	   colony	   comes	   from	   the	   Latin	   colonus,	   meaning	   farmer.	   This	   root	   reminds	   us	   that	   the	   practice	   of	  
colonialism	   usually	   involved	   the	   transfer	   of	   population	   to	   a	   new	   territory,	   where	   the	   arrivals	   lived	   as	  
permanent	   settlers	  while	  maintaining	   political	   allegiance	   to	   their	   country	   of	   origin.	  …	   It	   is	   not	   a	  modern	  
phenomenon.	  World	  history	  is	  full	  of	  examples	  of	  one	  society	  gradually	  expanding	  by	  incorporating	  adjacent	  
territory	   and	   settling	   its	   peoples	   on	   newly	   conquered	   territory.	   …	   the	  modern	   European	   colonial	   project	  
emerged	   when	   it	   became	   possible	   to	   move	   large	   numbers	   of	   people	   across	   the	   ocean	   and	   to	   maintain	  
political	  sovereignty	  in	  spite	  of	  geographical	  dispersion.	  The	  term	  colonialism	  is	  frequently	  used	  to	  describe	  
the	  settlements	  of	  North	  America,	  Australia,	  New	  Zealand,	  Algeria,	  and	  Brazil,	  places	  that	  were	  controlled	  
by	   a	   large	   population	   of	   permanent	   European	   residents”	   see	   M	   Kohn	   “Colonialism”	   (2006)	   electronic	  




affirmation	  of	  origins	  and	  ancestors,	  and	  the	  transmission	  of	  inherited	  values	  to	  
new	  generations”.2	  	  
	  
Colonization	  as	  such	  pre-­‐existed	  the	  European	  colonial	  wave.	  It	  was	  a	  practice	  in	  
usage	  by	  Greece,	  Rome,	  the	   Incas	  and	  the	  Aztec	  as	  well	  as	  many	  other	  groups.	  
While	   the	   initial	   waves	   of	   colonization	   mostly	   interested	   adjacent	   territories,	  
European	   colonialism	   soon	   reached	   a	   planetary	   dimension	   whose	   aim	   was	   to	  
subjugate	   the	  world	   to	  a	  universal	   regime	  of	   truth	  and	  power.	   In	   the	  words	  of	  
Shohat	   and	   Stam,3	  colonialism	   is	   “ethnocentrism	   armed,	   institutionalized,	   and	  
gone	   global”.	   The	   most	   evident	   corollaries	   of	   colonialism	   were:	   “the	  
expropriation	   of	   territory	   on	   a	   massive	   scale;	   the	   destruction	   of	   indigenous	  
peoples	  and	   their	   cultures;	   the	  enslavement	  of	  Africans	  and	  Native	  Americans;	  
the	   colonization	   of	   Africa	   and	   Asia;	   and	   racism	   not	   only	   within	   the	   colonized	  
world	   but	   also	   within	   Europe	   itself”.4 	  Not	   only	   did	   the	   encounter	   between	  
Europeans	  and	  indigenous	  peoples	  had	  political	  and	  economic	  repercussions	  for	  
the	   inhabitants	  of	  the	  new	  lands,	  but	  the	   impact	  of	   it	  greatly	  compromised	  the	  
integrity	  of	  indigenous	  cultures.	  
During	  most	  of	  the	  time	  of	  colonization	  (also	  known	  as	  the	  Age	  of	  Discovery	  of	  
the	  16th	  and	  17th	  century),5	  Western	  settlers	  perceived	  indigenous	  peoples	  from	  
their	  own	  evolutionary	  and	  scientific	  tradition,	  without	  being	  able,	  in	  most	  cases,	  
to	   grasp	   fully	   the	   complex	   universe	   in	   which	   indigenous	   peoples	   lived.	   It	   is	  
correct	   to	   say	   that	   eventually	  Western	   societies	   ended	  up	   labelling	   indigenous	  
peoples	  as	  ‘primitive’6	  (from	  a	  Western	  standpoint)	  and	  unworthy	  of	  any	  ‘special’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Alfredo	  Bosi	  Dialectica	  de	  la	  Colonizacion	  (Companhia	  das	  Letras,	  San	  Paulo,	  1992)	  at	  11	  and	  19.	  
3	  Ella	  Shohat	  and	  Robert	  Stam	  Unthinking	  Eurocentrism	  (Routledge,	  London	  and	  New	  York,	  1994)	  at	  16;	  “The	  
colonial	  process	  had	   its	  origins	   in	   internal	  European	  expansions	   (the	  Crusades,	  England’s	  move	  to	   Ireland,	  
the	  Spanish	  reconquista),	  made	  a	  quantum	  leap	  with	  the	  “voyages	  of	  discovery”	  and	  the	  institution	  of	  New	  
World	  slavery,	  and	  it	  reached	  its	  apogee	  with	  turn-­‐of-­‐the-­‐century	  imperialism,	  when	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  
earth’s	   surface	   controlled	   by	   European	   powers	   rose	   67	   per	   cent	   (in	   1884)	   to	   84.4	   per	   cent	   (in	   1914),	   a	  
situation	   that	   began	   to	   be	   reversed	   only	   with	   the	   disintegration	   of	   the	   European	   colonial	   empires	   after	  
World	  War	  II”	  see	  Harry	  Magdoff	  Imperialism:	  From	  the	  Colonial	  Age	  to	  the	  Present	  (Monthly	  Review	  Press,	  
New	  York,	  1978)	  at	  108.	  
4	  Ella	  Shohat	  and	  Robert	  Stam	  Unthinking	  Eurocentrism	  at	  16.	  
5 	  See	   Peter	   C	   Mancal	   “The	   Age	   of	   Discovery”	   (The	   Johns	   Hopkins	   University	   Press,	   1998)	   electronic	  
document	   <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/reviews_in_american_history/v026/26.1mancall.html>	   last	  
visited	  on	  12/12/2014.	  
6	  “The	  word	  ‘primitive’	  generally	  refers	  to	  someone	  or	  something	  less	  complex,	  or	  less	  advanced,	  than	  the	  
person	  or	  thing	  to	  which	   it	   is	  being	  compared.	   It	   is	  conventionally	  defined	   in	  negative	  terms,	  as	   lacking	   in	  
elements	  such	  as	  organization,	  refinement	  and	  technological	  accomplishment.	  In	  cultural	  terms	  this	  means	  




consideration.	   They	  were	   the	   ‘savages’	  who	   stood	  between	   colonizers	   and	   the	  
promised	  land,	  and	  were	  expected	  to	  either	  naturally	  disappear	  over	  time	  or	  to	  
be	  assimilated	   into	   society.7	  Colonisation	  as	   such,	   caused	   the	  disappearance	  of	  
entire	  civilizations	  and	  the	  enormous	  loss	  of	  indigenous	  cultures.	  What	  went	  lost	  
is	  not	  only	  the	  inheritance	  of	  entire	  civilizations,	  but	  the	  inheritance	  of	  all	  human	  
beings.	   In	   their	   book,	   Mor	   and	   Sjoo	   stress	   how	   political	   invasion	   and	   cultural	  
colonialism	   have	   been	   the	   major	   causes	   of	   the	   cultural	   regression	   and	  
suppression	  of	  the	  last	  two	  thousands	  years:8	  	  
	  
The	   invaders	   try	   to	   destroy	   the	   existing	   social	   forms,	   by	   force	   and	   punitive	  
colonial	   practices,	   and	   attempt	   to	   impose	   their	   own	   cultural	   and	   religious	  
patterns	   on	   the	   conquered.	   Culture	   is	   people’s	   own	   vision	   of	   themselves	   in	  
relation	  to	  the	  world,	  created	  by	  themselves	  through	  a	  blood-­‐continuity	  of	  time	  
and	  space.	  Political	  invasion,	  via	  cultural	  colonialism	  weakens	  the	  creative	  will	  of	  
the	  conquered	  by	  destroying	  the	  people’s	  coherent	  vision	  of	  themselves.	  Guns,	  
police,	  and	  the	  invader’s	  law	  help	  in	  this	  process;	  but	  imposition	  of	  alien	  cultural	  
symbols	   and	   religious	   ideas	   are	   the	   most	   effective	   tools,	   in	   the	   long	   run,	   for	  
obliterating	  or	  distorting	  a	  people’s	  self-­‐image	  …	  .	  
	  
In	   the	   last	   few	   centuries,	   the	  world	   has	   apparently	   evolved	   into	   technological	  
and	  capitalist	  societies:	  but	  at	  what	  cost?	  According	  to	  Sjoo	  and	  Mor,	  what	  today	  
remains	  of	  the	  spirit,	  poetry	  and	  symbolic	  truth	  in	  this	  world	  “did	  not	  come	  from	  
‘us’”,9	  but	  from	  those	  traditional	  cultures	  that	  have	  somehow	  managed	  to	  retain	  
some	  of	  their	  spiritual	  tradition	  in	  the	  face	  of	  Western	  ‘progress’	  and	  ‘evolution’.	  	  
Whether	   we	   like	   it	   or	   not,	   we	   have	   inherited	   a	   world	   that	   was	   built	   on	  
oppression	  and	  slavery.	  The	  traumas	  from	  oppression	  have	  gone	  so	  deep	  inside	  
the	   human	   psyche,	   indigenous	   and	   non	   (let’s	   not	   forget	   that	   at	   some	   point	   in	  
history	  we	  were	   all	   indigenous	   and	  we	   have	   all	  most	   likely	   been	   colonized	   by	  
stronger	  powers),10	  that	  not	  only	  do	  they	  take	  a	  long	  time	  to	  heal,	  but	  they	  have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Rhodes,	  1995);	  Chris	  Tilley,	  Webb	  Keane	  and	  others	  (eds)	  Handbook	  of	  Material	  Culture	  (SAGE	  Publishing,	  
London	  &	  Thousand	  Oaks,	  2006)	  at	  268.	  
7	  David	  R	  M	  Beck	  “The	  Myth	  of	  the	  Vanishing	  Race”	  electronic	  document	  
<http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/award98/ienhtml/essay2.html>	  last	  visited	  on	  01/02/2012.	  
8	  Monica	  Sjoo	  and	  Barbara	  Mor	  The	  Great	  Cosmic	  Mother	  (Harper	  &	  Row,	  San	  Francisco,	  1987)	  at	  24.	  
9	  Supra	  at	  85.	  




affected	   everyone	   directly	   and	   indirectly	   ever	   since	   political	   and	   cultural	  
colonization	  started.	  	  
Colonization,	  as	  such,	  is	  a	  recurrent	  historical	  phenomenon.	  Every	  event	  through	  
human	  intervention	  that	  causes	  a	  cultural	  and	  political	  threat	  to	  another	  society	  
is	   a	   form	  of	   colonization.11	  However,	   as	   commonly	   defined,	   ‘colonialism’	   is	   the	  
period	   of	   European	   expansion	   that	   started	   in	   the	   16th	   century	   towards	   Asia,	  
Africa,	  Oceania	  and	  Americas.	  When	  colonisers	   arrived	   in	   the	  new	  worlds	   they	  
established	   colonies. 12 	  The	   Spanish	   conquest	   of	   the	   Americas	   initiated	   a	  
theological,	  political	  and	  ethical	  debate	  about	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  use	  of	  force	  
to	  acquire	  or	  control	  new	  lands.	  This	  debate	  took	  place	  within	  the	  “framework	  of	  
a	  religious	  discourse	  that	  legitimized	  military	  conquest	  as	  a	  way	  to	  facilitate	  the	  
conversion	   and	   salvation	   of	   indigenous	   peoples”. 13 	  Often,	   to	   justify	   the	  
acquisition	  of	  foreign	  territories,	  new	  settlers	  claimed	  they	  had	  landed	  in	  terrae	  
nullius	   inhabited	   by	   groups	   of	   savages14 	  who	   were	   not	   regrouped	   under	   a	  
societal	  structure	  (as	  understood	  in	  Western	  culture)	  and,	  consequently,	  had	  no	  
legal	   status.	   In	   his	   book	   The	   Acquisition	   of	   Backward	   Territory	   in	   International	  
Law,	   Lindley	   explains	   that,	   in	   international	   law,	   territorium	   nullius	   includes	  
uninhabited	  lands	  or	  “…	  lands	  inhabited	  by	  individuals	  who	  are	  not	  permanently	  
united	  for	  political	  action”	  and	  “…	  lands	  which	  have	  been	  forfeited	  because	  they	  
have	   not	   been	   occupied	   effectively”.15	  Surely,	   such	   definition	   rested	   on	   the	  
conviction	   of	  what	   constituted	   a	   social	   and	   political	   structure	   under	   European	  
standards.	   It	   had	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	   the	   idea	   indigenous	   peoples	   had	   of	   a	  
society.16	  According	  to	  Brierly:17	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Colonialism	   (kəˈləʊnɪəˌlɪzəm)	   (Government,	   Politics	  &	  Diplomacy)	   the	   policy	   and	  practice	   of	   a	   power	   in	  
extending	   control	   over	   weaker	   peoples	   or	   areas.	   Also	   called:	   imperialism,	   see	   definition	   at	  
<www.thefreedictionary.com/colonialism>	  last	  visited	  in	  January	  2014.	  
12 	  Supra	   footnote	   1;	   see	   also	   Frederick	   Cooper	   Colonialism	   in	   Question:	   Theory,	   Knowledge,	   History	  
(University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2005)	  and	  Ania	  Loomba	  Colonialism/Postcolonialism	  (2nd	  ed,	  Routledge,	  New	  
York,	  2005).	  
13	  See	  M	  Kohn	  “Colonialism”	  (2006).	  
14	  “Civilization	  is	  that	  quality	  possessed	  by	  people	  with	  civil	  government;	  civil	  government	  is	  Europe’s	  kind	  of	  
government;	   Indians	   did	   not	   have	   Europe’s	   kind	   of	   government;	   therefore	   Indians	   were	   not	   civilized.	  
Uncivilized	  people	  live	  in	  wild	  anarchy;	  therefore	  Indians	  did	  not	  have	  any	  government	  at	  all.	  And	  therefore	  
Europeans	   could	   not	   have	   been	   doing	   anything	   wrong	   –	   were	   in	   fact	   performing	   a	   noble	   mission	   –	   by	  
bringing	   government	   and	   civilization	   to	   the	   poor	   savages”	   see	   Francis	   Jennings	   The	   Invasion	   of	   America	  
(WW	  Norton,	  New	  York,	  1975)	  at	  127.	  
15	  Sir	  MF	   Lindley	  The	  Acquisition	  of	  Backward	  Territory	   in	   International	   Law	   (Negro	  University	  Press,	  New	  
York,	  1969)	  at	  80.	  
16	  According	  to	  Keal	  “three	  points	  need	  to	  be	  made	  about	  terra	  nullius.	  First	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  say	  when	  the	  actual	  





…	  the	  doctrines	  of	  dispossession	  which	  emerged	  in	  the	  subsequent	  development	  
of	  modern	   international	   law,	  particularly	   the	   terra	  nullius	   and	   ‘discovery’	  ones,	  
have	  had	  well-­‐known	  adverse	  effects	  on	  indigenous	  peoples.	  …	  Strictly	  speaking,	  
in	   the	   seventeenth,	   eighteenth,	   and	   nineteenth	   centuries,	   the	   doctrine	   of	  
‘discovery’	   gave	   to	   a	   discovering	   State	   of	   lands	   previously	   unknown	   to	   it,	   an	  
inchoate	   title	   that	   could	   be	   perfected	   through	   effective	   occupation	   within	   a	  
reasonable	  time.18	  	  
	  
These	   newly	   created	   doctrines,	   at	   the	   time	   still	   unsupported	   by	   international	  
law,	   de	   facto	   excluded	   indigenous	   peoples	   from	   European	   social	   structure	  
leaving	   indigenous	   societies	   without	   any	   “entitlement	   to	   the	   rights	   Europeans	  
normally	  accorded	  to	  each	  other”.19	  In	  Europe,	  it	  was	  the	  general	  belief	  that	  the	  
populations	   of	   those	   lands	   were	   living	   without	   any	   pre-­‐existing	   social	   or	   legal	  
order	   and,	   as	   nomadic	   hunters,	   they	   could	   not	   claim	   any	   sovereignty	   over	   the	  
land	   they	   ‘temporally’	   occupied.20	  In	   this	   case,	   the	   right	   of	   Europeans	   to	   claim	  
such	  lands	  was	  held	  to	  derive	  from	  an	  act	  of	  ‘discovery’	  or	  actual	  ‘occupation’.	  	  
Lindley	   expressed	   his	   concern	   about	   whether	   the	   occupation	   of	   a	   territory	  
confers	   a	   de	   facto	   sovereignty	   on	   the	   occupants.	   He	   argues	   that	   jurists	   often	  
justify	   occupation	   on	   the	   sole	   basis	   of	   what	   legally	   constitutes	   a	   state;	   and	  
because	   native	   peoples	   were	   not	   regarded	   as	   entities	   that	   constituted	   states,	  
they	  were	   legally	  subjected	  to	  occupation	  and	  acquisition.	  Lindley’s	  theory,	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
times	  lands	  of	  the	  kind	  it	  was	  meant	  to	  describe	  were	  usually	  simply	  referred	  to	  as	  either	  ‘uninhabited’	  or	  
vacuum	  domicillium.	  Thus	  William	  Blackstone	  spoke	  of	  ‘desert	  uninhabited	  countries’	  (Commentaries	  on	  the	  
Laws	  of	  England:	  A	  Facsimile	  of	  the	  First	  Edition	  of	  1765-­‐1769,	  Vol.	  1)	  rather	  than	  terra	  nullius.	  Second,	  by	  
the	  time	  Lindley	  was	  writing	  the	  concept	  of	  terra	  nullius	  had	  been	  widened	  to	  include	  lands	  that	  were	  in	  fact	  
inhabited.	   It	  had	  been	  enlarged	  by	  international	   law	  to	  justify	  the	  acquisition	  of	  the	  territory	  occupied	  so-­‐
called	  ‘backward’	  peoples	  who	  did	  not	  conform	  to	  European	  understandings	  of	  political	  society.	  Third,	  in	  the	  
nineteenth	  century,	  especially	  during	  the	  ‘Scramble	  of	  Africa’,	  terra	  nullius	  was	  a	  reference	  not	  to	  whether	  
territory	  was	  occupied	  by	  non-­‐Europeans	  but,	  instead,	  another	  European	  state.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Scramble	  
for	  Africa	  it	  was	  usual	  for	  European	  states	  to	  claim	  sovereignty	  over	  territory	  they	  did	  not	  actually	  occupy.	  
For	   claims	   to	   be	   sustained	   against	   counter-­‐claims	   from	   other	   European	   states	   the	   claimant	   had	   to	  
‘effectively	  occupy’	  the	  territory	  in	  question	  within	  a	  reasonable	  time.	  Terra	  nullius	  in	  this	  sense	  served	  the	  
role	   of	   international	   law	   in	   prescribing	   ways	   to	   avoid	   conflict	   between	   European	   States”	   see	   Paul	   Keal	  
European	  Conquest	  and	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  2003)	  at	  
52.	  
17	  J	  L	  Brierly	  The	  Law	  of	  Nations	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  New	  York,	  1960)	  at	  154.	  
18	  Brierly	  at	  154.	  
19	  Anthony	  J	  Connolly	  Indigenous	  Rights	  (Ashgate,	  Fernham,	  2009)	  at	  47.	  
20 	  For	   further	   readings	   on	   the	   subject	   see	   Boyce	   Richardson	   People	   of	   Terra	   Nullius	   (University	   of	  




only	  questions	  the	  nature	  of	  indigenous	  settlements	  in	  the	  new	  worlds,	  but	  also	  
discusses	  the	  very	  core	  of	  what	  could	  be	  legally	  defined	  a	  ‘state’:21	  
	  
Now	   to	   say	   that	   a	   country	   is	   open	   to	   Occupation	   when	   it	   is	   not	   under	   the	  
sovereignty	  of	  a	  State,	  or	   is	  occupied	  by	  a	  savage	  nation,	  does	  not	  carry	  us	   far	  
unless	   we	   are	   agreed	   upon	   a	   definition	   of	   the	   term	   ‘State’,	   or	   know	   the	  
characteristics	   that	   are	   to	   distinguish	   savage	   from	   civilized	   peoples.	  No	   race	   is	  
without	  organization	  of	  some	  kind,	  and	   if	  …	  we	  regard	  as	  a	  State	  every	  society	  
which	   performs	   the	   functions	   of	   war	   and	   the	   administration	   of	   justice,	   many	  
peoples	  usually	  regarded	  as	  savage	  would	  form	  a	  State.	  
	  
According	   to	   Secher, 22 	  the	   distinction	   between	   a	   territory	   acquired	   by	  
occupation/settlement,	   a	   territory	   acquired	   through	   treaty,	   and	   a	   territory	  
acquired	   as	   a	   result	   of	   conquest	   was	   significant	   not	   only	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  
legitimising	   English	   rule	   in	   international	   law,	   but	   also	   for	   its	   consequences	   in	  
English	   law.	   The	   international	   law	   of	   the	   eighteenth	   century	   recognised	   four	  
ways	   of	   acquiring	   sovereignty	   over	   a	   new	   territory:	   by	   conquest,	   cession,	  
occupation	  and	  annexation.	  Initially,	  the	  doctrine	  of	  terra	  nullius	  was	  applied	  to	  
the	  acquisition	  of	  new	  territory	  which	  was	  uninhabited.	  Gradually,	  however,	  the	  
doctrine	   was	   extended	   to	   justify	   acquisition	   of	   inhabited	   territories	   by	  
occupation	   if	   the	   land	  was	   uncultivated	   or	   its	   Aboriginal	   inhabitants	   were	   not	  
‘civilised’	  or	  not	  organised	  in	  a	  society	  that	  was	  united	  permanently	  for	  political	  
action.23	  Today,	   the	   concept	   of	   terra	   nullius	   is	   generally	   considered	   racist	   (see	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Lindley	  continues	  by	  saying	  that:	  “Even	  when	  the	  rule	  is	  put	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  States	  which	  are	  members	  of	  
the	   Family	   of	  Nations	   or	   form	   the	   community	   of	   International	   Law,	   it	   is	   still	   not	   precise.	   The	   community	  
within	  which	  International	  Law	  operates	  is	  not	  one	  with	  definite	  limits.	  …	  Now	  the	  progress	  of	  ethnography	  
has	  shown	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  civilized	  and	  uncivilized	  is	  not	  one	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  with	  accuracy	  
in	  practice.	  The	  proper	  distinction	   is	  not	  between	  civilization	  and	  no	  civilization,	  but	  between	  one	  kind	  of	  
civilization	  and	  another,	  or	  one	  stage	  of	  development	  and	  another.	  Many	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘savage’	  races	  –	  or	  
…	   ‘natural’	   races	   –	   possess	   organized	   institutions	   of	   government,	   and	   it	   cannot	   be	   truly	   said	   that	   the	  
territory	  inhabited	  by	  such	  races	  is	  not	  under	  any	  sovereignty.	  Such	  sovereignty	  as	  is	  exercised	  there	  may	  be	  
of	  a	   crude	  and	   rudimentary	  kind,	  but,	   as	   long	  as	   there	   is	   some	  kind	  of	  authoritative	   control	  of	  a	  political	  
nature	   which	   has	   not	   been	   assumed	   for	   some	  merely	   temporary	   purposes,	   such	   as	   war,	   so	   long	   as	   the	  
people	  are	  under	  some	  permanent	  form	  of	  government,	  the	  territory	  should	  not,	  it	  would	  seem,	  de	  said	  to	  
be	  unoccupied”	  see	  MF	  Lindley	  The	  Acquisition	  and	  Government	  of	  Backward	  Territory	  in	  International	  Law	  
(Longmans,	  Green	  &	  Co.	  Ltd,	  London,	  1926)	  at	  19-­‐20.	  
22	  Ulla	   Secher	   Aboriginal	   Customary	   Law:	   A	   Source	   of	   Common	   Law	   Title	   to	   Land	   (Hart	   Publishing	   Ltd,	  
Oxford,	  2014).	  
23 	  “The	   crucial	   point	   is	   that,	   although	   the	   doctrine	   of	   terra	   nullius	   is	   a	   well-­‐established	   concept	   of	  
international	   law,	   it	   is	   not	   a	   concept	   of	   the	   common	   law.	  Nevertheless,	   the	   doctrine	   has	   a	   common	   law	  
counterpart	  in	  the	  ‘desert	  and	  uncultivated’	  doctrine	  which	  classified	  inhabited	  land	  as	  uninhabited	  for	  the	  




paragraph	   4	   of	   the	   Preamble	   of	   the	   2007	   UN	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	  
Indigenous	  Peoples).24	  In	   addition	   to	   that,	   and	  before	   the	  Mabo	   (No	  2)	   case	   in	  
(1992),25	  in	  1975	  the	  Advisory	  Opinion	  of	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  in	  the	  
Western	   Sahara	   case26	  had	   considered	   land	   agreements	   between	   indigenous	  
peoples	   and	   states	   as	   ‘derivative	   roots	  of	   title’	   rather	   than	   recognising	  original	  
title	  obtained	  by	  occupation	  of	  terra	  nullius.27	  
	  
During	  his	   time,	  de	  Vitoria	   (1483-­‐1546)28	  anticipated	  the	   liberal	  arguments	   that	  
would	   eventually	   circulate	   in	   Europe	   during	   the	   seventeenth	   and	   eighteenth	  
century	  on	  what	  power	  could	  be	  legitimately	  exercised	  by	  a	  state.29	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
acquired	  territory	  depended	  upon	  the	  manner	  of	   its	  acquisition	  by	  the	  Crown”	  see	  Ulla	  Secher	  Aboriginal	  
Customary	  Law:	  A	  Source	  of	  Common	  Law	  Title	  to	  Land	  (Hart	  Publishing	  Ltd,	  Oxford,	  2014)	  at	  29.	  
24	  “Affirming	  further	  that	  all	  doctrines,	  policies	  and	  practices	  based	  on	  or	  advocating	  superiority	  of	  peoples	  
or	   individuals	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   national	   origin	   or	   racial,	   religious,	   ethnic	   or	   cultural	   differences	   are	   racist,	  
scientifically	  false,	  legally	  invalid,	  morally	  condemnable	  and	  socially	  unjust”	  see	  UN	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Right	  
of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  electronic	  document	  <www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf>.	  
25	  Mabo	  v	  Queensland	  [No	  2]	  [1992]	  175	  CLR	  1	  (Mabo)	  declared	  that	  terra	  nullius	  had	  never	   legally	  existed	  
and	  that	  it	  had	  been	  wrongfully	  applied	  to	  Australia.	  The	  high	  court	  said	  that	  'ultimate'	  title	  existed	  instead,	  
and	  through	  that,	  native	  title	  could	  be	  claimed.	  Australian	  land	  law	  has	  developed	  from	  English	  land	  law	  and	  
it	  was	   under	   those	  principles	   that	  Australia	  was	   settled.	   At	   common	   law	   all	   land	   is	   owned	  by	   the	  Crown	  
which	  then	  deals	  with	  that	  land	  as	  it	  sees	  fit.	  The	  Queensland	  government	  reacted	  to	  the	  land	  rights	  claim	  
by	   passing	   the	   Queensland	  Coast	   Islands	   Declaratory	   Act	   1985	  (Qld)	   which	   said	   that	   the	   Torres	   Strait	  
Islander	   rights	   and	   claims	   had	   been	   extinguished	   in	   1879	   when	   the	   islands	   came	   under	   the	   rule	   of	   the	  
Queensland	   government.	   It	   was	   a	   futile	   move	   to	   stop	   the	   Meriam	   people's	   claim	   and	   in	   1989	   it	   was	  
overruled	  as	  it	  contravened	  the	  Racial	  Discrimination	  Act	  1975	  (Cth).	  The	  case	  then	  came	  to	  the	  High	  Court	  
of	  Australia	  –	   the	  highest	   court	   in	   the	   country.	   In	   the	  High	  Court	   the	  Meriam	  people	   claimed	  continuous	  
connection	  with	  their	   land.	  This	  was	  despite	  the	  fact	   it	  had	  been	  declared	  a	  possession	  of	  the	  New	  South	  
Wales	   Colony	   in	   1797	   and	   then	   annexed	   by	   the	   Queensland	   government	   in	   1879.	   The	   Queensland	  
government	  said	   it	  had	  saved	   the	   Indigenous	  people	  of	   the	  Murray	   Islands	   from	   'barbarism'	  and	   that	   the	  
Crown	  had	  assumed	  all	  rights	  to	  the	  land	  in	  1879.	  This	  assertion,	  however,	  was	  undermined	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  
in	  1913	  the	  Queensland	  government	  had	  bought	   land	  from	  the	  Meriam	  people	  on	  which	  to	  build	  a	  police	  
station.	  If	  the	  Crown	  (and	  therefore	  the	  State	  government)	  already	  owned	  the	  land	  then	  why	  would	  it	  have	  
to	   buy	   some	   from	   the	   Indigenous	   inhabitants?	   The	   government	   had	   also	   established	   a	   land	   court	   in	   the	  
early	  part	  of	   the	  20th	  Century	  to	  preside	  over	   land	  disputes	  between	  the	  Meriam	  people.”	  see	  electronic	  
document	   <www.skwirk.com/p-­‐c_s-­‐14_u-­‐120_t-­‐330_c-­‐1136/the-­‐mabo-­‐case/nsw/the-­‐mabo-­‐case/changing-­‐
rights-­‐and-­‐freedoms-­‐aboriginal-­‐people/land-­‐rights-­‐and-­‐native-­‐title>	   last	  visited	  on	  15/12/2014.	  For	   further	  
reading	  on	   the	  Mabo	   case,	   see	  Ulla	   Secher	  Aboriginal	   Customary	   Law:	  A	   Source	   of	   Common	   Law	  Title	   to	  
Land	  (Hart	  Publishing	  Ltd,	  Oxford,	  2014).	  
26 	  See	   UN	   International	   Court	   of	   Justice	   electronic	   document	   <www.icj-­‐
cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=323&p1=3&p2=4&case=61&p3=5>	  last	  visited	  on	  15/12/2014	  
27	  “The	  meaning	   of	   the	  words	   ‘legal	   ties’	   has	   to	   be	   sought	   in	   the	   object	   and	   purpose	   of	   resolution	  3292	  
(XXIX)	  of	   the	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly.	   It	   appears	   to	   the	  Court	   that	   they	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  
referring	  to	  such	  legal	  ties	  as	  may	  affect	  the	  policy	  to	  be	  followed	  in	  the	  decolonization	  of	  Western	  Sahara.	  
The	  Court	  cannot	  accept	  the	  view	  that	  the	  ties	  in	  question	  could	  be	  limited	  to	  ties	  established	  directly	  with	  
the	  territory	  and	  without	  reference	  to	  the	  people	  who	  may	  be	  found	  in	  it’	  at	  supra.	  
28	  “Francisco	   de	   Vitoria	   …	   raised	   in	   Burgos,	   was	   a	   Spanish	   Renaissance	   Roman	   Catholic	   philosopher,	  
theologian	   and	   jurist,	   founder	   of	   the	   tradition	   in	   philosophy	   known	   as	   the	   School	   of	   Salamanca,	   noted	  
especially	   for	   his	   contributions	   to	   the	   theory	   of	   just	  war	   and	   international	   law.	   He	   has	   in	   the	   past	   been	  
described	   by	   some	   scholars	   as	   the	   ‘father	   of	   international	   law’,	   though	   contemporary	   academics	   have	  
suggested	   that	   such	   a	   description	   is	   anachronistic,	   since	   the	   concept	   of	   international	   law	   did	   not	   truly	  
develop	   until	  much	   later.	   Because	   of	   Vitoria's	   conception	   of	   a	   ‘republic	   of	   the	  whole	  world’	   (res	   publica	  
totius	  orbis)	  he	  recently	  has	  been	  labelled	  ‘founder	  of	  global	  political	  philosophy’.	  Still,	  Vitoria	  is	  called	  one	  




He	  rejected	  the	  theory	  of	  discovery	  and	  dismissed	  the	  idea	  of	  terra	  nullius.30	  De	  
Vitoria	   claimed	   that	   the	   Indians	  were	   a	   civilized	   society	   that	   owned	   their	   land	  
and,	   therefore,	   the	   indigenous	   territories	   were	   not	   open	   to	   acquisition	   by	  
occupation.31	  However,	  he	  also	  alleged	  that	  the	  Spanish	  had	  the	  right	  to	  resort	  to	  
violence	   in	   case	   the	   Indians	   refused	   to	   engage	   with	   Spanish	   ‘natural	   rights	   of	  
trade	  and	  travel’	  (which	  included	  the	  right	  of	  priests	  and	  missionaries	  to	  travel	  to	  
preach	   in	   the	   new	   lands).32	  In	   such	   a	   case,	   colonizers	   would	   be	   justified	   to	  
engage	  in	  war	  and	  dispossess	  ‘infidels’	  of	  their	  lands.	  De	  Vitoria,	  in	  fact,	  believed	  
that	  Commerce	  and	  Christianity	  were	  the	  foundation	  of	  Civilization.	  Hence,	  any	  
discourse	  on	  indigenous	  peoples’	  territorial	  ownership	  would	  be	  subjected	  to	  the	  
law	  of	  Commerce	  and	  Theology.	  	  
In	   his	   book	  A	   Short	   Account	   of	   the	   Destruction	   of	   the	   Indies,	   Las	   Casas	   (1484-­‐
1566),	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   claimed	   that	   European	   colonization	   was	   brutal,	  
unlawful	  and	  unjust.33	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francisco_de_Vitoria>	  last	  visited	  in	  January	  2014;	  see	  also	  Thomas	  E	  Woods	  
How	   The	   Catholic	   Church	   Built	   Western	   Civilization	   (Regnery	   Publishing,	   Washington,	   2005);	  Anthony	  
Pagden	   Vitoria:	   Political	   Writings	  (Cambridge	   University	   Press,	   Cambridge,	   1991);	   	  Arthur	  	   Nussbaum	   	  A	  
concise	  history	  of	  the	  law	  of	  nations	  (Macmillan,	  1947).	  
29	  For	   further	   information	   on	   the	   subject,	   see	   Jéremié	   Gilbert	   Indigenous	   Peoples'	   Land	   Rights	   Under	  
International	  Law:	  From	  Victims	  to	  Actors	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff,	  The	  Netherlands,	  2012).	  
30	  “…	  or	  Territorium	  Res	  Nullius”.	  The	  terminology	  “suggests	  that	  there	  is	  ‘no	  prior	  presence’	  in	  conquered	  or	  
‘discovered’	   territories’	  see	  Laurel	  Kearns	  and	  Catherine	  Keller	   (eds)	  Ecospirit	  –	  Religions	  and	  Philosophies	  
for	  the	  Earth	  (Fordham	  University	  Press,	  New	  York,	  2007)	  at	  354.	  In	  the	  Mabo	  case,	  the	  Court	  stressed	  that	  
“The	  Doctrine	  of	  Terra	  Nullius	  applied	  to	  ‘uncultivated	  or	  desert	  lands’”.	  The	  Court	  also	  concluded	  that	  this	  
“unjust	   and	   discriminatory	   doctrine	   …	   can	   no	   longer	   be	   accepted”	   electronic	   document	  
<www.convictcreations.com/history/mabo.htm>	  last	  visited	  on	  15/06/2011.	  
31	  “Vitoria	  also	  dealt	  with	  the	  title	  to	  land	  being	  advanced	  by	  the	  Spaniards.	  He	  unequivocally	  rejected	  the	  
concept	  of	  basing	  title	  on	  the	  status	  of	  the	  Spanish	  emperor	  as	  the	  ‘Lord	  of	  the	  World’.	  He	  also	  stated	  that	  
title	  could	  not	  be	  based	  merely	  on	  the	  Indians’	  rejection	  of	  the	  supremacy	  of	  the	  Pope.	  With	  reference	  to	  
title	  based	  on	  claims	  that	  Spain	  was	  the	  first	  European	  nation	  to	  ‘discover’	  the	  New	  World,	  Vitoria	  dismissed	  
that	  proposition	  outright,	  saying	  the	  land	  ‘discovered’	  already	  had	  an	  owner	  from	  a	  public	  and	  private	  point	  
of	  view:	  the	  Indians.	  The	  most	  that	  discovery	  could	  do	  was	  to	  grant	  priority	  to	  the	  discovering	  state	  vis-­‐a-­‐vis	  
other	  potential	   colonizers	   in	  pursuing	   trade	  with	  or	   land	  purchases	   from	  the	   indigenous	  nation.	   Likewise,	  
papal	   grants	   could	   not	   substantiate	   title,	   but	   merely	   allocate	   priority	   rights	   among	   Catholic	   nations.	   In	  
Reflectiones,	  Vitoria	  also	  outlined	  the	  nature	  of	  what	  constituted	  legitimate	  contact	  with	  the	  Indian	  nations.	  
If	  the	  Indians	  were	  hostile	  after	  the	  Spaniards	  had	  demonstrated	  their	  ‘friendly’	  intentions,	  only	  then	  were	  
the	   Spaniards	   legitimately	   allowed	   to	  use	   force,	   and	  even	   then	   it	   had	   to	  be	  measured	   to	   inflict	   the	   least	  
amount	  of	  damage.	  Vitoria	  concluded	  this	  work	  on	  a	  practical	  note,	  stating	  that	  commerce	  with	  the	  Indians	  
was	  permitted,	  and	  that	  the	  Spanish	  Crown	  was	  bound	  by	  law	  and	  expediency	  to	  maintain	  its	  administration	  
of	  the	  lands	  in	  question,	  as	  there	  were	  already	  many	  Aboriginal	  converts.	  The	  Spanish	  Crown	  accepted	  the	  
validity	   of	   the	   principles	   articulated	   by	   Vitoria,	   although	   it	   perverted	   their	   intent	   through	   devising	   the	  
requirimientos,	   in	  which	   the	  king’s	  offer	  of	   friendship	  was	   read	  aloud	   in	  Spanish	   in	  a	  deserted	   locale.	  The	  
failure	   of	   the	   Indians	   to	   accept	   the	   offer	   authorized	   the	   military	   to	   attack”	   see	   The	   Justice	   System	   and	  
Aboriginal	   People,	   The	   Aboriginal	   Justice	   Implementation	   Commission	   electronic	   document	  
<www.ajic.mb.ca/volumel/chapter5.html#4>	  last	  visited	  on	  19/04/2012.	  
32	  See	  Francisco	  de	  Vitoria	  Vitoria:	  Political	  Writings	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  1991)	  at	  278-­‐
284.	  
33	  In	   the	   book	   Las	   Casas	   reported	   with	   great	   precision	   all	   the	   horrors	   and	   injustices	   perpetrated	   by	  




Thus	  far,	  de	  Vitoria	  and	  the	  other	  scholars	  of	  the	  time,	  who	  were	  still	  sufficiently	  
alien	   to	   indigenous	   traditions	   and	   believed	   in	   the	   inferiority	   of	   indigenous	  
peoples,	  created	  the	  corpus	  of	  the	  legal	  theory	  and	  jargon	  that	  would	  eventually	  
justify	   the	   conquest	   of	   indigenous	   territories	   regardless	   of	   their	   rights	   and	  
cultural	  traditions.	  Even	  the	  scholars	  who,	  like	  de	  Vitoria,	  seemed	  the	  defenders	  
of	   indigenous	   peoples,	   in	   reality,	  were	   just	   finding	   “more	   acceptable	   legal	   and	  
moral	   justifications	   precisely	   for	   the	   subjugation	   of	   the	   Indian	   people”. 34	  
Contrary	   to	   the	   Christian	   scriptures,	   which	   advocate	   human	   compassion	   and	  
tolerance	   towards	   all	   fellow	   human	   beings,	   invaders	   believed	   that	   their	  
superiority	   as	   a	   race	   was	   enough	   to	   justify	   any	   ethical,	   religious	   and	   moral	  
misbehaviour.35 	  Colonialists’	   political	   and	   religious	   powers	   enabled	   them	   to	  
convince	   themselves	   that	   they	  were	   doing	   a	   favour	   to	   the	   ‘infidels’	   by	   “lifting	  
them	   up	   from	   Mother	   Earth	   –	   through	   whips,	   degradations,	   imprisonments,	  
hunger,	   and	   slaughter’	   so	   they	   could	   glimpse	   through	   tears	   into	   God’s	  
kingdom”.36	  Followers	  of	  de	  Vitoria	  such	  as	  Emerich	  de	  Vattel	  (1714-­‐67)37	  and	  R	  
Phillimore	   (1810-­‐85)38	  added	   to	   the	   argument	   that	   it	   was	   permissible	   to	   take	  
possession	   of	   lands	   that	   were	   uninhabited	   or	   ownerless	   or	   in	   excess	   of	   what	  
would	  be	  required	  by	  the	  people	  traditionally	  occupying	  them.39	  
In	   his	  Mare	   Liberum	   (The	   Law	   of	   the	   Seas),	   Hugo	  Grotius	   responds	   to	   Spanish	  
conquests	   by	   arguing	   that	   it	   was	   plain	   heresy	   to	   believe	   that	   indigenous	  
communities	   were	   “not	   masters	   of	   their	   own	   property”	   as	   well	   as	   to	   freely	  
dispose	   of	   indigenous	   possessions	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   non-­‐Christian	   religious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Penguin	   Classics,	   1992);	   for	   further	   reading	   on	   the	   subject	   see	   also	   Tzvetan	   	  Todorov	   The	   Conquest	   of	  
America:	  The	  Question	  of	  the	  Other	  (University	  of	  Oklahoma	  Press,	  Norman,	  1999).	  
34	  Anthony	  J	  Connolly	  Indigenous	  Rights	  (Ashgate,	  Fernham,	  2009)	  at	  53.	  
35	  “The	  Institute	  of	  International	  Law	  at	  its	  session	  at	  Lausanne	  in	  1888	  adopted	  a	  declaration	  relative	  to	  the	  
occupation	  of	  the	  territories.	  …	  M	  de	  Martitz	  in	  submitting	  the	  draft,	  maintained	  that	  it	  was	  an	  exaggeration	  
to	  speak	  of	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  savage	  or	  semi-­‐barbarous	  peoples;	  that	  history	  shows	  that	  International	  Law	  
does	   not	  make	   the	   validity	   of	   an	   occupation	   depend	   upon	   a	   cession	   of	   the	   sovereignty;	   that	   a	   treaty	   of	  
cession	   can	   only	   be	   made	   by	   States	   recognizing	   International	   Law;	   that	   although	   it	   cannot	   be	   said	   that	  
backwards	  peoples	  are	  outside	   the	  community	  of	   International	  Law	  they	  are	  not	  members	  of	   it;	  and	  that	  
International	   law	  knows	  nothing	  of	   the	   ‘rights	  of	   independent	  tribes’”	  see	  MF	  Lindley	  The	  Acquisition	  and	  
Government	  of	  Backward	  Territory	  in	  International	  Law	  at	  16.	  
36	  Monica	  Sjoo	  and	  Barbara	  Mor	  The	  Great	  Cosmic	  Mother	  at	  25.	  
37	  See	  Vattel’s	  biography	  at	  <www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-­‐Vattel-­‐E.html>.	  
38	  Matthew	   C	   R	   Craven,	   Malgosia	   Fitzmaurice	   and	   other	   Time,	   History	   and	   International	   Law	   (Martinus	  
Nijhoff,	  The	  Netherlands,	  2011)	  at	  68-­‐70.	  




beliefs.40	  Grotius,	  in	  fact,	  believed	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘civilizing’	  barbarians	  was	  just	  
a	   pretext	   for	   gratuitous	   aggression	   that	   was	   hiding	   a	   “greedy	   longing	   for	   the	  
property	  of	  another”.41	  He	  argues	  that:42	  	  	  
	  
God	  was	  the	  founder	  and	  the	  ruler	  of	  the	  universe,	  and	  especially	  that	  being	  the	  
father	  of	  all	  mankind,	  He	  had	  not	  separated	  human	  beings,	  as	  He	  had	  the	  rest	  of	  
living	  things,	  into	  different	  species	  and	  various	  divisions,	  but	  had	  willed	  them	  to	  
be	  of	  one	   race	  and	   to	  be	  known	  by	  one	  name;	   that	   furthermore	  He	  had	  given	  
them	   the	   same	   origin,	   the	   same	   structural	   organism,	   the	   ability	   to	   look	   each	  
other	   in	   the	   face,	   language	   too,	   and	   other	  means	   of	   communication,	   in	   order	  
that	  they	  all	  might	  recognize	  their	  natural	  social	  bond	  and	  kinship.	  	  
	  
Grotius’	   vision	   was	   remarkably	   enlightened	   for	   his	   time.	   However,	   European	  
legal	   and	   moral	   standards	   continued	   being	   applied	   to	   indigenous	   peoples	  
without	   considering	   the	   cultural	   differences,	   distinct	   traditions	   and	   customary	  
laws	  of	   the	   indigenous	  peoples	   they	  encountered.43	  Indeed,	  on	   the	   same	  note,	  
Pufendorf	   (German	   jurist,	   political	   philosopher,	   economist,	   statesman	   and	  
historian,	  1632-­‐1694)	  argued	  that	  Indians	  were	  the	  property	  holders	  of	  their	  land	  
and	  “were	  under	  no	  obligation	  to	  receive	  visiting	  foreigners,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  with	  
other	   nations”. 44 	  Fortunately,	   French,	   German	   and	   British	   philosophers	   like	  
Montaigne,	   St	   Thomas	   Aquinas,	   Kant,	   Smith	   and	   Diderot 45 	  also	   refused	   to	  
embrace	   colonial	   discriminatory	   ideology	   and	   courageously	   questioned	   the	  
widespread	   moral	   values	   dictated	   by	   Eurocentrism. 46 	  In	   doing	   so,	   these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Hugo	   Grotius	   The	   Freedom	   of	   the	   Seas	   (Betoche	   Books,	   Kitchener,	   2000)	   at	   15	   electronic	   document	  
<http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/grotius/Seas.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  12/09/2011.	  
41	  Supra	  at	  16.	  
42	  Supra	  at	  7-­‐8.	  
43	  See	  Anthony	  J	  Connolly	  Indigenous	  Rights	  at	  602	  
44	  “Samuel	  Pufendorf,	  a	  contemporary	  of	  Grotius,	  criticized	  both	  Grotius	  and	  Vitoria	  in	  his	  renowned	  work,	  
De	   Jure	  Naturae	   et	  Gentium.	   The	   Indians,	   Pufendorf	   argued,	  were	  under	   no	  obligation	   to	   receive	   visiting	  
foreigners,	   as	   was	   the	   case	   with	   other	   nations.	   As	   the	   "property	   holders,"	   the	   Indians	   had	   the	   right	   to	  
consider	  and	  determine	  the	  purpose	  and	  length	  of	  the	  visit,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  number	  of	  visitors.	  Even	  when	  the	  
Indians	  granted	  the	  visitors	  certain	  trade	  and	  commercial	  privileges,	  they	  also	  had	  the	  right	  to	  revoke	  such	  
privileges.	   It	  was	  untenable	   to	   suggest,	   Pufendorf	   argued,	   that	   the	   Indians	  were	   forced	   to	  welcome	   such	  
visitors,	  especially	  when	  to	  do	  so	  would	  be	  at	  their	  own	  peril”	  see	  The	  Justice	  System	  and	  Aboriginal	  People,	  
The	   Aboriginal	   Justice	   Implementation	   Commission	   electronic	   document	  
<www.ajic.mb.ca/volumel/chapter5.html#4>	  last	  visited	  on	  19/04/2012.	  
45	  See	  Biographies	  at	  the	  Internet	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  <www.iep.utm.edu/>.	  
46	  “Eurocentrism	  is	  the	  doctrine	  ‘focusing	  on	  European	  culture	  or	  history	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  a	  wider	  view	  of	  
the	   world;	   implicitly	   regarding	   European	   culture	   as	   pre-­‐eminent”	   see	   Oxford	   Dictionary	   at	  
<www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/Eurocentric>	   last	   visited	   on	   11/12/2014;	   for	   further	  




philosophers	  looked	  at	  the	  ‘savage	  man’	  and	  saw	  in	  him	  the	  keeper	  of	  what	  was	  
left	  on	  earth	  of	  man’s	  integrity.	  As	  such,	  they	  were	  very	  critical	  of	  the	  barbarity	  
of	   colonialism	   and	   challenged	   the	   idea	   that	   “Europeans	   had	   the	   obligation	   to	  
‘civilize’	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   world”.47	  In	   Diderot’s	   mind	   (1713	   -­‐	   1784),	   indigenous	  
peoples	  had	  not	  much	  to	  benefit	  from	  European	  civilization	  apart	  from	  extreme	  
brutality	  and	  discrimination.	  Diderot	  challenged	  the	  motives	  behind	  colonization,	  
especially	  the	  right	  to	  commerce	  as	  discussed	  by	  de	  Vitoria	  in	  his	  writings.	  In	  fact,	  
Diderot	  was	  against	  the	  idea	  (approved	  by	  de	  Vitoria)	  that	  it	  was	  fair	  to	  resort	  to	  
war	   and	   conquer	   indigenous	   territories	   in	   those	   cases	   when	   native	   peoples	  
resisted	  the	   incursions	  Spanish	  made	   in	  the	  name	  of	   trade	  and	  commerce.	  Not	  
only	  did	  Diderot	  believe	  it	  was	  morally	  wrong	  to	  use	  commerce	  as	  an	  argument	  
to	  justify	  violence	  and	  exploitation,	  he	  also	  considered	  the	  new	  traders	  as	  violent	  
and	  dangerous	  guests.48	  The	  work	  of	  enlightenment	  anti-­‐imperialists	  like	  Diderot	  
and	  Kant	  already	  presented	  the	  tension	  between	  universalistic	  concepts,	  such	  as	  
international	   human	   rights	   and	   the	   reality	   of	   societies	   which	   are	   based	   on	  
multiculturalism.	   They	   recognised	   that	   even	   the	   most	   savage	   societies	   of	   the	  
world	  shared	  the	  desire	  to	  create	  workable	  rules	  that	  would	  make	  their	  lives	  to	  
flourish	  without	  creating	  more	  injustices	  and	  cruelties.49	  
A	   contemporary	   of	   Diderot,	   J	   J	   Rousseau	   (1712-­‐1778) 50 	  believed	   that	   the	  
“‘natural	  man’	  was	  free	  and	  connected	  to	  nature	  to	  a	  degree	  that	  was	  lost	  in	  the	  
‘civil	  society’”.	  Rousseau51	  believed	  that	  the	  human	  race	  was	  meant	  to	  remain	  in	  
the	  state	  of	  nature	  always;	  he	  thought	  that	  this	  state	  was	  the	  true	  ‘youth’	  of	  the	  
world,	  and	  that	  “all	  subsequent	  progress	  has	  been	  so	  many	  steps	  in	  appearance	  
towards	  the	  improvement	  of	  the	  individual,	  but	  so	  many	  steps	  in	  reality	  towards	  
the	  decrepitude	  of	  the	  species”.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
University	  Press,	  New	  York,	   2012);	   see	  Ella	   Shohat	   and	  Robert	   Stam	  Unthinking	  Eurocentrism	   (Routledge,	  
London	  and	  New	  York,	  1994).	  
47	  See	  M	  Kohn	  “Colonialism”	  (2006).	  
48	  Denis	  Diderot	  Histoire	  des	  Deux	  Indes	  (Editions	  la	  Bibliothèque	  Digitale,	  2013).	  
49	  “The	  struggle	  that	  all	  societies	  face	  to	  survive,	  adapt	  and	  develop	  is	  the	  common	  feature	  among	  humans	  
that	   forms	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   cross-­‐cultural	   moral	   understanding,	   one	   that	   Diderot	   contends	   European	  
imperialists	  routinely	  violate”	  see	  Sankar	  Muthu	  Enlightenment	  Against	  Empire	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  
Princeton,	  2003)	  at	  77;	  see	  also	  Julie	  K	  Ward	  and	  Tommy	  L	  Lott	  (eds)	  Philosophers	  on	  Race:	  Critical	  Essays	  
(Blackwell,	  Malden,	  2002).	  	  
50	  See	  Biography	  at	  <www.iep.utm.edu/rousseau/>	  last	  visited	  on	  02/03/2016	  




Rousseau	  personally	  met	  some	  American	  Indians	  who	  visited	  Europe	  in	  the	  18th	  
century.	   These	   encounters	   convinced	   him	   of	   their	   uncorrupted	   rationality	   and	  
goodness;	  something	  he	  considered	  missing	  in	  the	  ‘modern’	  social	  order.	  In	  the	  
18th	  century,	  indigenous	  peoples	  were,	  in	  fact,	  often	  regarded	  as	  the	  holders	  of	  a	  
primordial	   mind	   whose	   symbology	   and	   cosmology	   were	   still	   buried	   in	   the	  
unconscious	  mind	  of	  the	  modern	  man.	  In	  expressing	  his	  sympathy	  for	  indigenous	  
diversity,	   Rousseau	   automatically	   questioned	   the	   thought	   of	   philosophers	   like	  
Hobbes,	   Grotius,	   Pufendorf,	   Mill,	   Locke 52 	  who	   believed	   otherwise.	   He	  
encouraged	   them	   to	   examine	   the	   foundations	  of	  modern	   society	   in	   depth	   and	  
understand	  what	  ‘the	  state	  of	  nature’	  was	  before	  lightly	  philosophizing	  about	  it.	  
For	  Rousseau,	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  is	  something	  we	  all	  possess.	  It	  is	  where	  we	  all	  
come	  from.53	  	  
In	   his	   discussion	   of	   the	   state	   of	   nature,	   Thomas	   Hobbes	   (1588-­‐1679)54	  had	  
distinguished	   a	   ‘jus	   naturale’	   –	   a	   right	   of	   nature	   –	   that	   is	   an	   instinctual	   force	  
present	  in	  all	  men,	  from	  a	  ‘state	  of	  war’	  sometimes	  dormant	  (as	  in	  civil	  societies,	  
except	   when	   they	   engage	   in	   civil	   wars	   and	   external	   wars),	   which	   is	   brutally	  
awakened	  among	  savage	  people.	  In	  his	  discourse,	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  starts	  from	  
indigenous	   peoples	   as	   an	   obvious	   antithesis	   of	   civil	   societies. 55 	  Hobbes’	  
distinction	  between	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  and	  civil	  societies	  was	  unfortunately	  the	  
“starting	   point	   in	   any	   Eurocentric	   discussions	   of	   government	   and	   politics”,56	  as	  
well	   as	   the	   moral	   and	   legal	   justification	   for	   all	   the	   practices	   employed	   by	  
European	   colonizers	  with	   indigenous	  peoples.	  He	  did	   not	   see	   that	   the	   state	  of	  
nature	  presented	  hierarchical	  structure	  and	  societal	  order	  of	  a	  different	  kind	  that	  
reflected	   the	   needs	   and	   traditions	   of	   people	   who	   lived	   according	   to	   different	  
customs.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  Charles	  W	  Hendel	  Jean-­‐Jacques	  Rousseau:	  Moralist	  (The	  Hobbs-­‐Merrill	  Company	  Inc,	  New	  York,	  1934)	  at	  
64.	  
53	  Jean-­‐Jacques	  Rousseau	  Discourse	  on	  Inequality	  (Penguin,	  London,	  1984)	  at	  78.	  
54	  See	   Biography	   and	   moral	   and	   philosophical	   thought	   at	   <www.iep.utm.edu/hobmoral/>	   last	   visited	   on	  
02/03/2016.	  
55	  “The	   liberty	   each	  man	   has	   to	   use	   his	   own	   power,	   as	   he	   will	   himself,	   for	   the	   preservation	   of	   his	   own	  
nature,	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   his	   own	   life;	   and	   consequently,	   of	   doing	   anything	  which	   in	   his	   own	   judgment	   and	  
reason	   he	   shall	   consider	   to	   be	   the	   aptest	  means	   thereto”	   see	   Thomas	  Hobbes	   Leviathan;	   or	   the	  Matter,	  
Forme,	   and	   Power	   of	   a	   Commonwealth	   Ecclesiastical	   and	   Civil,	   (ed)	   CB	   Macpherson	   (Penguin	   Books,	  
Baltimore,	  1968)	  note	  14,	  ch	  12	  at	  246.	  




Closer	   to	   Rousseau’s	   thought,	   John	   Locke	   (1632–1704) 57 	  postulated	   that	  
indigenous	   peoples	   were	   grouped	   in	   nations	   and	   had	   governments	   that	   were	  
coherent	  with	   their	   traditions.	   Indigenous	  peoples	  had	   remained	   indifferent	   to	  
European	   political	   and	   social	   structures,	   for	   the	   simple	   reason	   that	   such	  
structures	   could	   not	   be	   artificially	   implanted	   into	   societies	   that	   had	   not	  
originated	  them.	  In	  other	  words,	  millennia	  of	  traditions	  could	  not	  be	  substituted	  
overnight	   just	   because	   colonial	   powers	  wished	   so.58	  Locke	  was	  one	  of	   the	   first	  
who	   recognised	   the	   legal	   personality	   of	   indigenous	   peoples.	   On	   this	   basis,	   he	  
encouraged	   European	   settlers	   to	   build	   consensual	   relationships	   with	   native	  
communities	  in	  the	  form	  of	  treaties	  and	  commercial	  agreements.59	  	  
In	   the	   17th	   century,	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   state	   of	   nature	   was	   common	   to	   all	  
humankind	  as	  a	  place	  where	  life	  started	  for	  everyone	  was	  not	  new	  in	  philosophy.	  
Back	  in	  the	  5th	  century	  BC,	  Plato	  (428/27BC-­‐348/47BC)	  in	  his	  Dialogues	  suggested	  
that	   a	   close	   study	   of	   the	   ‘state	   of	   nature’	   would	   be	   enlightening	   for	   all	  
humankind,	  because	  it	  would	  show	  the	  fundamental	  nature	  of	  individuals,	  their	  
beliefs	   and	   how	   race	   departed	   from	   its	   original	   type,	   diversifying	   itself	   into	  
former	  civilizations.60	  	  
There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  philosophers	  who	  argued	  in	  favour	  
of	   the	   ‘state	  of	  nature’	  were	  ethically	  and	  morally	   fair.	  However,	   in	  all	  of	   their	  
writings	  there	  is	  a	  subtle	  sense	  of	  rejection.	  As	  if	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  is	  something	  
dangerous	  from	  which	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  take	  distance,	  as	  it	  is	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  
instincts,	   spiritual	   rapture	   and	   the	   freedom	   of	   the	   senses.	   The	   Christianised	  
people	  could	  not	  conceive	  and	  embrace	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  pagan	  ones.	  The	  very	  
existence	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  was	  a	  reminder	  of	  how	  life	  began,	  and	  this	  was	  
not	  allowed	  for	  societies	  that	  evolved	  under	  the	  Christian	  belief.61	  Consequently,	  
any	   attempted	   description	   to	   define	   and	   defend	   the	   ‘savage	   man’	   remained	  
largely	   theoretical	   and	   aspirational;	   while	   no	   real	   attempt	   or	   desire	   to	  
comprehend	  indigenous	  peoples’	  lives	  and	  traditions	  was	  ever	  made	  in	  the	  fear	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  See	  Biography	  at	  <www.iep.utm.edu/locke/>	  last	  visited	  on	  02/03/2016.	  
58	  For	  further	  readings	  on	  the	  subject	  see	  John	  Locke	  Two	  Treaties	  of	  Government,	  P	  Laslet	  (ed)	  (Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  1970).	  
59	  Supra.	  
60	  Plato	  Republic	  (Macmillan	  &	  Co,	  London,	  1910).	  
61	  For	   further	  reading	  on	  the	  subject	  see	  Monica	  Sjoo	  and	  Barbara	  Mor	  The	  Great	  Cosmic	  Mother;	   Joseph	  
Campbell	  The	  Hero	  with	  a	  Thousand	  Faces	  (3rd	  ed,	  New	  World	  Library,	  2012);	  Mircea	  Eliade	  The	  Sacred	  and	  




that	  such	  a	  study	  would	  reveal	  something	  profoundly	  repressed	  in	  the	  ‘modern	  
man’.	   Moral,	   political	   and	   religious	   repression	   became	   the	   new	   credo	   against	  
anything	  that	  could	  undermine	  Western	  thought;	  and	  Eurocentrism	  became	  the	  
new	   philosophy	   of	   European	   empires.	   Under	   Eurocentric	   morality,	   indigenous	  
peoples	  became	  wild,	   rootless,	  property-­‐less	  and	   lawless.62	  This	  was	  a	  problem	  
which	  needed	  either	  reform	  or	  repression:	  or	  a	  repressed	  reform.	   Indeed,	  such	  
strategy	  did	  not	  come	  without	  costs;	   from	  a	  reality	  of	  religious	  and	  democratic	  
privilege,	   Europeans	  needed	   to	  dehumanize	   indigenous	  peoples	   to	   justify	   their	  
racist	  aggression	  and	  moral	  repression.	  	  
This	   moral	   strategy	   is	   not	   new	   in	   the	   history	   of	   humankind.	   Already	   during	  
Medieval	  times,	  the	  secular	  power	  (that	  created	  the	  Inquisition	  for	  the	  purpose)	  
engaged	  in	  a	  campaign	  of	  power	  through	  repression	  and	  in	  four	  centuries	  killed,	  
burned	  and	  wiped	  out	  nearly	  eight	  millions	  of	  ‘infidels’,	  including	  elders,	  women	  
and	  children	  whose	  only	  crime	  was	  to	  hold	  true	  to	  the	  religion	  of	  the	  Earth	  and	  
its	   traditions.63	  Indeed,	   indigenous	   peoples	  were	   representing	   ethnic	   groups	   of	  
people	  who	  were	  indulging	  in	  the	  religion	  of	  the	  earth	  and	  had	  different	  spiritual	  
creeds.	   As	   already	   happened	   before,	   in	   the	   16th	   century,	   the	   great	   design	   to	  
‘export’	   civilization	   therefore	   resulted	   in	   four	   hundred	   years	   of	   colonialism	  
around	   the	   Earth,	   which	   is	   today	   rightly	   considered	   ‘a	   process	   of	   conscious	  
choice	   supported	   by	   manipulated	   facts’	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   colonizers	   who	  
invented	   demons,	   where	   none	   actually	   existed,	   to	   justify	   atrocious	   acts.64	  As	  
Marie	   Battiste	   explains,65	  those	   “400	   years	   have	   had	   tragic	   consequences	   for	  
Indigenous	   peoples.	   The	   consequences	   are	   more	   than	   mere	   conquest	   or	   the	  
exercise	   of	   tyrannical	   power,	   slavery,	   and	   genocide;	   they	   go	   to	   the	   forced	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  “The	   secular	   European	  worldview	   affixes	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   race	   three	   correlates,	  which	   together	   underlie	  
racism.	   (1)	  differences	  based	  on	  race	  are	   fundamental,	   intractable,	  and	  utteringly	   indicative	  of	  superiority	  
and	  inferiority;	  (2)	  these	  differences	  exclude	  brown	  people	  from	  the	  domain	  of	  knowing,	  reason,	  equality,	  
and	  freedom	  …;	  and	  (3)	  through	  taking	  identity	  against	  construction	  of	  ‘Indians’,	  Europeans	  and	  colonialists	  
become	  bound	  in	  their	  own	  being	  by	  the	  terms	  by	  which	  they	  oppress	  others’.	  Point	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  see	  Jean-­‐
Jacques	   Rousseau	   The	   Social	   Contract	   and	   Discourses	   (Dent,	   London,	   1986)	   at	   186;	   Douglas	   B	   Davis	   The	  
Problem	  of	  Slavery	   in	  Western	  Culture	   (Cornell	  University	  Press,	   Ithaca,	  1966)	  at	  114-­‐15;	   John	  Locke	  “The	  
Second	  Treatise	  of	  Government”	  in	  Two	  Treatises	  of	  Government,	  Peter	  Laslett	  (ed)	  (Cambridge	  University	  
Press,	  Cambridge,	  1970)	  at	  325-­‐26;	  for	  point	  (3)	  see	  Georg	  Wilhelm	  Friedrich	  Hegel	  Phenomenology	  of	  Spirit	  
(Clarendon	  Press,	  Oxford,	  1977)	  at	  19.	  
63	  See	  Monica	   Sjoo	   and	   Barbara	  Mor	   The	   Great	   Cosmic	  Mother;	   Michael	   Baigent	   and	   Richard	   Leigh	   The	  
Inquisition	  (Penguin,	  London,	  2000).	  
64	  Marie	  Battiste	  (1986)	  “Micmac	  Literacy	  and	  Cognitive	  Assimilation”	  in	  J	  Barman,	  Y	  Hébert	  and	  D	  McCaskill	  
(eds)	  Indian	  Education	  in	  Canada:	  The	  Legacy	  (UBC	  Press,	  Vancouver,	  1986);	  Lise	  Noel	  Intolerance:	  A	  General	  
Survey	  (McGill-­‐Queen’s	  University	  Press,	  Montreal,	  1994)	  at	  100.	  




cognitive	  extinction”.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  colonization,	  a	  historical	  record	  of	  the	  facts	  is	  
not	  enough	  to	  explain	  the	  consequences	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  still	  facing	  
today.	  The	  scars	  of	  such	  programmed	  dominion	  –	  like	  any	  other	  forced	  dominion	  
–	  is	  enormous.	  Referring	  to	  Canadian	  Aboriginal	  people,	  Leroy	  Little	  Bear,	  affirms	  
that:66	  
	  
…	   colonization	   created	   a	   fragmentary	   worldview	   ….	   By	   force,	   terror,	   and	  
educational	   policy,	   [colonization]	   attempted	   to	   destroy	   the	   Aboriginal	  
worldview.	  …	  They	  no	  longer	  had	  an	  Aboriginal	  worldview,	  nor	  did	  they	  adopt	  a	  
Eurocentric	  worldview.	   Their	   consciousness	   became	   a	   random	  puzzle,	   a	   jigsaw	  
puzzle	  that	  each	  person	  has	  to	  attempt	  to	  understand.	  	  
	  
Similar	   words	   are	   used	   by	   Erica-­‐Irene	   Daes, 67 	  Chair	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	  
Working	  Group	  on	   Indigenous	  Populations	  between	  1984–2001.	   In	  her	  brilliant	  
Prologue	  to	  Battiste’s	  book,	  Reclaiming	  Indigenous	  Voice	  and	  Vision,	  she	  gives	  an	  
accurate	   account	   of	   the	   shared	   traumatic	   effects	   that	   colonialism	   had	   on	  
indigenous	  peoples	  worldwide:68	  
	  
The	  experience	  of	  oppression	  is	  spiritual	  death.	  It	  is	  about	  the	  destruction	  of	  our	  
inborn	   spiritual	   faith	   in	   the	   importance	   of	   individuality	   and	   …	   in	   the	   value	   of	  
trying	   to	   stay	   alive.	   Victims	   of	   oppression	   not	   only	   lose	   interest	   in	   self-­‐
preservation,	  but	  also	  find	   it	  difficult	  to	  maintain	  their	  relationships	  as	  parents,	  
friends,	   and	   neighbours.	   …	   Isolation	   is	   an	   important	   tool,	   and	   a	   devastating	  
result,	  of	   colonization.	  A	   fundamental	  weapon	  used	  by	  most	  colonizers	  against	  
colonized	   peoples	   is	   to	   isolate	   the	   colonized	   from	   all	   outside	   sources	   of	  
information	   and	   knowledge	   –	   and	   then	   to	   bombard	   them	   with	   propaganda	  
carefully	   aimed	   at	   convincing	   them	   that	   they	   are	   backward,	   ignorant,	   weak,	  
insignificant,	   and	   very,	   very	   fortunate	   to	   have	   been	   colonized.	   This	   strategy	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  Leroy	  Little	  Bear	  “Jagged	  Worldviews	  Colliding”	  in	  Marie	  Battiste	  Reclaiming	  Indigenous	  Voice	  and	  Vision	  
(UBC	  Press,	  Vancouver,	  2000)	  at	  84.	  
67	  Professor	  Dr	  Erica-­‐Irene	  Daes	   is	  an	  academic,	  diplomat,	  and	  United	  Nations	  expert.	  She	   is	   the	   founding	  
Chairperson	   and	   Special	   Rapporteur	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   Working	   Group	   on	   Indigenous	   Populations	  
(1984–2001),	  during	  which	  time	  she	  promoted	  the	  cause	  of	   the	  world's	   indigenous	  peoples	  and	  authored	  
many	   United	   Nations	   reports	   on	   Indigenous	   rights	   issues.	   She	   also	   served	   as	   a	   member	   of	   the	   United	  
Nations	  Subcommission	  on	  the	  Promotion	  and	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  and	  was	  a	  driving	  force	  behind	  
the	  negotiations	  and	  creation	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples.	  	  




colonialism	   is	   designed	   to	   break	   down	   any	   resistance	   by	   persuading	   the	  
colonized	  people	  that	  not	  only	  are	  they	  powerless	  to	  resist,	  but	  they	  would	  also	  
be	  naïve	  to	  attempt	  to	  do	  so.	  It	  aims	  to	  inculcate	  the	  colonized	  people	  with	  the	  
idea	   that	   they	   are	   out	   of	   step	   with	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   world;	   that	   they	   have	   no	  
friends;	  and	  that	  their	  feelings	  of	  resentment	  and	  resistance	  are	  foolish	  and,	  far	  
from	  being	  justified,	  simply	  prove	  just	  how	  savage	  and	  ignorant	  they	  must	  be.	  …	  
one	   of	   the	   most	   destructive	   of	   the	   shared	   personal	   experiences	   of	   colonized	  
peoples	   around	   the	   world	   is	   intellectual	   and	   spiritual	   loneliness.	   From	   this	  
loneliness	   comes	   a	   lack	   of	   self-­‐confidence,	   a	   fear	   of	   action,	   and	   a	   tendency	   to	  
believe	  that	  the	  ravages	  and	  pain	  of	  colonization	  are	  somehow	  deserved.	  Thus,	  
the	  victims	  of	  colonization	  begin,	  in	  certain	  cases,	  to	  blame	  themselves	  for	  all	  the	  
pain	  that	  they	  have	  suffered.	  
	  
Undoubtedly,	   such	   repressive	   practices	   were	   not	   new	   to	   human	   thought.	  
Repression	  and	  destruction	  are	  the	  best	  strategies	  to	  erase	  difference.	  No	  later	  
than	   the	   17th	   and	   18th	   centuries,	   thinkers	   of	   the	   Enlightenment	   movement	  
(1650s-­‐1776),	  such	  as	  Hegel,	  Hume,	  Descartes,69	  etc,	  had	  already	  decided	  to	  cut	  
indigenous	  peoples	  out	  of	  the	  evolutionary	  process.	  They	  discredited	  indigenous	  
peoples	   on	   the	   sole	   basis	   of	   their	   primitiveness	   and	  mental	   inferiority,	   which,	  
according	   to	   them,	   lacked	   any	   awareness	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   human	   freedom.	  
Later	   in	   the	  19th	   century,	   in	  his	   study	  on	  nature	  and	  evolution,	  Darwin	  himself	  
regarded	   indigenous	   peoples	   as	   inferior.	   In	   his	   Descent	   of	   Man	   (1871)70	  he	  
strongly	  asserted	  that	   the	  gulf	  between	  savages	  and	  civilized	  humans	   is	  almost	  
unbridgeable.	  From	  this	  obvious	  assumption,	  he	  believed	  that	  primitive	  societies	  
were	  destined	  to	  disappear	  from	  the	  face	  of	  the	  earth	  as	  the	  natural	  course	  of	  
any	   evolutionary	   process.	   They	   would	   be	   substituted	   by	   people	   fitter	   and	  
stronger.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  See	  Biographies	  at	  the	  Internet	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  <www.iep.utm.edu/>.	  
70	  “He	  who	  has	  seen	  a	  savage	  in	  his	  native	  land	  will	  not	  feel	  much	  shame	  if	  forced	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  
blood	   of	   some	   more	   humble	   creature	   flows	   in	   his	   veins”	   see	   Charles	   Darwin	   The	   Descent	   of	   Man	  




At	   some	   future	  period,	  not	  very	  distant	  as	  measured	  by	  centuries,	   the	  civilized	  
races	   of	   man	   will	   almost	   certainly	   exterminate,	   and	   replace	   the	   savage	   races	  
throughout	  the	  world.71	  
	  
It	   is	   interesting	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  Enlightenment	  philosophers	  made	  a	  few	  
mistakes	  of	  evaluation.	  They,	  who	  had	  ontologically	  separated	  themselves	  from	  
the	  atavist	  traditions	  of	  the	  world,	  naively	  believed	  they	  could	  comprehend	  the	  
secrets	  of	  nature	  ‘through	  reason	  and	  science’.	  In	  their	  minds	  “the	  laws	  of	  nature	  
governing	  the	  globe	  were	  ‘immutable’	  and	  ‘progressive’	   interpreted	  in	  the	   light	  
of	   a	   presiding	   divine	   design”.72	  Sitting	   on	   the	   bedrock	   of	   their	   self-­‐asserted	  
superiority,	  Western	  philosophers,	  religious	  and	  political	  leaders	  left	  no	  space	  for	  
anything	  that	  could	  be	  understood	  and	  conceived	  by	  a	  non-­‐Western	  intellect.	  In	  
his	   book,	  On	   the	   Origin	   of	   the	   Species	   by	   Means	   of	   Natural	   Selection,	   or	   the	  
Preservation	  of	   Favoured	  Races	   in	   the	  Struggle	   for	   Life,	  Darwin	  postulated	   that	  
only	   the	   fittest	   organisms	   in	   the	   struggle	   for	   survival	   are	   able	   to	   prevail	   long	  
enough	   to	   pass	   their	   superior	   traits	   to	   future	   generations	   and,	   in	   so	   doing,	  
guarantee	  the	  survival	  of	  that	  species.	  This	  nihilistic	  belief,	  today	  known	  as	  Social	  
Darwinism,73	  found	  many	  followers	  such	  as	  Herbert	  Spencer,	  Joseph	  A	  Gabineau,	  
John	  W	  Burgess	  and	  Theodore	  Roosevelt	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  The	  philosophy	  of	  social	  
Darwinism	   was	   used	   to	   encourage	   racial	   discrimination,	   and	   also	   to	   justify	   all	  
different	   inequitable	   socioeconomic	   relationships74	  existing	   in	   society.	   The	   idea	  
was	   that	   from	   an	   evolutionary	   and	   ontological	   point	   of	   view,	   the	   rich	   and	  
wealthy	  are	  indeed	  different	  from	  the	  poor.	  Power,	  science	  and	  religion	  say	  so,	  
so	   it	   must	   be	   true.	   Consequently,	   the	   philosophical	   credo	   behind	   Social	  
Darwinism	  promoted	  and	  justified	  imperial	  expansion	  and	  brutal	  colonization	  as	  
reflective	   of	   models	   of	   Natural	   Law.	   Eurocentric	   models	   regarded	   European	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  Supra	  at	  167-­‐168.	  
72	  Susan	  Greenwood	  The	  Nature	  of	  Magic	  –	  An	  Anthropology	  of	  Consciousness	  (Berg,	  New	  York,	  2005)	  at	  41.	  
73	  “Social	   Darwinism,	  the	   theory	   that	   persons,	   groups,	   and	   races	   are	   subject	   to	   the	   same	   laws	   of	  natural	  
selection	  as	  Charles	  Darwin	  had	  perceived	   in	  plants	  and	  animals	   in	  nature.	  According	  to	  the	  theory,	  which	  
was	   popular	   in	   the	   late	   19th	   and	   early	   20th	   centuries,	   the	   weak	   were	   diminished	   and	   their	   cultures	  
delimited,	  while	   the	  strong	  grew	   in	  power	  and	   in	  cultural	   influence	  over	   the	  weak.	  Social	  Darwinists	  held	  
that	   the	   life	   of	   humans	   in	  society	  was	   a	  struggle	   for	   existence	  ruled	   by	   ‘survival	   of	   the	   fittest’,	   a	   phrase	  
proposed	   by	   the	   British	   philosopher	   and	   scientist	  Herbert	   Spencer”	   see	   electronic	   document	   at	  
<www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/551058/social-­‐Darwinism>	  last	  visited	  on	  11/12/2014.	  
74	  For	  further	  details	  see	  Anthony	  J	  Hall	  Earth	   Into	  Property	  –	  Colonization,	  Decolonization,	  and	  Capitalism	  




settlers	  as	  the	  strongest	  and	  fittest	  of	  the	  species	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  only	  ones	  
that	  were	  rightly	  entitled	  to	  reign	  over	  the	  world.	  The	  fact	  that	  such	  superiority	  
was	  not	  necessarily	  based	  on	  moral,	  scientific	  and	  realistic	  rationales,	  but	  on	  the	  
sole	   superiority	   of	   modern	   weaponry	   engineering,	   was	   dismissed	   or	   ignored.	  
Darwin	  celebrated	  the	  importance	  of	  circumstances	  to	  define	  and	  decide	  who	  is	  
to	  survive	  in	  an	  unwelcoming	  world.	  He	  judged	  human	  strength	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
how	  everyone	  copes	  and	  reacts	  to	  every	  circumstance.	  However,	  as	  pointed	  out	  
by	   Nietzsche,75	  “the	   influence	   of	   ‘external	   circumstances’	   is	   overestimated	   by	  
Darwin	  to	  a	  ridiculous	  extent:	   the	  essential	   thing	   in	   the	   life	  process	   is	  precisely	  
the	  tremendous	  shaping,	  form-­‐creating	  force	  working	  from	  within	  which	  utilizes	  
and	  exploits	  ‘external	  circumstances’”.	  
On	   the	   opposite	   side	   of	   the	   spectrum	   of	   the	   study	   on	   evolution,	   the	  
anthropologist	   Claude	   Levi-­‐Strauss	   (1908-­‐2009)76,	   today	   rightly	   considered	   the	  
father	  of	  modern	  anthropology,	  argued	  that	  the	  mind	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  had	  
the	   same	   structure	   as	   the	   one	   of	   the	   so	   called	   ‘civilized	   men’,	   and	   that	   the	  
human	   characteristics	   of	   ‘primitive’	   societies	   are	   the	   same	   as	   those	   found	   in	  
Western	   societies.77	  On	   the	   same	   note,	   Franz	   Boas,78	  who	   is	   considered	   the	  
‘father	  of	  relativism’,	  firmly	  rejected	  any	  Eurocentric	  theory	  based	  on	  superiority,	  
and	  stressed	  that	  no	  researcher	  should	  project	  his/her	  Western	  values	  into	  any	  
study	  on	  culture.79	  Every	  culture,	  in	  fact,	  should	  be	  understood	  and	  described	  in	  
its	   own	   idiosyncratic	   terms	   and	   language,	   regardless	   of	   its	   complexity80 	  or	  
pretended	   righteousness.	   Culture,	   as	   such,	   is	   a	   very	   complex	   phenomena	   that	  
cannot	   be	   reduced	   or	   circumscribed	   to	   the	   ontological	   beliefs	   of	   the	   few,	   no	  
matter	  how	  righteous	  these	  few	  believe	  themselves	  to	  be.	  
	  
Indeed,	  as	  often	  happens	  in	  human	  history	  in	  arguments	  of	  any	  kind,	  the	  winning	  
theory	   is	   the	   one	   that	   better	   suits	   the	   élite	   in	   power.	   In	   total	   coherence	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Friederich	  Nietzsche	  The	  Will	  To	  Power	  (Random	  House,	  New	  York,	  1967)	  at	  344.	  
76	  See	  Biography	  at	  <www.britannica.com/biography/Claude-­‐Levi-­‐Strauss>	  last	  visited	  on	  02/03/2016.	  
77	  For	   further	   information	   on	   the	   topic	   see	   Claude	   Levi-­‐Strauss	   Tristes	   Tropiques	   (Jonathan	   Cape	   Ltd,	  
London,	  1973).	  
78	  See	  Biography	  at	  <www.biography.com/people/franz-­‐boas-­‐9216786>	  last	  visited	  on	  02/03/2016.	  
79	  See	   Franz	   Boas	   Race	   Language	   and	   Culture	   (The	   Free	   Press,	   New	   York,	   1940),	   and	   Anthropology	   and	  
Modern	  Life	  (The	  Norton	  Library	  &	  Co,	  New	  York,	  1962).	  





such	  manmade	  phenomena,	  the	  ‘good	  intentions’	  of	  researchers	  like	  Levi-­‐Strauss	  
and	   Boas,	   who	   stressed	   the	   uniqueness	   of	   the	   cultural	   and	   spiritual	   value	   of	  
native	  peoples,	  remained	  strategically	  outside	  any	  discourse	  on	  equality;	  where	  
‘equality’	  was	  obviously	  understood	   in	  Western	   terms.	   It	   is	  not	   surprising	   that,	  
until	  recently,	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  been	  stigmatised	  as	  alien	  entities	  whose	  
survival	   was	   not	   a	   matter	   of	   concern	   for	   developed	   societies.	   In	   this	   light,	  
indigenous	   communities	   were	   recognised	   as	   possessing	   no	   human	   and	  
proprietary	   rights	   over	   their	   land,	   traditions	   and	   cultural	   heritage.	   In	   their	  
incessant	  hunt	  for	  new	  lands	  and	  resources	  to	  exploit,	  states	  created	  legislation	  
that	  would	   justify	   the	  expropriation	  of	   the	   territories	   traditionally	   inhabited	  by	  
indigenous	   peoples.	   This	   happened	   regardless	   of	   any	   pre-­‐existing	   native	   title	  
over	  the	  land	  acknowledged	  during	  the	  ratification	  of	  treaties	  and	  agreements.	  
It	  was	  only	  in	  the	  19th	  century,	  and	  following	  the	  growth	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  
Canada	   of	   national	   and	   international	   organizations	   for	   the	   protection	   of	  
indigenous	   peoples’	   land	   rights,	   that	   the	   legal	   notion	   of	   ‘Aboriginal	   title’	   was	  
finally	   discussed.	  While	   such	   discussions	   acknowledged	   that	   exclusive	   use	   and	  
occupancy	  of	   land	   from	  time	   immemorial	  de	   facto	  gives	   rise	   to	  aboriginal	   title,	  
on	   the	   other	   hand,	   such	   title,	   in	   importance,	   will	   always	   be	   outplayed	   by	   the	  
Sovereignty	   of	   the	   State.	   The	   issues	   surrounding	   aboriginal	   title	   are	   the	  
consequences	   of	   the	   illicit	   assumption	   that,	   over	   the	   years,	   States,	   when	  
arbitrarily	   deemed	   necessary,	   can	   use	   their	   power	   to	   extinguish	   such	   title	   and	  
enforce	  their	  power	  to	  remove	  indigenous	  peoples	  from	  their	  traditional	  lands	  in	  
the	  name	  of	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  state	  (or	  under	  any	  other	  ‘valid’	  excuse).	  Even	  if	  
states	  over	  the	  years	  have	  come	  around,	  and	  established	  legislation	  recognising	  
and	   reaffirming	   aboriginal	   and	   treaty	   rights,	  many	  Courts	   in	   the	  United	   States,	  
Canada	   and	  Australia	   (to	   name	   a	   few)	   have	   decided	   that	   aboriginal	   rights	   and	  
aboriginal	  title	  to	  land	  are	  “not	  absolute	  but	  may	  be	  ‘infringed’	  by	  the	  federal	  or	  
provincial	  governments	  when	  the	  infringement	   is	   ‘justified’	  by	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  
larger	  society”.81	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  See	   Erica-­‐Irene	  Daes	  Prevention	   of	  Discrimination	   and	   Protection	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   and	  Minorities,	  
Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Council,	  (2001)	  UN	  Doc	  




In	   the	  Mabo	   case,82	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia	   finally	  dismissed	   the	  validity	  of	  
the	   doctrine	   of	   terra	   nullius.	   However,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   legitimated	   the	  
extinguishment	  of	  the	  native	  title	  by	  “legislation,	  by	  alienation	  of	  the	  land,	  by	  the	  
Crown	  or	  by	  the	  appropriation	  of	  the	  land	  by	  the	  Crown	  in	  a	  manner	  inconsistent	  
with	  the	  continuation	  of	  native	  title”.83	  	  
The	   Eurocentric	   belief	   that	   indigenous	   rights	   are	   subjected	   to	   the	   State’s	  well-­‐
being	  (on	  the	  basis	  of	  what	  any	  State	  believes	  its	  well-­‐being	  to	  be)	  has	  resulted	  in	  
the	  creation	  of	  legislation	  which,	  inter	  alia,	  legitimize	  the	  expropriation	  of	  native	  
lands	  and	   resources.	  Consequently,	   the	   loss	  of	   the	   indigenous	  culture	   that	  was	  
traditionally	   connected	   to	   the	   lands	   expropriated	   has	   been	   enormous.	  
Unrecorded	   histories	   and	   sacred	   and	   secret	   traditions	   that	   guaranteed	  
indigenous	   survival	   were	   forgotten.84	  And	   yet,	   today,	   after	   years	   of	   constant	  
discrimination,	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  reclaiming	  their	  voices	  and	  their	  place	  in	  
the	  societies	  they	  inhabit.85	  They	  are	  linked	  to	  the	  society	  they	  are	  part	  of	  and,	  at	  
the	   same	   time,	   they	   are	   linked	   together	   with	   other	   indigenous	   groups	   by	   the	  
experience	  of	  similarly	  oppressive	  practices	  that	  European	  colonizers	  performed	  
with	   efficacy	   in	   foreign	   lands;	   and	   these	   very	   practices	   are	   what	   makes	  
indigenous	   peoples	   seek	   workable	   common	   collective	   solutions	   to	   safeguard	  
their	  traditions	  and	  secret	  knowledge.86	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  Mabo	  v	  Queensland	  (No	  2)	  [1992]	  HCA	  23;	  (1992)	  175	  CLR	  1	  (3	  June	  1992).	  
83	  At	  16;	  see	  also	  the	  Native	  Title	  Amendment	  Bill	  1998	  at	  <www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2004A00354>	  last	  
visited	  on	  13/06/2012;	   see	  also	  Ulla	   Secher	  Aboriginal	  Customary	   Law:	  A	  Source	  of	  Common	  Law	  Title	   to	  
Land.	  
84 	  For	   more	   information	   see	   Eugene	   Linden	   “Lost	   Tribes,	   Lost	   Knowledge”	   electronic	   document	  
<www.ciesin.org/docs/002-­‐268/002-­‐268.html>	  last	  visited	  on	  03/02/2012.	  
85	  “Many	  [anthropologists]	  reject	  relativism	  in	  favour	  of	  an	  evolutionary	  analysis	  by	  observing	  that	  societies	  
do	  indeed	  change	  their	  customs	  by	  developing	  more	  humane	  habits	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  growth	  of	  their	  
economic,	   technological,	   and	   scientific	   capabilities.	   They	   emphasize	   the	   common	   denominators	   among	  
cultures,	   suggesting	   that	   it	   is	   proper	   to	   speak	  of	   the	   common	  humanity	   of	   people	   as	   the	  basis	   for	   cross-­‐
cultural	  morality	  and	  ethics	   that	  are	  not	  completely	  culturally	   relative”	  see	  Elizabeth	  M	  Zechenter	  “In	   the	  
Name	  of	  Culture:	  Cultural	  Relativism	  and	  the	  Abuse	  of	  the	  Individual”	  (1997)	  53	  Journal	  of	  Anthropological	  
Research	  319	  at	  326.	  	  
86	  “We	  never	   knew	   that	   indigenous	   people	  were	   so	   global,	   but	  we	   find	   that	  we	   have	   the	   same	   common	  
problems	   and	   the	   same	   kind	   of	   world-­‐view	   in	   most	   cases.	   That’s	   why,	   in	   the	   drafting	   of	   the	   UN	   Draft	  
Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples,	  it	  was	  easy	  for	  indigenous	  people	  to	  come	  to	  agreement	  on	  
what	   our	   rights	   are.	   It’s	   easy	   for	   us	   to	   agree”	   see	   Taiaiake	   Alfred	  Peace,	   Power,	   Righteousness:	   An	  




Hence,	   before	   going	   onto	   exploring	   indigenous	   cultures,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  
introduce	  who	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  today:	  what	  characterize	  and	  unite	  them	  
in	  their	  quest	  to	  see	  their	  cultures	  safeguarded.87	  
	  
1.2	  -­‐	  Who	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  Are	  Today.	  
	  
International	   law	   considers	   indigenous	   peoples	   as	   the	   descendants	   of	   the	  
original	  inhabitants	  of	  those	  territories	  taken	  over	  by	  aliens	  through	  conquest	  or	  
settlement. 88 	  Although	   governments	   still	   struggle	   to	   understand	   and	   codify	  
indigenous	  peoples’	  traditions	  and	  cultures,	  and	  consequently,	  to	  adopt	  the	  legal	  
obligations	  that	  would	  safeguard	  and	  respect	  these	  traditions,	  in	  general	  terms,	  
indigenous	   peoples	   constitute	   distinct	   groups	   of	   people	   united	   by	   common	  
ancestry	   and	   heritage.	   According	   to	   the	   United	   Nations	   Permanent	   Forum	   for	  
Indigenous	  Issues	  (UNPFII):89	  	  
	  
…	  they	  are	  the	  descendants	  of	  those	  who	  inhabited	  a	  country	  or	  a	  geographical	  
region	   at	   the	   time	  when	   people	   of	   different	   cultures	   or	   ethnic	   origins	   arrived.	  
The	   new	   arrivals	   later	   became	   dominant	   through	   conquest,	   occupation,	  
settlement	  or	  other	  means.	  
	  
It	   is	   common	   knowledge	   that	   there	   is	   no	   universally	   accepted	   definition	   of	  
indigenous	  peoples.	  General	  practice	  suggests	  that	  the	  definition	  created	  in	  1986	  
by	   the	   UN	   Special	   Rapporteur	   Martinez	   Cobo	   is	   still	   the	   most	   appropriate,	  
although	  incomplete,	  that	  is	  generally	  used.	  In	  Cobo’s	  words:90	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  For	   further	   reading	   on	   the	   topic,	   see	   also	   the	   excellent	   works	   of	   Professors	   Mick	   Dodson,	   Larissa	  
Behrendt,	  Marcia	  Langton,	  Martin	  Nakata	  and	  Megan	  Davis.	  
88	  Mr	   José	  Martínez	   Cobo	   “Study	   of	   the	   Problem	   of	   Discrimination	   Against	   Indigenous	   Populations:	   Final	  
report”	   E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Add.6	   (UN	   Economic	   and	   Social	   Council,	   June	   1982)	   electronic	   document	  
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/MCS_v_en.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  16/02/2017	  
89	  United	   Nations	   Permanent	   Forum	   on	   indigenous	   Issues	   “Who	   are	   Indigenous	   Peoples?”	   electronic	  
document	   <www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/5session_factsheet1.pdf>	   last	   visited	   on	  
04/12/2014.	  
90	  Cobo’s	  definition	   follows	  as:	   “The	  historical	   continuity	  may	  consist	  of	   the	  continuation	   for	  an	  extended	  
period	  reaching	  into	  the	  present,	  of	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  following	  factors:	  a)	  occupation	  of	  ancestral	  lands	  or	  
at	   least	   of	   part	   of	   them;	   b)	   common	   ancestry	   with	   the	   original	   occupants	   of	   these	   lands;	   c)	   culture	   in	  
general,	   or	   in	   specific	   manifestations	   (such	   as	   religion,	   living	   under	   a	   tribal	   system,	   membership	   of	   an	  
indigenous	  community,	  dress,	  means	  of	   livelihood,	   life-­‐style,	  etc);	  d)	   language	   (whether	  used	   	  as	   the	  only	  
language,	  as	  mother-­‐tongue,	  as	  the	  habitual	  means	  of	  communication	  at	  home	  or	   in	  the	  family,	  or	  as	  the	  
main,	  preferred,	  habitual,	   general	  or	  normal	   language);	  e)	   residence	   in	   certain	  parts	  of	   the	  country,	  or	   in	  





Indigenous	   communities,	   peoples	   and	   nations	   are	   those	   which,	   having	   an	  
historical	  continuity	  with	  pre-­‐invasion	  and	  pre-­‐colonial	  societies	  that	  developed	  
on	   their	   territories,	   consider	   themselves	   distinct	   from	   other	   sectors	   of	   the	  
societies	   now	   prevailing	   in	   those	   territories,	   or	   parts	   of	   them.	   They	   form	   at	  
present	   non-­‐dominant	   sectors	   of	   society	   and	   are	   determined	   to	   preserve,	  
develop	  and	  transmit	  to	  future	  generations	  their	  ancestral	  territories,	  and	  their	  
ethnic	   identity,	   as	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   continued	   existence	   as	   peoples,	   in	  
accordance	  with	  their	  own	  patterns,	  social	  institutions	  and	  legal	  systems.	  	  
	  
According	   to	   Cobo’s	   Report,	   the	   ‘historical	   continuity’	   may	   ‘consist	   of	  
continuation,	   for	   an	   extended	   period	   reaching	   into	   present’;	   where	   ‘historical	  
continuity’	  may	  be	  interpreted	  as:	  
	  
§ occupation	  of	  ancestral	  lands,	  or	  at	  least	  of	  part	  of	  them;	  
§ common	  ancestry	  with	  the	  original	  occupants	  of	  these	  lands;	  
§ culture	   in	   general,	   or	   in	   specific	   manifestations	   (eg	   religion,	   living	   under	  
tribal	  system,	  membership	  of	  an	  indigenous	  community	  etc);	  
§ language;	  and	  
§ residence	  in	  certain	  parts	  of	  the	  country,	  or	  regions	  of	  the	  world.91	  
	  
The	   Report	   stresses	   that	   such	   a	   definition	   is	   man-­‐made	   and,	   for	   real	  
effectiveness,	   indigenous	   peoples	   should	   be	   left	   free	   to	   define	   themselves	   in	  
accordance	  with	  their	  cultural	  traditions;92	  or	  to	  decide	  if	  such	  a	  definition	  is	  fair	  
or	  necessary.	  The	  common	  feature	  that	  clearly	  defines	  indigenous	  peoples	  is	  the	  
historical	   continuity	   they	   have	  with	   the	   pre-­‐invasion	   and	   pre-­‐colonial	   societies	  
that	   developed	   on	   their	   traditional	   territories.	   While	   agreeing	   with	   Cobo	   that	  
there	   is	   still	   ambiguity	   on	   the	  definition	  of	   indigenous	   peoples	   in	   international	  
law,	  the	  late	  Ian	  Brownlie	  emphasised93	  that	  “general	  or	  customary	  international	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Discrimination	   against	   Indigenous	   Populations	   UN	   Doc	   E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4	   at	   para	   379-­‐380	  
electronic	   document	   <www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/MCS_xvii_en.pdf>	   last	   visited	   on	  
06/12/2014.	  
91	  See	  UN	  Doc	  E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4	  at	  para	  378-­‐380.	  
92	  Douglas	   E	   Sanders	   “Indigenous	   Peoples:	   Issues	   of	   Definition”	   (1999)	   8	   International	   Journal	   of	   Cultural	  
Property	  4	  at	  6.	  





law	  does	  not	  prevent	   any	   rules	  or	  principles	   concerning	   indigenous	  peoples	   as	  
such”.	   He	  meant	   that	   international	   law	   is	   relevant	   to	   the	   affairs	   of	   indigenous	  
peoples.	   Human	   rights	   standards	   (including	   the	   principle	   of	   non-­‐discrimination	  
and	  group	  rights)	  apply	  to	  indigenous	  peoples	  too.94	  Brownlie	  stresses	  that,	  even	  
if	  there	  are	  no	  norms	  of	  general	  international	  law	  expressly	  designed	  to	  protect	  
the	   interests	   of	   indigenous	   peoples,	   today	   there	   are	   two	   general	   multilateral	  
Conventions	   and	   one	   Declaration	   dealing	   specifically	   with	   indigenous	   peoples:	  
the	   International	  Labour	  Organization	  Convention	   (ILO)	  No.	  107	  concerning	  the	  
Protection	   and	   Integration	   of	   Indigenous	   and	   other	   Tribal	   Populations	   in	  
Independent	   Countries	   (1957)95	  and	   its	   revised	   version,	   Indigenous	   and	   Tribal	  
Peoples	   Convention	   ILO	   No	   169	   (1989)96	  along	   with	   the	   UN	   Declaration	   on	   the	  
Rights	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   (2007)	   which	   sets	   standards	   that	   apply	   to	   all	  
nations.	  Although	  ILO	  No	  107	  uses	  a	  slightly	  obsolete	  and	  paternalistic	  language,	  
the	   provisions	   of	   Article	   3	   clearly	   state	   the	   necessity	   to	   introduce	   ‘special	  
measures’	  for	  the	  safeguard	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  in	  those	  countries	  where	  the	  
general	   laws	   fail	   to	   guarantee	   the	   enjoyment	   of	   equal	   rights	   of	   indigenous	  
peoples. 97 	  For	   this	   reason,	   in	   1989,	   the	   International	   Labour	   Organization	  
Convention	   No	   169	   accepted	   a	   broader	   historical	   requirement	   for	   indigenous	  
peoples	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  such.	  These	  new	  parameters	  are	  included	  in	  Article	  
1	  (1)	  as:98	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  “This	  follows	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  general	  principle,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  borne	  out	  by	  the	  case-­‐load	  of	  such	  institutions	  
as	   the	   UN	   Human	   Rights	   Committee	   related	   to	   the	   Civil	   and	   Political	   Rights	   Covenant,	   and	   the	   Inter-­‐
American	  Commission	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  …	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  the	  International	  Convention	  on	  the	  Elimination	  
of	  All	  Forms	  of	  Racial	  Discrimination	  provides	  protection	  for	  the	  rights	  of	  indigenous	  peoples”	  see	  supra	  at	  
62.	  
95 	  C	   107	   -­‐	   Indigenous	   and	   Tribal	   Populations	   Convention,	   1957	   (No	  107)	   Convention	   Concerning	   the	  
Protection	   and	   Integration	   of	   Indigenous	   and	   Other	   Tribal	   and	   Semi-­‐Tribal	   Populations	   in	   Independent	  
Countries	  (Entry	  into	  force:	  02	  Jun	  1959)	  	  
<www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C107>	   last	   visited	   on	  
10/07/2015.	  
96	  C	  169	  -­‐	  Indigenous	  and	  Tribal	  Peoples	  Convention,	  1989	  (No	  169)	  Convention	  Concerning	  Indigenous	  and	  
Tribal	   Peoples	   in	   Independent	   Countries	   (Entry	   into	   force:	   05	   Sep	   1991)	  
<www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_ILO_CODE:C169>	   last	  
visited	  on	  10/07/2015.	  
97	  ILO	   No	   107	   Article	   3.1:	   “So	   long	   as	   the	   social,	   economic	   and	   cultural	   conditions	   of	   the	   populations	  
concerned	   prevent	   them	   from	   enjoying	   the	   benefits	   of	   the	   general	   laws	   of	   the	   country	   to	   which	   they	  
belong,	   special	   measures	   shall	   be	   adopted	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   institutions,	   persons,	   property	   and	  
labour	  of	  these	  populations.	  2.	  Care	  shall	  be	  taken	  to	  ensure	  that	  such	  special	  measures	  of	  protection:	  (a)	  
are	  not	  used	  as	  a	  means	  of	  creating	  or	  prolonging	  a	  state	  of	  segregation;	  and	  (b)	  will	  be	  continued	  only	  so	  
long	   as	   there	   is	   need	   for	   special	   protection	   and	   only	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   such	   protection	   is	   necessary.	   3.	  
Enjoyment	  of	  the	  general	  rights	  of	  citizenship,	  without	  discrimination,	  shall	  not	  be	  prejudiced	  in	  any	  way	  by	  
such	  special	  measures	  of	  protection”.	  





(a)	  tribal	  peoples	  in	  independent	  countries	  whose	  social,	  cultural	  and	  economic	  
conditions	   and	   whose	   status	   is	   regulated	   wholly	   or	   partially	   by	   their	   own	  
customs	   or	   traditions	   or	   by	   special	   laws	   or	   regulations;	   (b)	   peoples	   in	  
independent	   countries	   who	   are	   regarded	   as	   indigenous	   on	   account	   of	   their	  
descent	   from	   the	   populations	   which	   inhabited	   the	   country,	   or	   a	   geographical	  
region	  to	  which	  the	  country	  belongs,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  conquest	  or	  colonisation	  or	  
the	   establishment	   of	   present	   state	   boundaries	   and	   who,	   irrespective	   of	   their	  
legal	   status,	   retain	   some	   or	   all	   of	   their	   own	   social	   economic,	   cultural	   and	  
economic	  institutions.	  	  
	  
In	   its	   wording,	   however,	   ILO	   Convention	   169	   played	   unfairly:	   on	   one	   side,	   it	  
referred	   to	   indigenous	   as	   ‘peoples’,	   and	   on	   the	   other,	   as	   suggested	   by	   James	  
Anaya,	  the	  Convention,	  blocked	  under	  the	  spell	  of	  states,	  specifies	  that	  the	  term	  
‘peoples’	   is	   understood	   to	   have	   “no	   implication	   as	   regards	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐
determination	  as	  understood	  in	  international	  law”.99	  The	  ILO’s	  Committee	  added	  
that	   specification	   to	  ensure	   that	  any	   indigenous	  peoples	   claiming	   their	   right	   to	  
self-­‐determination	   could	   not	   point	   to	   ILO	   169	   as	   endorsing	   the	   application	   of	  
common	   article	   1	   of	   the	   International	   Covenant	   on	   Civil	   and	   Political	   Rights	  
(ICCPR,	   1966), 100 	  and	   the	   International	   Covenant	   on	   Economic,	   Social	   and	  
Cultural	   Rights	   (ICESCR,	   1966). 101 	  In	   2007	   the	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	  
Indigenous	  Peoples	  (UNDRIP)102	  rectified	  the	  limitations	  of	  ILO	  107	  and	  169	  and	  
stated	   that	   indigenous	  peoples	  are	  vested	  with	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  James	  Anaya	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  in	  International	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  New	  York,	  2004)	  at	  60.	  
100	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  -­‐	  Adopted	  and	  opened	  for	  signature,	  ratification	  and	  
accession	   by	   General	   Assembly	   resolution	   2200A	   (XXI)	   of	   16	   December	   1966	  entry	   into	   force	   23	   March	  
1976,	   in	   accordance	   with	   Article	   49	   at	   <www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx>	   last	  
visited	  on	  10/07/2015.	  
101	  	  Article	  1:	  “All	  peoples	  have	  the	  right	  of	  self-­‐determination.	  By	  virtue	  of	  that	  right	  they	  freely	  determine	  
their	  political	  status	  and	  freely	  pursue	  their	  economic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  development.	  2.	  All	  peoples	  may,	  
for	  their	  own	  ends,	  freely	  dispose	  of	  their	  natural	  wealth	  and	  resources	  without	  prejudice	  to	  any	  obligations	  
arising	   out	   of	   international	   economic	   co-­‐operation,	   based	   upon	   the	   principle	   of	   mutual	   benefit,	   and	  
international	   law.	   In	   no	   case	  may	   a	   people	   be	   deprived	   of	   its	   own	  means	   of	   subsistence.	   3.	   The	   States	  
Parties	   to	   the	   present	   Covenant,	   including	   those	   having	   responsibility	   for	   the	   administration	   of	  Non-­‐Self-­‐
Governing	  and	  Trust	  Territories,	   shall	  promote	   the	  realization	  of	   the	  right	  of	   self-­‐determination,	  and	  shall	  
respect	  that	  right,	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations”.	  The	  International	  
Covenant	   on	   Economic,	   Social	   and	   Cultural	   Rights	   -­‐	   Adopted	   and	   opened	   for	   signature,	   ratification	   and	  
accession	   by	   General	   Assembly	   resolution	   2200A	   (XXI)	   of	   16	   December	   1966	  entry	   into	   force	   3	   January	  
1976,	  in	  accordance	  with	  article	  27	  at	  
<www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx>	  last	  visited	  on	  10/07/2015.	  
102	  Article	   3:	   “Indigenous	   peoples	   have	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination.	   By	   virtue	   of	   that	   right	   they	   freely	  




which	  includes	  their	  right	  to	  define	  themselves	  according	  to	  their	  traditions	  and	  
cultures.103	  It	   means	   that	   indigenous	   peoples	   must	   be	   considered	   as	   ‘peoples’	  
whose	   affiliation	   to	   a	   specific	   ethnic	   group	   has	   characteristics	   historically	   and	  
culturally	  more	  complex	  than	  the	  ones	  recognised	  by	  Cobo	  in	  the	  1980s.104	  It	   is	  
accurate	   to	   say	   that,	   while	   in	   the	   1980s	   and	   1990s	   Cobo’s	   definition	   was	  
generally	  considered	  accurate,	  today	  it	  is	  regarded	  as	  controversial	  and	  limited	  in	  
scope.	  According	  to	  Brownlie,	   in	  fact,	  while	  on	  one	  side	  the	  definition	  does	  not	  
take	   into	   account	   the	   peculiar	   ‘vulnerabilities’	   shared	   by	   many	   indigenous	  
populations	   confronted	  with	   the	   hegemonic	   exploitation	   of	   capitalist	   societies,	  
on	   the	   other,	   Cobo’s	   reductive	   approach	   limits	   indigenous	   peoples	   to	   a	   non-­‐
dominant	  part	  of	  the	  society	  whose	  needs	  and	  expectations	  must	  be	  considered	  
in	   this	   context. 105 	  In	   Brownlie’s	   view,	   to	   traditionally	   consider	   most	   of	   the	  
indigenous	  peoples	  on	  the	  sole	  basis	  of	  their	  numerical	  inferiority	  within	  state’s	  
borders	   is	   not	   only	   unfair	   and	   morally	   unethical,	   but	   is	   also	   “unhelpful	   and	  
inimical	  to	  the	  application	  of	  legal	  principles	  to	  establish	  equity”.106	  The	  number	  
of	   the	   components	   of	   a	   group	   cannot	   be	   used	   to	   jeopardize	   the	   rights	   of	   the	  
group.	  This	   is	  not	  only	  morally	  wrong,	  but	   it	  goes	  against	  specific	  human	  rights	  
regulations	  created	  to	  prevent	  such	  cases	  of	  discrimination.107	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  “The	  right	  of	  self-­‐determination	  is	  a	  keystone	  in	  the	  United	  Nations	  human	  rights	  system	  and	  has	  been	  
granted	  a	  privileged	  place	   in	   two	  major	   international	   treaties,	  namely	   the	   International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  
and	  Political	  Rights	  …	  and	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  -­‐	  1.	  Article	  1	  of	  
both	   Covenants	   clearly	   establishes	   the	   right	   of	   all	   peoples	   to	   self-­‐determination,	   including	   their	   right	   to	  
freely	  determine	   their	   political	   status	   and	   freely	  pursue	   their	   economic,	   social	   and	   cultural	   development,	  
and	  the	  corresponding	  obligation	  of	  States	  parties	  to	  respect	  and	  promote	  the	  realization	  of	  that	  right”	  see	  
Anna	  Batalla	  The	  Right	  of	  self-­‐determination	  –	  ICCPR	  and	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Committee	  
Symposium	  on	  “The	  Right	  to	  Self-­‐Determination	  in	  International	  Law”	  Organised	  by	  Unrepresented	  Nations	  
and	  Peoples	  Organization	  (UNPO),	  Khmers	  Kampuchea-­‐Krom	  Federation	  (KKF),	  Hawai’i	  Institute	  for	  Human	  
Rights	  (HIHR),	  (2006)	  at	  1.	  
104	  The	  Preamble	  of	  UNDRIP	   recognised	   that	   “all	   doctrines,	   policies	   and	  practices	  based	  on	  or	   advocating	  
superiority	   of	   peoples	   or	   individuals	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   national	   origin	   or	   racial,	   religious,	   ethnic	   or	   cultural	  
differences	  are	  racist,	  scientifically	  false,	   legally	   invalid,	  morally	  condemnable	  and	  socially	  unjust”	  and	  it	   is	  
convinced	  that	  “control	  by	  indigenous	  peoples	  over	  developments	  affecting	  them	  and	  their	  lands,	  territories	  
and	  resources	  will	  enable	  them	  to	  maintain	  and	  strengthen	  their	  institutions,	  cultures	  and	  traditions,	  and	  to	  
promote	   their	   development	   in	   accordance	  with	   their	   aspirations	   and	   needs’	   and	   acknowledges	   that	   ‘the	  
Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  and	  the	  
International	   Covenant	   on	  Civil	   and	  Political	   Rights,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  Vienna	  Declaration	   and	  Programme	  of	  
Action,	   affirm	   the	   fundamental	   importance	   of	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   of	   all	   peoples,	   by	   virtue	   of	  
which	   they	   freely	   determine	   their	   political	   status	   and	   freely	   pursue	   their	   economic,	   social	   and	   cultural	  
development	   …”	   Such	   rights	   were	   not	   yet	   as	   fully	   recognised	   to	   indigenous	   peoples	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	  
Cobo’s	  Report.	  
105	  Ian	  Brownlie	  Edited	  by	  F	  M	  Brookfield	  Treaties	  and	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  (Oxford,	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1992)	  at	  
60.	  
106	  Supra	  at	  60.	  




Following	   a	   new	   wave	   of	   indigenous	   revival,	   in	   the	   1990s,	   the	   World	   Bank	  
manifested	  a	  timid,	  growing	  concern	  for	  the	  ‘vulnerability’	  of	  indigenous	  cultures.	  
In	  1991,	  the	  World	  Bank	  re-­‐emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  protecting	  indigenous	  
peoples,	   and	   stressed	   that,	   while	   indigenous	   communities	   worldwide	   present	  
similar	  traits	  that	  can	  be	  rightly	  considered	  common	  to	  every	  holistic	  group	  who	  
live	   close	   to	   the	   land	   and	   of	   the	   land,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   is	   unquestionably	  
demonstrated	  that	  such	  communities	  present	  unique	  cultural	  features	  that	  differ	  
from	   region	   to	   region.	   To	   that	   end,	   the	  World	   Bank	   intervened	   in	   the	   narrow	  
definition	   left	   by	   Cobo	   and	   expanded	   it	   to	   include	   the	   ‘distinctiveness’	   of	  
indigenous	  societies.	  	  
	  
The	   terms	   ‘indigenous	   peoples’,	   ‘indigenous	   ethnic	   minorities’,	   tribal	   groups’,	  
and	   ‘scheduled	   tribes’	  describe	   social	  groups	  with	  a	   social	  and	  cultural	   identity	  
distinct	   from	   the	   dominant	   society	   that	   makes	   them	   vulnerable	   to	   being	  
disadvantaged	  in	  the	  development	  process.108	  	  
	  
The	   World	   Bank’s	   intervention	   was	   mostly	   needed;	   however,	   the	   road	   ahead	  
seemed,	   at	   that	   time,	   still	   very	   long.	   In	   2005,	   the	   World	   Bank	   presented	   the	  
Operational	  Programme	  4.10,	  which	  states	  that:109	  
	  
The	  Bank	   recognizes	   that	   the	   identities	  and	  cultures	  of	   Indigenous	  Peoples	  are	  
inextricably	  linked	  to	  the	  lands	  on	  which	  they	  live	  and	  the	  natural	  resources	  on	  
which	  they	  depend.	  These	  distinct	  circumstances	  expose	   Indigenous	  Peoples	  to	  
different	   types	   of	   risks	   and	   levels	   of	   impacts	   from	   development	   projects,	  
including	  loss	  of	  identity,	  culture,	  and	  customary	  livelihoods,	  as	  well	  as	  exposure	  
to	  disease.	  
	  
The	  Bank	  also	  stressed	  that:110	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 	  World	   Bank	   Operational	   Directive	   4.20	   (September,	   1991)	   electronic	   document	  
<www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/835cc50048855270ab94fb6a6515bb18/OD420_IndigenousPeoples.pdf?M
OD=AJPERES>	  last	  visited	  on	  16/02/2017.	  
109 	  The	   World	   Bank	   Operational	   Manual	   electronic	   document	  
<https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/090224b0822f89d5.pdf>	   last	   visited	   on	  
16/02/2017.	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  4.	  “For	   purposes	   of	   this	   policy,	   the	   term	   ‘Indigenous	   Peoples’	   is	   used	   in	   a	   generic	   sense	   to	   refer	   to	   a	  




Because	   of	   the	   varied	   and	   changing	   contexts	   in	  which	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   live	  
and	  because	  there	  is	  no	  universally	  accepted	  definition	  of	  ‘Indigenous	  Peoples’,	  
this	  policy	  does	  not	  define	   the	   term.	   Indigenous	  Peoples	  may	  be	  referred	  to	   in	  
different	  countries	  by	  such	  terms	  as	  ‘indigenous	  ethnic	  minorities’,	  ‘aboriginals’,	  
‘hill	  tribes’,	  ‘minority	  nationalities’,	  ‘scheduled	  tribes’,	  or	  ‘tribal	  groups’.	  
In	   1998	   Benedict	   Kingsbury111	  gathered	   together	   all	   pre-­‐existing	   definitions	   of	  
indigenous	   peoples	   and	   created	   a	   more	   flexible	   and	   constructive	   version	   that	  
would	   better	   reflect	   the	   evolution	   of	   national	   and	   international	   legislation.	   As	  
essential	  requirements	  he	  recognised:	  ‘the	  self-­‐identification	  as	  a	  distinct	  ethnic	  
group;	  historical	  experience	  of,	  or	  contingent	  vulnerability	  to,	  severe	  disruption,	  
dislocation	   or	   exploitation;	   long	   connection	   with	   the	   region	   and	   the	   wish	   to	  
retain	   a	   distinct	   identity. 112 	  As	   relevant	   indicia,	   he	   suggested	   indigenous	  
peoples’:113	  	  	  	  
	  
• non	  dominance	  in	  the	  national	  (or	  regional)	  society;	  	  
• close	  cultural	  affinity	  with	  a	  particular	  area	  of	  land	  or	  territories;	  	  
• historical	   continuity	   (especially	   by	  descent)	  with	  prior	  occupants	  of	   land	   in	  
the	  region;	  	  
• socioeconomic	  and	  sociocultural	  differences	  from	  the	  ambient	  population;	  	  
• distinctive	  objective	   characteristics	   such	  as	   language,	   race,	   and	  material	   or	  
spiritual	  culture;	  and	  
• their	  being	  regarded	  as	  indigenous	  by	  the	  ambient	  population	  or	  treated	  as	  
such	  in	  legal	  and	  administrative	  arrangements.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(a)	  self-­‐identification	  as	  members	  of	  a	  distinct	  indigenous	  cultural	  group	  and	  recognition	  of	  this	  identity	  by	  
others;	   (b)	  collective	   attachment	   to	   geographically	   distinct	   habitats	   or	   ancestral	   territories	   in	   the	   project	  
area	  and	  to	  the	  natural	  resources	  in	  these	  habitats	  and	  territories	  (c)	  	  customary	  cultural,	  economic,	  social,	  
or	   political	   institutions	   that	   are	   separate	   from	   those	   of	   the	   dominant	   society	   and	   culture;	   and	   (d)	  an	  
indigenous	   language,	  often	  different	   from	  the	  official	   language	  of	   the	  country	  or	  region.	  A	  group	  that	  has	  
lost	   ‘collective	   attachment	   to	   geographically	   distinct	   habitats	   or	   ancestral	   territories	   in	   the	   project	   area’;	  
(paragraph	  4	  (b))	  because	  of	  forced	  severance	  remains	  eligible	  for	  coverage	  under	  this	  policy.	  Ascertaining	  
whether	  a	  particular	  group	  is	  considered	  as	  ‘Indigenous	  Peoples’	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  policy	  may	  require	  a	  
technical	  judgment”	  see	  electronic	  document	  supra.	  
111	  See	  Benedict	  Kingsbury	  “Indigenous	  Peoples	  in	  International	  Law:	  A	  Constructivist	  Approach	  to	  the	  Asian	  
Controversy”	  (1998)	  92	  The	  American	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  414-­‐457.	  	  
112	  Supra	  at	  414-­‐457.	  	  
113	  Benedict	   Kingsbury	   quoted	   in	   Douglas	   E	   Sanders	   “Indigenous	   Peoples:	   Issues	   of	   Definition”	   (1999)	   8	  




Indeed,	  the	  issue	  of	  ‘who	  indigenous	  peoples	  are’,	  has	  been	  hotly	  debated	  over	  
the	   years,	   nationally	   and	   internationally,	   and	   nearly	   always	  without	   the	   direct	  
consultation	  of	  the	   indigenous	  peoples	  themselves.	  Professor	  James	  Anaya	  (UN	  
Special	   Rapporteur	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples,	  May	   2008-­‐May	   2014)	  
explains	   that	   it	   is	   more	   important	   to	   allow	   indigenous	   peoples	   to	   qualify	  
themselves	  as	  such,	  than	  to	  abstractly	  create	  an	  ad	  hoc	  definition	  that	  explains	  
which	  group	  qualify	  as	  ‘indigenous’.	  According	  to	  Anaya,	  the	  matter	  of	  definition	  
should	   be	   centred	   on	   “shared	   experiences,	   common	   aspirations,	   and	   an	  
identified	  scope	  of	  programmatic	  action”	  alongside	  with	  the	  “repeatedly	  claimed	  
right	   of	   self-­‐identification”. 114 On	   the	   same	   lines,	   UNPFII	   recognises	   the	  
importance	   of	   indigenous	   self-­‐identification	   and	   confirms	   that	   indigenous	  
peoples	  present	  distinctive	   features	   that	  are	  different	   from	  the	  society	  at	   large	  
and	  therefore	  an	  official	  definition	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  has	  not	  been	  adopted	  
by	   any	   UN-­‐system	   body.	   Instead	   the	   system	   has	   developed	   a	   modern	  
understanding	  of	  the	  term	  ‘indigenous	  peoples’	  based	  on	  the	  following	  criteria:	  	  
	  
•	  self-­‐identification	  as	  indigenous	  peoples	  at	  the	  individual	  level	  and	  accepted	  by	  
the	  community	  as	  their	  member;	  
•	  historical	  continuity	  with	  pre-­‐colonial	  and/or	  pre-­‐settler	  societies;	  	  
•	  strong	  link	  to	  territories	  and	  surrounding	  natural	  resources;	  
•	  distinct	  social,	  economic	  or	  political	  systems;	  
•	  distinct	  language,	  culture	  and	  beliefs;	  
•	  form	  non-­‐dominant	  groups	  of	  society	  (apart	  from	  exceptions	  eg	  Taonga);	  and	  
•	  resolve	   to	  maintain	  and	  reproduce	  their	  ancestral	  environments	  and	  systems	  
as	  distinctive	  peoples	  and	  communities.115	  
	  
The	   Forum	   carries	   on	   by	   explaining	   that	   the	   generic	   term	   ‘indigenous’	   has	  
prevailed	   over	   the	   years	   because	   indigenous	   peoples	   present	   important	  
similarities	   all	   over	   the	   globe.	   However,	   the	   term	   cannot	   be	   always	   used	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  James	  Anaya	  International	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  (Aspen	  Publishers,	  New	  York,	  2009)	  at	  
31-­‐32.	  
115	  See	  UN	  Permanent	  Forum	  on	  Indigenous	  Issues	  electronic	  document	  




generally	   and	   every	   community	   should	   be	   granted	   the	   right	   to	   address	  
themselves	  in	  respect	  of	  their	  traditions	  and	  heritage.116	  
Recently	   the	   African	   Commission	   on	   Human	   and	   Peoples’	   Rights	   (ACHPR)	   has	  
also	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   acknowledging	   and	   protecting	   the	   ‘special’	  
attachment	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  with	  their	  traditional	  lands.	  In	  the	  case	  
of	   indigenous	   peoples,	   sacred	   and	   spiritual	   locations	   are	   essential	   markers	   of	  
identifications.	  The	  ACHPR	  Advisory	  Opinion	  (2007)	  reconfirms	  such	  fundamental	  
bond	   between	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   their	   traditional	   lands	   and	   considers	   a	  
criteria	  of	  identification:117	  
	  
a) self-­‐identification;	  
b) a	  special	  attachment	  to	  and	  use	  of	  their	  traditional	  land	  whereby	  their	  
anscestral	   land	   and	   territory	   have	   a	   fundamental	   importance	   for	   their	  
collective	  physical	  and	  cultural	  survival	  as	  peoples;	  and	  
c) a	   state	   of	   subjugation,	   marginilisation,	   dispossession,	   exclusion,	   or	  
discrimination	  because	  these	  peoples	  have	  different	  cultures,	  ways	  of	  life	  
or	  mode	  of	  production	  than	  the	  national	  hegemonic	  and	  dominant	  model.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  “…	  the	  term	  ‘indigenous’	  has	  prevailed	  as	  a	  generic	  term	  for	  many	  years.	  In	  some	  countries,	  there	  may	  
be	   preference	   for	   other	   terms	   including	   tribes,	   first	   peoples/nations,	   aboriginals,	   ethnic	   groups,	   adivasi,	  
janajati.	   Occupational	   and	   geographical	   terms	   like	   hunter-­‐gatherers,	   nomads,	   peasants,	   hill	   people,	   etc.,	  
also	   exist	   and	   for	   all	   practical	   purposes	   can	   be	   used	   interchangeably	  with	   ‘indigenous	   peoples’.	   In	  many	  
cases,	  the	  notion	  of	  being	  termed	  ‘indigenous’	  has	  negative	  connotations	  and	  some	  people	  may	  choose	  not	  
to	  reveal	  or	  define	  their	  origin.	  Others	  must	  respect	  such	  choices,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  working	  against	  
the	   discrimination	   of	   indigenous	   peoples.	   Indigenous	   peoples	   are	   the	   holders	   of	   unique	   languages,	  
knowledge	   systems	   and	   beliefs	   and	   possess	   invaluable	   knowledge	   of	   practices	   for	   the	   sustainable	  
management	  of	  natural	   resources.	   They	  have	  a	   special	   relation	   to	  and	  use	  of	   their	   traditional	   land.	   Their	  
ancestral	   land	  has	  a	   fundamental	   importance	   for	   their	  collective	  physical	  and	  cultural	   survival	  as	  peoples.	  
Indigenous	   peoples	   hold	   their	   own	   diverse	   concepts	   of	   development,	   based	   on	   their	   traditional	   values,	  
visions,	  needs	  and	  priorities’.	  They	  have	  much	  in	  common	  with	  other	  neglected	  segments	  of	  societies,	   i.e.	  
lack	  of	  political	   representation	  and	  participation,	  economic	  marginalization	  and	  poverty,	   lack	  of	  access	   to	  
social	   services	  and	  discrimination.	  Despite	   their	  cultural	  differences,	   the	  diverse	   indigenous	  peoples	  share	  
common	   problems	   also	   related	   to	   the	   protection	   of	   their	   rights.	   They	   strive	   for	   recognition	   of	   their	  
identities,	   their	  ways	  of	   life	  and	  their	   right	  to	  traditional	   lands,	   territories”	  see	  United	  Nations	  Permanent	  
Forum	   on	   Indigenous	   Issues	   “Who	   Are	   Indigenous	   Peoples?”	   electronic	   document	  
<www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/5session_factsheet1.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  04/12/2014.	  
117	  However	  according	   to	   the	  ACHPR	  Advisory	  Opinion	   (2007)	   “in	  Africa,	   the	   term	   indigenous	  populations	  
does	  not	  mean	  «	  first	  inhabitants	  »	  in	  reference	  to	  aboriginality	  as	  opposed	  to	  non-­‐African	  communities	  or	  
those	  having	  come	   from	  elsewhere.	  This	  peculiarity	  distinguishes	  Africa	   from	  the	  other	  Continents	  where	  
native	   communities	   have	   been	   almost	   annihilated	   by	   non-­‐native	   populations.	   Therefore,	   the	   ACHPR	  
considers	  that	  any	  African	  can	   legitimately	  consider	  him/herself	  as	  an	   indigene	  on	  the	  Continent”	  see	  the	  
African	  Commission	  on	  Human	  and	  Peoples’	  Rights	  –	  Advisory	  Opinion	  of	  the	  African	  Commission	  on	  Human	  
and	   Peoples’	   Rights	   on	   the	   United	   Nations	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   (2007)	   at	  




More	   recently,	   In	   its	   study	   report	   on	   the	   UN	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	  
Indigenous	   Peoples	   (Hague,	   2010),	   the	   International	   Law	   Association	   (ILA)	   has	  
reconfirmed	  the	  general	  issues	  surrounding	  the	  definition	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  
and,	  at	   the	  same	  time,	  has	  underlined	   the	   importance	  of	  a	  definition	   to	  assess	  
the	   scope	   of	   the	   Declaration	   and	   all	   other	   laws	   that	   refer	   to	   indigenous	  
peoples. 118 	  In	   its	   final	   Report	   (Sofia,	   2012),	   the	   ILA	   has	   reconfirmed	   that	  
indigenous	  peoples	  can	  be	  considered	  those	  people	  who	  have:119	  
	  
• self-­‐identification:	  self-­‐identification	  as	  both	  indigenous	  and	  as	  a	  people;	  	  
• historical	   continuity:	   common	   ancestry	   and	   historical	   continuity	   with	   pre-­‐
colonial	  and/or	  pre-­‐settler	  societies;	  	  
• special	  relationship	  with	  ancestral	  lands:	  having	  a	  strong	  and	  special	  link	  with	  
the	   territories	   occupied	   by	   their	   ancestors	   before	   colonial	   domination	   and	  
surrounding	  natural	  resources.	  Such	  a	  link	  will	  usually	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
cultural	  distinctiveness	  of	  indigenous	  peoples;	  
• distinctiveness:	  having	  distinct	   social,	   economic	  or	  political	   systems;	  having	  
distinct	  language,	  culture,	  beliefs	  and	  customary	  law;	  	  
• non-­‐dominance:	  forming	  non-­‐dominant	  groups	  within	  the	  society;	  and	  	  
• perpetuation:	   perseverance	   to	   maintain	   and	   reproduce	   their	   ancestral	  
environments,	   social	   and	   legal	   systems	  and	   culture	   as	   distinct	   peoples	   and	  
communities.	  
	  
However,	  given	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis	  on	  indigenous	  sacred/secret	  knowledge,	  
the	  present	  work	  is	  making	  use	  of	  an	  additional	  definition	  often	  used	  to	  identify	  
indigenous	  peoples.	  Until	  recently,	  in	  anthropology,	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘peoplehood’	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  “…	  despite	  the	  persisting	  lack	  of	  agreement	  on	  this	  subject,	  it	  may	  be	  appropriate	  to	  address	  the	  problem	  
of	  the	  ‘definition’	  for	  at	  least	  two	  reasons,	  i.e.:	  a)	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  scope	  of	  application	  of	  UNDRIP,	  with	  
respect	  to	  which	  a	  precise	  legal	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  categories	  of	  people	  to	  whom	  it	  is	  addressed	  could	  
be	  helpful	  to	  increase	  its	  effectiveness;	  b)	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  that	  certain	  States	  –	  as	  has	  happened	  in	  the	  
recent	   past	   especially	   in	   Africa	   and	   Asia	   –	   while	   supporting	   UNDRIP	   in	   principle,	   claim	   that	   it	   is	   not	  
applicable	  in	  their	  territory	  in	  light	  of	  the	  assumed	  absence	  of	  indigenous	  communities	  within	  their	  borders	  
(the	  lack	  of	  any	  conceptualization	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  would	  in	  fact	  facilitate	  this	  position,	  which	  could	  be	  
hardly	  criticized	  lacking	  precise	  objective	  criteria	  to	  be	  used	  for	  ascertaining	  whether	  a	  given	  community	  is	  
indigenous	  or	  not).	  The	  second	  reason	  is	  of	  particular	  significance,	  as	  a	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  
the	   term	   ‘indigenous	  peoples’	  would	  have	   the	  primary	  purpose	  of	  preventing	   States	   from	  being	  de	   facto	  
free	   to	  determine	  who	  are	  or	   are	  not	   indigenous	  peoples”	   see	   the	   International	   Law	  Association	   (Hague,	  
2010)	   electronic	   document	   <www.ila-­‐hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1024>	   last	   visited	   on	  
20/01/2012.	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  The	  International	  Law	  Association	  Final	  Report	  on	  the	  Right	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  (Sofia,	  2012)	  electronic	  





has	   been	   centred	   on	   mainly	   three	   key	   factors:	   indigenous	   relationship	   to	   the	  
land;	  common	  spiritual	  bond	  and	  language	  use.120	  Subsequently,	  anthropologist	  
Robert	  K	  Thomas	  added	  another	  distinctive	  factor	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	  identification	  
of	  indigenous	  peoples:	  sacred	  history.121	  In	  their	  recent	  work	  Holm,	  Pearson	  and	  
Chavis122	  revised	  the	  traditional	  concept	  of	  peoplehood	  that	  identify	  indigenous	  
peoples	   in	  order	   to	  demonstrate	  how	  “group’s	   religion	   is	   inseparably	   linked	   to	  
language,	   sacred	   history,	   and	   to	   a	   particular	   environment”.	   Holm	   and	   others	  
revised	  the	  initial	  concept	  of	  ‘religion’	  and	  replaced	  it	  with	  ‘ceremonial	  cycles’.123	  
Given	   that	   the	   present	   thesis	   is	   an	   interdisciplinary	   work,	   and	   recognizing	   the	  
importance	  given	   to	   the	   spiritual	   (sacred/secret)	   aspect	  of	   indigenous	  peoples’	  
cultures,	   the	   author	   will	   also	   consider	   the	   complex	   interrelationships	   that	  
indigenous	  peoples	  have	  with	  the	  more	  sacred	  and	  private	  aspects	  of	  their	  lives,	  
considering	  them	  as	  important	  as	  any	  other	  indicator	  of	  identification.	  Marrying	  
the	  model	  given	  by	  Corntassel	  in	  his	  article124	  (inspired	  by	  the	  existing	  definition	  
of	   indigenous	  peoples	   and	   the	  work	  of	   the	  anthropologists	  Holm,	  Pearson	  and	  
Chavis)	  the	  present	  work	  considers	  also	  indigenous	  peoples	  as:125	  
	  
-­‐	   peoples	   who	   believe	   they	   are	   ancestrally	   related	   and	   identify	   themselves,	  
based	  on	  oral	  and/or	  written	  histories,	  as	  descendants	  of	  the	  original	  inhabitants	  
of	  their	  ancestral	  homelands;	  
-­‐	  peoples	  who	  may,	  but	  not	  necessarily,	  have	  their	  own	  informal	  and/or	  formal	  
political,	   economic	   and	   social	   institutions,	   which	   tend	   to	   be	   community-­‐based	  
and	   reflect	   their	  distinct	   ceremonial	   cycles,	   kinship	  networks,	  and	  continuously	  
evolving	  cultural	  traditions;	  
-­‐	   peoples	   who	   speak	   (or	   once	   spoke)	   an	   indigenous	   language,	   often	   different	  
from	  the	  dominant	  society’s	   language	  –	  even	  where	  the	  indigenous	  language	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120	  See	  the	  work	  of	  Edward	  H	  Spicer	  Cycles	  of	  Conquest:	  the	  Impact	  of	  Spain,	  Mexico	  and	  the	  United	  States	  
on	  the	  Indians	  of	  the	  Southwest,	  1533-­‐1960	  (University	  of	  Arizona	  Press,	  Tucson,	  1962)	  at	  576-­‐578.	  
121	  See	   Robert	   K	   Thomas	   “Colonialism:	   Classic	   and	   Internal”	   (1966-­‐67)	   6	   New	   University	   Thought	   37-­‐45	  
electronic	  document	  <http://works.bepress.com/robert_tJeffhomas/26/>	  last	  visited	  on	  04/12/2014.	  
122	  Tom	  Holm,	   J	  Diane	  Pearson	  and	  Ben	  Chavis	   “Peoplehood:	  A	  Model	   for	  American	   Indian	  Sovereignty	   in	  
Education”	   (2003)	   18	   Wicazo	   Sa	   Review	   7-­‐24	   electronic	   document	  
<http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/wic/summary/v018/18.1holm.html>	  last	  visited	  on	  04/12/2014.	  
123	  Tom	  Holm,	   J	  Diane	  Pearson	  and	  Ben	  Chavis	   “Peoplehood:	  A	  Model	   for	  American	   Indian	  Sovereignty	   in	  
Education”	   (2003)	   18	   Wicazo	   Sa	   Review	   7-­‐24	   electronic	   document	  
<http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/wic/summary/v018/18.1holm.html>	  last	  visited	  on	  04/12/2014.	  
124	  Jeff	   J	   Corntassel	   “Who	   Is	   Indigenous?	   ‘Peoplehood’	   and	   Ethnonationalist	   Approaches	   to	   Rearticulating	  
Indigenous	  identity”	  (2003)	  9	  Nationalism	  and	  Ethnic	  Politics	  at	  75.	  




not	   ‘spoken’,	   distinct	   dialects	   and/or	   uniquely	   indigenous	   expressions	   may	  
persist	  as	  a	  form	  of	  indigenous	  identity;	  and	  
-­‐	   peoples	  who	  distinguish	   themselves	   from	   the	   dominant	   society	   and/or	   other	  
cultural	   groups	   while	   maintaining	   a	   close	   relationship	   with	   their	   ancestral	  
homelands/sacred	   sites,	   which	   may	   be	   threatened	   by	   ongoing	   military,	  
economic	  or	  political	  encroachment	  or	  may	  be	  places	  where	  indigenous	  peoples	  
have	  been	  previously	  expelled,	  while	  seeking	  to	  enhance	  their	  cultural,	  political	  
and	  economic	  autonomy.	  
	  
The	   thesis	   will	   therefore	   make	   use	   of	   the	   working	   definition	   of	   indigenous	  
peoples	  that	  has	  been	  summarised	  by	  the	  ILA	  Final	  Report	  (supra	  at	  30)	  including	  
and	  completing	  it	  with	  the	  anthropological	  definitions	  (see	  previous	  page).	  	  
And	   yet,	   having	   said	   this,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   point	   out	   that	   indigenous	   peoples	  
should	  be	  able	  to	  self-­‐identify	  themselves	  if	  they	  wish	  to	  do	  so,	  and	  international	  
law	   needs	   a	   workable	   definition	   to	   create	   ad	   hoc	   legislation	   to	   safeguard	  
indigenous	   peoples	   and	   their	   cultural	   integrity.	   However,	   it	   is	   also	   true	   that	  
indigenous	  cultures	  differ	  greatly	  from	  the	  Western	  idea	  of	  culture	  and	  any	  study	  
on	   indigenous	   peoples’	   traditions	   and	   heritage	   should	   take	   into	   account	   the	  
culturally	   relative	   nature	   of	   their	   cultures.	   That	   is	   why	   the	   thesis	   will	   have	   a	  
culturally	   relative	   approach	   in	   respect	   of	   the	   multiculturalism	   of	   indigenous	  
peoples	  and	  the	  world.	  	  
	  
1.3	  –	  Cultural	  Relativism	  
	  
Traditionally,	   the	  most	  notable	  of	   the	  philosophers	  of	   the	  early	  modern	  period	  
who	  firmly	  believed	  in	  cultural	  relativism	  is	  Michel	  de	  Montaigne	  (1533-­‐1592).126	  
With	   the	  discovery	  of	   the	  new	  world,	  Montaigne	  was	  one	  of	   the	   first	   to	  argue	  
against	   the	   idea	   that	   there	   is	   an	   immutable	   human	   nature.	   The	   evidence	  
provided	   by	   the	   discoveries	   of	   new	   cultures,	   brought	   him	   to	   assert	  
unconditionally	   that	   there	   are	   no	   universal	   laws	   of	   human	   behaviours	   and	  
human	   nature.	   In	   his	   opinion,	   humans	   call	   barbarous	   every	   manifestation	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




which	   they	   are	   not	   accustomed. 127 	  In	   his	   view,	   and	   given	   the	   profound	  
differences	  in	  the	  moral,	  legal	  and	  spiritual	  behaviours	  of	  the	  inhabitants	  of	  the	  
new	   world,	   the	   only	   approach	   possible	   was	   ethical	   relativism.	   Indeed,	  
Montaigne’s	   point	   of	   view	   was	   very	   tolerant	   and	   open-­‐minded	   for	   his	   time.	  
According	  to	  Baghramian,	   the	  argument	  Montaigne	  used	  to	  deny	  the	  existence	  
of	  a	  single	  universal	  human	  nature	   is	  “empiricist	   in	   its	  orientation	  and	  relies	  on	  
the	   diversity	   of	   human	   nature	   –	   both	   at	   the	   individual	   and	   social	   levels”.128	  In	  
Montaigne’s	  vision	  “if	   there	  was	  such	  a	   thing	  as	  natural	   law,	   then	   there	  would	  
also	  be	  consensus	  on	  customs,	  laws	  and	  ethics”.129	  But	  as	  he	  stressed	  “nothing	  in	  
all	   the	   world	   has	   greater	   variety	   than	   law	   and	   custom”.130	  Thus,	   there	   is	   no	  
universal	   truth.131	  Today,	   scholars	   tend	   to	   divide	   cultural	   relativism	   into	   three	  
subcategories:	   cognitive	   relativism,	   social	   relativism	   and	   conceptual	   relativism	  
(each	  of	  them	  presents	  further	  subcategories	  which	  will	  not	  be	  analysed	  in	  this	  
work).132	  According	  to	  Baghramian,	  cognitive	  relativism	  is:133	  	  
	  
…	   the	  view	   that	  what	   is	   true	  or	   false,	   rational	  or	   irrational,	   valid	  or	   invalid	   can	  
vary	   from	  one	  society,	  culture	  or	  historical	  epoch	  to	  another	  and	  that	  we	  have	  
no	  trans-­‐cultural	  or	  ahistorical	  method	  or	  standard	  for	  adjudicating	  between	  the	  
conflicting	  cognitive	  norms.	  Relativism	  about	  truth	  and	  relativism	  about	  logic	  are	  
the	  strongest	  forms	  of	  cognitive	  relativism.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127	  Michelet	  de	  Montaigne	  An	  Apology	  for	  Raymond	  Sebond	  (Penguin,	  London	  1987)	  at	  Essays	  330-­‐50;	  202-­‐
31;	  79-­‐92.	  
128	  Maria	  Baghramian	  Relativism	  (Routledge,	  New	  York,	  2004)	  at	  53.	  
129	  Supra	  at	  53.	  
130	  Michelet	  de	  Montaigne	  An	  Apology	  for	  Raymond	  Sebond	  (Penguin,	  London	  1987)	  at	  163.	  
131	  In	  his	  blunt	  mastery,	  Nietzsche,	  for	  example,	  analyses	  truth	  and	  asks:	  “What	  is	  truth?	  A	  mobile	  army	  of	  
metaphors,	   metonymies,	   anthropomorphisms,	   in	   short	   a	   sum	   of	   human	   relations	   which	   have	   been	  
subjected	   to	  poetic	   and	   rhetorical	   intensification,	   translation,	   and	  decoration,	   and	  which,	   after	   they	  have	  
been	  is	  use	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  strike	  a	  people	  as	  firmly	  established,	  canonical,	  and	  binding;	  truths	  are	  illusions	  
of	  which	  we	  have	   forgotten	   that	   they	  are	   illusions,	  metaphors	  which	  have	  become	  worn	  by	   frequent	  use	  
and	  have	  lost	  all	  sensuous	  vigour,	  coins	  which,	  having	  lost	  their	  stamp,	  are	  now	  regarded	  as	  metal	  and	  no	  
longer	   as	   coins”	   see	   Friederich	  Nietzsche	  The	  Birth	   of	   Tragedy	   and	  Other	  Writings	   (Cambridge	  University	  
Press,	  Cambridge,	  	  1999)	  at	  146.	  
132 	  For	   further	   readins	   on	   the	   definitions	   used	   see	   the	   electronic	   document	  
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/>	  last	  visited	  on	  30/11/2015.	  
133	  Baghramian	   claims	   that:	   	   “…	   truth	   or	   falsity,	   the	   appropriateness	   or	   inappropriateness	   of	   an	   ethical	  
belief,	  is	  relative	  to	  its	  socio-­‐historical	  background	  and	  that	  moral	  beliefs	  cannot	  be	  assessed	  independently	  
of	   their	   social	   framework.	   They	  point	   to	   the	  existence	  of	  diverse	  moral	   systems	  and	  maintain	   that	  moral	  
values	   are	   grounded	   on	   societal	   conventions,	   historical	   conditions,	  metaphysical	   beliefs,	   etc.,	   which	   vary	  
from	  one	  society	  or	  societal	  grouping	  to	  another,	  and	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  no	  neutral	  standards	  available	  to	  





She	  asserts	  that	  social	  relativism	  is	  “the	  claim	  that	  the	  truth	  and	  falsity	  of	  beliefs,	  
the	  justification	  for	  knowledge-­‐claims	  and	  the	  right	  or	  wrong	  of	  actions,	  depend	  
on	   and	   are	   relative	   to	   prevailing	   social	   and	   cultural	   conditions”.134	  Conceptual	  
relativism	  believes	  that:135	  	  
	  
…	  the	  world	  does	  not	  present	  itself	  to	  us	  ready-­‐made	  or	  ready-­‐carved	  rather	  we	  
supply	  the	  different	  ways	  of	  categorising	  and	  conceptualising	  it.	  Our	  knowledge	  
of	  the	  world	  is	  mediated	  through	  a	  language,	  a	  theory	  or	  scheme	  and	  there	  is	  a	  
plurality	  of	  such	  mediatory	  schemes.	  
	  
Each	  different	  culture	  represents	  a	  coherent	  part	  of	  the	  whole.	  Each	  is	  legitimate	  
with	  the	  observation	  and	  its	  decodification	  into	  a	  cultural	  symbolism	  familiar	  and	  
coherent	  with	  the	  tradition	  of	  any	  given	  group	  residing	  in	  a	  specific	  area	  of	  the	  
world	   and	   sharing	   common	   experiences.	   However,	   as	   Boas	   points	   out,	  
environment,	  economy	  and	  history	  are	  not	  necessarily	   ‘essential’	   factors	   in	   the	  
development	   of	   culture,	   which	   can	   be	   used	   to	   predict	   and	   explain	   why	   such	  
culture	  developed	  the	  way	  it	  did.136	  In	  Boas’	  words:137	  	  	  
	  
…	   every	   attempt	   to	   deduce	   cultural	   forms	   from	   a	   single	   cause	   is	   doomed	   to	  
failure	   …	   Cultural	   phenomena	   are	   of	   such	   complexity	   that	   it	   seems	   to	   me	  
doubtful	   whether	   valid	   cultural	   laws	   can	   be	   found.	   The	   causal	   conditions	   of	  
cultural	  happenings	  lie	  always	  in	  the	  interaction	  between	  individual	  and	  society,	  
and	  no	  classificatory	  study	  of	  society	  will	  solve	  this	  problem.	  	  
	  
In	  relation	  to	  indigenous	  peoples,	  Boas	  stresses	  that:138	  	  
	  
…	   the	   fact	   that	  many	   fundamental	   features	  of	  culture	  are	  universal,	  or	  at	   least	  
occur	   in	   many	   isolated	   places,	   interpreted	   by	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   same	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134	  “According	  to	  this	   type	  of	  relativism,	  we	  are	   in	  a	  position	  to	  distinguish	  between	  true	  and	  false	  beliefs	  
and	  right	  and	  wrong	  actions	  and	   judgements,	  but	  only	  within	   the	  parameters	  of	  socially	  given	  norms	  and	  
conventions	   Cultural	   relativism	   inspired	   by	   the	   work	   of	   social	   anthropologists	   who	   conducted	   fieldwork	  
among	  tribal	  people,	   is	  one	  of	  the	  most	   influential	   forms	  of	  social	  relativism	  where	   it	   is	  argued	  that	  there	  
can	  be	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  culturally	  neutral	  criterion	  for	  adjudicating	  between	  conflicting	  claims	  arising	  from	  
different	  cultural	  contexts”	  supra	  at	  7.	  
135	  At	  7.	  
136	  Franz	  Boas	  Race	  Language	  and	  Culture	  (The	  Free	  Press,	  New	  York,	  1940)	  at	  255-­‐259.	  
137	  See	  Boas	  at	  257.	  




features	   must	   always	   have	   developed	   from	   the	   same	   causes,	   leads	   to	   the	  
conclusion	   that	   there	   is	   one	   grand	   system	   according	   to	   which	   mankind	   has	  
developed	   everywhere;	   that	   all	   occurring	   variations	   are	   no	   more	   than	   minor	  
details	   in	   this	   grand	   uniform	   evolution.	   It	   is	   clear	   that	   this	   theory	   has	   for	   its	  
logical	   basis	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   same	   phenomena	   are	   always	   due	   to	   the	  
same	  causes.	  
	  
This	   means	   that	   cultures	   initially	   respond	   to	   common	   intentional	   and	  
psychological/philosophical	   purposes.	   Then	   culture	   takes	   the	   direction	   or	  
representation	   that	   better	   responds	   to	   the	   needs	   of	   an	   ethnic	   group	   or	   is	  
coherent	   with	   the	   line	   of	   known	   traditions. 139 	  According	   to	   social	  
anthropologists,	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   culturally	   neutral	   criterion	   for	   adjudicating	  
between	   conflicting	   claims	   arising	   from	   different	   cultural	   contexts	   is	   morally,	  
ethically	   and	   philosophically	   incorrect.	   In	   other	   words,	   there	   is	   no	   ‘superior	  
culture’	  v	   ‘inferior	  culture’.	  Physics	  and	  science	   in	  general	  dismiss	   the	   idea	  of	  a	  
culture	  ‘A’	  that	  can	  dictate	  standards	  for	  all	  the	  other	  cultures	  of	  the	  world.140	  It	  
is	  therefore	  evident	  that	  the	  Western	  claim	  to	  superiority	  (justified	  by	  Darwinist	  
assumptions,	   now	   proved	   wrong)141	  is	   just	   based	   on	   the	   assumption	   of	   an	  
existing	   universal	   reality	   with	   its	   ‘rights’	   and	   ‘wrongs’	   that	   the	  more	   powerful	  
pretend	  to	  impose	  on	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  In	  more	  recent	  years,	  however,	  the	  
growing	   acceptance	   of	   cultural	   relativism	   seems	   to	   suggest	   that	   there	   is	   no	  
ground	   for	   a	   universal	   moral	   law.	   Every	   principle	   can	   be	   accepted	   only	   in	   a	  
certain	   culture.	   In	   this	   light	  we	   could	   no	   longer	   say	   that	   the	   customs	   of	   other	  
societies	   are	   morally	   inferior	   to	   our	   own.	   And	   yet,	   it	   is	   dangerous	   to	   accept	  
cultural	   relativism	   in	   its	  most	  strict	  approach.	   In	  doing	  so,	   reproachable	  acts	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	  Michael	  Krausz	  Relativism:	  A	  Contemporary	  Anthology	  (Columbia	  University	  Press,	  New	  York,	  2010).	  
140	  In	   the	   words	   of	   Nietzsche:	   “‘Everything	   is	   subjective’,	   you	   say;	   but	   even	   this	   is	   interpretation.	   The	  
‘subject’	  is	  not	  something	  given,	  it	  is	  something	  added	  and	  invented	  and	  projected	  behind	  what	  there	  is.	  –	  
Finally	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  posit	  an	  interpreter	  behind	  the	  interpretation?	  Even	  this	  is	  invention,	  hypothesis.	  In	  
so	  far	  as	  the	  word	  ‘knowledge’	  has	  any	  meaning,	  the	  word	  is	  knowable;	  but	  it	  is	  interpretable	  otherwise,	  it	  
has	   no	   meaning	   behind	   it,	   but	   countless	   meanings.	   –	   ‘Perspectivism’.	   It	   is	   our	   needs	   that	   interpret	   the	  
world;	  our	  drives	  and	  their	  For	  and	  Against.	  Every	  drive	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  lust	  to	  rule;	  each	  one	  has	  its	  perceptive	  
that	   it	  would	  like	  to	  compel	  all	  the	  other	  drives	  to	  accept	  as	  a	  norm”	  see	  Friederich	  Nietzsche	  The	  Will	  To	  
Power	  (Random	  House,	  New	  York,	  1967)	  at	  267.	  
141	  In	  his	  books	  On	  the	  Origin	  of	  the	  Species	  by	  Means	  of	  Natural	  Selection,	  or	  The	  Preservation	  of	  Favoured	  
Races	  in	  the	  Struggle	  for	  Life,	  Darwin	  suggests	  that	  only	  the	  fittest	  organisms	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  survival	  are	  
able	  to	  prevail	   long	  enough	  to	  pass	  their	  superior	  traits	  to	  future	  generations	  guaranteeing	  the	  survival	  of	  
that	  species.	  This	  Social	  Darwinism	  found	  many	  followers	  such	  as	  Herbert	  Spencer,	  Joseph	  A	  Gabineau,	  John	  
W	  Burgess	  and	  Theodore	  Roosevelt	  to	  name	  a	  few,	  who	  strongly	  used	  its	  philosophy	  to	  justify	  all	  different	  




traditions	  could	  be	   justified	   in	   the	  name	  of	  cultural	  differences.142	  According	   to	  
Rachels:143	  	  	  
	  
…	   there	   are	   some	  moral	   rules	   that	   all	   societies	  will	   have	   in	   common,	   because	  
those	  rules	  are	  necessary	  for	  society	  to	  exist.	  …	  Cultures	  may	  differ	  in	  what	  they	  
regard	  as	  legitimate	  exceptions	  to	  the	  rules,	  but	  this	  disagreement	  exists	  against	  
a	   background	   of	   agreement	   on	   the	   larger	   issues.	   Therefore,	   it	   is	   a	  mistake	   to	  
overestimate	   the	  amount	  of	  difference	  between	  cultures.	  Not	  every	  moral	   rule	  
can	  vary	  from	  society	  to	  society.	  	  
	  
Similarly,	  Lenzerini	  asserts	  that	  certain	  principles	  exist	  which	  may	  apply	  to	  every	  
culture	   of	   the	   world	   (well-­‐being,	   dignity	   of	   life,	   liberty,	   etc).	   The	   argument	   is	  
based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  all	  human	  beings	  have	  common	  inclinations	  ‘from	  
which	   an	   identical	   perception	   of	   rights	   arises’144	  that	   support	   a	   more	   general	  
idea	  of	  universalism.	  
Although	  this	  thesis	  makes	  use	  of	  a	  cultural	  relativist	  approach,	  it	  also	  recognises	  
that	  we	   live	   in	   a	  multicultural	  world	  whose	   citizens,	   regardless	  of	   cultures	   and	  
creeds,	   are	   united	   by	   a	   desire	   to	   fulfil	   their	   human	   potential	   -­‐	   in	   whatever	  
meaning	   they	   attach	   to	   it	   -­‐	   while	   promoting	   essential	   human	   needs.	   The	   next	  
section	  will	   explain	  what	  multiculturalism	   is	   and	  why	   it	   is	   important	   to	   rely	  on	  








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  “This	   implication	  of	  Cultural	  Relativism	   is	  disturbing	  because	   few	  of	  us	   think	   that	  our	   society’s	   code	   is	  
perfect	   –	   we	   can	   think	   of	   ways	   it	   might	   be	   improved.	   Yet	   Cultural	   relativism	   would	   not	   forbid	   us	   from	  
criticizing	  the	  codes	  of	  other	  societies;	  it	  would	  stop	  us	  from	  criticizing	  our	  own.	  After	  all,	  if	  right	  and	  wrong	  
are	  relative	  to	  culture,	  this	  must	  be	  true	  for	  our	  own	  culture	  just	  as	  much	  as	  for	  others”	  see	  James	  Rachels	  
“The	  Challenges	  of	  Cultural	  Relativism”	  in	  Nancy	  Ann	  Silbergeld	  Jecker,	  Albert	  R	  Jonsen,	  Robert	  A	  Pearlman	  
(eds)	  Bioethics:	  An	   Introduction	  to	   the	  History,	  Methods,	  and	  Practice	   (2nd	  ed,	   Jones	  &	  Bartlett	  Publishers,	  
Sudbury-­‐Massachussets,	  2007)	  at	  123.	  
143	  Supra	  at	  125.	  




1.4	  -­‐	  Multiculturalism	  
	  
Multiculturalism	   is	   considered	   a	   “social-­‐intellectual	   movement	   that	   promotes	  
the	   value	  of	   diversity	   as	   a	   core	   principle	   and	   insists	   that	   all	   cultural	   groups	   be	  
treated	  with	  respect	  and	  as	  equals”:145	  where	  ‘diversity’	  is	  considered	  as	  a	  value	  
per	  se.	  In	  recent	  years,	  multiculturalism	  has	  insisted	  on	  a	  fundamental	  question	  –	  
how	   can	   universal	   human	   and	   cultural	   rights	   exist	   in	   a	   multicultural	   world?	  
Globalization	   and	   the	   explosion	   of	   media	   information	   have	   brought	   together	  
cultures	  so	  fundamentally	  different	  that	  the	  whole	  system	  based	  on	  universalism	  
has	   been	   shaken	   to	   its	   foundations.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   some	   very	   different	  
cultures	   share	   social	   and	  economic	   rights	   in	  multicultural	   societies	  where	   their	  
cultural	   diversity	   has	   managed	   to	   integrate	   in	   the	   name	   of	   social	   rights	   and	  
duties	   of	   men	   (see,	   for	   example,	   Native	   Americans,	   Māori	   and	   Aborigenes).	  	  
Ayton-­‐Shenker	  questions	   if	   the	  world	   is	   ready	   for	   ‘universalism’	  and	  whether	  a	  
global	   culture	   is	   inevitable.146	  Although	  she	   recognises	   that	  human	  and	  cultural	  
rights	   are	   “culturally	   relative	   rather	   than	  universal”,147	  she	   also	   recognises	   that	  
extreme	   relativism	   undermines	   the	   very	   notion	   of	   the	   international	   legal	  
system.148	  A	  strictly	  relativist	  approach	  would	  be,	  thus,	  subject	  to	  state	  discretion	  
and	   could	   justify	   violations	   of	   human	   and	   cultural	   rights.149	  In	   the	   view	   of	   the	  
United	  Nations	  system,	  human	  beings	  must	  be	  guaranteed	   the	   respect	  of	   their	  
natural-­‐born	  rights.	  These	  rights	  are	  not	  privileges	  per	  se,	  but	  they	  are	  an	  integral	  
part	   of	   being	   a	   human	   being.	   According	   to	   the	   Vienna	   Declaration	   and	  
Programme	  of	  Action	  (1993):150	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145	  Blaine	  J	  Fowers	  and	  Frank	  C	  Richardson	  “Why	  Is	  Multiculturalism	  Good?”	  (1996)	  American	  Psychologist	  
609	  at	  609.	  
146	  See	   Diana	   Ayton-­‐Shenker	   “The	   Challenge	   of	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Cultural	   Diversity”	   (2014)	   electronic	  
document	  <www.un.org/rights/dpi1627e.htm>	  last	  visited	  on	  01/12/2014.	  
147	  See	  Ayton-­‐Shenker	  at	  1.	  
148	  “It	  may	  be	  relevant	  to	  start	  by	  stressing	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  very	  emergence	  of	   international	   law	  in	  world	  
history	  constitutes	  a	  tribute	  to	  multiculturalism	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  manifests	  the	  need	  felt	  by	  very	  different	  
political	  entities	  to	  create	  norms	  to	  regulate	  those	  aspects	  of	  their	  behaviours	  which	  required	  an	  interaction	  
with	  other	  political	   entities”	   see	  Manuel	  Rama-­‐Montaldo	   “Universalism	  and	  Particularism	   in	   the	  Creation	  
Process	  of	  International	  law”	  in	  Sienho	  Yee	  and	  Jacques-­‐Yvan	  Morin	  (eds)	  Multiculturalism	  and	  International	  
Law	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publisher,	  the	  Netherlands,	  2009)	  at	  130.	  
149	  “By	   rejecting	   or	   disregarding	   their	   legal	   obligations	   to	   promote	   and	   protect	   universal	   human	   rights,	  
States	   advocating	   cultural	   relativism	   could	   raise	   their	   own	   cultural	   norms	   and	   particularities	   above	  
international	  law	  and	  standards”	  supra	  at	  2.	  





…	   human	   rights	   and	   fundamental	   freedoms	   are	   the	   birthright	   of	   all	   human	  
beings;	  their	  protection	  and	  promotion	  is	  the	  first	  responsibility	  of	  Governments,	  
and	  …	  the	  universal	  nature	  of	  these	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  is	  beyond	  question	  (Art	  
1).	  
	  
Having	   said	   this,	   however,	   international	   human	   and	   cultural	   rights	   are	   not,	   or	  
should	   not,	   be	   oriented	   toward	   one	   culture	   at	   the	   exclusion	   of	   another.	   No	  
culture	   is,	   in	   this	   regard,	   better	   than	   another	   one. 151 	  As	   such,	   this	   thesis	  
recognises	  the	  multicultural	  nature	  of	  our	  world	  and	  while	  it	  is	  acceptable	  to	  talk	  
of	  universal	  basic	   rights	  common	  to	  every	  person,	   the	  approach	  of	   the	  present	  
work	   will	   remain	   fundamentally	   relativist	   while	   approaching	   the	   holistic	   and	  
profoundly	   idiosyncratic	  nature	  of	   the	   cultures	  of	   indigenous	  peoples.	   In	  doing	  
so,	  this	  work	  makes	  use	  of	  a	  cultural	  relativist	  approach,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  make	  the	  
mistake	   of	   equating	   cultural	   relativism	   with	   moral	   relativism	   which,	   strictly	  
speaking,	   believes	   that	   the	   “studies	   of	   various	   cultures	   have	   enabled	   them	   to	  
show	  that	  morality	  is	  relative	  to	  each	  culture,	  which	  implies,	  among	  other	  things,	  
that	   we	   cannot	   rightly	   pass	   moral	   judgement	   on	   members	   of	   other	   cultures	  
except	   by	   their	   own	   cultural	   standards,	  which	  may	   differ	   from	   ours”.152	  In	   the	  
author’s	   view,	   indigenous	   cultures	   and	   practices	   can	   only	   be	   understood	   from	  
the	  perspective	  of	   indigenous	  peoples	  and	  not	  from	  the	   interpretation	  that	  the	  
Western	  world	   has	   attached	   to	   them.	   Similarly,	   indigenous	   cultures	   cannot	   be	  
judged	  in	  universalistic	  terms;	  these	  cultures	  cannot,	  and	  will	  not,	  be	  considered	  
as	   part	   of	   the	   common	   heritage	   of	   humankind	   because	   of	   their	   intrinsic	  
idiosyncratic	   diversity	   from	   the	  Western	   idea	   of	   culture	   and	   heritage.	   On	   the	  
other	   hand,	   indigenous	   issues	   have	   reached	   a	   universal	   recognition	   in	   the	   last	  
several	   decades	   and	   their	   struggles	   and	   issues,	   while	   peculiar	   to	   every	  
community,	   present	   similar	   characteristics.	   It	   is	   therefore	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	  
work	   to	  describe	   these	  similarities	  and	   try	   to	   find	  an	   ‘international’	   solution	   to	  
local	   indigenous-­‐state	   problems.	   In	   doing	   so,	   this	   thesis,	   makes	   use	   of	  
‘descriptive’	   cultural	   relativism	   in	   describing	   indigenous	   holistic	   practices	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151	  “Rather	   than	   limit	  human	   rights	   to	   suit	   a	  given	  culture,	  why	  not	  draw	  on	   traditional	   cultural	   values	   to	  
reinforce	  the	  application	  and	  relevance	  of	  universal	  human	  rights?	  There	  is	  an	  increased	  need	  to	  emphasize	  
the	  common,	  core	  values	  shared	  by	  all	  cultures:	  the	  value	  of	  life,	  social	  order	  and	  protection	  from	  arbitrary	  
rule”	  see	  Diana	  Ayton-­‐Shenker	  “The	  Challenge	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Cultural	  Diversity”	  (2014).	  




traditions,153	  but	   then	  moves	   to	   a	  more	   universalistic	   approach	  when	   trying	   to	  
find	  a	  workable	   solution	   to	   the	  multifaceted	  problems	   that	   indigenous	  peoples	  
are	  facing	  today.	  The	  author	  rejects	  the	  more	  extreme	  form	  of	  cultural	  relativism	  
–	   epistemological	   relativism 154 	  –	   because,	   while	   acceptable	   in	   principle,	   it	  
becomes	  unrealistic	  in	  its	  applicability.	  	  
Although	  human	  beings	  are	  divided	   into	   fundamentally	  different	   cultures,	   they	  
are	   nonetheless	   all	   part	   of	   the	   world	   community.	   Relations	   among	   states	  
formalize	   the	   recognition	   of	   common	   human,	   economic,	   cultural	   and	   political	  
aspirations	   that	   are	   the	   foundations	   of	   international	   agreements	   and	   treaties;	  
and	   indigenous	  peoples	   live	   in	  states	   that	  are	  active	  participants	   in	   the	  world’s	  
negotiations	  and,	  as	  such,	  cannot	  be	  relegated	  in	  a	  corner	  with	  the	  excuse	  that	  
their	   culture	   is	   too	   idiosyncratic	   to	   be	   recognised	   and	   safeguarded.	   In	   Anaya’s	  
view,	   in	   fact,	   integration	   into	   the	  social	  and	  political	  order	  of	   the	   state	   is	  what	  
would	   allow	   indigenous	   peoples	   to	   live	   with	   their	   cultures	   intact.155	  In	   most	  
cases,	   indigenous	   peoples	   are	   reclaiming	   their	   voices	   and	   their	   place	   in	   the	  
societies	   in	  which	  they	  are	  members.156	  They	  are	   linked	  to	  the	  society	   they	  are	  
part	   of	   and,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   they	   are	   linked	   together	  with	   other	   indigenous	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153	  “…descriptive	  relativism	  (also	  known	  as	  weak	  relativism;	  amounting	  to	  a	  common	  sense	  observation	  that	  
cultures	   vary),	   …	  normative	   relativism	   (or	   strong	   relativism;	   positing	   that	   since	   all	   standards	   are	   culture-­‐
bound,	   there	   can	   be	   no	   transcultural	   moral	   and	   ethical	   standards),	   up	   to	   the	   most	   extreme	   form	   of	  
relativism,	  known	  as	  epistemological	  relativism	  (or	  extreme	  relativism)	  …	  (claiming	  that	  humans	  are	  shaped	  
exclusively	  by	  their	  culture	  and	  therefore	  there	  exist	  no	  unifying	  cross-­‐cultural	  human	  characteristic)”	  see	  IC	  
Jarvie	   “Rationality	   and	   Relativism”	   (1983)	   34	   British	   Journal	   of	   Sociology	   44-­‐60;	   ME	   Spiro	   “Cultural	  
Relativism	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  Anthropology”	  (1986)	  1	  Cultural	  anthropology	  	  259-­‐286.	  
154	  “Epistemological	  relativism	  may	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  view	  that	  knowledge	  (and/or	  truth	  or	  justification)	  is	  
relative	  –	  to	  time,	  to	  place,	  to	  society,	  to	  culture,	  to	  historical	  epoch,	  to	  conceptual	  scheme	  or	  framework,	  
or	   to	  personal	   training	  or	  conviction	  –	   in	   that	  what	  counts	  as	  knowledge	   (or	  as	   true	  or	   justified)	  depends	  
upon	  the	  value	  of	  one	  or	  more	  of	  these	  variables.	  According	  to	  the	  relativist,	  knowledge	   is	  relative	   in	  this	  
way	   because	   different	   cultures,	   societies,	   epochs,	   etc.	   accept	   different	   sets	   of	   background	   principles,	  
criteria,	   and/or	   standards	   of	   evaluation	   for	   knowledge-­‐claims,	   and	   there	   is	   no	   neutral	   way	   of	   choosing	  
between	   these	   alternative	   sets	   of	   standards.	   So	   the	   relativist's	   basic	   thesis	   is	   that	   a	   claim's	   status	   as	  
knowledge	  (and/or	  the	  truth	  or	  rational	  justifiability	  of	  such	  knowledge-­‐claims)	  is	  relative	  to	  the	  standards	  
used	  in	  evaluating	  such	  claims;	  and	  (further)	  that	  such	  alternative	  standards	  cannot	  themselves	  be	  neutrally	  
evaluated	   in	   terms	   of	   some	   fair,	   encompassing	   meta-­‐standard”	   see	   electronic	   document	  
<www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405190213_chunk_g978140519021312>	   last	  
visited	  on	  30/11/2015.	  
155	  James	  Anaya	  “International	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Indigenous	  Peoples:	  The	  Move	  Toward	  the	  Multicultural	  
State”	   (2009)	   Arizona	   Legal	   Studies	   13-­‐61	   at	   15	   electronic	   document	  
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1485138>	  last	  visited	  on	  03/12/2014.	  
156	  “Many	  [anthropologists]	  reject	  relativism	  in	  favour	  of	  an	  evolutionary	  analysis	  by	  observing	  that	  societies	  
do	  indeed	  change	  their	  customs	  by	  developing	  more	  humane	  habits	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  growth	  of	  their	  
economic,	   technological,	   and	   scientific	   capabilities.	   They	   emphasize	   the	   common	   denominators	   among	  
cultures,	   suggesting	   that	   it	   is	   proper	   to	   speak	  of	   the	   common	  humanity	   of	   people	   as	   the	  basis	   for	   cross-­‐
cultural	  morality	  and	  ethics	   that	  are	  not	  completely	  culturally	   relative”	  see	  Elizabeth	  M	  Zechenter	  “In	   the	  
Name	  of	  Culture:	  Cultural	  Relativism	  and	  the	  Abuse	  of	  the	  Individual”	  (1997)	  53	  Journal	  of	  Anthropological	  




groups	   by	   the	   experience	   of	   similarly	   oppressive	   practices	   that	   European	  
colonizers	  performed	  with	  efficacy	  in	  foreign	  lands;	  and	  these	  very	  practices	  are	  
what	   makes	   indigenous	   peoples	   seek	   workable	   collective	   solutions.157	  Having	  
said	   this,	   and	  before	   going	  on	   exploring	   indigenous	   cultures,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  
identify	   the	   features	   of	   indigenous	   spiritual	   traditions,	   and	   identify	   how	   they	  
differ	   from	   Western	   cultures.	   The	   next	   chapter	   will	   introduce	   and	   describe	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157	  “We	  never	  knew	   that	   indigenous	  people	  were	   so	  global,	  but	  we	   find	   that	  we	  have	   the	   same	  common	  
problems	   and	   the	   same	   kind	   of	   world-­‐view	   in	   most	   cases.	   That’s	   why,	   in	   the	   drafting	   of	   the	   UN	   Draft	  
Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples,	  it	  was	  easy	  for	  indigenous	  people	  to	  come	  to	  agreement	  on	  
what	   our	   rights	   are.	   It’s	   easy	   for	   us	   to	   agree”	   see	   Taiaiake	   Alfred	  Peace,	   Power,	   Righteousness:	   An	  






Culture	  and	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  
	  
	  
From	   a	  Western-­‐based	   perspective,	   indigenous	   peoples’	   cultures	   remain	   quite	  
elusive	  concepts.	  This	  is	  not	  only	  because	  of	  the	  striking	  difference	  between	  the	  
cultural	   expressions	   of	   indigenous	   and	   non-­‐indigenous	   peoples	   in	   general,	   but	  
also	   because,	   until	   recently,	   no	   real	   attempt	   has	   been	   made	   by	   Western	  
countries	   significantly	   to	   understand	   and	   accept	   holism	   as	   the	   living	   force	   and	  
inspiration	   of	   indigenous	   cultures.	   Not	   only	   is	   holism	   one	   of	   the	   most	  
fundamental	  aspects	  of	  the	  lives	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  worldwide	  but,	  over	  the	  
centuries,	  and	  thanks	  to	  the	  traditional	  role	  of	  the	  guardians,	   the	  protection	  of	  
holistic	   values	   has	   guaranteed	   the	   survival	   of	   the	   collective	   consciousness	   of	  
indigenous	   communities.	   Most	   of	   indigenous	   cultures,	   indeed,	   holistically	   link	  
indigenous	  peoples	  to	  their	  land,	  their	  ancestors	  and	  their	  creation.	  
When	  colonization	  started	  and	  Europeans	  encountered	  indigenous	  peoples,	  they	  
did	   not	   believe	   they	   had	   discovered	   great	   civilizations	   with	   organised	   social	  
structures	  and	  important	  oral	  expressions	  from	  which	  colonizers	  could	  learn	  the	  
ancestral	  traditions	  of	  the	  world.	  New	  settlers	  and	  invaders	  saw	  only	  profit	  in	  the	  
land	  and	  the	  natural	   resources	   that	   indigenous	  peoples	  occupied.	  Difference	   in	  
habits,	  colour	  of	  the	  skin	  and	  cultural	  expressions	  automatically	  discharged	  any	  
idea	   of	   equality.	   And	   the	   presumption	   of	   cultural	   superiority	   over	   primitivism	  
prevailed	  over	  any	  philosophical	  discourse.	  Yet,	  the	  colonization	  process	  was	  not	  
just	   the	   clash	   of	   a	   ‘civilized	   society’	   with	   a	   ‘primitive	   one’.1	  In	   actual	   fact,	   it	  
deeply	   challenged	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   people	   of	   a	   culture	   to	   penetrate	   the	  
thought	   of	   another	   culture,	   and	   provoked	   a	   cultural	   shock	   in	   the	   observers	   of	  
indigenous	   communities.	   Indeed,	   every	   society	   of	   the	   world	   started	   as	  
indigenous;	   and	   Europeans	   were	   forced	   to	   recognise	   that	   their	   own	   cultures	  
were	  not	  the	  ‘natural’	  way	  people	  live,	  for	  the	  simple	  reason	  that	  other	  people	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  “The	   term	  primitive	   was	   once	   popular,	   but	   it	   falsely	   suggests	   a	   lack	   of	   cultural	   development	   or	   factual	  
understanding,	   since	   in	   fact	   many	   native	   peoples	   have	   complex	   languages	   and	  mythologies”	   see	   John	   L	  





live	   and	   do	   things	   differently2	  while	   surviving	   in	   their	   own	   environment.	  While	  
studying	  these	  intercultural	  encounters,	  anthropologist	  John	  L	  Wengle	  observed	  
that:3	  
	  
The	   stability	   of	   an	   individual’s	   sense	   of	   identity	   depends	   directly	   on	   the	  
‘innumerable	   identifications’	  he	  has	  established	  with	  the	   familiar,	  personal	  and	  
interpersonal,	   concrete	   and	   abstract,	   animate	   and	   inanimate	   of	   his	   past	   and	  
present	   existence.	   When	   these	   many	   identifications	   are	   threatened,	   as	   for	  
example	  when	  an	   individual’s	   social	  or	  physical	  environmental	  changes	   rapidly,	  
his	  sense	  of	  identity	  will	  be	  challenged.	  	  
	  
When	   very	   different	   cultures	  meet,	   it	   is	   believed	   by	   anthropologists	   that	   such	  
cross-­‐cultural	  contacts	  usually	  have	  dangerous	  repercussions	  to	  the	  members	  of	  
each	  society.	  If	  one	  society	  is	  much	  stronger	  than	  the	  other,	  such	  repercussions	  
may	  be	  psychologically	  and	  physically	  devastating	  for	  the	  weaker.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
indigenous	  peoples	  and	  Europeans,	  these	  cross-­‐cultural	  contacts	  have	  proved	  to	  
be	  mostly	  deleterious	  for	  indigenous	  peoples	  because	  their	  cultures	  were	  never	  
accepted,	  but	  historically	  rejected	  and	  damaged,	   if	  not	  destroyed.4	  Colonization	  
was	  followed	  by	  cultural	  repression	  and	  regression.	  The	  idea	  that	  every	  culture	  is	  
legitimate	  in	  its	  own	  right	  was	  never	  considered.	  As	  Franz	  Fanon	  pointed	  out	  in	  
his	  book:5	  	  
	  
…	   Colonialism	   is	   not	   satisfied	   merely	   with	   holding	   a	   people	   in	   its	   grip	   and	  
emptying	  the	  native’s	  brain	  of	  all	  form	  and	  content.	  By	  a	  kind	  of	  perverted	  logic,	  
it	  turns	  to	  the	  past	  of	  the	  oppressed	  people,	  and	  distorts,	  disfigures	  and	  destroys	  
it.6	  	  
	  
Since	   the	   time	   of	   contact	   with	   Europe,	   indigenous	   peoples	   have	   struggled	   to	  
rebuild	  the	  self-­‐esteem	  and	  self-­‐worth	  they	  have	  lost	  through	  the	  dispossession	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Abraham	  Rosman,	  Paula	  G	  Rubel	  and	  Maxine	  Weisgrau	  The	  Tapestry	  of	  Culture	   (Altamira	  Press,	  Lanham	  
and	  Plymouth	  UK,	  2009)	  at	  2.	  
3	  John	   L	   Wengle	   Ethnographers	   in	   the	   Field:	   the	   Phycology	   of	   Research	   (University	   of	   Alabama	   Press,	  
Tuscaloosa,	  1988)	  at	  7-­‐8.	  
4	  John	  W	  Griffith	  Joseph	  Conrad	  and	  the	  Anthropological	  Dilemma	  (Clarendon	  Press,	  Oxford,	  1995)	  at	  30.	  
5	  Franz	  Fanon	  The	  Wretched	  of	  the	  Earth	  (Grove	  Press,	  New	  York,	  1966).	  




of	   their	   lands	  and	  the	  destruction	  of	   their	  heritage.7	  The	   loss	  of	   the	  cultures	  of	  
many	  indigenous	  societies	  has	  so	  far	  been	  monumental.8	  	  
	  
This	  chapter	  introduces	  indigenous	  culture	  and	  holistic	  way	  of	  living	  and	  explains	  
how	   indigenous	  cultures	  differ	   from	  the	  traditional	  Western	   idea	  of	  culture	  we	  
have	   inherited.	   Such	   analysis	   is	   of	   great	   importance	   to	   understand	   why	   the	  
Western	  legal	  systems	  often	  fail	  to	  address	  and	  accommodate	  indigenous	  rights	  
and	  expectations.	  The	  chapter	  also	  explains	  why	  it	   is	  today	  still	  difficult	  for	  non	  
indigenous	   peoples	   to	   understand	   indigenous	   traditions	   and	   which	   concrete	  
efforts	   have	   been	  made	  by	  Western	   legal	   traditions	   to	   accept	   the	   fact	   that	   all	  
cultures	   deserve	   the	   same	   level	   of	   protection	   locally	   and	   internationally.	   The	  
chapter	  also	  explains	  why	  this	  thesis	  accepts	  the	  diversity	  of	  indigenous	  cultures	  
and	   will	   progressively	   focus	   on	   the	  more	   sacred	   and	   secret	   aspects	   of	   it.	   The	  
central	   focus	   on	   secrecy	   will	   de	   facto	   hinder	   any	   real	   specificity	   on	   what	  
indigenous	   cultures	   are	   in	   light	   of	   the	   focus	   on	   secrecy	   as	   the	   chosen	  
management	   for	   the	  preservation	  of	   the	  cultural	   information.	  Protocols	  among	  
indigenous	   communities	   dictate	   that	   some	   cultural	   information	   is	   spiritually	  
sensitive	  and	  must	  be	  kept	  secret	  and	  guarded	  by	  custodians.	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  
know	   what	   is	   secret	   (apart	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   must	   be	   highly	   regarded	   as	  
essential	  to	  be	  kept	  secret	  and	  under	  the	  custody	  of	  allocated	  guardians)	  unless,	  
somehow,	  the	  information	  enters	  the	  public	  domain.	  In	  this	  latter	  situation,	  the	  
nature	  of	   the	   information	  can	  be	  assessed	  case	  by	  case	  and	  the	  reasons	   for	   its	  
secrecy	   better	   understood.	   Common	   factor	   in	   any	   discourse	   on	   indigenous	  









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Julian	  E	  Kunnie	  and	  Nomalungelo	   I	  Goduka	   Indigenous	  Peoples‘	  Wisdom	  and	  Power	   (Ashgate,	  Aldershot,	  
2006)	  at	  xv.	  
8	  For	  further	  reading	  on	  the	  topic,	  see	  also	  the	  excellent	  works	  of	  Professors	  Mick	  Dodson,	  Larissa	  Behrendt,	  





2.1	  –	  Conceptions	  of	  Culture	  
	  
Culture	   in	   general,	   and	   indigenous	   peoples’	   cultures	   in	   particular,	   is	   a	   very	  
complex,	  multi-­‐layered	  subject.	   From	  a	  philosophical	  point	  of	  view,	   the	   idea	  of	  
culture	  was	  first	  ‘rationalised’	  by	  Plato	  who	  defined	  it	  ‘paideia’,	  as	  for	  the	  “ideal	  
of	  a	  philosophically-­‐shaped	  human	  being”.9	  In	  his	  thoughts,	  culture	  was	  intended	  
as	   the	   “true	   realization	   of	   human	   nature,	   the	   true	   cultivation	   of	   the	   human	  
being,	  the	  only	  true	  civilization	  or	  ‘culture’”.10	  The	  Romans	  further	  developed	  the	  
concept	   of	   culture	   and	   translated	   the	  word	   into	   ‘cultura	   anima’,	   which	  meant	  
‘civilization’	  or	   ‘process’.11	  The	  general	   idea,	   at	   that	   time,	  was	   that	   culture	  was	  
something	   to	  be	  attained,	   something	  not	   reachable	  by	  everyone.	  Only	   the	   few	  
who	  lived	  according	  to	  cultural	  value	  could	  grasp	  the	  ‘spiritual	  element’	  that	  was	  
at	   the	   core	  of	  what	   culture	   truthfully	  was.	  Over	   the	   centuries,	   culture	  became	  
the	  root,	  the	  foundation	  of	  modern	  Western	  civilizations	  and	  the	  reference	  point	  
from	   which	   the	   West	   judged	   other	   cultures	   it	   perceived	   as	   less	   developed.12	  
Culture	   was	   then	   limited	   to	   human	   thought/speculation	   and	   what	   the	   human	  
mind	  could	  create.	  It	  could	  never	  be	  associated	  with	  spiritualism,	  holism	  and	  the	  
knowledge	   acquired	   through	   a	   deep	   interaction	   with	   nature.	   Culture	   was	  
fabricated,	  acquired,	  and	  never	  intrinsic.	  
From	  an	  anthropological	  perspective,	   culture	   “includes	   the	   fundamental	   values	  
guiding	   human	   behaviours”. 13 	  “It	   involves	   at	   least	   three	   components:	   what	  
people	   think,	   what	   they	   do,	   and	   the	   material	   product	   they	   produce”. 14	  
Therefore,	  culture	  is	  created	  by	  human	  mental	  processes,	  beliefs,	  knowledge	  and	  
values.	  It	  includes,	  among	  other	  things,	  people’s	  behaviours,	  symbols,	  emotions,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Yvonne	  M	  Donders	  Towards	  a	  Right	  to	  Cultural	  Identity?	  (Intersentia,	  Antwerpen-­‐Oxford-­‐New	  York,	  2002)	  
at	  25.	  
10	  Supra	  at	  25.	  
11	  At	  25. 
12	  “Historically,	  culture	  as	  an	  analytic	  concept	   in	  anthropology	  developed	  when	  there	  were	  understood	  by	  
Europeans	   to	   be	   civilized	   people	   and	   ‘primitives’	   who	   lived	   unchanging	   and	   utterly	   different,	   although	  
internally	   coherent,	   lives	   which	   had	   to	   be	   tolerated	   not	   because	   they	   conformed	   to	   the	   values	   of	   the	  
observer	  but	  because	  they	  were,	  in	  a	  sense,	  off	  the	  edge	  of	  his	  or	  her	  moral	  universe”	  see	  Sally	  Engle	  Merry	  
‘Changing	   Rights,	   Changing	   Culture”	   in	   Jane	   K	   Cowan,	   Richard	   A	   Wilson	   and	   other	   Culture	   and	   Rights:	  
Anthropological	  Perspectives	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  2001)	  at	  41.	  
13	  Bret	  Wallach	  Understanding	  the	  Cultural	  Landscape	  (The	  Guilford	  Press,	  New	  York	  and	  London,	  2005)	  at	  
14.	  




rituals	  and	  ceremonies.15	  Most	  of	   the	  symbolism16	  and	   the	  patterns	  people	  use	  
as	   cultural	   expressions	  derive	   from	   the	  past	   and	   the	   traditions	   that	  have	  been	  
reshaped	   into	   the	   present.	   As	   such,	   culture	   represents	   a	   fundamental	   form	   of	  
communication	   through	   which	   humankind	   communicate	   and	   perpetuate	   their	  
knowledge	  and	  traditions.17	  It	   is	   through	  culture	  and	   its	   symbolism	  that	  human	  
beings	   “adapt	   to	   their	   physical	   and	   social	   environment,	   making	   necessary	  
adaptive	  strategies	  to	  fit	  new	  or	  changing	  circumstances,	  and	  then	  transmitting	  
this	   knowledge	   to	   the	   young	   as	   social	   lore”. 18 	  Since	   culture	   is	   so	   deeply	  
intertwined	  with	  the	  physical	  and	  social	  environment,	  its	  relativism	  becomes	  one	  
of	  its	  major	  features.	  Indeed,	  culture	  is	  an	  ‘integrated	  system’,	  in	  which	  all	  of	  its	  
parts	   or	   traits	   are	   “adjusted	   to	   each	   other	   and	   make	   sense	   in	   terms	   of	   each	  
other,	   and	   together	   they	   form	   a	   coherent	   and	   continuous	   design	   for	   living”.19	  
Taylor	  does	  not	  make	  any	  distinction	  between	  culture	  and	  civilization.	  According	  
to	  him,20	  “culture	  or	  civilization,	  taken	  in	  its	  ethnographic	  sense,	  is	  that	  complex	  
whole	  which	  includes	  knowledge,	  belief,	  art,	  morals,	  law,	  custom,	  and	  any	  other	  
capabilities	  and	  habits	  acquired	  by	  man	  as	  a	  member	  of	  society”.	  	  
Today	   anthropology	   rejects	   the	   concept	   that	   culture	   is	   an	   “integrated,	  
harmonious,	   consensual	   phenomena”	   and	   tends	   to	   consider	   culture	   more	   as	  
“historically	  produced,	  globally	  interconnected,	  internally	  contested,	  and	  marked	  
with	   ambiguous	   boundaries	   of	   identity	   and	   practice”. 21 	  Culture	   is	   now	  
understood	  as	  being:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  See	  Bodley	  at	  8.	  
16	  The	  anthropologist	  Leslie	  White	  wrote	  that	  “Culture	  consists	  of	  a	  system	  of	  symbols.	  A	  symbol	  is	  any	  sign	  
endowed	   with	   general	   or	   abstract	   meaning,	   and	   a	   sign,	   in	   turn,	   is	   some	   visual	   or	   auditory	   stimulus,	  
commonly	  a	  sound	  or	  a	  visual	  image,	  that	  signifies	  something	  specific…Symbols	  serve	  in	  this	  manner	  to	  sort	  
out	   and	   classify	   the	   world”	   and	   “…	   human	   symbols,	   especially	   words,	   are	   veritable	   taxonomies	   of	  
experience”	  see	  Robert	  F	  Murphy	  Cultural	  and	  Social	  Anthropology	  –	  An	  Overture	  (Prentice	  Hall,	  New	  Jersey,	  
1989)	  at	  24-­‐25;	  the	  late	  Clifford	  Geertz	  defined	  culture	  as	  “the	  fabric	  of	  meaning	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  human	  
beings	  interpret	  their	  experiences	  and	  guide	  their	  actions;	  social	  structure	  is	  the	  form	  that	  action	  takes,	  the	  
…	   network	   of	   social	   relations.	   Culture	   and	   social	   structure	   are	   …	   different	   abstractions	   from	   the	   same	  
phenomena”	   see	   Roger	   M	   Keesing	   and	   Andrew	   J	   Strathern	   Cultural	   Anthropology	   –	   A	   Contemporary	  
Perspective	  (Harcourt	  Brace	  &	  Company,	  Orlando,	  1998)	  at	  23.	  
17	  Abraham	  Rosman,	  Paula	  G	  Rubel	  and	  Maxine	  Weisgrau	  The	  Tapestry	  of	  Culture	  at	  5.	  
18	  Robert	  F	  Murphy	  Cultural	  and	  Social	  Anthropology	  –	  An	  Overture	  (Prentice	  Hall,	  New	  Jersey,	  1989)	  at	  26.	  
19	  See	  Murphy	  at	  29.	  
20	  Edward	  Burnett	  Tylor	  The	  Origins	  of	  Culture	  (Harper	  &	  Row	  Publishers,	  New	  York,	  1958)	  at	  1.	  
21	  Sally	   Engle	   Merry	   “Changing	   Rights,	   Changing	   Culture”	   in	   Jane	   K	   Cowan,	   Richard	   A	   Wilson	   and	   other	  




	  …	  historically	  produced	  rather	  than	  static,	  unbounded	  rather	  than	  bounded	  and	  
integrated;	  contested	  rather	  than	  consensual;	   incorporated	  within	  structures	  of	  
power	   such	   as	   the	   construction	   of	   hegemony;	   rooted	   in	   practices,	   symbols,	  
habits,	   patterns	   of	   practical	   mastery	   and	   practical	   rationality	   within	   cultural	  
categories	   of	   meaning	   rather	   than	   any	   simple	   dichotomy	   between	   ideas	   and	  
behaviour;	   and	   negotiated	   and	   constructed	   through	   human	   action	   rather	   than	  
superorganic	  forces.22	  
	  
From	  a	  philosophical	  and	  sociological	  perspective,	  culture	  is:	  	  
	  
…	  the	  production,	  distribution,	  exchange	  and	  reception	  of	  textualised	  meaning.	  
…	  Per	   se,	   ‘culture’	   refers	   to	   the	  complex	  of	   institutions,	  artefacts	  and	  practices	  
that	   make	   up	   our	   symbolic	   universe:	   to	   art	   and	   religion,	   science	   and	   sport,	  
education	  and	  leisure.23	  	  
	  
Raymond	  Williams24	  makes	  a	  distinction	  between	  culture	  as	   ‘art’	  and	  culture	  as	  
‘the	  whole	  way	  of	  life’	  or	  society.25	  The	  first	  being	  the	  production	  of	  a	  culture,	  as	  
opposed	  to	  the	  inner	  societal	  forces	  which	  brought	  that	  specific	  form	  of	  culture	  
into	   existence.	   According	   to	   the	   UNESCO	   Mexico	   City	   Declaration	   on	   Cultural	  
Policies	  (1982):26	  	  
	  
…	   in	   its	   widest	   sense,	   culture	   may	   now	   be	   said	   to	   be	   the	   whole	   complex	   of	  
distinctive	   spiritual,	   material,	   intellectual	   and	   emotional	   features	   that	  
characterize	   a	   society	  or	   social	   group.	   It	   includes	  not	  only	   the	  arts	   and	   letters,	  
but	   also	   modes	   of	   life,	   the	   fundamental	   rights	   of	   the	   human	   being,	   value	  
systems,	   traditions	   and	   beliefs;	   that	   it	   is	   culture	   that	   gives	   man	   the	   ability	   to	  
reflect	   upon	   himself.	   It	   is	   culture	   that	   makes	   us	   specifically	   human,	   rational	  
beings,	  endowed	  with	  a	  critical	  judgment	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  moral	  commitment.	  It	  is	  
through	  culture	   that	  we	  discern	  values	  and	  make	  choices.	   It	   is	   through	  culture	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Supra	  at	  41-­‐42.	  
23	  Andrew	  Milner	  Re-­‐Imagining	  Cultural	   Studies	   (SAGE	  Publications,	   London	  and	  Thousand	  Oaks,	   2002)	   at	  
10-­‐11. 
24	  Raymond	  Williams	  Culture	  and	  Society	  1870-­‐1950	  (2nd	  ed,	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  New	  York,	  1983).	  
25	  Andrew	  Milner	  Re-­‐Imagining	  Cultural	  Studies	  at	  13.	  
26	  UNESCO	   Universal	   Declaration	   on	   Cultural	   Diversity,	   Nov	   2,	   2001,	   UNESCO	   Doc	   31C/Res	   25,	   Annex	   1	  
(2001),	   adopted	   by	   the	   General	   Conference	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   Educational,	   Scientific	   and	   Cultural	  
Organization	   at	   its	   thirty-­‐first	   session	   on	   2	   November	   2001	  




that	   man	   expresses	   himself,	   becomes	   aware	   of	   himself,	   recognizes	   his	  
incompleteness,	   questions	   his	   own	   achievements,	   seeks	   untiringly	   for	   new	  
meanings	  and	  creates	  works	  through	  which	  he	  transcends	  his	  limitations.	  	  
	  
To	  understand	  material	  culture	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  study	  human	  subjects	   in	   their	  
own	   society:	   the	  way	  people	   think	   through	   themselves;	   the	  way	   they	  perceive	  
themselves	  (identities),	  and	  how	  they	  use	  culture	  in	  their	  lives	  to	  preserve	  their	  
human	  bond	  with	   their	   surroundings	   and	   traditions.27	  Subjects	   and	  objects	   are	  
profoundly	   linked	  together	  and,	  only	  by	  “considering	  one,	  we	  find	  the	  other”.28	  
Culture	  is,	  indeed,	  both	  a	  “cognitive	  system	  organised	  in	  individual	  minds”	  and	  a	  
“system	   shared	  within	   a	   community”;29	  a	   system	  which	   holds	   special	   value	   for	  
the	  collective	  meanings	  of	  the	  public.	  Culture,	  therefore,	  can	  be	  a	  way	  of	  life	  as	  
well	   as	   a	  work	  of	   art.	  As	   such,	   culture	   is	  not	  only	   something	   that	  belongs	   to	  a	  
particular	   group	   of	   people,	   associated	   with	   their	   heritage,	   but	   also	   external	  
influences,	   globalization	   and	   creolization	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	   cultural	  
phenomena.30	  According	  to	  the	  World	  Commission	  on	  Culture	  and	  Development	  
(WCCD),	   culture	   can	   be	   understood	   simultaneously	   as	   tradition	   and	  
communication:	  “as	  roots,	  destiny,	  history,	  continuity	  and	  sharing	  on	  one	  hand,	  
and	  as	  impulses,	  choice,	  the	  future,	  change	  and	  variation	  on	  the	  other”.31	  	  
As	  regards	  ‘culture’,	  the	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  (1945)32	  (Art	  13,	  1	  (b);	  55	  
(b);	  57	  and	  62)	  and	  other	  international	  instruments	  like	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  
of	  Human	  Rights	  (1948)	  (Art	  27),	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  
and	   Cultural	   Rights 33 	  (Preamble,	   Article	   3	   and	   15),	   the	   General	   Assembly	  
Declaration	  on	  Principles	  of	  International	  Law	  Concerning	  Friendly	  Relations	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Chris	  Tilley,	  Webb	  Keane	  and	  other	  (eds)	  Handbook	  of	  Material	  Culture	  at	  4.	  
28	  At	  4.	  
29	  Roger	  M	  Keesing	  and	  Andrew	  J	  Strathern	  Cultural	  Anthropology	  –	  A	  Contemporary	  Perspective	  at	  51.	  
30	  The	   first	   being	   accepted	   and	   explained	   by	   cultural	   relativism,	   the	   second	   typical	   of	   deconstructuralist	  
trends.	  See	  supra	  at	  133.	  
31	  At	  132;	  see	  also	  UNESCO	  Our	  Creative	  Diversity	  (1995)	  electronic	  document	  
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001055/105586e.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  15/12/2014.	  
32	  The	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  was	  signed	  on	  26	  June	  1945,	  in	  San	  Francisco,	  at	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  
United	  Nations	   Conference	   on	   International	  Organization,	   and	   came	   into	   force	   on	   24	  October	   1945.	   The	  
Statute	  of	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  is	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  Charter.	  
33	  International	   Covenant	   on	   Economic,	   Social	   and	   Cultural	   Rights,	   adopted	   and	   opened	   for	   signature,	  
ratification	  and	  accession	  by	  General	  Assembly	  resolution	  2200A	  (XXI)	  of	  16	  December	  1966	  entry	  into	  force	  




Cooperation	   among	   States	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	   Charter	   of	  United	  Nations34	  
(1970)	  refer	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  culture	  in	  “connection	  with	  some	  fields	  of	  matters	  
in	  which	  cooperation	  among	  states	  shall	  be	  pursued	  by	  the	  United	  Nations”.35	  In	  
the	  above-­‐mentioned	  provisions,	  the	  term	  culture	  appears	  in	  its	  more	  restricted	  
sense	   covering	   literary	   and	   artistic	   activities,	   perhaps	   even	   scientific	   and	  
technical	  activities	  but	  definitely	  not	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  matters.36	  
In	   its	   Universal	   Declaration	   on	   Cultural	   Diversity	   (2001),	   UNESCO	   affirms	   that	  
culture:37	  
	  
…	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  set	  of	  distinctive	  spiritual,	  material,	  intellectual	  and	  
emotional	   features	   of	   society	   or	   a	   social	   group,	   and	   that	   it	   encompasses,	   in	  
addition	   to	  art	  and	   literature,	   lifestyles,	  ways	  of	   living	   together,	   value	   systems,	  
traditions	  and	  beliefs.	  	  
	  
UNESCO’s	  aim	  is	  to	  ensure	  the	  preservation	  and	  promotion	  of	  cultural	  diversity	  
in	   the	  world	  as	   an	  effective	  mean	   to	   guarantee	   the	  well-­‐being	  of	   international	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  The	  Declaration	  on	  Principles	  of	  International	  Law	  concerning	  Friendly	  Relations	  and	  Co-­‐operation	  among	  
States	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly	  on	  24	  
October	   1970	   (resolution	   26/25	   (XXV)),	   during	   a	   commemorative	   session	   to	   celebrate	   the	   twenty-­‐fifth	  
anniversary	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  (A/PV.1883).	  
35	  Sienho	  Yee	  and	  Jacques-­‐Yvan	  Morin	  Multiculturalism	  and	  International	  Law	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers,	  
The	  Netherlands,	  2009)	  at	  153-­‐154.	  
36	  At	  154.	  
37 	  The	   Universal	   Declaration	   on	   Cultural	   Diversity	   specifies	   that	   such	   definition	   is	   “in	   line	   with	   the	  
conclusions	   of	   the	  World	   Conference	   on	   Cultural	   Policies	   (Mondiacult,	  Mexico	   City,	   1982),	   of	   the	  World	  
Commission	   on	   Culture	   and	   Development	   (Our	   Creative	   Diversity,	   1995),	   and	   of	   the	   Intergovernmental	  
Conference	   on	   Cultural	   Policies	   for	   Development	   (Stockholm,	   1998)”.	   The	   Preamble	   also	   stresses	   that	  
“respect	  for	  the	  diversity	  of	  cultures,	  tolerance,	  dialogue	  and	  cooperation,	  in	  a	  climate	  of	  mutual	  trust	  and	  
understanding	   are	   among	   the	   best	   guarantees	   of	   international	   peace	   and	   security”.	   The	  Declaration	   also	  
focuses	   on	   other	   important	   concepts	   such	   as	   cultural	   diversity	   by	   confirming	   that	   “Culture	   takes	   diverse	  
forms	  across	  time	  and	  space.	  This	  diversity	  is	  embodied	  in	  the	  uniqueness	  and	  plurality	  of	  the	  identities	  of	  
the	  groups	  and	  societies	  making	  up	  humankind.	  As	  a	  source	  of	  exchange,	  innovation	  and	  creativity,	  cultural	  
diversity	  is	  as	  necessary	  for	  humankind	  as	  biodiversity	  is	  for	  nature.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  the	  common	  heritage	  
of	  humanity	  and	  should	  be	  recognized	  and	  affirmed	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  present	  and	  future	  generations	  (Art	  
1).	  In	  so	  doing,	  cultural	  pluralism	  is	  a	  guarantee	  of	  social	  cohesion	  in	  civil	  societies	  (Art	  2);	  cultural	  diversity	  
can	   be	   a	   factor	   in	   development	   (Art	   4);	   Human	   rights	   bodies	   are	   the	   enabling	   environments	   for	   cultural	  
diversity	   (Art	  5).	   The	  Declaration	  also	   reaffirms	   the	   right	   for	   all	   cultures	   to	  express	   themselves	  and	  make	  
themselves	  known	  to	  the	  world	  (Art	  6),	  stressing	  that	  cultural	  diversity	  and	  creativity	  are	  related	  and	  that	  
‘Creation	   draws	   on	   the	   roots	   of	   cultural	   tradition,	   but	   flourishes	   in	   contact	   with	   other	   cultures.	   For	   this	  
reason,	   heritage	   in	   all	   its	   forms	  must	   be	   preserved,	   enhanced	   and	  handed	  on	   to	   future	   generations	   as	   a	  
record	   of	   human	   experience	   and	   aspirations,	   so	   as	   to	   foster	   creativity	   in	   all	   its	   diversity	   and	   to	   inspire	  
genuine	   dialogue	   among	   cultures”	   (Art	   7)	   while	   ensuring	   that	   “the	   free	   circulation	   of	   ideas	   and	   works,	  
cultural	   policies	   must	   create	   conditions	   conducive	   to	   the	   production	   and	   dissemination	   of	   diversified	  
cultural	  goods	  and	  services	  through	  cultural	  industries	  that	  have	  the	  means	  to	  assert	  themselves	  at	  the	  local	  
and	  global	   level.	   It	   is	   for	  each	  State,	  with	  due	   regard	   to	   its	   international	  obligations,	   to	  define	   its	   cultural	  
policy	   and	   to	   implement	   it	   through	   the	   means	   it	   considers	   fit,	   whether	   by	   operational	   support	   or	  
appropriate	   regulations	   (Art	   9)”	   UNESCO	   electronic	   document	   <http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-­‐




relations	  among	  States.	  One	  of	  the	  objectives	  in	  its	  Action	  Plan	  to	  be	  achieved	  is	  
the	   deepening	   of	   the	   international	   debate	   on	   questions	   related	   to	   cultural	  
diversity	  especially	  in	  respect	  to	  development	  and	  policy	  making	  at	  the	  national	  
and	   international	   level.38	  Resolution	   60/167	   (2006),39	  entitled	   “Human	   Rights	  
and	   Cultural	   Diversity”,	   develops	   some	   of	   the	   key	   concepts	   of	   the	   UNESCO	  
Declaration	   by	   including,	   for	   example,	   the	   promotion	   of	   the	   cultural	   rights	   of	  
indigenous	  peoples.40	  According	  to	  the	  Resolution,	  acknowledging	  and	  fostering	  
the	   diversity,	   of	   the	   world	   is	   the	   best	   way	   to	   guarantee	   peace,	   freedom	   and	  
progress	  on	  earth.41	  The	   respect	   for	  every	  culture	  and	   its	  distinctive	   features	   is	  
considered	   as	   an	   enrichment	   to	   the	   cultural	   life	   of	   humankind	   and	   must	   be	  
guaranteed.42	  	  
While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  world	  seems	  oriented	  toward	  an	  acceptance	  of	  cultural	  
diversities	   in	   all	   their	   forms,	   it	   is	   also	   true	   that	   the	   language	   used	   to	   identify	  
those	  same	  cultures	  is	  often	  imbued	  with	  the	  Western	  idea	  of	  ‘culture’,	  making	  
de	   facto	   impossible,	   for	   a	  Westerner,	   to	   understand	   different	   cultures	   such	   as	  
the	  indigenous	  ones.	  The	  best	  way	  to	  understand	  a	  culture	  rests	  in	  the	  freedom	  
for	  such	  culture	  to	  describe	  itself,	  with	  its	  own	  language	  and	  symbolism.	  	  
The	  next	  section	  will	  attempt	  to	  describe	  what	  holism	  is	  and	  why	  it	  is	  important	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Sienho	  Yee	  and	  Jacques-­‐Yvan	  Morin	  Multiculturalism	  and	  International	  Law	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers,	  
The	  Netherlands,	  2009)	  at	  155.	  
39	  Resolution	  adopted	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly	  on	  the	  report	  of	  the	  Third	  Committee	  (A/60/509/Add.2	  (Part	  
II))	  60/167	  -­‐	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Cultural	  Diversity	  (2006).	  
40	  “Recognizing	  also	  that	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  indigenous	  people	  and	  their	  cultures	  and	  traditions	  
will	   contribute	   to	   the	   respect	   for	   and	   observance	   of	   cultural	   diversity	   among	   all	   peoples	   and	   nations”	  
electronic	  document	  <www.worldlii.org/int/other/UNGARsn/2005/190.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  14/12/2014.	  
41	  Supra.	  
42	  “In	  regard	  to	  human	  rights,	  the	  Resolution	  recognizes	  that,	  while	  cultures	  are	  distinctive	  and	  may	  differ	  
significantly	   one	   form	   another,	   it	   is	   the	   duty	   of	   human	   rights	   bodies	   to	   protect	   not	   only	   the	   relativity	   of	  
every	  culture,	  but	  also	  to	  foster	  and	  protect	  those	  common	  set	  of	  universal	  values	  that	  humans	  share.	  This	  
holds	  true	  because	  human	  rights	  are	  and	  remain	  universal,	  indivisible,	  interdependent	  and	  interrelated.	  As	  
such,	   and	   in	   total	   consideration	   of	   every	   cultural	   diversity,	   it	   is	   the	   duty	   of	   states	   to	   guarantee	   the	  
protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  all	  human	  rights	  and	  fundamental	  freedoms.	  The	  Resolution	  reaffirms	  that	  ‘all	  
human	   rights	   are	   universal,	   indivisible,	   interdependent	   and	   interrelated	   and	   that	   the	   international	  
community	  must	  treat	  human	  rights	  globally	  in	  a	  fair	  and	  equal	  manner,	  on	  the	  same	  footing	  and	  with	  the	  
same	   emphasis,	   and	   that,	   while	   the	   significance	   of	   national	   and	   regional	   particularities	   and	   various	  
historical,	  cultural	  and	  religious	  backgrounds	  must	  be	  borne	  in	  mind,	   it	   is	  the	  duty	  of	  States,	  regardless	  of	  
their	  political,	   economic	  and	   cultural	   systems,	   to	  promote	  and	  protect	   all	   human	   rights	   and	   fundamental	  





2.2	  -­‐	  Indigenous	  Traditions:	  A	  Holistic	  Approach	  to	  Life	  	  
	  
Indigenous	   cultures	   are	   generally	   holistic;	   where	   holism 43 	  can	   be	   rightly	  
interpreted	  as	  the	  spiritual	  and	  symbolic	  element	  that	  integrates	  and	  gives	  life	  to	  
all	  the	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  cultures	  of	  indigenous	  peoples.	  It	  is	  the	  spiritual	  belief	  
that	  bonds	  together	  the	  members	  of	  an	  indigenous	  community	  and	  ties	  them	  to	  
their	   land	   and	   their	   shared	   traditions,	   while,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   inspires	   the	  
continuous	   creation	   of	   idiosyncratic	   cultural	   expressions.	   Through	   ceremonies	  
and	   rituals,	   indigenous	   peoples	   keep	   these	   traditions	   from	   the	   past	   alive	   and	  
convey	   them	   to	   future	   generations.	   Such	   ceremonies	   tell	   stories	   of	   creation,	  
survival	   and	   evolution,	   resistance	   and	   resilience	   and	   their	   contact	   with	   the	  
‘divine’.	  Holism	  is	  the	  common	  understanding	  of	  life	  as	  perceived	  by	  indigenous	  
peoples.	  It	  is	  the	  soul	  of	  an	  indigenous	  community;	  its	  history,	  belief	  system	  and	  
symbolism.	   It	   is	   collective	   in	   nature	   and	   transmitted	   from	   one	   generation	   to	  
another	   orally	   or	   through	   cultural/symbolic	   expressions.	   Holism	   is	   shaped	   by	  
time,	  and	  it	  shapes	  time,	  the	  memories	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  their	  customs.	  
It	  is	  the	  force,	  the	  identity	  and	  the	  symbolism	  a	  community	  has	  experienced	  and	  
chosen	  as	  its	  collective	  distinctiveness	  over	  the	  ages.	  It	  is	  the	  ‘dream’,	  the	  ‘bark’,	  
the	   ‘tikanga’	   by	   which	   ‘specific’	   indigenous	   tribes	   and	   members	   of	   the	   tribe	  
identify	   themselves;	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   is	   the	   spiritual	   force	   leading	   to	   the	  
‘dream’,	   the	   ‘bark’	   and	   the	   ‘tikanga’	  which	   then	   shape	   the	   cultural	   features	  of	  
the	   community.	   Holism	   is	   the	   living	   bond	   between	   indigenous	   peoples,	   their	  
universe	   with	   its	   natural	   phenomena	   and	   the	   land	   they	   have	   traditionally	  
occupied.	  Native	  peoples	  believe	  that:44	  	  
	  
…	   unseen	   powers	   and	   creative	   forces	   formed	   the	   Earth,	   sun,	   stars,	   moon,	  
mountains,	   oceans,	   rivers,	   lakes,	   valleys,	   plains	   and	   other	   elements	   of	   the	  
natural	   environment.	   …	   Creative	   forces	   set	   the	   world	   in	   motion,	   establishing	  
natural	   laws	   by	  which	   the	   animate	   and	   inanimate	   live,	   sometimes	   in	   harmony	  
sometimes	  in	  conflict.	  Creative	  forces	  exist	  today,	  often	  manifesting	  themselves	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  “Holism	  is	  the	  belief	  that	  forces	  transcending	  humans	  explain	  social	  structure	  and	  change,	  and	  that	  even	  
the	   thoughts,	   decisions,	   and	   actions	   of	   people	   are	   explained	   by	   those	   forces”	   see	   James	   A	   Bell	  
Reconstructing	  Prehistory	  (Temple	  University	  Press,	  Philadelphia,	  1994)	  at	  271. 
44	  Gerald	  McMaster	  and	  Clifford	  E	  Trafzer	   (eds)	  Native	  Universe	  –	  Voices	  of	   Indian	  American	   (Smithsonian	  




in	   the	  work	   of	  Native	   peoples,	   particularly	   poets,	   artists,	   dancers,	   and	   singers.	  
These	  spirits	  are	  alive	  in	  every	  cell,	  every	  atom	  of	  the	  Native	  universe.	  They	  are	  a	  
part	  of	  the	  whole,	  the	  agent	  that	  brought	  forth	  and	  keeps	  life	  in	  motion.	  
	  
The	   ‘dreamtime’	   of	   Australian	   Aborigines,	   the	   Sundance	   ritual	   of	   some	   North	  
American	  First	  Nations,	   the	  Ghost	  Dance	   (circle	  dance)	  among	  the	  Sioux	  or	   the	  
hallucinogen-­‐induced	  visions	  of	   indigenous	  communities	   in	  Amazonia	  represent	  
the	   capability	  of	   indigenous	  peoples	   to	   reach	  altered	  and	  heightened	   states	  of	  
consciousness	  and	  visual	  perceptions	  through	  which	  the	  spirits	  and	  the	  cosmos	  
communicate	  with	  them	  and	  tell	  them	  about	  their	  creation.	  Indigenous	  cultures	  
are	  strongly	  bonded	  with	   the	  spiritual	  and	  the	  sacred:	  a	  concept	  often	  alien	   to	  
Western	   cultures	   that,	   generally	   speaking,	   do	   not	   recognize	   the	   sacred	   in	  
nature.45	  
Over	  the	  centuries,	  most	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  had	  to	  face	  were	  
essentially	   related	   to	   the	   presumption	   that	  Western	   scholars	   had	   the	   ‘mental	  
resources’	  to	  understand	  indigenous	  peoples’	  cultures.	  The	  problem	  was	  that	  the	  
good	  part	  of	  the	  studies	  on	  indigenous	  cultures	  was	  essentially	  limited	  to	  passive	  
observation	  and	  not	  to	  active	  participation.	  For	  a	  very	   long	  time,	  no	  researcher	  
thought	   to	   interact	   with	   indigenous	   peoples	   as	   a	   participant	   in	   their	   rituals,	  
relations	   and	   activities,	   or	   to	   blend	   with	   their	   collective	   consciousness. 46	  
Anthropologists	  observed,	  but	  did	  not	  really	  understand	  what	  they	  saw,	  as	  well	  
explained	  by	  Winch	  in	  “Understanding	  a	  Primitive	  Society”:47	  	  
	  
…	   an	   anthropologist	   studying	   such	   a	   people	  wishes	   to	  make	   those	   beliefs	   and	  
practices	   intelligible	   to	   himself	   and	   his	   readers.	   This	   means	   presenting	   an	  
account	  of	  them	  that	  will	  somehow	  satisfy	  the	  criteria	  of	  rationality	  demanded	  
by	  the	  culture	  to	  which	  he	  and	  his	  readers	  belong:	  a	  culture	  whose	  conception	  of	  
rationality	   is	   deeply	   affected	   by	   the	   achievements	   and	   the	   methods	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  See	  Mircae	  Eliade	  The	  Sacred	  and	  the	  Profane:	  The	  Nature	  of	  Religion	  (Harcourt	  Brace	  Jovanovich,	  1987);	  
Franz	  Boas	  Race,	  Language	  and	  Culture	  (Forgotten	  Books,	  2012);	  Franz	  Boas	  Anthropology	  and	  Modern	  Life	  
(Dover	  Publications,	  1987).	  
46	  H	   Russell	   Bernard	   (ed)	   Handbook	   of	  Methods	   in	   Cultural	   Anthropology	   (Altamira	   Press,	  Walnut	   Creek,	  
London	  and	  New	  Delhi,	  1998)	  at	  259-­‐261.	  




sciences,	  and	  one	  which	  treats	  such	  things	  as	  a	  belief	  in	  magic	  or	  the	  practice	  of	  
consulting	  the	  oracles	  as	  almost	  a	  paradigm	  of	  the	  irrational.48	  
	  
To	   such	   detached	   observers,	   holism	   represented	   something	   mysterious	   and	  
elusive	   that	   scholars	   failed	   to	   fully	   comprehend	   in	   its	   symbolic	  manifestations	  
and	  cosmologic	  readings.49	  Being	  holism	  the	  collective	   interpretation	  of	   life	  and	  
the	   universe	   in	   which	   a	   given	   indigenous	   community	   lives,	   it	   can	   also	   be	  
symbolic,	  spiritual	  and	  sacred,	  known	  and	  secret.	  In	  this,	  the	  notion	  of	  holism	  is	  
bound	   to	   that	   of	   culture.	   They	   both	   are	   metaphysical	   processes,	   where	   the	  
‘thing’	   is	   the	   very	   final	   ‘product’	   of	   a	   creative	   process	   entailing	   a	   spiritual	  
journey.	   In	  most	  cases	  the	  journey	  is	  more	  important	  than	  the	  final	  product.	   In	  
this,	  holism	  differs	   from	  the	  Western	   idea	  of	   culture	   in	   the	  very	   same	  abstract	  
creative	  process	  that	  associates	  them.	  It	  is	  also	  connected	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  religion.	  
As	  Deloria	  explains:50	  
	  
Something	   is	   observed	   or	   experienced	   by	   a	   community,	   and	   the	   symbols	   and	  
sequences	  of	  the	  mythology	  are	  given	  together	  in	  an	  event	  that	  appears	  so	  much	  
out	   of	   the	   ordinary	   experimental	   sequence	   as	   to	   impress	   itself	   upon	   the	  
collective	  memories	   of	   the	   community	   for	   a	   sufficiently	   long	   duration	   of	   time.	  
The	  basic	  myth	  may	  be	  refined	  to	  some	  extent,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  very	  much	  
editing	  because	  it	   is	  the	  common	  property	  of	  the	  community,	  not	  the	  exclusive	  








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  At	  307.	  
49	  For	  further	  reading	  on	  the	  subject	  see	  Kathleen	  L	  Gregory	  “Native-­‐View	  Paradigm:	  Multiple	  Cultures	  and	  
Culture	  Conflicts	  in	  Organizations”	  (1983)	  28	  3	  Administrative	  Science	  Quarterly	  359.	  




2.3	  –	  Indigenous	  Cosmology	  and	  Spiritual	  Symbolism	  –	  The	  Guarded	  
Knowledge	  
	  
Indigenous	   peoples’	   universe	   includes	   dreams	   of	   a	   cosmology	   that	   often	  
‘surprised’	   them	  with	   its	  marvels.	  A	  universe	  full	  of	  memories	  which	  are	  slowly	  
fading	   away	   along	   with	   the	   keepers	   of	   those	   ancestral	   recollections.	   In	   this	  
world,	  the	  power	  of	  spirits	  was	  to	  be	  found	  in	  rivers,	  rock	  formations,	  mountains,	  
forests,	  oceans	  and	  plateaus;	  places	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  considered	  sacred.	  
They	   lived	   and	   visited	   these	   places	   to	   hear	   the	   ‘voices’	   of	   spirits,	   gods,	   power	  
beings	   and	   their	   ancestors.	   Indigenous	   tribes	   sanctified	   these	   locations	   with	  
ceremonies,	  rites,	  dances	  and	  songs.51	  They	  created	  stories	  located	  in	  these	  holy	  
spots	  and	  transmitted	  to	  descendants	   the	  mental	  map	  of	  where	  these	  spiritual	  
forces	   could	   be	   found.52	  Native	   tribes	   believed	   that	   the	   earth,	   sky	   and	   spirit	  
world	   were	   one.	   Deep	   down	   they	   knew	   that	   the	   Creator	   or	   Great	   Spirit	   had	  
placed	  all	   things	  on	  earth	  for	  a	  purpose,	  and	  that	  human	  survival	  depended	  on	  
their	  capacity	  to	  live	  in	  balance	  with	  all	  the	  seen	  and	  unseen	  things.53	  
	  
For	   thousands	  of	  years,	  Native	  peoples	  have	   looked	  to	   the	  skies	   to	  understand	  
their	   place	   in	   the	   cosmos	   and	   organize	   their	   daily	   lives.	   Seasonal	   ceremonies	  
marked	  the	  equinoxes	  and	  solstices,	  and	  tribes	  throughout	  Americas	  used	  these	  
solar	  cycles	  as	  guides	  for	  the	  best	  time	  to	  hunt,	  fish,	  and	  plant.	  The	  sun,	  moon,	  
and	  stars	  are	  linked	  to	  stories	  of	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  universe,	  of	  different	  Native	  
peoples,	  and	  of	  heroic	  figures.54	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  “Many	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  in	  common	  their	  beliefs	  that	  the	  universe	  is	  populated	  by	  a	  ‘multitude	  of	  
supernatural	   beings’	   that	   communicate	  with	   them	   through	  dreams,	   visions	   and	  during	   rituals.	   Therefore,	  
they	  have	  created	  ceremonies	  and	  cultural	  expressions	  that	  keep	  open	  the	  gate	  between	  their	  world	  and	  
the	  one	  of	  the	  Great	  Spirits.	  Ancestors,	  for	  example,	  are	  venerated	  as	  spirits,	  and	  their	  ‘voice’	  often	  guides	  
indigenous	  communities	  to	  specific	  hunting	  areas	  or	  sacred	  locations”	  see	  Gerald	  McMaster	  and	  Clifford	  E	  
Trafzer	   (eds)	  Native	  Universe	  –	  Voices	  of	   Indian	  American	   (Smithsonian	   Institution	  &	  National	  Geographic,	  
Washington,	  2004)	  at	  16.	  
52	  John	  L	  Esposito,	  Darrel	   J	  Fasching	  and	  Todd	  Lewis	  World	  Religions	  Today	   (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  New	  
York,	  2009)	  at	  48-­‐49.	  
53	  Gerald	  McMaster	  and	  Clifford	  E	  Trafzer	  (eds)	  Native	  Universe	  –	  Voices	  of	  Indian	  American	  at	  85.	  




Spirituality	   is	  the	  axis	  mundi55	  around	  which	  all	  the	  other	  aspects	  of	   indigenous	  
peoples’	  culture	  revolve;	  it	  is	  the	  glue,	  the	  most	  important	  social	  component,	  the	  
basic	   philosophy	   and	   value	   system	   around	   which	   the	   whole	   indigenous	  
community	   constantly	  develops.	   Indigenous	   religious	  beliefs	   represent	   the	  way	  
indigenous	  peoples	  understand	   the	  world	   they	   inhabit	   and	   the	   appreciation	  of	  
the	   elements	   which	   sustain	   life,	   such	   as	   water,	   trees,	   land,	   food,	   etc.	   Their	  
ceremonies	   are	   therefore	   celebrations	   of	   life,	   not	   just	   of	   human	   life.56	  In	   this	  
celebration	  of	  life,	  the	  universe	  is	  generally	  conceived	  as	  being	  formed	  by	  three	  
parts:	   sky,	   earth	   and	   underworld;	   all	   are	   connected	   by	   an	   axis.	   Though	   every	  
indigenous	   community	   believes	   the	   universe	   to	   be	   inhabited	   by	   different	  
entities,	  most	  agree	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  this	  axis,	  or	  Pillar	  of	  the	  World.	  The	  hole	  
created	  by	  this	  axis/pillar	  opens	  the	  road	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Being	  and	  through	  this	  
holy	   spirits	   communicate	  with	   shamans	  and	  other	  members	  of	   the	   community	  
trained	  in	  the	  sacred.57	  
Though	  indigenous	  representations	  of	  the	  spiritual	  world	  may	  differ	  from	  tribe	  to	  
tribe,	  all	  indigenous	  peoples	  seem	  to	  share	  a	  deep	  indebtedness	  to	  nature.	  Great	  
natural	  phenomena	  were,	  indeed,	  believed	  to	  embody	  very	  powerful	  spirits.	  The	  
Sun	  was	   thus	  often	   identified	  with	   the	  Master	  of	  Breath,	  whereas	   Sunrise	  was	  
considered	   the	   “greatest	   daily	   event,	   and	   the	   annual	   march	   of	   the	   Sun	   from	  
north	   to	   south	  and	  back	  again	  was	   seen	   to	   control	   the	   seasons,	   the	  growth	  of	  
crops	  and	  the	  habits	  of	  wild	  animals”.58	  Dances	  were	  dedicated	  all	  over	  the	  world	  
to	  the	  Sun,	  and	  children	  were	  presented	  to	  the	  Sun	  in	  ceremonies.	  The	  Sky	  itself	  
was	   considered	   as	   one	   of	   the	  most	   powerful	   of	   all	   entities.	   Its	  mysteries	   have	  
been	  observed	  since	  the	  dawn	  of	  time	  and	  many	  indigenous	  tribes	  regarded	  and	  
still	   regard	   it	   as	   a	  deity.	  Durkheim	  considered	   indigenous	   religions	   as	   a	  unified	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  “…	  we	  have	  a	  sequence	  of	  religious	  conceptions	  and	  cosmological	  images	  that	  are	  inseparably	  connected	  
and	   form	  a	   system	   that	  might	   be	   called	   the	   ‘system	  of	   the	  world’	   prevalent	   in	   traditional	   societies:	   (a)	   a	  
sacred	  place	  constitutes	  a	  break	  in	  the	  homogeneity	  of	  space;	  (b)	  this	  break	  is	  symbolized	  by	  an	  opening	  by	  
which	  passage	  from	  one	  cosmic	  region	  to	  another	   is	  made	  possible	  (from	  heaven	  to	  earth	  and	  vice	  versa;	  
from	  earth	  to	  the	  underworld);	  (c)	  communication	  with	  heaven	  is	  expressed	  by	  one	  or	  another	  od	  certain	  
images,	  all	  of	  which	  refer	  to	  the	  axis	  mundi:	  pillar	  (cf.	  the	  universalis	  columna),	   ladder	  (cf.	  Jacob’s	   ladder),	  
mountain,	  tree,	  vine,	  etc.;	  (d)	  around	  this	  cosmic	  axis	  lies	  the	  world	  (=	  our	  world),	  hence	  the	  axis	  is	  located	  
‘in	  the	  middle’,	  at	  the	  ‘navel	  of	  the	  earth’;	  it	  is	  the	  Center	  of	  the	  World”	  see	  Mircea	  Eliade	  The	  Sacred	  and	  
the	  Profane	  (Harcourt,	  Brace	  &	  World	  Inc.,	  1959)	  at	  37.	  
56	  Jennifer	  IM	  Reid	  (ed)	  Religion	  and	  Global	  Culture	  (Lexington	  Books,	  Lanham-­‐USA,	  2003)	  at	  40-­‐41. 
57	  Mircea	  Eliade	  Shamanism	  (Routledge	  &Kegan	  Paul,	  London,	  1964)	  at	  264.	  
58	  Roger	  S	  Gttlieb	  (ed)	  This	  Sacred	  Earth	  –	  Religion,	  Nature,	  Environment	  (Routledge,	  New	  York	  and	  London,	  




system	  of	   sacred	  beliefs	   and	   secret	   practices	   connected	   to	   sacred	   things.59	  For	  
Durkheim,	  religion	   itself	   is	  a	  cultural	  means	  of	   fundamental	   importance	   for	   the	  
survival	   of	   any	   given	   society,	   whether	   ‘primitive’	   or	   not; 60 	  and	   indigenous	  
spirituality	  and	  totemism61	  guarantee	  the	  collective	  focus	  and	  identification	  with	  
a	   common	   symbol,	   and	   explain	   how	   through	   “the	   unseen	   but	   deeply	   felt	  
cohesive	  force	  of	  their	  own	  social	  group”,	  humans	  institute	  religions.62	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
2.4	  -­‐	  Indigenous	  Sacred	  and	  Secret	  Knowledge	  
	  
It	  is	  generally	  difficult	  to	  define	  what	  is	  sacred	  in	  a	  culture.	  In	  facing	  the	  issue	  of	  
‘sacredness’,	  many	   legitimate	  questions	  arise:	  What	  can	  be	  considered	  sacred?	  
Can	  we	  say	  that	  something	   is	  sacred	  to	  someone	  else	  but	  not	  to	  us?	   Is	   there	  a	  
characteristic	   that	   is	   common	   to	   everything	   that	   is	   perceived	   and	   can	   be	  
considered	  sacred?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Sometimes	  deities	  possessed	  a	  combination	  of	  human	  and	  animal	  features	  or	  were	  symbolised	  as	  humans	  
wearing	  an	  animal	  mask	  (this	  iconographic	  representations	  are	  not	  only	  limited	  to	  native	  tribes.	  In	  ancient	  
Egypt,	  for	  example,	  we	  have	  Anubis,	  Isis	  and	  Osiris).	  Though	  anthropology	  considers	  the	  representation	  of	  
animals	   or	   half	   human	   and	   half	   animals	   a	   very	   old	   practice,	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   indigenous	   peoples,	   such	  
representations	  seem	  to	  embody	  ‘magical’	  nonsense.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  when	  the	  sacred	  is	  identified	  
with	  a	   tree,	  a	  place,	  a	   river	  or	  any	  other	  natural	  phenomena.	  According	   to	  Durkheim	  “The	  division	  of	   the	  
world	  into	  two	  domains,	  the	  one	  containing	  all	  that	  is	  sacred,	  the	  other	  all	  that	  is	  profane,	  is	  the	  distinctive	  
trait	  of	  religious	  thought;	  the	  beliefs,	  myths,	  dogmas	  …	  express	  the	  nature	  of	  sacred	  things	  …	  But	  by	  sacred	  
things	  one	  must	  not	  understand	  simply	  those	  personal	  beings	  which	  are	  called	  gods	  or	  spirits;	  a	  rock,	  a	  tree,	  
a	   spring,	   a	   piece	   of	   wood,	   in	   a	   word,	   anything	   can	   be	   sacred.”	   He	   also	   firmly	   believed	   that	   totemic	  
phenomena	  were	  not	  limited	  to	  indigenous	  societies;	  all	  societies	  needed	  a	  sacred	  totem	  that	  embodied	  the	  
attributes	  necessary	  to	  keep	  the	  group	  united”	  see	  Emile	  Durkheim	  The	  Elementary	  Forms	  of	  the	  Religious	  
Life	   (Allen	   and	   Unwin,	   London,	   1976);	   Robert	   L	   Winzeler	   Anthropology	   and	   Religion	   (Altamira	   Press,	  
Plymouth,	  2008)	  at	  10.	  
60	  See	  World	  Religions	  Today	  at	  52.	  
61	  “Traditionally,	   totemism	  has	  been	  conceptualized	  as	  a	   form	  of	   social	  organization	   in	  which	  humans	  are	  
distributed	  in	  interlocking	  groups	  that	  borrow	  their	  characteristics	  from	  natural	  kinds,	  either	  because	  these	  
groups	  are	  said	   to	  share	  certain	  attributes	  with	  a	  set	  of	  non-­‐humans,	  or	  because	   they	   take	  as	  models	   for	  
patterning	   their	   internal	   differences	   the	   contrasts	   between	   eponymous	   species”	   see	   Ton	   Otto	   and	   Nils	  
Bubandt	  Experiments	  in	  Holism	  (Wiley-­‐Blackwell,	  Oxford,	  2010)	  at	  220.	  
62	  “In	  fact,	  the	  crucial	  feature	  common	  to	  all	  existing	  religions	  is	  the	  belief	   in	  totems,	  supernatural	  agents,	  
concluded	   spirits	   and	   souls.	   Therefore,	   the	   fact	   that	   some	   ‘elite’	   religions	   have	   been	   consecrated	   by	  
societies	  that	  consider	  themselves	  advanced	  and	  in	  a	  position	  to	  impose	  canons,	  does	  not	  implicitly	  include	  
that	  their	  beliefs	  were	  more	  real	  or	  plausible	  than	  the	  ones	  of	  the	   ‘primitive	  societies’	   they	  were	   judging.	  
Like	   for	   totems,	   the	   creation	   of	   native	   myths,	   being	   then	   more	   or	   less	   credible	   according	   to	   Western	  
standards,	   is	   today	   considered	   a	   natural	   reaction	   that	   originates	   from	   the	   attempt	   to	   explain	   natural	  
phenomena.	  Nonetheless,	  both	  myth	  and	  totemism	  are	  nothing	  but	  the	  fabrication	  of	  the	  anthropologist’s	  
mind,	  which	  is	  attempting	  to	  give	  names	  to	  the	  status	  quo	  of	  alien	  societies	  of	  which	  he/she	  had	  no	  prior	  
knowledge.	  It	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  Western	  scientific	  tradition	  that	  needs	  to	  classify	  and	  label	  everything	  that	  




As	   Jane	   Hubert	   points	   out	   in	   her	   article,63	  it	   is	   challenging	   to	   address	   what	  
‘sacred’	   is.	   In	   the	   Western	   society,	   ‘sacredness’	   is	   mostly	   connected	   to	   state	  
religion	   and	   traditions.64	  Durkheim	   clarifies	   that	   a	   common	   characteristic	   of	   all	  
religions	  is	  that	  of	  the	  ‘supernatural’.	  And	  by	  supernatural	  is	  understood	  a	  whole	  
set	   of	   complex	   concepts	   that	   most	   of	   the	   time	   surpass	   the	   limits	   of	   our	  
knowledge:	  “the	  supernatural	  is	  the	  world	  of	  the	  mysterious,	  the	  unknowable,	  of	  
the	   un-­‐understandable”.65	  He	   carries	   on	   by	   stressing	   that	   all	   religious	   beliefs	  
(simple	   and	   complex)	   present	   common	   characteristics	   according	   to	   which	   all	  
beliefs	  are	  divided	  into	  two	  realms:	  the	  sacred	  and	  the	  profane,	  where	  ‘sacred’	  is	  
not	  just	  made	  of	  ‘those	  personal	  beings	  which	  are	  called	  gods	  or	  spirits;	  a	  rock,	  a	  
tree,	   a	   spring,	   a	  pebble,	   a	  piece	  of	  wood,	   a	  house,	   in	   a	  word,	   anything	   can	  be	  
sacred’.66	  A	  rite	  can	  be	  sacred.	  According	  to	  Durkheim:67	  	  	  
	  
…	  there	  are	  words,	  expressions	  and	  formulae	  which	  can	  be	  pronounced	  only	  by	  
the	  mouths	  of	   consecrated	  persons;	   there	   are	   gestures	   and	  movements	  which	  
everybody	  cannot	  perform.	  	  
	  
He	   recognizes	   that	   in	  ancient	   societies	  and	   indigenous	  ones	   religion	  and	  magic	  
are	  profoundly	  entangled;	  where	   ‘magic’	   is	   considered	  as	  part	  of	   the	  sacred	  as	  
well.	   According	   to	  Durkheim,	  magic	   has	   “its	   ceremonies,	   sacrifices,	   lustrations,	  
prayers,	  chants	  and	  dances	  as	  well.	  The	  beings	  which	  the	  magician	  invokes	  and	  
the	   forces	  which	   he	   throws	   in	   play	   are	   not	  merely	   of	   the	   same	   nature	   as	   the	  
forces	   and	   beings	   to	   which	   religion	   addresses	   itself;	   very	   frequently	   they	   are	  
identically	   the	  same”.68	  However,	  while	   in	  magical	  acts	   the	  underlying	   idea	  and	  
aim	  of	  the	  act	  is	  always	  clear	  and	  finalized,	  in	  the	  religious	  ceremonies	  “there	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  According	  to	  Hubert	  “the	  concept	  of	  sacred	  implies	  restrictions	  and	  prohibitions	  on	  human	  behaviour	  –	  if	  
something	   is	   sacred	   then	   certain	   rules	  must	   be	   observed	   in	   relation	   to	   it,	   and	   this	   generally	  means	   that	  
something	  that	  is	  said	  to	  be	  sacred,	  whether	  it	  be	  an	  object	  or	  site	  (or	  person),	  must	  be	  placed	  apart	  from	  
everyday	  things	  or	  places,	  so	  that	  its	  special	  significance	  can	  be	  recognised,	  and	  rules	  regarding	  it	  obeyed”	  
see	   Jane	   Hubert	   “Sacred	   Beliefs	   and	   Beliefs	   of	   Sacredness”	   Columbia	   University	   electronic	   document	  
<www.columbia.edu/itc/anthropology/schildkrout/6353/client_edit/week9/anth_g6353.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  
20/11/2014.	  
64	  Jane	  Hubert	  “Sacred	  Beliefs	  and	  Beliefs	  of	  Sacredness”.	  
65	  Emile	  Durkheim	  The	  Elementary	  Forms	  of	  the	  Religious	  Life	  (George	  Allen	  &	  Unwin	  Ltd,	  London,	  1964)	  at	  
24.	  
66	  See	  Durkheim	  at	  37.	  
67	  At	  37.	  




no	   purpose	   directed	   toward	   a	   subsequent	   event”. 69 Indigenous	   sacred	  
knowledge,	   therefore,	   includes	   animism,	   animatism,	   totemism	   and	   fetishism.70	  
‘Sacred’	   comes	   from	   the	   “late	   14th	   century	   past	   participle	   adjective	   from	  
obsolete	  verb	  sacren	  ‘to	  make	  holy’	  (c.1200),	  from	  Old	  French	  sacrer	  ‘consecrate,	  
anoint,	   dedicate”	   (12c.)	   or	   directly	   from	   Latin	   sacrare	   “to	   make	   sacred,	  
consecrate;	  hold	  sacred;	   immortalize;	   set	  apart,	  dedicate”,	   from	  sacer	   (genitive	  
sacri)	   ‘sacred,	  dedicated,	  holy,	  accursed,’	   from	  Old	  Latin	  saceres,	   from	  PIE	   root	  
*sak-­‐	  ‘to	  sanctify’.71	  According	  to	  the	  Oxford	  dictionary,	  it	  is	  considered	  ‘sacred’	  
if	  it	  is:72	  
	  
• connected	   with	   God	   or	   a	   god	   or	   dedicated	   to	   a	   religious	   purpose	   and	   so	  
deserving	  veneration:	  eg	  sacred	  rites	  and	  sites;	  
• religious	  rather	  than	  secular;	  embodying	  the	  laws	  or	  doctrines	  of	  a	  religion;	  
• regarded	  with	  great	  respect	  and	  reverence	  by	  a	  particular	  religion,	  group,	  or	  
individual;	  and	  
• regarded	  as	  too	  valuable	  to	  be	  interfered	  with	  -­‐	  sacrosanct.	  
	  
In	   countries	   where	   there	   is	   an	   institutionalised	   religion,	   often	   the	   ‘sacred’	   is	  
linked	  to	  religious	  practices	  that	  might	  be	  restricted	  to	  specific	  moments	  of	  the	  
day/week	  or	  to	  specific	  activities	  and	  customs.	  Prohibitions	  and	  restrictions	  are	  
limited	   to	   religious	   contexts	   where	   the	   religion	   is	   practiced.	   In	   many	   other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Bronislaw	  Malinowski	  Magic,	  Science	  and	  Religion	  (Greenwood	  Press,	  Westport-­‐Connecticut,	  1948)	  at	  38.	  
70	  “Animism,	  belief	  in	  innumerable	  spiritual	  beings	  concerned	  with	  human	  affairs	  and	  capable	  of	  helping	  or	  
harming	  human	  interests.	  Animistic	  beliefs	  were	  first	  competently	  surveyed	  by	  Sir	  Edward	  Burnett	  Tylor	  in	  
his	  work	  Primitive	  Culture	  (1871),	  to	  which	  is	  owed	  the	  continued	  currency	  of	  the	  term.	  While	  none	  of	  the	  
major	  world	  religions	  are	  animistic	  (though	  they	  may	  contain	  animistic	  elements),	  most	  other	  religions—e.g.,	  
those	   of	   tribal	   peoples—are.	   For	   this	   reason,	   an	  ethnographic	   understanding	   of	   animism,	   based	   on	   field	  
studies	  of	  tribal	  peoples,	  is	  no	  less	  important	  than	  a	  theoretical	  one,	  concerned	  with	  the	  nature	  or	  origin	  of	  
religion”	   electronic	   document	   <www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/25814/animatism>	   last	   visited	   on	  
22/12/2014;	  “Animatism	  is	  a	  term	  coined	  by	  British	  anthropologist	  Robert	  Marett	  to	  refer	  to	  ‘a	  belief	   in	  a	  
generalized,	   impersonal	   power	   over	   which	   people	   have	   some	   measure	   of	   control’.	   Marett	   argues	   that	  
certain	  cultures	  believe	  ‘people,	  animals,	  plants,	  and	  inanimate	  objects	  were	  endowed	  with	  certain	  powers,	  
which	   were	   both	   impersonal	   and	   supernatural’”	   see	   Gary	   Ferraro	   Cultural	   Anthropology:	   An	   Applied	  
Perspective	  (Thompson	  Wadsworth,	  Belmont-­‐CA,	  2008)	  at	  340;	  “A	  fetish	  (derived	  from	  the	  French	  fétiche;	  
which	   comes	   from	   the	  Portuguese	   feitiço;	   and	   this	   in	   turn	   from	   Latin	   facticius,	   ‘artificial’	   and	   facere,	   ‘to	  
make’)	   is	   an	   object	   believed	   to	   have	   supernatural	   powers,	   or	   in	   particular,	   a	  man-­‐made	   object	   that	   has	  
power	  over	  others.	   Essentially,	   fetishism	   is	   the	   attribution	  of	   inherent	   value	  or	   powers	   to	   an	  object”	   see	  
electronic	   document	   <www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Fetishism.html>	   last	   visited	   on	  
22/12/2014.	  
71	  Electronic	  dictionary	  at	  <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/sacred>	  last	  visited	  on	  20/11/2014.	  





societies,	   however,	   the	   ‘sacred’	   is	   not	   confined	   to	   one	   small	   area	   of	   life,	   but	  
permeates	  everything.	  Hubert	  recognises	  that	  it	  might	  be	  difficult	  for	  those	  who	  
limit	   their	   lives	   to	   ‘religious	   activities’	   to	   fully	   comprehend	   when	   the	   ‘sacred’	  
permeates	  every	  aspect	  of	  life.73	  Sacred	  is	  something	  that	  has	  been	  consecrated,	  
devoted,	   set	   apart	   or	   dedicated	   to	   religious	   and	   spiritual	   use.	   In	   their	   article,	  
Gowda	  and	  Khan74	  define	  ‘sacred	  knowledge’	  as:75	  
	  
…	   something	   on	   which	   no	   objective	   price	   can	   be	   fixed	   and	   varies	   from	  
community	  to	  community.	  Its	  significance	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  no	  object	  or	  thing	  
is	  sacred	  unless	  a	  person	  or	  group	  of	  persons	  attach	  certain	  sanctity	  with	  it	  and	  
revere	  and	   respect	   the	   same.	  The	  object	  or	   idea	   in	   itself	   is	  not	   sacred.	  A	   thing	  
can	  be	  sacred	  only	  so	  long	  as	  it	  lasts	  and	  occupies	  a	  place	  of	  honour	  in	  the	  minds	  
of	  those	  that	  consider	  and	  hail	  it	  as	  sacrosanct.	  	  
	  
In	  indigenous	  societies	  much	  of	  the	  sacred	  knowledge	  is	  and	  remains	  essentially	  
secret.	  Ceremonies	  often	  cannot	  be	  attended	  by	  everyone	  and	  objects	  cannot	  be	  
utilised	   by	   the	   whole	   community.	   Traditionally,	   everything	   in	   indigenous	  
communities	  has	  a	  story	  and	  a	  purpose.	  Everything	  responds	  to	  protocols	  and	  is	  
generally	  controlled	  by	  elders,	  holders	  or	  guardians.	  76	  A	  complex	  system	  of	  laws	  
regulates	   ceremonies	   and	   rituals	   and	   the	   appropriate	   usage	   of	   ceremonial	  
objects.	  	  
Basing	  his	  words	  on	  the	  lengthy	  studies	  of	  Professor	  Strehlow,77	  Justice	  MD	  Kirby	  
explains78	  how	  the	  “complete	  and	  mandatory	  secrecy	  of	  much	  of	  the	  traditional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Jane	  Hubert	  “Sacred	  Beliefs	  and	  Beliefs	  of	  Sacredness”.	  
74	  Prakruthi	  P	  Gowda	  and	  Ushasi	  Khan	  “Sacred	  but	  Vulnerable:	  A	  Critical	  Examination	  of	  the	  Adequacy	  of	  the	  
Current	   Legal	   Framework	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Tribal	   Sacred	   Traditional	   Knowledge”	   (2008)	   1	  NUJS	   Law	  
Review	  109.	  
75	  Supra	  at	  111-­‐112.	  
76	  Mikhailovich	   and	   Pavli	   write	   that,	   among	   indigenous	   peoples,	   “ceremonies	   may	   be	   associated	   with	  
ancestral	  stories,	  rituals	  for	  increasing	  rain,	  plants	  and	  animal	  foods,	  fertility	  and	  initiation	  of	  young	  people	  
into	  adulthood,	  or	  associated	  with	  deaths	  and	  burial.	  Some	  rituals	  and	  ceremony	  are	  restricted	  to	  women	  or	  
men	  only	   and	  may	  be	   secret/sacred	  while	  others	   are	  public.	   Rituals	  may	  be	  practiced	  during	   ceremonies	  
that	   last	  for	  days	  or	  weeks,	  with	  singing	  and	  dancing,	  storytelling,	  and	  the	  display	  of	  body	  decoration	  and	  
ceremonial	   objects.	  During	   these	   ceremonies,	   the	   stories	   connected	   to	   the	  Ancestral	   Beings	   are	   told	   and	  
retold.	  All	  of	   the	  symbols	  of	   ritual	  –	   the	  words,	   songs	  and	   ritual	  objects	  are	  an	  outward	  expression	  of	  an	  
inner	   sacred	   life”	   see	   Katja	  Mikhailovich	   and	   Alexandra	   Pavli	  Freedom	  of	   Religion,	   Belief,	   and	   Indigenous	  
Spirituality,	   Practice	   and	   Cultural	   Rights	   (Centre	   of	   Education,	   Poverty	   and	   Social	   Inclusion	   -­‐	   Faculty	   of	  
Education,	  University	  of	  Canberra,	  2006).	  
77	  TGH	  Strehlow	  Songs	  of	  Central	  Australia	  (TBS	  The	  Book	  Service	  Ltd,	  1972).	  





law”	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   was	   “highly	   developed	   among	   Aboriginal	   society”.	  
Such	  law	  “demanded	  preservation	  and	  respect	  of	  its	  secrecy”.79	  	  
In	   its	   Glossary	   on	   technical	   terminology,	   the	   World	   Intellectual	   Property	  
Organization	  (WIPO)	  defines	  ‘sacred’	  as:80	  
	  
…	   any	   expression	   of	   traditional	   knowledge	   that	   symbolizes	   or	   pertains	   to	  
religious	  and	  spiritual	  beliefs,	  practices	  or	  customs.	  It	  is	  used	  as	  the	  opposite	  of	  
profane	   or	   secular,	   the	   extreme	   forms	   of	   which	   are	   commercially	   exploited	  
forms	  of	  traditional	  knowledge.	   (Daniel	   J.	  Gervais,	  Spiritual	  but	  not	   Intellectual:	  
the	  Protection	  of	  Sacred	  Intangible	  Traditional	  Knowledge,	  11	  Cardozo	  J.	   Int’l	  &	  
Comp.	   L.	   467,	   469-­‐490	   (2003))	   Sacred	   traditional	   knowledge	   refers	   to	   the	  
traditional	   knowledge	   which	   includes	   religious	   and	   spiritual	   elements,	   such	   as	  
totems,	   special	   ceremonies,	   sacred	  objects,	   sacred	  knowledge,	  prayers,	   chants,	  
and	  performances	  and	  also	  sacred	  symbols,	  and	  also	  refers	  to	  sacred	  traditional	  
knowledge	   associated	   with	   sacred	   species	   of	   plants,	   animals,	   microorganisms,	  
minerals,	  and	  refers	  to	  sacred	  sites.	  Whether	  traditional	  knowledge	  is	  sacred	  or	  
not	  depends	  on	  whether	   it	   has	   sacred	   significance	   to	   the	   relevant	   community.	  
Much	   sacred	   traditional	   knowledge	   is	   by	   definition	   not	   commercialized,	   but	  
some	  sacred	  objects	  and	  sites	  are	  being	  commercialized	  by	  religious,	  faith-­‐based	  
and	  spiritual	  communities	  themselves,	  or	  by	  outsiders	  to	  these,	  and	  for	  different	  
purposes.	  
	  
Whereas,	  secret	  knowledge	  can	  be	  defined	  as:	  
	  
…	   something	   that	   is	   kept	   from	   the	   knowledge	   of	   others	   or	   shared	   only	   with	  
those	  concerned	  (Black’s	  Law	  Dictionary).	  	  
‘Sacred-­‐secret’	   traditional	   knowledge	  and	   cultural	   expressions	  have	  a	   secret	  or	  
sacred	   significance	   according	   to	   the	   customary	   law	   and	   practices	   of	   their	  
traditional	  owners.	  (Pacific	  Regional	  Framework	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Traditional	  
Knowledge	  and	  Expressions	  of	  Culture,	  2002,	  Part	  I	  (4).)81	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<https://digital.library.adelaide.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/2440/42769/1/alr_V7n2_1980_KirTGH.pdf>	   last	  
visited	  on	  15/12/2014.	  
79	  See	  Kirby	  at	  185.	  
80 	  See	   World	   Intellectual	   Property	   Organization	   (WIPO)	   Glossary	   electronic	   document	  
<www.wipo.int/tk/en/resources/glossary.html#19>	  last	  visited	  on	  15/12/2014.	  





In	   the	   New	   South	   Wales	   Government’s	   Protocols	   for	   Staff	   Working	   with	  
Indigenous	   Peoples 82 	  sacred	   and	   secret	   refer	   to	   the	   practices	   that,	   under	  
indigenous	  customary	  laws,	  refer	  to	  information:	  
	  
• made	  available	  only	  to	  particular	  community	  members;	  
• used	  for	  a	  particular	  purpose;	  
• used	  at	  a	  particular	  time;	  and	  
• only	  to	  be	  seen	  and	  heard	  by	  particular	  community	  members	  (such	  as	  only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  men,	  only	  women	  or	  people	  with	  certain	  knowledge).83	  
	  
The	  Protocols	  consider	  sacred	  and	  secret	  material:84	  	  	  
	  
• photographs	  or	  descriptions	  of	  ceremonies	  –	  for	  example	  burials;	  
• rock	  carvings	  or	  drawings;	  
• photographs	  of	  art	  works	  featuring	  sacred	  stories;	  and	  
• photographs	  or	  descriptions	  of	  Indigenous	  ceremonial	  objects.	  
	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  ceremonies	  and	  rituals	  can	  be	  sacred	  and	  secret.	  However,	  in	  
indigenous	  traditions,	  also	  locations	  and	  geographical	  spaces	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  
sacred	  and,	  thus,	  secret.	  	  
	  
2.5	  -­‐	  Indigenous	  Peoples:	  The	  Guardians	  of	  Sacred	  Places	  and	  Territories	  	  
	  
A	   landscape,	   like	   any	   landscape,	   can	   embody	   different	   significances;	   not	   only	  
because	  of	  its	  geomorphic	  uniqueness,	  but	  also	  because	  every	  person	  linked	  to	  a	  
specific	  site	  perceives	  it	  differently	  or	  is	  trained	  to	  relate	  to	  it	  in	  a	  specific	  holistic	  
way	   (eg	   sacrality	   linked	   to	   a	  place)	   and,	   therefore,	   has	   an	   intimate	   connection	  
with	   it	   that	  can	  be	  both	  shared	  with	  the	  community	  of	  which	  she	  or	  he	   is	  part	  
and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  remain	  a	  merely	  personal	  experience.	  Thus	  any	  landscape	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  NSW	  Department	  of	  Commerce	  Protocols	  for	  Staff	  Working	  with	  Indigenous	  People	   (State	  of	  New	  South	  
Wales	  (2008)	  at	  11.	  
83	  At	  11.	   	  




has	   both	   physical	   and	  non-­‐physical	   features,	  where	   the	   greatest	   importance	   is	  
represented	   by	   the	   perception	   of	   being	   linked	   to	   it;	   as	   landscape	   is	   a	   “way	   of	  
seeing	  and	  a	  way	  of	  being,	  it	  only	  really	  exist	  in	  people’s	  perception”.85	  According	  
to	  the	  IUCN	  Guidelines	  for	  Protected	  Area	  Managers	  (2008):86	  	  
	  
…	   sacred	   natural	   sites	   are	   areas	   where	   nature,	   connection	   to	   the	   greater	  
universe,	  and	  collective	  or	   individual	  recollections	  come	  together	   in	  meaningful	  
ways.	   Sacred	   natural	   sites	   can	   be	   the	   abode	   of	   deities,	   nature	   spirits	   and	  
ancestors,	  or	  are	  associated	  with	  hermits,	  prophets,	  saints	  and	  visionary	  spiritual	  
leaders.	   They	   can	   be	   areas	   for	   ceremony	   and	   contemplation,	   prayer	   and	  
meditation.	  They	  can	  also	  hold	  secular	  values	  for	  history,	  culture,	  relaxation	  and	  
enjoyment.	  Sacred	  natural	  sites	  can	  be	  important	  places	  of	  reference	  for	  cultural	  
identity:	  for	  an	  extended	  family,	  a	  clan,	  a	  tribe,	  a	  religious	  faith	  or	  entire	  nations	  
that	  might	  root	  their	  identity	  in	  a	  specific	  place	  in	  nature.	  
	  
Since	  the	  dawn	  of	  time,	  in	  fact,	  places	  were	  chosen	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  energies	  
and	  powers,	   and	  used	  as	   sacred	  grounds	   for	   the	  performance	  of	   rituals,	  or	   for	  
the	   construction	   of	   sacred	   buildings.87	  For	   indigenous	   peoples	   any	   place	   has	  
spiritual	  significance,	  and	  is	  therefore	  traditionally	  considered	  ‘sacred’.88	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  Graham	  Fairclough,	  Rodney	  Harrison	  and	  others	  The	  Heritage	  Reader	  (Routledge,	  London	  and	  New	  York,	  
2008)	  at	  298.	  
86	  “In	  accordance	  with	  their	  spiritual	  beliefs,	  many	  traditional	  communities	  throughout	  the	  world	  have	  given	  
a	   special	   status	   to	   natural	   sites	   such	   as	  mountains,	   volcanoes,	   rivers,	   lakes,	   springs,	   caves,	   forest	   groves,	  
ponds,	  coastal	  waters	  and	  entire	  islands.	  Many	  of	  these	  have	  been	  set	  aside	  as	  sacred	  places.	  The	  reasons	  
for	  their	  sacredness	  are	  diverse.	  They	  may	  be	  perceived	  as	  abodes	  of	  deities	  and	  ancestral	  spirits;	  as	  sources	  
of	  healing	  water	  and	  medicinal	  plants;	  places	  of	  contact	  with	  the	  spiritual	  realm,	  or	  communication	  with	  a	  
‘more-­‐than-­‐human’	   reality;	   and	   sites	   of	   revelation	   and	   transformation.	   They	   are	   sometimes	   the	   burial	  
grounds	  of	  ancestors,	  places	  of	  pilgrimage,	  the	  locale	  of	  a	  temple,	  shrine	  or	  church,	  or	  sites	  associated	  with	  
special	  events,	  saints	  and	  spiritual	   leaders”	  see	  Robert	  Wild	  and	  Christopher	  McLeod	  (eds)	  Sacred	  Natural	  
Sites:	  Guidelines	  for	  Protected	  Area	  Managers,	  International	  Union	  for	  Conservation	  and	  Natural	  Resources	  
(Gland,	  Switzerland,	  2008)	  at	  5	  and	  7.	  
87	  “The	   ancient	   Egyptians,	   for	   example,	   located	   and	   oriented	   their	   tombs	   and	   temples	   according	   to	   the	  
geometry	  of	  the	  earth	  and	  the	  constellations	  in	  the	  sky.	  As	  many	  other	  cultures	  all	  over	  the	  world,	  Egyptians	  
practiced	   geomancy,	   the	   ‘lore	   of	   establishing	   buildings	   in	   relationship	   to	   the	   forms	   and	   energies	   of	   the	  
earth”	  see	  James	  A	  Swan	  The	  Power	  of	  Place	  (Gateway	  Books,	  Bath,	  1993)	  at	  16;	  see	  also	  Andrew	  Gulliford	  
Sacred	  Objects	  and	  Sacred	  Places	  (University	  Press	  of	  Colorado,	  Boulder,	  2000).	  
88	  “It	   is	   difficult,	   and	   in	  many	   cases	   inappropriate,	   to	   attempt	   to	   identify	   specific	   ‘sacred	   sites’	   or	   sites	   of	  
special	  cultural	  importance	  to	  indigenous	  peoples.	  All	  lands	  and	  resources	  are,	  to	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  extent,	  
sacred	  and	  integral	  to	   indigenous	  peoples’	  cultures	  and	  spiritual	   life,	  and	  often	  the	  most	   important	  places	  
cannot	   be	   revealed	   to	   outsiders”	   see	   the	   Commission	   on	   Human	   Rights	   Study	   on	   the	   protection	   of	   the	  
cultural	  and	  intellectual	  property	  of	  indigenous	  peoples,	  by	  Erica-­‐Irene	  Daes,	  Special	  Rapporteur	  of	  the	  Sub-­‐
Commission	  on	  Prevention	  of	  Discrimination	  and	  Protection	  of	  Minorities	  and	  Chairperson	  of	  the	  Working	  




Given	   this	   assumption,	   however,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   explain	   what	   can	   be	  
considered	   as	   a	   ‘sacred	   place’	   by	   indigenous	   and	   non-­‐indigenous	   peoples.	   As	  
history	  and	  religion	  have	  shown,	  human	  beings	  have	  always	  experienced	  spiritual	  
feelings	   in	   the	  presence	  of	  natural	  phenomena.	   Sacred	  places	  are	  where	   “man	  
encounters	  the	  numinous	  and	  the	  sublime,	  and	  holiness	  is	  …	  a	  mystic	  secret	  that	  
both	  fascinates	  and	  terrifies”.89	  In	  Deloria’s	  words:90	  
	  
…	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Indian	  tribal	  religions	  have	  a	  sacred	  center	  at	  a	  particular	  
place,	  be	   it	  a	  river,	  a	  mountain,	  a	  plateau,	  valley,	  or	  other	  natural	   feature.	  This	  
center	  enables	  the	  people	  to	  look	  out	  along	  the	  four	  dimensions	  and	  locate	  their	  
lands,	   to	   relate	   all	   historical	   events	  within	   the	   confines	   of	   this	   particular	   land,	  
and	  to	  accept	  responsibility	   for	   it.	  Regardless	  of	  what	  subsequently	  happens	  to	  
the	   people,	   the	   sacred	   lands	   remain	   as	   permanent	   fixtures	   in	   their	   cultural	   or	  
religious	  understanding.	  
	  
The	   sacred	   space	   is	   therefore	   considered	   the	   ‘centre	   of	   the	   world’	   and	   the	  
‘privileged	   place’	   that	   permits	   the	   communication	   with	   the	   heaven	   and	   the	  
underworld,	   that	   is,	   with	   the	   gods	   and	   the	   spirits	   of	   the	   dead. 91 	  Western	  
societies	  experience	   the	  manifestations	  of	   the	   sacred	  with	  uneasiness.92	  Luther	  
Standing	   Bear93	  once	   remarked	   that	   “a	   people	   had	   to	   be	   born,	   reborn,	   and	  
reborn	   again	   on	   a	   piece	   of	   land	   before	   beginning	   to	   come	   to	   grips	   with	   its	  
rhythms”.	   On	   the	   same	   note,	   Crazy	   Horse,	   when	   asked	   where	   his	   land	   was,	  
replied	  that	  his	  land	  was	  where	  his	  dead	  lay	  buried.94	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  Cristoph	  Engels	  1000	  Sacred	  Places	  (HF	  Ullmann	  Publishing,	  Germany,	  2010)	  at	  6.	  
90	  Vine	  Deloria	  Jr	  God	  is	  Red	  (Fulcrum	  Publishing,	  Golden-­‐Colorado,	  2003)	  at	  66.	  
91	  Mircea	  Eliade	  A	  History	  of	  Religious	  Ideas	  Vol	  I	  (The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  Chicago,	  1978)	  at	  118.	  
92	  According	  to	  the	  late	  Mircea	  Eliade,	  Professor	   in	  Religious	  Studies	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  Western	  
man	   “finds	   it	   difficult	   to	   accept	   the	   fact	   that,	   for	  many	   human	   beings,	   the	   sacred	   can	   be	  manifested	   in	  
stones	  or	  trees	  …	  But	  what	  is	  involved	  is	  not	  a	  veneration	  of	  the	  stone	  itself,	  a	  cult	  of	  the	  tree	  in	  itself.	  The	  
sacred	  tree,	  the	  sacred	  stone	  are	  not	  adored	  as	  stone	  or	  tree;	  they	  are	  worshipped	  precisely	  because	  they	  
are	   hierophanies,	   because	   they	   show	   something	   that	   is	   no	   longer	   stone	   or	   tree	   but	   the	   sacred.	   …	   By	  
manifesting	  the	  sacred,	  any	  object	  becomes	  something	  else,	  yet	  it	  continues	  to	  remain	  itself,	  for	  it	  continues	  
to	  participate	  in	  its	  surrounding	  cosmic	  milieu.	  …	  In	  other	  words,	  for	  those	  who	  have	  a	  religious	  experience	  
all	  nature	  is	  capable	  of	  revealing	  itself	  as	  cosmic	  sacrality.	  …	  The	  man	  of	  the	  archaic	  societies	  tends	  to	  live	  as	  
much	   as	   possible	   in	   the	   sacred	   or	   in	   close	   proximity	   to	   consecrated	   objects	  …	   as	   for	   the	  man	   of	   all	   pre-­‐
modern	   societies,	   the	   sacred	   is	   equivalent	   to	   a	  power,	   and,	   in	   the	   last	   analysis,	   to	   reality.	   The	   sacred	   is	  
saturated	  with	  being”	   see	  Mircea	   Eliade	   The	   Sacred	   and	   the	   Profane	   (Harcourt,	   Brace	  &	  World	   Inc,	   New	  
York,	  1959)	  at	  12.	  
93	  James	  A	  Swan	  The	  Power	  of	  Place	  (Gateway	  Books,	  Bath,	  1993)	  at	  32.	  




According	  to	  the	  International	  Union	  for	  Conservation	  of	  Nature	  (IUCN),	  “all	  over	  
the	   world,	   sacred	   natural	   sites	   and	   cultural	   landscapes	   are	   expressions	   of	  
traditional	   beliefs	   and	   land	   management	   systems	   of	   local	   and	   indigenous	  
communities”.95	  On	   the	   same	   line,	   the	   Akwe:	   Kon	   Guidelines96	  promulgated	  
under	   the	  Convention	   for	  Biological	  Diversity,	   considers	   that	   sacred	   sites	   “may	  
refer	  to	  a	  site,	  object,	  structure,	  area	  or	  natural	  feature	  or	  area,	  held	  by	  national	  
Governments	   or	   indigenous	   communities	   to	   be	   of	   particular	   importance	   in	  
accordance	  with	  the	  customs	  of	  an	  indigenous	  or	  local	  community	  because	  of	  its	  
religious	  and/or	  spiritual	  significance”	  (Guideline	  6	  (e)).97	  
For	  indigenous	  peoples	  all	   land	  they	  inhabit	  might	  have	  spiritual	  meaning,	  from	  
the	   top	   of	   a	   mountain	   to	   the	   sand	   of	   the	   shore,	   because	   Nature	   itself	   is	  
mysterious	   and	   sacred,	   some	   sacred	   lands	   can	   only	   be	   used	   for	   very	   limited	  
purposes	   (eg	   secret	   ceremonies)	   and	   often	   only	   by	   the	   guardians	   of	   secret	  
traditional	   knowledge.	   These	   lands	   were	   selected	   with	   great	   care	   and	   their	  
locations	  and	  sacredness	  was	  known	  only	  by	  very	  few.	  Since	  much	  of	  indigenous	  
life	   depends	   on	   the	   protection	   and	   preservation	   of	   these	   ‘sacred	   places’,	  
knowledge	   of	   their	   location	   was	   indeed	   guarded	   as	   a	   secret	   and	   only	   a	   few	  
people	  within	  the	  community	  were	  allowed	  to	  know	  their	  locations.	  For	  example	  
“a	   medicine	   man	   or	   woman,	   in	   time	   of	   tribal	   crisis,	   might	   be	   told	   during	   a	  
ceremony	   to	  perform	  another	   ceremony	   at	   a	   specific	   location”,98	  and	   this	   new	  
location	  would	  be	  regarded	  as	  sacred	  and	  of	  great	  importance	  for	  the	  wellbeing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  “Traditional	   societies	   around	   the	   world	   have	   assigned	   a	   special	   status	   to	   natural	   sites	   considered	   as	  
sacred	  –	  either	  through	  the	  perception	  of	  residing	  deities	  and	  spirits,	  as	  shrines	  dedicated	  to	  ancestors,	  or	  
as	   privileged	   spiritual	   sites	   for	   contemplation,	   meditation	   and	   even	   purification	   of	   the	   inner	   self.	   The	  
sacredness	  of	  a	  site	  distinguishes	  it	  from	  the	  adjoining	  non-­‐sacred	  areas	  that	  generally	  make	  up	  the	  bulk	  of	  
the	   land	  area;	  hence	  a	  sacred	  site	  can	  be	  a	   relatively	   small	  area	  of	   land.	  But	  as	   sacred	  sites	  are	  places	  of	  
seclusion	  from	  the	  non-­‐sacred	  world	  they	  are	  generally	  subject	  to	  restricted	  access	  and	  therefore	  less	  direct	  
human	  impact	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  economic	  exploitation	  of	  natural	  resources.	  …	  Forests,	  and	  more	  particularly	  
groves,	   are	  often	   considered	   as	   abodes	  of	   deities	   and	   can	  be	   considered	   as	   sacred.	   In	   some	  parts	   of	   the	  
world	  with	   strong	  ancestral	  belief	   systems,	  burial	  grounds	  can	   turn	   into	  groves	  and	  possibly	   into	  outright	  
forests	  over	  time.	  Sacred	  groves	  are	  particularly	  well	  marked	  in	  non-­‐forested	  areas	  such	  as	  savannahs	  and	  
steppes.	   Their	   presence	   in	  dry	   lands	  underlines	   their	   ‘special’	   character	   as	   areas	  of	   seclusion	   that	   render	  
visible	   the	  borderline	  between	   the	  non-­‐sacred	  and	   the	   sacred	  world.	   If	   sacred	   forests	  exist	   in	  mountains,	  
they	  can	  help	  to	  prevent	  soil	  erosion”	  see	  International	  Union	  for	  Conservation	  of	  Nature	  (IUCN)	  Conserving	  
Cultural	  and	  Biological	  Diversity:	  The	  Role	  of	  Sacred Natural	  Sites	  and	  Cultural	  Landscapes	  (UNESCO,	  Paris,	  
2006)	  at	  10-­‐12.	  
96	  Akwé:	   Kon	   are:	   “Voluntary	   guidelines	   for	   the	   conduct	   of	   cultural,	   environmental	   and	   social	   impact	  
assessments	   regarding	  developments	  proposed	   to	   take	  place	  on,	  or	  which	  are	   likely	   to	   impact	  on,	   sacred	  
sites	   and	   on	   lands	   and	   waters	   traditionally	   occupied	   or	   used	   by	   indigenous	   and	   local	   communities”	  
electronic	  document	  <www.cbd.int/traditional/guidelines.shtml>	  last	  visited	  on	  10/07/2015.	  
97 	  Secretariat	   of	   the	   Convention	   on	   Biological	   Diversity,	   Akwe:	   Kon	   Guidelines	   electronic	   document	  
<www.cbd.int/doc/publications/akwe-­‐brochure-­‐en.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  04/01/2015.	  




of	  the	  community	  from	  then	  onward.	  Native	  peoples	  who	  knew	  the	  location	  of	  
these	  secret	  spots,	  also	  found	  it	  incredibly	  difficult	  to	  explain	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  
mystic	   experiences	   one	   could	   have	   there,	   and	   how	   these	   experiences	   might	  
profoundly	   influence	   someone’s	   life. 99 	  Protection	   of	   the	   location	   and	   its	  
significance	  have	  always	  been	  the	  main	  reason	  for	  secrecy.	  Only	  those	  who	  are	  
prepared	   can	   understand	   and	   go	   through	   such	  mystic	   experiences	   unharmed.	  
Thus,	   secrecy	   and	   respect	   for	   sacred	   places	   is	   fundamental	   in	   indigenous	  
societies	   all	   over	   the	   world,	   because	   such	   places	   “mark	   the	   location	   and	  
circumstances	   of	   an	   event	   in	   which	   the	   holy	   became	   an	   objective	   fact	   of	  
existence”.100	  While	  for	  Christians	  holiness	  is	  an	  experience	  limited	  to	  the	  human	  
race,	  for	  most	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  holiness	  can	  be	  found	  in	  every	  creation,	  and	  
humans	  are	   just	  a	  part	  of	  the	  big	  whole.	  Thus	  a	  place	  may	  narrate	  the	  story	  of	  
the	  creation	  and	  hold	  the	  blueprints	  of	  the	  stars.	  
Generally,	   the	   value	   of	   a	   place	   is	   given	   by	   the	   people	   who	   have	   known	   it	   for	  
generations	   and	   have	   aligned	   to	   its	   rhythm.	   The	   Lakota,	   for	   example,	   have	  
regarded	  the	  Black	  Hills	  as	  a	  sacred	  place	  for	  centuries.	  They	  are	  the	  sanctuary	  
for	  the	  animals,	  and	  “human	  beings	  were	  not	  supposed	  to	  dominate	  the	  hills	  or	  
make	  their	  presence	  an	  inhibiting	  factor	  in	  the	  animals’	  use	  of	  the	  area”.101	  It	  can	  
be	  rightly	  said	  that	  for	  many	  indigenous	  peoples	  sacredness	  extends	  to	  all	  forms	  
of	  existence.	  In	  addition,	  the	  cultural	  value	  of	  the	  place	  is	  intrinsic	  and	  intangible,	  
and	  it	  should	  be	  understood	  and	  safeguarded	  by	  the	  law.	  For	  indigenous	  culture,	  
land	   cannot	   be	   possessed,	   and	   indigenous	   communities	   regard	   sacred	   sites	   as	  
something	   that	   needs	   to	   be	   protected	   by	   secrecy	   and	   tribal	   customary	  
regulations,	   along	  with	  a	  deeply	   rooted	   respect,	   and	  often	   fear,	   for	   the	   sacred	  
itself	  that	  inhabits	  the	  place.	  	  
	  
In	   respect	   of	   a	   cultural	   relativist	   approach,	   this	   chapter	   has	   briefly	   described	  
indigenous	  cultures	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  or	  those	  close	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  See	  Swan	  at	  35.	  
100	  At	  36.	  
101	  “The	  special	  human	  ability	  is	  to	  communicate	  with	  other	  forms	  of	  life,	  learn	  from	  them	  all,	  and	  act	  as	  a	  
focal	   point	   for	   things	   they	   wish	   to	   express.	   In	   any	   sacred	   location,	   therefore,	   humans	   become	   the	  
instrument	   by	  which	   all	   of	   creation	   is	   able	   to	   interact	   and	   express	   its	   totality	   of	   satisfaction.	   The	   sacred	  
place	   and	   the	  myriad	   forms	   of	   life	   which	   inhabit	   the	   land	   require	   specific	   forms	   of	   communication	   and	  





them.	   In	   these	   few	  pages	   it	  has	  become	  evident	   that	   indigenous	  cultures	  are	  a	  
very	  complex	  phenomena	  of	   traditions,	  customs	  and	  spiritualism.	  The	  sacred	   is	  
very	  present	   in	  most	  of	  the	  aspects	  of	   indigenous	   lives.	  Such	  sacred	  places	  and	  
activities	  are	  often	  secret	  and	  require	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  guardian	  (or	  more	  than	  
one)	  who	  would	  know,	  manage	  and	  protect	  the	  sacred	  knowledge	  and	  tradition.	  
The	  next	  chapter	  will	  define	  what	  indigenous	  heritage,	  traditional	  knowledge	  and	  
traditional	   cultural	   expression	   are	   and	   how	   they	   are	   today	   included	   and	  








Indigenous	  Heritage,	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  and	  Traditional	  
Cultural	  Expressions	  
	  
This	  chapter	  will	  introduce	  and	  explain	  what	  heritage,	  traditional	  knowledge	  (TK)	  
and	   traditional	   cultural	   expressions	   (TCEs)	   are.	   As	   will	   be	   seen,	   indigenous	  
heritage,	  TK	  and	  TCEs	  are	  quite	  complex,	  stratified	  concepts.	  It	  is	  worth	  clarifying	  
that	  they	  can	  be	  both	  sacred	  and	  secret	  and,	   therefore,	  guarded	  only	  by	  a	   few	  
people,	   or	   constitute	   common	   knowledge	   or	   heritage	   of	   an	   indigenous	  
community	  and,	  therefore,	  be	  known	  by	  the	  whole	  community.	  
	  
3.1	  –	  Cultural	  Heritage	  
	  
‘Heritage’	  is	  an	  old	  word	  originating	  from	  “the	  vocabulary	  of	  traditional	  societies	  
in	  which	  values	  were	  derived	  from	  ancestral	  relationships”.1	  However,	  today	  the	  
word	   is	   casually	   applied	   to	   any	   commodity	   that	   “purports	   to	   reproduce	   past	  
styles	  of	  architecture,	   furniture,	  household	  utensils	  or	  even	   food”.2	  In	  1968	  the	  
United	   Nations	   Educational,	   Scientific	   and	   Cultural	   Organization	   (UNESCO)	  
defined	  cultural	  property	  as	  “the	  product	  and	  witness	  of	  the	  different	  traditions	  
and	  of	  the	  spiritual	  achievements	  of	  the	  past	  and	  …	  thus	  an	  essential	  element	  in	  
the	  personality	  of	  the	  peoples	  of	  the	  world”.3	  Heritage	   is	  something	  which	  may	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  “In	   its	  original	  sense,	  heritage	  was	  the	  property	  which	  parents	  handed	  on	  to	  their	  children,	  although	  the	  
word	   could	   be	   used	   to	   refer	   to	   an	   intellectual	   or	   spiritual	   legacy	   as	   well.	   In	   the	   nineteenth	   and	   early	  
twentieth	   centuries,	   as	   new	   nation-­‐states	   fought	   for	   legitimacy,	   people	   began	   to	   speak	   of	   a	   ‘national	  
heritage’”	  see	  Graham	  Fairclough,	  Rodney	  Harrison	  and	  others	  The	  Heritage	  Reader	  (Routledge,	  London	  and	  
New	  York,	  2008)	  at	  31.	  
2	  Supra	  at	  31.	  
3	  UNESCO	   -­‐	   Recommendation	   concerning	   the	   Preservation	   of	   Cultural	   Property	   Endangered	   by	   Public	   or	  
Private	   works	   –	   “For	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	   recommendation,	   the	   term	   ‘cultural	   property’	   applies	   to:	   (a)	  
Immovables,	  such	  as	  archaeological	  and	  historic	  or	  scientific	  sites,	  structures	  or	  other	   features	  of	  historic,	  
scientific,	   artistic	   or	   architectural	   value,	   whether	   religious	   or	   secular,	   including	   -­‐groups	   of	   traditional	  
structures,	   historic	   quarters	   in	   urban	   or	   rural	   built-­‐up	   areas	   and	   the	   ethnological	   structures	   of	   previous	  
cultures	  still	  extant	  in	  valid	  form.	  It	  applies	  to	  such	  immovables	  constituting	  ruins	  existing	  above	  the	  earth	  as	  
well	  as	  to	  archaeological	  or	  historic	  remains	  found	  within	  the	  earth.	  The	  term	  cultural	  property	  also	  includes	  
the	   setting	   of	   such	   property;	   (b)	   Movable	   property	   of	   cultural	   importance	   including	   that	   existing	   in	   or	  
recovered	  from	  immovable	  property	  and	  that	  concealed	  in	  the	  earth,	  which	  may	  be	  found'	  in	  archaeological	  
or	   historical	   sites	   or	   elsewhere.	   2.	   The	   term	   ‘cultural	   property’	   includes	   not	   only	   the	   established	   and	  
scheduled	   architectural,	   archaeological	   and	   historic	   sites	   and	   structure,	   but	   also	   the	   unscheduled	   or	  




be	  inherited	  and	  it	  can	  denote	  a	  gift	  for	  future	  generations	  to	  be	  left	  unaltered.4	  
Value5	  underlies	  the	  notion	  of	  cultural	  heritage,	  and	  the	  holders	  of	  such	  heritage	  
are	  the	  only	  ones	  who	  can	  give	  a	  value	  to	  it.	  	  
As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  the	  cultural	  identity	  of	  a	  given	  society	  forms	  part	  
of	   its	   culture	   (language,	   religion,	   customs,	   sacred	   land,	   arts,	  works,	   etc).	  While	  
the	   concept	  of	   culture	  often	  gets	   lost	   in	   its	  own	  broad	  and	  complex	   system	  of	  
beliefs	   and	   practices,	   the	   idea	   of	   cultural	   identity	   is	   sometimes	   blurred.	   In	  
general,	  cultural	  identity	  is	  intended	  to	  capture	  the	  personification	  of	  a	  culture;6	  
such	  identity	  refers	  to	  the	  feelings	  and	  emotions	  that	  a	  community	  experiences	  
in	   relation	   to	   its	   own	   culture.	   Cultural	   identity	   is	   not	   only	   identified	   in	   certain	  
cultural	   features,	  but	   also	   in	   the	  perception	  of	   these	   features.	   It	   is	   also	  a	  non-­‐
homogeneous	  dynamic	  process	  that	  evolves	  over	  time;7	  it	  concerns	  the	  future	  as	  
much	  as	  the	  past,	  and	  it	  can	  have	  both	  a	  collective	  and	  individual	  nature.	  That	  is	  
why	  once	   a	   culture	   is	   lost	   the	   identity	  which	   linked	   a	   society	   to	   those	   cultural	  
expressions	  might	  simultaneously	  vanish	  forever.	  In	  that	  case,	  even	  if	  the	  culture	  
is	   later	  re-­‐established	  somehow,	  the	  emotions	  and	  identities	  related	  to	   it	  could	  
remain	  lost	  forever,	  or	  survive	  only	  in	  the	  artistic	  heritage	  which	  once	  embodied	  
the	  culture.	  Indigenous	  peoples’	  material/tangible	  heritage	  “could	  include	  almost	  
any	   object	   of	   some	   cultural	   significance	   for	   the	   indigenous	   group	   or	  
community”.8	  Objects	   among	   indigenous	   peoples	   are	   often	   functional	   and	   are	  
made	   for	   specific	   purposes	   and	   endowed	   with	   specific	   meanings;	   these	  
significances	   may	   widely	   differ	   from	   one	   community	   to	   another.	   Many	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
UNESCO	   electronic	   document	   <http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-­‐
URL_ID=13085&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html>	  last	  visited	  on	  11/09/2011.	  
4	  Craig	  Forrest	  International	  Law	  and	  the	  Protection	  of	  Cultural	  Heritage	  (Routledge,	  London	  and	  New	  York,	  
2010)	  at	  3.	  
5	  “Cultural	  heritage	  is	  value	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  neither	  the	  object	  nor	  the	  practice	  itself	  which	  is	  of	  some	  
importance	  to	  a	  people,	  but	  the	  importance	  itself.	  It	  is	  embodied	  in	  an	  object,	  a	  landscape,	  a	  dance	  or	  all	  in	  
combination.	  And	  it	   is	  this	  which	  legal	  regimes	  aim	  to	  protect.	  The	  way	  in	  which	  we	  conceive	  of,	  and	  give	  
value	   to	   cultural	   heritage	   determines	   the	   way	   in	   which	   we	   ‘protect’	   that	   heritage’”	   see	   Craig	   Forrest	  
International	  Law	  and	  the	  Protection	  of	  Cultural	  Heritage	  at	  3.	  
6	  “…	  cultural	   identity	  applies	   to	  all	   those	  elements	  of	  culture	  through	  which	   individuals	  and	  groups	  define	  
and	  express	   themselves	  and	  by	  which	   they	  wish	   to	  be	  recognised;	  as	  a	  phase	   in	  a	  process	  which	   is	  never	  
completed,	  it	  embraces	  the	  liberties	  of	  which	  personal	  dignity	  is	  compounded,	  and	  covers	  cultural	  diversity,	  
the	  particular	  and	  the	  universal,	  memory	  and	  aspiration”	  see	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Doc	  CAHMIN	  (May	  1995)	  16	  
Appendix	  IV	  at	  27.	  
7	  Yvonne	  M	  Donders	  Towards	  a	  Right	  to	  Cultural	  Identity?	  (Intersentia,	  Antwerpen-­‐Oxford-­‐New	  York,	  2002)	  
at	  12.	  
8 	  Graeme	   Aplin	   Heritage	   –	   Identification,	   Conservation,	   and	   Management	   (Oxford	   University	   Press,	  
Melbourne,	   2002)	   at	   13	   and	   15;	   see	   also	   Craig	   Forrest	   International	   Law	   and	   the	   Protection	   of	   Cultural	  




indigenous	   peoples	   use	   objects,	   songs,	   oral	   narratives	   and	   symbolic	   actions	   to	  
relate	  to	  specific	  places,	  events	  and	  cultural	  knowledge	  they	   intend	  to	  transmit	  
to	  future	  generations.	  Indigenous	  material	  culture	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  interaction	  
of	  people	  with	  their	  material	  worlds,	  and	  its	  material	  form	  is	  the	  principal	  means	  
by	  which	  culture	  is	  stored	  and	  transmitted.9	  As	  such,	  indigenous	  tangible	  culture	  
can	  rightly	  be	  considered	  a	  communication	  medium;	  whereas	  immovable	  places	  
and	   sites	   of	   sacred	   significance	   might	   include	   archaeological	   sites,	   natural	  
locations,	   sacred	   rituals,	   ceremonial	   sites	   and	   natural	   objects	   like	   trees,	   rocks	  
and	   waterfalls.10	  Often	   intangible	   culture	   is	   imbued	   with	   spiritual	   and	   sacred	  
significance,	  and	  it	  is	  often	  secretly	  guarded	  by	  the	  custodians	  of	  knowledge	  (see	  
next	  chapter).	  Since	  heritage	  and	  culture	  are	  the	  result	  of	  a	  given	  society	  and	  its	  
philosophies,	  the	  perception	  of	  it	  differs	  from	  one	  ethnic	  group	  to	  another.	  It	  is,	  
therefore,	  difficult	  for	  Western	  societies	  to	  understand	  that	  what	  they	  perceive	  
and	   appreciate	   as	   ‘art’,	   within	   an	   indigenous	   community	   could	   be	   considered	  
‘sacred’	  and,	  as	  such,	  holding	  a	  specific	  value	  and	  significance	  and,	  most	  of	  the	  
times,	  such	  value	  and	  significance	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  trade	  and	  commerce	  
as	   understood	   by	   developed	   countries.11	  According	   to	   UNESCO,	   the	   cultural	  
heritage	  of	  a	  people	  includes:12	  
	  
…	   the	  works	  of	   its	   artists,	   architects,	  musicians,	  writers	   and	   scientists	   and	   also	  
the	  work	  of	  anonymous	  artists,	  expressions	  of	  the	  people's	  spirituality,	  and	  the	  
body	   of	   values	   which	   give	   meaning	   to	   life.	   It	   includes	   both	   tangible	   and	  
intangible	  works	   through	  which	   the	   creativity	   of	   that	   people	   finds	   expression:	  
languages,	  rites,	  beliefs,	  historic	  places	  and	  monuments,	  literature,	  works	  of	  art,	  
archives	  and	  libraries	  (Mexico	  City	  Declaration	  on	  Cultural	  Policies,	  1982).	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  “The	  most	  distinctive	   feature	  of	  objects	   is	   that	   they	  are	   tangible.	   This	  means	   they	  have	   the	  property	  of	  
being	  able	  to	  exist	   in	  time	  and	  space	  independent	  of	  people.	  Since	  objects	  endure	  through	  time	  they	  also	  
have	  the	  ability	  to	  bridge	  passing	  generations,	  and	  bring	  continuity	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  cultural	  connectedness.	  
Thus	  material	  culture	  can	  play	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  the	  transmission	  of	  culture”	  see	  Christina	  F	  Kreps	  Liberating	  
Culture	  –	  Cross-­‐cultural	  Perspectives	  on	  Museums,	  Curation	  and	  Heritage	  Preservation	   (Routledge,	  London	  
and	  New	  York,	  2003)	  at	  49.	  
10	  Craig	  Forrest	  International	  Law	  and	  the	  Protection	  of	  Cultural	  Heritage	  at	  3.	  
11 	  James	   AR	   Nafziger	   and	   Ann	   M	   Nicgorski	   (eds)	   Cultural	   Heritage	   Issues:	   the	   Legacy	   of	   Conquest,	  
Colonization,	  and	  Commerce	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers,	  The	  Netherlands,	  2009)	  at	  7.	  
12	  Mexico	  City	  Declaration	  on	  Cultural	  Policies	  (1982)	  UNESCO	  electronic	  document	  





Since	   its	   creation,	   UNESCO	   has	   recognised	   the	   diversity	   of	   world	   cultural	  
expressions	  and	  the	  intrinsic	  cultural	  and	  spiritual	  value	  of	  every	  form	  of	  tangible	  
and	   intangible	   heritage	  present	   today	   in	   every	   area	   of	   the	  world.	   In	   1972,	   the	  
World	  Heritage	  Convention	  considered	  ‘heritage’	  as:13	  
	  
…	  the	  inherited	  patrimony	  of	  human	  experience	  and	  knowledge’	  mostly	  referred	  
as	  ‘cultural	  property’,	  along	  with	  ‘nature,	  flora	  and	  fauna’	  as	  constitutive	  parts	  of	  
the	   heritage	   of	   the	   world.	   The	   Convention	   was	   created	   to	   ensure	   ‘the	  
identification,	  protection,	  conservation,	  presentation	  and	  transmission	  to	  future	  
generations	  of	  cultural	  and	  natural	  heritage	  of	  outstanding	  universal	  value.	  
	  
This	  1972	  Convention	  did	  not	  consider	  cultural	  objects	  as	  heritage	  and	  left	  their	  
protection	   to	   domestic	   jurisdictions.14	  In	   saying	   that,	   the	   Convention	   set	   very	  
important	   innovative	  parameters	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  world	  heritage.	  Firstly,	  
it	   introduced	   a	   ‘world	   heritage’	   category,	   which	   is	   of	   inestimable	   value	   for	   all	  
human	   beings;	   and	   second,	   it	   put	   together	   culture	   and	   nature,	   through	  
recognising	  no	  difference	  in	  the	  greatest	  works	  of	  humankind	  as	  well	  as	  those	  of	  
nature.	   By	   including	   natural	   heritage,	   the	   Convention	   goes	   beyond	   its	   sole	  
purpose	   of	   protecting	   cultural	   heritage,	   and	   yet	   it	   lacks	   a	   formal	   definition	   of	  
what	   ‘world	  heritage’	   is,	  mending	   the	   lacuna	  with	   a	   list	   of	  what	   can	   rightly	  be	  
considered	  cultural	  and	  natural	  heritage.15	  Generally	  speaking,	  the	  lack	  of	  formal	  
definitions	  in	  international	  law	  is	  quite	  dangerous.	  It	  limits	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  law	  
only	   to	   the	   subjects	   enumerated	   in	   the	   list,	   while	   leaving	   out	   what	   could	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Operational	  Guidelines	   for	   the	   Implementation	  of	   the	  World	  Heritage	  Convention	   (2005)	  UNESCO,	  Doc	  
WHC.	  05/2,	  at	  para	  7.	  
14	  Francesco	  Francioni	  (ed)	  The	  1972	  World	  Heritage	  Convention	  –	  A	  Commentary	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
New	  York,	   2008)	   at	   3;	   see	   also	  UNESCO	  World	  Heritage	  –	  Challenges	   for	   the	  Millennium	   (UNESCO	  World	  
Heritage	  Centre,	  Paris,	  2007).	  
15	  UNESCO	  World	  Heritage	  Convention	  (1972)	  -­‐	  Article	  1:	  “For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  Convention,	  the	  following	  
shall	  be	  considered	  as	  ‘cultural	  heritage’:	  monuments:	  architectural	  works,	  works	  of	  monumental	  sculpture	  
and	   painting,	   elements	   or	   structures	   of	   an	   archaeological	   nature,	   inscriptions,	   cave	   dwellings	   and	  
combinations	  of	  features	  …;	  groups	  of	  buildings:	  groups	  of	  separate	  or	  connected	  buildings	  which,	  because	  
of	   their	   architecture,	   their	   homogeneity	   or	   their	   place	   in	   the	   landscape	   …;	   sites:	   works	   of	   man	   or	   the	  
combined	   works	   of	   nature	   and	   man,	   and	   areas	   including	   archaeological	   sites	   which	   are	   of	   outstanding	  
universal	  value	  from	  the	  historical,	  aesthetic,	  ethnological	  or	  anthropological	  point	  of	  view.	  Article	  2	   -­‐	  For	  
the	   purposes	   of	   this	   Convention,	   the	   following	   shall	   be	   considered	   as	   ‘natural	   heritage’:	   natural	   features	  
consisting	   of	   physical	   and	   biological	   formations	   or	   groups	   of	   such	   formations	   …;	   geological	   and	  
physiographical	   formations	   and	   precisely	   delineated	   areas	   which	   constitute	   the	   habitat	   of	   threatened	  
species	  of	  animals	  and	  plants	  …;	  natural	  sites	  or	  precisely	  delineated	  natural	  areas	  of	  outstanding	  universal	  
value	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   science,	   conservation	   or	   natural	   beauty”	   see	   UNESCO	  




reasonably	   be	   outside	   the	   specificity	   of	   any	   list	   but	   being	   included	  within	   the	  
broad	  definition.	  Having	   said	   this,	   the	  question	  here	   is	  whether	  world	  heritage	  
has	  value	  as	  per	  the	  sum	  of	   its	  parts,	  and	   if	  every	  part	  holds	  a	  value	   in	   its	  own	  
right,	  or	  whether	  such	  value	   is	  confined	  to	  the	  general	  sum	  of	   the	  parts	  or	   the	  
category	  that	  includes	  it	  (eg	  monuments,	  buildings	  etc).	  In	  the	  second	  case,	  what	  
constitutes	   heritage	   for	   indigenous	   peoples	   might	   not	   fit	   into	   the	   category	  
dictated	  by	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world;	  whereas	  it	  might	  find	  its	  own	  niche	  as	  heritage	  
when	   considered	   in	   isolation	   (eg	   sacred	   territories).	   A	   clear	   example	   of	   what	  
stated	  above	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  Moeraki	  Boulders	  (Aotearoa-­‐New	  Zealand).16	  
These	  boulders	  have	  spiritual	  significance	  for	  Māori	  people	  and	  are	  today	  legally	  
protected	  against	  removal	  or	  damage.	  While	  not	  all	  rock	  formations	  represent	  a	  
form	  of	  heritage	  (otherwise	  all	  the	  rocks	  of	  the	  world	  would	  amount	  to	  heritage),	  
the	   spiritual	   significance	   of	   the	  Moeraki	   Boulders	   of	   New	   Zealand	  make	   them	  
part	  of	  the	  culture	  of	  Māori	  people	  and,	  therefore,	   justify	  their	   legal	  protection	  
as	   heritage.	   The	   Heritage	   New	   Zealand	   Pouhere	   Taonga	   Act	  (2014),	   which	  
replaced	  the	  Historic	  Places	  Act	   (1993),	  dedicates	   its	  Section	  4	  to	  the	  criteria	  of	  
recognition	  of	  historical,	  cultural	  and	  ancestral	  significance.17	  
	  
The	   1972	   Convention	   focuses	   on	   the	   ‘monumentality’	   and	   ‘exceptionality’	   of	  
heritage	   as	   perceived	   from	   a	   universalistic	   Western	   viewpoint.	   Nothing	   in	   it	  
refers	   to	   culture	   as	   perceived	   from	   a	   non-­‐Western	   perspective. 18 	  This	  
Convention	   is	  a	  key	  piece	  of	   international	   legislation	  that	  was	  not	  conceived	  as	  
including	   and	   safeguarding	   intangible	   heritage.	   Such	   a	   category	   could	   be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  The	   Moeraki	   Boulders	   are	   situated	   on	   Koekohe	   Beach	   at	   a	   place	   named	   Kumara,	   midway	   between	  
Hampden	  and	  Moeraki	   townships	   in	  North	  Otago	   (South	   Island).	  According	   to	  Maori	   legend,	   the	  origin	  of	  
the	  boulders	  dates	  from	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  Arai-­‐te-­‐uru,	  one	  of	  the	  large	  sailing	  canoes	  that	  came	  from	  distant	  
Hawaiki.	   On	   her	   quest	   south	   for	   the	   precious	   greenstone,	   the	   canoe	   was	   wrecked	   near	   Shag	   Point	  
(Matakaea).	  The	  reef	  which	  today	  extends	  seawards	  is	  the	  canoe's	  petrified	  hull,	  while	  close	  by,	  in	  the	  shape	  
of	  a	  prominent	  rock,	  stands	  the	  petrified	  body	  of	  her	  commander.	  Strewn	  along	  the	  beach	  are	  the	  boulders	  
which	   represent	   the	   eel	   baskets,	   calabashes,	   and	   kumaras	   washed	   ashore	   from	   the	   wreck.	   The	   name	  
Moeraki	   (Moerangi)	   means	   “drowsy	   day”	   see	   the	   Encyclopaedia	   of	   New	   Zealand	   electronic	   document	  
<www.teara.govt.nz/en/1966/moeraki-­‐boulders>	  last	  visited	  on	  16/02/2017	  
17 	  See	   Heritage	   New	   Zealand	   Pouhere	   Taonga	   Act	   2014	   electronic	   document	  
<www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2014/0026/26.0/DLM4005414.html>	  last	  visited	  on	  16/02/2017	  
18	  As	  stressed	  by	  Dario	  Gamboni	  in	  2001:	  “On	  the	  world	  level,	  the	  real	  success	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  world	  heritage	  
will	   depend	   upon	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   the	   universalism	   born	   of	   European	   Enlightenment	   comes	   to	   be	  
perceived	   as	   truly	   universal,	   rather	   than	   appearing	   as	   a	   new	   form	   of	   colonialism	   or	   the	   cultural	   face	   of	  
economic	  globalization.	  …	  what	  we	  will	   need	   is	   a	   forum	   in	  which	   several	  worlds,	  with	  differing	   visions	  of	  
heritage	   or	   legacy,	   can	   come	   into	   contact,	   communicate,	   and	   negotiate	   those	   differences”	   see	   Dario	  
Gamboni	   “World	   Heritage:	   Shield	   or	   Target”	   (2001)	   electronic	   document	  




arbitrarily	   included	   as	   a	   sub-­‐category	   of	   ‘world	   heritage’;	   however,	   it	   could	   be	  
argued	  that	  if	  intangible	  heritage	  were	  one	  of	  the	  focuses	  of	  the	  Convention,	  its	  
category	  would	  have	  been	  present	  within	   the	  Convention	   from	  the	  start.	  Since	  
indigenous	  peoples	  consider	  the	  tangible	  and	  intangible	  aspects	  of	  their	  culture	  
as	   intertwined,	   the	   risk	   is	   that	   most	   of	   their	   traditions	   and	   the	   spiritual,	  
sacred/secret	   element	   of	   their	   heritage	   would	   be	   left	   out	   of	   the	   aims	   of	   the	  
Convention	  and	  totally	  unprotected.19	  During	  the	  30th	  World	  Heritage	  Committee	  
session	   in	  Lithuania	   (2006),	  delegates	   from	  New	  Zealand	  shared	  their	  profound	  
scepticism	  about	   such	   categorizations,	  underlining	   the	   impossibility	  of	   severing	  
tangible	  and	  intangible	  heritage	  into	  two	  distinct	  categories.20	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	  
the	  Māori	  delegation:21	  
	  
We	  have	  concerns	  that	  indigenous	  worldviews	  could	  be	  set	  into	  frameworks	  that	  
have	  been	  designed	  from	  primarily	  other	  perspectives.	  The	  distinction	  between	  
tangible	   and	   intangible	   qualities	   for	   example	   becomes	   blurred	   when	   viewed	  
through	  an	  indigenous	  lens.	  The	  two	  dimensions	  are	  immunised	  to	  perspectives	  
that	   infuse	   a	   sense	   of	   spirit	   and	   connection	   to	   animate	   and	   inanimate	   objects	  
and	   locate	   all	  matters	   along	   a	   continuum	   that	   includes	   people	   and	   immaterial	  
cultures.	  	  
	  
In	   consideration	   of	   the	   actual	   lack	   of	   protection	   for	   the	   world’s	   intangible	  
heritage,	   in	   1994	   the	   Operational	   Guidelines	   for	   the	   Implementation	   of	   the	  
World	  Heritage	  Convention	  included	  the	  ‘cultural	   landscape’	  category	  (counting	  
three	  typologies	  of	  landscape)	  22	  as	  “…	  the	  inscription	  of	  such	  landscapes	  on	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  “In	  1999	  the	  representatives	  of	  the	  Pacific	   Islands	  regions	  urged	  the	  World	  Heritage	  Committee	  to	  take	  
responsibility	   for	   intangible	   heritage.	   They	   argued	   that:	   ‘the	  meeting	   suggested	   that	   the	  World	   Heritage	  
Convention	   should	   ensure	   protection	   of	   the	   intangible	   heritage,	   including	   languages	   and	   traditions.	   The	  
meeting	  noted	   that	   the	   terms	  of	   the	   convention	  may	  need	   to	  be	  expanded	   to	   include	   recognition	  of	   the	  
importance	  of	  the	  spiritual	  element	  of	  heritage’”	  see	  Britta	  Rudolff	  ‘Intangible’	  and	  ‘Tangible’	  Heritage	  -­‐	  A	  
Topology	  of	  Culture	  in	  Contexts	  of	  Faith	  (Scientia	  Bonnensis	  Publishing,	  Germany,	  2010)	  at	  20.	  	  
20	  “From	  the	  New	  Zealand	  perspective,	  although	  tangible	  and	  intangible	  heritage	  can	  sometimes	  be	  severed,	  
in	  many	  instances	  they	  cannot.	  For	  New	  Zealand,	  the	  tangible	  and	  intangible	  link	  with	  much	  of	  our	  heritage	  
cannot	  be	  severed.	  This	  is	  especially	  so	  with	  cultural	  landscapes.	  To	  suggest	  otherwise,	  …	  is	  nonsense.	  The	  
land	   and	   the	   people,	   like	   the	   relationship	   between	   them,	   are	   one.	   This	   relationship	   cannot	   be	  
compartmentalised”	   see	   Britta	   Rudolff	   ‘Intangible’	   and	   ‘Tangible’	   Heritage	   at	   10;	   see	   UNESCO	   World	  
Heritage	   Committee	   (Lithuania,	   2006)	   UNESCO	   Doc	   WHC-­‐06/30.COM/19	   electronic	   document	  
<http://whc.unesco.org/archive/2006/whc06-­‐30com-­‐19e.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  22/01/2015.	  
21	  UNESCO	  World	  Heritage	  Committee	  (Lithuania,	  2006)	  	  Doc	  WHC-­‐06/30.COM/19	  supra.	  
22	  “(1)	   clearly	   defined	   landscapes	   designed	   and	   created	   intentionally	   by	   man;	   (2)	   organically	   evolved	  




World	   Heritage	   List	   is	   justifiable	   by	   virtue	   of	   the	   powerful	   religious,	   artistic	   or	  
cultural	   associations	   of	   the	   natural	   element 23 	  rather	   than	   material	   cultural	  
evidence,	   which	   may	   be	   insignificant	   or	   even	   absent”; 24 	  whereas	   ‘cultural	  
routes’25	  were	  added	  to	  the	  Operational	  Guidelines	  in	  2005.	  	  
The	  idea	  that	  protection	  in	  1972	  should	  be	  limited	  to	  monuments	  changed	  over	  
time	   and	   reflected	   the	   new	   trend	   in	   archaeology,	   anthropology	   and	   ethnology	  
that	  had	  started	  considering	  monuments	  as	  manifestations	  of	  “social	  structures,	  
ways	  of	  life,	  beliefs,	  …	  and	  system	  of	  knowledge”.26	  Today,	  the	  spiritual	  values	  of	  
cultural	  heritage	  are	  one	  of	  the	  main	  concerns	  of	  UNESCO.	  In	  2003,	  the	  UNESCO	  
Convention	   for	   the	   Safeguarding	   of	   Intangible	   Cultural	   Heritage	   filled	   the	  
dichotomic	  gap	  that	  used	  to	  divide	  tangible	  and	  intangible	  heritage	  by	  including	  
“instruments,	  objects,	   artefacts	  and	  cultural	   spaces”,	  but	   it	  did	  not	   include	   the	  
spiritual/sacred	  element	  of	  the	  cultural	  knowledge	  kept	  by	  elders	  and	  bearers.27	  
The	  absence	  of	  this	  part	  might	  be	  of	  no	  great	  importance	  for	  Western	  societies,	  
but	  is	  very	  important	  for	  the	  transmissibility	  of	  indigenous	  peoples’	  traditions.	  28	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
landscapes”	   see	   UNESCO	   –	   Operational	   Guidelines	   electronic	   document	  
<http://whc.unesco.org/archive/opguide94.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  10/08/2011.	  
23	  “In	  1993,	  Tongariro	  National	  Park	  (NZ)	  became	  the	  first	  property	  to	  be	   inscribed	  on	  the	  World	  Heritage	  
List	  under	  the	  revised	  cultural	  criteria	  …	  The	  Committee	  recognised	  that	  these	  mountains	  have	  cultural	  and	  
religious	  significance	  for	  the	  Maori	  people	  and	  represent	  the	  spiritual	  link	  between	  this	  community	  and	  its	  
natural	   environment.	   It	   was	   the	   first	   time	   that	   a	   natural	   World	   Heritage	   site	   received	   international	  
recognition	  for	   its	   intangible	  cultural	  values”	  see	  Barbara	  T	  Hoffman	  (ed)	  Art	  and	  Cultural	  Heritage	  –	  Law,	  
Policy	  and	  Practice	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  2009)	  at	  201.	  
24	  UNESCO	  –	  Operational	  Guidelines	  (1994)	  para	  39	  (iii)	  supra	  footnote	  20.	  
25 	  See	   UNWTO	   Global	   Reports	   on	   Cultural	   Routes	   and	   Itineraries	   electronic	   document	  
<http://cf.cdn.unwto.org/sites/all/files/pdf/global_report_cultural_routes_itineraries_v13.compressed_0.p
df>	  last	  visited	  on	  12/04/2017	  
26	  UNESCO	  –	  Operational	  Guidelines	  (1994a)	  at	  2-­‐3	  supra.	  
27	  Art	  2	  –	  “1.	  The	  ‘intangible	  cultural	  heritage’	  means	  the	  practices,	  representations,	  expressions,	  knowledge,	  
skills	   –	   as	   well	   as	   the	   instruments,	   objects,	   artefacts	   and	   cultural	   spaces	   associated	   therewith	   –	   that	  
communities,	   groups	   and,	   in	   some	   cases,	   individuals	   recognize	   as	   part	   of	   their	   cultural	   heritage.	   This	  
intangible	   cultural	   heritage,	   transmitted	   from	   generation	   to	   generation,	   is	   constantly	   recreated	   by	  
communities	  and	  groups	  in	  response	  to	  their	  environment,	  their	   interaction	  with	  nature	  and	  their	  history,	  
and	  provides	  them	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  identity	  and	  continuity,	  thus	  promoting	  respect	  for	  cultural	  diversity	  and	  
human	  creativity	  …	  -­‐	  2.	  The	  ‘intangible	  cultural	  heritage’	  …,	  is	  manifested	  inter	  alia	  in	  the	  following	  domains:	  
(a)	   oral	   traditions	   and	  expressions,	   including	   language	   as	   a	   vehicle	   of	   the	   intangible	   cultural	   heritage;	   (b)	  
performing	   arts;	   (c)	   social	   practices,	   rituals	   and	   festive	   events;	   (d)	   knowledge	   and	   practices	   concerning	  
nature	  and	  the	  universe;	  (e)	  traditional	  craftsmanship”.	  
28	  As	   stressed	  by	  Daes	   in	  1993:	   “Indigenous	  peoples	   regard	  all	   products	  of	   the	  human	  mind	  and	  heart	   as	  
interrelated,	  and	  as	  flowing	  from	  the	  same	  source:	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  people	  and	  their	  land,	  and	  
with	  the	  spirit	  world.	  Since	  the	  ultimate	  source	  of	  knowledge	  and	  creativity	   is	  the	  land	  itself,	  all	  of	  the	  art	  
and	   science	   of	   a	   specific	   people	   are	   manifestations	   of	   the	   same	   underlying	   relationship,	   and	   can	   be	  
considered	  as	  manifestations	  of	  the	  people	  as	  a	  whole”	  see	  Erica-­‐Irene	  Daes	  Study	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  
Cultural	   and	   Intellectual	   Property	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples,	   Commission	   on	   Human	   Rights	   UN	   Doc	  




To	   this	   end,	   the	   Universal	   Declaration	   on	   Cultural	   Diversity	   (UNESCO	   2001)29	  
considers	   cultural	   rights	   as	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   human	   rights	   (Art	   5).	   The	  
Declaration	   stresses	   the	   importance	   for	   states	   to	   adopt	   “inclusive	   ways	   of	  
encouraging	   cultural	   diversity	   through	   policies	   of	   cultural	   pluralism’	   and	   the	  
necessity	   to	   secure	   human	   rights	   as	   ‘guarantees	   of	   cultural	   diversity”. 30	  
Furthermore,	   it	  encourages	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  implicitly	  collective	  nature	  of	  
indigenous	  peoples’	  human	  and	  cultural	  rights.31	  In	  the	  2005	  Convention	  on	  the	  
Protection	   and	   Promotion	   of	   the	   Diversity	   of	   Cultural	   Expressions,	   UNESCO	  
defines	  cultural	  diversity	  as:	  	  
	  
…	   the	   manifold	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   cultures	   of	   groups	   and	   societies	   find	  
expression.	   These	   expressions	   are	   passed	   on	   within	   and	   among	   groups	   and	  
societies.	  Cultural	  diversity	  is	  made	  manifest	  not	  only	  through	  the	  varied	  ways	  in	  
which	   the	   cultural	   heritage	   of	   humanity	   is	   expressed,	   augmented	   and	  
transmitted	  through	  the	  variety	  of	  cultural	  expressions,	  but	  also	  through	  diverse	  
modes	   of	   artistic	   creation,	   production,	   dissemination,	   distribution	   and	  
enjoyment,	  whatever	  the	  means	  and	  technologies	  used	  (Art	  4.1).	  
	  
Having	  said	  this,	   it	   is	  also	  true	  that	  UNESCO	  remains	  vague	  on	  what	  constitutes	  
culture	  in	  many	  conventions	  and	  declarations	  and	  mostly	  refers	  to	  heritage32	  as	  
the	   expression	   of	   what	   culture	   is.	   However,	   Articles	   1	   and	   2	   of	   the	   UNESCO	  
Convention	   Concerning	   the	   Protection	   of	   the	   World	   Cultural	   and	   Natural	  
Heritage	   (1972)	   put	   together	   cultural	   and	   natural	   heritage	   as	   interchangeable	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Universal	  Declaration	  on	  Cultural	  Diversity	  (UNESCO	  2001)	  Article	  2	  –	  “From	  cultural	  diversity	  to	  cultural	  
pluralism:	   In	   our	   increasingly	   diverse	   societies,	   it	   is	   essential	   to	   ensure	   harmonious	   interaction	   among	  
people	   and	   groups	   with	   plural,	   varied	   and	   dynamic	   cultural	   identities	   as	   well	   as	   their	  willingness	   to	   live	  
together.	   Policies	   for	   the	   inclusion	   and	   participation	   of	   all	   citizens	   are	   guarantees	   of	   social	   cohesion,	   the	  
vitality	  of	   civil	   society	  and	  peace.	  Thus	  defined,	   cultural	  pluralism	  gives	  policy	  expression	   to	   the	   reality	  of	  
cultural	   diversity.	   Indissociable	   from	   a	   democratic	   framework,	   cultural	   pluralism	   is	   conducive	   to	   cultural	  
exchange	  and	  to	  the	  flourishing	  of	  creative	  capacities	  that	  sustain	  public	  life”	  UNESCO	  electronic	  document	  
<http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-­‐URL_ID=13179&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html>	   last	  
visited	  on	  01/08/2011.	  
30 	  UNESCO	   electronic	   document	   <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/127162e.pdf>	   last	  
visited	  on	  12/07/2015.	  
31	  Universal	   Declaration	   on	   Cultural	   Diversity:	   “Article	   4	   –The	   defence	   of	   cultural	   diversity	   is	   an	   ethical	  
imperative,	   inseparable	   from	   respect	   for	   human	   dignity.	   It	   implies	   a	   commitment	   to	   human	   rights	   and	  
fundamental	  freedoms,	   in	  particular	  the	  rights	  of	  persons	  belonging	  to	  minorities	  and	  those	  of	   indigenous	  
peoples.	  No	  one	  may	   invoke	  cultural	  diversity	   to	   infringe	  upon	  human	   rights	  guaranteed	  by	   international	  
law,	  nor	  to	  limit	  their	  scope”	  see	  Peter	  Poole	  Cultural	  Mapping	  and	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  (UNESCO,	  2003).	  
32	  The	  term	  heritage	  was	  officially	  adopted	  in	  the	  1972	  Convention	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  World	  Cultural	  




elements	  that	  can	  be	  regarded	  as:	  Culture.33	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  a	  holistic	  fashion,	  
culture	  as	  well	  as	  land	  becomes	  part	  of	  the	  heritage	  of	  human	  beings	  who	  could	  
only	   have	   developed	   a	   certain	   culture	   in	   certain	   natural	   scenarios.	   UNESCO’s	  
message	   has	   finally	   come	   to	   terms	   with	   a	   world	   profoundly	   diverse	   where	  
culture	   and	   heritage	   might	   have	   profoundly	   different	   meanings	   according	   to	  
each	   ethnic	   group	   and	   geographical	   area.34	  Article	   1	   of	   the	   Convention	   for	   the	  
Safeguarding	   of	   Intangible	   Cultural	   Heritage	   (UNESCO	   2003),	   35 	  speaks	   of	  
“cultural	  spaces”	  as	   inclusive	  of	   locations	  and	  natural	  settings.	  Such	   inclusion	   is	  
evident	   in	   the	   following	   passage	   of	   the	   article,	   where	   the	   stress	   goes	   to	  
“[peoples’]	   response	   to	   their	   environment,	   their	   interaction	   with	   nature	   and	  
their	  history”.36	  	  
In	  general,	  international	  law	  does	  not	  focus	  on	  culture	  in	  its	  abstract	  form	  (that	  is	  
left	  to	  anthropology	  and	  philosophy),	  but	  rather	  on	  the	  end	  result	  of	  the	  cultural	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Article	  1:	   “For	   the	  purposes	  of	   this	  Convention,	   the	   following	   shall	  be	   considered	  as	   ‘cultural	  heritage’:	  
monuments:	  architectural	  works,	  works	  of	  monumental	  sculpture	  and	  painting,	  elements	  or	  structures	  of	  an	  
archaeological	  nature,	   inscriptions,	  cave	  dwellings	  and	  combinations	  of	  features,	  which	  are	  of	  outstanding	  
universal	  value	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  history,	  art	  or	  science;	  groups	  of	  buildings:	  groups	  of	  separate	  or	  
connected	  buildings	  which,	  because	  of	  their	  architecture,	  their	  homogeneity	  or	  their	  place	  in	  the	  landscape,	  
are	  of	  outstanding	  universal	  value	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  history,	  art	  or	  science;	  sites:	  works	  of	  man	  or	  
the	  combined	  works	  of	  nature	  and	  man,	  and	  areas	  including	  archaeological	  sites	  which	  are	  of	  outstanding	  
universal	  value	  from	  the	  historical,	  aesthetic,	  ethnological	  or	  anthropological	  point	  of	  view.	  Article	  2	   -­‐	  For	  
the	   purposes	   of	   this	   Convention,	   the	   following	   shall	   be	   considered	   as	   ‘natural	   heritage’:	   natural	   features	  
consisting	   of	   physical	   and	   biological	   formations	   or	   groups	   of	   such	   formations,	   which	   are	   of	   outstanding	  
universal	  value	  from	  the	  aesthetic	  or	  scientific	  point	  of	  view;	  geological	  and	  physiographical	  formations	  and	  
precisely	   delineated	   areas	   which	   constitute	   the	   habitat	   of	   threatened	   species	   of	   animals	   and	   plants	   of	  
outstanding	   universal	   value	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   science	   or	   conservation;	   natural	   sites	   or	   precisely	  
delineated	  natural	  areas	  of	  outstanding	  universal	  value	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  science,	  conservation	  or	  
natural	  beauty”.	  
34	  In	   the	   Preamble	   of	   the	   Convention	   on	   the	   Protection	   and	   Promotion	   of	   the	   Diversity	   of	   Cultural	  
Expressions	  (UNESCO,	  2005)	  it	  reads:	  “3.	  Being	  aware	  that	  cultural	  diversity	  creates	  a	  rich	  and	  varied	  world,	  
which	   increases	   the	   range	   of	   choices	   and	   nurtures	   human	   capacities	   and	   values,	   and	   therefore	   is	   a	  
mainspring	   for	   sustainable	   development	   for	   communities,	   peoples	   and	   nations,	   4.	   Recalling	   that	   cultural	  
diversity,	   flourishing	   within	   a	   framework	   of	   democracy,	   tolerance,	   social	   justice	   and	   mutual	   respect	  
between	   peoples	   and	   cultures,	   is	   indispensable	   for	   peace	   and	   security	   at	   the	   local,	   national	   and	  
international	   levels,	   5.	   Celebrating	   the	   importance	   of	   cultural	   diversity	   for	   the	   full	   realization	   of	   human	  
rights	   and	   fundamental	   freedoms	   proclaimed	   in	   the	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights	   and	   other	  
universally	  recognized	  instruments”	  at	  <www.unesco.org/culture/culturaldiversity/convention_en.pdf>	  last	  
visited	  on	  04/03/2015	  
35	  In	  the	  words	  of	  the	  Convention	  for	  the	  Safeguarding	  of	  Intangible	  Cultural	  Heritage	  (UNESCO	  2003):	  “The	  
‘intangible	  cultural	  heritage’	  means	  the	  practices,	  representations,	  expressions,	  knowledge,	  skills	  –	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  instruments,	  objects,	  artefacts	  and	  cultural	  spaces	  associated	  therewith	  –	  that	  communities,	  groups	  
and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  individuals	  recognize	  as	  part	  of	  their	  cultural	  heritage.	  This	  intangible	  cultural	  heritage,	  
transmitted	  from	  generation	  to	  generation,	  is	  constantly	  recreated	  by	  communities	  and	  groups	  in	  response	  
to	   their	   environment,	   their	   interaction	  with	   nature	   and	   their	   history,	   and	   provides	   them	  with	   a	   sense	   of	  
identity	  and	  continuity,	  thus	  promoting	  respect	  for	  cultural	  diversity	  and	  human	  creativity	  (Article	  1)”.	  
36	  “Therefore,	   in	  general	  heritage	  is	  acknowledged	  as	  complex	  phenomena	  where	  all	  the	  elements	  (sacred	  
and	   non)	   are	   intertwined	   together.	   Heritage	   includes	   everything:	   from	   traditions,	   to	   rituals,	   languages,	  
cultural	  expressions	  and	  traditional	  knowledge.	  It	  represents	  something	  that	   is	  common	  to	  all	  mankind,	   in	  
the	  sense	   that	  every	  civilization,	  community	  and	  people	  are	  united	  by	   idiosyncratic	   features	  which	  define	  




process.	   That	   is	   why	   law	   mostly	   refers	   to	   ‘cultural	   heritage’	   or	   ‘cultural	  
expressions’	   and,	   as	   of	   today,	   there	   is	   no	   legally-­‐accepted	   definition	   of	  
‘traditional	  knowledge’.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this,	  vital	  questions	  remain:	  Where	  is	  the	  
legal	  definition	  of	   indigenous	  cultural	  heritage?	  What	  does	   it	   include?	  The	  next	  
few	  pages	  will	  attempt	  to	  answer	  some	  of	  these	  questions.	  
	  
3.2	  –	  Traditional	  Knowledge:	  When	  Heritage	  Gets	  Lost	  in	  Translation	  
	  
Traditional	   Knowledge	   (TK)	   is	   included	   in	   the	   heritage	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	  
(tangible	   and	   intangible) 37 	  and	   indigenous	   heritage	   rights. 38 	  Its	   includes	  
traditional	  medicinal	  knowledge	  in	  the	  context	  of	  health	  policy;39	  expressions	  of	  
folklore; 40 	  folklore	   or	   traditional	   and	   popular	   culture	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
safeguarding	  traditional	  culture;41	  intangible	  cultural	  heritage	  such	  as	  sacred	  and	  
secret	   knowledge,	   oral	   traditions,	   rituals	   and	   spiritual	   practices;	   indigenous	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  “The	  heritage	  of	   indigenous	  peoples	  has	  a	  collective	  character	  and	   is	  comprised	  of	  all	  objects,	  sites	  and	  
knowledge	   including	   languages,	   the	   nature	   or	   use	   of	   which	   has	   been	   transmitted	   from	   generation	   to	  
generation,	  and	  which	  is	  regarded	  as	  pertaining	  to	  a	  particular	  people	  or	  its	  territory	  of	  traditional	  natural	  
use.	   The	   heritage	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   also	   includes	   objects,	   sites,	   knowledge	   and	   literary	   or	   artistic	  
creation	  of	  that	  people	  which	  may	  be	  created	  or	  rediscovered	  in	  the	  future	  based	  upon	  their	  heritage’,	  ‘The	  
heritage	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   includes	   all	   moveable	   cultural	   property	   as	   defined	   by	   the	   relevant	  
conventions	  of	  UNESCO;	  all	  kinds	  of	   literary	  and	  artistic	  creation	  such	  as	  music,	  dance,	   song,	  ceremonies,	  
symbols	  and	  designs,	  narratives	  and	  poetry	  and	  all	  forms	  of	  documentation	  of	  and	  by	  indigenous	  peoples;	  
all	   kinds	   of	   scientific,	   agricultural,	   technical,	   medicinal,	   biodiversity-­‐related	   and	   ecological	   knowledge,	  
including	  innovations	  based	  upon	  that	  knowledge,	  cultigens,	  remedies,	  medicines	  and	  the	  use	  of	  flora	  and	  
fauna;	  human	  remains;	  immoveable	  cultural	  property	  such	  as	  sacred	  sites	  of	  cultural,	  natural	  and	  historical	  
significance	  and	  burials”	  see	  Erica-­‐Irene	  Daes	  Principles	  and	  Guidelines	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Heritage	  of	  
Indigenous	  Peoples	  at	  UN	  Sub-­‐Commission	  on	  The	  Prevention	  of	  Discrimination	  and	  Protection	  of	  Minorities	  
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26,	  as	  revised	  in	  E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000./26)	  at	  para	  12	  and	  13.	  
38 	  WIPO	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	  
Knowledge	  and	  Folklore	  (Genève	  2002)	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/9	  at	  para	  18	  electronic	  document	  
<www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_3/wipo_grtkf_ic_3_9.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  22/01/2015.	  
39 	  “The	   sum	   total	   of	   the	   knowledge,	   skills	   and	   practices	   based	   on	   theories,	   beliefs	   and	   experiences	  
indigenous	  to	  different	  cultures,	  whether	  applicable	  or	  not,	  used	  in	  the	  maintenance	  of	  health,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  
the	   prevention	   diagnosis,	   improvement	   or	   treatment	   of	   physical	   and	   mental	   illness”	   see	   Doc	  
WHO/EDM/TRM/2000	  electronic	  document	  
<http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2000/WHO_EDM_TRM_2000.1.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  12/07/2015.	  
40	  See	  the	  WIPO-­‐UNESCO	  Model	  Provisions	   for	  National	  Laws	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  Expressions	  of	  Folklore	  
Against	  Illicit	  Exploitation	  and	  Other	  Prejudicial	  Actions	  (1982)	  see	  Annex	  II	  at	  Section	  2.11.	  
41	  “Folklore	   (or	   traditional	   and	   popular	   culture)	   is	   the	   totality	   of	   tradition-­‐based	   creations	   of	   a	   cultural	  
community,	   expressed	   by	   a	   group	   or	   individuals	   and	   recognised	   as	   reflecting	   the	   expectations	   of	   a	  
community	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  reflect	  its	  cultural	  and	  social	  identity;	  its	  standards	  and	  values	  are	  transmitted	  
orally,	   by	   imitation	   or	   by	   other	   means.	   Its	   forms	   are,	   among	   others,	   language,	   literature,	   music,	   dance,	  
games,	   mythology,	   rituals,	   customs,	   handicrafts,	   architecture	   and	   other	   arts”	   see	   UNESCO	  
Recommendations	   on	   the	   Safeguarding	   of	   Traditional	   Culture	   and	   Folklore	   (1989)	   electronic	   document	  
<http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-­‐URL_ID=13141&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html>	   last	  




intellectual	   property42	  and	   indigenous	   cultural	   property;43	  traditional	   ecological	  
knowledge	   and	   traditional	   and	   local	   technology,	   knowledge,	   know-­‐how	   and	  
practices;44	  traditional	   knowledge,	   innovations	   and	   practices,	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
conservation	  and	  equitable	  use	  of	  biological	  resources.	  In	  its	  broader	  definition,	  
traditional	   knowledge	   can	   be	   rightly	   considered	   a	   complex	   and	   multifaceted	  
concept	   including	   and	   encompassing	   different	   components.	   It	   is	   not	   produced	  
systematically	   but	   “in	   accordance	   with	   the	   individual	   or	   collective	   creators’	  
responses	   to	   and	   interaction	   with	   their	   cultural	   environment”. 45 	  As	  
representative	  of	   the	  cultural	   values	  of	  an	   indigenous	   society,	   some	   traditional	  
knowledge	  can	  be	  held	  collectively	  and	  some	  other	   is	  held	  and	  safeguarded	  by	  
custodians	  and	  holders	  of	  knowledge.	  TK	  incorporates	  the	  core	  values,	  practices,	  
traditions	  and	  beliefs	  that	  characterize	  the	  traits	  of	  the	  community;	  it	  is	  generally	  
transmitted	   orally	   from	   one	   generation	   to	   another	   and	   remains,	   therefore,	  
largely	   undocumented.46	  TK	   can	   belong	   to	   “culturally	   distinct	   tribal	   people”	   as	  
well	   as	   to	   “traditional	   communities	   that	   are	  not	  necessarily	   removed	   from	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  “Indigenous	   intellectual	   property	   includes	   the	   information,	   practices,	   beliefs	   and	   philosophy	   that	   are	  
unique	  to	  each	  indigenous	  culture.	  Once	  traditional	  knowledge	  is	  removed	  from	  an	  indigenous	  community,	  
the	  community	   loses	  control	  over	   the	  way	   in	  which	  that	  knowledge	   is	  used.	   In	  most	  cases,	   this	  system	  of	  
knowledge	  evolved	  over	  many	  centuries	  and	  is	  unique	  to	  the	  indigenous	  peoples’	  customs,	  traditions,	  land	  
and	  resources”	  see	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  WIPO	  and	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  Leaflet	  
no	   12	   electronic	   document	   <www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuideIPleaflet12en.pdf>	   last	   visited	  
on	  22/01/2015.	  
43	  “Cultural	  property	  is	  defined	  in	  the	  UNESCO	  Convention	  on	  the	  Means	  of	  Prohibiting	  and	  Preventing	  the	  
Illicit	   Import,	  Export	  and	  Transfer	  of	  Ownership	  of	  Cultural	  Property	  (1970)	  as	  property	  which,	  on	  religious	  
or	   secular	   grounds,	   is	   specifically	   designated	   by	   each	   State	   as	   being	   of	   importance	   for	   archaeology,	  
prehistory,	  history,	  literature,	  art	  or	  science	  and	  which	  belongs	  to	  the	  following	  categories:	  rare	  collections	  
and	   specimens	   of	   fauna,	   flora,	   minerals	   and	   anatomy,	   and	   objects	   of	   paleontological	   interest;	   property	  
relating	  to	  history,	  including	  the	  history	  of	  science	  and	  technology	  and	  military	  and	  social	  history,	  to	  the	  life	  
of	   national	   leaders,	   thinkers,	   scientists	   and	   artists	   and	   to	   events	   of	   national	   importance;	   products	   of	  
archaeological	  excavations	  (including	  regular	  and	  clandestine)	  or	  of	  archaeological	  discoveries;	  elements	  of	  
artistic	   or	   historical	  monuments	   or	   archaeological	   sites	  which	   have	   been	   dismembered;	   antiquities	  more	  
than	  one	  hundred	  years	  old,	  such	  as	  inscriptions,	  coins	  and	  engraved	  seals;	  objects	  of	  ethnological	  interest;	  	  
(g)	  property	  of	  artistic	  interest,	  such	  as:	  pictures,	  paintings	  and	  drawings	  produced	  entirely	  by	  hand	  on	  any	  
support	   and	   in	   any	  material	   (excluding	   industrial	   designs	   and	  manufactured	   articles	   decorated	   by	   hand);	  
original	   works	   of	   statuary	   art	   and	   sculpture	   in	   any	   material;	   original	   engravings,	   prints	   and	   lithographs;	  
original	   artistic	   assemblages	   and	  montages	   in	   any	  material;	   rare	  manuscripts	   and	   incunabula,	   old	   books,	  
documents	   and	   publications	   of	   special	   interest	   (historical,	   artistic,	   scientific,	   literary,	   etc)	   singly	   or	   in	  
collections	   postage,	   revenue	   and	   similar	   stamps,	   singly	   or	   in	   collections;	   archives,	   including	   sound,	  
photographic	  and	  cinematographic	  archives;	  articles	  of	  furniture	  more	  than	  one	  hundred	  years	  old	  and	  old	  
musical	   instruments”	   see	   WIPO	   Glossary	   electronic	   document	  
<www.wipo.int/tk/en/resources/glossary.html#23>	  last	  visited	  on	  22/01/2015.	  
44	  See	  WIPO	  Doc	  -­‐	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/9	  at	  para	  18.	  
45	  WIPO	  International	  Forum	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Traditional	  Knowledge:	  Our	  Identity,	  Our	  Future	  
(2002)	  electronic	  document	  
<www.wipo.int/arab/en/meetings/2002/muscat_forum_ip/iptk_mct02_i3.htm>	  last	  visited	  on	  29/02/2012.	  





cultural	  mainstream	  of	  a	  country”.47	  Not	  all	  TK	   is	   sacred	   to	   these	  communities,	  
and	  safeguarded	  by	  specific	  groups	  of	  guardians.	  Since	  most	  indigenous	  cultures	  
are	  of	  old	  lineage	  they	  present	  traditional	  features,	  which	  have	  been	  developed	  
over	  considerable	  length	  of	  time.	  Such	  common	  knowledge	  is	  traditional	  because	  
it	  belongs	   to	   the	   tradition	  of	   the	  community,	  yet	   it	   is	  not	  necessarily	   sacred	  or	  
secret	  and	  it	  does	  not	  need	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  guardians.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
some	  TK	  is	  obviously	  so	  spiritually	  significant	  to	  the	  indigenous	  community	  that	  
its	  transmission	  is	  guarded	  by	  selected	  members	  of	  the	  community	  who	  hold	  the	  
knowledge	   in	   their	   custody	  and	  make	   sure	   it	   is	  not	  exploited	  by	  members	  and	  
non-­‐members	   of	   the	   community.	   These	   custodians	   often	   oppose	   the	  
commercialization	   of	   the	   knowledge	   under	   any	   circumstance.	   As	   poignantly	  
explained	  by	  Darrel	  Posey:48	  	  
	  
…	   although	   conservation	   and	   management	   practices	   are	   highly	   pragmatic,	  
indigenous	  and	  traditional	  peoples	  generally	  view	  this	  knowledge	  as	  emanating	  
from	   a	   spiritual	   base.	   All	   creation	   is	   sacred,	   and	   the	   sacred	   and	   secular	   are	  
inseparable.	   Spirituality	   is	   the	   highest	   form	   of	   awareness.	   In	   this	   sense	   a	  
dimension	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  is	  not	  local	  knowledge	  but	  knowledge	  of	  the	  
universal	  as	  expressed	  in	  the	  local.	  In	  indigenous	  and	  local	  cultures,	  experts	  exist	  
who	   are	   peculiarly	   aware	   of	   the	   organizing	   principles	   of	   nature,	   sometimes	  
described	  as	  entities,	  spirits,	  or	  natural	  law.	  Thus,	  knowledge	  of	  the	  environment	  
depends	   not	   only	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   humans	   and	   nature	   but	   also	  
between	  the	  visible	  world	  and	  the	  invisible	  spirit	  world.	  
	  
In	  1998-­‐99,	   the	  WIPO	  Secretariat	  organized	   fact-­‐finding	  missions	   to	   investigate	  
the	  world	  situation	  of	  TK.	  To	  facilitate	  the	  study,	  the	  Secretariat	  made	  use	  of	  a	  
‘working	  concept’	  that	  defined	  TK	  as	  follows:49	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  See	  Graham	  Dutfield	   Intellectual	   Property,	   Biogenetic	  Resources	  and	  Traditional	   Knowledge	   (Routledge,	  
UK,	  2004)	  at	  92-­‐93.	  
48	  Darrell	   Addison	   Posey	   “Selling	   Grandma:	   Commodification	   of	   the	   Sacred	   Through	   Intellectual	   Property	  
Rights”	   in	   Elazar	   Barkan	   (ed)	   Claiming	   the	   Stones	   Naming	   the	   Bones	   (The	   Getty	   Research	   Institute,	   Los	  
Angeles,	  2002)	  at	  201.	  
49 WIPO	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	  
Knowledge	   and	   Folklore	   (Genève	   2002),	   Doc	   WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/9	   at	   para	   25	   electronic	   document	  




…	   ‘traditional	   knowledge’	   …	   refer[s]	   to	   tradition-­‐based	   literary,	   artistic	   or	  
scientific	  works;	  performances;	  inventions;	  scientific	  discoveries;	  designs;	  marks,	  
names	   and	   symbols;	   undisclosed	   information;	   and	   all	   other	   tradition-­‐based	  
innovations	   and	   creations	   resulting	   from	   intellectual	   activity	   in	   the	   industrial,	  
scientific,	   literary	   or	   artistic	   fields.	   ‘Tradition-­‐based’	   refers	   to	   knowledge	  
systems,	   creations,	   innovations	   and	   cultural	   expressions	   which	   have	   generally	  
been	   transmitted	   from	   generation	   to	   generation;	   are	   generally	   regarded	   as	  
pertaining	  to	  a	  particular	  people	  or	   its	  territory;	  and,	  are	  constantly	  evolving	   in	  
response	  to	  a	  changing	  environment.	  Categories	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  could	  
include:	   agricultural	   knowledge;	   scientific	   knowledge;	   technical	   knowledge;	  
ecological	   knowledge;	   medicinal	   knowledge,	   including	   related	   medicines	   and	  
remedies;	  biodiversity-­‐related	  knowledge;	  ‘expressions	  of	  folklore’	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
music,	   dance,	   song,	   handicrafts,	   designs,	   stories	   and	   artwork;	   elements	   of	  
languages,	   such	  as	  names,	  geographical	   indications	  and	  symbols;	  and,	  movable	  
cultural	   properties.	   Excluded	   from	   this	   description	   of	   TK	   would	   be	   items	   not	  
resulting	   from	   intellectual	   activity	   in	   the	   industrial,	   scientific,	   literary	  or	  artistic	  
fields,	  such	  as	  human	  remains,	  languages	  in	  general,	  and	  other	  similar	  elements	  
of	  ‘heritage’	  in	  the	  broad	  sense.	  
	  
Given	  this	  lengthy	  description,	  WIPO	  underlines	  the	  impossibility	  of	  relying	  on	  a	  
global	   definition	   of	   TK50	  enforceable	   by	   law.	   The	   Committee	   argued	   that	   it	   is	  
incredibly	  difficult	  to	  create	  a	  definition	  that	  will	  be	  harmonious	  and	  uniform	  in	  
national	   laws	   that	   “is	   expected	   to	   result	   from	   an	   international	   legal	  
instrument”.51	  In	   saying	   so,	   however,	   WIPO	   explains	   that	   it	   has	   become	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  “Given	  this	  highly	  diverse	  and	  dynamic	  nature	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  it	  may	  not	  be	  possible	  to	  develop	  
a	  singular	  and	  exclusive	  definition	  of	  the	  term.	  However,	  such	  a	  singular	  definition	  may	  not	  be	  necessary	  in	  
order	  to	  delimit	  the	  scope	  of	  subject	  matter	  for	  which	  protection	  is	  sought.	  This	  approach	  has	  been	  taken	  in	  
a	   number	   of	   international	   instruments	   in	   the	   field	   of	   intellectual	   property”	   see	   WIPO	   at	   Doc	  
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/3	  at	  para	  65.	  
51	  “A	   relatively	   general	   approach	   to	   definition	   may	   be	   especially	   called	   for	   in	   relation	   to	   traditional	  
knowledge	   as	   the	   subject	   matter	   of	   protection,	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   areas	   of	   intellectual	   property	   already	  
surveyed	  here.	  TK	  subject	  matter	  is	  particularly	  dynamic	  and	  variable,	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  shaped	  by	  local,	  
cultural	  factors	  than	  other	  forms	  of	  IP	  (as	  discussed	  in	  the	  parallel	  paper,	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/8).	  Moreover,	  
there	  have	  been	  calls	  in	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Committee	  for	  there	  to	  be	  some	  recognition	  of	  customary	  law11	  as	  
an	   element	   in	   the	   definition	   and	   protection	   of	   TK.	   If	   there	   is	   to	   be	   reflection	   of	   customary	   law	   in	   the	  
characterization	  of	  traditional	  knowledge,	  this	  would	  necessarily	  involve	  a	  more	  general	  form	  of	  definition	  
at	  the	  international	  level,	  given	  the	  diverse	  and	  distinct	  quality	  of	  customary	  laws;	  equally,	  if	  weight	  is	  to	  be	  
given	  to	   local	  cultural	   factors,	  this	  could	  also	  entail	  a	  general	  umbrella	  definition	  at	  an	   international	   level.	  
This	  general	  approach	  was	  foreshadowed	  in	  document	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/3	  (itself	  echoing	  comments	  in	  the	  
‘WIPO	   Report	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   Needs	   and	   Expectations	   of	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   Holders’)”	   see	  
WIPO	  Intellectual	  Property	  Needs	  and	  Expectations	  of	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  Holders:	  WIPO	  Report	  on	  Fact-­‐
Finding	  Missions	  on	   Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Traditional	  Knowledge	   (1998-­‐1999)	   (WIPO,	  2001)	  electronic	  




tendency	  of	   international	   instruments	   in	   the	   field	  of	   IP	   law	  to	  avoid	  definitions	  
that	  would	  be	  too	  ‘exclusive’.	  Instruments	  such	  as	  The	  Berne	  Convention	  for	  the	  
Protection	   of	   Literary	   and	   Artistic	   Works,	   for	   example,	   prefers	   to	   give	   an	  
enumeration	  of	  all	  the	  ‘creations’	  that	  can	  rightly	  be	  considered	  fitting	  within	  the	  
‘Literary	  and	  Artistic	  Works’	  category	  protected	  under	  the	  Convention	  (Art	  2.1).52	  
Today	  WIPO	  considers	  TK	  as:53	  
	  
• know-­‐how,	   skills	   and	   practices	   that	   are	   developed,	   sustained	   and	   passed	   on	  
from	   generation	   to	   generation	   within	   a	   community,	   often	   forming	   part	   of	   its	  
cultural	  or	  spiritual	  identity.	  
• embracing	   the	   content	   of	   knowledge	   itself	   as	   well	   as	  traditional	   cultural	  
expressions,	  including	  distinctive	  signs	  and	  symbols	  associated	  with	  TK.	  
• referring	   to	   knowledge	  as	   such,	   in	  particular	   the	   knowledge	   resulting	   from	  
intellectual	   activity	   in	   a	   traditional	   context,	   and	   includes	   know-­‐how,	  
practices,	  skills,	  and	  innovations.	  
	  
According	   to	  WIPO	   “TK	   can	   be	   found	   in	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   contexts,	   including:	  
agricultural,	   scientific,	   technical,	   ecological	   and	  medicinal	   knowledge	  as	  well	   as	  
biodiversity-­‐related	   knowledge”.54	  Broadly,	   TK	   (secret	   and	   non-­‐secret)	   includes	  
the	  knowledge	  handed	  down	  by	   indigenous	  peoples	   from	  previous	  generations	  
(especially	  elders	  or	  guardians)55.	  It	  also	  includes	  ‘empirical	  knowledge’,	  which	  is	  
gained	   through	   a	   careful	   and	   lengthy	   observation	   of	   the	   environment	   and	   the	  
interaction	   with	   it;	   then	   there	   is	   a	   ‘revealed	   knowledge’,	   which	   is	   acquired	  
through	  dreams,	  visions	  and	  intuitions	  that	  are	  of	  spiritual	  and	  sacred	  nature	  and	  
is	   not	   necessarily	   shared	   by	   everyone	   within	   the	   community.	   An	   important	  
aspect	   of	   TK	   on	   which	   everyone	   agrees	   is	   that	   TK	   is	   ‘traditional’	   only	   to	   “the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  The	  Berne	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Literary	  and	  Artistic	  Works	  (1886,	  last	  amended	  on	  1979),	  Art	  
2(1)	  states	  that:	  “The	  expression	   ‘literary	  and	  artistic	  works’	  shall	   include	  every	  production	   in	  the	   literary,	  
scientific	   and	   artistic	   domain,	   whatever	   may	   be	   the	   mode	   or	   form	   of	   its	   expression,	   such	   as	   books,	  
pamphlets	  and	  other	  writings;	  lectures,	  addresses,	  sermons	  and	  other	  works	  of	  the	  same	  nature;	  dramatic	  
or	  dramatico-­‐musical	  works;	  choreographic	  works	  and	  entertainments	  in	  dumb	  show;	  musical	  compositions	  
with	   or	   without	   words;	   cinematographic	   works	   to	   which	   are	   assimilated	   works	   expressed	   by	   a	   process	  
analogous	   to	   cinematography;	   works	   of	   drawing,	   painting,	   architecture,	   sculpture,	   engraving	   and	  
lithography;	   photographic	   works	   to	   which	   are	   assimilated	   works	   expressed	   by	   a	   process	   analogous	   to	  
photography;	  works	  of	  applied	  art;	  illustrations,	  maps,	  plans,	  sketches	  and	  three-­‐dimensional	  works	  relative	  
to	  geography,	  topography,	  architecture	  or	  science”.	  
53	  See	  WIPO	  electronic	  document	  <www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/>	  last	  visited	  on	  16/02/2017	  
54	  See	  WIPO	  electronic	  document	  <www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/>	  last	  visited	  on	  16/02/2017.	  
55	  By	   the	   word	   ‘elder’	   or	   ‘guardian’	   is	   intended	   that	   the	   community	   recognises	   as	   imbued	   with	   the	  




extent	   that	   its	   creation	   and	   use	   are	   part	   of	   the	   cultural	   traditions	   of	  
communities”.56	  In	   this	   sense,	   ‘traditional’	   does	   not	   necessarily	  mean	   that	   the	  
knowledge	  is	  ancient.	  Such	  knowledge	  can	  be	  created	  at	  any	  time	  as	  a	  response	  
to	  the	  challenges	  that	  indigenous	  communities	  face	  in	  their	  interaction	  with	  their	  
natural,	   social	   and	   cultural	   environment.57	  Thus,	   TK	   is	   a	   living	   and	   evolving	  
phenomena	   deeply	   rooted	   within	   indigenous	   communities;	   it	   is	   part	   of	  
indigenous	   and	  non-­‐indigenous	   heritage	   and	   traditions	   and	   it	   is	  managed	  by	   a	  
complex	   set	   of	   rules	   created	   by	   the	   community.	   It	   may	   have	   been	   as	   well	  
developed	   in	   ancestral	   times,	   but	   it	   is	   subject	   to	   constant	   improvement	   and	  
adaptation	  to	  the	  environment;	  it	  is	  expressed	  in	  material	  and	  non-­‐material	  form	  
and	   it	   may	   possess	   commercial	   value,	   depending	   on	   its	   potential	   or	   actual	  
usage. 58 	  Though	   indigenous	   communities	   might	   be	   less	   individualistic	   than	  
Western	  societies,	  the	  idea	  that	  ‘ownership’	  might	  constitute	  an	  alien	  concept	  to	  
them	  is	  an	  often	  romantic	  misconception.	  Traditional	  societies	  are	  not	  hostile	  to	  
the	   idea	   of	   ownership	   or	   property.	   This	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	   complex	   set	   of	  
customary	  laws	  that	  control	  and	  manage	  traditional	  knowledge	  in	  a	  non-­‐inclusive	  
way,	   which	   is	   often	   similar	   to	   the	   Western	   intellectual	   property	   regime	   (see	  
Chapter	   6	   at	   6.2).	   As	   such,	   TK	   is	   also	   a	   phenomenon	   which	   is	   not	   limited	   to	  
indigenous	  societies.	  As	  explained	  by	  Dutfield:59	  	  
	  
…	   the	   existence	   of	   TK	   is	   not	   limited	   to	   certain	   types	   of	   society	   but,	   on	   the	  
contrary,	  may	  be	  found	  in	  all	  societies	  no	  matter	  how	  modern	  they	  might	  appear	  
to	  be	  and	  how	  untraditional	  much	  of	  the	  knowledge	  in	  circulation	  within	  them	  is.	  	  
	  
This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  TK	   is	  present	   in	  every	  society	  but,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
globalization	   and	   Westernization	   have	   not	   succeeded	   in	   totally	   eradicating	  
traditional	  practices	  from	  every	  traditional	  society	  of	  the	  world.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 	  WIPO	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Traditional	   Knowledge:	   Our	   Identity,	   Our	   Future	   (2002)	   electronic	  
document	   <www.wipo.int/arab/en/meetings/2002/muscat_forum_ip/iptk_mct02_i3.htm>	   last	   visited	   on	  
29/02/2012.	  
57	  Supra.	  
58	  See	   Carlos	   M	   Correa	   “Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Intellectual	   Property”	   commissioned	   by	   The	   Quaker	  
United	   Nations	   Office	   (QUNO,	   Genève)	   electronic	   document	   <www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/.../Traditional-­‐
Knowledge-­‐IP-­‐English.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  19/09/2012.	  
59	  Graham	  Dutfield	  “Legal	  and	  Economic	  Aspects	  of	  Traditiional	  Knowledge”	  in	  Keith	  E	  Maskus	  and	  Jerome	  H	  
Reichman	   (eds)	   International	   Public	   Goods	   and	   Transfer	   of	   Technology	   Under	   a	   Globalized	   Intellectual	  




According	   to	  WIPO,	   as	   cultural	   phenomena,	   TK	  does	  not	   exist	   in	   isolation;	   it	   is	  
broader	   than	   the	   ‘expressions	   of	   folklore’60	  and	   ‘indigenous	   knowledge’	   but	  
narrower	   than	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘indigenous	   heritage’	   (tangible	   and	   intangible),	  
which	   also	   includes	   indigenous	   ancestral	   remains,	   sacred	   indigenous	   sites,	   oral	  
traditions,	  performing	  arts,	  social	  practices,	  rituals	  and	  festive	  events;	  knowledge	  
concerning	  nature	  and	  the	  universe.61	  In	  its	  Fact-­‐finding	  Missions	  on	  Intellectual	  
Property	  and	  Traditional	  Knowledge	   (1998-­‐1999),	  WIPO	  defined	  which	  working	  
words	   describe	   indigenous	   cultural	   manifestations.	   Concerning	   ‘indigenous	  
heritage’,	   WIPO	   decided	   to	   use	   the	   definition	   created	   ad	   hoc	   by	   Daes	   in	   her	  
Principles	   and	   Guidelines	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   the	   Heritage	   of	   Indigenous	  
Peoples;62	  whereas	  ‘indigenous	  knowledge’	  is	  used	  to	  “describe	  knowledge	  held	  
and	  used	  by	   communities,	   peoples	   and	  nations	   that	   are	   ‘indigenous’”63	  (in	   this	  
context	  WIPO	  makes	  use	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  used	  by	  Cobo).64	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  See	  WIPO	  Intellectual	  Property	  Needs	  and	  Expectations	  of	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  Holders:	  WIPO	  Report	  on	  
Fact-­‐Finding	   Missions	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   (1998-­‐1999)	   (WIPO,	   2001)	  
electronic	   document	   <www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ffm/report/final/pdf/part1.pdf>	   last	   visited	   on	   05/03/2012;	  
“Though	  the	  word	  Folklore	   is	  still	  present	   in	  many	  international	   instruments,	   it	   is	  today	  widely	  considered	  
an	   archaic	   definition	   with	   a	   Eurocentric	   connotation	   that	   lacks	   any	   holistic	   interpretation	   of	   indigenous	  
cultural	  expressions.	  Nonetheless,	  WIPO	  still	  uses	  the	  word	  ‘folklore’	  in	  its	  instruments:	  ‘Representatives	  of	  
the	  Spanish-­‐speaking	  countries	  at	  the	  1984	  session	  of	  the	  WIPO-­‐UNESCO	  Group	  of	  Experts	  on	  the	  Protection	  
of	  Expressions	  of	  Folklore	  by	  Intellectual	  Property	  took	  the	  position	  that	  ‘folklore’	  was	  an	  archaism,	  with	  the	  
negative	  connotation	  of	  being	  associated	  with	  the	  “creations	  of	   lower	  or	  superseded	  civilizations’.	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  other	  participants	   in	   the	   same	  session	  pointed	  out	   that	   the	   term	  had	  acquired	  new	  meaning	  
and	   legitimacy.	  From	  the	  work	  of	   the	  Committee	  to	  date,	   it	   is	  already	  apparent	  that	   ‘folklore’	   is	  still	  used	  
internationally	   by	   a	   number	   of	   governments,	   organizations	   and	   academics.	   The	   WIPO-­‐UNESCO	   Model	  
Provisions,	  using	   this	   term,	   remain	  an	   international	   reference	  point	   in	   this	   area,	   and	   the	   term	  appears	   in	  
several	  operational	  legal	  mechanisms	  at	  the	  domestic	  and	  international	  levels”	  see	  WIPO	  Intergovernmental	  
Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Folklore	   (Genève	  
2002)	   Doc	   WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/9	   at	   para	   19	   electronic	   document	  
<www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_3/wipo_grtkf_ic_3_9.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  29/02/2011.	  
61	  Erica-­‐Irene	  Daes	  UN	  Principles	  and	  Guidelines	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Heritage	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  see	  
Principle	   12	   and	   13	   electronic	   document	  
<www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/42263fd3915c047ec1256929004f1ffc?Opendocument>	   last	  
visited	  on	  29/02/2011.	  
62	  “The	   term	   ‘heritage’	   appears	  within	   the	   context	   of,	   for	   example,	   the	   ‘heritage	   of	   indigenous	   peoples’.	  
WIPO	   understands	   ‘heritage	   of	   indigenous	   peoples’	   (and	   other	   peoples)	   to	   refer	   broadly	   to	   the	   items	  
described	  in	  paragraphs	  11	  and	  12	  of	  the	  Draft	  Principles	  and	  Guidelines	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Heritage	  
of	  Indigenous	  People,	  1995,	  elaborated	  by	  the	  Special	  Rapporteur	  of	  the	  Sub-­‐Commission	  on	  the	  Prevention	  
of	  Discrimination	  and	  Protection	  of	  Minorities,	  Dr	  Erica	   Irene	  Daes”	  see	  WIPO	  Intellectual	  Property	  Needs	  
and	  Expectations	  of	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  Holders:	  WIPO	  Report	  on	  Fact-­‐Finding	  Missions	  on	   Intellectual	  
Property	   and	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   (1998-­‐1999)	   (WIPO,	   2001)	   at	   23	   electronic	   document	  
<www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ffm/report/final/pdf/part1.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  05/03/2012.	  
63	  Supra	  at	  23;	  “On	  the	  other	  hand,	  ‘indigenous	  knowledge’	  is	  also	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  knowledge	  that	  is	  itself	  
‘indigenous’”	  see	  supra.	  
64	  WIPO	  refers	  to	  ‘indigenous	  peoples’	  as:	  “…	  those	  which,	  having	  a	  historical	  continuity	  with	  ‘pre-­‐invasion’	  
and	   pre-­‐colonial	   societies	   that	   developed	   on	   their	   territories,	   consider	   themselves	   distinct	   from	   other	  
sectors	   of	   the	   societies	   now	   prevailing	   in	   those	   countries,	   or	   parts	   of	   them.	   They	   form	   at	   present	   non-­‐
dominant	   sectors	  of	   society	  and	  are	  determined	   to	  preserve,	  develop	  and	   transmit	   to	   future	  generations	  
their	  ancestral	  territories,	  and	  their	  ethnic	  identities,	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  continued	  existence	  as	  peoples,	  in	  




While	  indigenous	  knowledge	  is	  regarded	  as	  TK	  or	  expressed	  in	  traditional	  cultural	  
expressions	  (TCEs),	  not	  all	  traditional	  knowledge	  is	  ‘indigenous’.65	  Knowledge	  is,	  
in	  fact,	  not	   ‘traditional’	  because	  of	   its	  object,	  nor	   its	  subject	  matter	  or	  content,	  
nor	  its	  age	  or	  antiquity,	  nor	  its	  aesthetic	  qualities.66	  Its	  traditionality	  depends	  on	  
the	   way	   it	   has	   been	   preserved	   and	   transmitted	   within	   any	   given	   community,	  
rather	  than	  its	  antiquity.67	  As	  such,	  TK	  is	  inherently	  linked	  to	  the	  traditions	  of	  the	  
community,	  its	  customary	  laws,	  and	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  function	  it	  has	  for	  the	  
community.	   Therefore,	   all	   indigenous	   knowledge	   is	   mostly	   limited	   to	   the	  
microcosm	  it	  inhabits	  and	  represents.	  According	  to	  Dutfield,	  “TK	  has	  always	  been	  
adaptive	   because	   adaptation	   is	   the	   key	   to	   survival	   in	   a	   precarious	  
environment”.68	  
Today,	   most	   of	   the	   international	   instruments	   that	   deal	   with	   TK	   focus	   on	   its	  
biological	   resources’	  character	  and	   its	  possible	  commodification	   in	   the	  national	  
and	   international	   markets.	   Nonetheless,	   as	   explained	   above,	   this	   thesis	  
addresses	  TK	  in	  its	  broadest	  character,	   including	  traditional	  cultural	  expressions	  
and	   indigenous	   heritage.	   This	   decision	   is	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that,	   holistically,	   no	  
indigenous	   knowledge	   is	   disconnected	   from	   the	   whole,	   but	   it	   is	   rather	   the	  
expression	  of	  the	  whole.	  A	  painting	  could	  represent	  a	  sacred	  practice	  indigenous	  
peoples	  use	  for	  the	  cultivation	  of	  their	   land;	  or	  a	  story,	  song	  or	  dance	  could	  be	  
performed	   to	   bring	   rain	   or	   good	   fortune	   in	   harvesting.	   Limiting	   TK	   to	   a	  
compartmentalized	   system	   of	   knowledge	   (mostly	   connected	   with	   biodiversity	  
and	   preservation	  management)	   is	   in	   general	  wrong	   because	   in	   the	   indigenous	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Cobo	   Study	   of	   the	   Problem	   of	   Discrimination	   Against	   Indigenous	   Populations	   UN	   Doc	  	  
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Add.6	  electronic	  document	  
<http://social.un.org/index/IndigenousPeoples/Library/Mart%C3%ADnezCoboStudy.aspx>	   last	   visited	   on	  
05/03/2012;	  see	  also	  chapter	  1	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
65“On	  the	  other	  hand,	  ‘indigenous	  knowledge’	  is	  also	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  knowledge	  that	  is	  itself	  ‘indigenous’”	  
see	  WIPO	  Intellectual	  Property	  Needs	  and	  Expectations	  of	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  Holders:	  WIPO	  Report	  on	  
Fact-­‐Finding	  Missions	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  at	  24.	  
66	  Antony	   Taubman	   and	  Matthias	   Leistner	   “Traditional	   Knowledge”	   in	   Silke	   Von	   Lewinski	   (ed)	   Indigenous	  
Heritage	  and	  Intellectual	  Property	  (2nd	  ed,	  Wolters	  Knluwer,	  The	  Netherlands,	  2008)	  at	  59-­‐60.	  
67	  “While	   it	   is	   often	   thought	   that	   tradition	   is	   only	   about	   imitation	   and	   reproduction,	   it	   is	   also	   about	  
innovation	  and	  creation	  within	  the	  traditional	  framework.	  Tradition	  is	  not	  immutable.	  Cultural	  heritage	  is	  in	  
a	   permanent	   process	   of	   production;	   it	   is	   cumulative	   and	   innovative.	   	   Culture	   is	   organic	   in	   nature	   and	   in	  
order	  for	  it	  to	  survive,	  growth	  and	  development	  are	  necessary	  –	  tradition	  thus	  builds	  the	  future”	  see	  Barry	  
Bergey	  “A	  Multi-­‐faceted	  Approach	  to	  the	  Support	  and	  Conservation	  of	  Folk	  and	  Traditional	  Culture”	  paper	  
delivered	  at	  the	  International	  Symposium	  on	  Protection	  and	  Legislation	  of	  Folk/Traditional	  Culture,	  (Beijing,	  
December	  18	  to	  20,	  2001)	  in	  Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Genetic	  Resources,	  
Traditional	  Knowledge	  and	  Folklore,	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/3/	  at	  12.	  
68 	  See	   Graham	   Dutfield	   “TRIPS-­‐Related	   Aspects	   of	   Traditional	   Knowledge”	   electronic	   document	  
<http://leeds.academia.edu/GrahamDutfield/Papers/890629/TRIPSrelated_Aspects_of_Traditional_Knowle




world,	   there	   is	  no	  compartmentalization.	   In	  her	   studies,	  anthropologist	  Martha	  
Johnson69	  has	  defined	  the	  existence	  of	  another	  type	  of	  TK:	  traditional	  ecological	  
knowledge	   (TEK)	   that	  presents	   features	  similar	   to	   the	  widest	  TK	  definition.	   It	   is	  
defined	  as	  knowledge	  that:	  
	  
• is	  recorded	  and	  transmitted	  through	  oral	  tradition;	  
• is	  learned	  through	  observation	  and	  hands-­‐on	  experience;	  
• 	  is	  based	  on	  the	  understanding	  that	  the	  elements	  of	  matter	  have	  a	  life	  force.	  
(All	  parts	  of	  the	  natural	  world	  are	  therefore	  infused	  with	  spirit);	  
• does	   not	   view	   human	   life	   as	   superior	   to	   other	   animate	   and	   inanimate	  
elements:	  all	  life-­‐forms	  have	  kinship	  and	  are	  interdependent;	  
• 	  is	   holistic	   (whereas	  western	   science	   is	   reductionist)	   -­‐	   and	   is	   intuitive	   in	   its	  
mode	  of	  thinking	  (whereas	  western	  science	  is	  analytical);	  
• is	  mainly	  qualitative	  (whereas	  western	  science	  is	  mainly	  quantitative);	  
• is	  based	  on	  data	  generated	  by	   resource	  users.	   (As	   such	   it	   is	  more	   inclusive	  
than	   western	   science,	   which	   is	   collected	   by	   a	   specialized	   group	   of	  
researchers	   who	   tend	   to	   be	   more	   selective	   and	   deliberate	   in	   the	  
accumulation	  of	  facts);	  
• is	   based	   on	   diachronic	   data	   (whereas	   western	   science	   is	   largely	   based	   on	  
synchronic	  data);	  
• is	   rooted	   in	   a	   social	   context	   that	   sees	   the	   world	   in	   terms	   of	  social	   and	  
spiritual	   relations	   between	   all	   life-­‐forms.	   (In	   contrast,	   western	   science	   is	  
hierarchically	  organized	  and	  vertically	  compartmentalized);	  and	  
• derives	   its	   explanations	   of	   environmental	   phenomena	   from	   cumulative,	  
collective	   and	   often	   spiritual	   experiences.	   Such	   explanations	   are	   checked,	  
validated,	   and	   revised	   daily	   and	   seasonally	   through	   the	   annual	   cycle	   of	  
activities.70	  
	  
Given	  the	  innovative	  work	  and	  in	  depth	  analysis	  of	  Posey’s	  and	  Dutfield’s	  studies	  
over	   the	   years,	   this	   thesis	   will	   use	   their	   definition	   of	   TK	   (inclusive	   of	   TEK)	   as	  
follows:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Martha	   Johnson	   “Research	   on	   Traditional	   Environmental	   Knowledge:	   Its	   Development	  and	   Its	   Role”	   in	  





1.	   knowledge	   of	   current	   use,	   previous	   use,	   or	   potential	   use	   of	   plant	   and	   animal	  
species,	  as	  well	  as	  soils	  and	  minerals;	  
2.	  knowledge	  of	  preparation,	  processing,	  or	  storage	  of	  useful	  species;	  
3.	  knowledge	  of	  formulations	  involving	  more	  than	  one	  ingredient;	  
4.	  knowledge	  of	  individual	  species	  (planting	  methods,	  care,	  selection	  criteria,	  etc.);	  	  
5.	   knowledge	   of	   ecosystem	   conservation	   (methods	   of	   protecting	   or	   preserving	   a	  
resource	  that	  may	  be	  found	  to	  have	  commercial	  value,	  although	  not	  specifically	  used	  
for	  that	  purpose	  or	  other	  practical	  purposes	  by	  the	  local	  community	  or	  the	  culture);	  	  	  
6.	  classification	  systems	  of	  knowledge,	  such	  as	  traditional	  plant	  taxonomies.	  
7.	   renewable	   biological	   resources	   (eg	   plants,	   animals,	   and	   other	   organisms)	   that	  
originate	  (or	  originated)	  in	  indigenous	  lands	  and	  territories;	  	  
8.	  cultural	  landscapes,	  including	  sacred	  sites;	  	  
9.	  non-­‐renewable	  resources	  (e.g.,	  rocks	  and	  minerals);	  
10.	  handicrafts,	  works	  of	  art,	  and	  performances;	  
11.	  traces	  of	  past	  cultures	  (eg	  ancient	  ruins,	  manufactured	  objects,	  human	  remains);	  
12.	   images	  perceived	  as	   ‘exotic’,	   such	  as	   the	  appearance	  of	   indigenous	  people,	   their	  
homes	  and	  villages,	  and	  the	  landscape;	  and	  	  
13.	   cultural	   property	   (ie	   culturally	   or	   spiritually	   significant	  material	   culture,	   such	   as	  
important	   cultural	   artefacts,	   that	   may	   be	   deemed	   sacred	   and,	   therefore,	   not	  
commodifiable	  by	  the	  local	  people	  
* Categories and embodiments of traditional knowledge and folklore developed by 
Dutfield 71 
	  
According	  to	  WIPO,	  in	  its	  holistic	  character,	  TK	  presents	  four	  unique	  characters:72	  	  	  
	  
• the	  spiritual	  and	  practical	  elements	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  are	  intertwined	  
and	  thus	  are	  inseparable	  (it	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  every	  element	  of	  traditional	  
knowledge	   serves	   as	   an	   inherent	   factor	   of	   cultural	   identification	   of	   its	  
holders);	  	  
• since	   traditional	   communities	   generate	   knowledge	   as	   a	   response	   to	   a	  
changing	   environment,	   traditional	   knowledge	   is	   in	   constant	   evolution	   and	  
incrementally	  improving;	  	  
• traditional	  knowledge	  covers	  different	  fields,	  in	  areas	  of	  cultural	  expressions	  
and	  in	  technical	  domains;	  and	  	  
• because	   its	   creation	   is	   not	   necessarily	   undertaken	   through	   a	   formal,	  
expressly	  systematic	  procedure,	  traditional	  knowledge	  may	  appear	  less	  than	  
formal	  in	  character,	  and	  its	  full	  character	  and	  systematic	  nature	  may	  only	  be	  
apparent	  with	  a	  greater	  understanding	  of	  the	  cultural	  context	  and	  rules	  that	  
govern	  its	  creation.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  Graham	  Dutfield	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  and	  Sustainable	  Development	  (2003)	  UNCTAD	  -­‐	  ICTSD	  Project	  
on	  IPRs	  and	  Sustainable	  Development,	  International	  Trade	  &	  Sustainable	  Development	  Series	  No	  4	  at	  19.	  
72 	  WIPO	   -­‐	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	  





While	   WIPO	   addresses	   the	   spiritual	   nature	   of	   TK,	   its	   traditional	   ‘working	  
definition’	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  address	  the	  knowledge	  that	  is	  kept	  secret	  and	  under	  
the	   protection	   of	   the	   guardians	   of	   knowledge.	   Today	   WIPO	   recognises	   that	  
indigenous	  secret	  knowledge	  exists	  and	  needs	  special	  consideration	  because	  of	  
its	   sensitive	   nature.73	  Until	   now,	  WIPO	   has	   mostly	   only	   referred	   to	   the	   secret	  
knowledge	  that	  has	  already	  been	   fixed	   in	  some	  form	  (eg	   recorded,	   registered).	  
To	  fill	  such	  gap,	  the	   Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	   Intellectual	  Property	  and	  
Genetic	  Resources,	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Folklore	   is	   currently	  working	  on	  
“Draft	  Instruments	  on	  Genetic	  Resources,	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  and	  Traditional	  
Cultural	   Expressions”	   as	   an	   instrument	   on	   TK	   and	   TCE	   which	   will	   be	  
internationally	   recognised	   and	   accepted. 74 	  Its	   Article	   3	   on	   the	   criteria	   for	  
eligibility	  specifically	  refers	  to	  the	  indigenous	  culture	  that	  is	  sacred	  and	  secret	  or	  
otherwise	   known	   by	   only	   few	   within	   the	   community	   and	   how	   states	   should	  
guarantee	   the	   safeguarding	   of	   such	   knowledge.75	  Traditional	   secret	   knowledge	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Protection	  of	  secret	  and	  sacred	  TK	  and	  TCEs	  -­‐	  Confidential	  or	  secret	  records	  or	  registers	  of	  TK	  and	  TCEs	  
safeguard	  particularly	  sensitive	  cultural	  materials,	  access	  to	  which	  and	  use	  of	  which	  are	  exclusively	  reserved	  
for	  the	  relevant	  traditional	  holders	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  customary	  laws	  and	  practices.	  Restricted	  access	  
contributes	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  TK	  and	  TCEs	  from	  an	  IP	  perspective,	  as	  it	  prevents	  disclosure	  and	  third-­‐party	  
uses	  prohibited	  by	  those	  customary	  laws.	  
74	  The	  Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Genetic	  Resources,	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  
and	   Folklore	   “The	   Protection	   of	   Traditional	   Cultural	   Expressions:	   Draft	   Articles”	   electronic	   document	  
<www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_33/facilitator_s_text_rev_2.pdf>	   last	   visited	   on	  
16/02/2017.	  
75 	  Option	   1	   [Scope	   of	   Protection	   3.1:	   Where	   the	   [subject	   matter]/[traditional	   cultural	  
expressions]/[protected	   traditional	   cultural	   expressions]	   is	   [sacred],	   [secret]	   or	   [otherwise	   known	   only]	  
[closely	   held]	   within	   indigenous	   [peoples]	   or	   local	   communities,	   [Member	   States]/[Contracting	   Parties]	  
[should]/[shall]:	   (a)	   [ensure	   that	   beneficiaries	   have	   the	   exclusive	   and	   collective	   right	   to]/[provide	   legal,	  
policy	   and/or	   administrative	   measures,	   as	   appropriate	   and	   in	   accordance	   with	   national	   law	   that	   allow	  
beneficiaries	   to]:	   i	   -­‐	   [create,]	   maintain,	   control	   and	   develop	   said	   [subject	   matter]/[traditional	   cultural	  
expressions]/[protected	   traditional	   cultural	   expressions];	   ii	   -­‐	   [discourage]	   prevent	   the	   unauthorized	  
disclosure	   and	   fixation	   and	   prevent	   the	   unauthorized	   use	   of	   [secret]	   [protected]	   traditional	   cultural	  
expressions;	   iii	   -­‐	   [authorize	  or	  deny	  the	  access	  to	  and	  use/[utilization]	  of	  said	   [subject	  matter]/[traditional	  
cultural	   expressions]/[protected	   traditional	   cultural	   expressions]	   based	   on	   prior	   and	   informed	   consent	   or	  
approval	  and	  involvement	  and	  mutually	  agreed	  terms;]	  iv	  -­‐	  protect	  against	  any	  [false	  or	  misleading]	  uses	  of	  
[protected]	  traditional	  cultural	  expressions,	  in	  relation	  to	  goods	  and	  services,	  that	  suggest	  endorsement	  by	  
or	  linkage	  with	  the	  beneficiaries;	  and	  v.	  [prevent]	  prohibit	  use	  or	  modification	  which	  distorts	  or	  mutilates	  a	  
[protected]	   traditional	   cultural	   expression	   or	   that	   is	   otherwise	   offensive,	   derogatory	   or	   diminishes	   its	  
cultural	   significance	   to	   the	  beneficiary.	   (b)	   [ensure	   that]/[encourage]	  users	   [to]:	   i	   -­‐	   attribute	   said	   [subject	  
matter]/[traditional	  cultural	  expressions]/[protected	  traditional	  cultural	  expressions]	  to	  the	  beneficiaries;	  ii	  -­‐	  
[provide	  beneficiaries	  with	  [a	  fair	  and	  equitable	  share	  of	  benefits]/[fair	  and	  equitable	  compensation],	  arising	  
from	   the	   use/[utilization]	   of	   said	   [subject	  matter]/[traditional	   cultural	   expressions]/[protected	   traditional	  
cultural	   expressions]	   based	  on	  prior	   informed	   consent	  or	   approval	   and	   involvement	   and	  mutually	   agreed	  
terms;	   see	  The	   Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	   Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Genetic	  Resources,	   Traditional	  
Knowledge	  and	  Folklore	  “The	  Protection	  of	  Traditional	  Cultural	  Expressions:	  Draft	  Articles”	  (the	  revision	  of	  
the	  articles	  is	  due	  by	  March	  2017)	  	  
electronic	   document	   <www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_33/wipo_grtkf_ic_33_4.pdf>	   last	  




remains	  today	  a	  widely	  avoided	  subject.	  It	  is	  known	  that	  it	  exists	  but,	  for	  its	  very	  
elusive	  and	  secretive	  nature,	  it	  is	  rarely	  addressed.	  Many	  scholars76	  are	  to	  today	  
discussing	   indigenous	   TK,	   TEK,	   TCE	   and	   indigenous	   traditions	   at	   national	   and	  
international	   level.	  Many	  of	   them	  have	  written	  extensively	  on	   the	   subject,	  and	  
although	   their	   works	   have	   brought	   invaluable	   contribution	   to	   the	   study	   on	  
indigenous	  peoples’	  culture,	  none	  of	   them	  has	  so	   far	  specifically	  addressed	  the	  
unique	   challenges	   of	   protecting	   effectively	   indigenous	   sacred	   and	   secret	  
knowledge.	  
	  
In	   order	   to	   successfully	   address	   indigenous	   cultures,	   and	   given	   that	   this	   thesis	  
focuses	  on	  the	  sacred,	  secret	  knowledge	  and	  culture	  in	  the	  custody	  of	  indigenous	  
custodians,	   and	   given	   that	   indigenous	   culture	   includes	   secret	   knowledge,	   the	  
thesis	  will	  use	  interchangeably	  the	  working	  definitions	  of	  knowledge,	  culture	  and	  
heritage	   as	   reflective	   of	   the	   holistic,	   sacred	   and	   secret	   element	   of	   indigenous	  
practices	  and	  way	  of	   life.	  77	  In	  saying	   this,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   remember	   that	   the	  
description	  of	  TK	  is	  a	  Western-­‐made	  characterization	  imposed	  upon	  the	  cultural	  
forms	   of	   indigenous	   peoples.	   No	   indigenous	   peoples	   participated	   in	   the	  
development	   of	   such	   categorizations	   and	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	   political-­‐
rhetorical	   potential	   of	   modern	   intellectual	   property	   law	   that	   implies	   a	  
privatization	   derived	   from	   and	   imposed	   by	   the	   market	   models	   of	   capitalist	  
societies.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  For	  further	  information,	  see	  the	  works	  of	  Professors	  Christopher	  Antons,	  Katy	  Bowrey,	  Donna	  Craig,	  Susan	  
Corbett,	   Peter	   Drahos,	   Susy	   Frankel,	  Matthew	   Rimmer,	   Henry	   Reynolds,	   Natalie	   Stoianoff,	   Ana	   Vrdoljak,	  
Patricia	  Adjei,	  Miranda	  Forsyth,	  Daniel	  Robinson,	  Robynne	  Quiggin	  and	  Valmaine	  Toki.	  
77	  In	   1999	   UNESCO	   defined	   TK	   as	   encompassing:	   “…	   spirituality,	   spiritual	   knowledge,	   ethics	   and	   moral	  
values,	  social	  institutions	  (kinship,	  political,	  traditional	  justice),	  dances,	  ceremonies	  and	  ritual	  performances	  
and	  practices,	  games	  and	  sports,	  music,	   language,	  names,	  stories,	  traditions,	  songs	   in	  oral	  narratives,	   land	  
and	   sea	   and	   air,	   all	   sites	   of	   cultural	   significance	   and	   immovable	   cultural	   property	   and	   their	   associate	  
knowledge,	   cultural	   environmental	   resources,	   traditional	   resource	   management	   including	   traditional	  
conservation	  measures,	  all	  material	  objects	  and	  moveable	  cultural	  property,	  all	   traditional	  knowledge	  and	  
expressions	  of	  indigenous	  cultures	  held	  in	  ex	  situ	  collections,	  indigenous	  peoples	  ancestral	  remains,	  human	  
genetic	   materials,	   scientific,	   agricultural,	   technical	   and	   ecological	   knowledge,	   and	   the	   skills	   required	   to	  
implement	  this	  knowledge	  (including	  that	  pertaining	  to	  resource	  use	  practices	  and	  systems	  of	  classification),	  
the	  delineated	  forms,	  parts	  and	  details	  of	  visual	  compositions	  (designs),	  permanently	  documented	  aspects	  
of	  traditional	  indigenous	  cultures	  in	  all	  forms	  (including	  scientific	  and	  ethnographic	  research	  reports,	  papers	  
and	  books,	  photographs	  and	  digital	   images,	   films	  and	  sound	  recordings)”	   see	  UNESCO	  Symposium	  on	   the	  
Protection	  of	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  and	  Expressions	  of	  Indigenous	  Cultures	  in	  the	  Pacific	  Islands	  (Noumea,	  
15	  -­‐19	  February	  1999)	  electronic	  document	  
<http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/14264/10645002355Noumea1999.pdf/Noumea1999.pdf>	   last	  




3.3	  -­‐	  Traditional	  Cultural	  Expressions	  
	  
Traditional	   Cultural	   Expressions78	  (TCEs),	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   include,	   among	  
other	   things,	   the	   ‘expressions	   of	   folklore’,79	  ‘indigenous	   culture’	   and	   ‘tangible	  
and	   intangible	   cultural	   heritage’.	   In	   recent	   years	  WIPO	   has	   adopted	   the	   term	  
‘traditional	  cultural	  expressions’	  in	  the	  place	  of	  ‘expressions	  of	  folklore’	  because	  
the	   term	   folklore	   was	   believed	   to	   have	   a	   negative,	   paternalistic	   connotation	  
implying	   antiquated	   or	   obsolete	   knowledge.	   Indeed,	   while	   indigenous	   culture	  
might	   well	   be	   ‘traditional’,	   it	   is	   not	   necessarily	   old,	   and	   it	   varies	   continuously	  
over	   time.	   Today,	   WIPO	   defines	   TCEs	   as	   ‘traditional	   cultural	   expressions’	   and	  
‘expressions	  of	  folklore’	  which	  means:80	  
	  
…	  productions	  consisting	  of	  characteristic	  elements	  of	  the	  traditional	  artistic	  
heritage	  developed	  and	  maintained	  by	  a	  community	  of	  (name	  of	  country)	  or	  
by	   individuals	   reflecting	   the	   traditional	   artistic	   expectations	   of	   such	   a	  
community,	  in	  particular:	  	  
• verbal	  expressions,	  such	  as	  folk	  tales,	   folk	  poetry	  and	  riddles,	  signs,	  
words,	   symbols	   and	   indications;	   musical	   expressions,	   such	   as	   folk	  
songs	  and	  instrumental	  music;	  
• 	  expressions	  by	  actions,	  such	  as	  folk	  dances,	  plays	  and	  artistic	  forms	  
or	  rituals;	  whether	  or	  not	  reduced	  to	  a	  material	  form;	  and,	  tangible	  
expressions,	  such	  as:	  productions	  of	  folk	  art,	  in	  particular,	  drawings,	  
paintings,	   carvings,	   sculptures,	   pottery,	   terracotta,	   mosaic,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78“Traditional	  music,	  designs,	  rituals,	  performances,	  oral	  narratives,	  names,	  symbols	  and	  signs	  communicate	  
a	  community’s	  beliefs	  and	  values,	  embody	  skills	  and	  know-­‐how,	  reflect	  a	  community’s	  history,	  and	  define	  its	  
cultural	   identity.	   Traditional	   cultural	   expressions	   (TCEs)	   are	   therefore	   valuable	   cultural	   assets	   of	   the	  
communities	   who	   maintain,	   practice	   and	   develop	   them.	   They	   can	   also	   be	   economic	   assets	   –	   they	   are	  
creations	  and	  innovations	  that	  can,	  if	  so	  wished,	  be	  traded	  or	  licensed	  for	  income-­‐generation	  and	  economic	  
development.	   They	  may	  also	   serve	  as	   an	   inspiration	   to	  other	   creators	   and	   innovators	  who	  can	  adapt	   the	  
traditional	   expressions	   and	   derive	   new	   creations	   and	   innovations”	   see	   WIPO	   electronic	   document	  
<www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/consultations/draft_provisions/pdf/tce_provisions_summary.pdf>	  
last	  visited	  on	  24/02/2012.	  
79	  “WIPO	  recognises	   the	   term	  TCE	  as	  being	   synonymous	  with	   ‘expressions	  of	   folklore’	  –	   ‘The	   terms	   ‘TCEs’	  
and	  ‘expressions	  of	  folklore’	  are	  used	  synonymously	  in	  international	  policy	  discussions	  concerning	  this	  area	  
of	   intellectual	   property’	   -­‐	   though	   in	   recent	   years	   the	   term	   folklore	   and	   its	   paternalistic	   or	   negative	  
connotation	   has	   been	   slowly	   discontinued	   in	   any	   discourse	   on	   indigenous	   TK	   and	   TCE”	   see	  
Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	   Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Genetic	  Resources,	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  and	  
Folklore,	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/3/.	  
80 	  See	   WIPO	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Traditional	   Cultural	   Expressions/Folklore	   electronic	   document	  




woodwork,	   metal	   ware,	   jewellery,	   basket	   weaving,	   needlework,	  
textiles,	  carpets	  and	  costumes;	  
• crafts;	  	  
• musical	  instruments;	  and	  
• architectural	  forms.	  
	  
In	   the	   draft	   articles	   of	   The	   Protection	   of	   Traditional	   Cultural	   Expressions	   the	  
Intergovernmental	  Committee	  considers	  “[Traditional]	  cultural	  expression	  means	  
any	   form	   of	   [artistic	   and	   literary],	   [creative	   and	   other	   spiritual]	   expression,	  
tangible	  or	   intangible,	  or	  a	  combination	   thereof,	   such	  as	  actions81	  ,	  materials,82	  
music	   and	   sound,83	  verbal84	  and	   written	   [and	   their	   adaptations],	   regardless	   of	  
the	  form	  in	  which	  it	  is	  embodied,	  expressed	  or	  illustrated	  [which	  may	  subsist	  in	  
written/codified,	  oral	  or	  other	  forms]”.85	  Indeed,	  WIPO	  explains	  that	  ‘expressions	  
of’	   traditional	   culture	   (or	   ‘expressions	   of’	   folklore)	   may	   be	   either	   intangible,	  
tangible	  or,	  most	  usually,	  combinations	  of	  the	  two	  –	  an	  example	  of	  such	  a	  ‘mixed	  
expression	   of	   folklore’	   would	   be	   a	   woven	   rug	   (a	   tangible	   expression)	   that	  
expresses	   elements	   of	   a	   traditional	   story	   (an	   intangible	   expression). 86 	  The	  
difficulty	   in	   addressing	   the	   cultural	   content	   of	   TCEs	   depends	   on	   the	   symbolic	  
meaning,	   artistic	   dimension,	   and	   cultural	   values	   that	   derive	   from	   the	   diverse	  
cultural	  identities	  of	  those	  originating	  the	  expression.87	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  [Such	   as	   dance,	   works	   of	   mas,	   plays,	   ceremonies,	   rituals,	   rituals	   in	   sacred	   places	   and	   peregrinations,	  
games	  and	  traditional	  sports/sports	  and	  traditional	  games,	  puppet	  performances,	  and	  other	  performances,	  
whether	   fixed	   or	   unfixed]	   see	   The	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	  
Resources,	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Folklore	   “The	   Protection	   of	   Traditional	   Cultural	   Expressions:	   Draft	  
Articles”	   (the	   revision	   of	   the	   articles	   is	   due	   by	   March	   2017)	   at	   4	   electronic	   document	  
<www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_33/wipo_grtkf_ic_33_4.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  16/02/2017.	  
82 	  [Such	   as	   material	   expressions	   of	   art,	   handicrafts,	   ceremonial	   masks	   or	   dress,	   handmade	   carpets,	  
architecture,	  and	  tangible	  spiritual	  forms,	  and	  sacred	  places]	  at	  supra.	  
83	  [Such	  as	  songs,	  rhythms,	  and	  instrumental	  music,	  the	  songs	  which	  are	  the	  expression	  of	  rituals]	  at	  supra.	  
84	  [Such	  as	  stories,	  epics,	  legends,	  popular	  stories,	  poetry,	  riddles	  and	  other	  narratives;	  words,	  signs,	  names	  
and	  symbols]	  at	  supra.	  
85	  See	  supra	  at	  4.	  
86	  Supra	  at	  footnote	  68.	  
87	  Article	  4:	  “1.	  Cultural	  diversity	  –	   ‘Cultural	  diversity’	  refers	  to	  the	  manifold	  ways	   in	  which	  the	  cultures	  of	  
groups	   and	   societies	   find	   expression.	   These	   expressions	   are	   passed	   on	   within	   and	   among	   groups	   and	  
societies.	  Cultural	  diversity	  is	  made	  manifest	  not	  only	  through	  the	  varied	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  cultural	  heritage	  
of	  humanity	  is	  expressed,	  augmented	  and	  transmitted	  through	  the	  variety	  of	  cultural	  expressions,	  but	  also	  
through	   diverse	   modes	   of	   artistic	   creation,	   production,	   dissemination,	   distribution	   and	   enjoyment,	  
whatever	  the	  means	  and	  technologies	  used.	  2.	  Cultural	  content	  –	  ‘Cultural	  content’	  refers	  to	  the	  symbolic	  
meaning,	  artistic	  dimension	  and	  cultural	  values	  that	  originate	  from	  or	  express	  cultural	  identities.	  3.	  Cultural	  
expressions	  ‘Cultural	  expressions’	  are	  those	  expressions	  that	  result	  from	  the	  creativity	  of	  individuals,	  groups	  
and	  societies,	  and	  that	  have	  cultural	  content”	  see	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Protection	  and	  Promotion	  of	  the	  




UNESCO	   clarifies	   that	   “the	   term	   ‘cultural	   expressions’	   was	   to	   encompass	   both	  
‘cultural	   contents’	   and	   ‘artistic	   expressions’”.88	  Having	   said	   this,	   in	   general,	   all	  
cultural	   expressions	   should	   be	   included	   and	   safeguarded	   by	   the	   freedom	   of	  
expression,	   information	   and	   communication	   as	   stated	   in	   Art	   2	   and	   18	   of	   the	  
Universal	  Declaration	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  other	  legislation	  at	  the	  national	  and	  
international	  level.	  They	  should	  also	  be	  included	  and	  safeguarded	  by	  the	  right	  to	  
self-­‐determination	  as	  worded	  in	  Common	  Art	  1	  (ICCPR	  and	  ICESCR)	  and	  Art	  3	  of	  
the	   UNDRIP.	   In	   1985	   UNESCO	   and	   WIPO	   developed	   a	   Model	   Provisions	   for	  
National	   Laws	   on	   the	   Protection	   of	   Expressions	   of	   Folklore	   Against	   Illicit	  
Exploitation	  and	  Other	  Prejudicial	  Actions	  in	  which	  it	  recognized	  the	  following	  as	  
falling	  into	  the	  TCEs/folklore	  category:	  	  
	  
• verbal	   expressions	   (folksongs	   and	   instrumental	   music);	   verbal	   expressions	  
(folktales,	  folk	  poetry	  and	  riddles);	  	  
• expressions	  by	  actions	  (dances,	  plays	  and	  artistic	  forms	  or	  rituals);	  and	  
• tangible	  expressions	  (productions	  of	  various	  types	  of	  folk	  art,	  crafts,	  musical	  
instruments	  and	  architectural	  form).	  	  
	  
After	  many	  years	  of	  study	  on	  indigenous	  cultural	  heritage,	  TK	  and	  TCEs,	  UNESCO	  
created	   a	   Convention	   on	   the	   Protection	   and	   Promotion	   of	   the	   Diversity	   of	  
Cultural	  Expressions	   in	  2005	  that	   is	  essentially	  encouraging	  states	  to	  accept	  the	  
fundamental	   values	   of	   world	   cultural	   diversity	   and	   its	   multi-­‐faceted	  
manifestations.	   The	   Convention	   (which	   entered	   into	   force	   in	   March	   of	   2007)	  
urges	  states	  to	  “protect	  and	  promote	  the	  diversity	  of	  cultural	  expressions”	   (Art	  
1.a)	  and	  to	  “promote	  respect	   for	   the	  diversity	  of	  cultural	  expressions	  and	  raise	  
awareness	  of	   its	   value	   at	   the	   local,	   national	   and	   international	   levels”	   (Art	   1.e).	  
The	   Convention	   recognizes	   that	   the	   respect	   for	   culturally	   diverse	   forms	   of	  
expressions	   is	   not	   limited	   to	   any	   production	   of	   the	   mind	   that	   might	   have	  
commercial	   value,	   but	   it	   is	   rather	   a	   fundamental	   human	   right	   common	   to	   all	  
people	  of	  the	  world.	  In	  Article	  2.1	  it	  is	  stated	  that:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  UNESCO	  -­‐	  Preliminary	  Report	  by	  the	  Director-­‐General	  Setting	  Out	  the	  Situation	  to	  Be	  Regulated	  and	  the	  
Possible	  Scope	  of	  the	  Regulating	  Action	  Proposed,	  Accompanied	  by	  the	  Preliminary	  Draft	  of	  a	  Convention	  on	  
the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Diversity	  of	  Cultural	  Contents	  and	  Artistic	  Expressions,	  Doc	  33	  C/23	  (2005)	  at	  para	  7	  
electronic	   document	   <www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IPeoples/Seminars/UNESCOconv-­‐e.pdf>	   last	  





….	   cultural	   diversity	   can	   be	   protected	   and	   promoted	   only	   if	   human	   rights	   and	  
fundamental	   freedoms,	   such	   as	   freedom	   of	   expression,	   information	   and	  
communication,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   ability	   of	   individuals	   to	   choose	   cultural	  
expressions,	   are	   guaranteed.	   No	   one	   may	   invoke	   the	   provisions	   of	   this	  
Convention	   in	   order	   to	   infringe	   human	   rights	   and	   fundamental	   freedoms	   as	  
enshrined	   in	   the	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights	   or	   guaranteed	   by	  
international	  law,	  or	  to	  limit	  the	  scope	  thereof.	  	  
	  
It	  does	  not	  strictly	  refer	  to	  ‘the	  production	  of	  the	  mind’,	  because	  the	  expression	  
of	  one’s	  own	  culture	  is	  fundamental	  for	  the	  preservation	  and	  transmission	  of	  the	  
idiosyncratic	   characteristics	   of	   any	   given	   culture	   inhabiting	   the	   earth. 89 	  In	  
addition	  to	  that,	  although	  the	  working	  definitions	  generally	  used	  are	  quite	  broad	  
and	  inclusive,	  similar	  to	  TK,	  there	  is	  no	  widely	  accepted	  definition	  of	  TCEs	  that	  is	  
enforceable	   by	   law.90 The	   fact	   that	   TCEs	   are	   based	   on	   traditions	   and	   are	   the	  
result	   of	   traditions	   conveyed	   orally,	   visually	   by	   transmission,	   imitation	   or	   in	  
performances,	  might	   set	   them	  aside	   from	   the	   intellectual	  property	   framework,	  
but	  not	  from	  any	  culturally	  diverse	  notion	  of	  heritage.	   Indeed,	  TCEs	  and	  TK	  are	  
the	   result	   of	   individual	   and	   collective	   forces	   that	   distinguish	   the	   tradition	   of	   a	  
given	   community	   as	   a	   whole;	   as	   such	   no	   one	   has	   the	   authority	   to	   de	   facto	  
alienate	   the	   rights	   connected	   to	   the	   cultural	   expressions.	   In	   addition	   to	   that,	  
while	   the	   expression	   of	   the	   knowledge	   is	   generally	   tangible,	   the	   underlying	  
knowledge	   is	   intangible91	  and	   difficult	   to	   define	   and	   address	   through	   modern	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  UNESCO	  -­‐	  Convention	  on	  the	  Protection	  and	  Promotion	  of	  the	  Diversity	  of	  Cultural	  Expressions,	  Article	  2.3	  
stresses	   that:	   “the	   protection	   and	   promotion	   of	   the	   diversity	   of	   cultural	   expressions	   presuppose	   the	  
recognition	  of	  equal	  dignity	  of	  and	   respect	   for	  all	   cultures,	   including	   the	  cultures	  of	  persons	  belonging	   to	  
minorities	  and	  indigenous	  peoples”.	  Article	  2.5,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  underlines	  that	  “cultural	  development,	  
and	  the	  possibility	  for	  each	  culture	  to	  evolve	  without	  external	  constraints	  and	  influences,	  is	  as	  important	  as	  
the	   economic	   development	   of	   any	   given	   society”	   see	   electronic	   document	  
<http://en.unesco.org/creativity/convention/2005-­‐convention/2005-­‐convention-­‐text>	   last	   visited	   on	  
12/07/2015.	  
90	  See	  UNESCO	  and	  WIPO	  Model	  Provisions	   for	  National	   Laws	  on	   the	  Protection	  of	  Expressions	  of	  Folklore	  
Against	   Illicit	   Exploitation	   and	   Other	   Prejudicial	   Actions	   at	   9-­‐10	   electronic	   document	  
<www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=6714>	  last	  visited	  on	  28/09/2012.	  
91	  UNESCO	   defines	   intangible	   culture/heritage	   as:	   “Art	   1.	   The	   ‘intangible	   cultural	   heritage’	   means	   the	  
practices,	  representations,	  expressions,	  knowledge,	  skills	  –	  as	  well	  as	  the	  instruments,	  objects,	  artefacts	  and	  
cultural	  spaces	  associated	  therewith	  –	  that	  communities,	  groups	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  individuals	  recognize	  as	  
part	  of	  their	  cultural	  heritage.	  This	  intangible	  cultural	  heritage,	  transmitted	  from	  generation	  to	  generation,	  
is	  constantly	  recreated	  by	  communities	  and	  groups	  in	  response	  to	  their	  environment,	  their	  interaction	  with	  
nature	  and	  their	  history,	  and	  provides	  them	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  identity	  and	  continuity,	  thus	  promoting	  respect	  




laws.	   Such	   knowledge	   is	   safeguarded	   by	   the	   coordinated	   work	   of	   traditional	  
customary	   laws	  and	  the	  keepers/guardians	  of	  knowledge	  whose	  duty	  of	  care	   is	  
to	  protect	  and	  transmit	  indigenous	  knowledge	  to	  future	  generations.	  
Indeed,	   within	   indigenous	   communities,	   the	   role	   played	   by	   the	   guardians	   of	  
knowledge	   is	  essential.	  Not	  only	  do	   they	  know	  the	  culture	   they	  are	  protecting,	  
but	  they	  also	  know	  why	  their	  role	  is	  traditionally	  so	  important.	  	  
The	   next	   chapter	   will	   introduce	   who	   indigenous	   guardians	   of	   knowledge	   are,	  
what	   their	   role	   entails	   and	  why	   it	   is	   regulated	   by	   a	   complex	   set	   of	   customary	  
laws.	   The	   chapter	   will	   necessarily	   address	   the	   shared	   characteristics	   that	  
indigenous	  guardians	  have	  among	  indigenous	  communities	  worldwide.	   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
solely	   to	   such	   intangible	   cultural	   heritage	   as	   is	   compatible	   with	   existing	   international	   human	   rights	  
instruments,	   as	   well	   as	   with	   the	   requirements	   of	   mutual	   respect	   among	   communities,	   groups	   and	  
individuals,	  and	  of	  sustainable	  development.	  –	  2.	  The	  ‘intangible	  cultural	  heritage’,	  as	  defined	  in	  paragraph	  
1	   above,	   is	   manifested	   inter	   alia	   in	   the	   following	   domains:	   (a)	   oral	   traditions	   and	   expressions,	   including	  
language	  as	  a	  vehicle	  of	  the	  intangible	  cultural	  heritage;	  (b)	  performing	  arts;	  (c)	  social	  practices,	  rituals	  and	  
festive	   events;	   (d)	   knowledge	   and	   practices	   concerning	   nature	   and	   the	   universe;	   (e)	   traditional	  
craftsmanship”	   see	   UNESCO	   Convention	   for	   the	   Safeguarding	   of	   the	   Intangible	   Cultural	   Heritage	   (2003)	  







Guardianship	  and	  Stewardship	  
	  
This	   chapter	   introduces	   one	   of	   the	   main	   topics	   of	   this	   thesis:	   indigenous	  
guardians.1	  To	   understand	   the	   argument	  made	   in	   this	   work,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  
understand	  who	  indigenous	  guardians	  are,	  what	  traits	  they	  share	  worldwide	  and	  
how	   they	   differ	   from	   the	   creators	   of	   knowledge.	   The	   relationship	   between	  
guardians	  or	   custodians	   (people	  who	  hold	  a	  duty	  of	   care)	  of	   knowledge	   to	   the	  
cultural	   and	   intellectual	   production	   of	   the	   commons	   is,	   in	   fact,	   quite	   different	  
from	   that	   of	   creators,	   inventors	   and	   innovators.2	  Guardians	   do	   not	   create	   the	  
knowledge,	  they	  inherit	  it	  from	  their	  ancestors.	  The	  information	  inherited	  might	  
be	   fairly	   recent,	  but	   it	   is	  never	  new	  as	   in	   the	   case	  of	   authors	  or	   creators.3	  The	  
concepts	  of	  guardianship	  and	  custodianship	  themselves	  suggest	  that	  an	  element	  
of	   the	   knowledge	   kept	  might	   be	   secret	   and	   not	   supposed	   to	   enter	   the	   public	  
domain.4	  If	   commodification	   of	   knowledge	   was,	   in	   fact,	   the	   intention	   of	   the	  
indigenous	  community,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  need	  to	  control	  the	  circulation	  of	  such	  
knowledge	  by	  addressing	  guardians	  and	  custodians5	  and	  by	  regulating	  their	  ‘duty	  
of	  care’	  with	  customary	  laws.	  	  
	  
As	   ancestral	   customary	   practices,	   stewardship	   and	   guardianship	   have	   come	   a	  
long	   way;	   they	   usually	   originate	   from	   the	   customary	   body	   of	   laws	   that	  
indigenous	  communities	  created	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  their	  history.	  Most	  of	  these	  
laws	   indeed	  go	  back	   to	  pre-­‐colonial	   time	  and	  are	  not	   influenced	  by	   the	  Anglo-­‐
American	  notion	  of	  cultural	  property.	  In	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  system,	  the	  creator	  
or	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  knowledge	  or	  cultural	  expression	  can	  designate	  a	  custodian	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  discussion	  on	  who	  the	  guardians	  of	  TK	  are	  is	  also	  analysed	  in	  the	  case	  study	  reported	  in	  Chapter	  7.	  
2	  Djims	   Milius	   “Justifying	   Intellectual	   Property	   in	   Traditional	   Knowledge”	   (2009)	   2	   Intellectual	   Property	  
Quarterly	  at	  193.	  
3	  The	  concept	  will	  be	  further	  expanded	  in	  the	  next	  chapters.	  
4	  Djims	  Milius	  “Justifying	  Intellectual	  Property	  in	  Traditional	  Knowledge”	  at	  193.	  
5	  “…	  the	  difference	  between	  concepts	  of	  guardianship	  suggests	  that	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  commons	  where	  a	  
particular	  element	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  resides	  might	  not	  always	  be	  (or	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  become)	  
public.	  And	  that	   is	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  discretion	  of	  those	  who	  hold	  that	  knowledge	   in	  their	   trust,	  




of	  his	  property,	  or	  can	  consider	  the	  property	  just	  a	  commodity6	  and	  sell	  it	  in	  the	  
marketplace.7	  Indigenous	  peoples,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  being	  unfamiliar	  with	  the	  
concept	   of	   commodification,	   traditionally	   gave	   no	   monetary	   value	   to	   their	  
heritage. 8 The	   World	   Intellectual	   Property	   Organization	   (WIPO)	   uses	   the	  
terminology	  ‘traditional	  knowledge	  holders’	  to	  refer	  to:9	  	  	  
	  
…	  all	  persons	  who	  create,	  originate,	  develop	  and	  practice	  traditional	  knowledge	  
in	   a	   traditional	   setting	   and	   context.	   Indigenous	   communities,	   peoples	   and	  
nations	   are	   traditional	   knowledge	   holders,	   but	   not	   all	   traditional	   knowledge	  
holders	  are	  indigenous.	  	  
	  
However,	   not	   all	   traditional	   knowledge	   holders	   are	   guardians	   of	   the	   same	  
knowledge.	  WIPO	  also	  uses	  the	  word	  ‘custodians’	  to	  refer	  to	  those	  people	  within	  
indigenous	   communities	   who	   act	   as	   guardians	   of	   knowledge.10	  Indeed,	   within	  
indigenous	   societies	   there	   are	   ‘special’	   members	   who	   can	   act	   as	   guardians	   of	  
traditionally	   transmitted	   forms	  of	  more	  or	   less	  sacred/secret	  knowledge.	  While	  
the	  Western	  world	  tends	  to	  consider	  all	  indigenous	  peoples	  as	  holders/guardians	  
of	   knowledge,	   guardianship	   is	   generally	   an	   internal	   structure	   that	   indigenous	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  “In	   economics,	   a	   commodity	   is	   the	   generic	   term	   for	   any	  marketable	   item	   produced	   to	   satisfy	  wants	   or	  
needs”	  see	  Karl	  Marx	  “A	  Contribution	  to	   the	  Critique	  of	  Political	  Economy”	   in	   the	  Collected	  Works	  of	  Karl	  
Marx	  and	  Frederick	  Engels:	  Volume	  29	  (International	  Publishers,	  New	  York,	  1987)	  at	  269.	  
7	  Kristen	   A	   Carpenter,	   Sonia	   K	   Katyal	   and	   others	   “Clarifying	   Cultural	   Property”	   (2010)	   17	   International	  
Journal	  of	  Cultural	  Property	  581	  at	  587.	  
8	  “The	  true	  Indian	  sets	  no	  price	  upon	  either	  his	  property	  or	  his	  labour.	  His	  generosity	  is	  only	  limited	  by	  his	  
strength	  and	  ability.	  He	  regards	  it	  as	  an	  honour	  to	  be	  selected	  for	  a	  difficult	  or	  dangerous	  service,	  and	  would	  
think	  it	  shame	  to	  ask	  for	  any	  reward	  …	  Nevertheless,	  he	  recognises	  rights	  in	  property.	  To	  steal	  from	  one	  of	  
his	  own	  tribe	  would	  be	  indeed	  disgrace	  if	  discovered,	  the	  name	  of	  ‘Wamanon’,	  or	  Thief,	   is	  fixed	  upon	  him	  
forever	   as	   an	   unalterable”	   see	   John	   E	   Lewis	   (ed)	   The	  Mammoth	   Book	   of	   Native	   Americans	   (Constable	  &	  
Robinson,	  London,	  2004)	  at	  396.	  
9	  WIPO	  Report	  on	  Fact-­‐Finding	  Missions	  on	   Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  (1998-­‐1999)	  –	  
Intellectual	  Property	  Needs	  and	  Expectations	  of	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  Holders	  (Genève,	  2001)	  at	  26.	  
10	  WIPO	  uses	  the	  Black’s	  Law	  Dictionary’s	  definition	  of	  custodian	  as	  a	  “person	  or	  institution	  that	  has	  charge	  
or	   custody	   (of	   a	   child,	   property,	   papers,	   or	   other	   valuables)”.	   According	   to	   the	   same	   source,	   “’custody’	  
refers	  to	  the	  care	  and	  control	  of	  a	  thing	  or	  person	  for	  inspection,	  preservation,	  or	  security.	  A	  ‘custodian’	  is	  
defined	   in	   the	   Oxford	   English	   Dictionary	   as	   ‘one	   who	   has	   the	   custody	   of	   a	   thing	   or	   person;	   a	   guardian,	  
keeper’.	  The	  Merriam-­‐Webster	  dictionary	  provides:	   ‘one	  that	  guards	  and	  protects	  or	  maintains’.	  The	  term	  
‘custodian’	   in	   the	   context	  of	   traditional	   knowledge	  and	   cultural	   expressions	   refers	   to	   those	   communities,	  
peoples,	   individuals	  and	  other	  entities	  which,	   according	   to	   customary	   laws	  and	  other	  practices,	  maintain,	  
use	  and	  develop	  the	  traditional	  knowledge	  and	  cultural	  expressions.	   It	  expresses	  a	  notion	  that	   is	  different	  
from	   ‘ownership’,	   since	   it	   conveys	   a	   sense	   of	   responsibility	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   traditional	   knowledge	   or	  
cultural	   expressions	   are	  used	   in	   a	  way	   that	   is	   consistent	  with	   community	   values	   and	   customary	   law”	   see	  
World	   Intellectual	   Property	   Organization	   (WIPO)	   Glossary	   electronic	   document	  




peoples	   give	   to	   themselves	   and	   it	   is	   organised	   by	   community	   laws.11	  In	   rare	  
cases,	  the	  guardians	  can	  be	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  tribe;	  normally	  they	  are	  selected	  
members	  of	  the	  community,	  such	  as	  medicine	  men/women,	  elders,	  shamans	  or	  
other	  chosen	  people	  with	  special	  attributes	  or	  line	  of	  descent.	  Whoever	  they	  are,	  
they	   share	   a	   similar	   trait:	   they	   are	   the	   holders	   of	   knowledge	   that	   cannot	   be	  
known	   by	   everybody	   else	   within	   the	   tribe	   or	   the	   region	   the	   clan	   inhabits.12	  
Although	  they	  might	  be	  endorsed	  with	  property	  rights	  deriving	  from	  the	  complex	  
customary	   laws	   of	   the	   community,	   outside	   their	   social	   structure,	   they	   are	   not	  
recognised	  any	  Western-­‐based	  property	  rights	  over	  the	  knowledge	  held	  in	  their	  
custody	  (see	  chapters	  9	  and	  10).	  Indigenous	  traditional	  holders	  (as	  per	  the	  above	  
WIPO	   definition),	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   are	   the	   keepers	   of	   a	   knowledge	   that	   is	  
known	   by	   the	   whole	   indigenous	   community,	   but	   is	   unknown	   by	   Western	  
people.13	  	  
As	  often	  happens,	   the	  struggle	   scholars	   face	   is	  essentially	   linguistic:	   indigenous	  
peoples	  do	  not	  generally	  define	  themselves	  as	  holders	  or	  guardians.	  They	  have	  
traditional	   definitions	   that	   describe	   the	   role	   everyone	   plays	   within	   the	  
community;	   or	   they	   might	   use	   no	   definitions	   at	   all.	   Everyone	   within	   the	  
community	  knows	  the	  role	  played	  by	  anyone	  else.	   It	   is	   important	   to	  stress	   this	  
differentiation,	  because	  this	  thesis	  will	  mostly	  deal	  with	  the	  guardians	  as	  specific	  
groups	  of	  people	  within	  the	  communities	  that	  have	  a	  ‘duty	  of	  care’	  in	  relation	  to	  
more	   or	   less	   sacred/secret	   forms	   of	   knowledge	   and	   the	   relative	   cultural	  
expressions	  that	  derive/originate	  from	  such	  knowledge.	  The	  level	  of	  sacredness	  
and	   secrecy	   of	   the	   knowledge	   and	   its	   management	   generally	   depends	   on	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  “…	   linked	   to	   a	   local	   or	   Indigenous	   community	   or	   other	   group	   of	   persons	   identifying	  with	   a	   traditional	  
culture	   through	   a	   sense	   of	   custodianship,	   guardianship	   or	   cultural	   responsibility,	   such	   as	   a	   sense	   of	  
obligation	   to	   preserve	   the	   knowledge,	   or	   a	   sense	   that	   to	   permit	   misappropriation	   or	   demeaning	   usage	  
would	  be	  harmful	  or	  offensive,	  a	   relationship	   that	  may	  be	  expressed	   formally	  or	   informally	  by	  customary	  
law”	   see	  WIPO	   Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	   Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Genetic	  Resources,	  Traditional	  
Knowledge	  and	  Folklore	  (Genève,	  2007)	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/11/9	  at	  para	  63.	  
12	  “Guardianship	   of	   specific	   types	   of	   traditional	  medicinal	   knowledge	   can	   vary	  widely.	   It	  may	  be	   carefully	  
preserved	   within	   a	   family,	   known	   to	   specialized	   healers	   or	   to	   one	   gender,	   shared	   among	   community	  
members,	   clans	   and	   tribes,	   or	   generally	   known	   in	   a	   regional	   context.	   In	   certain	   cases,	   as	   with	   many	  
traditional	  healers	  in	  Sub	  Sahara	  Africa,	  this	   information	  is	  closely	  guarded	  because	  like	  trade	  secrets	  they	  
are	  perceived	  as	  being	  valuable	  assets,	  which	  can	  assure	  a	  practitioner’s	  livelihood.	  …	  Elsewhere,	  knowledge	  
of	   healing	   may	   be	   passed	   along	   through	   forms	   of	   apprenticeship	   or	   training	   to	   those	   expressing	   their	  
willingness	   to	  utilize	   and/or	  practice	   it”	   see	  Memory	  Elvin-­‐Lewis	   “Evolving	  Concepts	  Related	   to	  Achieving	  
Benefit	   Sharing	   for	   Custodians	   of	   Traditional	   Knowledge”	   electronic	   document	  
<http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/239/I1547-­‐3465-­‐04075.pdf?sequence=4>	  	  
last	  visited	  on	  15/12/2014.	  
13	  Maatatua	  Declaration	  (1993)	  Article	  2.1	  –	  “Recognise	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  the	  guardians	  of	  their	  




internal	   traditions	   of	   each	   community	   and	   the	   set	   of	   customary	   laws/customs	  
that	  regulate	  the	  transmission	  of	  the	  knowledge.	  
Among	  the	  peoples	  of	   the	  Sepik	  River	   (Papua	  New	  Guinea),	   for	  example,	   there	  
are	  marked	  inequalities	   in	  ceremonial	  ranks.	  Such	  inequalities	  are	  of	  traditional	  
descent,	  and	  are	   linked	  to	  magical	  and	  ritual	  prerogatives.	  Normally,	  the	  senior	  
lineage	  of	   the	  clan	   inherits	   these	  powers.14	  On	   the	  same	   line,	  and	  according	   to	  
the	   first	   reports	   on	   encounters	   with	   Polynesian	   peoples,	   their	   general	   culture	  
seemed	  to	  be	  well	  structured	  and	  organized.	   In	  1879,	  Staniland	  Wake	  reported	  
that	   the	   ‘tapu’ 15 	  was	   “the	   great	   weapon	   of	   sovereign	   authority”	   among	  
Polynesian	  people,	  and	  through	  it	  their	  lives	  were	  organized	  in	  complex	  political	  
and	   social	   structures. 16 	  Although	   each	   community	   manages	   its	   knowledge	  
according	   to	   its	   internal	   customary	   laws,	   the	   role	   of	   guardians	   presents	  
similarities	  among	  indigenous	  peoples	  that	  can	  be	  assessed	  in	  their	  generality.	  	  
	  
4.1	  -­‐	  The	  Shared	  Values	  of	  the	  Indigenous	  Guardians	  of	  Knowledge	  
	  
The	  Ancestral	  Beings	  recurring	  in	  the	  Australian	  Dreamtime	  traditions	  (which	  are	  
broadly	   similar	   throughout	   Australia)	   named	   the	   places	   they	   journeyed	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  “None	   of	   the	   cult	   rituals	   owned	   by	  Wuluwi-­‐Nyawi	   or	   Nggela’angkw	   can	   take	   place	  without	   first	   being	  
inaugurated	   by	   its	   owners’	   senior	   subclans.	   The	   ritually	   senior	   men	   of	   these	   subclans	   must	   give	   their	  
consent	   before	   the	   ritual	   can	   be	   held,	   and	   they	   control	   the	   timing	   of	   all	   performances	   of	   cult	   ritual.	  
Throughout	  the	  course	  of	  the	  rituals,	  the	  men	  of	  all	  the	  ‘owner’	  subclans	  have	  many	  special	  responsibilities	  
and	   entitlements;	   but	   these	   are	   rigidly	   graded	   in	   importance	   according	   to	   each	   subclan’s	   order	   of	  
ceremonial	   rank”	   see	   Simon	   J	  Harrison	  Stealing	   People’s	  Names	   (Cambridge	  University	   Press,	   Cambridge,	  
1990)	  at	  69.	  
15	  “The	  term	  ‘tapu’	  means	  ‘forbidden	  or	  prohibited’	  and	  is	  still	  widely	  used	  in	  this	  sense	  today.	  Traditionally,	  
however,	   its	   semantics	   included	  also,	   and	  essentially,	   ‘sacredness’	  –	  a	  meaning	   that	  at	   first	   glance	   seems	  
incompatible	  with	  our	  notion	  of	  prohibition.	  Something	  being	  tapu	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  ‘forbidden’	  was	  rather	  a	  
consequence	  of	  its	  being	  sacred,	  that	  is,	  loaded	  with	  the	  supernatural	  power	  mana.	  Mana,	  a	  core	  concept	  
of	  Polynesian	  worldview,	  contained	  a	  broad	  spectrum	  of	  meanings:	  it	  implied	  or	  induced	  prestige,	  influence,	  
supernatural	  power,	  or	  luck.	  It	  could	  be	  loaded	  like	  energy	  and	  was	  attributed	  to	  people,	  animals,	  things,	  or	  
actions.	  With	   people,	   it	   was	   particularly	   the	   higher	   ranking	  who	  were	   endowed	  with	  mana.	   The	   contact	  
between	   people	   of	   different	   rank	   was	   regarded	   as	   dangerous	   for	   both	   sides	   and	   there-­‐	   fore	   strictly	  
regulated	   by	   avoidance	   rules,	   the	   tapu”	   see	   Andrea	   Bender	   and	   Sieghard	   Beller	   “Polynesian	   tapu	   in	   the	  
‘deontic	   square’:	   a	   cognitive	   concept,	   its	   linguistic	   expression	   and	   cultural	   context”	   in	   R	   Alterman	   and	  D	  
Kirsh	   (eds)	   in	   Proceedings	   of	   the	   Twenty-­‐Fifth	   Annual	   Conference	   of	   the	   Cognitive	   Science	   Society	   (NJ:	  
Lawrence	   Erlbaum,	   Mahwah,	   2003);	   “Tapu,	   tabu	   or	   kapu	   is	   a	   Polynesian	   traditional	   concept	   denoting	  
something	   holy	   or	   sacred,	   with	   ‘spiritual	   restriction’	   or	   ‘implied	   prohibition’;	   it	   involves	   rules	   and	  
prohibitions.	  The	  English	  word	  ‘taboo’	  derives	  from	  this	  later	  meaning	  and	  dates	  from	  Captain	  James	  Cook's	  
visit	   to	   Tonga	   in	   1777.	   The	   concept	   exists	   in	  many	   societies,	   including	   traditional	   Fijian,	  Māori,	   Samoan,	  
Rapanui,	  Tahitian,	  Hawaiian,	  and	  Tongan	  cultures	  –	  in	  most	  cases	  using	  a	  recognisably	  similar	  word—but	  in	  
Rotuman	   term	   for	   this	   concept	   is	   ‘ha'a’”	   electronic	   document	  
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tapu_%28Polynesian_culture%29>	  last	  visited	  on	  21/04/2012.	  
16	  For	   further	   information	   see	   C	   Staniland	  Wake	   “The	  Origin	   of	   the	   Classificatory	   System	   of	   relationships	  
Used	  Among	  Primitive	  Peoples”	   (1879)	  8	  The	   Journal	  of	   the	  Anthropological	   Institute	  of	  Great	  Britain	  and	  




created	   the	   nature	   that	   would	   characterize	   these	   places;	   they	   also	   created	  
‘sacred	   rules’	   of	   human	   social	   life	   and	   indigenous	   culture.	   These	   Ancestral	  
Beings17	  entrusted	   custodianship	   of	   certain	   Australian	   territories	   to	   particular	  
language	  groups,	  and	  the	  custodianship	  rights	  and	  duties	  of	   the	  chosen	  groups	  
were	   normally	   regulated	   by	   the	   law.18	  To	   understand	   the	   role	   of	   Aboriginal	  
custodians,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  delve	  into	  the	  Dreamtime19	  traditions	  of	  his	  people.	  	  
	  
The	  essence	  of	  the	  Dreaming	   is	  that	  every	  part	  of	  the	   life	  force	  –	  the	  Ancestral	  
Beings,	   the	   land,	   the	   sea,	   humans,	   fauna	   flora	   and	   natural	   phenomena	   –	   is	  
inextricably	  and	  eternally	  connected	  to	  every	  other	  part.20	  	  
	  
It	   means	   that	   even	   the	   custodians	   are	   part	   of	   a	   whole	   with	   specific	   features	  
regulated	   by	   sacred	   laws. 21 	  Compared	   to	   Western	   religious	   beliefs,	   for	  
Aborigines:	  	  
	  
…	   the	  very	   land	   itself	   is	  a	  kind	  of	   ‘church’;	   it	   is	  a	  kind	  of	   theophany	  where	   the	  
land	  contains	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  Ancestors,	  and	  is	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Ancestors.	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  “These	  dreaming	  characters	  who	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  development	  of	  humanity	  were	  of	  many	  kinds	  
and	   had	   widely	   differing	   personalities.	   They	   also	   came	   from	   many	   directions.	   Some	   came	   out	   of	   the	  
unknown,	  whether	  or	  not	   it	  was	  named,	   some	   from	  the	  sky,	  and	  others	  out	  of	   the	  earth	   itself,	  emerging	  
through	  an	  act	  of	  self-­‐creation.	  And	  they	  came	  at	  different	  times,	  not	  all	  at	  once.	  There	  were	  many	  of	  them,	  
all	  operating	  within	  the	  Dreaming;	  and	  they	  moved	  over	  the	  land,	  within	  particular	  areas,	   leaving	  tangible	  
signs	   of	   their	   own	   physical	   presence	   there,	   becoming	  metamorphosed,	   turning	   into	   something	   else”	   see	  
Ronald	  M	  Berndt	  and	  Catherine	  H	  Berndt	  The	  Speaking	  Land	  –	  Myth	  and	  Story	  in	  Aboriginal	  Australia	  (Inner	  
Traditions	  International	  Ltd,	  Rochester-­‐USA,	  1994)	  at	  15.	  
18	  Stephanie	  Fryer-­‐Smith	  Aboriginal	  Benchbook	  for	  Western	  Australian	  Courts	   (2002)	  Ch	  2	  at	  2.2	  electronic	  
document	  <www.aija.org.au/online/ICABenchbook/Intro.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  16/12/2014	  
19	  “…	  a	  moral	   code	   that	   informs	  and	  unites	  all	   life.	  The	  dogma	  of	  Dreaming	  states	   that	  all	  of	   the	  world	   is	  
known	   and	   can	   be	   classified	  within	   the	   taxonomy	   created	   by	   ancestral	   heroes	  whose	   pioneering	   travels	  
gave	  form,	  shape,	  and	  meaning	  to	  the	   land”	  see	  Diane	  Bell	  “Living	  the	  Dreaming”	   in	  Steven	  J	  Friesen	  (ed)	  
Ancestors	  in	  Post-­‐Contact	  Religion	  (Harvard	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge-­‐Massachusetts,	  2001)	  at	  177.	  	  
20	  Stephanie	  Fryer-­‐Smith	  Aboriginal	  Benchbook	  for	  Western	  Australian	  Courts	  (2002)	  at	  2.2.2.	  
21	  “The	  Law	  known	  to	  Aboriginal	  peoples	   is	   inscribed	   in	   the	   land	  and	  encoded	   in	   the	  relationship	  that	  are	  
testimony	   to	   the	   continuance	   of	   the	   Law.	   The	   law	   of	   Dreamtime	   binds	   people,	   flora,	   fauna,	   and	   natural	  
phenomena	  into	  one	  enormous	  interfunctional	  world.	  It	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  living,	  who	  trace	  direct	  
relationships	  to	  these	  ancestors,	  to	  give	  form	  and	  substance	  to	  this	  heritage	  in	  their	  daily	  routines	  and	  their	  
ceremonial	  practice:	  to	  keep	  the	  Law,	  to	  visit	  sites,	  to	  use	  the	  country,	  and	  to	  enjoy	  its	  bounty.	  It	   is	   in	  the	  
living	  out	  of	   the	  Dreamtime	  heritage,	  particularly	   in	   the	   ceremonial	  domain,	   that	  we	   see	  how	   the	  past	   is	  
negotiated	  in	  the	  present,	  how	  women	  and	  men	  position	  themselves	  vis	  à	  vis	  each	  other	  and	  vis	  à	  vis	  the	  
Law.	   The	   common	   core	   of	   knowledge	   of	   the	  Dreamtime	   concerns	   knowledge	   of	   ancestral	   activity	  …,	   the	  
rights	   of	   living	   descendants,	   and	   the	   responsibilities	   of	   the	   ritual	   bosses	   of	   the	   business.	   It	   is	   through	  
ceremonial	  activity	  that	  men	  and	  women	  give	  form	  to	  their	  distinctive	   interpretation	  of	  this	  heritage”	  see	  
Steven	   J	   Friesen	   (ed)	   Ancestors	   in	   Post-­‐Contact	   Religion	   (Harvard	   University	   Press,	   Cambridge-­‐




whole	  land	  is	  a	  religious	  sanctuary,	  with	  special	  regions	  throughout	  it	  that	  have	  
acquired	  special	  sacred	  status.22	  
	  
Thus,	  in	  the	  traditions	  of	  Aborigines	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  land	  is	  one	  of	  the	  
most	   sacred	   and	   cherished	   aspects	   of	   their	   lives	   because	   it	   represents	   an	  
important	   element	   for	   their	   survival.23	  Consequently,	   this	   special	   relationship	  
between	  individuals	  or	  groups	  and	  the	  territory	  cannot	  be	  lost	  or	  exchanged.	  In	  
this,	  the	  relationship	  between	  Aborigines	  and	  their	  territory	  is	  common	  to	  every	  
member	  of	  the	  community	  with	  no	  exceptions.	  However,	  strongly	  defined	  roles	  
regulate	  Aboriginal	  life.	  Elders,	  for	  example,	  are	  generally	  responsible	  for	  sacred	  
objects,	  cultural	  matters	  and	  the	  performance	  of	  rituals.	  They	  are	  the	  custodians	  
of	  the	  Law,	  who	  honour	  and	  maintain	  the	  Law	  and	  pass	  it	  to	  future	  generations.	  
Thus,	   they	  are	   the	  ones	  deciding	  how	  culture	   can	  be	  used	  or	  preserved	  within	  
the	   community.	   Indigenous	   social	   organization	   and	   kinship	   structures	   are	  
regulated	   by	   customary	   Aboriginal	   Laws.	   Central	   to	   these	   Laws	   is	   “the	  
responsibility	  to	  maintain	  culture	  as	  it	  has	  been	  set	  down	  in	  creation	  stories”.24	  
Ceremonies	  and	  rituals	  maintain	  links	  to	  the	  Ancestral	  past	  and	  its	  stories;25	  the	  
rules	   associated	   with	   these	   ceremonies	   are	   therefore	   very	   strict:	   “through	  
ceremonies,	   participants	   as	   guardians	   of	   the	   story,	   bring	   the	  world	   into	   being	  
through	  their	  bodies,	  songs	  and	  actions”.26	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Colin	  Dean	  The	  Australian	  Aboriginal	   ‘Dreamtime’	   (Gamahucher	  Press,	  Geelong	  Victoria-­‐Australia,	  1996)	  
at	  2.	  
23	  “Land	   is	   vested	   in	   each	  member	   of	   the	   language	   group	   as	   a	   sacred	   bequest	   from	   the	   Dreaming,	   and	  
thereby	  provides	   the	   foundation	   for	   the	  group’s	  existence.	   Each	  group’s	   territory	   is	  physically,	   spiritually,	  
economically	   and	   culturally	   essential	   for	   survival”	   see	   Stephanie	   Fryer-­‐Smith	   Aboriginal	   Benchbook	   for	  
Western	  Australian	  Courts	  (2002)	  Ch	  2	  at	  2.2.3.	  
24	  “The	  Law	  establishes	  a	  complex	  set	  of	  kinship	  and	  social	  arrangements	  that	  come	  with	  responsibilities	  and	  
obligations’.	  For	  further	  information	  on	  the	  social	  organization	  of	  Aboriginal	  peoples”	  see	  Katja	  Mikhailovich	  
and	   Alexandra	   Pavli	   Freedom	   of	   Religion,	   Belief,	   and	   Indigenous	   Spirituality,	   Practice	   and	   Cultural	   Rights	  
(Centre	  of	  Education,	  Poverty	  and	  Social	   Inclusion	  -­‐	  Faculty	  of	  Education,	  University	  of	  Camberra,	  2006)	  at	  
Ch	  6.	  
25	  “Ceremonies	  may	  be	  associated	  with	  ancestral	  stories,	  rituals	  for	  increasing	  rain,	  plants	  and	  animal	  foods,	  
fertility	  and	   initiation	  of	   young	  people	   into	  adulthood,	  or	  associated	  with	  deaths	  and	  burial.	   Some	   rituals	  
and	   ceremony	   are	   restricted	   to	   women	   or	  men	   only	   and	  may	   be	   secret/sacred	   while	   others	   are	   public.	  
Rituals	   may	   be	   practiced	   during	   ceremonies	   that	   last	   for	   days	   or	   weeks,	   with	   singing	   and	   dancing,	  
storytelling,	   and	   the	   display	   of	   body	   decoration	   and	   ceremonial	   objects.	   During	   these	   ceremonies,	   the	  
stories	  connected	   to	   the	  Ancestral	  Beings	  are	   told	  and	  retold”	  see	  Katja	  Mikhailovich	  and	  Alexandra	  Pavli	  
Freedom	  of	  Religion,	  Belief,	  and	  Indigenous	  Spirituality,	  Practice	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  at	  Ch	  7.	  
26	  Commonwealth	   of	   Australia,	   Department	   of	   Environment,	   Heritage	   and	   Arts,	   Uluru	   Visitor	   Guide	   2009	  





In	   the	  past	   it	  was	  often	  believed	   that	  women	  did	  not	  perform	  significant	   roles	  
within	   the	   clan.	   It	   is	   generally	   known	   that,	   for	   example,	   among	   the	   Yolngu	  
people,	  women’s	  acquisition	  of	  knowledge	  “follows	  a	  pattern	  similar	   to	   that	  of	  
men,	  though	  …	  they	  are	   less	   likely	  to	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  exercise	  rights	   in	  
sacred	  law”.	  In	  Yolngu	  tradition,	  women	  do	  not	  go	  through	  “the	  same	  stages	  of	  
initiation	   as	   men”	   and	   are	   “seldom	   called	   upon	   to	   exercise	   rights	   in	   religious	  
knowledge	   in	  public”.27	  However,	  most	   recent	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  women	  
are	   the	   guardians	   of	   the	   feminine	   line	   of	   transmission	   and	   have	   control	   over	  
other	   sacred	   associations	   connected	   to	   a	   sacred	   ritual.	   Their	   role	   is	   less	  
ceremonial	  and	  more	  secular,	  and	  it	  is	  organised	  by	  a	  different	  set	  of	  customary	  
laws. 28 	  In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Yolngu	   peoples,	   women	   are	   the	   owners	   of	   the	  
Djungguwan	  ceremony29	  and	  have	  a	  major	  role	  in	  organising	  the	  public	  phases	  of	  
the	   ritual.30	  In	   general,	   among	   Yolngu	   peoples,	   the	   ‘revelation’	   of	   the	   most	  
sacred	  objects	  of	  the	  clan	  and	  their	  utilisation	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  most	  senior	  male	  
members	  of	  the	  clan,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  senior	  initiated.31	  In	  the	  specific,	  knowledge,	  
art	  and	  artistic	  expressions	  are	  regulated	  by	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  ritual	  authority,	  which	  
have	   the	   power	   to	   restrict	   access	   to	   the	   knowledge	   –	   “who	   can	   visit	   certain	  
places	   is	   restricted.	   Who	   can	   touch	   certain	   objects	   or	   take	   part	   in	   particular	  
phases	   of	   a	   ceremony	   is	   restricted”.32	  Knowledge	   is	   divided	   into	   public	   and	  
confidential;	   with	   the	   first	   being	   the	   knowledge	   accessible	   by	   the	   whole	  
community	  and	  the	  second	  restricted	  to	  male	  elders	  who	  act	  as	  the	  custodians	  of	  
the	  line	  of	  transmission.	  In	  this	  case,	  secrecy	  is	  what	  “marks	  the	  division	  between	  
inside	   and	   outside	   knowledge	   and	   creates	   pauses	   in	   the	   transmission	   of	  
knowledge”.33	  Art,	   sacred	   objects	   and	   paintings	   are	   fundamental	   elements	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Howard	  Morphy	  Ancestral	  Connections	  –	  Art	  and	  an	  Aboriginal	  System	  of	  Knowledge	   (The	  University	  of	  
Chicago	   Press,	   Chicago	   and	   London,	   1991)	   at	   59;	   see	   also	  William	  H	   Edwards	   (ed)	   Traditional	   Aboriginal	  
Society	  (MacMillan,	  Melbourne,	  1987).	  
28	  For	   further	   readings	  on	  Aboriginal	  women	  see	  William	  H	  Edwards	   (ed)	  Traditional	  Aboriginal	   Society	   at	  
237.	  
29	  “The	  Djungguwan	  is	  a	  ceremony	  of	  the	  Rirratjingu	  and	  the	  Marrakulu	  clans.	  It	  is	  a	  ceremony	  of	  transition,	  
teaching	  and	  remembering.	  It	  is	  an	  initiation	  ceremony	  that	  aims	  to	  teach	  young	  boys	  about	  discipline,	  law	  
and	  respect	   for	   the	   traditions	  of	   their	  people.	  Through	  song,	  dance	  and	  art,	  a	  narrative	   is	   told	  about	   two	  
ancestral	   beings,	   the	  Wawilak	   Sisters,	   as	   they	   journey	   through	   country	   creating	   each	   tribe	   and	   clan	   and	  
giving	   them	   their	   law”	   see	   electronic	   document	   <http://filmaustraliaceremony.com.au/s3_1.htm>	   last	  
visited	  on	  25/04/2012.	  
30	  See	  Morphy	  Ancestral	  Connections	  –	  Art	  and	  an	  Aboriginal	  System	  of	  Knowledge	  at	  88.	  
31	  At	  59.	  
32	  At	  76.	  




Aborigines’	   lives;	   they	   are	   the	   manifestations	   of	   the	   Ancestral	   Beings.	   The	  
guardians	  control	  the	  rights	  to	  the	  utilization	  of	  the	  designs	  and	  objects,	  to	  make	  
sure	  nobody	  steals	  them,	  or	  uses	  them	  inappropriately.	  By	  protecting	  the	  sacred	  
laws	  that	  are	  symbolised	  in	  their	  art,	  the	  custodians	  fulfil	  their	  obligations	  to	  the	  
tribe	  and	  the	  Ancestors	  who	  have	  entrusted	  them	  with	  the	  knowledge	  and	  the	  
land	  from	  which	  they	  took	  the	  knowledge.34	  It	  is	  the	  line	  of	  knowledge	  with	  the	  
past	   that	   must	   be	   safeguarded	   to	   make	   sure	   that	   it	   will	   continue	   to	   sustain	  
indigenous	   life	   and	   keep	   the	   line	   uncorrupted.	   Often,	   within	   indigenous	  
communities,	   the	   guardians	   constitute	   a	   distinct	   group	   that	   can	   go	   under	   the	  
name	  of	  the	  tribe	  and	  being	  generically	   identified	  as	  the	  ‘elders’	  of	  the	  clan,	  or	  
they	  can	  have	  a	  traditional	  name	  to	  describe	  their	  role.	  Specificity	  is	  not	  always	  
required,	   because	   the	   community	   knows	   well	   who	   the	   ‘custodians’	   of	   the	  
knowledge	  are	  and	  the	  strict	  laws	  regulate	  their	  role.	  In	  her	  report	  Our	  Culture,	  
Our	  Future,	  Terry	  Janke	  explains	  that:35	  
	  
Although	  Indigenous	  Cultural	  and	  Intellectual	  Property	   is	  collectively	  owned,	  an	  
individual	   or	   group	   is	   often	   the	   custodian	   or	   caretaker	   of	   a	   particular	   item	   of	  
heritage.	  The	  traditional	  custodians	  are	  empowered	  as	  caretakers	   in	  relation	  to	  
the	  particular	  item	  of	  heritage	  only	  in	  so	  far	  as	  their	  actions	  conform	  to	  the	  best	  
interests	  of	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole.	  
	  
In	  general,	  within	   indigenous	  communities,	  similar	  customary	   laws	  regulate	  the	  
practice	  of	  custodianship	  among	  Native	  Americans.	  The	  Medicine	  Lodge’s	  group	  
represents	  an	  example	  of	  guardianship.	  Originating	  among	  the	  Algonquin	  tribe,	  
and	  later	  extending	  to	  the	  Sioux	  of	  the	  Mississippi	  Valley,	  the	  Lodge	  was:	  	  
	  
…	  a	  union	  of	  affiliation	  of	  a	  number	  of	  lodges,	  each	  with	  its	  distinctive	  songs	  and	  
medicines.	  Leadership	  was	  in	  order	  of	  seniority	  in	  degrees,	  which	  could	  only	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  William	  H	  Edwards	  (ed)	  Traditional	  Aboriginal	  Society	  (MacMillan,	  Melbourne,	  1987)	  at	  21.	  
35	  Terri	  Janke	  Our	  Culture,	  Our	  Future	  Report	  Prepared	  for	  the	  Australian	  Institute	  of	  Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  
Strait	   Islander	  Studies	  and	   the	  Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	   Islander	  Commission	  at	  8	  electronic	  document	  




obtained	  by	  merit,	  and	  women	  were	  admitted	  to	  membership	  upon	  equal	  terms,	  
with	  possibility	  of	  attaining	  to	  the	  highest	  honours.36	  	  
	  
In	   these	   gatherings	   the	   use	   of	   curative	   medicines	   were	   taught	   and	   practiced	  
mainly	  by	  the	  eldest	  of	  the	  clan,	  and	  its	  younger	  members	  were	  trained	  to	  fill	  the	  
places	  of	  those	  that	  would	  eventually	  pass	  away.37	  	  
In	  many	  African	  societies,	  like	  the	  Hausa	  community	  for	  example,	  women	  are	  the	  
guardians	   of	   traditional	   knowledge.	   They	   pass	   on	   their	   knowledge	   through	  
storytelling,	   riddles,	   proverbs,	   and	   idioms.38	  They	   also	   use	   rituals	   and	   religious	  
practices	   to	   pass	   on	   the	   values	   considered	   “essential	   in	   understanding	   and	  
experiencing	   the	   fullness	   of	   life”.39	  In	   Africa,	   “individual	   elders	   may	   preserve	  
knowledge	   for	   the	   community	   and	   various	   members	   share	   knowledge	   while	  
specific	   elders	   from	   the	   community	   remain	   its	   custodians”.40	  The	   knowledge	   is	  
stored	  in	  the	  guardians’	  minds	  along	  with	  the	  instructions	  on	  how	  and	  where	  to	  
use	   it.	   It	   is	   intangible	   and	   often	   rests	   hidden	   in	   the	   colours	   of	   indigenous	  
languages	   and	   traditions.	   As	   such,	   the	   sacred	   knowledge	   does	   not	   need	   to	   be	  
defined,	  and	  it	  is	  never	  considered	  a	  commodity	  by	  those,	  within	  the	  tribe,	  who	  
are	   guided	   by	   traditions	   and	   customary	   laws.41	  In	   the	   interpretation	   of	   what	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Jon	  E	  Lewis	  (ed)	  The	  Mammoth	  Book	  of	  Native	  Americans	   (Constable	  &	  Robinson,	  London,	  2004)	  at	  383	  
and	  385	  
37	  “A	  medicine	  or	   ‘mystery	   feast’	  was	  not	   a	   public	   affair,	   as	  members	  only	  were	  eligible,	   and	  upon	   these	  
occasions	   all	   the	   ‘medicine	   bags’	   and	   totems	   of	   the	   various	   lodges	   were	   displayed	   and	   their	   peculiar	  
“medicine	  songs”	  were	  sung.	  …	  The	   ‘Grand	  Medicine	  Dance’	  was	  given	  on	  the	  occasion	  of	   initiating	  those	  
candidates	  who	   had	   finished	   their	   probation,	   a	   sufficient	   number	   of	  whom	  were	   designated	   to	   take	   the	  
place	   of	   those	   who	   had	   died	   since	   the	   last	   meeting	   …	   After	   silent	   prayer,	   each	   medicine-­‐man	   in	   turn	  
addressed	  himself	   to	  his	  charge,	  exhorting	  him	  to	  observe	  all	   the	   rules	  of	   the	  order	  under	   the	  eye	  of	   the	  
Mysterious	  One,	  and	   instructing	  him	   in	  his	  duty	   toward	  his	   fellow-­‐man	  and	   toward	   the	  Ruler	  of	   Life”;	   for	  
further	  details	  on	  the	  Great	  Medicine	  Lodge	  see	  Jon	  E	  Lewis	  (ed)	  The	  Mammoth	  Book	  of	  Native	  Americans	  at	  
384.	  
38	  “Most	  African	   societies	  acknowledge	   the	   fact	   that	  oral	   traditional	   teachings	   facilitate	   the	   inculcation	  of	  
socially	  desirable	  values	  such	  as	  hard	  work,	  honesty,	  thrift,	  and	  wisdom”	  see	  Njoki	  Nathami	  Wane	  “Mapping	  
the	   Field	   of	   Indigenous	   Knowledges	   in	   Anti-­‐colonial	   Discourse:	   A	   Transformative	   Journey	   in	   Education”	  
(2008)	  11	  2	  Race	  Ethnicity	  and	  Education	  183	  at	  186.	  
39	  Supra	  at	  190.	   	  
40	  A	   Agrawal	   “Neither	   Having	   One’s	   Cake,	   Nor	   Eating	   It:	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	   and	   ‘Indigenous	  
Knowledge’”	  (1995)	  3	  3	  Common	  Property	  Resources.	  	  
41	  Muchae,	  for	  example,	  reports	  how	  in	  Kenya	  “among	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Kikuyu	  community,	  indigenous	  
knowledge	  in	  some	  fields	  was	  a	  well-­‐guarded	  secret.	  For	  instance	  a	  person	  who	  had	  acquired	  special	  skills	  as	  
a	   black	   smith	   would	   not	   allow	   just	   anybody	   to	   walk	   into	   his	   workshop	   and	   watch	   him	   make	   such	  
instruments	   as	   spears,	   pangas,	   diggings	   hoes,	   etc.	   The	   skills	   of	   making	   such	   instruments	   were	   carefully	  
guarded.	  Such	  a	  person	  would	  only	  train	  his	  son	  or	  a	  very	  close	  relative.	  The	  same	  case	  applied	  to	  herbalists.	  
An	  intruder	  was	  always	  heavily	  fined	  in	  order	  to	  deter	  any	  attempt	  to	  steal	  such	  knowledge.	  The	  problem	  
with	   this	   type	   of	   system	   is	   that	   such	   important	   knowledge	  was	   owned	   by	   and	   confined	   to	   a	   few	   family	  




indigenous	   knowledge	   might	   be,	   the	   confusion	   is	   essentially	   ours.	   We,	   the	  
Westerners,	   need	   to	   define	   and	   place	   every	   phenomenon	   within	   a	   linguistic	  
framework	   that	   has	   often	   meaning	   only	   for	   us	   and,	   especially	   in	   the	   case	   of	  
indigenous	  peoples,	  might	  mean	  nothing	  at	  all	  to	  them.	  	  
The	   mission	   of	   guardians	   and	   custodians	   is	   to	   make	   sure	   that	   the	   line	   of	  
knowledge	  stays	  unbroken	  and	  uncorrupted	  within	  the	  indigenous	  society	  and	  is	  
safely	  passed	  to	  future	  generations.	  The	  corruption	  of	  a	  knowledge,	  which	  holds	  
sacred,	  ancestral	  power,	   could	  have	  dramatic	   consequences	   for	   the	   rest	  of	   the	  
community.	  Guardians	  are	  what	  in	  modern	  language	  is	  translated	  into	  the	  idiom:	  
‘facilitators’.	   They	   are	   the	   chosen	   ones	  who,	   because	   of	   their	   special	   training,	  
spiritual	  predispositions	  and	  legacy,	  can	  handle	  the	  sacred	  and	  what	  comes	  with	  
the	   knowledge	   of	   it,	   and	   can	   filter	   its	   power	   into	   knowledge	   that	   is	  
comprehensible	  and	  non-­‐harmful	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  community.	  For	  indigenous	  
peoples	   the	   misuse	   of	   the	   sacred	   can	   bring	   destruction	   and	   despair,	   and	   not	  
everyone	   can	   have	   access	   to	   the	   ultimate	   knowledge.	   It	   is	   not	   by	   chance,	  
therefore,	   that	   guardianship	   is	   often	  bound	   to	   religious	   and	   spiritual	   practices,	  
and	   sacredness	   and	   secrecy	   are	   the	   recognisable	   features	   of	   the	   selected	  
members	   of	   the	   group	   of	   guardians/custodians.	   Within	   indigenous	   tribes,	  
secrecy	  normally	  generates:	  	  
	  
…	  a	  social	  hierarchy’	  between	  those	  who	  know	  and	  those	  who	  do	  not.	  In	  absence	  
of	   significant	   social	  and	  economic	   stratification,	   “the	  social	   ranking	   fostered	  by	  
ritual	  secrecy	  may	  anchor	  existing	  patterns	  of	   leadership”;	  which	  means	  that	   ‘a	  
breakdown	   of	   secrecy	   threatens	   traditional	   patterns	   of	   political	   and	   religious	  
life.42	  
	  
In	   his	   book	   Who	   Owns	   Native	   Culture?,	   Brown	   points	   out	   that	   within	   Hopi	  
society,	  for	  example:43	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Knowledge	   and	   Industry	   Property	   Rights:	   Kenyan	   Experience	   (Inter-­‐Regional	   Workshop	   on	   intellectual	  
Property	  Rights	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  Traditional	  Medicine,	  Bangkok,	  2000).	  
42	  Michael	  F	  Brown	  Who	  Owns	  Native	  Culture?	  (Harvard	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge-­‐Massachusetts,	  2003)	  
at	  30.	  




…	   religious	   knowledge	   is	   rigorously	   compartmentalized	   among	   a	   range	   of	  
specialized	   organizations.	   Community	   values	   discourage	   curiosity	   about	   the	  
details	  of	  ritual	  in	  which	  one	  is	  not	  a	  direct	  participant.	  
	  
While	  in	  Australia,	  under	  Aboriginal	  law:	  	  
	  
…	   the	   right	   to	   create	  artworks	  depicting	   creation	  and	  dreaming	   stories,	   and	   to	  
use	   pre-­‐existing	   designs	   and	   totems	   of	   the	   clan,	   resides	   with	   the	   traditional	  
owners	  as	  custodians	  of	   the	   images.	  The	  traditional	  owners	  have	  the	  collective	  
authority	   to	   determine	   whether	   these	   images	  may	   be	   used	   in	   an	   artwork,	   by	  
whom	  the	  artwork	  may	  be	  created,	  by	  whom	  it	  may	  be	  published,	  and	  the	  terms,	  
if	  any,	  on	  which	  the	  artwork	  may	  be	  reproduced.44	  	  
	  
Under	  Aboriginal	  customary	  law	  a	  story	  or	  a	  design	  must	  be	  reproduced	  with	  the	  
permission	   of	   the	   traditional	   custodians	   (or	   owners),45	  and	   the	   granting	   of	   the	  
concession	  depends	  upon	  “the	   subject	  matter	  of	   the	  work”.46	  In	   the	  Australian	  
case	  Bulun	  Bulun	  &	  Anor	  v	  R	  &	  T	  Textiles	  Pty	  Ltd47	  the	  bark	  painting	  of	  Mr	  Bulun	  
Bulun	   (Magpie	   Geese	   and	   Water	   Lilies	   at	   the	   Waterhole)	   was	   created	   “in	  
accordance	   with	   the	   traditional	   laws	   and	   customs	   of	   the	   Ganalbingu	   people”.	  
According	  to	  Janke,	  the	  case	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  traditional	  holders,	  but	  it	  suggests	  
that	   the	   authorization	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   artwork	   comes	   from	   the	  
Ganalbingu	  elders.48	  In	  another	  famous	  Australian	  case	  -­‐	  Milpurrurru	  and	  Others	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  “Aboriginal	   artwork	   will	   often	   depict	   secret	   parts	   of	   a	   dreaming	   that	   will	   only	   be	   recognised	   and	  
understood	  by	  those	  who	  are	  initiated	  into	  the	  relevant	  ceremonies,	  or	  at	  least	  have	  a	  close	  knowledge	  of	  
the	  cultural	  significance	  of	   the	  story”	  see	  Terri	   Janke	  Case	  Studies	  on	   Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Traditional	  
Cultural	  Expressions	  (WIPO,	  Genève,	  2003)	  at	  14.	  
45	  “If	   permission	  has	  been	  given	  by	   the	   traditional	  owners	   to	  a	  particular	   artist	   to	   create	  a	  picture	  of	   the	  
dreaming,	   and	   that	   artwork	   is	   inappropriately	   used	   or	   reproduced	   by	   a	   third	   party,	   the	   artist	   is	   held	  
responsible	   for	   the	  breach	  which	  has	  occurred,	  even	   if	   the	  artist	  had	  no	  control	  over	  or	  no	  knowledge	  of	  
what	  occurred”	  see	  M*,	  Payunka,	  Marika	  &	  Others	  v	  Indofurn	  Pty	  Ltd	  and	  Others	  [1993]	  130	  ALR	  659	  at	  663.	  
46	  “…	  an	  artwork	   that	   is	  associated	  with	  a	  public	   story	  or	  ceremony	  might	  have	   fewer	   restrictions	   that	  an	  
artwork	  that	  embodies	  a	  dreaming	  or	  creation	  story.	  Aboriginal	  artwork	  will	  often	  depict	  secret	  parts	  of	  a	  
dreaming	   that	   will	   only	   be	   recognised	   and	   understood	   by	   those	   who	   are	   initiated	   into	   the	   relevant	  
ceremonies,	   or	   at	   least,	   have	   a	   close	   knowledge	  of	   the	   cultural	   significance	   of	   the	   story”	   see	   Terri	   Janke	  
Minding	  Culture	  –	  Case	  Studies	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Traditional	  Cultural	  Expressions	  (WIPO,	  Genève,	  
2003)	  at	  14.	  
47	  Bulun	  Bulun	  Case:	   John	  Bulun	  Bulun	  &	  Anor	   v	  R	  &	  T	   Textiles	   Pty	   Ltd	   [1998]	   IndigLawB	  87;	   (1998)	   4(16)	  
Indigenous	  Law	  Bulletin	  at	  24.	  
48	  “The	  Ganalbingu	  people	  are	  the	  traditional	  Aboriginal	  owners	  of	  the	  Ganalbingu	  country.	  …	  It	  is	  pleaded	  
that	  the	  traditional	  owners	  of	  the	  Ganalbingu	  country	  comprise:	  (i)	  Members	  of	  the	  Ganalbingu	  People,	  (ii)	  
The	   Yolngu	   People	   (Aboriginal	   people	   of	   the	   Arnhem	   Land)	   who	   are	   the	   children	   of	   the	   women	   of	   the	  
Ganalbingu	  People,	  (iii)	  the	  Yolngu	  People	  who	  stand	  in	  a	  relationship	  of	  mother’s-­‐mother	  to	  the	  members	  




v	  Indofurn	  Pty	  Ltd	  and	  Others	  (1993),49	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  clearly	  stated	  that	  
the	  traditional	  custodians	  and	  artists	  (and	  not	  the	  whole	  indigenous	  community)	  
consent	   to	   reproduce	   artistic	   works	   of	   special	   significance	   for	   the	   community	  
when	  the	  reproductions	  are	  meant	  to	  be	  placed	   in	  prestigious	   institutions	  such	  
as	  museums,	  or	  published	  in	  educational	  publications.50	  Ms	  Banduck	  Marika,	  one	  
of	  the	  artists	  involved	  in	  the	  claim	  concerning	  the	  unauthorised	  reproduction	  of	  
traditional	  images	  belonging	  to	  the	  Rirratingo	  clan	  (in	  the	  Northern	  Territories	  of	  
Australia),	  explained	  how	  distressing	  it	  was	  to	  see	  the	  unauthorised	  reproduction	  
of	   sacred	   designs	   on	   rugs;	   how	   she	   feared	   to	   be	   held	   responsible	   for	   the	  
reproduction	   and	   misuse	   of	   the	   sacred	   knowledge,	   and	   how	   the	   consequent	  
exclusion	  from	  the	  trust	  of	  the	  clan	  could	  badly	  affect	  her	   livelihood	  within	  her	  
people. 51 	  According	   to	   Banduk	   Marika,	   in	   the	   past	   there	   were	   very	   severe	  
consequences	   for	   misuse	   of	   artwork	   without	   permission.	   The	   consequences	  
could	   also	   involve	   death	   sentences.52	  Even	   the	  mere	   reproduction	   of	   artworks	  
and	   traditional	   designs	   can	   hold	   a	   special	   significance	   for	   Aborigines,	   and	   its	  
reproduction	  is	  generally	  strictly	  controlled	  by	  the	  tribe.	  In	  his	  judgement,	  Justice	  
Van	  Doussa	  explained	  how:53	  
	  
Sacred	   ceremonies	   generally	   restricted	   to	   the	   initiated	   of	   the	   tribe	   or	   those	  
undergoing	   initiation,	  and	   their	   related	  celebrations	   in	  dance,	   song	  and	  design,	  
form	  the	  basis	  of	  what	  might	  seem	  nothing	  more	  than	  complex	  abstract	  patterns	  
in	   the	   paintings.	   The	   patterns	   in	   fact	   represent	   explicit	   visual	   descriptions,	  
stylised	  maps	  of	   identifiable	   locations	   and	  myths	  …	   the	  paintings	   are	   eloquent	  
witnesses	   to	   the	   rich	  and	  enduring	  nature	  of	  Aboriginal	   culture.	  …	  The	   right	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
according	  to	  ganalbingu	  law	  and	  custom	  as	  being	  traditional	  Aboriginal	  owners	  of	  Ganalbingu	  country.	  …	  Mr	  
Milpurrurru	  is	  the	  most	  senior	  person	  of	  all	  the	  Ganalbingu	  People.	  The	  Ganalbingu	  People	  are	  divided	  into	  
‘top’	   and	   ‘bottom’	   people,	   as	   is	   the	  Ganalbingu	   country.	  Mr	  Milpurrurru	   is	   a	   ‘top’	  Ganalbingu.	  Mr	   Bulun	  
Bulun	   is	   the	  most	   senior	  person	  of	   the	  “bottom”	  Ganalbingu	  and	  second	   in	   line	   to	  Mr	  Milpurrurru	  of	   the	  
Ganalbingu	  People	  generally”	  see	  Bulun	  Bulun	  &	  Anor	  v	  R	  &	  T	  Textiles	  Pty	  Ltd	  case.	  
49	  Milpurrurru	  and	  Others	  v	  Indofurn	  Pty	  Ltd	  and	  Others	  [1994]	  130	  ALR	  659.	  
50	  See	  Milpurrurru	  and	  Others	  v	  Indofurn	  Pty	  Ltd	  and	  Others	  [1994]	  130	  ALR	  659	  at	  662.	  
51	  “…	  I	  fear	  that	  my	  family	  and	  others	  may	  accuse	  me	  of	  giving	  permission	  for	  the	  reproduction	  behind	  her	  
backs	  without	  consulting	  and	  seeking	  permission	  in	  the	  manner	  required	  by	  our	  law	  and	  culture.	  I	  fear	  that	  
this	  could	  result	  in	  my	  family	  and	  others	  deciding	  that	  I	  cannot	  be	  trusted	  to	  use	  important	  images	  such	  as	  
this	  one	  anymore”	  see	  Terri	   Janke	  Minding	  Culture	  –	  Case	  Studies	  on	   Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Traditional	  
Cultural	  Expressions	  at	  14.	  
52	  Fortunately,	   nowadays	   the	   clan	   generally	   chooses	   different	   kinds	   of	   punishments,	   including	   refusing	  
participation	   in	   ceremonies,	   or	   the	   removal	   of	   the	   “right	   to	   reproduce	   designs	   or	   any	   other	   story	   of	   the	  
clan”	  see	  M*,	  Payunka,	  Marika	  &	  Others	  v	  Indofurn	  Pty	  Ltd	  and	  Others	  [1993]	  130	  ALR	  659	  at	  663.	  




create	  paintings	  and	  other	  artworks	  depicting	  creation	  and	  dreaming	  stories,	  and	  
to	  use	  pre-­‐existing	  designs	  and	  well-­‐recognised	  totems	  of	  the	  clan,	  resides	  in	  the	  
traditional	  owners	  (or	  custodians)	  of	  the	  stories	  or	  images.	  Usually	  that	  right	  will	  
not	  be	  with	  only	  one	  person,	  but	  with	  a	  group	  of	  people	  who	  together	  have	  the	  
authority	   to	   determine	   whether	   the	   story	   and	   images	   may	   be	   used	   in	   an	  
artwork	  ….	  	  
	  
The	   transmission	   of	   knowledge	   depends	   on	   tribal	   traditions	   and	   customs	   that	  
regulate	   it.	   Wherever	   there	   is	   a	   transmission	   of	   the	   knowledge	   that	   is	   not	  
supposed	   to	   be	   known	   by	   the	   whole	   clan,	   there	   exists	   an	   element	   of	  
custodianship,	  regardless	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  tribal	  customs	  define	  or	  regulate	   it	  or	  
not.	   Specialists	   of	   practices	   (mostly	   religious)	   are	   custodians	   of	   the	   ritual	  
practices	   and	   the	   objects	   used	   during	   the	   ceremonies,	   and	   often	   control	   the	  
transmission	  of	  the	  knowledge.	  	  
WIPO	  suggests	   that	  now	  more	   than	  ever	  before,	   traditional	  knowledge	  holders	  
and	  guardians	  sit	  between	  a	  customary	  system	  that	   initiated	  their	  role	  and	  still	  
regulates	  their	  activity	  within	  the	  community,	  and	  a	  formal	  Intellectual	  Property	  
(IP)	  system	  “administered	  by	  governments	  and	  inter-­‐governmental	  organizations	  
such	  as	  WIPO”	  itself.54	  Consequently,	  while	  the	  holders	  are	  situated	  within	  their	  
traditional	   system,	   they	   also	   increasingly	   interact,	   sometimes	   forcibly,	   with	   a	  
Western-­‐framed	   IP	   system,	   whose	   aim	   is	   rarely	   focused	   on	   the	   safeguard	   of	  
holders’	   interests	   among	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   property	  market	   at	   large.	   In	   the	  
modern	  era,	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  encouraged	  to	  neglect	  their	  internal	  system	  
of	  customary	  laws,	  and	  use	  the	  IP	  domain	  as	  a	  defensive	  mechanism.	  In	  theory,	  
the	   shift	   from	   customary	   laws	   to	   the	   IP	   system	  would	   be	   admissible	   if	   IP	   laws	  
were	   inclusive	   of	   indigenous	   peoples’	   cultural	   expressions	   and	   culture.	  
Unfortunately,	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case	   yet.	   Not	   only	   are	   IP	   laws	   not	   inclusive	   of	  
indigenous	   holistic	   approach	   to	   culture,	   but	   under	   the	   threat	   of	   losing	   their	  
traditional	   practices,	   often	   ‘stolen’	   by	   governments	   and	   private	   enterprises,	  
indigenous	  guardians	  frequently	  lose	  their	  battles	  for	  the	  simple	  reason	  that	  they	  
are	  alien	  to	  the	  rules	  that	  govern	  such	  battles.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




4.2	  -­‐	  Guardianship	  at	  the	  Time	  of	  Colonization	  and	  Today	  
	  
Traditionally,	   the	   early	   documents	   circulating	   in	   Europe	   that	   described	  
indigenous	  peoples’	  customs	  were,	   for	   the	  most	  part,	  collected	  by	  missionaries	  
and	   occasional	   travellers	  who	   came	   into	   contact	  with	   indigenous	   tribes	   during	  
colonization	  time.	  Highly	  unprepared	  for	  these	  encounters,	  missionaries	  had	  no	  
previous	   experience	   of	   ‘indigeneity’, 55 	  and	   were	   often	   responsible	   for	   the	  
misrepresentation	   of	   indigenous	   life	   and	   the	   consequent	   degradation	   of	  
indigenous	  culture.	  Wrong	  assumptions	  about	  indigenous	  customs	  spread	  in	  the	  
Western	  world	  and	  influenced	  any	  future	  misinterpretation	  of	  the	  way	  of	   living	  
of	  indigenous	  peoples,	  justifying	  the	  idea	  of	  European	  superiority,	  discrimination	  
and	  racism.	  Moved	  by	  the	  obsessive	  quest	  for	  evangelization	  and	  greed,	  Western	  
missionaries	   were	   often	   responsible	   for	   the	   appropriation	   and	   repression	   of	  
native	   practices.	   The	   traditional	   role	   of	   the	   guardians,	   shamans,	   healers	   and	  
visionaries	  that	  had	  traditionally	  played	  a	  role	  of	  fundamental	  importance	  within	  
the	  clan	  or	  tribe	  was,	  therefore,	  discouraged	  or	  banned.	  To	  ‘break	  the	  spirit’	  of	  
the	   tribes	   from	   within,	   missionaries	   delegitimized	   the	   role	   of	   the	   elders	   and	  
elevated	   their	   protégées	   to	   temporal	   power;	   such	   imposition	   aimed	   at	  
weakening	  and	  dismembering	  the	  native	  society56	  and	  facilitated	  the	  assimilation	  
process.	   Whilst	   it	   might	   be	   argued	   that	   history	   is	   full	   of	   the	   work	   of	   ‘good’	  
missionaries	  who,	  especially	   in	  south	  and	  central	  America	  and	  Asia,	  risked	  their	  
lives	   to	   protect	   their	   communities	   from	   colonizers,57	  it	   is	   generally	   known	   that	  
the	   approach	   missionaries	   had	   towards	   indigenous	   peoples	   was	   to	   assimilate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  “At	  worst,	  missionaries	  consciously	  opened	  paths	  for	  traders,	  raiders	  and	  other	  colonisers	  to	  follow,	  and	  
which	  have	  led	  to	  the	  extermination	  of	  aboriginal	  peoples.	  At	  best,	  they	  elevated	  the	  ‘savage’	   into	  a	  new,	  
purer	  kind	  of	  being	  …	   .	  Across	   the	  middle	  ground,	  however,	  missionaries	  were	  usually	  bigoted,	  venal	  and	  
often	   treacherous.	   They	   protected	   their	   wards	   from	   the	   most	   vicious	   impacts	   of	   colonization,	   only	   to	  
ensnare	  them	  with	  materialism,	  facilitate	  the	  robbery	  of	  their	  natural	  resources,	  exploit	  their	  labour,	  divide	  
their	  families,	  remove	  their	  children	  and	  degrade	  their	  culture”	  see	  Roger	  Moody	  (ed)	  The	  Indigenous	  Voice	  
(International	  Books,	  Utrecht,	  1988)	  at	  243.	  
56	  “In	  Tapuruquara,	  before	  the	  missionaries	  came,	  there	  were	  many	  Indians.	  …	  Then	  the	  missionaries	  came	  
and	  began	  to	  change	  the	  lives	  of	  Indians,	  interfering	  in	  their	  customs	  and	  religion.	  Then	  the	  priests	  said	  that	  
our	  most	  important	  ritual	  was	  no	  good,	  and	  they	  tried	  to	  force	  us	  was	  no	  good,	  and	  they	  tried	  to	  force	  the	  
man	  to	  play	  to	  play	  the	  sacred	  trumpets	  that	  were	  used	  in	  the	  Dabukuri	  in	  the	  church	  in	  front	  of	  everyone	  –	  
women,	   children,	  priests.	  Women	  and	   children	  are	  not	   allowed	   to	   see	   these	   trumpets	   –	   if	   a	  woman	   saw	  
them,	  in	  the	  old	  days,	  she	  was	  killed”	  (Tariano	  Indian,	  Rio	  Negro,	  Brazil).	  “…	  the	  missions	  kill	  us	  from	  within,	  
because	  they	  forget	  our	  traditions,	  culture	  and	  religion.	  They	  impose	  upon	  us	  another	  religion,	  belittling	  the	  
values	  we	  hold.	  This	  decharacterizes	  us	  to	  the	  point	  where	  we	  are	  ashamed	  to	  be	  Indians”	  (Daniel	  Cabixi,	  
Pareci	  Indian,	  Brazil),	  documents	  from	  secondary	  source	  by	  Roger	  Moody	  (ed)	  The	  Indigenous	  Voice	  at	  248.	  




them	  and,	  in	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  they	  needed	  to	  convert	  them,	  sometimes	  resorting	  
to	  force,	  to	  the	  Christian	  belief.58	  Any	  knowledge	  initially	  acquired	  by	  colonizers	  
was	   intended	   to	   be	   used	   to	   weaken	   or	   neutralize	   indigenous	   inhabitants.	  	  
Colonizers	  ignored	  the	  pre-­‐existence	  of	  hierarchical	  structures	  within	  the	  tribes,	  
unless	   that	   information	   was	   strategically	   important	   to	   succeed	   in	   their	  
assimilationist	  practices.	  The	  early	  documents	   ignore	   the	  role	  of	   the	  guardians,	  
to	   focus	   on	   the	   role	   of	   ‘kings’	   and	   ‘queens’	   or	   other	   ‘special’	  members	   of	   the	  
tribe	  who	  dressed	  and	  acted	  differently	   from	  the	   rest	  of	   the	  community.	  Since	  
the	  role	  of	  the	  guardians	  was	  sacred	  and	  secret,	  it	  was,	  in	  fact,	  impossible	  for	  the	  
strangers	   to	   observe	   or	   join	   in	   the	   sacred	   rituals	   performed	   by	   the	   elders	   and	  
understand	  the	  intrinsic	  spiritual	  value	  the	  ceremonies	  had	  for	  the	  community.	  
Even	   today	   it	   is	   still	   difficult	   to	   find	   authentic,	   accurate	   and	   realistic	  
representation	   of	   what	   indigenous	   peoples’	   traditions	   used	   to	   be	   before	   their	  
cultural	   corruption.	  Undeniably,	  even	   if	   strangers	  were	   invited	   to	  participate	   in	  
the	  rituals,	  they	  did	  not	  have	  the	  cultural	  and	  technical	  resources	  to	  comprehend	  
the	   holistic	   way	   of	   living	   of	   indigenous	   inhabitants.	   Totally	   unaware	   of	   their	  
ignorance,	   and	   strong	   in	   their	   arrogance,	   new	   settlers	   tended	   to	   distort	  
everything	   they	   saw.59	  In	   this	   scenario,	   custodians	   had	   the	   duty	   to	   preserve	  
intact	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  Great	  Spirit	  and	  society.	  They	  were	  the	  only	  
link	  between	  the	  Sacred	  and	   the	  community,	  and	   their	  decisions	  were	   induced	  
by	  the	  Spirits	  of	  creation	  or	  the	  Spirit	  of	  the	  ancestors.	  Whatever	  the	  Spirit	  said	  
would	   be	   heard	   by	   the	   custodians	   and,	  when	   required,	   translated	   into	   action.	  
The	  introduction	  of	  the	  Ghost	  Dance	  among	  Indian	  Nations	  is	  an	  example	  of	  the	  
work	  of	  the	  custodians	  of	  knowledge	  at	  the	  time	  of	  colonization.	  During	  sacred	  
ceremonies,	   shamans	  were	   told	   to	  perform	   this	   specific	   ceremony	   to	  welcome	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  “The	  more	   conservative	  missionaries	   believed	   that	   the	   Aborigines	  were	   pagans	  who	   had	   to	   be	   quickly	  
converted	   to	   Christianity	   and	   that	   all	   Aboriginal	   culture	   should	   be	   swept	   away”	   see	   Richard	   Broome	  
Aboriginal	  Australians	  (3rd	  ed,	  Southwood	  Press,	  Sydney,	  2001)	  at	  113.	  
59	  In	   his	   book	   Disciplining	   the	   Savages,	   Savaging	   the	   Disciplines	   Martin	   Nakata	   discusses	   the	   role	   of	  
missionaries	  in	  Australia	  and	  argues	  that	  the	  missionaries’	  view	  was	  indeed	  lacking	  in	  cognitive	  resources	  to	  
comprehend	   indigenous	   peoples;	   he	   also	   stresses	   how	   this	   distorted	   idea	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   was	   a	  
crucial	   factor	   that	   determined,	   and	   justified,	   the	   segregationist	   practices	   put	   into	   place	   by	   many	  
missionaries,	   who	   missed	   completely	   the	   complexity	   of	   indigenous	   lives,	   and	   created	   prejudicial	  
descriptions	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   (defined	   lost	   souls,	   cannibals	   or	   noble	   savages)	   that	   no	   Australian	  
Islanders	  would	  have	  given	  to	  himself.	  See	  Martin	  Nakata	  Disciplining	  the	  Savages,	  Savaging	  the	  Disciplines	  




the	   return	   of	   the	   buffalo	   in	   native	   lands	   and	   resist	   invasion	   (see	   footnote).60	  
During	   colonization,	   the	  primary	  approach	   travellers	  had	   in	   the	  new	   lands	  was	  
visual	   observation;61 	  they	   observed	   everything	   they	   believed	   important	   and	  
reported	   their	  observations	   in	  diaries,	   letters	  and	  other	  documents	   that	  would	  
be	   afterwards	   handed	   to	   their	   governments.	   This	   because	   the	   main	   focus	   of	  
colonizers	  was	  the	  acquisition	  of	  new	  lands,	  regardless	  of	  the	  people	  inhabiting	  
those	   lands.	   Thus,	   the	   early	   documents	   collected	   were	   reports	   that,	   in	   most	  
cases,	   show	   very	   little	   understanding	   of	   and	   interest	   in	   the	   complex	   social	  
structure	  of	   indigenous	  peoples’	   communities.62	  After	  Europeans	  had	  settled	   in	  
the	  new	  lands,	  many	  rituals	  performed	  by	  indigenous	  peoples	  were	  forbidden	  for	  
religious	   reasons	   (especially	   in	   the	   Americas)	   and	   discontinued.	   Some	   of	   the	  
rituals	  were	  re-­‐established	  after	  many	  years,	  and	  yet	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  determine	  if	  
the	   line	  of	  transmission	  safeguarded	  by	  the	  custodians	  had	  remained	  authentic	  
during	  the	  period	  of	  suspension.63	  In	  some	  cases,	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  the	  first	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  “…	  There	  were	  many	  shaman	  dreamers	  (among	  Indians),	  but	  the	  most	  powerful	  was	  the	  Paiute	  Wovoka.	  
Just	  before	  dawn	  on	  New	  Year’s	  Day,	  1889,	  far	  out	  in	  remote	  Nevada,	  the	  34-­‐year-­‐old	  Wovoka	  fell	  ill.	  In	  his	  
delirium	  he	  dreamed	  he	  visited	  the	  Great	  Spirit	  in	  heaven.	  There,	  he	  was	  told	  that	  a	  time	  was	  coming	  when	  
the	  buffalo	  would	  once	  again	  fill	   the	  plains	  and	  dead	  tribesmen	  would	  be	  restored	  to	  their	  families.	   If	  the	  
Indians	   refrained	   from	   violence,	   and	   if	   they	  were	   virtuous	   and	   performed	   the	   proper	   ritual	   dance	   –	   the	  
Ghost	  Dance	  –	  they	  could	  hasten	  the	  coming	  of	   the	  new	  world,	  which	  would	  cover	  the	  old,	  and	  push	  the	  
White	  man	   into	  the	  sea.	  …	  The	  Sioux	  began	  Ghost	  Dancing	   in	  the	  spring,	   in	  secret	  ceremonies	  away	  from	  
White	  Eyes”	  see	  Jon	  E	  Lewis	  (ed)	  The	  Mammoth	  Book	  of	  Native	  Americans	  at	  299-­‐300.	  
61	  “The	  method	  of	  observation	  has	  a	  sure	  procedure;	  it	  gathers	  facts	  to	  compare	  them,	  and	  compares	  them	  
to	   know	   them	   better.	   The	   natural	   sciences	   are	   in	   a	  way	   no	  more	   than	   a	   series	   of	   comparisons.	   As	   each	  
particular	  phenomenon	  is	  ordinarily	  the	  result	  of	  the	  combined	  action	  of	  several	  causes,	  it	  would	  be	  only	  a	  
deep	  mystery	  for	  us	  if	  we	  considered	  it	  on	  its	  own:	  but	  if	   it	   is	  compared	  with	  analogous	  phenomena,	  they	  
throw	  light	  each	  on	  the	  other.	  The	  particular	  action	  of	  each	  cause	  we	  see	  as	  distinct	  and	  independent,	  and	  
general	  laws	  are	  the	  result.	  Good	  observation	  requires	  analysis;	  now,	  one	  carries	  out	  analysis	  in	  philosophy	  
by	   comparisons,	   as	   in	   chemistry	   by	   the	   play	   of	   chemical	   affinities”	   see	   Joseph-­‐Marie	   Degérando	   “The	  
Observation	  of	  Savage	  People”	  in	  Antonius	  CGM	  Robben	  and	  Jeffrey	  A	  Sluka	  (eds)	  Ethnographic	  Fieldwork:	  
An	  Anthropological	  Reader	  (2nd	  ed,	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell,	  2011)	  at	  57.	  
62	  According	  to	  Degérando,	  for	  example,	  “the	  first	  fault	  that	  we	  notice	   in	  the	  observations	  of	  explorers	  on	  
savages	  is	  their	  incompleteness;	  it	  was	  only	  to	  be	  expected,	  given	  the	  shortness	  of	  their	  stay,	  the	  division	  of	  
their	   attention,	   and	   the	   absence	   of	   any	   regular	   tabulation	   of	   their	   findings.	   Sometimes,	   con-­‐	   fining	  
themselves	   to	   the	   study	   of	   some	   isolated	   individuals,	   they	   have	   given	   us	   no	   information	   on	   their	   social	  
condition,	  and	  have	  thus	  deprived	  us	  of	  the	  means	  of	  estimating	  the	  influence	  which	  these	  social	  relations	  
might	   have	   on	   individual	   faculties.	   Sometimes,	   pausing	   on	   the	   smallest	   details	   of	   the	   physical	   life	   of	   the	  
savages,	  they	  have	  given	  us	  scarcely	  any	  details	  of	  their	  moral	  customs.	  Sometimes,	  describing	  the	  customs	  
of	  grown	  men,	  they	  have	  failed	  to	  find	  out	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  education	  received	  in	  childhood	  and	  youth:	  and	  
above	   all,	   pre-­‐	   occupied	   almost	   entirely	   with	   the	   external	   and	   overt	   characteristics	   of	   a	   people,	   of	   its	  
ceremonies	   and	   of	   its	   dress,	   they	   have	   generally	   taken	   too	   little	   care	   to	   be	   initiated	   in	   the	   far	   more	  
important	  circumstances	  of	   its	   theoretical	   life,	  of	   its	  needs,	   its	   ideas,	   its	  passions,	   its	  knowledge,	   its	   laws.	  
They	   have	   described	   forms	   rather	   than	   given	   instructive	   reports;	   they	   have	  marked	   certain	   effects,	   and	  
explained	   scarcely	   any	   causes”	   see	   Joseph-­‐Marie	   Degérando	   “The	   Observation	   of	   Savage	   People”	   in	  
Antonius	  CGM	  Robben	  and	  Jeffrey	  A	  Sluka	  (eds)	  Ethnographic	  Fieldwork:	  An	  Anthropological	  Reader	  (2nd	  ed,	  
Wiley-­‐Blackwell,	  2011)	  at	  58.	  	  
63	  “While	  missionaries	  often	  forcefully	  imposed	  Christianity	  on	  Indigenous	  people,	  responses	  to	  Christianity	  
varied	   greatly,	   including	   ambivalence,	   rejection	   or	   enthusiastic	   acceptance.	   Traditional	   Indigenous	  




to	   question	   the	   authenticity	   of	   their	   own	   traditional	   practices.	   Indeed,	   during	  
colonization	  many	  indigenous	  communities	  all	  over	  the	  world	  had	  accepted	  and	  
married	   Western	   habits	   and	   mixed	   them	   with	   their	   traditional	   way	   of	   living,	  
giving	   birth	   to	   a	   parallel	   ‘cultural	   hybridity’.	   This	   process	   was	   mainly	   due	   to	  
curiosity	   and	   desperation.	   Better	   to	   hide	   and	   thus	   safeguard	   indigenous	  
traditions	   into	   newly	   imposed	   beliefs	   and	   symbolism,	   than	   lose	   their	   heritage	  
during	   forced	   assimilation.	   Since	   the	   knowledge	   held	   by	   guardians	   is	   mostly	  
secret,	   it	   is	   incredibly	  difficult,	   if	  not	   impossible,	  to	  address	  how	  much	  of	   it	  has	  
been	  maintained	  or	  whether	  the	  custodians	  decided	  to	  discontinue	  it	  to	  protect	  
it.	   Even	   the	   guardians	   of	   today	   might	   have	   difficulty	   to	   determine	   if	   the	  
knowledge	  they	  hold	  and	  protect	   is	  the	  one	  that	  originated	  during	  the	  creation	  
time.	  Whatever	  was	   left	   of	   the	  most	   sacred	   traditions	  was	   often	   preserved	   in	  
total	  secrecy	  by	  the	  guardians.	  Secrecy,	  therefore,	  became	  the	  ultimate	  form	  of	  
protection	   of	   indigenous	   heritage.	   The	   large	   use	   of	   secrecy	   happened	  because	  
indigenous	  peoples	  never	  considered	  their	  sacred	  knowledge	  as	  the	  ‘heritage	  of	  
humankind’64	  and	  therefore	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  disclose	  its	  content	  to	  strangers,	  or	  
have	  it	  exploited	  by	  the	  public	  at	  large.	  Moreover,	  the	  diffusion	  of	  the	  knowledge	  
could	  bring	  great	  harm	  to	  the	  members	  of	  the	  community	  who	  were	  kept	  away	  
from	   the	   knowledge	   for	   their	   own	   protection.	   In	   some	   cases,	   the	   knowledge	  
itself	  needs	  to	  be	  protected	  from	  the	  members	  of	   the	  community	  to	  avoid	  any	  
internal	  corruption	  and	  exploitation	  of	  the	  knowledge.	  Truly,	  the	  duty	  of	  care	  of	  
guardians	   is	  both	  to	  protect	  the	  knowledge	  and	  the	  people	  separately,	  and	  the	  
knowledge	  from	  the	  people	  of	  the	  community.	  While	  most	  of	  the	  exploitation	  of	  
indigenous	  cultures	  comes	  from	  outside,	   it	   is	  known	  that	   it	  may	  also	  be	  caused	  
by	   internal	   factors.	   Sometimes,	   indigenous	  members	   themselves,	   for	   different	  
reasons	  such	  as	  financial	  gain,	  might	  try	  to	  exploit	  the	  knowledge	  in	  the	  custody	  
of	  the	  guardians	  or	  the	  community.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
other	   religious	   traditions”	   see	   Katja	   Mikhailovich	   and	   Alexandra	   Pavli	   Freedom	   of	   Religion,	   Belief,	   and	  
Indigenous	   Spirituality,	   Practice	   and	   Cultural	   Rights,	   by	   the	   Centre	   for	   Education,	   Poverty	   and	   Social	  
Inclusion,	  Faculty	  of	  Education,	  University	  of	  Canberra	  (2011)	  at	  Introduction.	  
64	  For	   further	   information	   on	   the	   subject,	   see	   Ana	   Filipa	   Vrdoljak	   International	   Law,	   Museums	   and	   the	  




Customary	   laws	   exist	   to	   prevent	   the	   internal	   and	   external	   corruption	   of	   the	  
knowledge.	  The	  factors	  determining	  the	  creation	  and	  enforcement	  of	  customary	  
laws	   safeguarding	   sacred	   traditional	   knowledge	   varied	   on	   a	   case	   by	   case	   and	  
region	  by	  region	  basis.65	  	  
The	  next	  section	  will	  explain	  what	  customary	  laws	  are	  and	  how	  they	  differ	  from	  
the	   Western	   legal	   system.	   This	   is	   important	   in	   order	   to	   comprehend	   the	  
understanding	   indigenous	   peoples	   have	   of	   the	   law,	   and	   how	   they	   use	   it	   to	  
protect	  their	  sacred/secret	  culture	  guarded	  by	  the	  custodians.	  
	  
4.3	  -­‐	  Indigenous	  Customary	  Laws:	  The	  Regulators	  of	  the	  Guardianship	  
In	  Bennet’s	  words:66	  	  	  
	  
…	  customary	  law	  grows	  out	  of	  the	  social	  practices	  which	  a	  given	  jural	  community	  
has	  come	  to	  accept	  as	  obligatory.	  It	  is	  a	  pervasive	  normative	  order,	  providing	  the	  
regulatory	   framework	   for	   spheres	   of	   human	   activity	   as	   diverse	   as	   family,	   the	  
neighbourhood,	   the	  business	   of	  merchant	   banking,	   or	   international	   diplomacy.	  
Customary	   law	   is	   often	   unwritten.	   It	   is	   then	   a	   matter	   of	   oral	   history	   and	  
ritualized	  activity.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  a	  complex	  system	  of	  unwritten	  law	  (lex	  non	  scripta)	  which	  applies	  to	  a	  group	  
that	  shares:	  
	  
…	   a	   common	   linking	   factor	   such	   as	   nationality,	   religion,	   ethnicity,	   occupation,	  
locality,	  or	  family.	  Of	  course,	  over	  the	  years,	  the	  unwritten	  corpus	  of	  customary	  
law	  might	  have	  been	  codified	  in	  written	  form,	  or	  documented	  in	  scholarly	  works.	  
Traditionally,	   guardianship	   is	   regulated	   by	   indigenous	   customary	   laws.	   Being	  
structured	   into	   organized	   societies,	   indigenous	   peoples	   have	   always	   had	   their	  
own	   laws	   and	   procedures	   for	   protecting	   their	   culture	   and	   ‘determining	   when	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  In	   Australia,	   for	   example,	   “…	   some	   Aboriginal	   people	   rejected	   Christianity	   and	   maintained	   their	   own	  
traditional	   practice	   and	   belief.	  Many	   others	   took	   the	   new	   and	   combined	   it	   with	   it	   with	   their	   traditional	  
knowledge	  and	  spiritual	  practice	  syncretising	  beliefs”	  see	  Katja	  Mikhailovich	  and	  Alexandra	  Pavli	  Freedom	  of	  
Religion,	   Belief,	   and	   Indigenous	   Spirituality,	   Practice	   and	   Cultural	   Rights,	   by	   the	   Centre	   for	   Education,	  
Poverty	  and	  Social	  Inclusion,	  Faculty	  of	  Education,	  University	  of	  Canberra	  (2011).	  	  	  
66	  See	   TW	   Bennet	   “Comparative	   Law	   and	   African	   Customary	   Law”	   in	   Mathias	   Reimann	   and	   Reinhard	  





and	  with	  whom	  their	  heritage	  can	  be	  shared.67	  	  
	  
In	  Dutfield’s	  words,	  customs	  are,	  in	  fact:68	  	  	  
	  
…	   established	  modes	  of	   behaviour	  within	   a	   cultural	   community	   that	  may	  have	  
the	  force	  of	  law.	  Customary	  norms	  and	  rules	  exist	  in	  all	  cultures,	  although	  not	  all	  
cultural	  communities	  have	  dedicated	  judicial	  institutions	  to	  enforce	  them	  and	  to	  
resolve	  disputes.	  	  
	  
Compared	   to	   the	   law,	   which	   is	   based	   on	   a	   tradition	   of	   documented	   case	   law	  
arguments,	   customary	   laws	   are	   unwritten	   and	   do	   not	   constitute	   a	   subject	   for	  
legal	  specialists.	  They	  are	  part	  of	  everyday	  life.	  Therefore,	  in	  customary	  law	  there	  
is	  a	  great	  component	  of	  spiritual	  laws	  and	  common	  sense.	  As	  such,	  an	  indigenous	  
law	  system	  can	  be	  regarded	  as:	  	  
	  
…	  a	  ‘living	  law’,	  a	  law	  activated	  and	  modified	  not	  by	  specialised	  practitioners	  but	  
by	  those	  who	   in	  their	  daily	   lives,	  practice	  the	   law,	   living	  out	  of	   their	   traditional	  
customs	   in	   everyday	   contacts	   –	   and	  occasional	   confrontation	  with	   neighbours,	  
rivals,	  partners,	  relatives.69	  
	  
In	   her	   report	   for	   the	   UN	   Commission	   on	   Human	   Rights,	   Daes	   describes	  
indigenous	  customary	  laws	  as	  a	  complex	  set	  of	  rules	  which	  “vary	  greatly	  among	  
different	   indigenous	   peoples”.70	  Daes	   studied	   indigenous	   peoples	   thoroughly	  
and,	   from	  her	  experience,	  she	  confirmed	  the	   impossibility	  to	  describe	  the	  rules	  
forming	   the	   customary	   body	   of	   laws	   of	   indigenous	   communities	   because:	   first	  
the	  rules	  vary,	  often	  substantially,	  from	  one	  indigenous	  society	  to	  another;	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  Erica-­‐Irene	  Daes	  Study	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Cultural	  and	  Intellectual	  Property	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples,	  
Sub-­‐Commission	   on	   Prevention	   of	   Discrimination	   and	   Protection	   of	   Minorities	   and	   Chairperson	   of	   the	  
Working	  Group	  on	   Indigenous	  Populations’	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  Sub-­‐Commission	  on	  Prevention	  
of	  Discrimination	  and	  Protection	  of	  Minorities	  (28	  July	  1993)	  Doc	  E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28	  at	  para	  27.	  
68	  Graham	   Dutfield	   Protecting	   Traditional	   Knowledge:	   Pathways	   to	   The	   Future	   (International	   Centre	   for	  
Trade	  and	  Sustainable	  Development	  (ICTSD),	  Genève,	  2006)	  at	  37.	  
69	  For	   further	   info	   see	   Leon	   Sheleff	   The	   Future	   of	   Tradition:	   Customary	   Law,	   Common	   Law,	   and	   Legal	  
Pluralism	  (Frank	  Cass,	  London	  and	  Portland,	  1999).	  
70	  Erica-­‐Irene	  Daes	  Study	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Cultural	  and	  Intellectual	  Property	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples,	  
Sub-­‐Commission	   on	   Prevention	   of	   Discrimination	   and	   Protection	   of	   Minorities	   and	   Chairperson	   of	   the	  
Working	  Group	  on	   Indigenous	  Populations’	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  Sub-­‐Commission	  on	  Prevention	  




secondly	  because	  “each	  indigenous	  people	  must	  remain	  free	  to	  interpret	  its	  own	  
system	  of	  laws,	  as	  it	  understands	  them”.71	  However	  Daes	  also	  recognized	  similar	  
traits	  in	  indigenous	  customary	  laws	  that	  could	  be	  effectively	  summarized	  into:72	  	  
	  
Heritage	   is	   ordinarily	   a	   communal	   right,	   and	   is	   associated	   with	   a	   family,	   clan,	  
tribe	   or	   other	   kinship	   group.	   Only	   the	   group	   as	   a	   whole	   can	   consent	   to	   the	  
sharing	   of	   heritage,	   and	   its	   consent	   must	   be	   given	   through	   specific	   decision-­‐
making	   procedures,	   which	   may	   differ	   depending	   on	   whether	   songs,	   stories,	  
medicines	  or	  some	  other	  aspect	  of	  heritage	  is	  involved.	  In	  whatever	  way	  consent	  
is	  given,	   it	   is	  always	  temporary	  and	  revocable:	  heritage	  can	  never	  be	  alienated,	  
surrendered	   or	   sold,	   except	   for	   conditional	   use.	   Sharing	   therefore	   creates	   a	  
relationship	   between	   the	   givers	   and	   receivers	   of	   knowledge.	   The	   givers	   retain	  
the	   authority	   to	   ensure	   that	   knowledge	   is	   used	   properly	   and	   the	   receivers	  
continue	  to	  recognize	  and	  repay	  the	  gift.	  	  
	  
In	  her	  observations	  of	   the	   indigenous	  world,	   she	  also	   identified	   the	   role	  of	   the	  
guardians,	   how	   custodianship	   works	   and	   what	   rights	   the	   custodians	   normally	  
have	  within	  the	  community.	  She	  wrote	  that:73	  
	  
Although	  heritage	   is	   communal,	   there	   is	   usually	   an	   individual	  who	   can	  best	  be	  
described	   as	   a	   custodian	   or	   caretaker	   of	   each	   song,	   story,	   name,	   medicine,	  
sacred	   place	   and	   other	   aspect	   of	   a	   people’s	   heritage.	   Such	   individual	  
responsibilities	   should	   not	   be	   confused	   with	   ownership	   or	   property	   rights.	  
Traditional	  custodians	  serve	  as	  trustees	  for	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  community	  as	  a	  
whole	  and	  they	  enjoy	  their	  privileges	  and	  status	   in	  this	  respect	  for	  only	  so	  long	  
as	  they	  continue	  to	  act	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  community.	  
	  
Today	  WIPO	  defines	  indigenous	  customary	  laws	  as:74	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  Daes	  supra.	  
72	  See	  Daes	  at	  para	  28.	  
73	  See	  Daes	  at	  para	  29	  
74 	  ‘Approaches	   to	   defining	   or	   characterising	   “customary	   law”	   typically	   make	   some	   reference	   to	   an	  
established	  pattern	  within	  a	  community	  which	  is	  seen	  by	  the	  community	  itself	  as	  having	  a	  binding	  quality.	  
For	  instance,	  customary	  laws	  are	  defined	  variously	  by	  some	  authorities	  as	  •	  “customs	  that	  are	  accepted	  as	  
legal	  requirements	  or	  obligatory	  rules	  of	  conduct;	  practices	  and	  beliefs	  that	  are	  so	  vital	  and	  intrinsic	  a	  part	  
of	  a	  social	  and	  economic	  system	  that	  they	  are	  treated	  as	  if	  they	  were	  laws”,	  and	  •	  “established	  patterns	  of	  
behaviour	  that	  can	  be	  objectively	  verified	  within	  a	  particular	  social	  setting.	  The	  modern	  codification	  of	  civil	  
law	  developed	  out	  of	   the	  customs,	  or	  costumes	  of	   the	  middle	  ages,	  expressions	  of	   law	  that	  developed	   in	  





…	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  life	  and	  custom	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  local	  communities.	  
What	  has	  the	  status	  of	  “custom”	  and	  what	  amounts	  to	  “customary	  law”	  as	  such	  
will	   depend	   very	   much	   on	   how	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   local	   communities	  
themselves	   perceive	   these	   questions,	   and	   on	   how	   they	   function	   as	   indigenous	  
peoples	  and	  local	  communities.	  	  
	  
In	   general,	   the	   custodians	   have	   the	   collective	   authority	   to	   determine	   how	   the	  
knowledge	   can	   be	   used,	   and	   in	  which	   ‘form’	   the	   knowledge	   can	   be	   translated	  
(song,	   painting,	   story,	  medicine	   etc).	   According	   to	   indigenous	   customary	   laws,	  
the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   knowledge	   can	   be	   reproduced	   depends	   on	   the	  
sacredness	  of	  the	  knowledge	  itself,	  in	  which	  type	  of	  reproduction	  it	  is	  supposed	  
to	  be	  translated	  into,	  and	  what	  use	  (cultural,	  educational,	  commercial	  etc)	  will	  be	  
done	  of	  the	  reproduction.	  Only	  those	  who	  are	  initiated	  to	  the	  secret	  parts	  of	  the	  
knowledge	   are	   able	   to	   manage	   it.	   In	   this	   context,	   traditional	   knowledge,	   and	  
particularly	  sacred	  traditional	  knowledge,	  can	  be	  primarily	  understood	  from	  the	  
point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  communities	  concerned,	  and	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  traditional	  
life	  of	  the	  community.	  The	  Secretariat	  of	  WIPO’s	  Intergovernmental	  Committee	  
on	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Traditional	   Cultural	  
Expressions	   (IGC)	   confirms	   that	   many	   traditional	   societies	   like	   the	   indigenous	  
ones	  have	  developed	  “highly	   sophisticated	  and	  effective	   customary	   intellectual	  
property	   systems”	   that	   have	   remained	   invisible	  when	   compared	   to	   the	   official	  
intellectual	   property	   system.	   Given	   the	   fact	   that	   customary	   laws	   have	   been	  
effectively	  and	  tactically	  neglected	  for	  such	  a	  long	  time,	  IGC	  suggests	  that	  there	  
is	   today	   a	   growing	   interest	   in	   studying	   “the	   relationship	   between	   customary	  
protection	  of	   traditional	  knowledge	  and	  the	   intellectual	  property	  system”.75	  On	  
the	   same	   line,	   the	   World	   Bank	   stresses	   that	   any	   discourse	   on	   traditional	  
knowledge	  should	  be	  included	  in	  the	  broader	  concept	  of	  cultural	  pluralism.	  The	  
world	  has	  never	  been	  organized	   into	   the	  European	   systems	  of	   knowledge.	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
force	  of	   law	  when	   they	  became	   the	  undisputed	   rule	  by	  which	   certain	  entitlements	   (rights)	   or	  obligations	  
were	  regulated	  between	  members	  of	  a	  community”’	  see	  WIPO	  Customary	  Law,	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  and	  
Intellectual	   Property:	   An	   Outline	   of	   the	   Thesis	   (2013)	   at	   2	   electronic	   document	  
<www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/resources/pdf/overview_customary_law.pdf>	   last	   visited	   on	  
22/02/2017	  	  




fact	   that	   Europe	   considered	   itself	   to	   be	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   world,	   politically,	  
culturally,	   economically	   and	   legally,	   does	   not	   change	   that,	   since	   time	  
immemorial,	   the	   world	   has	   been	   inhabited	   by	   different	   societies	   with	   very	  
distinctive	   cultures	  and	   customary	   laws.	   Indigenous	   culture	  and	  heritage	   is	  not	  
just	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  intellectual	  property,	  but	  an	  entirely	  different	  entity	  born	  
in	  environments	  totally	  different	  from	  the	  European	  one	  (see	  chapter	  2).	  In	  this	  
context,	   it	   is	   correct	   to	   say	   that	  Western	   laws	   are	   not	   inclusive	   of	   indigenous	  
customary	  law	  systems,	  while	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  living	  indigenous	  customary	  laws	  
are	  not	  inclusive	  of	  Western	  laws.	  This	  means	  that	  in	  our	  globalized	  world	  there	  
are	   no	   existing	   regulations	   that	   are	   reflective	   and	   inclusive	   of	   all	   cultural	  
diversities.	  Only	  a	  legally	  diverse	  system	  flexible	  enough	  to	  include	  the	  diversities	  
of	   the	  world	   could	   accommodate	   all	   the	  needs	  of	   different	   societies,	   including	  
those	   inhabiting	   remote	   areas	   of	   the	   world.	   Indeed,	   there	   are	   notable	   and	  
marked	  differences	  between	   indigenous	  customary	   laws	  and	   the	  Western	   legal	  
system	  deriving	  from	  common	  law.	  
	  
INDIGENOUS	  CUSTOMARY	  LAWS	   NON	  INDIGENOUS	  LAWS	  
§ Generally	  orally	  transmitted	   § Emphasis	  on	  material	  form	  
§ Emphasis	  on	  perpetual	  
preservation	  and	  maintenance	  
of	  culture	  
§ Limited	  in	  time	  
§ Socially	  based;	  transmitted	  
from	  one	  generation	  to	  another	  
§ Individually	  based	  –	  created	  by	  
individuals	  or	  group	  of	  
individuals	  
§ Generally	  non	  transferable,	  but	  
transmission	  when	  allowed,	  is	  
based	  on	  sacred	  and	  cultural	  
qualifications	  belonging	  to	  few	  
chosen	  custodians	  
§ Intellectual	  property	  can	  be	  
freely	  transmitted	  and	  assigned	  
–	  usually	  for	  economic	  returns,	  
for	  limited	  time,	  in	  any	  medium	  
and	  territory	  
§ Severe	  restrictions	  on	  how	  
transmission	  can	  occur	  
especially	  in	  relation	  to	  
sacred/secret	  knowledge	  
§ Intellectual	  property	  holders	  
can	  freely	  dispose	  on	  how	  and	  
by	  whom	  the	  information	  can	  
be	  transmitted,	  transferred	  or	  
assigned	  
§ All	  aspects	  of	  cultural	  heritage	  
are	  holistically	  interrelated	  
§ Intellectual	  property	  are	  
generally	  compartmentalized	  
categories	  eg	  tangible	  vs	  
intangible	  
§ Community	  owned,	  but	  
guardians	  manage	  its	  
§ Intellectual	  property	  rights	  are	  




transmission	  and	  dissemination	  
§ No	  economic	  value	  attached	  to	  
culture	  
§ Economic	  value	  attached	  to	  the	  
creation;	  emphasis	  on	  
economic	  rights	  and	  privileges	  
§ Traditional	  in	  nature,	  rarely	  
new	  	  
§ Intellectual	  property	  law	  
guarantees	  property	  rights	  to	  
new	  creations	  
§ Specific	  laws	  manage	  and	  
protect	  sacred/secret	  laws	  
§ No	  special	  protection	  for	  
sacred/secret	  culture	  
§ Gender	  restrictions	   § No	  gender	  restriction	  
	  
*	  This	  graphic	  was	  inspired	  by	  the	  one	  represented	  in	  the	  article:	  Terri	  Jenke	  “Indigenous	  Cultural	  
and	  Intellectual	  Property:	  the	  Main	  Issues	  for	  the	  Indigenous	  Arts	  Industry	  in	  2006”.76	  
	  
Most	  of	  the	  indigenous	  communities	  today	  live	  in	  between	  the	  ‘traditional’	  and	  
the	   ‘modern’	  world;	   this	  means	   living	   in	  between	   customary	   laws	  and	  modern	  
national	   and	   international	   legal	   systems.	   According	   to	   the	   WIPO	   Fact-­‐Finding	  
Missions	   (1998-­‐99),77	  most	   of	   the	   IP	   needs	   of	   the	   guardians	   of	   knowledge	   are	  
shaped	  by	  their	  contact	  with	  the	  formal	   IP	  regime.	  What	   is	  too	  often	  missing	  is	  
the	  other	   side	  of	   the	   coin.	  While	   it	   is,	   in	   fact,	   compulsory	   for	   the	  guardians	   to	  
relate	   to	   the	   IP	  system	  for	   the	  protection	  of	   their	  knowledge,	  because	   it	   is	   the	  
system	   that	   today	   rules	   the	   intellectual	   property	   world,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   in	  
democratic	   societies,	   the	   contrary	   should	  be	   applicable.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	   IP	  
system	  should	  rephrase	  those	  regulations	  that	  exclude	  the	  guardians’	   interests,	  
or	  traditional	  practices,	  and	  the	  guardianship	  that	  protects	  them.	  It	  should	  forget	  
the	  time	  when	  no	  IP	  law	  existed,	  or	  was	  needed,	  and	  rephrase	  its	  own	  identity.	  
In	   an	   egalitarian	   world,	   a	   more	   recent	   legal	   framework	   should	   ideally	   take	  
account	   of	   the	   already	   existing	   practices	   (traditional	   and	   non),	   and	   create	  
regulations	   that	   can	   effectively	   respond	   to	   every	   possible	   scenario.	   From	   a	  
philosophical	  point	  of	  view,	  why	  should	  the	  guardians	  feel	  compelled	  to	  adhere	  
to	  a	  Western	  legal	  framework	  that	  aims	  to	  manage	  their	  knowledge,	  but	  has	  no	  
legal	  jargon	  that	  is	  inclusive	  of	  such	  knowledge?	  Why	  should	  guardianship	  use	  an	  
IP	  law	  system	  that	  does	  not	  accommodate	  any	  of	  the	  customary	  regulations	  that	  
the	  community	  has	  successfully	  used	  for	  centuries?’	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  Written	   for	   the	   Aboriginal	   and	   Torres	   Islander	   Arts	   Board,	   Australia	   Council	   electronic	   document	  
<www.australiacouncil.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/.../ICIP.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  19/08/2012.	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  See	   WIPO	   electronic	   document	   <www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/pcipd_1/pcipd_1_10.pdf>	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One	  of	   the	  greatest	  dilemmas	  that	  scholars	  and	   indigenous	  representatives	  are	  
today	  facing	  is	  whether	  customary	  laws	  should	  be	  codified.	  While	  they	  certainly	  
could	   be	   codified,	   the	   codification	   would,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   freeze	   them	   in	  
time,	  preventing	  their	  evolution.	  In	  addition	  to	  that,	  customary	  laws	  do	  not	  need	  
to	  be	  fixed	  in	  order	  to	  be	  recognised	  by	  indigenous	  peoples.	  Scholars	  argue	  that	  
the	   codification	   would	   help	   to	   better	   understand	   indigenous	   customs	   and	  
integrate	  them	  into	  national	   legal	  systems	  (where	  required).78	  What	   indigenous	  
peoples	   are	   mostly	   concerned	   about	   is	   that	   Western	   IP	   system	   has	   been	  
universalized	  and	  prioritised	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  any	  other	  system	  of	  law.	  Which	  
means	   that	   no	  matter	  what	   traditions	   indigenous	   peoples	   have,	   they	   can	   only	  
protect	   them	   as	   long	   as	   they	   can	   translate	   their	   culture	   into	   Westernized	  
language.	   It	   is	   irrelevant	   whether	   indigenous	   peoples’	   systems	   of	   law	   are	  
effective	  or	  not.	  Many	  communities	  stress	  that	  they	  already	  have	  their	  own	  laws	  
in	  place.79	  Ideally,	  national,	  international	  and	  regional	  sui	  generis	  laws,	  as	  well	  as	  
laws	  regulating	  intangible	  property,	  should	  empower	  communities	  “to	  authorize	  
legitimate	  uses	  of	  their	  knowledge	  and	  cultural	  expressions,	  and	  for	  safeguarding	  
the	   traditional	   domain	   against	   illegitimate	   acts	   by	   third	   parties”. 80 	  On	   the	  
subject,	  WIPO	  reflects	  on	  the	  fact	  that:81	  
	  
…	   in	   distilling	   a	   possible	   common	   international	   outcome	   that	   allows	   sufficient	  
space	   for	   diversity	   while	   promoting	   convergence	   around	   shared	   norms,	   the	  
provisions	  may	  need	  to	  look	  beyond	  specific	  legal	  mechanisms,	  such	  as	  property	  
rights,	   and	   instead	   concentrate	   on	   clarifying	   the	   acts	   of	   third	   parties	   that	   are	  
considered	   illegitimate.	   As	   has	   been	   noted	   in	   past	   documents,	   this	   would	   be	  
consistent	  with	  the	  evolution	  of	   intellectual	  property	   in	  a	  range	  of	  other	   fields,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Graham	   Dutfield	   Protecting	   Traditional	   Knowledge:	   Pathways	   to	   The	   Future	   (International	   Centre	   for	  
Trade	  and	  Sustainable	  Development	  (ICTSD),	  Genève,	  2006).	  
79	  In	  its	  report	  on	  indigenous	  holders	  of	  knowledge,	  for	  example,	  WIPO	  reports	  the	  interview	  with	  the	  Four	  
Directions	   Council	   that	   comments	   the	   issue	   as:	   “Indigenous	   peoples	   possess	   their	   own	   locally-­‐specified	  
system	   of	   jurisprudence	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   classification	   of	   different	   types	   of	   knowledge,	   proper	  
procedures	   for	   acquiring	   and	   sharing	   knowledge,	   and	   the	   rights	   and	   responsibilities	   which	   attach	   to	  
possessing	   knowledge,	   all	   of	   which	   are	   embedded	   uniquely	   in	   each	   culture	   and	   its	   language”	   see	  WIPO	  
Report	   on	   Fact-­‐Finding	   Missions	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   (1998-­‐1999)	   –	  
Intellectual	  Property	  Needs	  and	  Expectations	  of	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  Holders	  (Genève,	  2001)	  at	  220.	  
80 	  WIPO	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	  
Knowledge	  and	  Folklore	  (Genève,	  2007)	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/11/9	  at	  20.	  	  




when	  the	  formulation	  of	  distinct	  property	  rights	  remain	  an	  option,	  implemented	  
only	  if	  nations	  choose	  to	  take	  that	  path.	  	  
	  
This	   approach	   would	   ideally	   leave	   indigenous	   communities	   to	   decide	   how	   to	  
exercise	  their	  say	  over	  their	  culture,	  but	  mostly	  once	  the	  knowledge	  has	  already	  
been	   exploited.	   In	   that	   case,	   the	   damage	   is	   done,	   and	   secret	   knowledge	  
safeguarded	  by	  guardians	  has	  entered	  a	  domain	   in	  which	   it	   should	  have	  never	  
entered.	   What	   in	   Western	   societies	   can,	   in	   fact,	   work	   in	   a	   defensive	   way,	  
adjudicating	   damages	   in	   case	   of	  misappropriation,	   in	   indigenous	   societies	   it	   is	  
not	  the	  economic	  value	  of	  the	  knowledge	  that	   is	   important,	  but	  the	  knowledge	  
itself	  and	  its	  secrecy	  and	  traditionality.	  WIPO	  suggests	  to	  leave	  to	  domestic	  laws	  
the	   development	   of	   sui	   generis	   regulations	   that	   would	   safeguard	   indigenous	  
peoples	   against	   misappropriation.82	  In	   that	   case,	   states	   could	   integrate	   their	  
legislation	   with	   pre-­‐existing	   fundamental	   rights	   arising	   within	   the	   indigenous	  
communities,	   in	   full	   consideration	   of	   the	   development	   of	   the	   customary	   laws	  
that	   regulate	   custodianship	   and	   the	   management	   of	   cultural	   expressions.	   In	  
other	  words,	  this	  flexibility	  could	  include	  community	  regulations,	  or	  their	  scope,	  
within	   a	   broader	   national	   legislation.	   However,	   such	   integration	   would	   be	  
effective	  only	  within	  the	  border	  of	  a	  state.	  In	  other	  words,	  once	  the	  indigenous	  
cultures	  exit	  the	  protection	  of	  state	  laws,	  no	  protection	  would	  be	  guaranteed	  in	  
case	   of	   exploitation	   in	   states	   that	   do	   not	   have	   in	   place	   the	   same	   kind	   of	  
regulations	  in	  existence	  in	  the	  state	  of	  origin.	  Good	  intentions	  aside,	  what	  today	  
happens	   within	   the	   border	   of	   a	   state	   and	   outside	   its	   borders	   is	   not	   always	  
morally	  praiseworthy.	  In	  most	  cases,	  even	  if	  the	  custodians	  are	  given	  the	  right	  to	  
their	  say	  on	  how	  outsiders	  plan	  to	  use	  indigenous	  knowledge,	  when	  the	  time	  for	  
a	   ‘no’	  comes,	   the	  knowledge	  has	  already	  entered	  a	   ‘forbidden	  domain’.	  That	   is	  
why	  indigenous	  peoples	  should	  be	  given	  the	  right	  to	  preserve	  in	  their	  traditional	  
ways	   their	   knowledge:	   including	   hiding	   it	   from	   the	   public	   domain	   when	  
necessary.	  As	  it	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  last	  chapters,	  this	  consideration	  excludes	  any	  
resort	   to	   equity	   law,	   which	   sets	   remedies	   based	   on	   monetary	   compensation;	  
same	  applies	  to	  contract	  and	  antitrust	  law.	  All	  these	  laws	  respond	  to	  issues	  that	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   Law	   and	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   Knowledge	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   electronic	   document	  




have	   entered	   or	   are	   about	   to	   enter	   the	   public	   domain;	   whereas	   indigenous	  
customary	  laws	  related	  to	  sacred	  and	  secret	  knowledge	  refrain	  the	  custodians	  of	  
knowledge	   to	   share	   it	   with	   those	   non-­‐entitled.	   According	   to	   UNESCO	   it	   is	  
impossible	  to	  safeguard	  indigenous	  peoples’	  traditions	  without	  maintaining	  and	  
respecting	   their	   customary	   practices	   and	   the	   traditional	   roles	   the	   keepers	   of	  
knowledge	   have	   within	   the	   community.	   Article	   15	   of	   the	   Convention	   for	   the	  
Safeguarding	   of	   the	   Intangible	   Cultural	   Heritage	   reconfirms	   that	   “within	   the	  
framework	  of	  its	  safeguarding	  activities	  of	  the	  intangible	  cultural	  heritage,	  each	  
State	   Party	   shall	   endeavour	   to	   ensure	   the	   widest	   possible	   participation	   of	  
communities,	   groups	   and,	  where	   appropriate,	   individuals	   that	   create,	  maintain	  
and	   transmit	   such	   heritage,	   and	   to	   involve	   them	   actively	   in	   its	  management”.	  
This	  means	  that	  even	  though	  the	  guardians	  of	  knowledge	  and	  TK	  holders	  might	  
not	   have	   property	   rights	   over	   the	   knowledge	   in	   their	   custody,	   because	   they	  
“maintain	  and	  transmit	  such	  heritage”,	  they	  have	  legal	  personality	  and	  can	  fully	  
participate	  in	  the	  management	  of	  such	  knowledge	  and	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  ad	  hoc	  
sui	   generis	   legislation	   whose	   scope	   is	   to	   safeguard	   and	   preserve	   indigenous	  
heritage.	   The	   UNESCO/WIPO	   Model	   Provisions	   for	   National	   Laws	   on	   the	  
Protection	  of	  Expressions	  of	  Folklore	  Against	  Illicit	  Exploitation	  and	  other	  Forms	  
of	  Prejudicial	  Action	  (1985)	  goes	  through	  all	  the	  inadequacies	  of	  modern	  IP	  laws	  
and	  suggests	   that	   it	   should	  be	   left	   to	  national	   jurisdiction,	  adopting	  sui	  generis	  
legislation,	  to	  safeguard	  indigenous	  peoples’	  heritage,	  which,	  though	  distinctive,	  
is	   nonetheless	   part	   of	   the	   heritage	   of	   a	   nation.83	  As	   pointed	   out	   by	   Daes,	   the	  
reasoning	  behind	  the	  creation	  of	  sui	  generis	   legislation	  safeguarding	  indigenous	  
peoples’	  culture	  and	  expressions	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  coherent	  completion	  of	  
indigenous	  peoples	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination84	  as	  stated	  in	  common	  Article	  1	  of	  
the	   ICCPR	   and	   ICESCR	   and	   Art	   3	   of	   the	   UNDRIP.	   However,	   the	   limited	  
participation	   of	   indigenous	   representatives	   at	   national	   and	   international	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  For	  further	  information	  see	  WIPO	  Model	  Provisions	  for	  National	  Laws	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  Expressions	  of	  
Folklore	   Against	   Illicit	   Exploitations	   and	   Other	   Prejudicial	   Actions	   (1985)	   electronic	   document	  
<www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=6714>	  last	  visited	  on	  01/12/2015.	  
84	  Article	  2:	  “To	  be	  effective,	  the	  protection	  of	  indigenous	  peoples'	  heritage	  should	  be	  based	  broadly	  on	  the	  
principle	  of	  self-­‐determination,	  which	  includes	  the	  right	  and	  the	  duty	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  to	  develop	  their	  
own	  cultures	  and	  knowledge	  systems,	  and	  forms	  of	  social	  organization”	  see	  Erica-­‐Irene	  Daes	  Principles	  and	  
Guidelines	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   the	   Heritage	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples,	   elaborated	   in	   conformity	   with	  
resolution	   1993/44	   and	   decision	   1994/105	   of	   the	   Sub-­‐Commission	   on	   Prevention	   of	   Discrimination	   and	  
Protection	  of	  Minorities	  of	  the	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Council,	  United	  Nations	  




meetings,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  consultation	  with	  the	  elders	  and	  the	  guardians	  have	  so	  
far	  retarded	  any	  in	  depth	  understanding	  of	  indigenous	  cultures	  and	  the	  creation	  
of	  effective	  legal	  mechanisms	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  indigenous	  traditions.	  
The	  next	  section	  will	  explain	  why	  indigenous	  guardians	  are	  the	  true	  stakeholders	  
of	   indigenous	   sacred	   and	   secret	   knowledge	   and	   why	   their	   participation	   at	  
national	  and	  international	  forums	  is	  so	  crucial	  for	  the	  discussion	  and	  elaboration	  
of	   legislation	   that	   could	   effectively	   and	   successfully	   safeguard	   indigenous	  
cultures.	  
	  
4.4	  -­‐	  Indigenous	  Guardians:	  the	  ‘True’	  Stakeholders	  of	  Indigenous	  Culture	  and	  
Intangible	  Sacred	  Knowledge	  
	  
It	  is	  true	  that	  we	  entered	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  and	  indigenous	  peoples	  (like	  it	  
or	   not)	   are	   now	   part	   of	   the	   ‘global	   family’	   inhabiting	   this	   world.	   In	   this	  
perspective,	   the	  mixing	  of	   indigenous	  cultures	  with	  the	  world	  culture	  could	  be,	  
when	  not	  forced,	  rightly	  considered	  the	  result	  of	  evolutionary	  patterns	  we	  are	  all	  
subjected	  to.	  It	  is	  also	  true	  that	  the	  mixing	  of	  such	  distinctive	  cultures	  (Western	  
and	  indigenous)	  is	  never	  easy,	  straightforward	  and	  painless.	  To	  give	  an	  example,	  
by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  significant	  changes	  had	  been	  taking	  place	   in	  the	  
lives	  of	  Australian	  Aborigines.	  When	  not	  imposed,	  these	  changes	  came	  with	  the	  
death	   of	   many	   elders	   and	   custodians	   of	   the	   traditions,	   and	   the	   subsequent	  
interruption	  of	  the	  line	  of	  transmission.	  Such	  changes	  were	  also	  reflective	  of	  the	  
willingness	   of	   Aborigines	   to	   explore	   other	   traditions	   once	   theirs	  were	   lost.85	  In	  
other	  more	  fortunate	  cases,	  change	  “came	  to	  traditional	  culture	  not	  because	  of	  
the	   direct	   pressure	   of	   missionaries,	   but	   because	   their	   mere	   presence	   and	  
example	  caused	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  community	  ideas”.86	  This	  is	  why	  scholars	  would	  not	  
need	   to	   address	   how	   far	   back	   indigenous	   cultural	   expressions	   go	   in	   order	   to	  
safeguard	   their	   transmission.	   The	   existence	  of	   such	   indigenous	   knowledge	   and	  
epistemology,	  being	  it	  a	  reflection	  of	  traditions	  existing	  prior	  or	  post	  colonization	  
time,	  is	  enough	  to	  justify	  the	  existence	  of	  indigenous	  rights	  over	  their	  culture	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  For	  more	  information	  see	  Richard	  Broome	  Aboriginal	  Australians	  (3rd	  ed,	  Southwood	  Press,	  Sydney,	  2001)	  
at	  77.	  




traditions.87	  Consequently,	   indigenous	   peoples,	   being	   the	   holders,	   guardians	   or	  
the	   totality	   of	   the	   community,	   should	   be	   considered	   legal	   personalities	   and	  
granted	  the	  full	  accessibility	  to	  their	  knowledge,	  and	  the	  right	  to	  dispose	  of	  it	  as	  
they	   so	   decide.	   Unfortunately,	   we	   live	   in	   a	   world	   that	   organises	   everything	  
according	   to	   Western	   scientific	   methods	   and	   in	   this	   scientific	   monopoly	  
‘indigenous	   issues’	   are	   not	   granted	   venues	   where	   indigenous	   claims	   are	  
presented	   with	   indigenous	   epistemological	   instruments. 88 	  The	   Western-­‐built	  
legal	   institutions	   that	  host	   and	  analyse	   indigenous	   claims,	  most	  of	   the	   time,	   in	  
fact,	  deconstruct	  and	  decontextualize	   indigenous	  cultures.89	  Moreover,	   in	  these	  
forums	   indigenous	   traditional	   holders	   and	   custodians	   of	   knowledge	   are	   not	  
allowed	  to	  present	   their	  own	  claims	  and	  fight	   for	   their	  own	  rights	   in	   their	  own	  
language	  and	  using	  their	  customary	  laws.	  Indeed,	  the	  first	  act	  of	  violence	  starts	  
when	  indigenous	  representatives	  are	  ‘forced’	  to	  shift	  from	  their	  epistemological	  
system	  of	  knowledge	  to	  the	  Western	  one	   in	  order	  to	  be	  heard;	  shift	   that	  often	  
causes	   objective	   problems	   (linguistic,	   cultural,	   etc)	   in	   the	   translation	   of	   values	  
and	  knowledge	  that	  are	  alien	  to	  the	  Western	  auditorium	  and,	  most	  of	  the	  time,	  
non-­‐translatable.	   In	  addition	   to	   that,	   today,	   international	   and	  national	   fora	  are	  
often	  inappropriate	  venues	  to	  address	  indigenous	  issues,	  mostly	  because	  none	  of	  
them	   is	   indigenous-­‐oriented.	   At	   those	   venues,	   indigenous	   representatives	   can	  
only	   attend	   as	   observers	   with	   no	   voting	   rights,90	  even	   when	   the	   decisions	   at	  
stake	  have	  profound	  implications	  for	  indigenous	  lives.	  Overall,	  and	  on	  a	  practical	  
level,	   this	   custom	  has	   caused	  much	  distress	   and	  many	  problems	   to	   indigenous	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  “The	  capacity	  of	  ‘tribal’	  peoples	  to	  live	  in	  history	  and	  to	  creatively	  interpret	  and	  expressively	  confront	  the	  
historical	  circumstances	  in	  which	  they	  live-­‐using	  their	  cultural	  traditions	  to	  do	  so-­‐cannot	  be	  contemplated,	  
except	  under	  marginalized	  categories	  like	  ‘syncretism’	  which	  suggest	  impurity	  and	  decline”	  see	  Rosemary	  J	  
Coombe	  The	  Cultural	   Life	   of	   Intellectual	   Properties	   (Duke	  University	   Press,	  Durham	  and	   London,	   1998)	   at	  
218.	  
88 	  “While	   operating	   at	   a	   far	   more	   subtle	   and	   sanitized	   manner	   in	   the	   late	   twentieth	   century,	   this	  
epistemological	   tyranny	   still	   operates	   in	   the	   academy	   to	   undermine	   efforts	   to	   include	   other	   ways	   of	  
knowing	  and	  knowledge	  production	  …	  The	  power	  issues	  here	  are	  naked	  and	  visible	  to	  all	  who	  are	  to	  look:	  
the	  power	  struggle	  involves	  who	  is	  allowed	  to	  proclaim	  truth	  and	  to	  establish	  the	  procedures	  by	  which	  truth	  
is	   to	  be	  established	  …”	   see	  Ladislaus	  M	  Semali	   and	   Joe	  L	  Kincheloe	   (eds)	  What	   is	   Indigenous	  Knowledge?	  
Voices	  from	  the	  Academy	  (Falmer	  Press,	  New	  York	  and	  London,	  1999)	  at	  31.	  
89 	  “In	   this	   Western	   gaze,	   indigenous	   knowledge	   is	   tacitly	   decontextualized,	   severed	   of	   the	   cultural	  
connections	  that	  grant	  meaning	  to	  its	  indigenous	  producers,	  archived	  and	  classified	  in	  Western	  databases,	  
and	  eventually	  used	  in	  scientific	  projects	  that	  may	  operate	  against	  the	  interests	  of	  indigenous	  peoples”	  see	  
Ladislaus	  M	  Semali	  and	  Joe	  L	  Kincheloe	  (eds)	  What	  is	   Indigenous	  Knowledge?	  Voices	  from	  the	  Academy	  at	  
21.	  
90	  See	  Rule	  39	  –	  “Observers	  shall	  not	  have	  the	  right	  to	  vote”	  see	  WIPO	  General	  Rules	  of	  Procedure	  
CRNR/DC/9	  Rev	  WIPO	  electronic	  document	  




communities.	   How	   can	   indigenous	   issues	   be	   resolved	   if	   they	   are	   presented	   by	  
non-­‐indigenous	   representatives	   and	   any	   follow-­‐on	   resolution	   is	   voted	   by	   non-­‐
indigenous	  people?91	  	  
In	   its	  article,92	  Maina	  reports	   interviews	  that	  he	  conducted	  with	  the	   indigenous	  
elders	   of	   Canada.	   The	   frustration	   indigenous	   peoples	   feel	   about	   their	   ‘limited’	  
presence	  in	  the	  international	  debate	  is	  often	  stressed	  in	  the	  dialogues:	  
	  
People	  are,	  and	   rightly	   so,	  annoyed	   that	   the	  government	   is	   sending	   individuals	  
from	  whatever,	  the	  Department	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  or	  Environment	  Canada,	  to	  go	  
and	   speak	   on	   a	   topic	   that	   they	   have	   no	   knowledge	   of.	   Along	   the	   lines	   of	  
representation	  issues,	  of	  all	  the	  people	  that	  I	  know	  that	  have	  participated	  in	  this	  
process,	   very	   few,	   even	   the	   Indigenous	   People[s],	   would	   be	   what	   you	   would	  
consider	   traditional	   knowledge	   holders.	   I	   have	   never	   seen	   somebody	   from	  
Canada,	  like	  a	  healer	  or	  an	  elder	  at	  these	  meetings.	  People	  who	  go,	  and	  again	  it	  
is	   representation	   based	   on	   expertise,	   tend	   to	   be	   those	   with	   expertise	   on	  
intellectual	   property	   rights	   or	   biodiversity	   and	   it	   is	   not	   to	   denigrate	   the	  
individuals	  that	  are	  attending	  but	  it	  is	  that,	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  cases,	  nobody	  
formally	  sent	  them.93	  
	  
Indigenous	   peoples	   are	   the	   stakeholders	   of	   their	   knowledge,	   and	   as	   such	   they	  
should	  be	  entitled	   to	  more	  decision-­‐making	  rights	  over	   issues	   that	  concern	   the	  
livelihood	  of	   their	   communities	   or	   have	  profound	   implications	   for	   their	   future.	  
Normally,	   in	   the	   international	   fora,	   attending	   indigenous	   stakeholders	   include	  
specific	   indigenous	  communities,	   local,	  national	  and	   international	  organizations	  
and	  NGOs	  that	  play	  a	  representative	  role	  of	  indigenous	  peoples’	  interests;	  while	  
member	   states	   stakeholders	   include	   countries	   that	   are	   either	   members	   of	  
organizations	  (eg	  WTO,	  UN)	  or	  signatories	  of	  international	  instruments	  that	  deal	  
with	   indigenous	   peoples	   issues	   (DRIP,	   CBD,	   ILO	   69).94	  The	   latter	   are	   generally	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  “Insufficient	   and	   inhautentic	   indigenous	   representation	   in	   the	   international	   forums	   means	   that	   their	  
voices	   are	   not	   gaining	   any	   traction	   in	   these	   forums”	   see	   Charles	   Kamau	  Maina	   “Power	   Relations	   in	   the	  
Traditional	   Knowledge	   Debate:	   A	   Critical	   Analysis	   of	   Forums”	   (2011)	   18	   International	   Journal	   of	   Cultural	  
Property	  145-­‐178	  at	  158.	  
92	  Charles	   Kamau	   Maina	   “Power	   Relations	   in	   the	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   Debate:	   A	   Critical	   Analysis	   of	  
Forums”	  at	  158.	  
93	  See	  Maina	  supra	  at	  159.	  
94	  “Member	  states	  stakeholders	  are	  either	  individual	  states	  or	  regional	  blocks	  such	  as	  the	  African	  Union	  or	  




considered	  as	   regional	  blocks	  which	  have	   the	  power	   to	   “exercise	   their	   right	   to	  
vote	  with	  a	  number	  of	  votes	  equal	  to	  the	  number	  of	  their	  member	  States	  which	  
are	   Parties.	   Such	   organizations	   shall	   not	   exercise	   their	   right	   to	   vote	   if	   their	  
member	   States	   exercise	   theirs,	   and	   vice	   versa”. 95 	  In	   the	   case	   of	   industrial	  
stakeholders,	   these	   organizations	   must	   have	   “direct	   or	   indirect	   commercial	  
interests	   in	   traditional	   knowledge	   and	   are	   involved	   in	   the	   debate	   at	   the	  
international	  level”.96	  	  
The	   recent	   growing	   concern	   over	   indigenous	   peoples’	   cultural	   survival	   has	  
resulted	   in	   the	   growth	   of	   indigenous	   representatives-­‐stakeholders	   who	   are	  
convinced	   that	   today	   no	   existing	   forum	   is	   actually	   appropriate	   to	   host	   and	  
address	   indigenous	   peoples’	   issues,	   and	   are	   struggling	   to	   make	   their	   voices	  
heard.	   In	   many	   cases,	   the	   stakeholders	   representing	   indigenous	   peoples’	  
interests	   are	   profoundly	   bureaucratized	   entities	  with	  well-­‐defined	   political	   and	  
social	   agendas	   that	   often	   operate	   at	   a	   considerable	   geographic,	   cultural	   and	  
linguistic	   distance	   from	   the	   communities	   they	   pretend	   to	   represent.	   This	  
distance	  can	  result	  in	  a	  tendency	  to	  oversimplify	  and	  romanticize	  the	  indigenous	  
issues	   at	   stake.	   In	   his	   study	   on	   the	   indigenous	   of	   Amazonia,	   for	   example,	  
Greene97	  suggests	   that	   the	   popular	   image	   we	   have	   of	   Amazonian	   Indians	   as	  
guardians	   of	   the	   tropical	   forest	   is	   “in	   the	   significant	   part	   due	   to	   the	   alliance	  
created	   between	   environmental	   NGO	   and	   indigenous	   peoples	   in	   the	   past	   two	  
decades”.98	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  while	   it	   is	   true	  that	  the	  organizations	  sometimes	  
provide	   the	   economic	   and	   legal	   resources	   to	   support	   indigenous	   issues,	   they	  
often	   build	   around	   indigenous	   claims	   unrealistic	   and	   exaggerated	   expectations	  
about	   the	   economic	   potential	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   intellectual	   property	  
claims.99	  In	  other	  cases,	  NGOs	  stakeholders	   tend	   to	   legitimize	   those	   indigenous	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  Principle	  39.2	   -­‐	  Rules	  of	  Procedure	   for	  Meetings	  of	   the	  Conference	  of	   the	  Parties	   to	   the	  Convention	  on	  
Biological	   Diversity	   (CBD)	   electronic	   document	   <www.cbd.int/convention/rules.shtml>	   last	   visited	   on	  
03/03/2015.	  
96	  Supra.	  
97	  Shane	  Greene	  “Indigenous	  Peoples	  Incorporated?”	  (April	  2004)	  45	  2	  Current	  Anthropology.	  
98	  See	  Greene	  supra.	  
99	  “Researchers	  of	  all	  sorts,	   religious	  organizations,	   international	   funding	  agencies,	  corporations,	  and	  state	  
bureaucracies	   all	   influence	   and	   complicate	   the	   politics	   of	   indigenous	   representation	   in	   accordance	   with	  
their	   own	   agendas.	   …	   dissent	   and	   internal	   discussion	   within	   indigenous	   groups	   over	   the	   issue	   of	  
representation	  often	  gives	  potential	  credence	  to	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  argument,	  just	  as	  it	  reveals	  the	  problems	  
inherent	  in	  negotiating	  collectively	  owned	  cultures	  with	  only	  a	  selection	  of	  indigenous	  brokers.	  Because	  of	  
the	   collective	   nature	   of	   claims	   to	   culture	   as	   property,	   there	   is	   a	   common	   assumption	   on	   all	   sides	   of	   the	  




groups	  which	  conform	  to	   the	  political,	   institutional	  and	  social	  objectives	  of	   the	  
organization,	  without	   confronting	   the	   complex	   realities	  of	   indigenous	   lives	   and	  
customs	   in	   their	   environment.	   The	   situation	   has	   become	   so	   intolerable	   for	  
indigenous	  peoples	  that,	  in	  2012,	  indigenous	  representatives	  have	  ‘unanimously’	  
walked	   out	   of	   the	   UN	   World	   Intellectual	   Property	   Organization’s	  
Intergovernmental	   Committee	   (IGC)	   in	   Genève. 100 	  They	   justified	   the	   act	   by	  
stating:101	  
	  
We,	  the	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  and	  Nations	  present	  at	  the	  International	  Indigenous	  
Forum	   during	   WIPO	   IGC	   20,	   have	   evaluated	   our	   participation	   in	   all	   of	   the	  
proceedings	   of	   this	   Committee,	   and	   we	   note	   with	   concern	   the	   continued	  
reduction	   of	   the	   amount	   and	   level	   of	   our	   participation	   in	   this	   process.	   We	  
Indigenous	   Peoples	   have	   participated	   as	   experts	   in	   the	   IGC	   sessions,	   we	   have	  
worked	  in	  good	  faith,	  and	  we	  have	  made	  efforts	  over	  the	  years	  to	  submit	  to	  the	  
IGC	   sessions	  our	   collectively	  developed	  and	   sound	  proposals,	  which	  have	  been	  
ignored	  or	  left	  in	  brackets	  in	  negotiation	  texts.	  The	  IGC,	  in	  its	  overall	  procedures,	  
has	  systematically	  ignored	  our	  rights,	  as	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  and	  as	  Nations	  with	  
internationally	   recognized	   collective	   rights,	   to	   self-­‐determination	   and	   full	   and	  
equitable	   participation	   at	   all	   levels.	   The	   draft	   study	   of	   the	   Secretariat	   on	   the	  
participation	   of	   observers	   before	   the	   IGC	   does	   not	   contain	   modifications	  
proposed	   by	   the	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   to	  WIPO’s	   rules	   of	   procedure.	   The	   States	  
have	   obligations	   under	   their	   constitutions	   that	   have	   not	   been	   observed	   in	   the	  
IGC,	   nor	   have	   they	   submitted	   proposals	   that	   could	   resolve	   the	   existing	  
deficiencies	   in	  order	   to	   improve	  our	  participation.	  Distinguished	  delegates:	  we,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
comparable	  to	  that	  of	  consolidated	  nation-­‐states	  with	  which	  external	  actors	  can	  negotiate.	  Establishing	  who	  
are	   the	   legitimate	   representatives	   of	   indigenous	   collectives	   is,	   however,	   often	   a	   matter	   of	   internal	   and	  
external	  debate”	  see	  Greene	  supra	  footnote	  94.	  
100“The	   International	   Indigenous	   Forum	   has	   presented	   two	   statements	   at	   the	   UN	   World	   Intellectual	  
Property	   Organization’s	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   (IGC)	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	  
Resources,	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  and	  Folklore	  which	  met	  14-­‐22	  February,	  2012	  in	  Geneva.	  The	  statement	  
made	   on	   February	   21,	   2012,	   announces	   the	  withdrawal	   of	   indigenous	   delegations	   from	   the	  work	   of	   the	  
Committee.	   Decided	   unanimously,	   this	   withdrawal	   is	   motivated	   by	   the	   lack	   of	   consideration	   for	   their	  
positions	  and	  a	  procedure	  which	  does	  not	  allow	  their	  full	  and	  equitable	  participation,	  as	  recognised	  by	  the	  
international	  standards.	  The	  statement	  made	  on	  February	  22,	  2012,	  follows	  the	  dialogue	  with	  the	  Chair	  and	  
the	  Secretariat	  of	  the	  Committee.	  It	  announces	  the	  reinstatement	  of	  indigenous	  delegations	  to	  the	  process	  
based	  on	  the	  proposals	  contained	   in	   this	  declaration,	  which	  aim	  at	  changing	   the	  mode	  of	  participation	  of	  
indigenous	   peoples”	   see	   WIPO	   IGC	   20	   Indigenous	   Peoples’	   Statements	   electronic	   document	  
<www.docip.org/WIPO-­‐IGC-­‐20-­‐Indigenous-­‐People.78+M592d3115ae2.0.html>	  last	  visited	  on	  03/03/2015.	  
101	  See	  WIPO	   International:	   Final	   Statement	   Of	   The	   International	   Indigenous	   Forum	   at	  WIPO	   –	   IGC	   20	   –	  
Indigenous	   Peoples	   Issues	   and	   Resources	   electronic	   document	  





the	  Indigenous	  Peoples,	  are	  the	  titleholders,	  proprietors	  and	  ancestral	  owners	  of	  
traditional	   knowledge	   that	   is	   inalienable,	   nonforfeitable	   and	   inherent	   to	   the	  
genetic	  resources	  that	  we	  have	  conserved	  and	  utilized	   in	  a	  sustainable	  manner	  
within	  our	   territories.	  For	   this	   reason,	  we	  appeal	   to	   the	  States	   to	  acknowledge	  
that	  the	  discussion	  on	   intellectual	  property	  rights	  and	  genetic	  resources	  should	  
include	   Indigenous	  Peoples	  on	  equal	   terms	  with	   the	   States	   since	   the	  work	  will	  
directly	  impact	  our	  lives,	  our	  lands,	  our	  territories	  and	  resources,	  and	  will	  reach	  
to	   the	   very	   heart	   of	   our	   cultures,	   which	   are	   the	   inheritance	   of	   future	  
generations.	  Therefore,	  the	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  present	  at	  IGC	  20	  have	  reflected	  
seriously	  on	  our	  role	  in	  this	  process	  and	  have	  decided,	  unanimously,	  to	  withdraw	  
our	  active	  participation	  in	  the	  work	  developed	  by	  this	  Committee	  until	  the	  States	  
change	  the	  rules	  of	  procedure	  to	  permit	  our	  full	  and	  equitable	  participation	  at	  all	  
levels	  of	  the	  IGC	  and	  until	  the	  instruments	  recognize	  and	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  
existing	   international	   frameworks	   for	   the	   rights	   and	   interests	   of	   Indigenous	  
Peoples	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   IGC.	   Thank	   you,	   Mr.	   Chairman.	   February	   21,	  
2012.	  
	  
In	   their	   statements,	   indigenous	   representatives	   explained	   that	   their	   act	   was	  
dictated	   by	   the	   unjustifiable	   lack	   of	   equal	   participation	   of	   the	   attending	  
members.102	  For	   indigenous	   representatives,	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   are	   not	   given	  
effective	  decision-­‐making	  power	  has	  profound	  repercussions.	  First	  of	  all,	  they	  are	  
not	  recognised	  as	  having	  any	  authority	  to	  influence	  the	  decisions	  of	  international	  
and	   national	   organizations	   or	   intervene	   in	   the	   standards	   of	   their	   agendas.	  
Second,	  the	  lack	  of	  indigenous	  decision-­‐making,	  allows	  powerful	  stakeholders	  to	  
dictate	  and	  direct	   the	  agendas	   limiting	   the	  participation	  of	   indigenous	  peoples,	  
and	   minimizing	   the	   importance	   of	   their	   claims.	   In	   WIPO’s	   General	   Rules	   of	  
Procedure,	   for	   example,	   the	   Observers	   “may	   take	   part	   in	   debates	   at	   the	  
invitation	  of	  the	  Chairman,	  but	  they	  may	  not	  submit	  proposals,	  amendments	  or	  
motions”.103	  The	   same	  happens	  within	   the	  Working	  Group	   on	  Article	   8	   (j)104	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  Supra.	  
103	  Rule	  24,	  WIPO’s	  General	  Rules	  of	  Procedure.	  
104	  Article	   8	   (j)	   states	   that:	   “Subject	   to	   its	   national	   legislation,	   respect,	   preserve	   and	  maintain	   knowledge,	  
innovations	  and	  practices	  of	  indigenous	  and	  local	  communities	  embodying	  traditional	  lifestyles	  relevant	  for	  
the	  conservation	  and	   sustainable	  use	  of	  biological	  diversity	  and	  promote	   their	  wider	  application	  with	   the	  
approval	  and	  involvement	  of	  the	  holders	  of	  such	  knowledge,	  innovations	  and	  practices	  and	  encourage	  the	  




the	   Convention	   on	   Biologic	   Diversity	   (CBD),105	  where	   indigenous	   peoples	   can	  
participate	   only	   as	   observers.	   Similarly,	   in	   the	   CBD’s	   Rules	   of	   Procedure	   it	   is	  
stated	   again	   that	   “observers	  may,	   upon	   invitation	  of	   the	   President,	   participate	  
without	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  the	  proceedings	  of	  any	  meeting	  unless	  at	   least	  one	  
third	  of	  the	  Parties	  present	  at	  the	  meeting	  object”	  and	  “may,	  upon	  invitation	  of	  
the	   President,	   participate	   without	   the	   right	   to	   vote	   in	   the	   proceedings	   of	   any	  
meeting	  in	  matters	  of	  direct	  concern	  to	  the	  body	  or	  agency	  they	  represent	  unless	  
at	  least	  one	  third	  of	  the	  Parties	  present	  at	  the	  meeting	  object”.106	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
WTO’s	  meetings,	  indigenous	  peoples	  cannot	  participate	  at	  all.	  
For	   the	   last	   twenty	   years,	   indigenous	   peoples	   have	   tried	   to	   convince	   the	  
international	   fora	   that,	   as	   holders	   of	   indigenous	   knowledge,	   they	   are	   the	   only	  
ones	  who	  know	  what	  traditional	  knowledge	  is	  and,	  as	  custodians,	  they	  should	  be	  
legally	  entitled	  to	  suggest	  and	  work	  on	  solutions	  that	  involve	  the	  management	  of	  
their	  own	  culture.	  In	  the	  Kimberley	  Declaration,107	  indigenous	  peoples	  expressed	  
their	  position	  on	  the	  intrinsic	  idiosyncratic	  value	  of	  their	  TK	  for	  the	  livelihood	  of	  
their	   communities	   and	   the	   preservation	   of	   indigenous	   identities	   for	   future	  
generations.	  The	  Declaration	  reads:	  	  
	  
Our	  traditional	  knowledge	  systems	  must	  be	  respected,	  promoted	  and	  protected;	  
our	  collective	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  must	  be	  guaranteed	  and	  ensured.	  Our	  
traditional	   knowledge	   is	   not	   in	   the	   public	   domain;	   it	   is	   collective,	   cultural	   and	  
intellectual	  property	  protected	  under	  our	  customary	  law.	  Unauthorized	  use	  and	  
misappropriation	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  is	  theft.	  	  
	  
The	  usage	  of	   strong	  words,	   such	  as	   ‘theft’,	   proves	   that	   indigenous	  peoples	  are	  
fully	  aware	  of	  the	  manipulative	  neo-­‐colonialist	  forces	  that	  today	  dictate	  national	  
and	  international	  economic	  agendas.	  Such	  feelings	  are	  clearly	  stated	  a	  few	  lines	  
later:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105	  The	   Convention	   on	   Biological	   Diversity	   (CBD)	   entered	   into	   force	   on	   29	  December	   1993.	   It	   has	   3	  main	  
objectives:	   The	   conservation	   of	   biological	   diversity;	   the	   sustainable	   use	   of	   the	   components	   of	   biological	  
diversity;	  the	  fair	  and	  equitable	  sharing	  of	  the	  benefits	  arising	  out	  of	  the	  utilization	  of	  genetic	  resources.	  See	  
the	  text	  of	  the	  Convention	  at	  <www.cbd.int/convention/text/>	  last	  visited	  on	  15/07/2015.	  
106	  See	  CBD	  Rules	  of	  Procedure,	  Rule	  6.2	  and	  7.2.	  
107	  International	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   Summit	   on	   Sustainable	   Development,	   Khoi-­‐San	   Territory,	   Kimberley,	  






Economic	  globalization	  constitutes	  one	  of	  the	  main	  obstacles	  for	  the	  recognition	  
of	   the	   rights	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples.	   Transnational	   corporations	   and	  
industrialized	   countries	   impose	   their	   global	   agenda	   on	   the	   negotiations	   and	  
agreements	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   system,	   the	   World	   Bank,	   the	   International	  
Monetary	   Fund,	   the	  World	   Trade	  Organization	   and	   other	   bodies	  which	   reduce	  
the	   rights	   enshrined	   in	   national	   constitutions	   and	   in	   international	   conventions	  
and	  agreements.108	  	  
	  
Consequently,	   the	   representatives	   gathered	   at	   Kimberley,	   urged	   the	   United	  
Nations:109	  
	  	  
…	   to	   promote	   respect	   for	   the	   recognition,	   observance	   and	   enforcement	   of	  
treaties,	   agreements	   and	   other	   constructive	   arrangements	   concluded	   between	  
Indigenous	   Peoples	   and	   States,	   or	   their	   successors,	   according	   to	   their	   original	  
spirit	  and	  intent,	  and	  to	  have	  States	  honor	  and	  respect	  such	  treaties,	  agreements	  
and	  other	  constructive	  arrangements.	  	  
	  
The	   general	   sentiment	   of	   indigenous	   elders,	   guardians	   and	   representatives	   at	  
international	   summits	   is	   unequivocal	   and	   yet	  where	   does	   the	   resistance	   lie	   to	  
enforce	   mechanisms	   guaranteeing	   the	   participation,	   the	   right	   of	   self-­‐
determination,	   prior-­‐informed	   consent	   and	   benefit	   sharing	   of	   indigenous	  
stakeholders?	   At	   the	   G8	   Summit	   held	   in	   Hokkaido-­‐Japan,	   in	   2008,	   indigenous	  
representatives	  prepared	  a	  Declaration	   in	  which	  they	  expressed	  their	  profound	  
concerns	  for	  the	  “continuing	  egregious	  violations	  of	  our	  civil,	  political,	  economic,	  
cultural	   and	   social	   rights”.	   They	   also	   stated	   that	   “the	   continuing	   racism	   and	  
discrimination	  against	  us	  and	  against	  our	  use	  of	  our	  own	  languages	  and	  practice	  
of	  our	   cultures”,	   the	  “non-­‐recognition	  of	  our	   collective	   identities	  as	   indigenous	  
peoples”	   and	   the	   “theft	   of	   our	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   over	   our	   cultural	  
heritage,	   traditional	   cultural	   expressions	   and	   traditional	   knowledge,	   including	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108	  See	  electronic	  document	  <www.ipcb.org/resolutions/htmls/kim_dec.html>	  last	  visited	  on	  24/06/2012.	  
109	  International	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   Summit	   on	   Sustainable	   Development,	   Khoi-­‐San	   Territory,	   Kimberley,	  
South	   Africa	   (20-­‐23	   August	   2002)	   electronic	   document	   <www.ipcb.org/resolutions/htmls/kim_dec.html>	  




biopiracy	   of	   genetic	   resources	   and	   related	   knowledge”.110	  At	   the	   G8	   Summit	  
(2008),	   among	   other	   important	   things,	   indigenous	   peoples	   requested	   that	   the	  
international	  community	  “effectively	  implement	  the	  United	  Nations	  Declaration	  
on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  and	  use	  this	  as	  the	  main	  framework	  to	  guide	  
the	  development	  of	  all	  official	  development	  assistance	   (ODA),	   investments	  and	  
policies	   and	   programmes	   affecting	   Indigenous	   Peoples”.111	  In	   the	   same	   vein	  
indigenous	   representatives	   demanded	   that	   states	   “support	   the	   fundamental	  
rights	  of	   Indigenous	  Peoples	   to	  practice	  and	   to	  enjoy	   their	   cultural	  history	  and	  
the	   right	   to	   protect	   and	   to	   teach	   their	   cultural	   heritage	   through	   the	  
establishment	  of	  Indigenous-­‐owned	  and	  controlled	  cultural	  centres	  within	  states	  
and	  local	  jurisdictions”.112	  In	  2007,	  before	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	  
Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Genetic	  Resources,	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  and	  Folklore	  
(IGC),	   it	  was	   reported	   that	   “a	   set	   of	   initiatives	   to	   promote	   the	   participation	   of	  
indigenous	   and	   local	   communities	   has	   culminated	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   an	  
indigenous-­‐chaired	  panel	  as	  opening	  segment	  of	  each	  session	  of	  the	  IGC,	  and	  the	  
successful	   launch	   of	   a	   Voluntary	   Fund	   directly	   to	   support	   the	   participation	   of	  
these	  communities”.113	  Although	  the	  initiative	  of	  WIPO	  is	  admirable,	  it	  does	  not	  
take	  into	  account	  important	  aspects	  of	  the	  issue.	  It	   is	  unrealistic	  to	  believe	  that	  
all	   indigenous	  peoples	  are	  informed	  about	  the	  traditional	  practices	  (and	  related	  
cultures)	  happening	  within	   the	   community,	  otherwise	   there	  would	  be	  no	  need	  
for	  the	  role	  of	  the	  guardians.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  underlined,	  the	  custodians	  
are,	  most	  of	  the	  time,	  holders	  of	  sacred	  practices	  that	  cannot	  be	  disclosed	  to	  the	  
general	  public	   inside	  and	  outside	  the	  community.	   In	  addition,	  contrary	   to	  what	  
most	  books	  state,	  indigenous	  guardians	  are	  not	  the	  custodians	  of	  the	  resources	  
(natural	   and	   non),	   but	   of	   the	   knowledge	   that	   comes	   with	   the	   use	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 	  Indigenous	   Peoples’	   Declaration	   on	   G8	   Summit	   (Hokkaido-­‐Japan,	   2008)	   electronic	   document	  
<www.dominionpaper.ca/weblogs/lia_tarachansky/1925>	  last	  visited	  on	  03/03/2015.	  
111	  “Ensure	  that	  we,	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  all	  over	  the	  world,	  take	  up	  the	  responsibility	  to	  implement	  the	  UN	  
Declaration	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples,	   themselves,	   and	   enter	   into	   constructive	   dialogue	   with	  
States,	   the	   UN	   System	   and	   the	   other	   intergovernmental	   bodies	   to	   discuss	   how	   they	   can	   effectively	  
implement	  the	  Declaration	  at	  the	  local,	  national,	  regional	  and	  international	  levels.	  3.	  Use	  the	  UN	  Permanent	  
Forum	  on	  Indigenous	  Issues,	  the	  Expert	  Mechanism	  on	  Indigenous	  Peoples’	  Rights,	  the	  Special	  Rapporteur	  
on	   the	   situation	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   fundamental	   freedoms	   of	   indigenous	   people,	   as	   mechanisms	   to	  
monitor	   and	   ensure	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   UNDRIP	   by	   the	   aforementioned	   actors”	   see	   Indigenous	  
Peoples’	   Declaration	   on	   G8	   Summit	   electronic	   document	  
<www.dominionpaper.ca/weblogs/lia_tarachansky/1925>	  last	  visited	  on	  03/03/2015.	  
112	  Supra.	  
113 	  WIPO,	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	  




resources.	  While	   resources	   can	  be	   static,	   the	   knowledge	   and	   cultural	   practices	  
connected	  to	  them	  are	  dynamically	  evolving	  and	  consequently	  mostly	  unfixable.	  
It	   is	   the	   knowledge	   that	  brings	   value	   to	   the	   resource.	  Without	   it,	   the	   resource	  
would	   be	   valuable	   only	   in	   its	   potential	   unexplored	   intrinsic	   value.	   To	   add	   a	  
problem	  to	  a	  problem,	  not	  all	   indigenous	  representatives	  or	  stakeholders	  might	  
have	   at	   heart	   the	   best	   interests	   of	   their	   communities.	   Moved	   by	   easy	   profit,	  
some	  indigenous	  representatives	  who	  grew	  up	  outside	  the	  educational	  values	  of	  
the	   community	  might	   be	   capable	   of	   exploiting	   the	   cultural	   expressions	   of	   that	  
same	  community.	  This	  scenario	   is	   today	   far	   from	  being	  unrealistic.	   In	   this	  case,	  
the	   selection-­‐process	   of	   indigenous	   representatives	   within	   international	   fora	  
becomes	   of	   strategic	   importance.	   This	   raises	   the	   question	  whether	   indigenous	  
experts	   are	   actually	   chosen	   by	   indigenous	   communities.	   In	   this	   regard,	   WIPO	  
remains	  vague.	   It	  says	  that	  over	  the	  years	  the	  “WIPO	  Secretariat	  has	  continued	  
its	  practice	  of	  consulting	  with	  interested	  representatives	  of	  indigenous	  and	  local	  
communities	   on	   draft	   documents	   and	   other	   material	   being	   developed	   for	   the	  
IGC”,114	  but	   it	   does	   not	   explain	  who	   these	   representatives	   are,	  why	   they	   have	  
been	  chosen	  and	  what	  credentials	  they	  bring	  to	  the	  forum.	  In	  addition,	  when	  it	  
comes	  to	  indigenous	  representatives,	  WIPO	  explains	  that	  their	  role	  is	  limited	  to	  
‘consultation’,	  without	  any	  active	  participation	  in	  the	  voting	  system.	  
It	  is	  the	  belief	  of	  the	  author	  that	  such	  selection	  processes	  are	  of	  key	  importance	  
for	   the	   correct	   and	   effective	   representation	   of	   indigenous	   communities	  within	  
national	  and	  international	  fora.	  It	  is	  also	  firm	  belief	  that	  the	  participation	  in	  the	  
decision	  process	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  holders	  should	  be	  more	  effective	  and	  
incisive.115	  	  
In	   the	   Mataatua	   Declaration	   on	   Cultural	   and	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	   of	  
Indigenous	   Peoples	   (1993),	   indigenous	   representatives	   insisted	   that	   “existing	  
protection	  mechanisms	  are	  insufficient	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 	  WIPO,	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	  
Knowledge	  and	  Folklore	  (Genève,	  2007)	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/11/9	  at	  13.	  
115	  Art	  18	  of	  the	  UNDRIP	  states	  that:	  “Indigenous	  peoples	  have	  the	  right	  to	  participate	  in	  decision-­‐making	  in	  
matters	  which	  would	  affect	  their	  rights,	  through	  representatives	  chosen	  by	  themselves	  in	  accordance	  with	  
their	   own	   procedures,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   maintain	   and	   develop	   their	   own	   indigenous	   decision-­‐making	  
institutions”,	  whereas	  Art	  19	  carries	  on	  stating	  that	  “States	  shall	  consult	  and	  cooperate	   in	  good	  faith	  with	  
the	   indigenous	   peoples	   concerned	   through	   their	   own	   representative	   institutions	   in	   order	   to	   obtain	   their	  
free,	  prior	  and	  informed	  consent	  before	  adopting	  and	  implementing	  legislative	  or	  administrative	  measures	  




Intellectual	  and	  Cultural	  Property	  Rights”.116	  They	  stressed	  that	  the	  beneficiaries	  
of	   the	  knowledge	  “(cultural	  and	   intellectual	  property	  rights)	  must	  be	  the	  direct	  
indigenous	   descendants	   of	   such	   knowledge”.117	  They	   added	   that	   they	   are	   “the	  
guardians	  of	  their	  customary	  knowledge”118	  and	  consequently	  have	  the	  right	  “to	  
protect	   and	   control”	   its	   dissemination119	  and	   to	   be	   “the	   first	   beneficiaries	   of	  
indigenous	  knowledge”.120	  
Over	  time,	  indigenous	  statements	  and	  declarations	  have	  repeated	  the	  same	  view	  
that	   “…	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   and	   Nations	   …	   are	   capable	   of	   managing	   our	  
intellectual	   property	   ourselves,	   but	   are	   willing	   to	   share	   it	   with	   all	   humanity	  
provided	   that	   our	   fundamental	   rights	   to	   define	   and	   control	   this	   property	   are	  
recognised	   by	   the	   international	   community”.121	  But	   who	   should	   be	   called	   to	  
represent	   indigenous	   peoples’	   interests?	   In	   the	   management	   of	   intellectual	  
property,	  indigenous	  peoples	  often	  refer	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  guardians	  as	  keepers	  
of	  the	  knowledge	  who	  are	  the	  only	  ones	  entitled	  by	  customary	  laws	  to	  manage	  
the	  diffusion	  and	  transmission	  of	  the	  knowledge.122	  They	  are	  the	  representatives	  
that	  should	  be	  informed	  of	  the	  decisions	  taken	  in	  the	  national	  and	  international	  
fora,	  and	  should	  be	  the	  representatives	  that	  attend	  such	  meetings.	  How	  could	  it	  
be	   otherwise?	   How	   can	   representatives	   who	   know	   nothing	   of	   the	   sacred	  
knowledge	   fight	   for	   its	   protection?	   True	   one	   can	   discuss	   the	  manifestation	   of	  
such	  knowledge	  that	  has	  already	  entered	  the	  public	  domain	  through	  art,	  medical	  
remedies,	  songs	  etc.	  And	  yet,	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  the	  intrinsic	  spiritual	  
values	   of	   the	   cultural	   expression	   that	   is	   embodied	   in	   the	   expression,	   and	   the	  
abstract	  knowledge	  (sacred	  or	  not)	  that	  was	  channelled	  in	  that	  specific	  form.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  Mataatua	  Declaration	  on	  Cultural	  and	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  Commission	  on	  
Human	  Rights	  Sub-­‐Commission	  of	  Prevention	  of	  Discrimination	  and	  Protection	  of	  Minorities	  Working	  Group	  
on	   Indigenous	   Populations	   (Whakatane,	   12-­‐18	   June	   1993	   Aotearoa,	   New	   Zealand,	   July	   1993)	   Article	   2	  
<www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/databases/creative_heritage/docs/mataatua.pdf>	   last	   visited	   on	  
15/07/2015.	  
117	  Art	  2.5.	  
118	  Art	  2.1.	  
119	  Art	  2.1.	  
120	  Art	  1.3.	  
121	  The	  Julayinbul	  Statement	  on	  Indigenous	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  (1993).	  
122	  “As	   Indigenous	  women,	   we	   have	   a	   fundamental	   role	   in	   environmental	   conservation	   and	   preservation	  
throughout	   the	  history	  of	  our	  Peoples.	  We	  are	   the	  guardians	  of	   Indigenous	  knowledge	  and	   it	   is	  our	  main	  
responsibility	   to	   protect	   and	   perpetuate	   this	   knowledge.	  Our	  weavings,	  music,	   songs,	   costumes,	   and	   our	  
knowledge	  of	  agriculture,	  hunting	  or	  fishing	  are	  all	  examples	  of	  some	  of	  our	  contributions	  to	  the	  world.	  We	  
are	  daughters	  of	  Mother	  Earth	  and	  to	  her	  we	  are	  obliged.	  Our	  ceremonies	  recognize	  her	  and	  we	  return	  to	  
her	   the	   placentas	   of	   our	   children.	   She	   also	   safeguards	   the	   remains	   of	   our	   ancestors”	   see	   The	  Manukan	  
Declaration	  of	  the	  Indigenous	  Women's	  Biodiversity	  Network	  (IWBN)	  Maunkan,	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  to	  




By	  saving	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  knowledge,	  do	  we	  save	  the	  knowledge?	  Or	  is	  the	  
possibility	   of	   a	   representation	   of	   the	   knowledge	   in	   any	   forms	   considered	  
necessary	  for	  the	  life	  of	  the	  community	  that	  should	  be	  safeguarded?	  In	  that	  case,	  
it	   is	   the	   role	  of	   the	   guardian	   that	  becomes	  essential,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   customary	  
laws	   that	   control	   it.	   This	  means	   that	   the	   values	  of	   the	  guardianship	  associated	  
with	   the	   custody	   of	   the	   knowledge	   are	   the	   ones	   that	   need	   to	   be	   defined	   and	  
protected,	  as	   living	  manifestations	  of	  the	  sacred	  knowledge	   itself.	  On	  the	  same	  
token,	   do	   we	   need	   to	   address	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   knowledge	   and	   a	   cultural	  
expression	  of	  that	  knowledge	  to	  believe	  it	  exists,	  or	  is	  it	  enough	  to	  know	  that	  it	  
exists	   because	   it	   is	   so	   said,	   to	   guarantee	   its	   perpetual	   existence	   and	  
manifestation?	  This	   is	  what	   indigenous	  guardians	  have	  always	   said.	  Knowledge	  
has	   always	   existed.	   The	   guardians	   have	   been	   selected	   and	   granted	   the	   access	  
and	  the	  task	  to	  ensure	  protection	  of	  that	  knowledge	  because	  they	  were	  judged	  
suitable	   to	  guarantee	   the	  perpetual	  protection	  of	   the	  knowledge.	  All	   the	   rights	  
over	   the	   knowledge	   reside	   in	   the	   customary	   laws.	  Knowledge	   creates	   the	   laws	  
and	  the	  laws	  guarantee	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  knowledge.	  To	  intervene	  in	  this	  
circular	   mechanism	   means	   to	   interrupt	   or	   distort	   (alter)	   the	   flow	   of	   the	  
knowledge	  itself.	  In	  this	  light,	  is	  it	  correct	  to	  use	  the	  Western	  legal	  framework	  as	  
the	  referential	  point	  from	  where	  all	  laws	  depart	  if	  those	  laws	  where	  not	  de	  facto	  
comprehensive	  of	  indigenous	  knowledge?	  
At	   present	  WIPO	   seems	   divided	   between	   the	   interests	   of	   TK	   holders	   and	   the	  
political	   pressure	   of	   industrial	   and	   states	   stakeholders:	   the	   first	   stressing	   the	  
holistic	  nature	  of	  TK	  and	  TCE	  which	  cannot	  become	  subject	  of	  “private	  IPRs	  in	  the	  
hands	  of	  outside	  parties”;123	  the	  second	  insisting	  on	  the	  importance	  to	  work	  with	  
a	  broader	  notion	  of	  protection	   in	  which	   indigenous	  custodians,	  as	  a	  minority	   in	  
the	  great	  scheme	  of	  things,	  must	  try	  to	  accommodate	  their	  claims	  in	  order	  to	  be	  
heard.	  After	  years	  of	  debates,	   it	  seems,	  however,	  that	  both	  requests	  cannot	  be	  
accommodated	  at	   the	  same	  time.	  While	  a	  one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all	  approach	  will	  not	  be	  
workable	  for	   indigenous	  peoples,	  dividing	   IPRs	   into	   indigenous	  peoples	  and	  the	  
rest	   of	   the	  world	   seems,	   politically	   and	   economically,	   not	   only	   unpractical	   but	  
unrealistic.	   How	   can	   the	   world	   safeguard	   indigenous	   knowledge	   from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




commercialization	  while	  commercializing	  it?	  	  
In	  Western	  societies,	  human	  knowledge	  and	  the	  reproduction	  of	  that	  knowledge	  
entails	   an	   idea	   of	   reward,	   personal	   control,	   dissemination	   and	   commercial	  
agreement	   between	   the	   right-­‐holder	   and	   the	   society	   that	   is	  manifested	   in	   the	  
commercialization	   of	   the	   property	   and	   its	   protection	   from	   the	  
commercialization’s	   mechanisms.	   Intellectual	   property	   rights	   regulate	   the	  
protection	  of	   the	  knowledge	  and	   its	   representations.124	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   the	  
safeguarding	  of	   indigenous	  knowledge	  can	  be	  guaranteed	  not	   in	   the	  control	  of	  
the	  dissemination,	   but	   in	   the	   restriction	  of	   the	   access.	   In	   this	   case,	   indigenous	  
peoples	   already	   possess	   a	   code	  of	   laws	  which	   guarantee	   the	   restriction	   of	   the	  
access	   to	   the	  knowledge	   through	   “locally-­‐specific	   system	  of	   jurisprudence	  with	  
respect	  to	  the	  classification	  of	  different	  types	  of	  knowledge,	  proper	  procedures	  
for	   acquiring	   and	   sharing	   knowledge,	   and	   the	   rights	   and	   responsibilities	  which	  
attach	   to	   possessing	   knowledge,	   all	   of	   which	   are	   embedded	   uniquely	   in	   each	  
culture	  and	  its	  language”125	  that	  are	  not	  recognised	  by	  national	  and	  international	  
laws,	   and	   yet	   remain	   the	   best	   system	   of	   regulations	   that	   indigenous	   peoples	  
have.	  	  
	  
While	  this	  chapter	  has	  defined	  who	  indigenous	  guardians	  are	  and	  what	  their	  role	  
entails	   within	   indigenous	   communities,	   the	   next	   chapters	   will	   explain	   that	  
indigenous	  cultures,	  and	  culture	  in	  general,	  over	  the	  years,	  have	  acquired	  more	  
importance	  at	  national	  and	  international	  level,	  and	  human	  rights	  and	  intellectual	  
property	   laws	  have	   come	  closer	   in	  discussing	   the	   issues	   concerning	   indigenous	  
peoples	  heritage	  and	   traditions,	  while	   trying	   to	   find	  workable	   solutions	   for	   the	  
safeguard	   of	   indigenous	   cultures.	   As	   it	   will	   be	   seen	   next,	   culture	   itself	   has	   a	  
broad,	   complex	   meaning	   that	   cannot	   be	   limited	   to	   a	   clear-­‐cut	   definition	   and	  
protected	  by	  a	  single	  law.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  discuss	  indigenous	  cultures	  and	  
international	   law.	   The	   chapter	   is	   important	   in	   order	   to	   discuss	   and	   collocate	  
indigenous	  peoples	  as	   legal	  entities	  within	  the	  broader	  context	  of	   international	  
law.	   To	   that	   end,	   the	   chapter	   discusses	   how	   international	   law	   has,	   so	   far,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124	  See	   Johanna	  Gibson	  Community	  Resources:	   Intellectual	  Property,	   International	   Trade	  and	  Protection	  of	  
Traditional	  Knowledge	  (Ashgate	  Publishing,	  Aldershot,	  2005)	  at	  Introduction.	  
125 	  WIPO	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	  




understood	   and	   safeguarded	   indigenous	   cultures.	   The	   chapter	   will	   also	   show	  
that	  international	  law	  is	  slowly	  taking	  into	  consideration	  indigenous	  ‘sacred’	  and	  
‘secret’	  practices	  as	  fundamental	  aspects	  of	   indigenous	  lives	  and	  traditions	  that	  





Indigenous	  Culture	  and	  International	  Law	  	  	  
	  
This	  chapter	  is	  an	  overview	  of	   indigenous	  peoples	  within	  the	  international	   legal	  
system.	   It	   is	   important,	   in	   fact,	   to	   describe	   indigenous	   peoples’	   rights	   and	  
expectations	  and	  to	  explain	  what	  the	  international	  legal	  system	  has	  done	  so	  far	  
to	  safeguard	  their	  cultures	  and	  traditions.	  
	  
International	   law	   is	   a	   “body	  of	   transnational	   rules	   and	  procedures	   and	   links	   to	  
international	  institutions,	  in	  which	  the	  state	  is	  the	  primary	  or	  dominant	  actor”.1	  
According	   to	   the	   United	   Nations,	   “international	   law	   defines	   the	   legal	  
responsibilities	  of	  States	  in	  their	  conduct	  with	  each	  other,	  and	  their	  treatment	  of	  
individuals	   within	   State	   boundaries”. 2 	  According	   to	   Anaya,	   while	   the	  
international	   law	   of	   the	   colonial	   era	   upheld	   the	   suppression	   of	   indigenous	  
peoples	  and	  their	  cultures,	  it	  continues	  to	  “be	  applied	  and	  regarded	  as	  affirming	  
the	  sovereignty	  of	  states	  over	  indigenous	  peoples”.3	  However,	  things	  are	  slowly	  
changing,	  and	   indigenous	  voices	  are	   today	  stronger	   than	  ever.	  The	  chapter	  will	  
collocate	  indigenous	  peoples	  within	  the	  broad	  scenario	  of	  international	  affairs	  to	  
delineate	  what	  has	  been	  done	  so	   far	   to	  safeguard	  their	  cultures,	  and	  what	  still	  
needs	   to	   be	   done.	   Any	   discourse	   on	   International	   Intellectual	   Property	   laws	  






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  James	  Anaya	  “Indigenous	  Law	  and	  Its	  Contribution	  to	  Global	  Pluralism”	  (2007)	  3	  Indigenous	  Law	  Journal	  3	  
at	  4.	  
2 	  “Its	   domain	   encompasses	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   issues	   of	   international	   concern	   such	   as	   human	   rights,	  
disarmament,	  international	  crime,	  refugees,	  migration,	  problems	  of	  nationality,	  the	  treatment	  of	  prisoners,	  
the	  use	  of	  force,	  and	  the	  conduct	  of	  war,	  among	  others.	  It	  also	  regulates	  the	  global	  commons,	  such	  as	  the	  
environment,	   sustainable	   development,	   international	   waters,	   outer	   space,	   global	   communications	   and	  
world	  trade”	  see	  UN	  electronic	  document	  <www.un.org/en/globalissues/internationallaw/>.	  




5.1	  -­‐	  International	  Law’s	  Attempts	  to	  Understand	  and	  Safeguard	  Indigenous	  
Peoples’	  Cultures	  and	  Traditions	  
	  
Today,	   indigenous	   peoples’	   organizations,	   NGOs,	   and	   stakeholders	   are	   actively	  
trying	   to	   safeguard	   what	   is	   left	   of	   indigenous	   cultures,	   through	   restitution,	  
reparation	  and	  pressure	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  sui	  generis	  legislation.	  On	  one	  side,	  it	  
is	   clear	   that	   international	   and	   local	   indigenous	   organizations	   are	   using	   the	  
existing	   legal	  measures	   in	  a	  defensive	  way	   to	   redress	  wrongs	  done	   in	   the	  past.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  history	  cannot	  be	  changed	  or	  cancelled	  and	  
the	   changes	   every	   society	   have	   gone	   through	   during	   its	   history	   is	   undeniable,	  
regardless	   of	   the	   just	   or	   unjust	   reasons	   that	   determined	   the	   change.	  What	   is	  
important	   today	   is	   to	   comprehend	   how	   fundamental	   it	   is	   to	   understand	  
indigenous	  peoples’	  traditions	  and	  the	  essential	  role	  they	  play	  within	  indigenous	  
societies	   and	   –	   where	   necessary	   –	   to	   consult	   with	   indigenous	   representatives	  
and	   create	   ad	   hoc,	   sui	   generis	   legislation	   to	   address	   indigenous	   claims	   and	  
safeguard	   traditional	   knowledge.	   This	   is	   because	   indigenous	   peoples	   have	   the	  
right	  to	  self-­‐determine	  their	  own	  destinies	  and	  to	  decide	  how	  to	  safeguard	  their	  
traditions	   and	   preserve	   their	   integrity	   as	   they	   have	   traditionally	   done	   prior	  
colonization.	  	  
Today	   indigenous	  peoples,	  TK	  holders	  and	  guardians	  are	   struggling	   to	  preserve	  
what	  is	  left	  of	  their	  traditions.	  The	  struggle	  they	  are	  facing	  is	  legal	  and	  political,	  
as	  well	  as	  moral	  and	  psychological.	  It	  is	  internal	  within	  the	  community,	  as	  much	  
as	  external	   in	   the	  world	  at	   large.	  Much	  of	   the	   idea	   indigenous	  peoples	  have	  of	  
themselves	   is,	   in	   fact,	   still	   influenced	   by	   an	   ongoing	   ‘colonization	   of	   the	  mind’	  
which	  has	  been	  instilled	  during	  centuries	  of	  colonization	  and	  forced	  assimilation.	  
In	   her	   article	   Njoki	   Nathami	   Wane	   explains	   that	   the	   worse	   typology	   of	  
colonization	  ever	  exported	  is	  the	  one	  of	  the	  mind.4	  	  The	  colonization	  of	  the	  mind	  
erodes	   cultures,	   ideas	   and	   identities,	   and	   unnaturally	   substitutes	   them	   with	  
imposed	  prefabricated	  ideas	  that	  have	  no	  roots	  in	  the	  traditional	  domain	  of	  the	  
colonized.	  The	  result	   is	   isolation,	  alienation,	   low	  self-­‐esteem	  and	  a	  total	   lack	  of	  
faith	   in	   the	   future.	   When	   international	   law	   refers	   to	   the	   right	   of	   self-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 	  Njoki	   Nathami	   Wane	   “Mapping	   the	   Field	   of	   Indigenous	   Knowledge	   in	   Anti-­‐Colonial	   Discourse:	   a	  




determination,	   it	   should	   assume	   that,	   in	   order	   for	   such	   a	   right	   to	   be	  
implemented	  correctly,	  indigenous	  peoples	  should	  first	  of	  all	  regain	  the	  identity	  
lost	  with	   the	  colonization	  process	  and	  the	  colonization	  of	   the	  mind	  that	  comes	  
with	  it,	  and	  only	  then	  assess	  the	  type	  of	  future	  they	  picture	  for	  themselves	  and	  
their	   children.	   In	   this	   scenario,	   states	   should	   encourage	   and	   facilitate	   such	  
healing	   process.5 	  As	   such,	   indigenous	   peoples’	   culture	   and	   its	   dispossession	  
remain	  central	  in	  any	  discourse	  on	  indigenous	  rights.	  
If	   the	   matter	   were	   not	   so	   important,	   the	   Preamble	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	  
Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples6	  would	  not	  state	  that:	  	  
	  
…	   all	   doctrines,	   policies	   and	   practices	   based	   on	   or	   advocating	   superiority	   of	  
peoples	  or	  individuals	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  national	  origin	  or	  racial,	  religious,	  ethnic	  or	  
cultural	   differences	   are	   racist,	   scientifically	   false,	   legally	   invalid,	   morally	  
condemnable	   and	   socially	   unjust	   [as	   well	   as]	   that	   indigenous	   peoples	   have	  
suffered	   from	  historic	   injustices	  as	  a	   result	  of,	   inter	  alia,	   their	   colonization	  and	  
dispossession	   of	   their	   lands,	   territories	   and	   resources,	   thus	   preventing	   them	  
from	   exercising,	   in	   particular,	   their	   right	   to	   development	   in	   accordance	   with	  
their	  own	  needs	  and	  interests.	  
	  
In	  international	  law,	  the	  fundamental	  importance	  of	  the	  cultural	  life	  of	  any	  given	  
community	  was	   firstly	   recognized	  by	  Article	  27	  of	   the	  Universal	  Declaration	  on	  
Human	  Rights7	  which	  states	  that:	  
	  
Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  freely	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  cultural	  life	  of	  the	  community,	  
to	   enjoy	   the	   arts	   and	   to	   share	   in	   scientific	   advancement	   and	   its	   benefits.	  
Everyone	   has	   the	   right	   to	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   moral	   and	   material	   interests	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 	  Njoki	   Nathami	   Wane	   “Mapping	   the	   Field	   of	   Indigenous	   Knowledge	   in	   Anti-­‐Colonial	   Discourse:	   a	  
Transformative	  Journey	  in	  Education”	  at	  183-­‐197.	  
6	  The	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly	  on	  Thursday,	  
13	  September	  2007	  see	  full	  text	  at	  <www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf>	   last	  visited	  
on	  14/07/2015.	  
7	  The	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (UDHR)	  is	  a	  milestone	  document	  in	  the	  history	  of	  human	  rights.	  
Drafted	  by	  representatives	  with	  different	  legal	  and	  cultural	  backgrounds	  from	  all	  regions	  of	  the	  world,	  the	  
Declaration	  was	  proclaimed	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  in	  Paris	  on	  10	  December	  1948	  General	  
Assembly	  resolution	  217	  A	  (III)	  as	  a	  common	  standard	  of	  achievements	  for	  all	  peoples	  and	  all	  nations.	  It	  sets	  





resulting	   from	   any	   scientific,	   literary	   or	   artistic	   production	   of	   which	   he	   is	   the	  
author.	  
	  
The	   Universal	   Declaration	   remains	   the	   primary	   source	   of	   global	   human	   rights	  
standards.	  Every	  international	  instrument	  that	  advocates	  human	  rights	  refers	  to	  
the	  UDHR.	  It	  essentially	  recognises	  the	  fundamental	  connection	  between	  culture	  
and	   the	   survival	  of	   any	   community	  of	   this	  world.	   In	   simple	   terms,	   it	   advocates	  
the	   importance	   of	   respecting	   cultures	   and	   cultural	   manifestations	   as	   part	   of	  
people’s	   lives.	  While	   declarations	  have	   recommendatory	  purposes	   and	   are	  not	  
legally	   binding	   on	   states,	   today	   most	   of	   the	   Universal	   Declaration	   is	   however	  
believed	  to	  have	  attained	  a	  customary	  international	  law	  status	  (ius	  gentium).8	  In	  
other	   words,	   its	   articles	   have	   gained	   mandatory	   legal	   force. 9 	  Some	   of	   its	  
provisions	   have	   even	   reached	   the	   character	   of	   ius	   cogens,	   being	   therefore	  
inderogable.10	  They	  are	   inherent	  because	   they	  are	   intrinsic	   in	   the	  characteristic	  
of	  being	  human.11	  Together	  with	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  
Rights	  (ICCPR)12	  and	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  “In	  Roman	   law,	   the	   term	   for	   the	  body	  of	  customary	  norms	   is	   ius	  gentium.	  Two	  requirements	  determine	  
whether	  a	  particular	  norm	  expresses	   ‘international	  custom,	  as	  evidence	  of	  a	  general	  practice	  accepted	  as	  
law’.	  There	   is,	   first,	  an	  objective	   factor:	  sufficiently	  widespread	  and	  repeated	  practice	  by	  states	  and	  other	  
international	   legal	   actors.	   Second,	   there	   is	   a	   subjective	   factor,	   known	   as	  opinio	   juris	   sive	   necessitatis,	   by	  
which	  the	  established	  practice	  must	  be	  followed	  our	  out	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  legal	  obligation.	  The	  second	  element	  
is	   necessary	   because	   states	   and	   other	   international	   legal	   actors	  might	   behave	   in	   a	   particular	  way	   out	   of	  
habit	  or	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  convenience	  but	  not	  feel	  compelled	  by	  any	  sense	  of	  a	  legal	  obligation	  to	  act	  in	  that	  
manner”	   see	   James	  AR	  Nafziger,	  Robert	  K	  Paterson	  and	  others	  Cultural	   Law	   (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  
New	  York,	  2010)	  at	  149.	  
9	  Hurst	  Hannum	  “The	  status	  of	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  National	  and	  International	  Law”	  
(1995-­‐1996)	  J	  Int'l	  and	  Comp	  L	  287	  at	  289-­‐290.	  
10	  “Jus	   cogens	  (from	   Latin:	   compelling	   law;	   English:	   peremptory	   norm)	   refers	   to	   certain	   fundamental,	  
overriding	   principles	   of	   international	   law,	   from	  which	   no	   derogation	   is	   ever	   permitted.	  	  See	  Ian	   Brownlie,	  
Principles	  of	  Public	  International	  Law	  (5th	  ed,	  Oxford,	  1998).	  	  In	  practice,	  jurists’	  attempt	  to	  classify	  certain	  
rules,	  rights	  and	  duties	  asjus	  cogens	  or	  peremptory	  norms	  have	  not	  met	  with	  success:	  while	  there	  is	  near-­‐
universal	   agreement	   for	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   category	   of	  jus	   cogens	  norms,	   there	   is	   far	   less	   agreement	  
regarding	  the	  actual	  content	  of	  this	  category.	  	  Id.	  at	  517.	  Examples	  of	  jus	  cogens	  norms	  include:	  	  prohibition	  
on	  the	  use	  of	  force;	  the	  law	  of	  genocide;	  principle	  of	  racial	  non-­‐discrimination;	  crimes	  against	  humanity;	  and	  
the	   rules	   prohibiting	   trade	   in	   slaves	   or	   human	   trafficking”	   electronic	   document	  
<www.law.cornell.edu/wex/jus_cogens>	  last	  visited	  on	  06/03/2015.	  
11 	  See	   Anthea	   Roberts	   “Traditional	   And	   Modern	   Approaches	   to	   Customary	   International	   Law:	   A	  
Reconciliation”	  and	  Dinah	  Shelton	  “Introduction:	  Law,	  Non-­‐Law	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	   ‘Soft	  Law’”	   in	  Henry	   J	  
Steiner,	   Philip	   Alston	   and	   others	   International	   Human	   Rights	   in	   Context,	   (3rd	   ed,	  Oxford	  University	   Press,	  
New	   York	   and	   Oxford,	   2007)	   at	   162	   and	   165;	   see	   also	   Hurst	   Hannum	   “The	   Status	   of	   the	   Universal	  
Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  National	  and	  International	  Law”	  (1995)	  25	  Georgia	  Journal	  of	  International	  
and	  Comparative	  Law	  at	  295.	  
12	  International	   Covenant	   on	   Civil	   and	   Political	   Rights	   Adopted	   and	   opened	   for	   signature,	   ratification	   and	  
accession	   by	   General	   Assembly	   resolution	   2200A	   (XXI)	   of	   16	   December	   1966	   entry	   into	   force	   23	  March	  




Rights	   (ICESCR)13	  and	   their	   respective	   Optional	   Protocols,	   the	   UDHR	   form	   the	  
International	  Bill	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  Over	  the	  years,	  the	  human	  rights	  system	  has	  
been	  augmented	  by	  three	  regional	  Human	  Rights	  systems,	  established	  by	  three	  
main	  conventions:	  the	  European	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  
and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms	  (1950),	  the	  American	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  
(1978),	  and	  the	  African	  Charter	  on	  Human	  and	  Peoples’	  Rights	  (1987).	  While	  the	  
Charter	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   only	   requires	   that	   states	   would	   “pledge	  
themselves”	   to	   action	   “for	   the	   achievement”	   of	   purposes	   including	   the	  
promotion	   of	   human	   rights	   (Art	   1.2,	   1.3	   and	   Art	   55),	   the	   above	   instruments	  
compensate	   for	   the	   lack	   of	   specificity	   of	   the	  UN	   former	  multilateral	   treaty,	   by	  
covering	   in	  detail	   the	  basic	  categories	  of	   rights	   that	   figure	   in	   the	  UDHR	  and,	  at	  
the	  same	  time,	  include	  additional	  specific	  rights.	  	  
In	   1966	   the	   International	   Convention	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   All	   Forms	  of	   Racial	  
Discrimination	   (CERD) 14 	  was	   adopted	   to	   fight	   racism.	   Although	   all	   these	  
Conventions	  do	  not	  specifically	  refer	  to	  indigenous	  peoples	  as	  such,	  they	  include	  
indigenous	   peoples	   and	  minorities	   by	   reaffirming	   the	   importance	   to	   eliminate	  
every	   form	  of	   racial	  discrimination	   through	   the	  world	  as	  previously	  asserted	   in	  
the	  UDHR	  (Art.	  2).	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  indirectly	  call	  upon	  states	  to	  grant	  protection	  
to	   indigenous	   cultural	   diversity	   as	   well.	   Indigenous	   cultural	   rights	   are	   also	  
guaranteed	  by	  common	  Article	  1	  of	  the	  ICCPR	  and	  ICESCR,	  which	  states	  that:	  “…	  
all	  peoples	  have	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination.	  By	  virtue	  of	  that	  right	  they	  freely	  
determine	   their	   political	   status	   and	   freely	   pursue	   their	   economic,	   social	   and	  
cultural	  development”.15	  The	  general	  provision	  of	  the	  article	  has	  been	  amended	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  International	   Covenant	   on	   Economic,	   Social	   and	   Cultural	   Rights	   Adopted	   and	   opened	   for	   signature,	  
ratification	  and	  accession	  by	  General	  Assembly	  resolution	  2200A	  (XXI)	  of	  16	  December	  1966	  entry	  into	  force	  
3	  January	  1976,	  in	  accordance	  with	  article	  27.	  	  
14	  Adopted	   and	   opened	   for	   signature	   and	   ratification	   by	   General	   Assembly	   resolution	   2106	   (XX)	   of	   21	  
December	  1965	  entry	  into	  force	  4	  January	  1969,	  in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  19.	  
15	  Article	  1	  of	   the	   International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	   (ICCPR)	   reads:	   “All	  peoples	  have	   the	  
right	   of	   self-­‐determination.	   By	   virtue	   of	   that	   right	   they	   freely	   determine	   their	   political	   status	   and	   freely	  
pursue	  their	  economic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  development”.	  This	  exact	  language	  is	  also	  found	  in	  article	  1	  of	  the	  
International	   Covenant	   on	   Economic,	   Social	   and	   Cultural	   Rights	   (ICESCR).	   The	   two	   abovementioned	   UN	  
human	   rights	   Covenants	   were	   intended	   to	   serve	   as	   a	   ‘more	   elaborate	   formulation	   of	   human	   rights	  
standards’	  than	  the	  ‘preliminary	  step’	  of	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  that	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  
UN	  General	   Assembly	   on	   December	   10,	   1948.	   In	   other	  words,	   the	   above	   language	   regarding	   all	   peoples	  
having	   the	   right	   of	   self-­‐determination	   found	   in	   the	   Covenants	   of	   December	   16,	   1966,	   was	   part	   of	   the	  
General	  Assembly's	  effort	  to	  clarify	  the	  overall	   framework	  of	  human	  rights	  that	   it	  began	  to	  express	   in	  the	  
Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights.	   (See	   Ian	  Brownlie,	  Basic	  Documents	   in	   International	  Law	  (1983)	  p.	  
257)	   In	   the	   preamble	   of	   the	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights,	   we	   find	   that	   the	   General	   Assembly	  




later	  on	  with	  Article	  3	  of	  the	  UN	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  
(2007). 16 	  Although	   since	   2007	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   is	   specifically	  
referred	  to	   indigenous	  peoples	  as	  beneficiaries	  of	   the	  right,	  states	  participating	  
in	   the	   drafting	   of	   the	   Declaration	  made	   sure	   that	   Article	   3	  would	   refer	   to	   the	  
right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   in	   its	  weakest	   form.	  The	  possible	  effects	  of	   such	  an	  
article	   on	   the	   integrity	   of	   national	   States,	   in	   fact,	   deeply	   concerned	   the	   states	  
participating	  at	  the	  drafting	  process.	  While	  Canada,	  United	  States,	  New	  Zealand	  
and	  Australia	  had	  originally	  been	   the	  greatest	  opponents	   to	   the	  Declaration,	   it	  
was	  the	  African	  Union	  that,	  quite	  unexpectedly,	  in	  2006	  and	  2007	  led	  a	  campaign	  
to	   limit,	   in	   plain	   terms,	   the	   scope	  of	  Article	   3.17	  Article	   46.1	  was	   introduced	   to	  
formalize	   such	   limit.18	  In	   any	   event,	   indigenous	  peoples	   do	  not	   seek	   secession;	  
they	  only	  want	  to	  benefit	  from	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  to	  build	  a	  cultural	  
autonomy	  that	  will	  allow	  them	  to	  preserve	  their	  endangered	  cultures,	  their	  lands	  
and	   their	   languages. 19 	  Regardless	   of	   the	   consistent	   resistance	   of	   states	   to	  
recognise	  indigenous	  peoples’	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  for	  fear	  of	  secessionist	  
claims,20	  indigenous	  peoples’	  demand	  to	  self-­‐determine	  their	  own	  livelihood	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
peoples	  and	  all	  nations’.	  The	  General	  Assembly	   further	  declared	   the	  need	   for	   the	   ‘universal	  and	  effective	  
recognition’,	  of	  the	  rights	  enumerated	  therein,	  ‘both	  among	  the	  peoples	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  themselves	  
and	  among	  the	  peoples	  of	  the	  territories	  under	  their	  jurisdiction’.	  In	  short,	  the	  ICCPR	  and	  ICESCR	  clarify	  that	  
self-­‐determination	   is	   an	   essential	   part	   of	  what	   the	  UN	  General	   Assembly	   has	   declared	   to	   be	   ‘a	   common	  
standard	  of	  achievement	  for	  all	  peoples	  and	  all	  nations’,	  including	  the	  peoples	  considered	  to	  be	  ‘under	  the	  
jurisdiction	  of’	  Member	  States”	  see	  Steve	  Newcomb	  (Shawnee/Lenape)	  “Toward	  the	  Global	  Liberation	  of	  All	  
Nations	   and	   Peoples”	   Indigenous	   Law	   Institute	   electronic	   document	  
<http://ili.nativeweb.org/global_liberation.html>	  last	  visited	  on	  04/03/2015.	  
16 	  For	   further	   readings	   on	   the	   scope	   of	   self-­‐determination	   see	   James	   Anaya	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   in	  
International	   Law	   (Oxford	   University	   Press,	   New	   York,	   2004)	   at	   98;	   see	   also	   James	   Anaya	   International	  
Human	   Rights	   and	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   (Aspen	   Publishers	   Inc.,	   2009);	   Claire	   Charters	   and	   Rodolfo	  
Stavenhagen	   (eds)	   Making	   the	   Declaration	   Work:	   The	   United	   Nations	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	  
Indigenous	  Peoples	  (IWGIA,	  2010);	  Alexandra	  Xanthaki	  Reflections	  on	   the	  UN	  Declaration	  on	   the	  Rights	  of	  
Indigenous	  Peoples	   (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  2011);	  Marc	  Weller	  and	  Jessie	  Hohmann	  The	  
UN	  Declaration	  on	   the	  Rights	  of	   Indigenous	  Peoples:	  A	  Commentary	   (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Oxford	  and	  
New	  York,	  2017);	  Elvira	  Pulitano	   Indigenous	  Rights	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  the	  Un	  Declaration	   (Cambridge	  University	  
Press,	  Cambridge,	  2014).	  
17 	  See	   Assembly/AU/	   Dec	   141	   (VIII)	   <www.ohchr.org/en/Issues/IPeoples/Pages/Declaration.aspx>	   last	  
visited	  on	  04/08/2014.	  
18	  “Nothing	   in	   this	  Declaration	  may	  be	   interpreted	  as	   implying	   for	  any	  State,	  people,	  group	  or	  person	  any	  
right	   to	   engage	   in	   any	   activity	   or	   to	   perform	   any	   act	   contrary	   to	   the	   Charter	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   or	  
construed	  as	  authorizing	  or	  encouraging	  any	  action	  which	  would	  dismember	  or	  impair,	  totally	  or	  in	  part,	  the	  
territorial	  integrity	  or	  political	  unity	  of	  sovereign	  and	  independent	  States”.	  
19	  See	  Lorie	  M	  Graham	  and	  Siegfried	  Wiessner	  “Indigenous	  Sovereignty,	  Culture,	  and	  International	  Human	  
Rights	  Law”	  (2011)	  The	  South	  Atlantic	  Quarterly	  403	  at	  409-­‐413.	  
20	  “One	  of	  the	  issues	  in	  contention	  remains	  the	  definition	  and	  extent	  of	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination.	  Due	  
to	   the	   insistence	   of	   the	   African	   governments,	   this	   right	   was	   expressly	   conditioned	   by	   the	   principles	  
favouring	   the	   territorial	   integrity	   and	   political	   unity	   of	   states,	   principles	   that	   are	   not	   absolute	   and	   that	  
already	   conditioned	   the	   right	   of	   self-­‐determination	   under	   international	   law.	   Now,	   very	   few,	   if	   any,	  
indigenous	   peoples	   actually	   had	   asked	   for	   anything	   approaching	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   territorial	   integrity	   or	  




wellbeing	   has	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	   any	   call	   for	   political	   independence,	   but	   it	   is	  
rather	   linked	   to	   their	   right	   to	  “freely	  determine	   their	  political	   status	  and	   freely	  
pursue	  their	  economic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  development”,	  as	  specified	  by	  Article	  3	  
of	   the	  UNDRIP.	  Article	  4	  of	   the	  Declaration,	  consistently	  guarantees	   indigenous	  
peoples’	   “right	   to	   autonomy	   or	   self-­‐government	   in	   matters	   relating	   to	   their	  
internal	   and	   local	   affairs,	   as	   well	   as	   ways	   and	   means	   for	   financing	   their	  
autonomous	  functions”.	   Indigenous	  claims	  to	  self-­‐determination	  and	  autonomy	  
are	   fundamentally	   related	  to	   indigenous	  peoples’	  struggle	   for	  cultural	   integrity,	  
based	   on	   the	   need	   to	   ensure	   continuity	  with	   their	   traditions	   and	   customs.	  On	  
considering	  autonomy,	  cultural	  autonomy	  is	  today	  more	  readily	  recognised	  than	  
other	  aspects	  of	  self-­‐determination.21	  As	  shown	   in	  the	  previous	  chapters,	  when	  
speaking	   of	   indigenous	   cultures	  we	   try	   to	   enter	   into	   a	   realm	   that	   is	   not	   easily	  
accessible.	   It	   is	   the	   realm	   of	   the	   sacred,	   the	   secret	   and	   holistic	   beliefs	   and	  
practices.	   In	  his	  article	  on	  indigenous	  cultural	  rights,	  Wiessner	  quotes	  Professor	  
Reisman	  in	  explaining	  that,	  while	  political	  and	  economic	  rights	  are	  important:22	  	  	  
	  
…	   it	   is	   the	   integrity	  of	   the	   inner	  worlds	  of	  peoples	  –	   their	   rectitude	  systems	  or	  
their	   sense	   of	   spirituality	   –	   that	   is	   their	   distinctive	   humanity.	   Without	   an	  
opportunity	  to	  determine,	  sustain,	  and	  develop	  that	   integrity,	   their	  humanity	  –	  
and	  ours	  –	  is	  denied.	  	  
	  
Indigenous	   peoples’	   sovereignty	   cannot	   be	   separated	   from	   their	   cultures,	  
practices	   and	   their	   sacred	   lands.	  Given	   the	   complex	   interconnectedness	  of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sense	  of	  cultural	  and	  spiritual	  reaffirmation	  much	  more	  than	  in	  the	  Western	  sense	  of	  independent	  political	  
power.	   Looking	  at	   state	  practice,	   very	  widespread	  agreement	  persists,	   as	   stated	   in	  1999,	   that	   indigenous	  
peoples	   ‘hold	   the	   right	   to	   political,	   economic	   and	   social	   self-­‐determination,	   including	   a	   wide	   range	   of	  
autonomy	  and	   the	  maintenance	  and	  strengthening	  of	   their	  own	  system	  of	   justice’”	   see	   James	  Anaya	  and	  
Siegfried	  Wiessner	   “The	  UN	  Declaration	  on	   the	  Rights	  of	   Indigenous	  Peoples:	   Towards	   re-­‐empowerment”	  
electronic	   document	   <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/10/un-­‐declaration-­‐on-­‐rights-­‐of-­‐
indigenous.php>	  last	  visited	  on	  27/06/2012.	  
21	  According	  to	  Smith	  “…	  cultural	  autonomy	  would	  enable	  indigenous	  peoples	  ...	  to	  live	  in	  accordance	  with	  
their	  traditional	  practices,	  customs	  and	  laws	  …	  and	  to	  …	  develop	  those	  practices	  in	  response	  to	  the	  evolving	  
society	   in	  which	   they	   find	   themselves”	   see	   Rhona	   KM	   Smith	   Text	   and	  Materials	   on	   International	   Human	  
Rights	  (Routledge,	  New	  York,	  2007)	  at	  444.	  
22	  See	  Geoffrey	  Reisman	  “International	  Law	  and	  the	  Inner	  Worlds	  of	  Others”	  (1996)	  9	  St	  Thomas	  I	  Rev	  25	  in	  
Siegfried	  Wiessner	   “The	  Cultural	   Rights	   of	   Indigenous	  Peoples:	  Achievements	   and	  Continuing	  Challenges”	  




experiences	   of	   life	   of	   indigenous	   peoples,	   their	   claims	   are	   fundamentally	  
cultural.23	  
	  
5.2	  -­‐	  Indigenous	  Right	  to	  Self-­‐determination	  
	  
The	   right	   of	   self-­‐determination	   is	   today	   considered	   one	   of	   the	   major	  
developments	   of	   international	   law	   during	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   twentieth	  
century.24	  Davis	  considers	   it	  both	  a	  principle	  of	   international	   law	  and	  a	  bedrock	  
human	   right	   which	   is	   today	   at	   the	   core	   of	   democratic	   entitlement.25	  Although	  
discussed	   during	   the	   negotiations	   of	   the	   UNDRIP,	   indigenous	   peoples	   do	   not	  
qualify	   for	   the	   secessionist	   aspect	   included	   in	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	  
(often	  referred	  as	  the	  external	  dimension	  of	  the	  right),	  because	  they	  have	  been	  
unequivocally	  excluded	  from	  the	  category	  of	  colonized	  people.26	  However,	  they	  
still	  benefit	  from	  the	  ‘internal’	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination,	  which	  entails	  the	  right	  
to	   preserve	   and	   manage	   their	   own	   culture	   and	   traditions	   in	   accordance	   with	  
their	   values.27 	  This	   is	   why	   the	   UN	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	   Indigenous	  
Peoples,	  while	  restricting	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  to	  its	  internal	  character	  
(by	   adding	   article	   46),	   nonetheless	   recognises	   the	   respect	   for	   indigenous	  
knowledge,	  cultures,	  traditional	  practices	  and	  traditional	  lands.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Siegfried	  Wiessner	  “The	  Cultural	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples:	  Achievements	  and	  Continuing	  Challenges”	  
(2011)	  22	  1	  EJIL	  121	  at	  129.	  
24	  Accordance	  with	   International	  Law	  of	   the	  Unilateral	  Declaration	  of	   Independence	   in	  Respect	  of	  Kosovo,	  
Advisory	   Opinion	   (2010)	   International	   Court	   of	   Justice	   at	   141	   electronic	   document	   <www.icj-­‐
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&case=141&p3=4>	  last	  visited	  on	  05/01/2015.	  
25	  Megan	  Davis	  “Indigenous	  Struggles	   in	  Standard-­‐Setting:	  The	  United	  Nations	  Declaration	  on	   the	  Right	  of	  
Indigenous	  Peoples”	  (2008)	  9	  Melbourne	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  439	  at	  459.	  
26	  “The	   problem	   with	   the	   UN’s	   decolonization	   process	   was	   this:	   the	   choice	   as	   to	   the	   political	   future	   of	  
colonized	  peoples	  was	  not	  given	  to	  the	   individual	  peoples	  conquered,	  but	  to	  the	   inhabitants	  of	  territories	  
colonized	   by	   European	   conquerors,	   within	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   lines	   of	   demarcation	   drawn	   by	   the	  
colonizers.	  Thus	  the	  colonizers,	  via	  their	  constituting	  the	  new	  country’s	  ‘people’	  under	  the	  new	  sovereign’s	  
control,	  continued	  to	  rule	  the	  colonized	  from	  their	  grave.	  The	  name	  of	  the	  game	  in	  uti	  possidetis,	  a	  Roman	  
legal	   term	   that	   essentially	  means	   one	   should	   leave	   the	   place	   as	   one	   received	   it”	   see	   Siegfried	  Wiessner	  
“Indigenous	  Self-­‐determination,	  Culture,	  and	  land:	  a	  Reassessment	  in	  Light	  of	  the	  2007	  UN	  Declaration	  on	  
the	   Rights	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples”	   in	   Elvira	   Pulitano	   Indigenous	   rights	   in	   the	   Age	   of	   the	   UN	   Declaration	  
(Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  2012);	  see	  also	  GA	  Res	  1514,	  UN	  GAOR,	  15th	  Sess,	  Supp	  No	  16,	  UN	  
Doc	  A/4684	  (December	  14,	  1960);	  GA	  Res	  1514,	  UN	  GAOR,	  15th	  Sess,	  Annex,	  UN	  Doc	  A/4651	  (December	  15,	  
1960);	  see	  Malcolm	  N	  Shaw	  “The	  Heritage	  of	  States:	  The	  Principles	  of	  Uti	  Possidetis	  Juris	  Today”	  (1997)	  67	  
British	   Year	   Book	   of	   International	   Law	   75;	   see	   Helen	   Ghebrewebet	   Identifying	   Units	   of	   Statehood	   and	  
Determining	  international	  Boundaries:	  A	  Revised	  Look	  at	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  Uti	  Possidetis	  and	  the	  Principle	  of	  
Self-­‐determination	  (Peter	  Lang,	  Frankfurt	  am	  Main	  and	  New	  York,	  2006).	  
27	  See	  Dianne	  Otto	   “A	  Question	  of	   Law	  or	  Politics?	   Indigenous	  Claims	   to	   Sovereignty”	   (1995)	   21	  Syracuse	  




Sitting	   on	   the	   bedrock	   of	   all	   the	   human	   rights	   instruments,	   the	   Declaration	  
reconfirms	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  entitled	  “to	  all	  human	  rights	  recognized	  
in	   international	   law”,	   as	   well	   as	   that	   they	   “possess	   collective	   rights	   which	   are	  
indispensable	  for	  their	  existence”	  (Preamble).28	  As	  beneficiaries	  of	   fundamental	  
rights,	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  the	  right	  to	  not	  be	  subjected	  to	  the	  destruction	  
of	  their	  cultures	  and	  any	  ethnocidal	  practice	  (Art	  8)	  and	  to	  revitalise	  their	  cultural	  
traditions	   and	   customs	   (Art	   11.1).	   The	   UNDRIP	   attributes	   importance	   to	   the	  
spiritual	  aspect	  of	  indigenous	  cultures	  by	  stressing	  in	  Art	  11.2	  that	  states	  should	  
redress	  and	   respect	   the	  cultural,	   intellectual,	   religious	  and	  spiritual	  property	  of	  
indigenous	  peoples.	  As	  such,	   they	  have	  the	  right	   to	  manifest,	  practice,	  develop	  
and	  teach	  their	  spiritual	  and	  religious	  traditions,	  customs	  and	  ceremonies	  along	  
with	   maintaining	   their	   religious	   and	   cultural	   sites	   and	   the	   usage	   of	   their	  
ceremonial	  objects	  (Art	  12.1).	  Part	  of	  the	  survival	  of	  indigenous	  identities	  rests	  in	  
their	   right	   to	  revitalize,	  use,	  develop	  and	  transmit	  histories,	   languages	  and	  oral	  
traditions	   to	   future	  generation	   (Art	  13.1).	   Indigenous	  peoples	  have	   the	   right	   to	  
the	  dignity	  and	  the	  diversity	  of	  their	  traditions,	  which	  are	  different	  from	  the	  ones	  
of	  the	  Western	  world	  (Art	  15).	  As	  such,	  they	  can	  create	  the	  media	  coverage	  that	  
better	  responds	  to	  their	  needs	  (Art	  16.1).	  In	  addition	  to	  that,	  they	  have	  the	  right	  
to	   use	   and	  preserve	   their	   traditional	  medical	   practices	   and	   the	  plants,	   animals	  
and	  minerals	  that	  they	  need	  for	  healing	  (Art	  23.1).	  Concerning	  traditional	   lands	  
and	   territories,	  which	  are	   fundamental	   for	   their	  well-­‐being	   (art	  25),	   indigenous	  
peoples	   have	   the	   right	   to	   maintain	   and	   strengthen	   the	   distinctive	   spiritual	  
relationship	  with	  their	  land	  (owned	  or	  occupied).	  They	  must	  also	  be	  guaranteed	  
the	  respect,	   return	  and	  access	   to	  the	   lands	  that	  are	  spiritually	  and	  traditionally	  
essential	  for	  indigenous	  sacred/secret	  practices	  (Art	  26	  and	  28).	  Article	  31	  refers	  
to	   the	   protection,	   control	   and	   development	   of	   indigenous	   heritage.	   Among	   all	  
the	  articles	  of	   the	  Declaration,	   this	   is	   the	  one	  that	  directly	  refers	   to	   indigenous	  
cultural	   property,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   intellectual	   property	   of	   their	   traditional	  
knowledge	  and	  cultural	  expressions.	  Article	  26	  of	  UNDRIP	  states	  that	  “indigenous	  
peoples	   have	   the	   right	   to	   the	   lands,	   territories	   and	   resources	  which	   they	  have	  
traditionally	  owned,	  occupied	  or	  other-­‐	  wise	  used	  or	  acquired”.	  They	  also	  “have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





the	   right	   to	  own,	  use,	   develop	  and	   control	   the	   lands,	   territories	   and	   resources	  
that	   they	   possess	   by	   reason	   of	   traditional	   ownership	   or	   other	   traditional	  
occupation	  or	   use,	   as	  well	   as	   those	  which	   they	   have	  otherwise	   acquired”;	   and	  
“States	  shall	  give	  legal	  recognition	  and	  protection	  to	  these	  lands,	  territories	  and	  
resources.	  Such	  recognition	  shall	  be	  conducted	  with	  due	  respect	  to	  the	  customs,	  
traditions	   and	   land	   tenure	   systems	  of	   the	   indigenous	  peoples	   concerned”.	   The	  
Article	   completes	   the	   “spiritual	   and	   cultural	   value”	   of	   land	   and	   territories	  
previously	  introduced	  by	  Article	  11.1	  and	  12.1.29	  	  
As	   is	   well	   known,	   for	   its	   very	   nature,	   the	   Declaration	   is	   not	   in	   itself	   legally	  
binding.	   States	   originally	   voting	   against	   it,	   such	   as	   the	   United	   States,30	  have	  
rejected	   the	   possibility	   that	   UNDRIP	   is,	   or	   would	   become,	   customary	  
international	   law,	   because	   it	   does	   not	   constitute	   evidence	   of	   customary	  
international	  law.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  Declaration	  lacks	  support	  of	  state	  practice	  
and	  cannot	  provide	  a	  proper	  basis	  for	  legal	  actions,	  complaints,	  or	  other	  claims	  in	  
any	   international,	   domestic,	   or	   other	   proceedings.31	  However,	   as	   stressed	  on	   a	  
few	   occasions	   by	   Professor	   Anaya	   (Special	   Rapporteur	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	  
Indigenous	  peoples	  (2008-­‐14)),	  every	  right	  contained	  in	  the	  Declaration	  must	  be	  
independently	   assessed	   before	   excluding	   any	   existence	   of	   customary	  
international	  law.32	  Anaya	  and	  Weissner	  claim	  that:33	  
	  
…	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   UN	  Declaration	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples,	   the	  
negative	  vote	  by	  four	  governments,	  even	  though	  they	  have	  significant	  number	  of	  
indigenous	   peoples	   living	   in	   their	   midst,	   does	   not	   necessarily	   invalidate	   the	  
claims	  to	  the	  customary	  international	  law	  character	  of	  individual	  key	  parts	  of	  the	  
instrument	   or	   of	   principles	   embedded	   in	   it.	   This	   distinct	   body	   of	   customary	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Art	   11.1:	   “Indigenous	   peoples	   have	   the	   right	   to	   practise	   and	   revitalize	   their	   cultural	   traditions	   and	  
customs.	   This	   includes	   the	   right	   to	   maintain,	   protect	   and	   develop	   the	   past,	   present	   and	   future	  
manifestations	  of	  their	  cultures,	  such	  as	  archaeological	  and	  historical	  sites,	  artefacts,	  designs,	  ceremonies,	  
technologies	  and	  visual	  and	  performing	  arts	  and	  literature”.	  Art	  12.1:	  “Indigenous	  peoples	  have	  the	  right	  to	  
manifest,	  practise,	  develop	  and	  teach	  their	  spiritual	  and	  religious	  traditions,	  customs	  and	  ceremonies;	  the	  
right	  to	  maintain,	  protect,	  and	  have	  access	  in	  privacy	  to	  their	  religious	  and	  cultural	  sites;	  the	  right	  to	  the	  use	  
and	  control	  of	  their	  ceremonial	  objects;	  and	  the	  right	  to	  the	  repatriation	  of	  their	  human	  remains”.	  
30	  The	   States	   against	   the	   endorsement	   of	   the	   Declaration	  were	  United	   States,	   New	   Zealand,	   Canada	   and	  
Australia.	  In	  the	  following	  years,	  they	  all	  changed	  their	  vote	  and	  endorsed	  the	  Declaration.	  
31	  James	  Anaya	  and	  Siegfried	  Wiessner	  “The	  UN	  Declaration	  on	   the	  Rights	  of	   Indigenous	  Peoples:	  Toward	  
Re-­‐empowerment”	  (2007)	  electronic	  document	  <http://jurist.org/forum/2007/10/un-­‐declaration-­‐on-­‐rights-­‐
of-­‐indigenous.php>	   last	   visited	   on	   03/01/2015;	   see	   also	   Siegfried	   Wiessner	   “The	   Cultural	   Rights	   of	  
Indigenous	  peoples:	  Achievement	  and	  Challenges”	  (2011)	  22	  1	  EJIL	  121	  at	  130-­‐131.	  





international	   law	   concerning	   indigenous	   peoples,	   not	   necessarily	   coextensive	  
with	  the	  full	  reach	  of	  the	  present	  Declaration,	  had	  formed	  long	  before	  this	  vote	  
occurred.	  	  
	  
Many	  scholars	  conveniently	  consider	  UNDRIP	  ‘just’	  a	  Declaration	  with	  no	  legally	  
binding	   status,	  but	   this	   is	   incorrect.34	  It	  may	  be	  argued,	  as	  often	  happens,	   that	  
when	  it	  comes	  to	  indigenous	  peoples,	  most	  of	  the	  regulations	  referring	  to	  them	  
constitute	   soft	   law	   and	   are	   not	   binding;	   while	   some	   others	   are	   regional	  
regulations	  with	  no	  universal	   applicability,	   and	  others,	   like	   ILO	  169,	   have	  been	  
ratified	   by	   only	   a	   small	   number	   of	   states.	   However,	   the	   fact	   that	   all	   pertinent	  
articles	  restate	  the	  same	  concepts	  and	  principles	  using	  nearly	  the	  same	  language	  
should	  trigger	  the	  question	  whether	  these	  regulations	  have	  reached	  the	  status	  of	  
customary	   international	   law.	   Commenting	   on	   the	   non-­‐binding	   nature	   of	   the	  
UNDRIP	   and	   customary	   international	   law	   related	   to	   indigenous	   populations,	  
Anaya	  confirmed	  that:35	  
	  
…	   this	   distinct	   body	   of	   customary	   international	   law	   concerning	   indigenous	  
peoples,	   not	   necessarily	   co-­‐extensive	   with	   the	   full	   reach	   of	   the	   present	  
Declaration,	  had	  formed	  long	  before	  this	  vote	  occurred.	  	  
	  
Although	  the	  language	  of	  the	  Declaration	  might	  be	  more	  exhaustive	  than	  other	  
contemporary	   instruments	   concerning	   indigenous	   populations,	   however,	   the	  
provisions	  stated	  in	  it	  cannot	  be	  considered	  new.	  In	  the	  same	  line,	  in	  his	  article	  
on	   the	   UNDRIP,	   Wiessner36	  argues	   that	   though	   declarations	   and	   soft	   law	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  See	   International	   Law	  Association	  Rights	  of	   Indigenous	  Peoples	  –	  Final	  Report	   (Sofia	  Conference,	  2012)	  
electronic	   document	   < www.ila-­‐hq.org/download.cfm/docid/227B560E-­‐F0F5-­‐4773-­‐BECC974CFC6A11B8>	  
last	  visited	  on	  03/03/2015. 	  
35	  “In	  analyzing	  the	  individual	  parts	  of	  the	  Declaration,	  we	  see	  that	  all	  new	  rules	  of	  customary	  international	  
law,	   as	   found	   in	   our	   respective	   surveys	   of	   state	   and	   international	   practice	   of	   1999,	   2001,	   and	   2004,	   still	  
remain	  part	  of	   the	  global	   consensus.	  As	   stated	   in	  1999,	   ‘indigenous	  peoples	  are	  entitled	   to	  maintain	  and	  
develop	   their	  distinct	   cultural	   identity,	   their	   spirituality,	   their	   language,	  and	   their	   traditional	  ways	  of	   life’.	  
Most	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Declaration	  go	  to	  the	  preservation	  of	  culture,	  language,	  religion,	  and	  identity;	  
and	  state	  practice	  in	  the	  states	  with	  indigenous	  peoples	  largely	  conforms	  to	  these	  legal	  tenets.	  Due	  to	  the	  
strength	  of	  the	  indigenous	  renascence	  throughout	  the	  world,	  the	  original	  goal	  of	  assimilation	  of	  indigenous	  
cultures	  into	  the	  maelstrom	  of	  the	  modern	  world	  has	  largely	  been	  abandoned	  in	  favour	  of	  preservation	  and	  
reinvigoration	   of	   indigenous	   cultures,	   languages	   and	   religions.	   The	   legal	   guarantees	   of	   these	   claims	   are,	  
however,	  not	  the	  real	  bones	  of	  contention”	  see	  James	  Anaya	  and	  Siegfried	  Wiessner	  “The	  UN	  Declaration	  
on	   the	   Rights	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples:	   Towards	   Re-­‐empowerment”	   electronic	   document	  
<http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/10/un-­‐declaration-­‐on-­‐rights-­‐of-­‐indigenous.php>	   last	   visited	   on	  
27/06/2012.	  




general	  are	  aspirational	  instruments	  in	  nature,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Declaration	  on	  
the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  some	  of	  its	  provisions	  have	  reached	  a	  status	  of	  
customary	  international	  law.	  He	  confirms	  that:37	  
	  
…	   UNDRIP	   is	   a	   solemn,	   comprehensive	   and	   authoritative	   response	   of	   the	  
international	   community	   of	   States	   to	   the	   claims	   of	   indigenous	   peoples,	   with	  
which	  maximum	  compliance	  is	  expected.	  Some	  of	  the	  rights	  stated	  therein	  may	  
already	   form	  part	  of	  customary	   international	   law,	  others	  may	  become	  the	   fons	  
et	   origo	   of	   later-­‐emerging	   customary	   international	   law.	   Scholarly	   analyses	   of	  
State	   practice	   and	   opinio	   juris	   have	   concluded	   that	   indigenous	   peoples	   are	  
entitled	  to	  maintain	  and	  develop	  their	  distinct	  cultural	  identity,	  their	  spirituality,	  
their	   language,	   and	   their	   traditional	   ways	   of	   life;	   that	   they	   hold	   the	   right	   to	  
political,	   economic	   and	   social	   self-­‐determination,	   including	   a	   wide	   range	   of	  
autonomy;	  and	  that	  they	  have	  a	  right	  to	  the	  lands	  they	  have	  traditionally	  owned	  
or	  otherwise	  occupied	  and	  used.	  	  
	  
The	   same	   conclusion	   has	   been	   reached	   in	   2012	   by	   the	   International	   Law	  
Association,	  which	  recognized	  that	  although	  not	  all	  of	  UNDRIP	  reflects	  customary	  
international	  law,	  “it	  includes	  several	  key	  provisions	  which	  correspond	  to	  existing	  
State	   obligations	   under	   customary	   international	   law”. 38 Most	   of	   UNDRIP	  
regulations	  were	  already	  phrased	  in	  existing	  instruments	  referring	  to	  indigenous	  
peoples,	   and	   in	   most	   cases	   they	   reflect	   state	   practice	   and,	   therefore,	   can	  
correctly	  be	  considered	  as	  customary	  international	  law.	  In	  his	  commentary	  to	  the	  
Declaration,	  Anaya	  stresses	  that	  the	  recognition	  of	  indigenous	  ‘cultural’	  rights	  is	  
today	  part	  of	  a	  general	  consensus	  and	  state	  practice	  that	  have	  crystallized	   into	  
customary	  international	  law.	  Anaya	  recognises	  that:39	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Supra.	  
38	  The	  2012	   ILA	  Final	  Report	  on	   the	  Rights	  of	   Indigenous	  Peoples	  also	   recognises	   the	   fact	   that	  “in	  general	  
terms,	  a	  progressively	  growing	  number	  of	  States	  is	  incorporating	  provisions	  concerning	  indigenous	  peoples’	  
land	  rights	  in	  their	  domestic	  legislation,	  including	  at	  the	  constitutional	  level”	  and	  also	  that	  “the	  competent	  
international	  institutions	  incessantly	  continue	  to	  remind	  States	  about	  their	  obligations	  related	  to	  indigenous	  
peoples	   land	   rights.	   This	   holds	   true,	   in	   particular,	   with	   respect	   to	   ILO	   supervisory	   bodies	   and	   to	   the	   UN	  
Committee	  on	  the	  Elimination	  of	  Racial	  Discrimination,	  as	  well	  as,	  at	  the	  regional	  level,	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  
Inter-­‐American	   Commission	   and	   the	   IACHR”	   see	   International	   Law	   Association,	   RESOLUTION	   No	   5/2012	  
Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  at	  1.	  
39	  James	  Anaya	  and	  Siegfried	  Wiessner	  “The	  UN	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	   Indigenous	  Peoples:	  Towards	  
Re-­‐empowerment”	   electronic	   document	   <www.twnside.org.sg/title2/resurgence/206/cover3.doc>	   last	  
visited	   on	   25/10/2012;	   In	   addition	   to	   that,	   and	   as	   recently	   underlined	   by	   Wiessner:	   “The	   Awas	   Tingni	  





…	  new	  rules	  of	  customary	  international	  law,	  as	  found	  in	  our	  respective	  surveys	  of	  
state	  and	  international	  practice	  of	  1999,	  2001,	  and	  2004,	  still	  remain	  part	  of	  the	  
global	   consensus.	   …	   Most	   of	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   Declaration	   go	   to	   the	  
preservation	  of	  culture,	  language,	  religion,	  and	  identity;	  and	  state	  practice	  in	  the	  
states	  with	  indigenous	  peoples	  largely	  conforms	  to	  these	  legal	  tenets.	  Due	  to	  the	  
strength	  of	  the	  indigenous	  renascence	  throughout	  the	  world,	  the	  original	  goal	  of	  
assimilation	  of	  indigenous	  cultures	  into	  the	  maelstrom	  of	  the	  modern	  world	  has	  
largely	   been	   abandoned	   in	   favour	   of	   preservation	   and	   reinvigoration	   of	  
indigenous	  cultures,	  languages	  and	  religions.	  
	  
Concerning	  state	  practice,	  Chief	  Justice	  A	  O	  Conteh,	  of	  the	  Belize	  Supreme	  Court,	  
for	   example,	   believes	   that	   Article	   26	   (UNDRIP)	   simply	   summarizes	   pre-­‐existing	  
customary	  international	  law	  (and	  state	  practice),40	  which	  is,	  in	  fact,	  contained	  in	  
other	   existing	   international	   legal	   instruments	   that	   recognise	   ownerships	   or	  
native	  title	  of	  traditional	  territories.41	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Belize	  relied	  on	  the	  
Declaration	  to	  affirm	  that	  land	  and	  resources	  rights	  of	  the	  Mayans42	  today	  form	  
part	  of	  customary	  international	  law.	  	  	  
	  
In	  Mabo	  v	  Queensland	  (No.	  2),43	  the	  Australian	  High	  Court	  found	  that:44	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Western	  Shoshone	  against	   the	   taking	  of	   their	   sacred	   lands	  are	   just	   two	  examples	   reaffirming	   the	  original	  
assessment,	   based	   on	   recent	   state	   practice,	   that	   the	   lands	   traditionally	   held	   by	   indigenous	   peoples	   are	  
theirs	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   right	   under	   customary	   international	   law.	   Honoring	   the	   land	   rights	   of	   indigenous	  
peoples	   is	   the	   first	   step	   toward	   preservation	   of	   their	   culture”	   see	   Siegfried	   Wiessner	   “Indigenous	  
Sovereignty:	  A	  Reassessment	  in	  Light	  of	  the	  UN	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples”	  (2009)	  41	  
Vanderbilt	  Journal	  of	  Transnational	  Law	  1141	  at	  1144-­‐1145.	  
40	  See	  Aurelio	  Cal,	  et	  al	  v	  Attorney	  General	  of	  Belize	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Belize	  Claims	  No	  171	  and	  172	  of	  2007)	  
(18	   Oct	   2007)	   (Mayan	   land	   rights)	   electronic	   document	  
<https://law2.arizona.edu/iplp/outreach/maya_belize/documents/Claim%20366%20of%202008.pdf>	   last	  
visited	  on	  04/08/2014.	  
41	  See	  Siegfried	  Wiessner	  “United	  Nations	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples”	  at	  6	  electronic	  
document	   <http://65.60.52.92/sites/default/files/undeclarationontherightsofindigenouspeoples.pdf>	   last	  
visited	  on	  05/01/2015;	  see	  also	  Siegfried	  Wiessner	  and	  James	  Anaya	  “The	  UN	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  
Indigenous	   Peoples:	   Towards	   Re-­‐empowerment”;	   see	   also	   International	   Law	   Association	   Rights	   of	  
indigenous	   Peoples-­‐Final	   Report	   (Sofia,	   2012)	   electronic	   document	   <www.ila-­‐
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1024>	  last	  visited	  on	  05/01/2015.	  
42	  See	  electronic	  document	  
<https://law2.arizona.edu/iplp/outreach/maya_belize/documents/Claim%20366%20of%202008.pdf>	  last	  
visited	  on	  03/01/2015.	  	  
43	  Mabo	  v	  Queensland	  Case	  No	  2)	  [1992]	  HCA	  23;	  (1992)	  175	  CLR	  1	  (3	  June	  1992).	  
44	  See	  Mabo	   v	   Queensland	   (No	   2)	   [1992]	   HCA	   23;	   (1992)	   175	   CLR	   1	   (3	   June	   1992)	   electronic	   document	  




…	  the	  common	  law	  of	  this	  country	  recognizes	  a	  form	  of	  native	  title	  which,	  in	  the	  
cases	   where	   it	   has	   not	   been	   extinguished,	   reflects	   the	   entitlement	   of	   the	  
indigenous	   inhabitants,	   in	   accordance	   with	   their	   laws	   or	   customs,	   to	   their	  
traditional	  lands	  and	  that,	  subject	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  some	  particular	  Crown	  leases,	  
the	   land	   entitlement	   of	   the	  Murray	   Islanders	   in	   accordance	  with	   their	   laws	   or	  
customs	  is	  preserved,	  as	  native	  title,	  under	  the	  law	  of	  Queensland.	  	  
	  
Indeed,	   although	   the	   UNDRIP	   was	   created	   ad	   hoc	   to	   respond	   to	   indigenous	  
peoples’	   issues,	   it	  does	  not	   represent	   the	  only	   instrument	   that,	  over	   the	  years,	  
has	  taken	   into	  consideration	   indigenous	  peoples’	  cultures	  and	  traditions,	  needs	  
and	  expectations.	  
	  
5.3	  –	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  and	  the	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  System	  
	  
The	  idea	  of	  cultural	  human	  rights	  within	  international	  human	  rights	  laws	  is	  that	  
everyone	  is	  entitled	  to	  the	  dignity	  of	  life	  while	  living	  in	  accordance	  with	  his/her	  
traditions	   and	   beliefs	   in	   the	   territories	   that	   have	   special	   significance	   for	   them	  
and	  can	  guarantee	  the	  continuation	  of	  their	  cultures	  and	  traditions.	  On	  the	  same	  
line,	   Article	   15(1)(a)	   of	   the	   ICESCR	   stresses	   that	   “States	   parties	   to	   the	   present	  
Covenant	   recognize	   the	   right	   of	   everyone	   to	   take	   part	   in	   cultural	   life”.	   Again,	  
some	  believe	  that	  these	  formulations,	  which	  initially	  involved	  individuals,	  started	  
reflecting	   over	   time	   the	   desire	   to	   protect	   culture	   through	   individual	   rights	   of	  
members	  of	  a	  distinctive	  group,	  rather	  than	  collective	  rights	  of	  the	  group	  itself.	  
However,	   treaty-­‐monitoring	   bodies	   seem	   to	   have	   gone	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   a	  
‘collectivization’	   of	   these	   rights.	   The	   UN	   Committee	   for	   Economic,	   Social	   and	  
Cultural	   Rights	   stated	   that	   minorities	   and	   indigenous	   peoples	   must	   be	  
guaranteed	   the	   freedom	   to	   practice	   and	   promote	   awareness	   of	   their	   culture,	  
defined	   in	   both	   individual	   and	   collective	   dimensions	   and	   as	   reflecting	   “the	  
community’s	  way	  of	  life	  and	  thought”.45	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  protecting	  indigenous	  
cultural	  rights,	  Art	  27	  of	  the	  ICCPR	  has	  been	  successfully	  used	  in	  many	  cases	  by	  
indigenous	   individuals.	   In	   this	   respect,	   indigenous	   peoples	   are	   considered	   as	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  General	  Discussion	  on	  the	  Right	  to	  Take	  Part	  in	  Cultural	  Life	  as	  recognized	  in	  Art	  15	  of	  the	  ICESCR,	  UN	  Doc	  
E/1993/23	   Ch	   VII	   at	   para	   204,	   205,	   209	   and	   210.	   	   See	   Human	   Right	   Bodies	   electronic	   document	  




sub	   category	   of	   ‘minorities’	   (though	   the	   concept	   of	   minorities	   is	   generally	  
distinguished	   from	   the	  notion	  of	   indigenous	  peoples).	  While	   ICCPR’s	  provisions	  
were	   initially	   conceived	   for	   individuals,	   and	   not	   for	   groups	   of	   individuals,	   over	  
time,	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  article	  has	  slowly	  extended	  in	  practice	  to	  include	  groups	  of	  
people	   that	   are	   united	   by	   idiosyncratic	   traditions	   and	   cultures.	   In	   fact,	   some	  
rights,	   though	   being	   on	   paper	   reserved	   to	   individuals	   have	   an	   inherent	   group	  
character	  which	  includes	  group	  identity	  (such	  as	  race,	  ethnicity,	  gender,	  religion),	  
or	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  such	  right	   is	  generally	  shared	  with	  others	   (as	  suggested	  by	  
Art	  27).46	  According	  to	  Anaya,	  over	  the	  years,	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  bypassed	  
the	   individual-­‐state	   dichotomy	   and	   claimed	   and	   articulated	   “human	   rights	   in	  
terms	   of	   group	   or	   collective	   rights”.47	  In	   their	   discourses	   over	   land,	   culture,	  
sacred	  and	  secret	  practices	  and	  rights,	  indigenous	  leaders,	  elders	  and	  custodians	  
have	   given	   clear	   explanations	   and	   illustrations	   “providing	   convincing	  
justifications	   for	   collective	   rights”.48	  In	   its	   language,	   Art	   27	   of	   the	   ICCPR	   states	  
that	   “persons	   belonging	   to	   such	   minorities	   shall	   not	   be	   denied	   the	   right,	   in	  
community	  with	  the	  other	  members	  of	  their	  group,	  to	  enjoy	  their	  own	  culture,	  to	  
profess	  and	  practise	  their	  own	  religion,	  or	  to	  use	  their	  own	  language”.	   In	  other	  
words,	  the	  Covenant	  seems	  to	  initially	  protect	  the	  rights	  of	  persons	  who	  belong	  
to	  a	  ‘cultural	  group’	  as	  opposed	  to	  rights	  held	  by	  the	  whole	  group.	  However,	  in	  
its	  application	  in	  practice,	  Article	  27	  has	  acquired	  a	  collective	  dimension.	  Anaya	  
often	  supports	  the	  view	  that	  culture	  is	  an	  “outgrowth	  of	  collectivity”;	  therefore,	  
when	   speaking	   of	   cultural	   practice,	   one	   always	   refers	   to	   the	   culture	   of	   a	  
particular	   cultural	   group.49	  In	   the	   ground-­‐breaking	   Lovelace	   v	   Canada	   case50	  
(1981),	  Ms	  Lovelace,	  a	  Maliseet	  Indian,	  after	  the	  marriage	  with	  a	  non-­‐Indian,	  was	  
no	  longer	  entitled	  to	  live	  on	  the	  Tobique	  Indian	  Reserve	  with	  her	  parents.51	  She	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Henry	  J	  Steiner,	  Philip	  Alston	  and	  others	  International	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Context	  (3rd	  ed,	  Oxford	  University	  
Press,	  New	  York	  and	  Oxford,	  2007)	  at	  153.	  
47	  James	  Anaya	  “Indigenous	  Law	  and	  Its	  Contribution	  to	  Global	  Pluralism”	  (2007)	  3	  Indigenous	  Law	  Journal	  3	  
at	  6.	  
48	  Anaya	  supra.	  
49	  “Given	  that	  culture	   is	  a	  product	  of,	  and	   is	  manifested	  through	  group	  dynamics,	   the	  enjoyment	  of	   rights	  
connected	  with	   culture	   is	  mostly	  meaningful	   in	   a	   group	   context”	   see	   James	  Anaya	   “International	  Human	  
Rights	   and	   Indigenous	   Peoples:	   The	  Move	   Toward	   the	  Multicultural	   State”	   (2004)	   21	   Arizona	   Journal	   of	  
International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  13	  at	  22.	  
50	  Sandra	  Lovelace	  v	  Canada,	  Communication	  No	  R.6/24,	  UN	  Doc	  Supp	  No	  40	  (A/36/40)	  at	  166	  (1981).	  
51	  “The	  Human	  rights	  Committee	  …	  has	  to	  proceed	  from	  the	  basic	  fact	  that	  Sandra	  Lovelace	  married	  a	  non-­‐




was	   consequently	   denied	   the	   right	   to	   return	   to	   her	   tribe	   after	   divorcing.	   The	  
Human	   Rights	   Committee,	   acting	   under	   Article	   5(4)	   of	   the	   Optional	   Protocol,	  
found	  that	  the	  denial	  to	  return	  to	  her	  tribe	  was,	  inter	  alia,	  in	  breach	  of	  Art	  27	  of	  
the	   ICCPR.	   By	   being	   a	   member	   of	   the	   Maliseet	   Indians,	   Sandra	   Lovelace	  
belonged,	   de	   facto,	   to	   a	   minority	   group	   and,	   as	   such,	   she	   was	   entitled	   to	  
protection	   under	   Art	   27.52	  Besides,	   by	   refusing	   Ms	   Lovelace	   to	   return	   to	   her	  
community,	   the	  Canadian	   Indian	  Act	  was	   denying	   her	   the	   access	   to	   her	   native	  
culture	   and	   language,	   which	   was	   practiced	   nowhere	   else	   outside	   her	  
communities.53	  This	   again,	   was	   regarded	   by	   the	   Committee	   as	   a	   denial	   of	   the	  
woman’s	   fundamental	   right	   to	   live	   in	   the	   Tobique	   Indian	   Reserve	   with	   her	  
community,	   practicing	   her	   culture	   and	   traditions.54	  In	   the	  Apriana	  Mahuika	   vs	  
New	  Zealand	  case55	  the	  claimants	  stated	  that:	  	  
	  
…	   the	   Government's	   actions	   are	   threatening	   their	   [Māori]	   way	   of	   life	   and	   the	  
culture	  of	  their	  tribes,	  in	  violation	  of	  article	  27	  of	  the	  Covenant.	  They	  submitted	  
that	   fishing	   is	   one	   of	   the	  main	   elements	   of	   their	   traditional	   culture,	   that	   they	  
have	  present-­‐day	  fishing	  interests	  and	  the	  strong	  desire	  to	  manifest	  their	  culture	  
through	  fishing	  to	  the	  fullest	  extent	  of	  their	  traditional	  territories.	  	  
	  
At	  para	  9.8,	  the	  Committee	  recognised	  the	  individual	  and	  collective	  importance	  
of	   fishing	   activities	   for	   Māori	   people	   as	   well	   as	   its	   spiritual	   and	   traditional	  
significance,	  and	  stressed	  that	  “the	  State	  party	  continues	  to	  be	  bound	  by	  article	  
27	  which	  requires	  that	  the	  cultural	  and	  religious	  significance	  of	  fishing	  for	  Maori	  
must	   deserve	   due	   attention	   in	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Waitangi	  
(Fisheries	  Claims)	  Settlement	  Act”.56	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
provision	  was	  –	  and	  still	   is	  –	  based	  on	  a	  distinction	  de	   iure	  on	   the	  ground	  of	  sex”	  see	  Lovelace	  v	  Canada,	  
Communication	  No	  R.6/24*/	  30	  July	  1981	  at	  para	  10.	  
52	  Lovelace	  v	  Canada	  at	  para	  14.	  	  
53	  “The	   Indian	  Act	  was	  amended	   in	  1985	   to	  eliminate	   gender	  discrimination	   in	  determining	   Indian	   status.	  
The	  amendments	  also	  restored	  status	  of	  aboriginal	  women	  who	  had	  lost	  status	  through	  the	  old	  legislation's	  
"marrying	   out"	   provisions.	   As	   of	   June	   1995,	   the	   amended	   Act	   allowed	   for	   the	   reinstatement	   of	   95,	   429	  
persons,	  more	  than	  half	  of	  whom	  were	  women	  (57.2%)”	  see	  Sandra	  Lovelace	  v	  Canada,	  Communication	  No	  
24/1977:	   Canada	   30/07/81,	   UN	   Doc	   CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977	   electronic	   document	   <www.escr-­‐
net.org/docs/i/1307559>	   last	  visited	  on	  02/12/2015;	   in	  1982	  Canada	  also	  passed	   the	  Canadian	  Charter	  of	  
Rights	  and	  Freedoms.	  
54	  DJ	  Harris	  International	  Law,	  Cases	  and	  Materials	  (Sweet	  &	  Maxwell,	  London,	  2004)	  at	  725-­‐726.	  	  
55	  Apriana	  Mahuika	  vs	  New	  Zealand,	  Communication	  No	  547/1993,	  UN	  Doc	  CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993	  (2000).	  
56	  “With	   reference	   to	   its	   earlier	   case	   law	   (19),	   the	   Committee	   emphasises	   that	   in	   order	   to	   comply	   with	  




The	   Lansman	   cases57	  and	   the	  Apriana	  Mahuika	   case58	  reconfirmed	   that	   Art	   27	  
includes	   a	   dimension	   that	   protects	   indigenous	   peoples’	   collective	   nature.	  
According	  to	  Svensson:59	  	  	  
	  
…	   the	   question	   of	   cultural	   survival	   has	   become	   a	   growing	   concern	   for	  
encapsulated	   minorities	   in	   ethnically	   plural	   situations.	   In	   the	   relationship	  
between	   relatively	   powerless	   indigenous	   minorities	   and	   the	   nation-­‐state,	  
cultural	  survival	  is	  not	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  culture	  per	  se.	  It	  can	  also	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  
human	   rights	   issue	   based	   on	   political	   rights	   and	   land	   rights,	   the	   two	  
predominant	  elements	  subsumed	  in	  what	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘Aboriginal	  rights’.	  	  
	  
In	  his	  article,60	  Svensson	  confirms	  the	  collective	  nature	  of	  indigenous	  culture	  and	  
property	  rights	  as	  intrinsically	  connected	  one	  to	  another.	  	  
In	  1994,	  the	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  Committee	  re-­‐considered	  the	  collective	  nature	  of	  
indigenous	   cultural	   rights,	   and	   clarified	   that	   the	   persons	   designed	   to	   be	  
protected	   (by	   Art	   27)	   are	   those	   “who	   belong	   to	   a	   group	   and	   who	   share	   in	  
common	  a	  culture,	  a	  religion	  and/or	  a	  language”.61	  Hence,	  although	  Art	  27	  refers	  
to	   individual	   rights,	   it	   is	   intended	   to	   protect	   the	   values	   belonging	   to	   the	  
community	   as	   well,	   which	   will	   otherwise	   be	   deprived	   of	   instruments	  
guaranteeing	   its	  survival	  and	   its	  continued	  cultural	  development.62	  The	  practice	  
of	   other	   human	   rights	   monitoring	   bodies	   confirms	   the	   idea	   that	   indigenous	  
peoples	   often	   have	   holistic	   cultural	   traditions	   which	   deserve	   respect	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
continue	  to	  enjoy	  their	  culture,	  and	  profess	  and	  practice	  their	  religion	  in	  community	  with	  other	  members	  of	  
their	  group.	  The	  State	  party	  is	  under	  a	  duty	  to	  bear	  this	  in	  mind	  in	  the	  further	  implementation	  of	  the	  Treaty	  
of	  Waitangi	  (Fisheries	  Claims)	  Settlement	  Act”	  at	  para	  9.9.	  
57	  Ilmari	  Lansman	  v	  Finland	  No	  511/1992	  UN	  Doc	  CCPR/52/D/511/1992	  and	  Jouni	  E	  Lansman	  v	  Finland	  No	  
671/1995	  UN	  Doc	  CCPR/C/58/D/671.1995.	  
58	  Apriana	  Mahuika	  et	  al	  v	  New	  Zealand	  No	  547/1993	  UN	  Doc	  A/56/40	  (2000).	  
59	  Tom	  G	  Svensson	  “Right	  to	  Self-­‐Determination:	  A	  Basic	  Human	  Right	  Concerning	  Cultural	  Survival:	  The	  Case	  
of	  the	  Sami	  and	  the	  Scandinavian	  State”	  in	  Abdullahi	  Ahmed	  An-­‐Na'im	  (ed)	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Cross-­‐Cultural	  
Perspectives	  Perspectives	  (University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Press,	  Philadelphia,	  1992)	  at	  363.	  
60	  Supra.	  
61	  “Although	  the	  rights	  protected	  under	  article	  27	  are	  individual	  rights,	  they	  depend	  in	  turn	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  
the	  minority	   group	   to	  maintain	   its	   culture,	   language	  or	   religion.	  Accordingly,	   positive	  measures	  by	   States	  
may	   also	   be	   necessary	   to	   protect	   the	   identity	   of	   a	  minority	   and	   the	   rights	   of	   its	  members	   to	   enjoy	   and	  
develop	  their	  culture	  and	  language	  and	  to	  practice	  their	  religion,	  in	  community	  with	  the	  other	  members	  of	  
the	   group	   ...	   The	   protection	   of	   these	   rights	   is	   directed	   towards	   ensuring	   the	   survival	   and	   continued	  
development	   of	   the	   cultural,	   religious	   and	   social	   identity	   of	   the	  minorities	   concerned,	   thus	   enriching	   the	  
fabric	  of	  society	  as	  a	  whole”	  see	  at	  paras	  6.2	  and	  9,	  Human	  Rights	  Committee,	  General	  Comment	  23,	  Article	  
27	   UN	   Doc	   CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5	   (1994)	   electronic	   document	  
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrcom23.htm>	  last	  visited	  on	  19/09/2009.	  
62	  Federico	   Lenzerini	   “The	   Status	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   in	   International	   Law”	   in	   Federico	   Lenzerini	   (ed)	  




protection.	  However,	  according	  to	  Makau	  Mutua,	  Western	  societies	  still	  tend	  to	  
resist	  the	  cultural	  autonomy	  of	  indigenous	  peoples.	  In	  his	  words:63	  
	  
…	   international	   human	   rights	   fall	   within	   the	   historical	   continuum	   of	   European	  
colonial	   project	   in	   which	   the	   whites	   pose	   as	   the	   saviours	   of	   a	   benighted	   and	  
savage	  non-­‐European	  world	  ....	  Thus	  human	  rights	  reject	  the	  cross	  fertilization	  of	  
cultures	   and	   instead	   seek	   the	   transformation	   of	   non-­‐Western	   cultures	   by	  
Western	  cultures.	  	  
	  
It	   took	   until	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   UN	   Working	   Group	   on	   Indigenous	  
Populations	   (WGIP,	   1982)64	  for	   indigenous	  peoples	   to	  have	  a	  political	   venue	   to	  
which	   they	   could	   bring	   their	   claims	   and	   express	   their	   concerns	   about	   any	   on-­‐
going	   discrimination.65	  Over	   the	   years	   indigenous	   revival	   had	   been	   forcing	   the	  
international	   community	   to	   revise	   the	   concept	   of	   property,	   being	   it	   tangible,	  
intangible,	   intellectual,	   etc.	   It	   was	   to	   this	   end,	   that	   “the	   Working	   Group	   on	  
Indigenous	   Populations	   (WGIP)	   of	   the	   Sub-­‐Commission	   on	   the	   Promotion	   and	  
Protection	   of	   Human	   Rights	   (then	   called	   Sub-­‐Commission	   on	   Prevention	   of	  
Discrimination	  and	  Protection	  of	  Minorities)	  was	  established	  by	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  
United	   Nations	   Economic	   and	   Social	   Council”.	  66	  Since	   the	   1980s,	   the	  Working	  
Group	   also	   sponsored	   studies	   (in	   the	   form	   of	   reports,	   decisions,	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Makau	  Mutua	  “The	  Complexity	  of	  Universalism	  in	  Human	  Rights”	  in	  Andras	  Sajo	  (ed)	  Human	  Rights	  with	  
Modesty	  (Springer,	  2004)	  at	  51.	  
64	  Following	   a	   reform	   to	   the	   UN	   human	   Rights	  machinery,	   the	   Human	   Rights	   Council	   adopted	   resolution	  
6/16	  to	  request	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights	  to	  convene	  an	  informal	  meeting	  to	  
discuss	   the	   most	   appropriate	   mechanisms	   to	   continue	   the	   work	   of	   the	   working	   Group	   on	   Indigenous	  
Populations.	  The	   Informal	  meeting	   took	  place	   in	  Geneva	  on	  6	  December	  and	  the	  morning	  of	  7	  December	  
2007.	   As	   a	   follow-­‐up	   to	   the	   informal	   meeting	   the	   indigenous	   caucus	   and	   a	   number	   of	   governments	  
continued	  informal	  negotiations	  to	  finalize	  a	  draft	  resolution	  and	  submitted	  to	  the	  resumed	  6th	  session	  of	  
the	   Human	   Rights	   Council.	   On	   December	   14,	   2007	   draft	   resolution	   A/HRC/6/L.42	   (HRC	   Resolution	   6/36)	  
establishing	  a	  new	  expert	  mechanism	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  was	  adopted	  by	  consensus	  by	  the	  
HRC	  elctronic	  document	  <www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/groups/groups-­‐01.htm>.	  
65	  “Since	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Working	   Group	   on	   Indigenous	   Populations,	   indigenous	   peoples	   have	  
emphasized	  in	  that	  forum	  the	  fundamental	  nature	  of	  their	  relationship	  to	  their	  homelands.	  They	  have	  done	  
so	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  urgent	  need	  for	  understanding	  by	  non-­‐indigenous	  societies	  of	  the	  spiritual,	  social,	  
cultural,	  economic	  and	  political	  significance	  to	  indigenous	  societies	  of	  their	  lands,	  territories	  and	  resources	  
for	  their	  continued	  survival	  and	  vitality.	  …	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  that,	  as	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  explained,	  it	  is	  
difficult	   to	   separate	   the	   concept	   of	   indigenous	   peoples’	   relationship	   with	   their	   lands,	   territories	   and	  
resources	   from	   that	   of	   their	   cultural	   differences	   and	   values.	   The	   relationship	  with	   the	   land	   and	   all	   living	  
things	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  indigenous	  societies”	  see	  Erica-­‐Irene	  Daes	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  and	  their	  Relationship	  
to	  Land,	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Council,	  UN	  Doc	  E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21	  at	  para	  12-­‐13.	  





resolutions)67	  on	   indigenous	  peoples’	  way	  of	   life	   to	  understand	  the	  holistic	  and	  
spiritual	   approach	   to	   land	   and	   resources	   they	   traditionally	   have.	   Back	   in	   1983,	  
Special	   Rapporteur	   Jose	  Martinez	   Cobo	   had	   already	   produced	   a	   very	   detailed	  
report	   (with	   recommendations	   annexed),	   in	   which	   the	   ‘distinct	   relationship’	  
indigenous	   peoples	   had	   with	   their	   land	   was	   carefully	   addressed.	   The	   report	  
states	  that:68	  	  	  
	  
It	   is	   essential	   to	   know	  and	  understand	   the	   deeply	   spiritual	   special	   relationship	  
between	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   their	   land	   as	   basic	   to	   their	   existence	   as	   such	  
and	  to	  all	  their	  beliefs,	  customs,	  traditions	  and	  culture.	  …	  	  For	  such	  peoples,	  the	  
land	   is	   not	   merely	   a	   possession	   and	   a	   means	   of	   production.	   The	   entire	  
relationship	  between	  the	  spiritual	   life	  of	   indigenous	  peoples	  and	  Mother	  Earth,	  
and	   their	   land,	   has	   a	   great	  many	   deep-­‐seated	   implications.	   Their	   land	   is	   not	   a	  
commodity	  which	  can	  be	  acquired,	  but	  a	  material	  element	  to	  be	  enjoyed	  freely.	  	  
	  
It	  was	  Cobo’s	  report	  that	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  WGIP.	  Before	  Cobo’s	  Report,	  
the	   1957	   Indigenous	   and	   Tribal	   Populations	   Convention	   (ILO	   107)	   was	   the	   first	  
Convention	  dedicated	  to	   indigenous	  peoples	  which,	  though	  assimilationist	   in	  scope	  
and	   paternalistic	   in	   language,	   encouraged	   states	   to	   take	   into	   account	   indigenous	  
peoples’	  cultural	  and	  religious	  values	  (Art	  4),	  while	  promoting	  their	  social,	  economic	  
and	   cultural	   development	   (Art	   2).	   The	   part	   on	   the	   land	   recognised	   indigenous	  
peoples’	   collective	  ownership	  of	   the	   land	  and	   their	   right	   to	   the	   territories	   they	  
are	   traditionally	   occupying.	   This,	   according	   to	   Anaya,	   “demonstrates	   the	   long-­‐
standing	   concern	   in	   international	   practice	   for	   protecting	   indigenous	   peoples’	  
rights	   to	   their	   traditional	   lands”. 69 Less	   assimilationist	   and	   paternalistic	   in	  
language	  and	  scope,	  ILO	  169	  Convention	  on	  Indigenous	  and	  Tribal	  Peoples	  (ILO,	  
1989)70 	  revised	   and	   broadened	   the	   scope	   of	   ILO	   107	   and	   focussed	   on	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 	  See	   Working	   Group	   on	   Indigenous	   Populations	   electronic	   document	  
<www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/Pages/WGIP.aspx>	  last	  visited	  on	  05/01/2015.	  
68	  Study	   of	   the	   Problem	   of	   Discrimination	   Against	   Indigenous	   Populations	   “Final	   report	   submitted	   by	   the	  
Special	  Rapporteur	  Mr.	  José	  Martínez	  Cobo”	  (1981-­‐3)	  Doc	  E/CN.4/Sub.2/476,	  Doc	  E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2	  and	  
Doc	  E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21.	  
69	  James	   Anaya	   and	   Robert	   A	  Williams	   Jr	   “The	   protection	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples’	   Rights	   over	   Lands	   and	  
Natural	  resources	  Under	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Human	  Right	  System”	  (2001)	  14	  Harvard	  Human	  Rights	  Journal	  
33	  at	  54.	  
70	  Convention	  Concerning	   Indigenous	  and	  Tribal	  Peoples	   in	   Independent	  Countries	   (Entry	   into	   force	  on	  05	  




intangible	   character	   of	   indigenous	   culture,	   by	   stating	   that	   “in	   applying	   the	  
provisions	   of	   this	   Convention:	   (a)	   the	   social,	   cultural,	   religious	   and	   spiritual	  
values	  and	  practices	  of	  these	  peoples	  shall	  be	  recognised	  and	  protected,	  and	  due	  
account	  shall	  be	   taken	  of	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  problems	  which	   face	   them	  both	  as	  
groups	   and	   as	   individuals;	   (b)	   the	   integrity	   of	   the	   values,	   practices	   and	  
institutions	  of	  these	  peoples	  shall	  be	  respected”	  (Article	  5).	  ILO	  169	  stresses	  that	  
indigenous	   peoples	   “shall	   have	   the	   right	   to	   decide	   their	   own	   priorities	   for	   the	  
process	  of	  development	  as	  it	  affects	  their	  lives,	  beliefs,	  institutions	  and	  spiritual	  
well-­‐being	  and	  the	  lands	  they	  occupy	  or	  otherwise	  use,	  and	  to	  exercise	  control”	  
(Art	   7.1).	   The	  Convention	   carries	  on	   contributing	  with	   a	  whole	   section	  on	   land	  
rights	   upholding,	   inter	   alia,	   that	   indigenous	   peoples	   should	   be	   recognised	   “…	  
possession	   of	   the	   peoples	   concerned	   over	   the	   lands	   which	   they	   traditionally	  
occupy”.	   In	   addition	   “…	   measures	   shall	   be	   taken	   in	   appropriate	   cases	   to	  
safeguard	   the	   right	   of	   the	   peoples	   concerned	   to	   use	   lands	   not	   exclusively	  
occupied	   by	   them,	   but	   to	   which	   they	   have	   traditionally	   had	   access	   for	   their	  
subsistence	  and	  traditional	  activities”	   (Art	  14.1).	  Part	   II	  of	   the	  Convention	   is,	   in	  
fact,	   dedicated	   to	   indigenous	   land	   rights	   (from	   Article	   13	   to	   19),	   from	   the	  
spiritual	   values	   and	   relationships	   indigenous	   peoples	   have	  with	   the	   traditional	  
territories	  they	  occupy	  or	  use	  (Art	  13,	  14),	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  rights	  concerned	  to	  
the	  natural	  resources	  to	  which	  they	  need	  access	  (Art	  15).	  Article	  13	  explains	  the	  
holistic	   and	   spiritual	   importance	   of	   indigenous	   traditional	   territories,	   and	  
encourages	   states	   to	   approach	   indigenous	   issues	   taking	   into	   account	   this	  
‘special’	  holistic	  relationship”.71	  In	  short,	  the	  Convention	  reiterates	  that	  the	  land	  
has	   an	   intrinsic	   cultural	   value	   which,	   over	   the	   centuries,	   has	   guaranteed	  
indigenous	  peoples’	  survival	  both	  physical	  and	  spiritual.	  Therefore,	  States	  parties	  
have	  the	  duty	  to	  take	  the	  necessary	  steps	  to	  identify	  which	  lands	  were	  owned	  or	  
used	   by	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   try,	   where	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   recognize	  
ownership	   to,	   at	   least,	   guarantee	   access	   and	   work	   with	   indigenous	  
representatives	   to	   find	   alternative	   locations	   which	   would	   be	   suitable	   for	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  ILO	  Article	  13.1:	  “In	  applying	  the	  provisions	  of	  this	  Part	  of	  the	  Convention	  governments	  shall	  respect	  the	  
special	  importance	  for	  the	  cultures	  and	  spiritual	  values	  of	  the	  peoples	  concerned	  of	  their	  relationship	  with	  
the	   lands	   or	   territories,	   or	   both	   as	   applicable,	  which	   they	   occupy	   or	   otherwise	   use,	   and	   in	   particular	   the	  
collective	  aspects	  of	   this	   relationship.	  2:	  The	  use	  of	   the	   term	   lands	   in	  Articles	  15	  and	  16	  shall	   include	   the	  
concept	  of	  territories,	  which	  covers	  the	  total	  environment	  of	  the	  areas	  which	  the	  peoples	  concerned	  occupy	  




practice	  of	  their	   traditional	  activities.	  Even	   if	   the	  number	  of	  states	  ratifying	  the	  
Convention	   is	   very	   limited,	   and	   there	   is	   persisting	   international	   resistance	   to	  
specific	   regulations	   (in	   this	   case	   to	   the	   safeguarding	   of	   indigenous	   peoples’	  
heritage	   and	   territories),	   the	   growing	   emergence	   of	   instruments	   addressing	  
specific	   issues	   on	   indigenous	   cultures	   and	   traditions	   today	   influence	   state	  
behaviour	  at	  national	  and	   international	   level.	  As	  will	  be	  seen	   in	  chapter	  on	  the	  
Waitangi	   Tribunal	   case	   WAI	   262,	   there	   is	   a	   growing	   undeniable	   interest	   at	  
national	  level	  on	  the	  preservation	  of	  indigenous	  cultures	  and	  traditions.	  
	  
5.4	  –	  International	  Law	  and	  Indigenous	  Traditional	  Territories	  
	  
As	  introduced	  in	  chapter	  2,	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  a	  holistic	  approach	  to	  land,	  
which	  means	  that	  land	  is	  not	  regarded	  as	  a	  commodity,	  but	  it	  is	  instead	  a	  “living	  
tradition	  over	  which	  the	  collectivity	  holds	  a	  communal	  responsibility	  and	  exercise	  
custodianship”.72	  Indigenous	   traditional	   territories	  are	   considered	   today	  part	  of	  
indigenous	   culture	   and	   their	   preservation	   is	   considered	   of	   fundamental	  
importance	   for	   the	   preservation	   of	   indigenous	   cultures.	   According	   to	   IUCN	  
Guidelines	   for	   Protected	   Area	  Managers	   (2008),73	  one	   of	   the	   defining	   features	  
that	   traditional/sacred	  natural	   sites	  have	   in	  common	   is	   that	  people	  have	  cared	  
for	   these	  places	   for	  a	   very	   long	   time,	  by	  often	  keeping	   the	   location	   secret	  and	  
therefore	   accessed	   only	   by	   a	   few.74	  These	   few	   are	   people	   who	   have	   acted	   as	  
guardians	   or	   custodians	   of	   the	   spiritual,	   cultural	   and	   biological	   values	   of	   such	  
places	  and	  are	  usually	  closely	  identified	  with	  these	  locations.75	  	  
The	   2003	   UNESCO	   Convention	   for	   the	   Safeguarding	   of	   the	   Intangible	   Cultural	  
Heritage	   does	   not	   speak	   of	   traditional	   sacred	   sites,	   but	   of	   ‘cultural	   spaces’	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  Michele	  Langfield,	  Willieam	  Logan	  and	  others	  Cultural	  Diversity,	  Heritage	  and	  Human	  Rights	   (Routledge	  
London	  and	  New	  York,	  2010)	  at	  32.	  
73	  Robert	  Wild	  and	  Christopher	  McLeod	  (eds)	  Sacred	  Natural	  Sites:	  Guidelines	  for	  Protected	  Area	  Managers,	  
International	  Union	  for	  Conservation	  and	  Natural	  Resources	  (Gland,	  Switzerland,	  2008).	  
74	  Supra	  at	  7.	  
75	  ‘Custodian’	   in	   this	   regard	   “covers	   in	   a	   single	   word,	   complex	   and	   often	   multi-­‐layered	   management,	  
ownership	   and	   institutional	   situations”	   …	   “The	   custodial	   situations	   of	   individual	   sacred	   natural	   sites	   are	  
therefore	  unique	  and	  need	   to	  be	  approached	  with	   care.	  Custodians	  may	   range	   from	  an	  extended	   family,	  
several	   clans,	   tribes	   or	   other	   indigenous	   groups,	   whole	   communities,	  multiple	   indigenous	   ethnic	   groups,	  
churches,	   temples,	  monastic	  orders,	  groups	  of	  monastic	  orders,	  sects,	  and	  groups	   from	  multiple	  religions.	  
Identifying	  and	   interacting	  with	  custodians	  of	   sacred	  natural	   sites	  often	   requires	  great	   sensitivity,	   respect	  
and	   trust	   building,	   sometimes	   in	   historically	   difficult,	   politically	   charged	   and	   very	   tense	   situations.	   The	  
legitimacy,	   and	   sometimes	  even	   the	  authenticity,	   of	   individuals	  or	   groups	   to	  be	   recognised	  as	   custodians	  




importance	  because	  people	   recognise	   them	  as	  part	  of	   their	   cultural	  heritage.76	  
Therefore,	  land	  is	  broadly	  regarded	  as	  part	  of	  indigenous	  culture.77	  As	  such,	  since	  
the	   1970s,	   more	   attention	   has	   been	   devoted	   to	   the	   preservation	   and,	   when	  
possible,	  restitution	  of	  traditional	  lands	  to	  indigenous	  peoples	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
intrinsic	   significance	   these	   places	   have	   for	   their	   cultural	   survival	   and	   the	  
transmission	  of	   their	  heritage	   to	   future	  generations.	   In	  1978,	  during	   the	  World	  
Conference	  to	  Combat	  Racism,	  the	  ‘special	  relationship’	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  
with	   their	   land	   and	   the	   crucial	   importance	   this	   bond	   has	   for	   the	   continuity	   of	  
indigenous	   lives	   and	   traditions	  was	   acknowledged.78	  A	   holistic	   approach	   to	   the	  
issue	   proved	   to	   be	   unquestionable.	   During	   the	   1978	   and	   1983	   UN	   World	  
Conferences	  to	  Combat	  Racism	  and	  Racial	  Discrimination,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  CERD	  
directed	  special	  consideration	  to	  indigenous	  issues.79	  In	  addition	  to	  that,	  in	  1997	  
CERD	  General	  Recommendation	  No	  XXIII80	  addressed	  again	   indigenous’	   cultural	  
issues	  calling	  upon	  states	  to	  recognise	  and	  respect	  indigenous	  distinct	  cultures.81	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Article	  2.1:	  “For	   the	  purposes	  of	   this	  Convention,	   the	   ‘intangible	  cultural	  heritage’	  means	   the	  practices,	  
representations,	  expressions,	  knowledge,	  skills	  –	  as	  well	  as	  the	  instruments,	  objects,	  artefacts	  and	  cultural	  
spaces	  associated	  therewith	  –	  that	  communities,	  groups	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  individuals	  recognize	  as	  part	  of	  
their	   cultural	   heritage.	   This	   intangible	   cultural	   heritage,	   transmitted	   from	   generation	   to	   generation,	   is	  
constantly	   recreated	  by	  communities	  and	  groups	   in	   response	   to	   their	  environment,	   their	   interaction	  with	  
nature	  and	  their	  history,	  and	  provides	  them	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  identity	  and	  continuity,	  thus	  promoting	  respect	  
for	  cultural	  diversity	  and	  human	  creativity”	  see	  Convention	  for	  the	  Safeguarding	  of	  the	   Intangible	  Cultural	  
Heritage,	   The	  General	   Conference	  of	   the	  United	  Nations	   Educational,	   Scientific	   and	  Cultural	  Organization	  
(UNESCO)	  (Paris,	  from	  29	  September	  to	  17	  October	  2003)	  at	  32nd	  Session.	  
77	  The	   International	   Convention	   Concerning	   the	   Protection	   of	   the	   World	   Cultural	   and	   Natural	   Heritage,	  
United	   Nations	   Educational,	   Scientific	   and	   Cultural	   Organization	   (UNESCO)	   Adopted	   by	   the	   General	  
Conference	  at	  its	  seventeenth	  session	  Paris	  (16	  November	  1972)	  defines	  natural	  heritage	  sites	  as:	  “works	  of	  
man	   or	   the	   combined	   works	   of	   nature	   and	   man,	   and	   areas	   including	   archaeological	   sites	   which	   are	   of	  
outstanding	  universal	  value	  from	  the	  historical,	  aesthetic,	  ethnological	  or	  anthropological	  point	  of	  view”	  (Art	  
1.3).	  
78	  General	  Issue	  43	  states:	  “We	  also	  recognize	  the	  special	  relationship	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  with	  the	  
land	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  their	  spiritual,	  physical	  and	  cultural	  existence	  and	  encourage	  States,	  wherever	  possible,	  
to	  ensure	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  able	  to	  retain	  ownership	  of	  their	  lands	  and	  of	  those	  natural	  resources	  
to	   which	   they	   are	   entitled	   under	   domestic	   law”	   electronic	   document	  
<www.un.org/WCAR/aconf189_12.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  10/09/2011.	  
79	  In	  its	  Programme	  of	  Action,	  the	  1978	  UN	  Conference	  referred	  explicitly	  to	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  urged	  
states	  to	  recognise	  their	  right:	  “to	  call	  themselves	  by	  their	  proper	  name	  and	  to	  express	  freely	  their	  ethnic,	  
cultural	   and	   other	   characteristics”	   ...	   The	   1983	   Conference	   endorsed	   “the	   right	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   to	  
maintain	   their	   traditional	   structure	   of	   economy	   and	   culture,	   including	   their	   language”;	   recognised	   “the	  
special	   relationship	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   to	   their	   land”;	   and	   stressed	   that	   land,	   land	   rights	   and	   natural	  
resources	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  away	  from	  them”	  see	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  –	  A	  Global	  Quest	  for	  Justice,	  by	  the	  
Secretariat	  of	   the	   Independent	  Commission	  on	   International	  Humanitarian	   Issues	   (Zed	  Books	  Ltd,	  London,	  
1987)	  at	  117.	  
80 	  See	   General	   Recommendation	   XXIII	   (1997)	   at	   para	   4	   electronic	   document	  
<www.bayefsky.com//general/cerd_genrecom_23.php>	  last	  visited	  on	  24/07/2014.	  
81	  CERD	   –	   “(a)	   Recognize	   and	   respect	   indigenous	   distinct	   culture,	   history,	   language	   and	  way	   of	   life	   as	   an	  
enrichment	   of	   the	   States’	   cultural	   identity	   and	   to	   promote	   its	   preservation;	   (b)	   Ensure	   that	  members	   of	  
indigenous	  peoples	  are	  free	  and	  equal	   in	  dignity	  and	  rights	  and	  free	  from	  any	  discrimination,	   in	  particular	  
that	  based	  on	   indigenous	  origin	  or	   identity;	   (c)	  Provide	   indigenous	  peoples	  with	  conditions	  allowing	   for	  a	  




The	   Committee	   has	   also	   recognized	   the	   “Aboriginal	   rights	   to	   land,	   property,	  
social	   security,	   adequate	   standards	   of	   living,	   cultural	   development,	   work,	   and	  
remedies”,	   recommending	   that	   “the	   State	  party	   considers	   the	  negotiation	  of	   a	  
treaty	   agreement	   to	   build	   a	   constructive	   and	   sustained	   relationship	   with	  
Indigenous	  peoples”.82	  What	  is	  evident	  from	  the	  many	  Concluding	  Observations	  
released	   by	   the	   Committee	   over	   the	   years	   has	   been	   a	   growing	   tendency	   to	  
interpret	  and	  connect	  indigenous	  cultural	  claims	  to	  land	  claims.	  This	  means	  that,	  
when	   interpreting	   indigenous	   land	   claims,	   the	   land	   cannot	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	  
commodity,	  because	  it	  is	  imbued	  with	  cultural	  holistic	  significance	  as	  well	  and	  it	  
is	   communally	   owned.	   In	   some	   cases,	   General	   Recommendation	   XXIII	   and	   the	  
Committee’s	   Concluding	   Observations	   invoke	   Art	   5.5	   of	   the	   ICERD	   guarantees	  
“the	   right	   to	   own	   property	   alone	   as	   well	   as	   in	   association	   with	   others”.83	  
Continuing	   this	   trend,	   the	   1992	   Rio	   Declaration	   on	   Environment	   and	  
Development	  recognised	  the	  vital	  role	  indigenous	  knowledge	  traditionally	  had	  in	  
environmental	  management	  and	  stressed	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  preservation	  of	  
traditional	   practices.84	  The	   following	   year,	   Erica	   Daes,	   then	   Chair	   of	   the	  WGIP,	  
stressed	  that:	  
	  
…	   the	   discovery,	   use	   and	   teaching	   of	   indigenous	   peoples’	   knowledge,	   arts	   and	  
cultures	   is	   inextricably	   connected	   with	   the	   traditional	   lands	   and	   territories	   of	  
each	  people.	  Control	  over	  traditional	  territories	  and	  resources	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that	  indigenous	  communities	  can	  exercise	  their	  rights	  to	  practise	  and	  revitalize	  their	  cultural	  traditions	  and	  
customs	   and	   to	   preserve	   and	   to	   practise	   their	   languages”	   electronic	   document	  
<www.bayefsky.com//general/cerd_genrecom_23.php>.	  
82	  CERD,	   77th	   Session	   (2010)	   “Consideration	   of	   reports	   submitted	   by	   States	   parties	   under	   article	   9	   of	   the	  
convention:	   Concluding	   observations	   of	   the	   Committee	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   Racial	   Discrimination”	  
CERD/C/ISL/CO/19-­‐20	   electronic	   document	   <www.refworld.org/docid/4c15eb842.html>	   last	   visited	   on	  
24/07/2014.	  
83	  In	  the	  Concluding	  Observations	  at	  the	  57th	  Session	  (Finland,	  para.	  2),	  the	  Committee	  stresses	  its	  concern	  
for	   those	   activities	   authorized	   by	   the	   state	   in	   Sami	   reindeer-­‐breeding	   areas	   “which	   may	   threaten	   Sami	  
culture	   and	   their	   traditional	   way	   of	   life”.	   On	   the	   same	   line,	   the	   Committee	   calls	   upon	  United	   States	   “to	  
recognize	   the	   right	   of	   Native	   Americans	   to	   participate	   in	   decisions	   affecting	   them,	   and	   consult	   and	  
cooperate	   in	   good	   faith	   with	   the	   indigenous	   peoples	   concerned	   before	   adopting	   and	   implementing	   any	  
activity	  in	  areas	  of	  spiritual	  and	  cultural	  significance	  to	  Native	  Americans”.	  The	  Committee	  does	  not	  use	  the	  
word	   ‘holistic’	   in	   its	   analysis,	   but	   ‘holism’	   is	   included	   in	   the	   language:	   “areas	   of	   spiritual	   and	   cultural	  
significance”	  see	  CERD	  70Th	  Session,	  Concluding	  Observations	  of	  the	  Committee:	  United	  States	  of	  America	  at	  
para	  29.	  	  
84 	  “Indigenous	   people	   and	   their	   communities,	   and	   other	   local	   communities,	   have	   a	   vital	   role	   in	  
environmental	  management	  and	  development	  because	  of	  their	  knowledge	  and	  traditional	  practices.	  States	  
should	   recognize	   and	   duly	   support	   their	   identity,	   culture	   and	   interests	   and	   enable	   their	   effective	  
participation	   in	   the	   achievement	   of	   sustainable	   development”	   at	   Principle	   22	   electronic	   document	  	  





continued	   transmission	   of	   indigenous	   peoples’	   heritage	   to	   future	   generations,	  
and	  its	  full	  protection	  (Principle	  6).	  
	  
In	  its	  53rd	  session	  in	  2001,	  the	  Sub-­‐Commission	  on	  the	  Promotion	  and	  Protection	  
of	  Human	  Rights85	  reconfirmed	  that	  “indigenous	  peoples	  have	  a	  distinctive	  and	  
profound	   spiritual	   and	  material	   relationship	   with	   their	   lands	   and	   with	   the	   air,	  
waters,	   coastal	   sea,	   ice,	   flora,	   fauna	  and	  other	   resources.	   This	   relationship	  has	  
various	   social,	   cultural,	   spiritual,	   economic	   and	   political	   dimensions	   and	  
responsibilities”	  (Principle	  121).86	  Though	  the	  Report	  stressed	  the	  general	  failure	  
of	   states	   to	   address	   indigenous	   issues	   (willingly	   or	   not),	   it	   nonetheless	   proved	  
that	   indigenous	   voices	   were	   getting	   stronger,	   and	   states	   were	   ‘kindly’	  
encouraged	   to	   address	   indigenous	   claims	   worldwide.	   To	   give	   an	   example,	   in	  
1985,	   following	   long-­‐lasting	   indigenous	   requests,	   the	   Labour	   government	   of	  
Prime	   Minister	   Bob	   Hawke,	   agreed	   to	   transfer	   the	   title	   of	   one	   of	   the	   major	  
Australian	  tourist	  attractions,	   the	  Uluru/Ayers	  Rock	  and	  the	  Olga	  Mountains,	   to	  
Aboriginal	   ownership.	   The	   return’s	   claim	  was	   carried	   out	  with	   reference	   to	   an	  
unquestionable	   morality:	   the	   nobility	   of	   Aboriginal	   culture	   as	   culture,	   the	  
incontrovertible	   sacredness	   of	   the	   site,	   the	   profanity	   of	   self-­‐serving	   Western	  
greed,	  the	  well-­‐documented	  sin	  of	  the	  past,	  traditional	  affiliation	  with	  the	  land,	  
the	   imperatives	  of	  human	  rights	  and	   the	   inalienable	   title	   to	  a	   ‘quality	  of	   life’.87	  
The	  issue	  of	  establishing	  ownership	  over	  the	  Uluru/Ayers	  Rock	  thus	  required	  the	  
formal	  proof	  that	  traditional	  Aboriginal	  owners	  had	  spiritual	  connections	  to	  the	  
land,	   that	   they	   were	   physically	   using	   the	   land,	   and	   the	   Rock	   represented	   a	  
fundamental	   aspect	   of	   their	   cultural	   and	   spiritual	   life.	   As	   such,	   to	   prove	   their	  
ownership,	  Aboriginals	  had	   to	  produce	  sacred	   lore	   from	  the	  Dreamtime	  period	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  Titled	   Prevention	   of	   Discrimination	   and	   Protection	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   and	  Minorities	   –	   “Indigenous	  
Peoples	  and	  Their	  Relationship	  to	  Land”.	  
86	  Commission	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  Erica	  Irene	  Daes	  Prevention	  of	  Discrimination	  and	  Protection	  of	  Indigenous	  
Peoples	   and	   Minorities	   (2001)	   Doc	   E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21	   electronic	   document	  
<www1.umn.edu/humanrts/demo/RelationshiptoLand_Daes.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  06/01/2015.	  
87	  Elvi	  Whittaker	  “Public	  Discourse	  of	  Sacredness:	  the	  Transfer	  of	  Ayers	  Rock	  to	  Aboriginal	  Ownership”	  
(1994)	  21	  2	  American	  Ethnologist	  310-­‐334	  at	  311;	  see	  also	  Julie	  Marcus	  “The	  Journey	  Out	  of	  the	  Centre:	  the	  
Cultural	  Appropriation	  of	  Ayers	  Rock”	  	  in	  Gillian	  Cowlishaw	  and	  Barry	  Morris	  (eds)	  Race	  Matters	  (Aboriginal	  
Studies	  Pr,	  September	  2000);	  Gordon	  Waitt	  and	  Others	  “Fissures	  in	  the	  rock:	  rethinking	  pride	  and	  shame	  in	  






showing	   how	   ancestral	   peoples	   were	   using	   the	   Uluru/Ayers	   Rock	   and	   its	  
surrounding	  landscapes.88	  	  
Indigenous	  land	  as	  such	  is	  important	  to	  indigenous	  peoples	  for	  both	  its	  tangible	  
and	   intangible	   significance	   along	   with	   the	   resources	   it	   contains.	   These	  
characteristics	   are	   indissoluble.	   This	  means	   that,	  while	   land	   usually	   belongs	   to	  
the	  category	  of	  tangible	  heritage	  law	  and	  common	  law	  of	  property,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
indigenous	  peoples,	  land	  claims	  could	  be	  based	  solely	  on	  its	  intangible	  character	  
status	  (such	  as	  sacredness).	  Despite	  this,	  according	  to	  international	  and	  national	  
laws,	  land	  is	  mostly	  a	  tangible	  entity,	  whose	  ownership	  must	  be	  addressed	  on	  a	  
case	  by	   case	  basis	   under	   the	   law	  on	  property	   inherited	   from	   the	   common	   law	  
system.89	  And	  yet,	   the	   intangible	  significance	  of	   the	   land	   is	   today	   recognized	   in	  
international	  (and,	  often,	  also	  national)	  law.	  	  
	  
The	  UNDRIP	  clearly	   refers,	   inter	  alia,	   to	   the	   land/cultural	   rights	  dichotomy	   in	  a	  
few	  of	  its	  articles.	  In	  particular,	  Article	  25	  explains	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  “have	  
the	  right	   to	  maintain	  and	  strengthen	  their	  distinctive	  spiritual	   relationship	  with	  
their	   traditionally	   owned	   or	   otherwise	   occupied	   and	   used	   lands,	   territories,	  
waters	  and	  coastal	  seas	  and	  other	  resources	  and	  to	  uphold	  their	  responsibilities	  
to	   future	   generations	   in	   this	   regard”.	   In	   his	   article	   Wiessner	   states	   that	  
Indigenous	   “claims	   and	   aspirations	   are	   diverse,	   but	   their	   common	   ground	   is	   a	  
quest	   for	   the	   preservation	   and	   flourishing	   of	   a	   culture	   inextricably,	   and	   often	  
spiritually,	   tied	   to	   their	   ancestral	   land.	   This	   specific	   relationship	   to	   the	   land	  
distinguishes	  them	  from	  other	  communities	  or	  groups	  dispossessed	   in	  terms	  of	  
power	  or	  wealth.	  The	  world	  community	  has,	  through	  domestic	  and	  international	  
laws,	   recognized	   their	   special	   claims,	   and	   it	   has	   tailored	   a	   legal	   regime	   for	  
them”90	  which	   recognise	   the	   complexity	   of	   indigenous	   peoples’	   culture	   and	  
heritage.	  Important	  in	  this	  regard	  is,	  for	  example,	  the	  2001	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  
of	   Human	   Rights’	   decision	   in	   the	  Mayagna	   (Sumo)	   Awas	   Tingni	   Community	   v.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  Supra	  at	  315.	  	  
89	  See	  Theodore	  F.	  T.	  Plucknett	  	  A	  Concise	  History	  of	  the	  Common	  Law	  	  (Liberty	  Fund,	  	  2010);	  Oliver	  Wendell	  
Holmes	  The	  Common	  Law	  (Holmes	  Press,	  2012);	  Tom	  Bingham	  The	  Rule	  of	  Law	  (Penguin,	  2011).	  
90	  Siegfried	  Wiessner	  “The	  Cultural	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples:	  Achievements	  and	  Continuing	  Challenges”	  




Nicaragua	   case.91	  In	   this	   case,	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  Court	   on	  Human	  Rights	   held	  
that	   the	   State	   of	   Nicaragua	   had	   deprived	   the	   Awas	   Tingni	   community	   of	   the	  
enjoyment	   of	   their	   ancestral	   land	   in	   violation	   of	   Art	   21	   of	   the	   American	  
Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights.92	  The	  Court,	  in	  its	  final	  decision,	  asserted	  that	  Art	  
21	  of	   the	  American	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights93	  was	   applicable	   to	   the	   case,	  
and	  also	  carefully	  crafted	  a	  broader	  definition	  of	  the	  ‘right	  to	  property’	  to	  include	  
indigenous	  communal	  land	  occupancy	  in	  a	  manner	  consistent	  with	  the	  provision	  
of	  Art	  21	  of	  the	  Convention:94	  
	  
Among	   indigenous	   peoples	   there	   is	   a	   communitarian	   tradition	   regarding	   a	  
communal	  form	  of	  collective	  property	  of	  the	  land,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  ownership	  of	  
the	   land	   is	   not	   centred	   on	   an	   individual	   but	   rather	   on	   the	   group	   and	   its	  
community.	  Indigenous	  groups,	  by	  the	  fact	  of	  their	  very	  existence,	  have	  the	  right	  
to	  live	  freely	  in	  their	  own	  territory;	  the	  close	  ties	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  with	  the	  
land	   must	   be	   recognized	   and	   understood	   as	   the	   fundamental	   basis	   of	   their	  
cultures,	   their	   spiritual	   life,	   their	   integrity,	   and	   their	   economic	   survival.	   For	  
indigenous	   communities,	   relations	   to	   the	   land	   are	   not	   merely	   a	   matter	   of	  
possession	  and	  production	  but	  a	  material	  and	  spiritual	  element	  which	  they	  must	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  The	  Mayagna	  (Sumo)	  Awas	  Tingni	  Community	  v	  Nicaragua	  (Judgment	  of	  August	  31,	  2001)	  Inter-­‐Am	  Court	  
HR,	  (Ser	  C)	  No	  79	  [2001].	  
92	  “…	   the	   Mayagna	   Community	   has	   communal	   property	   rights	   to	   land	   and	   natural	   resources	   based	   on	  
traditional	   patterns	   of	   use	   and	   occupation	   of	   ancestral	   territory”	   see	   The	  Mayagna	   (Sumo)	   Awas	   Tingni	  
Community	   v	  Nicaragua,	   Judgment	  of	  August	  31,	   2001,	   Inter-­‐Am	  Court	  HR,	   (Ser.	  C)	  No	  79	   (2001)	   at	  para	  
140(a);	   “In	   this	   case	   the	  Court	  held	   that	   the	   international	   human	   right	   to	  enjoy	   the	  benefits	  of	   property,	  
particularly	   as	   affirmed	   in	   the	   American	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights,	   includes	   the	   right	   of	   indigenous	  
peoples	   to	   the	  protection	  of	   their	   customary	   land	   and	   resource	   tenure.	   The	  Court	   held	   that	   the	   State	   of	  
Nicaragua	  violated	  the	  property	  rights	  of	   the	  Awas	  Tingni	  Community	  by	  granting	  to	  a	   foreign	  company	  a	  
concession	   to	   log	  within	   the	   Community’s	   traditional	   lands	   and	  by	   failing	   to	   otherwise	   provide	   adequate	  
recognition	  and	  protection	  of	   the	  Community’s	  customary	   tenure.	   It	  was	  not	  enough	  that	   the	  Nicaraguan	  
constitution	   and	   laws	   recognize	   in	   general	   terms	   the	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   to	   the	   lands	   they	  
traditionally	  use	  and	  occupy.	  The	  Court	  admonished	  that	  Nicaragua	  must	  secure	  the	  effective	  enjoyment	  of	  
those	  rights,	  which	  it	  had	  not	  done	  for	  Awas	  Tingni	  nor	  for	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  indigenous	  communities	  of	  
the	   Atlantic	   Coast	   region	   of	   Nicaragua”	   see	   also	   James	   Anaya	   and	   Claudio	   Grossman	   “The	   Case	   of	   Awas	  
Tingni	   v.	   Nicaragua:	   A	   New	   Step	   in	   the	   International	   Law	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples”	   electronic	   document	  
<www.arizonajournal.org/ajicl/archive/AJICL2002/vol191/introduction-­‐final.pdf>	   last	   visited	   on	  
05/03/2015.	  
93	  American	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  Article	  21:	  Right	  to	  Property:	  1-­‐	  “Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  the	  use	  
and	  enjoyment	  of	  his	  property.	  The	  law	  may	  subordinate	  such	  use	  and	  enjoyment	  to	  the	  interest	  of	  society.	  
2-­‐	  No	  one	  shall	  be	  deprived	  of	  his	  property	  except	  upon	  payment	  of	  just	  compensation,	  for	  reasons	  of	  public	  
utility	  or	  social	  interest,	  and	  in	  the	  cases	  and	  according	  to	  the	  forms	  established	  by	  law.	  3	  -­‐	  Usury	  and	  any	  
other	  form	  of	  exploitation	  of	  man	  by	  man	  shall	  be	  prohibited	  by	  law”.	  
94	  1.	  “Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  the	  use	  and	  enjoyment	  of	  his	  property.	  The	  law	  may	  subordinate	  such	  use	  
and	  enjoyment	  to	  the	  interest	  of	  society.	  -­‐	  2.	  No	  one	  shall	  be	  deprived	  of	  his	  property	  except	  upon	  payment	  
of	   just	  compensation,	   for	  reasons	  of	  public	  utility	  or	  social	   interest,	  and	   in	  the	  cases	  and	  according	  to	  the	  




fully	   enjoy,	   even	   to	   preserve	   their	   cultural	   legacy	   and	   transmit	   it	   to	   future	  
generations.95	  
	  
This	   case	   is	   important	   because	   it	   clearly	   stresses	   the	   importance	   land	   has	   for	  
indigenous	  communities,	  and	  it	  also	  shows	  how	  States	  should	  act	  to	  secure	  the	  
collective	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   to	   “ensure	   survival	   of	   indigenous	  
cultures	  in	  accordance	  with	  international	  law”.96	  In	  the	  same	  case,	  the	  Court	  also	  
recognised	   that	   the	   communitarian	   traditions	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   require	   a	  
different	   understanding	   of	   what	   property,	   land	   and	   culture	   represent	   for	  
indigenous	   peoples.	   In	   the	   Xákmok	   Kásek	   Indigenous	   Community	   v.	   Paraguay	  
case	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  stressed	  that:	  97	  
	  
For	   the	  members	   of	   the	   Xákmok	  Kásek	  Community,	   cultural	   features	   like	   their	  
own	  language	  (Sanapaná	  and	  Enxet),	  their	  shaman	  rituals,	  their	  male	  and	  female	  
initiation	   rituals,	   their	   ancestral	   shamanic	   knowledge,	   their	   ways	   of	  
commemorating	  the	  dead,	  and	  their	  relationship	  with	  the	  land	  are	  essential	  for	  
developing	   their	   cosmology	   and	   unique	   way	   of	   existing.	   …	   All	   these	   cultural	  
features	  and	  practices	  of	  the	  Community	  have	  been	  affected	  by	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  
their	   traditional	   lands.	   According	   to	   the	   testimony	   of	   the	   witness	   Rodrigo	  
Villagra,	  the	  Community’s	  displacement	  from	  its	  traditional	  territory	  has	  resulted	  
in	  “the	  fact	  that	  the	  people	  cannot	  bury	  [their	  family	  members]	   in	  their	  chosen	  
places,	  …	  that	  [they]	  cannot	  return	  [to	  those	  places],	  that	  those	  places	  have	  also	  
in	  some	  ways	  become	  unsanctified	  ….	  [This]	  forced	  process	  means	  that	  none	  of	  
that	  emotional	  relationship	  can	  exist,	  neither	  symbolically	  nor	  spiritually.	  
	  	  
The	  Court	  observed	  that:98	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 	  See	   electronic	   document	   <www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/AwasTingnicase.html>	   last	   visited	   on	  
14/12/2011.	  
96	  James	  Hopkins	  “The	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  and	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples:	  Human	  Rights	  and	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…	   the	   Xákmok	   Kásek	   Community	   had	   suffered	   several	   effects	   to	   its	   cultural	  
identity	  that	  are	  fundamentally	  results	  of	  the	  Community’s	  lack	  of	  territory	  and	  
the	  natural	   resources	   that	  come	  with	   it,	  which	   represents	  a	  violation	  of	  Article	  
21(1)	  of	  the	  Convention	  [American	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights]	  in	  relation	  with	  
Article	  1(1).	  	  
	  
The	  Court	  also	  concluded	  its	  argument	  by	  saying	  that:99	  	  	  
	  
…	   the	   State's	   duty	   to	   take	   positive	  measures	   should	   be	   prioritized	   precisely	   in	  
relation	   to	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   lives	   of	   vulnerable	   people	   such	   as	   the	  
indigenous.	  	  
	  
The	  Court	  also	  ruled	  that:100	  	  
	  
…	   the	   close	   link	   that	   indigenous	  peoples	  have	   to	   their	   traditional	   lands,	   to	   the	  
natural	   resources	   found	   that	   are	   part	   of	   their	   culture,	   and	   to	   the	   lands'	   other	  
intangible	   elements,	   should	   be	   safeguarded	   by	   Article	   21	   of	   the	   American	  
Convention.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   Kichwa	   Indigenous	   People	   of	   Sarayaku	   v	   Ecuador	   case, 101 	  the	   Inter-­‐
American	   Court	   interpreted	   Art	   21	   in	   conjunction	   with	   other	   human	   rights	  
instruments,	  and	  stated	  that	  “under	  international	  law,	  indigenous	  people	  cannot	  
be	   denied	   the	   right	   to	   enjoy	   their	   own	   culture,	   which	   consists	   of	   way	   of	   life	  
strongly	  associated	  with	   the	   land	  and	   the	  use	  of	   its	  natural	   resources”.102	  In	   its	  
negotiations	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Draft	  American	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  
Indigenous	   peoples,	   the	   Organization	   of	   American	   States,	   proposed	   that:	  
“indigenous	  peoples	  have	   the	   right	   to	   [recover,	   preserve,	   use,	   control,	   protect,	  
and	   access]	   their	   [existing	   and	   future]	   sacred	   sites	   and	   objects,	   including	   their	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burial	   grounds,	  human	   remains,	   and	   relics	   [located	   in	   their	   ancestral	   and	  other	  
territories]”	  (Art	  XV.3).103	  On	  the	  same	  line,	  the	  draft	  of	  Article	  XII	  states	  that:104	  	  	  
	  
…	   Indigenous	  people	  have	   the	   right	   to	   the	   recognition	  and	   respect	   for	  all	   their	  
ways	   of	   life,	  world	   views,	   spirituality,	   uses	   and	   customs,	   norms	   and	   traditions,	  
forms	   of	   social,	   economic	   and	   political	   organization,	   forms	   of	   transmission	   of	  
knowledge,	   institutions,	   practices,	   beliefs,	   values,	   dress	   and	   languages,	  
recognizing	  their	  inter-­‐relationship	  as	  elaborated	  in	  this	  Declaration.	  	  
	  
While	  the	  proposed	  Article	  XXIV	  recognises	  indigenous	  peoples’	  right	  to	  property,	  
Article	  XXVIII	  focuses	  on	  the	  intellectual	  dimension	  of	  indigenous	  peoples’	  culture	  
and	  heritage	  by	  stating	  that:	  	  
	  
…	  the	  intellectual	  property	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  includes,	  inter	  alia,	  traditional	  
knowledge,	   ancestral	   designs	   and	   procedures,	   cultural,	   artistic,	   spiritual,	  
technological,	   and	   scientific,	   expressions,	   genetic	   resources	   including	   human	  
genetic	   resources,	   tangible	   and	   intangible	   cultural	   heritage,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
knowledge	  and	  developments	  of	  their	  own	  related	  to	  biodiversity	  and	  the	  utility	  
and	  qualities	  of	  seeds	  and	  medicinal	  plants,	  flora	  and	  fauna.	  	  
	  
In	   more	   recent	   years,	   other	   cases	   have	   been	   successful	   in	   safeguarding	  
indigenous	  peoples’	  sacred	  territories.	  In	  Saramaka	  People	  v	  Suriname	  (2007)105	  
the	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  State:106	  	  
	  
…	  delimit,	  demarcate,	  and	  grant	  collective	  title	  over	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  members	  
of	  the	  Saramaka	  people,	   in	  accordance	  with	  their	  customary	   laws,	  and	  through	  
previous,	  effective	  and	   fully	   informed	  consultations	  with	   the	  Saramaka	  people,	  
without	  prejudice	  to	  other	  tribal	  and	  indigenous	  communities.	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The	   Court	   referred	   to	   the	   pre-­‐existing	   Cases	   of	   the	   Moiwana	   Community	   v	  
Suriname	   (2005)107	  and	   the	   Sawhoyamaxa	   Indigenous	   Community	   v	   Paraguay	  
(2006)108	  by	  stressing	  how	  essential	  is	  “the	  special	  relationship	  that	  members	  of	  
indigenous	   and	   tribal	   peoples	   have	   with	   their	   territory,	   and	   on	   the	   need	   to	  
protect	  their	  right	  to	  that	  territory	  in	  order	  to	  safeguard	  the	  physical	  and	  cultural	  
survival	   of	   such	   peoples”,	   and	   recognizing	   that	   indigenous	   communities	  might	  
have	  a	  collective	  understanding	  of	   the	  concepts	  of	  property	  and	  possession,	   in	  
the	  sense	  that	  ownership	  of	  the	  land	  “is	  not	  centered	  on	  an	  individual,	  but	  rather	  
on	   the	   group	   and	   its	   community”. 109 	  As	   such,	   the	   State	   must	   respect	   and	  
guarantee	  that	   the	  “protection	  of	  property	  under	  Article	  21	  of	   the	  Convention,	  
read	   in	   conjunction	   with	   Articles	   1(1)	   and	   2	   of	   said	   instrument,	   places	   upon	  
States	  a	  positive	  obligation	  to	  adopt	  special	  measures	  that	  guarantee	  members	  
of	  indigenous	  and	  tribal	  peoples	  the	  full	  and	  equal	  exercise	  of	  their	  right	  to	  the	  
territories	   they	   have	   traditionally	   used	   and	   occupied”. 110 	  Most	   recently	   the	  
African	   Commission	   on	  Human	   and	   Peoples’	   Rights	   in	   the	  Endorois	   case111	  has	  
confirmed	  the	  indigenous	  peoples’	  rights	  to	  their	  lands,	  territories	  and	  resources	  
are	  part	  of	  the	  corpus	  of	  binding	  human	  rights	  law.112	  
	  
From	  the	  foregoing	  analysis	   it	  emerges	  that	  honouring	   land	  rights	   is	  one	  of	  the	  
first	  step	  toward	  the	  preservation	  of	  indigenous	  cultures	  and	  holistic	  traditions.	  
Indeed,	  though	  time	  has	  changed,	  it	  is	  still	  true	  that	  holism	  is	  and	  remains	  one	  of	  
the	  most	  important	  key	  features	  of	  indigenous	  cultures.	  	  
Even	   if	   today	   international	   law	   is	   still	   struggling	   to	   fully	   understand	   the	  
holistic/intangible	   elements	   present	   in	   indigenous	   peoples’	   cultures,	   over	   the	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years,	   it	  has	  nonetheless	  made	   important	   step	   towards	  a	  better	  understanding	  
and	  protection	  of	  indigenous	  peoples’	  cultures.	  
	  
This	  chapter	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  culture	  is	  an	  essential	  element	  of	  indigenous	  
traditions	  that	  characterise	  a	  collectivity,	  and	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  relegate	  culture	  to	  a	  
specific	  sector	  of	  international	  law.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  sacredness	  and	  secrecy	  
present	   in	   indigenous	   peoples’	   traditions	   do	   not	   always	   help	   to	   identify	   what	  
needs	  protection	  and	  why.	  	  
The	   next	   chapter	  will	   explain	   that	   indigenous	   cultures,	   and	   culture	   in	   general,	  
over	   the	   years,	   have	   acquired	   more	   importance	   at	   national	   and	   international	  
level,	   and	   human	   rights	   and	   intellectual	   property	   laws	   have	   come	   closer	   in	  
discussing	   the	   issues	   concerning	   indigenous	   peoples	   heritage	   and	   traditions,	  
while	  trying	  to	  find	  workable	  solutions	  for	  the	  safeguard	  of	  indigenous	  cultures.	  
As	  it	  will	  be	  seen	  next,	  culture	  itself	  has	  a	  broad,	  complex	  meaning	  that	  cannot	  
be	  limited	  to	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  definition	  and	  protected	  by	  a	  single	  law.	  Culture,	  in	  fact,	  
not	  only	  guarantees	   the	   integrity	  of	   life	  and	   the	   identity	  of	  a	  group	  of	  peoples	  
but,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  represents	  the	  product	  of	  the	  mind	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  







Indigenous	  Peoples’	  Culture:	  In	  Between	  International	  Intellectual	  
Property	  and	  Human	  Rights	  
	  
This	  chapter	  begins	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  which	  
refers	   to	   intellectual	  property.	  Since	   its	  creation,	  human	  rights	   law	  has	  evolved	  
by	   indirectly	   including	   subject	   matters	   that	   were	   initially	   excluded	   from	   its	  
language.	  Over	  the	  years	  the	   inclusion	  of	   intellectual	  property	  within	  the	  scope	  
of	   human	   rights	   law	   has	   become	  more	   evident.	   According	   to	   Gervais,1	  despite	  
the	  differences	  between	  tangible	  and	  intangible	  property,	  natural	   law	  roots	  are	  
something	   that	   intellectual	  property,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  acutely	   copyrights	  and	  
patents,	  still	  share	  with	  traditional	  (Eurocentric)	  human	  rights	  theory.2	  Art	  27	  of	  
the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  Art	  25	  of	  the	  International	  Covenant	  
on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (see	  chapter	  5)	  as	  well	  as	  Art	  13	  of	  the	  
American	  Declaration	  on	   the	  Rights	  and	  Duties	  of	  Man3	  can	   relate	   to	  copyright	  
law;	  whereas	  Art	  1	  of	  Protocol	  1	  of	   the	  European	  Convention	  of	  Human	  Rights	  
protects	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  private	  property.4	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Daniel	  J	  Gervais	  “Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Human	  Rights:	  Learning	  to	  Live	  Together”	  in	  Paul	  LC	  Torremans	  
(ed)	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Human	  Rights	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International,	  The	  Netherlands,	  2008).	  
2	  “What	   are	   the	   threads	   that	   weave	   intellectual	   property	   and	   human	   rights	   together?	   First,	   intellectual	  
property	  rights	  claim	  to	  have	  roots	  in	  natural	  law,	  most	  famously	  as	  the	  Lockean	  moral	  desert	  theory,	  which	  
held	   that	  property	   rights	   should	  be	  commensurate	  with	   ‘the	  sacrifice	  actually	   incurred.’	  According	   to	   this	  
view,	  property	   is	   justifiable	  as	  a	   (just)	   reward	   for	  work	  done	   to	  create	  new	  works	   from	  the	  existing	  stock	  
ideas	   of	   public	   domain	   works,	   or	   on	   a	   significant,	   industrially	   useful	   improvement	   on	   the	   existing	   stock	  
technological	  knowledge”	  supra	  at	  1.	  
3	  American	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  and	  Duties	  of	  Man	  (Adopted	  by	  the	  Ninth	  International	  Conference	  of	  
American	   States,	   Bogotá,	   Colombia,	   1948)	   -­‐	   Article	   XIII:	   “Every	   person	   has	   the	   right	   to	   take	   part	   in	   the	  
cultural	   life	   of	   the	   community,	   to	   enjoy	   the	   arts,	   and	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   benefits	   that	   result	   from	  
intellectual	  progress,	  especially	  scientific	  discoveries.	  He	  likewise	  has	  the	  right	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  his	  moral	  
and	  material	  interests	  as	  regards	  his	  inventions	  or	  any	  literary,	  scientific	  or	  artistic	  works	  of	  which	  he	  is	  the	  
author”.	  
4	  Convention	   for	   the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms.	  The	   text	  of	   the	  Convention	  
had	  been	  previously	  amended	  according	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  Protocol	  No	  3	  (ETS	  No	  45),	  which	  entered	  into	  
force	  on	  21	  September	  1970,	  of	  Protocol	  No.	  5	  (ETS	  No	  55),	  which	  entered	  into	  force	  on	  20	  December	  1971	  
and	  of	  Protocol	  No.	  8	  (ETS	  No	  118),	  which	  entered	  into	  force	  on	  1	  January	  1990,	  and	  comprised	  also	  the	  text	  
of	  Protocol	  No.	  2	  (ETS	  No	  44)	  which,	  in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  5,	  paragraph	  3	  thereof,	  had	  been	  an	  integral	  
part	   of	   the	   Convention	   since	   its	   entry	   into	   force	   on	   21	   September	   1970.	   All	   provisions	   which	   had	   been	  
amended	  or	  added	  by	  these	  Protocols	  were	  replaced	  by	  Protocol	  No.	  11	  (ETS	  No	  155),	  as	  from	  the	  date	  of	  
its	  entry	  into	  force	  on	  1	  November	  1998.	  As	  from	  that	  date,	  Protocol	  No	  9	  (ETS	  No	  140),	  which	  entered	  into	  
force	  on	  1	  October	  1994,	  was	  repealed	  and	  Protocol	  No	  10	  (ETS	  No	  146)	  had	  lost	  its	  purpose.	  
Article	  1	  –	  Protection	  of	  property	  –	  “Every	  natural	  or	  legal	  person	  is	  entitled	  to	  the	  peaceful	  enjoyment	  of	  
his	  possessions.	  No	  one	  shall	  be	  deprived	  of	  his	  possessions	  except	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  and	  subject	  to	  the	  




Ultimately,	  Art	  31	  of	  the	  UNDRIP	  states	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  “the	  right	  
to	  maintain,	   control,	   protect	   and	   develop	   their	   intellectual	   property	   over	   such	  
cultural	  heritage,	  traditional	  knowledge,	  and	  traditional	  cultural	  expressions”.5	  
The	  contribution	  of	  this	  chapter	  to	  the	  general	  discussion	  is	  important.	  It	  shows,	  
in	   fact,	   that	   an	   evolution	   is	   today	   taking	   place	  within	  HR	   and	   IP	   laws	   that	   has	  
brought	   together	   these	   two	   traditionally	   distant	   realms	  while	   trying	   to	   fill	   the	  
gaps	  that	  each	  possess.	  After	  all,	  the	  right	  to	  culture	  is	  a	  human	  right,	  because	  it	  
is	   essential	   to	   the	   survival	   and	   well	   being	   of	   humankind.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	  
culture	  is	  the	  product	  of	  the	  mind,	  of	  its	  speculation	  and	  observation.	  	  
	  
6.1	  -­‐	  Indigenous	  Culture	  as	  a	  Product	  of	  the	  Mind	  and	  a	  Human	  Right	  
	  	  	  
Only	   in	   the	   last	   part	   of	   the	   19th	   century	   did	   indigenous	   peoples	   start	   to	  
sporadically	  record	  their	  traditions	  in	  writing	  using	  their	  own	  language.	  However,	  
most	   of	   indigenous	   culture	   and	   knowledge	   remained	   fundamentally	   intangible	  
and	  orally	   transmitted.	   It	   has	   been	  often	  questioned	  how	  much	  originality	   has	  
survived	  in	  indigenous	  traditions	  after	  centuries	  of	  suppression,	  persecution	  and	  
erosion	  of	   their	   cultures.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   culture	  as	   such	   is	  a	  phenomenon	  
that	   is	   in	  constant	  movement,	  subjected	  to	  changes	  that	  are	  sometimes	  forced	  
and	  sudden	  or,	  other	  times,	  slow	  and	  deep.	  No	  one	  can	  foresee	  the	  evolution	  of	  
a	  culture.	  No	  one	  can	  assess	  with	  certainty	  where	  a	  given	  culture	  appeared	  first,	  
and	  which	  influences	  shaped	  its	  evolution.	  
It	  is	  the	  author’s	  belief	  that	  any	  discourse	  on	  ‘internal	  originality’	  (as	  truthfulness	  
of	  origins	  present	  or	  existing	  from	  the	  beginning)	  is	  today	  irrelevant.	  This	  is,	  first	  
of	  all,	  because	  when	  ethnocide	  happens,	  cultures	  undergo	  such	  a	  traumatic	  and	  
forced	  modification	   that	  can	  deeply	  affect	   its	   characteristics;	   secondly,	   it	   is	   the	  
perception	   that	   indigenous	   peoples	   have	   of	   their	   own	   culture	   which,	   alone,	  
should	  represent	  the	  parameter	  by	  which	  any	  fundamental	  human,	  cultural	  and	  
political	  right	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  should	  be	  respected	  and	  applied.	  Moreover,	  
nothing	  in	  the	  UNDRIP,	  ILO	  107	  and	  169,	  ICESCR	  and	  ICCPR	  refer	  to	  ‘originality’	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
shall	   not,	   however,	   in	   any	  way	   impair	   the	   right	  of	   a	   State	   to	   enforce	   such	   laws	   as	   it	   deems	  necessary	   to	  
control	   the	  use	  of	  property	   in	  accordance	  with	   the	  general	   interest	  or	   to	   secure	   the	  payment	  of	   taxes	  or	  
other	  contributions	  or	  penalties”.	  




a	   key	   element	   to	   justify	   any	   claim	   of	   protection	   for	   indigenous	   cultural	   and	  
human	   rights,	   and	   the	   generalization	   used	   in	   many	   of	   the	   articles	   of	   the	  
Declaration	   and	   the	   Conventions	   is	   a	   reflection	   of	   the	   broad	   scope	   and	  
applicability	  of	  the	  laws.6	  
Hence,	   this	   thesis	   will	   not	   enter	   into	   any	   discussion	   on	   the	   originality	   of	  
indigenous	   cultures	   and	   traditions,	   intended	   as	   the	   uncorrupted	   line	   of	  
transmission	  of	  indigenous	  lore	  since	  time	  immemorial.	  It	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  
ascertain	  the	  changes	  which	  have	  happened	  within	  indigenous	  communities,	  and	  
such	   changes	  will	   substantially	  depend	  on	   specific	  historical	   circumstances	  and	  
geography.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   is	   fairly	   accurate	   to	   say	   that	   time	   and	  
globalization	  have	  changed	  the	  profile	  of	  every	  society	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  not	  just	  
the	   indigenous	   ones.	   Indigenous	   peoples	   are	   the	   first	   to	   be	   aware	   of	   these	  
changes,	  and	  they	  do	  not	  ask	  to	  go	  back	  to	  a	  time	  that	  does	  not	  exist	  anymore.	  
They	  ask	  to	  have	  their	  fundamental	  rights	  respected	  as	  ‘peoples’,	  and	  to	  be	  left	  
free	  to	  decide	  how	  to	  dispose	  of	  the	  culture	  and	  resources	  in	  their	  ‘custody’.	  At	  
the	  Sixth	  Session	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Permanent	  Forum	  on	  Indigenous	  Issues	  
(2007)	  indigenous	  representatives	  firmly	  reaffirmed:7	  
	  
…	   our	   spiritual	   and	   cultural	   relationship	   with	   all	   life	   forms	   existing	   in	   our	  
traditional	  territories;	  Reaffirming	  our	  fundamental	  role	  and	  responsibility	  as	  the	  
guardians	  of	  our	  territories,	  lands	  and	  natural	  resources;	  Recognizing	  that	  we	  are	  
the	   guardians	   of	   the	   Indigenous	   knowledge	   passed	   down	   from	   our	   ancestors	  
from	  generation	  to	  generation	  and	  we	  reaffirm	  our	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  and	  
perpetuate	   this	   knowledge	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   our	   peoples	   and	   our	   future	  
generations;	   Strongly	   reaffirming	   our	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination,	   which	   is	  
fundamental	   to	   our	   ability	   to	   carry	   out	   our	   responsibilities	   in	   accordance	  with	  
our	  cultural	  values	  and	  our	  customary	  laws.	  
	  
In	  saying	  this,	  however,	  while	  originality	  per	  se	  does	  not	  represent	  a	  key	  element	  
in	   the	   evaluation	   of	   indigenous	   peoples’	   culture,	   TK	   and	   TCEs,	   authenticity	  
remains	   one	   of	   the	   fundamental	   parameters	   in	   the	   applicability	   of	   Intellectual	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  See	  chapter	  4.	  
7	  Declaration	  on	  Indigenous	  Peoples’	  Rights	  to	  Genetic	  Resources	  and	  Indigenous	  Knowledge,	  Convened	  at	  




Property	  Rights	  (IPR)	   laws.8	  According	  to	  the	  Western	  world,	   it	  does	  not	  matter	  
whether	   indigenous	  peoples’	   knowledge	  has	   changed	  over	   the	   centuries;	  what	  
today	   is	   important	   is	   how	   much	   authenticity	   indigenous	   culture	   can	   claim	   to	  
have,	   and	   whether	   such	   originality	   has	   been	   fixed	   in	   physical	   form	   or	   not.	  
Authenticity,	   originality	   and	   fixation	   are,	   in	   fact,	   the	   requirements	   of	   IPR	  
protection	   at	   the	   national	   and	   international	   level.	   Since	   indigenous	   culture,	   TK	  
and	   TCEs	   are	   mostly	   intergenerational,	   orally	   transmitted	   and	   ‘traditional’	  
(especially	   the	   sacred	   and	   secret	   practices	   and	   the	   knowledge	   held	   by	   the	  
custodians),	  they	  exist	  mainly	  in	  unwritten	  form,	  lack	  originality	  (apart	  from	  the	  
originality	  that	  the	  expression	  of	  knowledge	  holds	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  its	  diffusion,	  
commodification	   and	   consequent	   protection	   under	   IPR	   law),	   are	   transmitted	  
over	  prolonged	  periods	  of	   time,	  and	  were	  never	   created	   for	   financial	   gain,	  but	  
rather	  as	  a	  map	  of	  the	  traditions	  of	  a	  given	  community.	  Copyright	   law	  provides	  
intellectual	   property	   protection	   for	   artistic	   original	  works	   against	   unauthorised	  
use	   or	   reproduction.	   In	   doing	   so,	   copyright	   laws	   aim	   to	   provide	   creators	   with	  
exclusive	  economic	  rights	  to	  exploit	  their	  own	  creative	  efforts,	  while	  encouraging	  
the	   creative	   process	   itself.9	  In	   copyright	   law,	   these	   rights	   are	   limited	   in	   time	  
(normally	  the	  life	  of	  the	  creator	  plus	  50-­‐70	  years),	  and	  belong	  to	  the	  creator	  or	  a	  
definable	  group	  of	  creators.	  	  
Human	   rights	   legal	   instruments,	   instead,	   do	   not	   require	   originality	   as	   a	  
parameter	   for	   the	   safeguarding	   of	   indigenous	   cultures;	   they	   protect	   it	   for	   the	  
intrinsic	   value	   that	   culture	   has	   for	   the	   survival	   of	   all	   human	   societies.	   Cultural	  
rights	   are	   part	   of	   the	   dignity	   of	   life	   as	   stated	   in	   Art	   27	   of	   the	   Universal	  
Declaration	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (UDHR,	  1948).10	  As	  seen	  in	  chapter	  5,	  Art	  27	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  See	  chapters	  8	  and	  9.	  
9	  “Today’s	   intellectual	  property	  laws	  originate	  from	  this	  era.	  Thus	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  are	  based	  on	  
the	   notion	   that	   innovation	   is	   the	   product	   of	   the	   creative,	   intellectual	   and	   applied	   concepts	   and	   ideas	   of	  
individuals.	  The	  state	  grants	  specific	  economic	  rights	  to	   inventive	  people	  to	  own,	  use	  and	  dispose	  of	  their	  
creations	  as	  a	   reward	   for	   sharing	   their	   contributions	  and	   to	   stimulate	   inventive	  activities”	   see	  Terri	   Janke	  
“Our	   Culture:	   Our	   Future:	   Report	   on	   Australian	   Indigenous	   Cultural	   and	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights”	  
prepared	   for	   Australian	   Institute	   of	   Aboriginal	   and	   Torres	   Strait	   Islander	   Studies	   and	   the	   Aboriginal	   and	  
Torres	   Strait	   Islander	   Commission	   (1998)	   electronic	   document	  
<frankellawyers.com.au/media/report/culture.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  23/06/2012.	  
10	  The	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights	   (UDHR)	   is	   a	   milestone	   document	   in	   the	   history	   of	   human	  
rights.	   Drafted	   by	   representatives	   with	   different	   legal	   and	   cultural	   backgrounds	   from	   all	   regions	   of	   the	  
world,	   the	  Declaration	  was	  proclaimed	  by	   the	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	   in	  Paris	  on	  10	  December	  
1948	  General	  Assembly	  resolution	  217	  A	  (III)	  (French)	  (Spanish)	  as	  a	  common	  standard	  of	  achievements	  for	  




UDHR	  acknowledges	  two	  fundamental	  human	  rights:	  the	  right	  for	  every	  person	  
to	  participate	  in	  the	  cultural	  life	  –	  “a	  right	  which	  includes	  both	  a	  passive	  element	  
of	   access	   to	   culture	   and	   an	   active	   element	   of	   engaging	   in	   creative	   activity;	  
therefore,	  the	  right	  might	  be	  called	  the	  right	  to	  ‘access	  and	  participation’”.11	  The	  
second	  right	  included	  in	  Art	  27	  is	  the	  right	  of	  authors	  to	  “enjoy	  protection	  over	  
moral	  and	  material	  interests	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  productions	  –	  a	  right	  which	  is	  
sort	  of	  intellectual	  property	  law”.12	  According	  to	  Gervais,13	  Art	  27(1)	  of	  the	  UDHR	  
also	  protects:	  	  
	  
…	  both	  the	  right	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  moral	  and	  material	   interests	  resulting	  
from	  any	  scientific,	   literary	  or	  artistic	  production	  of	  which	  he	   is	   the	  author	  and	  
users’	   right	   freely	   to	  participate	   in	   the	   cultural	   life	  of	   the	   community,	   to	  enjoy	  
the	  arts	  and	  to	  share	  in	  scientific	  advancement	  and	  its	  benefits.	  The	  objective	  of	  
protection	  embraces	  at	   least	   indirectly	  the	  moral	  theory,	  while	  the	  objective	  of	  
access	   is	   ‘expressed	  teleologically	  as	  a	   tool	   to	  allow	  everyone	  to	  enjoy	   the	  arts	  
and	  to	  share	  in	  scientific	  advancement	  and	  its	  benefits.14	  	  
	  
In	   its	   complexity,	   indigenous	  culture	   sits	   in	  between	  common	   law	  on	  property,	  
human	  rights	   law	  and	   intellectual	  property.	   It	   is	   tangible	  and	   intangible,	   sacred	  
and	  not,	   secret	   and	  not	   and	  mostly	   communal.	   Although	   communal	   in	   nature,	  
there	  is	  usually	  an	  individual,	  or	  a	  group	  of	  individuals,	  who	  act	  as	  custodians	  of	  
such	   knowledge.	   The	   more	   the	   knowledge	   is	   sacred,	   the	   more	   it	   becomes	  
inaccessible	   and	   secret	   and	   is	   closely	   guarded	   by	   specific	   members	   of	   the	  
community.	  As	  such,	  culture	  can	  rarely	  be	  considered	  as	  property	  in	  the	  common	  
understanding	   of	   the	   Western	   concept	   of	   property.	   It	   is	   often	   impossible	   to	  
connect	  culture,	  TK	  and	  TCEs	  to	  a	  creator/author	  or	  to	  a	  specific	  timeline.	  They	  
are	  all	  holistic	  aspects	  of	  a	  culture.15	  Both	  rights	  included	  in	  Art	  27	  UDHR	  create	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
protected.	  Universal	  Declaration	   of	  Human	  Rights	  GA	  Res	   217,	  UN	  GOAR,	   3d	   Sess,	  UN	  Doc	  A/810	   (1948)	  
<www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/Introduction.aspx>.	  
11	  Prof	  Hugh	  C	  Hansen	  (ed)	   Intellectual	  Property	  Law	  and	  Policy	  Vol	  10	  (Hart	  Publishing,	  Portland,	  2008)	  at	  
372.	  
12	  At	  372.	  
13	  Daniel	  J	  Gervais	  “Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Human	  Rights:	  Learning	  to	  Live	  Together”.	  
14	  See	  Gervais	  at	  14-­‐15.	  
15	  As	   explained	  by	  Daes:	   “the	   protection	   of	   cultural	   and	   intellectual	   property	   is	   connected	   fundamentally	  
with	   the	   realization	  of	   the	   territorial	   rights	  and	   self-­‐determination	  of	   indigenous	  peoples”	   see	  Erika-­‐Irene	  




package	   of	   cultural	   rights	   which	   were	   later	   included	   in	   more	   detail	   into	   the	  
ICCPR,	   Art	   27,	   and	   the	   ICESCR,	   Art	   15.16	  Both	   Articles	   enshrine	   the	   right	   to	  
participate	   in	  cultural	   life;	   in	  other	  words,	  as	  pointed	  out	  by	  Dinstein,	   “cultural	  
life	  must	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  benefit	  to	  which	  every	  member	  of	  the	  community	   is	  
entitled.	  Culture	  must	  not	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  esoteric	  activity	  of	  a	  superior	  social	  
elite”.17	  According	  to	  the	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights:18	  	  	  
	  
…	  only	   the	   ‘author’,	  namely	   the	  creator,	  whether	  man	  or	  woman,	   individual	  or	  
group	  of	   individuals,	   of	   scientific,	   literary	   or	   artistic	   productions,	   such	   as,	   inter	  
alia,	  writers	   and	   artists,	   can	   be	   the	   beneficiary	   of	   the	   protection	   of	   article	   15,	  
paragraph	  1(c).	  This	  follows	  from	  the	  words	  ‘everyone’,	  ‘he’	  and	  ‘author’,	  which	  
indicate	   that	   the	   drafters	   of	   that	   article	   seemed	   to	   have	   believed	   authors	   of	  
scientific,	   literary	  or	   artistic	  productions	   to	  be	  natural	  persons,	  without	  at	   that	  
time	  realizing	  that	  they	  could	  also	  be	  groups	  of	  individuals.	  	  
	  
According	  to	  the	  Committee,	  “under	  the	  existing	  international	  treaty	  protection	  
regimes,	   legal	   entities	   are	   included	   among	   the	   holders	   of	   intellectual	   property	  
rights”. 19 	  This	   means	   that,	   although	   the	   guardians	   of	   knowledge	   have	   not	  
physically	  created	  the	  TCEs,	  and	  they	  are	  bound	  by	  a	  ‘duty	  of	  care’	  to	  safeguard	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Property	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   Commission	   on	   Human	   Rights	   –	   Sub	   Commission	   on	   the	   Prevention	   of	  
Discrimination	  and	  Protection	  of	  Minorities	  (1993)	  UN	  Doc	  E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28.	  
16	  The	   human	   right	   to	   benefit	   from	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   moral	   and	   material	   interests	   of	   the	   author	   is	  
recognized	   in	  a	  number	  of	   international	   instruments.	   In	   identical	   language,	  article	  27,	  paragraph	  2,	  of	   the	  
Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  provides:	  Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  moral	  and	  
material	   interests	   resulting	   from	   any	   scientific,	   literary	   or	   artistic	   production	   of	  which	   he	   is	   the	   author.”	  
Similarly,	  this	  right	  is	  recognized	  in	  regional	  human	  rights	  instruments,	  such	  as	  article	  13,	  paragraph	  2,	  of	  the	  
American	  Declaration	  of	  the	  Rights	  and	  Duties	  of	  Man	  of	  1948,	  article	  14,	  paragraph	  1	  (c),	  of	  the	  Additional	  
Protocol	  to	  the	  American	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  Area	  of	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  of	  
1988	  (‘Protocol	  of	  San	  Salvador’)	  and,	  albeit	  not	  explicitly,	  in	  article	  1	  of	  Protocol	  No	  1	  to	  the	  Convention	  for	  
the	   Protection	   of	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Fundamental	   Freedoms	   of	   1952	   (European	   Convention	   on	   Human	  
Rights)’	  see	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights,	  General	  Comment	  17,	  the	  right	  of	  everyone	  
to	  benefit	   from	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  moral	  and	  material	   interests	  resulting	  from	  any	  scientific,	   literary	  or	  
artistic	  production	  of	  which	  he	  or	   she	   is	   the	  author	   (article	  15,	  paragraph	  1	   (c),	  of	   the	  Covenant)	  UN	  Doc	  
E/C.12/GC/17	  (2006)	  at	  2	  electronic	  document	  <www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/escgencom17.html>	  
last	  visited	  on	  06/01/2015.	  	  
17	  Yoram	  Dinstein	  “Cultural	  Rights”	  (1979)	  9	  Israel	  Yearbook	  on	  Human	  Rights	  58	  at	  76.	  
18	  “Human	  Rights	  and	  Intellectual	  Property”	  see	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights,	  twenty-­‐
seventh	   session	   (2001),	   “Human	   Rights	   and	   Intellectual	   Property”	   Statement	   by	   the	   Committee	   on	  
Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (29	  November	  2001)	  UN	  Doc	  E/C.12/2001/15.	  
19	  “However,	  as	  noted	  above,	  their	  entitlements,	  because	  of	  their	  different	  nature,	  are	  not	  protected	  at	  the	  
level	   of	   human	   rights”	   see	   Committee	   on	   Economic,	   Social	   and	   Cultural	   Rights,	   twenty-­‐seventh	   session	  
(2001)	   “Human	   Rights	   and	   Intellectual	   Property”	   Statement	   by	   the	   Committee	   on	   Economic,	   Social	   and	  




the	   knowledge	   represented	   in	   the	   TCE,	   under	   Art	   15	   they	   are	   holders	   of	  
intellectual	  property	  rights.	  In	  General	  Comment	  No	  2120	  it	  is	  stated	  that:21	  
	  
…	  the	  Committee	  recognizes	   that	   the	  term	   ‘everyone’	   in	   the	   first	   line	  of	  article	  
15	  may	   denote	   the	   individual	   or	   the	   collective;	   in	   other	   words,	   cultural	   rights	  
may	  be	  exercised	  by	  a	  person	  (a)	  as	  an	  individual,	  (b)	  in	  association	  with	  others,	  
or	  (c)	  within	  a	  community	  or	  group,	  as	  such.	  	  
	  
Referring	  to	  minorities,	  General	  Comment	  No	  21	  states	  that	  Art	  15,	  paragraph	  1	  
(a)	  of	  the	  Covenant	  also	  includes	  the	  right	  of	  minorities	  and	  of	  persons	  belonging	  
to	  minorities	   to	   take	   part	   in	   the	   cultural	   life	   of	   society,	   and	   also	   to	   conserve,	  
promote	  and	  develop	  their	  own	  culture.22	  This	  right	  entails:	  
	  
…	   the	   obligation	   of	   States	   parties	   to	   recognize,	   respect	   and	   protect	   minority	  
cultures	   as	   an	   essential	   component	   of	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   States	   themselves.	  
Consequently,	   minorities	   have	   the	   right	   to	   their	   cultural	   diversity,	   traditions,	  
customs,	   religion,	   forms	  of	  education,	   languages,	  communication	  media	   (press,	  
radio,	  television,	  Internet)	  and	  other	  manifestations	  of	  their	  cultural	  identity	  and	  
membership.	   Minorities,	   as	   well	   as	   persons	   belonging	   to	   minorities,	   have	   the	  
right	   not	   only	   to	   their	   own	   identity	   but	   also	   to	   development	   in	   all	   areas	   of	  
cultural	  life.23	  
	  
In	  Art	  15	  (c),	  the	  ICESCR	  stresses	  that	  everyone	  has	  the	  right	  “to	  benefit	  from	  the	  
protection	   of	   the	   moral	   and	   material	   interests	   resulting	   from	   any	   scientific,	  
literary	  or	  artistic	  production	  of	  which	  he	   is	   the	  author”.	   The	  Article,	  however,	  
does	  not	  specify	  which	  modalities	  of	  protection	  are	  granted	  to	  authors	  or	   legal	  
entities.24	  The	   Article	   seems	   indeed	   to	   limit	   the	   protection	   to	   “the	   moral	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Council,	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  General	  comment	  No	  21	  
-­‐	  Right	  of	  everyone	  to	  take	  part	  in	  cultural	  life	  (art	  15,	  para	  1	  (a),	  of	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  
Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights)	  (21	  December	  2009)	  UN	  Doc	  E/C.12/GC/21.	   	  
21	  Supra	  at	  3.	  
22International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights,	  art.	  27;	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Persons	  Belonging	  
to	  National	  or	  Ethnic,	  Religious	  and	  Linguistic	  Minorities,	  at	  para	  1	  (1).	  
23	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Council,	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  General	  comment	  No	  21	  
-­‐	  Right	  of	  everyone	  to	  take	  part	  in	  cultural	  life	  (art	  15,	  para	  1	  (a),	  of	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  
Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights)	  (21	  December	  2009)	  UN	  Doc	  E/C.12/GC/21	  at	  para	  32-­‐33.	  
24	  The	  Committee	  observes	   that,	   “by	   recognizing	   the	  right	  of	  everyone	  to	   ‘benefit	   from	  the	  protection’	  of	  




material	   interests	   resulting	   from	   their	  productions”.	  Art	  27	  of	   the	  UDHR	  states	  
that	  the	  material	  and	  moral	  interests	  of	  the	  author	  (with	  respect	  to	  his/her	  work)	  
should	  be	  protected	  under	  international	  human	  rights	  law.	  The	  aim	  of	  Art	  27(1)	  
is	   to	   make	   it	   clear	   that	   everyone	   should	   be	   put	   in	   the	   position	   to	   reach	   and	  
express	  culture.	   In	  other	  words,	   it	  must	  be	  possible	   to	  both	  access	  culture	  and	  
participate	  in	  its	  creation.	  
Globally	   speaking,	   apart	   from	   ICCPR	   and	   ICESCR,	   several	   human	   rights	  
instruments	   safeguard	   indigenous	   peoples’	   TK	   and	   TCEs	   either	   directly	   or	  
indirectly.	  Aside	  from	  the	  regulations	  created	  ad	  hoc	  for	  indigenous	  peoples	  (ILO	  
157,	  ILO	  169	  and	  UNDRIP),	  human	  rights	  instruments	  seem	  to	  refer	  and	  address	  
the	   issues	   related	   to	   indigenous	  peoples’	  heritage	  and,	   indirectly,	   the	   role	   that	  
guardians	  play	   in	  preserving	   the	  cultural	   identity	  of	  a	   community.	  However,	  all	  
the	  laws	  fail	  to	  address	  the	  intangible	  aspect	  of	  a	  culture.	  	  
	  
Major	   international	   instruments	   recognising	   indigenous	   peoples’	   right	   to	  
safeguard,	  manage	  and	  preserve	  their	  TK	  according	  to	  their	  traditions	  
	  
The	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	  
Rights	  
Article	  27	  
ICESCR	   Article	  15,	  para	  1(c)	  
ICCPR	   Article	  27	  
CBD	   Article	  8(j)	  
ILO	  169	   Articles	  13,	  15,	  23	  
Agenda	  21	   Paragraph	  26.1	  
The	  Rio	  Declaration	   Principle	  22	  
UNDRIP	   Art	  9,	  11,	  12,	  13,	  15,	  24,	  31,	  33,	  34,	  35	  
	  
They	  protect	  the	  manifestations	  in	  material	  form	  of	  such	  intangible	  culture,	  but	  
the	  idea	  -­‐	  the	  spiritual,	  sacred	  force	  which	  determined	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  culture	  
-­‐	  remains	  fundamentally	  unprotected	  by	  HR	  and	  IP	  laws.25	  	  
In	  1995,	  the	  Sub-­‐Commission	  on	  Prevention	  of	  Discrimination	  and	  Protection	  of	  
Minorities	   created	  a	   set	  of	   “Principles	  and	  Guidelines	   for	   the	  Protection	  of	   the	  
Heritage	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples”	   in	   which	   it	   was	   specified	   that	   indigenous	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
paragraph	   1	   (c),	   by	   no	   means	   prevents	   States	   parties	   from	   adopting	   higher	   protection	   standards	   in	  
international	  treaties	  on	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  moral	  and	  material	  interests	  of	  authors	  or	  in	  their	  domestic	  
laws,	  provided	  that	  these	  standards	  do	  not	  unjustifiably	  limit	  the	  enjoyment	  by	  others	  of	  their	  rights	  under	  
the	  Covenant”	  see	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights,	  General	  Comment	  No	  17	  (2005)	  UN	  
Doc	  E/C.12/GC/17	  at	  4.	  




peoples	   are	   the	   owners	   of	   their	   cultural	   heritage	   (in	   its	   broad	   and	   inclusive	  
definition)	  and	  that	  such	  heritage	  is	  safeguarded	  by	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole,	  
or	  by	   specific	  members	  of	   the	  community	  who	  act	  as	  holders/guardians	  of	   the	  
knowledge	  and	  may	  decide	  how	  to	  dispose	  of	  it.26	  	  
As	   it	  will	  be	  seen	   in	  the	  next	  chapters,	   the	   idea	  that	  states	  should	  consult	  with	  
indigenous	   guardians	   is	   very	   practical.	   Given	   the	   fact	   that	   indigenous	   TK	   is	   in	  
good	  part	  sacred	  and	  consequently	  kept	  secret	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  community,	  
only	  the	  guardians	  can	  express	  when	  and	  how	  there	  might	  be	  an	  infringement	  of	  
their	   cultural	   rights	  and	  explain	  how	  and	  when	   the	   culture	   they	  are	  protecting	  
has	   been	   misused.	   As	   cultural	   representatives,	   the	   guardians	   are	   in	   the	   best	  
position	  to	  advise	  states	  on	  what	  is	  ideally	  required	  to	  protect	  their	  tangible	  and	  
intangible	  knowledge	  from	  any	  misuse	  or	  exploitation.	  They	  could	  suggest	   legal	  
revisions	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   experience	   with	   communal	   customary	   laws;	   or	  
could	   simply	  help	  with	   the	   language	  and	   the	   translation	  of	   the	  values	   that	   the	  
national	  and	  international	  communities	  try	  to	  safeguard.	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  do	  
so,	   states	   should	  extend	  privileges	   to	   indigenous	  peoples	   that	   they	  have	  so	   far	  
resisted	  extending.	  	  
As	   introduced	   above,	   ICESCR	   realises	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   respect	   for	   every	  
form	  of	  cultural	  expression	  and	  on	  the	  subject	  it	  states	  that:	  	  
	  
The	  States	  Parties	  to	  the	  present	  Covenant	  recognize	  the	  right	  of	  everyone:	  	  
(a)	  to	  take	  part	  in	  cultural	  life;	  	  
(b)	  to	  enjoy	  the	  benefits	  of	  scientific	  progress	  and	  its	  applications;	  	  
(c)	   to	  benefit	   from	  the	  protection	  of	   the	  moral	  and	  material	   interests	   resulting	  
from	  any	  scientific,	   literary	  or	  artistic	  production	  of	  which	  he	   is	   the	  author	  (Art	  
15.1).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Principle	  11	  reads	  that:	  “Every	  element	  of	  an	  indigenous	  peoples'	  heritage	  has	  traditional	  owners,	  which	  
may	  be	  the	  whole	  people,	  a	  particular	  family	  or	  clan,	  an	  association	  or	  society,	  or	  individuals	  who	  have	  been	  
specially	  taught	  or	  initiated	  to	  be	  its	  custodians.	  The	  traditional	  owners	  of	  the	  heritage	  must	  be	  determined	  
in	  accordance	  with	  indigenous	  peoples’	  own	  customs,	  laws	  and	  practices”.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  dispute	  over	  the	  
custody	  or	  use	  of	  any	  traditional	  element	  of	   indigenous	  knowledge	  and	  heritage,	  Principle	  15	  affirms	  that	  
“…	   judicial	   and	   administrative	   bodies	   should	   be	   guided	   by	   the	   advice	   of	   indigenous	   elders	   who	   are	  
recognized	  by	  the	  indigenous	  communities	  or	  peoples	  concerned	  as	  having	  specific	  knowledge	  of	  traditional	  
laws”	  see	  Erica-­‐Irene	  Daes	  Principles	  and	  Guidelines	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Heritage	  of	  Indigenous	  People,	  
Elaborated	   in	   conformity	   with	   resolution	   1993/44	   and	   decision	   1994/105	   of	   the	   Sub-­‐Commission	   on	  
Prevention	  of	  Discrimination	  and	  Protection	  of	  Minorities	  of	   the	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  Economic	  
and	   Social	   Council,	   United	   Nations	   (UN	   Doc	   E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26,	   GE	   95-­‐12808	   (E),	   (21	   June	   1995)	  





Though	   in	   the	  1960s	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   ICESCR	  was	  mainly	  aspirational	  and	   the	  
article	  reflected	  the	  concept	  of	  authorship	  presented	  by	  IPR	  laws,	  over	  the	  years,	  
Article	  15	  seems	  to	  have	  taken	  a	  different	  route.	  According	  to	  copyright	  law,	  an	  
author	  draws	  his	  or	  her	  idea	  for	  any	  artistic	  expression	  from	  a	  well	  of	  pre-­‐existing	  
common	   knowledge,	   which	   is	   potentially	   available	   to	   everyone	   to	   be	   copied.	  
What	  gives	  originality	  to	  the	  work	  is	  how	  such	  knowledge	  is	  reshaped	  into	  new	  
expressions	   to	  be	  brought	   into	   the	  public	  domain.27	  This	   seems	  to	  suggest	   that	  
all	  humanity	   is	   linked	  by	  a	  collective	  knowledge	  that	  can	  be	  used	  by	  anyone.	   In	  
this	  context,	  IPR	  laws	  exist	  to	  control	  the	  circulation	  of	  these	  new	  ‘productions’	  
of	  knowledge	  from	  any	  economic	  and	  moral	  exploitation	  by	  someone	  other	  than	  
the	   creator.	   The	   limit	   in	   time	   of	   such	   protection	   is	   directly	   related	   to	   the	  
assumption	  that	  no	  idea	  is	  intrinsically	  new	  and	  therefore	  its	  economic	  privileges	  
should	  be	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  creator	  during	  his	  lifetime.	  Copyright	  laws	  consider	  fair	  
to	  limit	  the	  privileges	  of	  the	  ‘information’	  to	  the	  lifetime	  of	  the	  author	  plus	  50/70	  
years,	  and	  then	  let	  it	  freely	  circulate	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  that	  initially	  originated	  
it.	  However,	  indigenous	  peoples	  might	  not	  draw	  from	  the	  same	  well	  of	  common	  
knowledge	   that	   Western	   law	   refers	   to,	   and	   among	   indigenous	   communities	  
there	  might	  be	  a	  different	  idea	  of	  what	  can	  be	  rightly	  considered	  communal.	  The	  
existence	   of	   guardians	   of	   knowledge	   alone	   seems	   to	   prove	   that	   not	   all	  
indigenous	  knowledge	  constitutes	  a	  background	  material	  common	  and	  enjoyable	  
by	  everyone;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  according	  to	  indigenous	  customary	  laws,	  usually	  
knowledge	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	   fixed	   in	  material	   form	   in	  order	   to	  exist	  and	  be	  
granted	  exclusive	  rights;	  and	  for	  indigenous	  peoples,	  knowledge	  does	  not	  usually	  
constitute	   property.	   The	   Committee	   on	   Economic,	   Social	   and	   Cultural	   Rights	  
recognises	   that	   the	  creation	  process	  can	  be	  unique	  and,	  at	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  “Public	  domain	  and	  IP	  systems	  are	  closely,	  even	  integrally,	  linked.	  From	  different	  policy	  perspectives,	  the	  
relationship	   between	   a	   public	   domain	   and	   an	   IP	   system	   may	   be	   characterised	   variously	   as	   harmonious	  
synergy;	   pragmatic,	   uneven	   accommodation;	   or	   inherent	   tension.	   Policy	   discourse	   or	   ideological	   leanings	  
may	  favour	  one	  side	  of	  this	  coin	  over	  the	  other.	  But	  even	  critiques	  of	  the	  embedded	  values	  in	  the	  IP	  system	  
yoke	   IP	   law	   as	   public	   domain	   together:	   ‘indigenous	   peoples	   have	   rarely	   placed	   anything	   in	   the	   so-­‐called	  
public	  domain,	  a	  term	  without	  meaning	  to	  us	  …	  the	  public	  domain	  is	  a	  construct	  of	  the	  IP	  system	  and	  does	  
not	   take	   into	   account	   domains	   established	   by	   customary	   indigenous	   laws’”	   see	   Anthony	   Taubman	   “The	  
Public	   Domain	   and	   International	   Intellectual	   Property	   Laws	   Treaties”	   in	   Charlotte	   Waelde	   and	   Hector	  
MacQueen	   (eds)	   Intellectual	  Property	  –	  The	  Many	  Faces	  of	   the	  Public	  Domain	   (Edward	  Elgar,	  Cheltenham	  
UK,	  Northampton,	  MA-­‐USA,	  2007)	  at	  57;	  see	  also	  WIPO	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/3	  (2003);	  see	  also	  Johanna	  
Gibson	   “Audiences	   in	   Tradition:	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   the	   Public	   Domain”	   in	   Charlotte	  Waelde	   and	  




result	   of	   interactive	   processes	   between	   creator	   and	   environment,28	  which	   is	  
often	   impossible	   to	   define	   or	   categorize.	   However,	   as	   restated	   in	   general	  
Comment	  No	  21	  “the	  right	  to	  take	  part	  in	  cultural	  life	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  a	  
freedom.	   In	  order	   for	   this	   right	   to	  be	  ensured,	   it	   requires	   from	  the	  State	  party	  
both	  abstention	  (ie	  non-­‐interference	  with	  the	  exercise	  of	  cultural	  practices	  and	  
with	   access	   to	   cultural	   goods	   and	   services)	   and	   positive	   action	   (ensuring	  
preconditions	   for	   participation,	   facilitation	   and	   promotion	   of	   cultural	   life,	   and	  
access	  to	  and	  preservation	  of	  cultural	  goods)”,29	  which	  means	  that	  there	  should	  
be	  a	  limit	  of	  interference	  between	  states	  and	  the	  cultural	  life	  of	  the	  people	  living	  
within	   the	   borders.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   states	   should	   act	   as	   facilitators	   in	   the	  
promotion	   of	   culture	   by	   leaving	   the	   people	   involved	   in	   cultural	   life	   to	   directly	  
participating	  in	  its	  management.30	  	  
Art	  27	  of	   the	  UDHR	  and	  Art	  15	  of	   ICESCR	  state	   that	  everyone	  has	   the	  “right	   to	  
freely	  participate	   in	  the	  cultural	   life	  of	  the	  community,	  to	  enjoy	  the	  arts	  and	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 	  “The	   concept	   of	   culture	   must	   be	   seen	   not	   as	   a	   series	   of	   isolated	   manifestations	   or	   hermetic	  
compartments,	  but	  as	  an	   interactive	  process	  whereby	   individuals	  and	  communities,	  while	  preserving	  their	  
specificities	   and	  purposes,	   give	   expression	   to	   the	   culture	   of	   humanity.	   This	   concept	   takes	   account	   of	   the	  
individuality	  and	  otherness	  of	  culture	  as	  the	  creation	  and	  product	  of	  society”	  see	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  
Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  General	  Comment	  21-­‐	  Right	  of	  everyone	  to	  take	  part	  in	  cultural	  life	  (art	  15,	  para	  1	  
(a),	  of	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights)	  (2009)	  UN	  Doc	  E/C.12/GC/21	  at	  
4.	  See	  also	  note	  12	  of	  the	  General	  Comment	  No	  21	  stating	  that:	  Culture	  is	  (a)	  “the	  set	  of	  distinctive	  spiritual,	  
material,	  intellectual	  and	  emotional	  features	  of	  a	  society	  or	  a	  social	  group,	  [which]	  encompasses,	  in	  addition	  
to	   art	   and	   literature,	   lifestyles,	   ways	   of	   living	   together,	   value	   systems,	   traditions	   and	   beliefs”	   (UNESCO	  
Universal	   Declaration	   on	   Cultural	   Diversity,	   fifth	   preambular	   paragraph);	   (b)	   “in	   its	   very	   essence,	   a	   social	  
phenomenon	  resulting	  from	  individuals	  joining	  and	  cooperating	  in	  creative	  activities	  [and]	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  
access	  to	  works	  of	  art	  and	  the	  human	  rights,	  but	  is	  at	  one	  and	  the	  same	  time	  the	  acquisition	  of	  knowledge,	  
the	  demand	  for	  a	  way	  of	  life	  and	  need	  to	  communicate”	  (UNESCO	  recommendation	  on	  participation	  by	  the	  
people	   at	   large	   in	   cultural	   life	   and	   their	   contribution	   to	   it,	   1976,	   the	   Nairobi	   recommendation,	   fifth	  
preambular	  paragraph	  (a)	  and	  (c));	  (c)	  “covers	  those	  values,	  beliefs,	  convictions,	  languages,	  knowledge	  and	  
the	  arts,	  traditions,	  institutions	  and	  ways	  of	  life	  through	  which	  a	  person	  or	  a	  group	  expresses	  their	  humanity	  
and	  meanings	  that	  they	  give	  to	  their	  existence	  and	  to	  their	  development”	  (Fribourg	  Declaration	  on	  Cultural	  
Rights,	   art.	   2	   (a)	   (definitions);	   (d)	   “the	   sum	   total	  of	   the	  material	   and	   spiritual	   activities	   and	  products	  of	   a	  
given	  social	  group	  which	  distinguishes	  it	  from	  other	  similar	  groups	  [and]	  a	  system	  of	  values	  and	  symbols	  as	  
well	  as	  a	  set	  of	  practices	  that	  a	  specific	  cultural	  group	  reproduces	  over	  time	  and	  which	  provides	  individuals	  
with	   the	   required	   signposts	   and	   meanings	   for	   behaviour	   and	   social	   relationships	   in	   everyday	   life”	   see	  
Rodolfo	   Stavenhagen	   “Cultural	   Rights:	   A	   social	   science	   perspective”	   in	   H	   Niec	   (ed)	   Cultural	   Rights	   and	  
Wrongs:	  A	   collection	  of	   essays	   in	   commemoration	  of	   the	  50th	  anniversary	  of	   the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  
Human	  Rights	  (UNESCO	  Publishing	  and	  Institute	  of	  Art	  and	  Law,	  Paris	  and	  Leicester).	  
29	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  General	  Comment	  No	  21-­‐	  Right	  of	  everyone	  to	  take	  
part	  in	  cultural	  life	  (art	  15,	  para	  1	  (a)	  of	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights)	  
(2009)	  UN	  Doc	  E/C.12/GC/21	  at	  2.	  
30	  “The	  decision	  by	  a	  person	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  exercise	  the	  right	  to	  take	  part	  in	  cultural	  life	  individually,	  or	  
in	  association	  with	  others,	  is	  a	  cultural	  choice	  and,	  as	  such,	  should	  be	  recognized,	  respected	  and	  protected	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  equality.	  This	  is	  especially	  important	  for	  all	  indigenous	  peoples,	  who	  have	  the	  right	  to	  the	  full	  
enjoyment,	  as	  a	  collective	  or	  as	  individuals,	  of	  all	  human	  rights	  and	  fundamental	  freedoms	  as	  recognized	  in	  
the	   Charter	   of	   the	   United	   Nations,	   the	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights	   and	   international	   human	  
rights	  law,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  United	  Nations	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples”	  see	  Committee	  on	  
Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  General	  Comment	  No	  21-­‐	  Right	  of	  everyone	  to	  take	  part	  in	  cultural	  life	  
(art	   15,	   para	   1	   (a)	   of	   the	   International	   Covenant	   on	   Economic,	   Social	   and	  Cultural	   Rights)	   (2009)	  UN	  Doc	  




share	   in	   scientific	  advancement	  and	   its	  benefits”.	   They	  both	   reaffirm	   the	   same	  
concepts.	  Moreover,	   the	   same	  articles	   are	  echoed	   in	  Art	   13.2	  of	   the	  American	  
Declaration	  of	  the	  Rights	  and	  Duties	  of	  Man	  (1948);31	  Art	  14.1	  of	  the	  Additional	  
Protocol	  to	  the	  American	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  Area	  of	  Economic,	  
Social	   and	   Cultural	   Rights	   “Protocol	   of	   San	   Salvador”	   (1988);32	  Art	   22	   of	   the	  
African	  (Banjul)	  Charter	  on	  Human	  and	  Peoples’	  Rights	  (1981);33	  Art	  11.1	  and	  31	  
of	  UNDRIP	  (2008)34	  and	  Art	  5.1	  and	  8.2	  of	  ILO	  169.35	  	  
Over	  the	  years,	  human	  rights	  instruments	  and	  IP	  law	  have	  slowly	  come	  to	  terms	  
with	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  indigenous	  cultures,	  tangible,	  intangible,	  sacred,	  secret,	  and	  
land	   are	   all	   expressions	   of	   the	   same	   culture	   and	   cannot	   be	   distinguished	   in	  
different	   categories	   of	   culture	   and	   property.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   regulations	  
concerning	   individualistic	   human	   and	   cultural	   rights,	   have	   started	   including	   a	  
collective	  connotation	   that	  was	  not	   taken	   into	  account	   in	   the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  
when	  such	  legislation	  was	  first	  created	  (UDHR,	  ICESCR	  and	  ICCPR).	  Human	  Rights	  
bodies	  (especially	  in	  the	  Americas)	  have	  finally	  applied	  a	  ‘collective’	  nature	  to	  Art	  
15	   ICESCR	   and	   all	   other	   regulations	   referring	   to	   indigenous	   cultural	   rights	   and	  
property	   rights.	  Whereas,	   the	   consistency	   of	   recent	   state	   practice	   proves	   that	  
regulations	   safeguarding	   land	   and	   cultural	   property	   rights,	   though	   complex	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Article	  14:	  “Every	  person	  has	  the	  right	  to	  work,	  under	  proper	  conditions,	  and	  to	  follow	  his	  vocation	  freely,	  
in	  so	  far	  as	  existing	  conditions	  of	  employment	  permit.	  Every	  person	  who	  works	  has	  the	  right	  to	  receive	  such	  
remuneration	   as	   will,	   in	   proportion	   to	   his	   capacity	   and	   skill,	   assure	   him	   a	   standard	   of	   living	   suitable	   for	  
himself	  and	  for	  his	  family”.	  
32	  Article	  14.1:	   “The	  States	  Parties	   to	   this	  Protocol	   recognize	   the	   right	  of	  everyone:	  a.	   To	   take	  part	   in	   the	  
cultural	  and	  artistic	  life	  of	  the	  community;	  b.	  To	  enjoy	  the	  benefits	  of	  scientific	  and	  technological	  progress;	  
c.	   To	   benefit	   from	   the	   protection	   of	  moral	   and	  material	   interests	   deriving	   from	   any	   scientific,	   literary	   or	  
artistic	  production	  of	  which	  he	  is	  the	  author”.	  
33	  Article	  22:	  “1.	  All	  peoples	  shall	  have	  the	  right	  to	  their	  economic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  development	  with	  due	  
regard	   to	   their	   freedom	  and	   identity	  and	   in	   the	  equal	  enjoyment	  of	   the	  common	  heritage	  of	  mankind.	  2.	  
States	  shall	  have	  the	  duty,	  individually	  or	  collectively,	  to	  ensure	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  right	  to	  development”.	  
34	  Article	   11:	   “1.	   Indigenous	   peoples	   have	   the	   right	   to	   practise	   and	   revitalize	   their	   cultural	   traditions	   and	  
customs.	   This	   includes	   the	   right	   to	   maintain,	   protect	   and	   develop	   the	   past,	   present	   and	   future	  
manifestations	  of	  their	  cultures,	  such	  as	  archaeological	  and	  historical	  sites,	  artefacts,	  designs,	  ceremonies,	  
technologies	   and	   visual	   and	   performing	   arts	   and	   literature”;	   Article	   31:	   “1.	   Indigenous	   peoples	   have	   the	  
right	  to	  maintain,	  control,	  protect	  and	  develop	  their	  cultural	  heritage,	  traditional	  knowledge	  and	  traditional	  
cultural	   expressions,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  manifestations	   of	   their	   sciences,	   technologies	   and	   cultures,	   including	  
human	   and	   genetic	   resources,	   seeds,	   medicines,	   knowledge	   of	   the	   properties	   of	   fauna	   and	   flora,	   oral	  
traditions,	  literatures,	  designs,	  sports	  and	  traditional	  games	  and	  visual	  and	  performing	  arts.	  They	  also	  have	  
the	   right	   to	  maintain,	   control,	  protect	  and	  develop	   their	   intellectual	  property	  over	   such	  cultural	  heritage,	  
traditional	  knowledge,	  and	  traditional	  cultural	  expressions”.	  
35	  Article	   5:	   “In	   applying	   the	   provisions	   of	   this	   Convention:	   (a)	   the	   social,	   cultural,	   religious	   and	   spiritual	  
values	  and	  practices	  of	  these	  peoples	  shall	  be	  recognised	  and	  protected,	  and	  due	  account	  shall	  be	  taken	  of	  
the	  nature	  of	  the	  problems	  which	  face	  them	  both	  as	  groups	  and	  as	   individuals;	  Article	  8.2.	  These	  peoples	  
shall	   have	   the	   right	   to	   retain	   their	   own	   customs	   and	   institutions,	  where	   these	   are	  not	   incompatible	  with	  
fundamental	  rights	  defined	  by	  the	  national	  legal	  system	  and	  with	  internationally	  recognised	  human	  rights.	  
Procedures	  shall	  be	  established,	  whenever	  necessary,	  to	  resolve	  conflicts	  which	  may	  arise	  in	  the	  application	  




nature	  and	  meaning,	  have	  today	  crystallized	  or	  are	  in	  the	  process	  of	  crystallizing	  
into	   customary	   international	   law.36	  Referring	   to	   the	   ICESCR,	  Rosemary	  Coombe	  
insists	  that:37	  	  
	  
…	  most	  States	  party	   to	   the	  CESCR	  report	  developments	   in	   intellectual	  property	  
protections	  pursuant	  to	  their	  reporting	  obligations	  under	  the	  CESCR	  (rather	  than	  
under	   the	   ICCPR),	  which	  would	   indicate	   that	   there	   is	   an	   international	   practice	  
and	   potentially	   a	   customary	   norm	   of	   recognizing	   IPRs	   as	   cultural	   rights	   in	  
international	  human	  rights	  law.	  	  
	  
This	   means	   that	   human	   rights	   have	   gained	   a	   broader	   reach	   for	   the	   holistic	  
safeguard	  of	  indigenous	  TK	  and	  TCEs	  that	  currently	  compensate	  for	  the	  profound	  
gaps	  present	  in	  the	  IPR	  laws.	  Today,	  the	  scope	  of	  IPR	  law	  is,	  in	  fact,	  still	  limited	  to	  
defensive	   protection	   rather	   than	   active	   legal	   legislation	   for	   TK.38	  Though	   the	  
initial	  scope	  of	  Art	  15	  of	  ICESCR	  was	  limited	  and	  mostly	  inadequate	  in	  addressing	  
the	  multifaceted	  inherent	  significance	  of	  cultural	  rights	  as	  they	  might	  manifest	  in	  
different	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  over	  the	  years	  the	  article	  has	  acquired	  a	  collective	  
component	  that,	  united	  with	  Art	  27	  of	  UDHR	  and	  Art	  27	  of	  ICCPR,	  recognize	  the	  
undisputable	   right	   for	   everyone	   to	   participate	   to	   the	   cultural	   life	   of	   the	  
community	   (see	   previous	   chapter).	   As	   Lenzerini	   underlines	   “cultural	   rights	   are	  
indeed	   dependent	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   culture,	   the	   internationally	   accepted	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  “While	  the	  fact	  that	   indigenous	  peoples’	   land	  rights	  are	  protected	  by	  customary	  international	   law	  is	  not	  
reasonably	   disputable	   as	   a	  matter	   of	   positive	   law,	  more	   difficulties	   arise	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   establish	   the	  
exact	   practical	   contours	   of	   these	   rights	   according	   to	   customary	   international	   law.	   In	   reality,	   providing	   an	  
answer	  to	  this	  question	  appears	  possible	  if	  one	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  rationale	  and	  purpose	  of	  indigenous	  
peoples’	  land	  rights.	  Indeed,	  they	  are	  not	  aimed	  at	  safeguarding	  a	  “property	  right”,	  i.e.	  an	  exclusive	  absolute	  
right	  to	  use,	  enjoy	  and	  dispose	  of	  a	  thing	  (uti,	  frui,	  fui)	  –	  conceived,	  according	  to	  the	  common	  meaning	  of	  
this	  expression	  in	  the	  Western	  world,	  as	  a	  right	  having	  first	  of	  all	  an	  economic	  connotation	  –	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  
prerogative	  with	  a	  primarily	  spiritual,	  i.e.	  cultural,	  purpose.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  right	  in	  point	  is	  functional	  to	  
the	  safeguarding	  –	  through	  ensuring	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  special	   link	  between	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  
their	  Motherland	  –	  of	  the	  very	  distinct	  cultural	  identity	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  as	  well	  as	  of	  their	  survival	  and	  
flourishing	  as	  different	  human	  communities”	  see	   International	  Law	  Association	  Report	   (Sofia,	  2012)	  at	  27-­‐
28;	  see	  also	  Siegfried	  Wiessner	  “Re-­‐Enchanting	  the	  World:	  Indigenous	  Peoples’	  Rights	  as	  Essential	  Parts	  of	  a	  
Holistic	  Human	  Rights	  Regime”	  (2010)	  UCLA	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  and	  Foreign	  Affairs	  at	  239.	  
37	  “When	  Article	  27	  of	  the	  UDHR	  was	  negotiated,	  controversy	  arose	  over	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  right	  to	  benefit	  
from	  the	  moral	  and	  material	   interests	  of	  the	  author.	  Some	  members	  of	  the	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  
argued	   that	   it	  was	  not	  a	   right	  applicable	   to	  everyone,	  adding	   that	   it	   also	   felt	   that	  patents	  and	  copyrights	  
could	  sometimes	  become	  an	  obstacle	  to	  the	  possibility	  for	  others	  to	  enjoy	  the	  benefits	  of	  scientific	  progress	  
and	   its	  applications.	   In	  the	  end,	  however,	   it	  was	   included”	  see	  Rosemary	  J	  Coombe	  “Intellectual	  Property,	  
Human	  Rights	  &	  Sovereignty:	  New	  Dilemmas	   in	   International	  Law	  Posed	  by	  the	  Recognition	  of	   Indigenous	  
Knowledge	  and	  the	  Conservation	  of	  Biodiversity”	  (1998)	  6	  1	  Indiana	  Journal	  of	  Global	  Legal	  Studies	  at	  note	  
21.	  	  




definition	  of	  which	  shows	  how	  inextricably	  its	  individual	  component	  is	  linked	  to	  
its	  collective	  element”.39	  According	  to	  the	  Mexico	  City	  definition	  (1982):40	  
	  
…	   culture	   may	   now	   be	   said	   to	   be	   the	   whole	   complex	   of	   distinctive	   spiritual,	  
material,	  intellectual	  and	  emotional	  features	  that	  characterize	  a	  society	  or	  social	  
group.	   It	   includes	   not	   only	   the	   arts	   and	   letters,	   but	   also	   modes	   of	   life,	   the	  
fundamental	  rights	  of	  the	  human	  being,	  value	  systems,	  traditions	  and	  beliefs.	  	  
	  
Given	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  right	  to	  intellectual	  property	  is	  a	  cultural	  right,	  because	  it	  
seeks	   to	   protect	   the	   cultural	   manifestation	   of	   an	   individual	   or	   a	   group	   of	  
individuals,	  it	  might	  be	  considered	  as	  being	  strictly	  related	  to	  Art	  15	  ICESCR.	  The	  
same	  concepts	  are	  expressed	   in	  Art	  27	  of	   the	  UDHR	  and	   in	  Art	  13	  on	  “Right	  to	  
the	  benefits	  of	  culture”	  of	  the	  American	  Declaration	  of	  the	  Rights	  and	  Duties	  of	  
Man.41	  The	  enjoyment	  of	  one’s	  own	   culture	  and	   the	  production	  of	   the	  mind	   is	  
part	   of	   the	   entitlement	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   to	   maintain	   and	   develop	   their	  
distinct	   cultural	   identity,	   their	   spirituality,	   their	   language,	   and	   their	   traditional	  
ways	   of	   life.	   Art	   2	   of	   the	   Convention	   on	   the	   Protection	   and	   Promotion	   of	   the	  
Diversity	  of	  Cultural	  Expressions	  (2005)	  recognises	  the	  fundamental	  character	  of	  
Art	  2	  and	  27	  of	  the	  UDHR	  and	  stresses	  that:	  	  
	  
…	   cultural	   diversity	   can	   be	   protected	   and	   promoted	   only	   if	   human	   rights	   and	  
fundamental	   freedoms,	   such	   as	   freedom	   of	   expression,	   information	   and	  
communication,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   ability	   of	   individuals	   to	   choose	   cultural	  
expressions,	  are	  guaranteed.	  	  
	  
The	  Convention	  has	  an	  inclusive	  approach,	  by	  recognising	  that:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Federico	  Lenzerini	  “Indigenous	  Peoples’	  Cultural	  Rights	  and	  the	  Controversy	  over	  Commercial	  Use	  of	  their	  
Traditional	  Knowledge”	  at	  3	  electronic	  document	  
<www.culturalrights.net/descargas/drets_culturals263.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  10/12/2015.	  
40	  UNESCO	  Mexico	  City	  Declaration	  on	  Cultural	  Policies	  World	  Conference	  on	  Cultural	  Policies	  Mexico	  City	  
(1982)	  at	  Preamble.	  
41	  Art	  13:	  “Every	  person	  has	  the	  right	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  cultural	  life	  of	  the	  community,	  to	  enjoy	  the	  arts,	  and	  
to	   participate	   in	   the	   benefits	   that	   result	   from	   intellectual	   progress,	   especially	   scientific	   discoveries.	   He	  
likewise	  has	  the	  right	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  his	  moral	  and	  material	  interests	  as	  regards	  his	  inventions	  or	  any	  




…	   no	   one	   may	   invoke	   the	   provisions	   of	   this	   Convention	   in	   order	   to	   infringe	  
human	   rights	   and	   fundamental	   freedoms	   as	   enshrined	   in	   the	   Universal	  
Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  or	  guaranteed	  by	  international	   law,	  or	  to	  limit	  the	  
scope	  thereof.42	  	  
	  
This	  means	  that,	  over	  the	  years,	  international	  law	  has	  been	  harmonized	  and	  has	  
become	  a	   coherent	   corpus	   of	   legislation	   that	   supports	   and	   completes	   itself	   by	  
integrating	   and	   extending	   the	   existing	   laws	   while	   forming	   new	   legislation.	   By	  
addressing	   cultural	   rights	   and	   property	   rights	   over	   the	   expressions	   of	   such	  
culture,	   Art	   15	   ICESCR,	   seems	   to	   succeed	   in	   transcending	   the	   limitations	  
proposed	   by	   IPR	   laws	   and	   becomes	   a	   binding	   instrument	   that	   can	   be	   used	   to	  
safeguard	  indigenous	  peoples’	  TK	  and	  TCEs.	  General	  Comment	  No	  1743	  explicitly	  
emphasizes	  that:44	  	  	  
	  
…	   human	   rights	   are	   fundamental,	   inalienable	   and	   universal	   entitlements	  
belonging	  to	  individuals	  and,	  under	  certain	  circumstances,	  groups	  of	   individuals	  
and	   communities.	   Human	   rights	   are	   fundamental	   as	   they	   are	   inherent	   to	   the	  
human	   person	   as	   such,	   whereas	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   are	   first	   and	  
foremost	   means	   by	   which	   States	   seek	   to	   provide	   incentives	   for	   inventiveness	  
and	   creativity,	   encourage	   the	   dissemination	   of	   creative	   and	   innovative	  
productions,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  development	  of	  cultural	  identities,	  and	  preserve	  the	  
integrity	  of	  scientific,	  literary	  and	  artistic	  productions	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  society	  as	  
a	  whole.	  In	  contrast	  to	  human	  rights,	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  are	  generally	  of	  
a	  temporary	  nature,	  and	  can	  be	  revoked,	  licensed	  or	  assigned	  to	  someone	  else.	  	  
	  
The	   fact	   that	   knowledge	  and	   culture	  are	   inalienable	   rights	   that	   trespass	   to	   the	  
IPR	  side	  of	  the	  law	  only	  proves	  the	  importance	  these	  rights	  have	  for	  the	  people	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  See	  Article	  2.1	  –	  Guiding	  Principles.	  
43	  General	   Comment	   No	   17:	   “The	   Right	   of	   Everyone	   to	   Benefit	   from	   the	   Protection	   of	   the	   Moral	   and	  
Material	   Interests	   Resulting	   from	   any	   Scientific,	   Literary	   or	   Artistic	   Production	   of	  Which	  He	   or	   She	   is	   the	  
Author	   (art	   15,	   para	   1	   (c)	   of	   the	   Covenant)”	   see	   UN	   Committee	   on	   Economic,	   Social	   and	   Cultural	   Rights	  
(ICESCR)	   (2006)	   UN	   Doc	   E/C.12/GC/17	   electronic	   document	   <www.refworld.org/docid/441543594.html>	  
last	  visited	  on	  15/07/2015.	  
44	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	   Social	   and	  Cultural	  Rights,	  General	  Comment	  No	  17,	   the	   right	  of	   everyone	   to	  
benefit	   from	   the	   protection	   of	   the	  moral	   and	  material	   interests	   resulting	   from	   any	   scientific,	   literary	   or	  
artistic	  production	  of	  which	  he	  or	  she	   is	   the	  author	   (article	  15,	  paragraph	  1	   (c),	  of	   the	  Covenant)	  UN	  Doc	  




concerned.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  General	  Comment	  No	  2145	  seems	  to	  understand	  
the	   difficulty	   in	   finding	   an	   inclusive	   description	   of	   ‘culture’	   which	   could	   be	   a	  
working	   definition	   of	   every	   conceivable	   form	   of	   art,	   both	   holistic	   and	   non-­‐
holistic.46	  This	  means	  that	  every	  culture	  in	  the	  world	  has	  a	  right	  to	  exist	  and	  be	  
preserved.	   The	   fact	   that	   people	   should	   participate	   in	   the	   cultural	   life	   of	   a	  
community	  means	  that	  such	  culture	  is	  available.	  In	  this	  case	  ‘availability’	  seems	  
to	   imply	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   existing	   cultural	  management	  within	   the	   community	  
that	  preserves	  and	  maintains	  the	  culture,	  which	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  right	  
for	  communities	  to	  manage	  their	  own	  culture	  according	  to	  their	  own	  traditions	  
and	   specificities.	   Because	   culture	   needs	   to	   be	  managed	   somehow	   in	   order	   to	  
exist,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  guardians	  seems	  to	  fit	  into	  the	  process	  of	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  
one’s	  own	  culture.	   If,	   in	   fact,	   there	   is	  no	  culture,	   there	   is	  no	  enjoyment	  of	   the	  
culture.	   In	   many	   indigenous	   societies,	   traditional	   knowledge	   holders	   and	   the	  
guardians	   of	   knowledge	   are	   the	   personality	   in	   charge	   of	   the	   preservation	   and	  
consequent	   availability	   and	   adaptability	   of	   traditional	   forms	   of	   knowledge.	  
According	  to	  the	  words	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Declaration	  and	  Programme	  of	  Action:47	  
	  	  
…	   while	   the	   significance	   of	   national	   and	   regional	   particularities	   and	   various	  
historical,	   cultural	   and	   religious	   backgrounds	  must	   be	   borne	   in	  mind,	   it	   is	   the	  
duty	   of	   States,	   regardless	   of	   their	   political,	   economic	   and	   cultural	   systems,	   to	  
promote	  and	  protect	  all	  human	  rights	  and	  fundamental	  freedoms.	  	  
	  
Similarly,	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  on	  Cultural	  Diversity	  stresses	  that:48	  
	  
…	   the	   defence	   of	   cultural	   diversity	   is	   an	   ethical	   imperative,	   inseparable	   from	  
respect	  for	  human	  dignity’,	  which	  means	  that	  every	  state	  should	  be	  committed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights,	  General	  comment	  No	  21,	  Right	  of	  everyone	  to	  take	  
part	   in	   cultural	   life	   (art.	   15,	   para.	   1	   (a))	   UN	   Doc	   E/C.12/GC/21	   (2009)	   electronic	   document	  
<www.refworld.org/docid/4ed35bae2.html>	  last	  visited	  on	  15/07/2015.	  
46 	  “The	   concept	   of	   culture	   must	   be	   seen	   not	   as	   a	   series	   of	   isolated	   manifestations	   or	   hermetic	  
compartments,	  but	  as	  an	   interactive	  process	  whereby	   individuals	  and	  communities,	  while	  preserving	  their	  
specificities	  and	  purposes,	  give	  expression	  to	  the	  culture	  of	  humanity”	  see	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  
and	  Cultural	  Rights,	  General	  comment	  No	  21:	  Right	  of	  everyone	  to	  take	  part	   in	  cultural	   life	  (art	  15,	  para	  1	  
(a),	  of	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights)	  UN	  Doc	  E/C.12/GC/21	  at	  3.	  
47 	  Vienna	   Declaration	   and	   Programme	   of	   Action	   at	   para	   5	   electronic	   document	  
<www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx>	  last	  visited	  on	  15/07/2015.	  




to	   the	   respect	   of	   ‘human	   rights	   and	   fundamental	   freedoms,	   in	   particular	   the	  
rights	  of	  persons	  belonging	  to	  minorities	  and	  those	  of	  indigenous	  peoples.	  
	  
In	  this	  case	  a	  violation	  of	  human	  and	  cultural	  rights	  occurs	  when	  there	  is:	  	  
	  
…	  a	  failure	  to	  take	  appropriate	  steps	  to	  achieve	  the	  full	  realization	  of	  the	  right	  of	  
everyone	  to	  take	  part	  in	  cultural	  life,	  and	  the	  failure	  to	  enforce	  relevant	  laws	  or	  
to	   provide	   administrative,	   judicial	   or	   other	   appropriate	   remedies	   to	   enable	  
people	  to	  exercise	  in	  full	  the	  right	  to	  take	  part	  in	  cultural	  life.49	  	  
	  
The	   idea	   of	   safeguarding	   the	   cultural	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   is	   also	  
inherently	  included	  within	  their	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  as	  stated	  in	  common	  
Art	  1	  of	   ICCPR	  and	   ICESCR.50	  Given	   the	   fact	   that	   indigenous	  peoples	  have	  a	  
right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  and	  a	  right	  to	  the	  enjoyment	  and	  preservation	  
of	   their	   cultural	   rights,	   and	  given	   the	  efforts	   that	  human	   rights	   laws	  and	  
intellectual	   property	   laws	   have	   made	   to	   come	   closer	   in	   their	   scope	   to	  
safeguarding	  indigenous	  peoples’	  interests,	  it	  seems	  fair	  to	  question	  if	  they	  
have	   actually	   succeeded.	   Considering	   indigenous	   intangible	   culture,	   such	  
as	  sacred	  practices	  and	  territories	  imbued	  with	  ancestral	  spiritual	  values,	  it	  
is	   fair	   to	   question	   who	   today	   owns	   and	   manages	   indigenous	   culture.	  
Because,	  as	  will	  be	  explored	  next,	   indigenous	  peoples	  do	  not	  always	  own	  








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights,	  General	  comment	  No	  21:	  Right	  of	  everyone	  to	  take	  
part	  in	  cultural	  life	  (art	  15,	  para	  1	  (a),	  of	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights)	  
UN	  Doc	  E/C.12/GC/21	  at	  63.	  
50	  “All	   peoples	   have	   the	   right	   of	   self-­‐determination.	   By	   virtue	   of	   that	   right	   they	   freely	   determine	   their	  




6.2.	  -­‐	  Who	  Owns	  Indigenous	  Culture?	  
	  
Before	  entering	  into	  any	  further	  discourse	  on	  indigenous	  peoples’	  TK	  and	  TCEs,	  it	  
is	  important	  to	  understand	  what	  constitutes	  indigenous	  property	  and	  who	  owns	  
indigenous	   culture.	   Is	   it	   the	   individual	   creator	   or	   the	   whole	   community?	   Or	  
rather	   a	   selected	   group	   of	   people,	   such	   as	   the	   guardians,	   the	   holders	   or	   the	  
elders	   of	   the	   community	   who	   have	   access	   to	   the	   knowledge?	   Is	   culture	   the	  
property	  of	  a	  specific	  people	  or	  nations?	  Does	   it	  belong	  to	   those	  who,	  without	  
authorisation,	   have	   exploited	   the	   knowledge	   and	   brought	   it	   into	   the	   public	  
domain?	  Or	  is	  it	  representative	  of	  a	  universal	  heritage	  of	  humankind?	  
	  
As	   of	   today,	   the	   answer	   to	   the	   questions	   is	   not	   necessarily	   and	   always	  
straightforward,	  and	  in	  recent	  years	  those	  same	  questions	  have	  caused	  many	  hot	  
debates	   at	   both	  national	   and	   international	   levels	   between	   indigenous	  peoples’	  
representatives	  and	  states.	  The	  truth	  is:	   indigenous	  peoples	  do	  not	  always	  own	  
their	  cultural	  property.	  	  
Some	  scholars	  argue	  that	  in	  indigenous	  societies	  the	  concept	  of	  property	  is	  non-­‐
existent,	   therefore	   indigenous	  peoples	  do	  not	  own	   their	   culture.	   It	   is	   true	   that	  
the	   concept	  of	  property	   for	   indigenous	  peoples	  might	  differ	   from	   the	  Western	  
conceptualization	  of	  what	   constitutes	   property.51	  The	   same	   idea	   applies	   to	   the	  
notion	   that	   traditional	   property	   rights	   are	   always	   collective	   or	   communal	   in	  
character.	  As	  Dutfield	  clarifies,52	  it	   is	  true	  that	   in	   indigenous	  communities	  there	  
are	  shared	  responsibilities	  for	  land	  and	  territories	  and	  families	  or	  individuals	  may	  
hold	  “lands,	  resources	  or	  knowledge	  for	  their	  own	  use”;	  however	  “ownership	  is	  
often	  subject	  to	  customary	  law	  and	  practice	  and	  based	  on	  the	  collective	  consent	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  “The	   objects	   and	   entitlements	   of	   ownership	   vary	   across	   legal	   systems,	   as	   does	   the	   degree	   of	   private	  
access	   to	   public	   property	   and	   vice	   versa.	   In	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   system,	   the	   roots	   of	   property	   law	   lie	   in	  
centuries	  past,	  when	  ownership	  of	   land	  or	   ‘real	   property’	   determined	   social	   status;	   legal	   rights	   and	  even	  
hereditary	  titles	  were	  (and	  are)	  linked	  to	  particular	  geographic	  areas	  or	  estates.	  Land,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  social	  
significance	  and	  permanence,	  is	  therefore	  the	  paradigmatic	  form	  of	  property	  in	  our	  legal	  system.	  With	  the	  
Industrial	  Revolution	  and	  the	  increase	  in	  vast	  personal	  fortunes	  not	  tied	  to	  real	  estate,	  ‘personal	  property’	  in	  
the	   form	  of	  moveable	  goods	  or	   liquid	  assets	   increased	   in	   importance	  as	  an	   indicator	  of	  success	  or	  status.	  
‘Intellectual	  property’,	  or	  ownership	  of	  ideas	  that	  can	  be	  expressed	  or	  embodied	  in	  some	  tangible	  form,	  is	  a	  
relative	   newcomer	   to	   the	   realm	   of	   property.	   Among	   its	   distinctive	   features	   is	   the	   element	   of	   human	  
creativity	  in	  its	  formation;	  unlike	  real	  property,	  intellectual	  property	  cannot	  simply	  be	  claimed	  or	  annexed”	  
see	  Susan	  Scafidi	  Who	  Owns	  Property?	  (Rutgers	  University	  Press,	  New	  Brunswick,	  2005)	  at	  159-­‐160.	  
52	  Graham	  Dutfield	   “Protecting	   Traditional	   Knowledge:	   Pathways	   to	   the	   Future”	   (International	   Centre	   for	  




of	   the	   community”.53	  Dutfield	   explains	   that:	   “customary	   rules	   governing	   access	  
to	   and	   use	   of	   knowledge	   not	   necessarily	   differ	   all	   that	   widely	   from	   Western	  
intellectual	   property	   formulations,	   but	   in	   the	   vast	  majority	   of	   cases	   they	  most	  
certainly	  do.	  They	  also	  differ	  widely	   from	  each	  other”.54	  And	  yet,	   this	  does	  not	  
mean	   that	   property	   rights	   do	   not	   exist	   in	   traditional	   societies.	   According	   to	  
Tsosie55	  the	  “rights	  to	  ownership	  and	  access	  within	  Native	  and	  Western	  cultures	  
are	  developed	  according	   to	  a	   set	  of	   cultural	  norms	   that	   is	  markedly	  different”.	  
The	  two	  sets	  of	  cultures,	  in	  fact,	  not	  only	  do	  not	  share	  a	  uniform	  understanding	  
of	  the	  past,	  but	  they	  have	  a	  different	  understanding	  of	  what	  constitutes	  sacred	  
culture	  and	  why	  such	  culture	  needs	  secrecy	  and	  guardianship.	  The	  two	  cultures	  
also	   do	   not	   share	   a	   similar	   understanding	   of	   what	   constitutes	   tangible	   and	  
intangible	  sacred/secret	  heritage	  and	  culture.	  What	  can	  then	  be	  rightly	  defined	  
as	   indigenous	   cultural	   property?	   The	   question	   is	   very	   delicate	   because,	   as	  
pointed	  out	  by	  Tsosie:56	  
	  
…	   indigenous	   property	   systems	   often	   encompass	   notions	   of	   the	   ‘sacred’	  
reflecting	   tribal	  worldviews	   that	   see	  a	   special	   relationship	  between	   the	  people	  
and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  universe.	  …	  Moreover,	  Native	  cultural	  resources	  often	  have	  a	  
tangible	  component	  and	  an	  intangible	  component,	  which	  are	  inseparable.	  
	  
In	  the	  words	  of	  UNESCO,	  cultural	  property	  consists	  of:57	  	  
	  
…	  property	  which,	  on	   religious	  or	   secular	   grounds,	   is	   specifically	  designated	  by	  
each	  State	  as	  being	  of	  importance	  for	  archaeology,	  prehistory,	  history,	  literature,	  
art	  or	  science	  and	  which	  belongs	  to	  the	  following	  categories:	  (a)	  Rare	  collections	  
and	   specimens	   of	   fauna,	   flora,	   minerals	   and	   anatomy,	   and	   objects	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Dutfield	  at	  13.	  
54	  Graham	  Dutfield	  “Legal	  and	  Economic	  Aspects	  of	  Traditional	  Knowledge”	  in	  Keith	  E	  Maskus	  and	  Jerome	  H	  
Reichman	   (eds)	   International	   Public	   Goods	   and	   Transfer	   of	   Technology	   Under	   a	   Globalized	   Intellectual	  
Property	  Regime	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  2005)	  at	  502.	  
55	  Rebecca	   Tsosie	   “Who	   Controls	   Native	   Cultural	   Heritage?:	   ‘Art’,	   ‘Artefacts’,	   and	   the	   Right	   to	   Cultural	  
Survival”	   in	   James	   AR	   Nafziger	   and	   Ann	   M	   Nicgorski	   Cultural	   Heritage	   Issues:	   The	   Legacy	   of	   Conquest,	  
Colonization,	  and	  Commerce	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers,	  The	  Netherlands,	  2009)	  at	  6.	  
56	  “The	  primary	  value	  of	  certain	  objects	  may	  be	  spiritual,	  and	  thus,	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  object	  and	  the	  duties	  
associated	   with	   appropriate	   care	   of	   the	   object	   may	   be	   very	   incompatible	   with	   Western	   notions	   of	  
ownership,	  which	  tend	  to	  center	  upon	  material	  profit	  and	  utility”	  see	  Rebecca	  Tsosie	  “Who	  Controls	  Native	  
Cultural	  Heritage?:	  ‘Art’,	  ‘Artefacts’,	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Cultural	  Survival”	  at	  32.	  
57	  Article	  1	  -­‐	  Convention	  on	  the	  Means	  of	  Prohibiting	  and	  Preventing	  the	  Illicit	  Import,	  Export	  and	  Transfer	  of	  




paleontological	  interest;	  (b)	  property	  relating	  to	  history,	  including	  the	  history	  of	  
science	   and	   technology	   and	   military	   and	   social	   history,	   to	   the	   life	   of	   national	  
leaders,	  thinkers,	  scientists	  and	  artists	  and	  to	  events	  of	  national	  importance;	  (c)	  
products	  of	  archaeological	  excavations	  (including	  regular	  and	  clandestine)	  or	  of	  
archaeological	   discoveries;	   (d)	   elements	   of	   artistic	   or	   historical	  monuments	   or	  
archaeological	   sites	   which	   have	   been	   dismembered;	   (e)	   antiquities	   more	   than	  
one	  hundred	  years	  old,	  such	  as	  inscriptions,	  coins	  and	  engraved	  seals;	  (f)	  objects	  
of	   ethnological	   interest;	   (g)	   property	   of	   artistic	   interest,	   such	   as:	   (i)	   pictures,	  
paintings	   and	   drawings	   produced	   entirely	   by	   hand	   on	   any	   support	   and	   in	   any	  
material	   (excluding	   industrial	   designs	   and	   manufactured	   articles	   decorated	   by	  
hand);	   (ii)	   original	   works	   of	   statuary	   art	   and	   sculpture	   in	   any	   material;	   (iii)	  
original	  engravings,	  prints	  and	  lithographs	  ;	  (iv)	  original	  artistic	  assemblages	  and	  
montages	   in	   any	   material;	   (h)	   rare	   manuscripts	   and	   incunabula,	   old	   books,	  
documents	   and	   publications	   of	   special	   interest	   (historical,	   artistic,	   scientific,	  
literary,	   etc)	   singly	   or	   in	   collections;	   (i)	   postage,	   revenue	   and	   similar	   stamps,	  
singly	  or	  in	  collections.	  	  
	  
In	   her	   Principles	   and	  Guidelines,58	  Daes	   specifies	   that,	   contrary	   to	   the	  modern	  
idea	   of	   authorship	   as	   established	   by	   modern	   IP	   laws,	   indigenous	   peoples’	  
traditional	   culture	   and	   heritage	   (inclusive	   of	   TK	   and	   TCEs)	   “has	   traditional	  
owners,	   which	   may	   be	   the	   whole	   people,	   a	   particular	   family	   or	   clan,	   an	  
association	  or	  society,	  or	  individuals	  who	  have	  been	  specially	  taught	  or	  initiated	  
to	  be	  its	  custodians”,	  and	  because	  of	  the	  difficulty	  of	  isolating	  specific	  creators	  of	  
intellectual	  property,	  “the	  traditional	  owners	  of	  heritage	  must	  be	  determined	  in	  
accordance	  with	   indigenous	  peoples'	  own	  customs,	   laws	  and	  practices”.59	  Daes	  
refers	   to	   the	   “traditional	   owners	   of	   heritage”	   and	   not	   to	   the	   “creators	   of	  
heritage”	  because,	  as	  pointed	  out	  at	  differed	  stages	  in	  this	  thesis,	  those	  who	  own	  
the	  culture	  in	  indigenous	  societies	  do	  not	  necessarily	  coincide	  with	  the	  person	  or	  
persons	  who	  actually	  created	  the	  knowledge	  and	  the	  cultural	  expression.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Erica-­‐Irene	   Daes	   Principles	   and	   Guidelines	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   the	   Heritage	   of	   Indigenous	   People,	  
Elaborated	   in	   conformity	   with	   resolution	   1993/44	   and	   decision	   1994/105	   of	   the	   Sub-­‐Commission	   on	  
Prevention	  of	  Discrimination	  and	  Protection	  of	  Minorities	  of	   the	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  Economic	  
and	   Social	   Council,	   United	   Nations	   (UN	   Doc	   E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26,	   GE.	   95-­‐12808	   (E),	   21	   June	   1995)	  





For	   example,	   the	   Native	   American	   Graves	   Protection	   and	   Repatriation	   Act	  
(NAGPRA,	  1990),60	  defines	  ‘cultural	  patrimony’	  as	  meaning	  “an	  object	  having	  on-­‐
going	   historical,	   traditional,	   or	   cultural	   importance	   central	   to	   the	   Native	  
American	   group	   or	   culture	   itself,	   rather	   than	   property	   owned	   by	   an	   individual	  
Native”.61	  The	   Act	   carries	   on	   defining	   ‘the	   right	   to	   possession’	   as	   possession	  
“obtained	   with	   the	   voluntary	   consent	   of	   an	   individual	   or	   group	   that	   had	  
authority	  of	   alienation”.62	  However,	   like	   for	  most	  of	   the	   legislation	   referring	   to	  
indigenous	   peoples,	   NAGPRA	   tends	   to	   protect	   the	   tangible	   aspect	   of	   Native	  
American	   cultures	   (such	   as	   ancestral	   human	   remains	   and	   cultural	   objects)	   and	  
neglects	   that	   intangible	   culture	   which	   does	   not	   fit	   into	   existing	   categories	   of	  
intellectual	  property	  defined	  by	  domestic	   laws.	  In	  fact,	  NAGPRA’s	  main	  concern	  
is	   to	   protect	   and	   to	   return	   to	   the	   appropriate	   tribes	   (when	   possible)	   human	  
remains,	   funerary	   objects,	   sacred	   objects	   and	   objects	   of	   cultural	   patrimony	   as	  
long	  as	  they	  are	  in	  the	  collections	  of	  federal	  agencies	  or	  museums.63	  
According	   to	  Western	  principles,	   property	   implies	   a	   privatization	  deriving	   from	  
market	  models	  and	  ideals	  that	  apply	  a	  value	  (mostly	  economic)	  to	  the	  property.	  
The	   ‘value’,	   as	  defined	  by	  Western	   capitalism,	   for	   indigenous	   communities	   can	  
only	   exist	   if	   indigenous	   knowledge	   is	   converted	   into	   property.	   Therefore,	   if	  
indigenous	  communities	  aim	  to	  enjoy	  privileges	  deriving	  from	  their	  TK	  and	  TCEs,	  
they	  must	  reproduce	  or	  translate	  their	  knowledge	  into	  forms	  of	  property	  which	  
are	  not	  only	  acceptable	   for	   the	  parameters	  of	   community	   customary	   laws,	  but	  
also	  for	  the	  modern	  laws	  of	  intellectual	  property.	  The	  process	  just	  described	  may	  
be	  easy	   in	   theory,	   if	   the	   traditionality	  of	   the	  cultural	  expressions	  of	   indigenous	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Native	   American	   Graves	   Protection	   and	   Repatriation	   Act,	   Public	   Law	   101-­‐601-­‐-­‐NOV.	   16,	   1990	   Native	  
American	  Graves	   Protection	   and	  Repatriation	  Act	   [104	   STAT.	   3048	  PUBLIC	   LAW	  101-­‐601-­‐-­‐NOV.	   16,	   1990]	  
Public	  Law	  101-­‐601	  101st	  Congress	  (Nov.	  16,	  1990).	  
61	  NAGPRA	  electronic	  document	  <http://www.nps.gov/nagpra/mandates/25usc3001etseq.htm>	  last	  visited	  
on	  28/01/2015.	  
62	  “The	  original	   acquisition	  of	   a	  Native	  American	  unassociated	   funerary	  object,	   sacred	  object	   or	   object	   of	  
cultural	  patrimony	   from	  an	   Indian	  tribe	  or	  Native	  Hawaiian	  organization	  with	   the	  voluntary	  consent	  of	  an	  
individual	   or	   group	   with	   authority	   to	   alienate	   such	   object	   is	   deemed	   to	   give	   right	   of	   possession	   of	   that	  
object,	   unless	   the	   phrase	   so	   defined	   would,	   as	   [104	   STAT.	   3050	   PUBLIC	   LAW	   101-­‐601-­‐-­‐NOV.	   16,	   1990]	  
applied	  in	  section	  7(c),	  result	  in	  a	  Fifth	  Amendment	  taking	  by	  the	  United	  States	  as	  determined	  by	  the	  United	  
States	  Claims	  Court	  pursuant	  to	  28	  USC	  1491	   in	  which	  event	  the	  ‘right	  of	  possession’	  shall	  be	  as	  provided	  
under	  otherwise	  applicable	  property	   law.	  The	  original	  acquisition	  of	  Native	  American	  human	  remains	  and	  
associated	   funerary	   objects	  which	  were	   excavated,	   exhumed,	   or	   otherwise	   obtained	  with	   full	   knowledge	  
and	  consent	  of	  the	  next	  of	  kin	  or	  the	  official	  governing	  body	  of	  the	  appropriate	  culturally	  affiliated	  Indian	  
tribe	   or	  Native	  Hawaiian	   organization	   is	   deemed	   to	   give	   right	   of	   possession	   to	   those	   remains”	   electronic	  






peoples	   is	  not	   considered	  at	   all	   along	  with	   the	   sacredness	  and	   secrecy	  of	   such	  
knowledge.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  indigenous	  culture	  is	  often	  totally	  different	  in	  form	  
and	  in	  perception	  to	  what	  constitutes	  intellectual	  property	  in	  the	  Western	  legal	  
framework.	   Consequently,	   such	   translation	   into	   Westernized	   forms	   of	  
expressions	   is	   for	   indigenous	  peoples	  realistically	  difficult,	   if	  not	   impossible.	  On	  
the	  other	  hand,	  without	  translation	  into	  Western	  forms	  of	  property,	  indigenous	  
culture,	   TK	   and	   TCEs	   remain	   often	   vulnerable	   to	   capitalist	   markets	   and	  
unscrupulous	   entrepreneurs	   who	   can	   copy,	   reproduce	   or	   steal	   the	   unfixed	  
traditional	  knowledge	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  make	  a	  business	  out	  of	  it.	  Going	  
back	   in	   time,	  when	   the	  phrase	   ‘cultural	  property’	   entered	   the	  English-­‐speaking	  
world,	   it	   did	   not	   include	   in	   its	   meaning	   the	   cultural	   property	   of	   indigenous	  
peoples,	  indigenous	  guardianship,	  TK	  and	  TCEs.	  Though	  the	  term	  was	  already	  in	  
use	   in	   the	   Italian	   civil	   law	   under	   ‘beni	   culturali’	   and	   in	   the	   French-­‐speaking	  
countries	  as	  ‘biens	  culturels’,	  the	  English	  version	  was	  not	  a	  well-­‐established	  legal	  
terminology	   in	   the	   Common	   Law. 64 	  Indeed,	   cultural	   property	   is	   a	   Western	  
concept	  with	  commercial	  connotations	  and	  directly	   linked	  to	  property	   law	  and,	  
therefore,	   to	   the	   Western	   idea	   of	   ownership.	   Cultural	   property	   and	   its	  
subcategories	   TK	   and	   TCEs	   include	   the	   rights	   to	   land	   (real	   property	   linked	   to	  
indigenous	   ancestral	   lands),	   personal	   property	   which,	   in	   turn,	   includes	  
everything	   apart	   from	   the	   land,	   and	   the	   fruits	   of	   the	   intellect	   (intellectual	  
property	   law).	   In	   addition	   to	   that,	   the	   idea	   of	   culture	   and	   heritage	   gives	  
continuity	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   property	   as	   evocative	   of	   something	   guarded,	  
transmitted,	  or	  handed	  down.	  The	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  knowledge	  that	  generates	  
the	  cultural	  property	  are	  not	  necessarily	  the	  persons	  who	  create	  or	  safeguard	  it	  
(guardians);	   instead,	   the	   knowledge	   is	   traditionally	   created	   and	   safeguarded	  
because	  its	  characteristic	  feature	  rests	  in	  its	  transmission.	  Moreover,	  an	  answer	  
to	   the	   question	   ‘who	   owns	   indigenous	   cultural	   property?’	   is	   fundamental	   to	  
address	  where	  the	  rights	  over	  the	  property	  rest	  on,	  who	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  For	   further	   information	  on	   the	   subject	   see	   Lyndel	  V	  Prott	   and	  Patrick	   J	  O’Keefe	   ‘”Cultural	  Heritage”	  or	  
“Cultural	   Property”?’	   (1992)	   1	   International	   Journal	   of	   Cultural	   Property	   307-­‐320;	   Manlio	   Frigo	   “Cultural	  




rights	   are	   and	   how	   these	   rights	   can	   be	   safeguarded	   and	   implemented	   at	   the	  
national	  and	  international	  level.65	  
	  
6.3	  –	  Cultural	  Property:	  A	  Problem	  of	  Definition.	  
	  
Even	  if	  the	  last	  60	  years	  have	  slowly	  addressed	  the	  issue,	  still	  today	  the	  idea	  of	  
‘cultural	   property’66	  remains	   a	   contradictory	   concept.	  Modern	   laws	   on	   cultural	  
property	  place	  moral	  and	  economic	  value	  on	  cultural	  products	  and	  expressions,	  
providing	   a	   legal	   framework	   that	   should	   safeguard	   the	   management	   of	   such	  
cultural	   property,	   and	   then	   use	   standardised	   regulations	   for	   its	   protection	  
framed	  in	  a	  Western	  conceptualization	  of	  ‘property’.	  In	  doing	  so,	  a	  good	  part	  of	  
the	  cultural	  production	  of	  the	  world	  is	  left	  outside	  the	  existing	  legal	  framework,	  
being	   the	   laws	  phrased	   in	  ways	   that	   are	  not	   inclusive	  of	  non-­‐Western	   ideas	  of	  
cultural	  property	  (as	  discussed	  in	  previous	  chapters).	  To	  make	  things	  worse,	  the	  
very	  concept	  of	  culture	  and	  property	  are	  fundamentally	  contradictory,	  and	  to	  put	  
them	  together	  does	  not	  simplify	  the	  problem.	  
In	  general,	  property	  is	  fixed,	  owned,	  controlled	  by	  the	  owner,	  and	  it	  is	  alienable.	  
It	   is	  the	  right	  of	  someone	  to	  do	  what	  one	  wishes	  with	  what	  one	  owns,	  thereby	  
denying	  or	  excluding	  others	   from	  benefiting	  from	  the	  property.	  Culture,	  on	  the	  
other	   hand,	   can	   be	   unfixed,	   dynamic,	   created	   or	   controlled	   by	   a	   multitude,	  
inalienable	   because	   regulated	   by	   customary	   laws	   that	   say	   so,	   and	  may	   not	   be	  
owned	   by	   anyone,	   but	   rather	   be	   the	   heritage	   of	   a	   culturally	   defined	   group	   of	  
people	   or	   guardians	   and,	   as	   such,	   subjected	   to	   changes	   following	   the	   cultural	  
changes	   occurring	   within	   the	   group.	   The	   idea	   of	   putting	   the	   two	   concepts	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  For	   reference	   see	  Michael	   F	   Brown	  Who	   Owns	   Native	   Culture?	   (Harvard	   University	   Press,	   Cambridge-­‐
Massachusetts,	  2003)	  and	  Susan	  Scafidi	  Who	  Owns	  Culture?	   (Rutgers	  University	  Press,	  New	  Brunswick-­‐NJ,	  
2005).	  
66	  The	  phrase	  ‘cultural	  property’	  was	  first	  used	  in	  the	  1954	  Hague	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Cultural	  
Property	  in	  the	  Event	  of	  Armed	  Conflict	  -­‐	  Article	  1:	  “For	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  present	  Convention,	  the	  term	  
‘cultural	  property’	   shall	   cover,	   irrespective	  of	  origin	  or	  ownership:	   (a)	  movable	  or	   immovable	  property	  of	  
great	   importance	   to	   the	   cultural	   heritage	   of	   every	   people,	   such	   as	   monuments	   of	   architecture,	   art	   or	  
history,	   whether	   religious	   or	   secular;	   archaeological	   sites;	   groups	   of	   buildings	   which,	   as	   a	   whole,	   are	   of	  
historical	   or	   artistic	   interest;	   works	   of	   art;	   manuscripts,	   books	   and	   other	   objects	   of	   artistic,	   historical	   or	  
archaeological	  interest;	  as	  well	  as	  scientific	  collections	  and	  important	  collections	  of	  books	  or	  archives	  or	  of	  
reproductions	  of	  the	  property	  defined	  above;	  (b)	  buildings	  whose	  main	  and	  effective	  purpose	  is	  to	  preserve	  
or	  exhibit	  the	  movable	  cultural	  property	  defined	  in	  sub-­‐paragraph	  (a)	  such	  as	  museums,	  large	  libraries	  and	  
depositories	   of	   archives,	   and	   refuges	   intended	   to	   shelter,	   in	   the	   event	   of	   armed	   conflict,	   the	   movable	  
cultural	  property	  defined	  in	  subparagraph	  (a);	  (c)	  centres	  containing	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  cultural	  property	  as	  




together	  brings	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  culture	  a	  solidity	  and	  staticity	  that	  culture	  does	  
not	   possess.	   It	   also	   cuts	   off	   any	   ‘distinctive	   culture’	   from	   any	   evolutionary	  
pattern.	   Culture	   normally	   reflects	   the	   identity	   of	   a	   group	   or	   a	   person	   in	   a	  
moment	   in	   time;	   as	   such,	   it	   is	   subjected	   to	   changes	   that	   follow	   the	   life	   of	   the	  
group,	   or	   person,	  who	   created	   it.	   It	   is	   also	   subjected	   to	   a	   constant	   process	   of	  
redefinition	  that	  is	  not	  static	  in	  time,	  and	  that	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  commodify	  or	  
to	   simply	   consider	   it	   as	   commodification.	   According	   to	   Art	   1	   of	   the	   Universal	  
Declaration	  on	  Cultural	  Diversity	  (UNESCO	  2001):67	  
	  
…	  culture	  takes	  diverse	  forms	  across	  time	  and	  space.	  This	  diversity	  is	  embodied	  
in	   the	   uniqueness	   and	   plurality	   of	   the	   identities	   of	   the	   groups	   and	   societies	  
making	   up	   humankind.	   As	   a	   source	   of	   exchange,	   innovation	   and	   creativity,	  
cultural	  diversity	   is	  as	  necessary	   for	  humankind	  as	  biodiversity	   is	   for	  nature.	   In	  
this	  sense,	  it	  is	  the	  common	  heritage	  of	  humanity	  and	  should	  be	  recognized	  and	  
affirmed	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  present	  and	  future	  generations.	  
	  
In	   the	  case	  of	   indigenous	  peoples,	  not	  only	  does	  all	   that	  was	  said	  above	  apply,	  
but	  other	  features	  of	  indigenous	  cultural	  expressions	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  relate	  to	  
the	  idea	  of	  cultural	  property.	  Indigenous	  culture	  is	  holistic	  and	  traditional:	  which	  
means	  that	  it	  can	  be	  of	  old	  lineage	  and	  transmitted	  uncorrupted	  for	  a	  very	  long	  
time,	  or	  it	  may	  have	  changed	  dramatically	  in	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time	  as	  a	  reaction	  
to	  external	  or	  internal	  factors	  affecting	  the	  community	  (eg	  colonization,	  natural	  
disasters,	  wars	  etc).	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   in	   the	  age	  of	   globalization,	  most	  of	   the	  
traditional	   cultures	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   are	   today	   mixed	   with	   other	   human	  
cultures	   of	   the	   world;	   this	   cultural	   interaction	   has	   reshaped	   indigenous	  
traditional	  features	  into	  something	  resembling	  a	  cultural	  hybrid.	  In	  his	  book	  Who	  
Owns	   Native	   Culture,68	  Brown	   approaches	   the	   dilemma	   of	   indigenous	   cultural	  
property	  and	  analyses	  its	  mixing	  with	  the	  modern	  society.	  He	  definitely	  considers	  
indigenous	  peoples	  as	  members	  of	  the	  global	  community	  and	  argues	  that	  most	  
of	   the	   loss	   of	   indigenous	   knowledge	   and	   the	   injustices	   faced	   by	   indigenous	  
stakeholders	   are	   caused	   by	   the	   inequity	   of	   economic,	   political	   and	   legal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  See	  Universal	  Declaration	  on	  Cultural	  Diversity,	  Article	  1.	  




resources	   that	   appropriators	   have	   compared	   to	   the	   often	   limited	   ones	   that	  
indigenous	   groups	   retain.69	  In	   fact,	   even	  when	   indigenous	   property	   rights	   over	  
knowledge	  are	  asserted,	  they	  are	  often	  insufficient	  to	  prevent	  abuses	  when	  the	  
knowledge	  has	  entered	  the	  public	  domain	  and	  cannot	  be	  controlled	  any	   longer	  
by	   indigenous	  holders.70	  Arguably,	   in	   this	   case,	  what	   is	   relevant	   is	  not	  whether	  
and	  when	   the	   knowledge	   entered	   the	   public	   domain,	   but	   what	   circumstances	  
determined	  its	  entrance	  into	  the	  public	  domain.	  Was	  the	  knowledge	  stolen?	  Was	  
it	  unlawfully	  taken	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  community?	  Were	  the	  persons	  in	  
charge	   of	   the	   transmission	   of	   the	   knowledge	   aware	   that	   what	   they	   were	  
protecting	   was	   about	   to	   be	   shared	   by	   the	   world	   at	   large?	   Why	   was	   the	  
knowledge	  taken	  in	  the	  first	  place?	  For	  its	  economic	  value,	  or	  for	  other	  ‘altruistic’	  
reasons?	   Will	   indigenous	   communities	   be	   the	   users	   and	   beneficiaries	   of	   the	  
knowledge	  that	  entered	  the	  public	  domain?71	  
Modern	   societies	   give	   an	   economic	   value	   to	   everything,	   and	   value	   everything,	  
culture	   included,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  economic	   importance	  and	  profit	   that	  such	  
cultural	   property	   might	   have	   once	   entering	   the	   market.	   Most	   indigenous	  
peoples,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   often	   have	   no	   interest	   in	   the	   commodification	   of	  
their	  culture	  and	  TK,	  because,	  to	  them,	  any	  expression	  of	  culture	  has	  a	  spiritual	  
and	   traditional	   value	   that	  might	   have	   nothing	   to	   do	  with	   the	   capitalist	   idea	   of	  
economic	  profit	  or	  commercial	  profitability.	  Obviously,	  once	   their	  knowledge	   is	  
unlawfully	   misappropriated	   and	   commoditized,	   indigenous	   TK	   holders,	   or	  
indigenous	   custodians/guardians	   of	   the	   knowledge,	   might	   resort	   to	   making	  
efforts	   to	  reclaim	  proprietary	  rights	  over	   the	  knowledge	  sold	  or	  about	   to	  enter	  
the	   market.	   In	   this	   case,	   they	   define	   their	   culture	   as	   indigenous	   ‘cultural	  
property’	   or	   TK,	   because	   only	   by	   marrying	   the	   wording	   of	   the	   Western	   legal	  
system	  might	  they	  get	  a	  chance	  to	  see	  the	  rights	  allocated	  to	  them.	  This	  does	  not	  
mean	  that	  they	  have	  traditionally	  organised	  their	  culture	  and	  TK	  into	  property	  to	  
begin	   with,	   or	   ever	   considered	   their	   culture	   as	   the	   common	   heritage	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  “The	  inequity	  lies	  instead	  with	  the	  appropriators’	  social	  capital,	  which	  leaves	  them	  better	  positioned	  than	  
their	   indigenous	   counterparts	   to	   reap	   financial	   reward.	   This	   is	  manifestly	   unfair,	   but	   it	   is	   symptomatic	   of	  
broader	   social	   realities,	   not	   of	   failure	   of	   intellectual	   property	   law	   as	   such”	   see	   Brown	  Who	  Owns	  Native	  
Culture?	  at	  236.	  
70	  For	   further	   information	   see	   Graham	   Dutfield	   Protecting	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Folklore	   ICTSD	   –	  
UNCTAD	  Project	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  and	  Sustainable	  Development	  (2003).	  




humankind.	   When	   indigenous	   peoples	   engage	   in	   defensive	   mechanisms	   to	  
invoke	   IP	   rights	   (mostly	   copyright	   and	   patents)	   allocated	   to	   a	   TK	   or	   cultural	  
expression	   that	   has	   been	   unlawfully	   misappropriated,	   such	   defensive	  
mechanisms	  have	  the	  perverse	  effect	  of	  placing	  TK	  in	  the	  public	  domain,	  so	  that	  
not	  only	  the	  patent	  or	  copyright	  holder	  is	  free	  to	  use	  the	  knowledge,	  but	  anyone	  
else	  who	  wishes	  to.	  Obviously,	  this	  is	  especially	  dangerous	  and	  offensive	  for	  the	  
sacred	   and	   secret	   knowledge.72	  Arguably,	   custodianship	   and	   guardians’	   rights	  
and	   responsibilities	   do	   not	   cease	   to	   exist	   just	   because	   the	   knowledge	   has	  
entered	   the	  public	   domain.	   Taubman	   recognises	   that	   “from	   the	  perspective	   of	  
some	  TK	  holders	  at	  least,	  TK	  did	  not	  ‘fall’	  into	  the	  public	  domain:	  it	  was	  pushed	  
there,	  unjustly,	  either	  by	  access	  and	  publication	  that	  overrode	  customary	  law	  or	  
otherwise	  by	  the	  operation	  of	  an	  IP	  system	  that	  inadequately	  respects	  TK”.73	  	  
Not	   only	   is	   the	   idea	   of	   public	   domain	   status	   an	   idea	   that	   evolved	   in	  Western	  
societies	   and	   is	   not	   reflective	   of	   a	   global	   agreement	   among	   all	   the	   different	  
societies	  and	  diverse	  cultures	  of	  the	  world,	  but	  the	  public	  domain	  status	  is	  often	  
the	   result	  of	  a	  disclosure	  of	   information	  without	   the	  prior-­‐informed	  consent	  of	  
the	  creator	  or	   the	  guardian,	  and	  with	   the	  consequent	  breach	  of	   the	  customary	  
laws	   of	   a	   given	   community.74	  In	   their	   article	   “Clarifying	   Cultural	   Property”,75	  
Carpenter	  and	  others	  give	  the	  example	  of	  the	  Quileute	  Nation	  (from	  the	  Pacific	  
North	  West	   region	   of	   the	  United	   States),	  who	  before	   the	   Twilight	  mania76	  and	  
the	   following	  movies,	  was	  mostly	  unknown	  to	   the	  general	  public,	  and	  has	  now	  
become	  an	   international	  commercial	  phenomena.	   In	   just	  about	  seven	  years,	  an	  
unknown	   Indian	   tribe	   has	   become	   famous	   all	   over	   the	   world,	   with	  
entrepreneurs,	  tourists	  and	  fans	  that	  go	  to	  the	  Quileute’s	  reserve	  to	  steal	  rocks,	  
take	   souvenirs	   and	   film	   graves	   of	   deceased	   tribal	   elders.	   Of	   all	   the	   books	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  See	  Graham	  Dutfield	  supra	  at	  footnote	  70;	  see	  also	  Graham	  Dutfield	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  and	  the	  
Life	  Science	  Industries:	  a	  Twentieth	  Century	  History	  (Ashgate,	  Aldershot,	  2003);	  Graham	  Dutfield	  Intellectual	  
Property,	   Biogenetic	   Resources	   and	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   (Routledge,	   UK,	   2004);	   Graham	   Dutfield	  
Protecting	  Traditional	  Knowledge:	  Pathways	  to	  The	  Future	   (International	  Centre	  for	  Trade	  and	  Sustainable	  
Development	  (ICTSD),	  Genève,	  2006).	  
73	  Antony	  Taubman	  “Saving	  the	  Village:	  Conserving	  Jurisprudential	  Diversity	  in	  the	  International	  Protection	  
of	  Traditional	  Knowledge”	  in	  Keith	  E	  Maskus	  and	  Jerome	  H	  Reichman	  (eds)	  International	  Public	  Goods	  and	  
Transfer	   of	   Technology	   Under	   a	   Globalized	   Intellectual	   Property	   Regime	   (Cambridge	   University	   Press,	  
Cambridge,	  2005)	  at	  545.	  
74	  See	  last	  chapter.	  
75	  Kristen	  A	  Carpenter	  and	  others	  “Clarifying	  Cultural	  Property”	   (2010)	  17	   International	   Journal	  of	  Cultural	  
Property	  581-­‐598.	  
76	  Twilight	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  American	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  Stephenie	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souvenirs	  made	  about	   the	  Quileute	  Nation,	   little	  or	  nothing	  goes	   to	   the	   Indian	  
tribe	  which,	  according	  to	  Carpenter,	   is	  using	   the	   little	  economic	  resources	   they	  
have	  to	  fight	  to	  protect	  their	  ancestral	  lands.	  With	  a	  choice	  between	  silence	  and	  
losing,	  and	  commodifying	  their	  culture	   in	   their	  own	  terms,	   the	  Quileute	  Nation	  
decided	  to	  make	  use	  of	  a	  process	  they	  were	  not	  able	  to	  stop.	  Recently	  they	  have	  
started	   controlling	   the	   circulation	   of	   their	   culture	   and	   TK77	  while,	   at	   the	   same	  
time,	   they	   are	   trying	   to	   correct	   all	   the	   misconceptions	   on	   the	   history	   and	  
traditions	  of	  the	  tribe	  given	  by	  the	  author	  of	  the	  Twilight	  Saga.	  To	  the	  world,	  the	  
Quileute	   Nation	   is	   a	   brand	   producing	   cultural	   products	   of	   great	   value	   for	   the	  
increasing	   demand	   of	   the	  market;	   for	   the	   peoples	   of	   the	  Quileute	  Nation,	   the	  
market	   is	   exploiting	   their	   ancestral	   knowledge	   while	   stealing	   their	   cultural	  
heritage.	  	  
Unfortunately,	  the	  only	  use	  indigenous	  peoples	  can	  make	  of	  intellectual	  property	  
law,	   is	   as	   a	   defensive	  mechanism.	   Indigenous	   knowledge	   is	   excluded	   from	   the	  
mainstream	   of	  Western	   referentiality	   because	  Western	   laws	   do	   not	   recognise	  
the	   authority	   of	   the	   guardians	   and	   TK’s	   holders,	   and	   their	   ownership	   over	   the	  
knowledge	   (sacred	   and	   not).	   Part	   of	   the	   problem	   resides	   in	   the	   fact	   that	  
indigenous	  guardians	  and	  TK’s	  holders	  do	  not	  produce	  or	  own	  the	  knowledge.	  	  
It	  is	  today	  recognised	  that	  property	  is	  not	  about	  absolute	  dominium	  in	  the	  strict	  
meaning	   of	   the	   word;	   it	   however	   entails	   specific	   rights	   that,	   for	   economic	  
reasons,	   limit	   the	  action	  of	  others	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  product.	  Guardianship,	  on	  
the	   other	   hand,	   limit	   the	   action	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   product	   to	   safeguard	   the	  
knowledge	  embodied	   in	  and	  by	  the	  product,	  and	  not	  for	  the	  economic	  profit	   it	  
might	  embody.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  idea	  of	  intellectual	  production	  and	  property	  
comes	   from	   the	   assumption	   that	   human	   beings	   tap	   their	   ideas	   from	   an	  
intellectual	   reservoir	   shared	  by	  humanity	   at	   large.	  As	   such,	   ideas	  might	  not	  be	  
totally	  original	  per	  se.	  Copyright	  therefore	  does	  not	  protect	  ideas,	  but	  rather	  the	  
unique	  way	  these	  ideas	  give	  birth	  to	  a	  product	  of	  the	  intellect	  through	  a	  creative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  “Traveling	  across	  our	  great	  country	  and	  observing	  other	  native	  tribes	  commercially	  marketing	  their	  wares	  
in	   a	   successful	   and	   respectful	   manner	   motivated	   us	   to	   explore	   the	   concept	   of	   promoting	   culturally	  
appropriate	   authentic	   Quileute	   items	   online”	  …	   “Though	  we	   began	   this	   exploration	   prior	   to	   the	   Twilight	  
phenomenon,	  I	  am	  delighted	  for	  the	  artisans	  in	  the	  village	  who	  have	  a	  global	  audience	  interested	  in	  owning	  
a	   part	   of	   authentic	  Quileute	   culture,	   and	   thrilled	  we	   can	   share	   our	   art	  with	   fans	   and	   collectors	  who	   are	  
unable	   to	   visit	   LaPush	   personally”	   said	   Chairwoman	   Anna	   Rose	   Counsell-­‐Geyer	  




process.	  Does	  that	  mean	  that	  the	  person	  owns	  the	  product	  but	  not	  the	  idea?	  If	  
everybody	   taps	   into	   the	   same	   reservoir,	   but	   only	   few	   can	   create	   something	  of	  
moral	   and	   economic	   value	   out	   of	   it,	   it	   means	   that	   the	   idea	   (or	   the	   way	  
information	   is	   assembled)	   has	   an	   intrinsic	   authenticity	   that	   makes	   it	   different	  
from	  all	   other	   ideas	   contained	   in	   the	   reservoir.	   In	   theory,	   one	   should	  own	   the	  
idea	  as	  much	  as	  the	  product,	  because	  only	  that	  idea	  and	  its	  usage	  gave	  birth	  to	  
that	   product	   of	   the	   mind.	   However,	   given	   the	   difficulty	   of	   assessing	   property	  
rights	   over	   intangible	   forms	   of	   knowledge,	   such	   as	   ideas,	   IP	   laws	   limit	   their	  
protection	  to	  the	  product	  of	  the	  mind,	  and	  not	  the	  ideas.	  
As	   we	   have	   previously	   seen,	   in	   indigenous	   societies	   culture	   is	   organized,	  
produced	  and	  considered	  differently.	  In	  arguing	  this	  case,	  Taubman	  points	  out	  in	  
his	  article78	  that	  the	  knowledge	  component	  inherently	  present	  in	  every	  TK	  should	  
be	  regarded	  as	  integral	  with:	  	  
	  
i) practices	  that	  define	  custodianship	  or	  the	  nature	  of	  community	  ownership;	  	  
ii)	  the	  rights	  and	  responsibilities	  that	  determine	  custody,	  access	  rights,	  means	  of	  
dissemination	  and	  preservation	  of	  knowledge;	  and	  	  
iii)	   the	   customary	  mode	   in	  which	   traditional	   knowledge	   is	   passed	   on	   between	  
generations.	  	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  only	  a	  respect	   for	  customary	   laws	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  effective	  
sui	  generis	  systems	  built	  on	  the	  observance	  of	  indigenous	  customary	  laws,	  could	  
understand	   and	   accommodate	   indigenous	   cultural	   claims.	   Given	   the	   fact	   that	  
indigenous	  guardians	  and	  TK	  holders	  have	   traditionally	  held	  authority	  over	   the	  
knowledge	  and	   its	  management	  within	   the	  community,	  and	  given	   the	   fact	   that	  
indigenous	   knowledge	   does	   not	   necessarily	   come	   from	   the	   same	  well	   of	   ideas	  
that	   gives	   birth	   to	   the	   so	   called	   ‘products	   of	   the	   intellect’,	   Western	   societies	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should	  take	   into	  consideration	  the	  opinio	   juris79	  of	   indigenous	  custodians	   in	  the	  
management	  of	  indigenous	  resources.80	  	  
Western	   societies	   would	   never	   leave	   the	   management	   of	   their	   cultural	   and	  
natural	  resources	  to	   indigenous	  peoples;	  why	  then	  should	  the	  other	  way	  round	  
be	   considered	   legitimate?	   In	   this	   contradictory	   scenario	   of	   IP	   laws	   and	  
indigenous	  TK	  holders,	  it	  is	  not	  about	  who	  is	  right	  or	  wrong,	  or	  whose	  culture	  is	  
original	   and	   legitimate.	   There	   is	   no	   right	   or	   wrong.	   The	   question	   is:	   can	   a	  
philosophy	  of	   life	  and	  what	  comes	  with	   it	  be	  considered	  right	   just	  because	   the	  
capitalist	  part	  of	   the	  world	   say	   so?	  The	   issue	  at	   stake	  here	   is	   as	  much	   legal	   as	  
ethical	   and	   philosophical,	   and	   it	   has	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	   a	   romanticisation	   of	  
indigenous	  peoples’	  cultures.	  	  
This	   thesis	   has	  no	   interest	   in	  defining	  which	   culture	   is	   better;	   or	   if	   any	   culture	  
(Western	   or	   indigenous)	   has	   a	   grounded	   legitimacy	   in	   existing.	   The	   fact	   that	  
indigenous	  culture	  is	  fundamentally	  different	  from	  the	  Western	  idea	  of	  culture,	  
from	   the	   creative	   process	   to	   the	   product,	   is	   an	   undisputable	   truth.	   To	   force	  
indigenous	   culture	   and	   cultural	   expressions	   into	   Western	   parameters	   is	  
unrealistic	   and	   fundamentally	   against	   indigenous	   rights	   to	   freedom	   and	   self-­‐
determination.	   In	  her	  book	  Community	  Resources,81	  Gibson	  gives	  an	  exhaustive	  
description	   of	   the	   issues	   faced	   by	   indigenous	   communities	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	  
world	  intellectual	  property	  regime.	  She	  explains	  that	  the	  world	  is	  unprepared	  to	  
include	   indigenous	   peoples’	   knowledge	   in	   the	   system	   of	   IP	   law,	   and	   she	   gives	  
important	  reasons	  for	  that	  that	  are	  shared	  by	  many	  scholars.	  Her	  analysis	  is	  very	  
thorough;	  however,	   there	  are	   few	   interpretations	   that	   seem	  misleading.	  When	  
talking	  about	  indigenous	  TK	  and	  TCEs,	  she	  uses	  the	  words	  ‘community	  resources’	  
to	  inclusively	  refer	  to	  indigenous	  claimants	  vs	  IP	  law:	  two	  words	  that	  alone	  mean	  
all	   and	  nothing.	   The	   etymology	  of	   the	  word	   ‘resource’	   comes	   from	   the	   French	  
resourse	  and	  “means	  of	  supplying	  a	  want	  or	  deficiency”	  and	  resourdre	  “to	  rally,	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  “In	  customary	   international	   law,	  opinio	   juris	  is	   the	  second	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  state	  practice)	  necessary	  
to	   establish	   a	   legally	   binding	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  Opinio	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  denotes	   a	   subjective	   obligation,	   a	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   on	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   that	   it	   is	   bound	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   the	   law	   in	   question”	   see	   electronic	   document	  	  
<www.law.cornell.edu/wex/opinio_juris_international_law>	  last	  visited	  on	  05/02/2015.	  
80	  See	  the	  case	  study	  of	  the	  next	  chapter.	  




raise	  again”	  and	  from	  the	  Latin	  resurgere	  “rise	  again”.82	  The	  use	  of	  resources	  as	  
“a	  country's	  wealth”	  was	  recorded	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  1779.	  The	  word	  is	  today	  
connected	   to	   “resources,	   money,	   or	   any	   property	   that	   can	   be	   converted	   into	  
money,	   assets”.	   Community	   comes	   from	   the	   Latin	   word	   communitatem	   (nom	  
communitas),	   “community,	   fellowship”;	   from	   communis	   “common,	   public,	  
general,	  shared	  by	  all	  or	  many”.83	  The	  two	  words	  together	  seem	  to	  refer	  to	  “the	  
common	  wealth	   shared	   by	   all	   or	  many”;	  which	   implies	   a	   tricky	   generalization.	  
Every	   indigenous	   society,	   in	   fact,	   manages	   its	   own	   resources	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	  
traditional	  to	  the	   laws	  of	  the	  community.	  And	  these	   laws	  can	  vary	  greatly	  from	  
one	  community	  to	  another.	  	  
Gibson’s	   book	   presents	  many	   insights	   and	   analysis	   on	   indigenous	   TK	   and	   TCEs	  
and	   the	  modern	   system	  of	   IPR	   law.	  However,	   as	   for	  many	  other	   books	  on	   the	  
market	  analysing	  the	  same	  topics,	  Gibson	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  how	  crucial	  
the	   complex	   stratification	   of	   indigenous	   society	   is	   for	   any	   in-­‐depth	   study	   on	  
indigenous	  TK	  and	  TCEs.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  stratification	  of	  most	  of	  indigenous	  societies	  
that	   the	  dilemma	  of	   today’s	  ownership	  of	   indigenous	  cultural	  property	   resides.	  
The	  community	  at	  large	  is,	  in	  fact,	  rarely	  responsible	  for	  the	  management	  of	  TK,	  
and	  to	  consider	  the	  whole	  community	  as	  a	  legal	  personality	  is	  misleading	  and	  in	  
the	   long	   run	   will	   hinder	   the	   introduction	   of	   effective	   sui	   generis	   legal	  
mechanisms	   for	   the	   safeguard	   of	   indigenous	   cultures.	   In	   addition	   to	   that,	  
indigenous	  peoples	  are	  very	  often	  ignorant	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  legal	  discourses	  
that	   happen	   outside	   of	   their	  microcosm.	   They	   have	   relied	   on	   their	   customary	  
laws	  for	  centuries	  and	  are	  often	  unconvinced	  why	  something	  that	  has	  worked	  for	  
them	   for	   such	   a	   long	   time	   should	   be	   replaced	   by	   unfamiliar	   regulations	   that	  
protect	  the	  economic	  interests	  of	  societies	  outside	  their	  milieu.	  
The	   UNDRIP	   does	   not	   generally	   enter	   in	   the	   debate	   concerning	   indigenous	  
cultural	  property.	  However,	   in	  Art	  11(2)	   it	  encourages	  states	  to	  provide	  redress	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  See	  definition	  at	  
<www.etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=resource&searchmode=none	  last>	  last	  
visited	  on	  15/07/2015.	  
83	  Latin	   communitatem	   “was	  merely	   a	   noun	   of	   quality	   ...	  meaning	   ‘fellowship,	   community	   of	   relations	   or	  
feelings’,	  but	  in	  med.L.	  it	  was,	  like	  universitas,	  used	  concretely	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  ‘a	  body	  of	  fellows	  or	  fellow-­‐
townsmen’”	  [OED].	  An	  O.E.	  word	  for	  ‘community’	  was	  gemænscipe	  ‘community,	  fellowship,	  union,	  common	  
ownership’,	   probably	   composed	   from	   the	   same	   PIE	   roots	   as	   communis.	   Community	   service	   as	   a	   criminal	  





for	   the	   wrong	   done	   using	   effective	   mechanisms	   with	   respect	   to	   indigenous	  
“cultural,	   intellectual,	   religious	   and	   spiritual	   property	   taken	  without	   their	   free,	  
prior	  and	  informed	  consent	  or	  in	  violation	  of	  their	  laws,	  traditions	  and	  customs”.	  
In	  its	  general	  phrasing,	  the	  Declaration	  does	  not	  get	  into	  an	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  
what	  constitutes	  property	   in	   international	   law	  and	  for	   indigenous	  peoples;	  but,	  
again,	   it	   refers	   to	   indigenous	   territories,	   lands	   and	   resources	  which	   indigenous	  
communities	   have	   “traditionally	   owned”	   or	   “occupied”	   without	   explaining	   the	  
legal	  implication	  of	  that	  statement.	  The	  same	  applies	  when	  the	  Declaration	  does	  
not	   give	   any	   basic	   explanation	   of	   what,	   in	   international	   law,	   means	   a	   land	  
“traditionally	  owned”	  and	  which	  regulations,	  if	  any,	  could	  be	  used	  to	  implement	  
what	   is	   written	   in	   the	   Article.	   In	   Art	   31,	   the	   UNDRIP	   states	   that	   indigenous	  
peoples	   have	   the	   right	   to	   “maintain,	   control,	   protect	   and	   develop	   their	  
intellectual	   property	   over	   such	   cultural	   heritage,	   traditional	   knowledge	   and	  
traditional	   cultural	   expressions”.	   Again,	   the	   Declaration	   uses	   ambiguous	  
language.	   It	   confirms	   that	   indigenous	   peoples	   have	   the	   rights	   to	   protect	   and	  
develop	   their	   intellectual	   property	   over	   such	   cultural	   heritage,	   but	   it	   does	   not	  
stress	  that	  any	  heritage,	  TK	  or	  TCEs	  of	   indigenous	  peoples	   is	   indeed	   indigenous	  
property.	   The	   Declaration,	   which	   is	   today	   the	   most	   comprehensive	   of	   the	  
instruments	   dealing	   with	   indigenous	   peoples’	   rights,	   sometimes	   remains	   an	  
elusive	  guide	  to	  who	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	   the	  rights	  are	   (in	   this	  case	   indigenous	  
peoples),	   and	  how	   those	   rights	   can	   be	   respected	  or	   implemented.	   In	   addition,	  
the	  complex	  strata	  of	  indigenous	  societies	  makes	  it	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible,	  to	  
resolve	   the	   issue.	   While	   the	   issue	   of	   indigenous	   proprietary	   rights	   is	   overall	  
debated	   at	   national	   and	   international	   levels,	  with	   few	   results,	   to	   address	   such	  
rights	   in	  an	   indigenous	  cultural	   system	  which	  customarily	  does	  not	  possess	   the	  
culture,	  but	  uses	  it	  and	  safeguards	  it,	  becomes	  close	  to	  impossible;	  especially	  in	  
fora	   guided	   by	   Western	   standards	   and	   controlled	   by	   Western	   laws	   where	  
guardianship	   is	   an	  alien	   concept.	   In	  her	  book	  Gibson	   justifies	   any	  discourse	  on	  
‘ownership’	  by	  underlying	  its	  centrality	  in	  any	  discussion	  on	  intellectual	  property	  
law.	  Though	  ownership	  in	  this	  case	  has	  not	  much	  to	  do	  with	  total	  dominium,	  but	  
rather	  ‘control’	  over	  access	  to	  the	  knowledge,	  many	  indigenous	  communities	  are	  




because	  they	  cannot	  prove	  the	  ownership	  over	  the	  knowledge.	  Gibson	  observes	  
that	  denying	  ownership	  rights	  to	  indigenous	  communities	  “is	  to	  deny	  Indigenous	  
and	   traditional	   practices	   and	   relationships	   of	   custodianship.	   It	   is	   to	   deny	   the	  
community’s	  right	  to	  respect	  through	  its	  knowledge	  (as	  culture	  rather	  than	  as	  an	  
informational	   commodity)	   if	   that	   community	   is	   unable	   to	   access	   and	   practise	  
traditional	   systems	   and	   customs	   of	   custodianship	   and	   guardianship	   …”.84	  The	  
best	  solution	  for	  indigenous	  peoples	  is	  to	  keep	  their	  cultural	  property	  away	  from	  
the	  market.	  However,	  with	  the	  technological	  expansion	  of	  cultural	  limits,	  to	  keep	  
sacred	   knowledge	   secret	   has	   become	   for	   indigenous	   peoples	   more	   and	   more	  
challenging.	   In	   a	   complex	   scenario,	   Carpenter	   suggests	   to	   resort	   to	   static	  
stewardship	  which	  could	  become	  of	  help	  by	  focussing	  on:85	  
	  
1. an	  interest	  in	  conserving	  a	  sacred	  resource	  from	  over	  use	  or	  pollution;	  
2. an	  interest	  in	  placing	  an	  object	  to	  rest,	  such	  as	  funerary	  remains;	  
3. an	  interest	  in	  maintaining	  the	  physical	  and	  spiritual	  integrity	  of	  an	  object	  by	  
imposing	  rules	  against	  alienability,	  such	  as	  tribal	  rules	  that	  prohibit	  the	  sale	  
of	  sacred	  objects	  to	  nontribal	  member;	  and	  
4. an	  interest	  in	  ensuring	  continued	  access	  to	  and	  the	  preservation	  of	  a	  cultural	  
resource	  for	  prayer,	  like	  a	  sacred	  site.	  
	  
Although	  the	  solutions	  presented	  above	  seem	  sound	  and	  feasible,	  however,	  they	  
refer	   to	   the	   tangible	   aspect	   of	   the	   sacred	   knowledge	   held	   by	   the	   custodians.	  
What	   happens	   in	   the	   case	   of	   intangible	   knowledge?	   How	   can	   IP	   laws	  
accommodate	   the	   intangible,	   holistic	   aspect	  of	   indigenous	   cultures	   and	  TK?	  As	  
we	  have	  seen,	  while	  the	  human	  rights	  system	  is	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  indigenous	  
tangible	   and	   intangible	   cultures,	   the	   intellectual	   property	   system	   was	   not	  
created	   to	   protect	   intangible	   knowledge	   and	   it	   is	   today	   struggling	   to	  
accommodate	   indigenous	   cultural	   claims.	   To	   solve	   such	   problem,	   today	  
indigenous	   peoples	   are	   unrealistically	   being	   asked	   to	   live	   by	   “the	   rules	   of	  
customary	  laws	  and	  modern	  IP	  systems	  at	  the	  same	  time”86	  (when	  these	  are	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  Johanna	  Gibson	  Community	  Resources	  at	  11.	  
85	  Kristen	  A	  Carpenter	  and	  others	  “In	  Defense	  of	  Property”	  (2009)	  118	  6	  The	  Yale	  Law	  Journal	  1022	  at	  1085.	  
86	  WIPO	  “Report	  on	  Fact-­‐Finding	  Missions	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Traditional	  Knowledge”	  (1998-­‐1999)	  




in	  conflict;	   in	  that	  case	  IP	  regulations	  will	  most	  likely	  win	  over	  customary	  laws);	  
but	  IP	  is	  not	  expected	  to	  abandon	  its	  monopolistic	  attire	  and	  rephrase	  its	  jargon	  
to	  accommodate	  indigenous	  unique	  cultural	  practices.87	  It	  is	  often	  up	  to	  states	  to	  
create	  ad	  hoc	  sui	  generis	  legislation	  for	  the	  safeguarding	  of	  indigenous	  cultures.	  
This	  chapter	  has	  shown	  that	  human	  rights	  and	   intellectual	  property	  have	  come	  
to	  terms	  with	  indigenous	  TK	  and	  are	  trying	  to	  accommodate	  indigenous	  holistic	  
cultures	  although	  often	  unsuccessfully.	  The	  chapter	  has	  also	  shown	  how	  difficult	  
it	  is	  today	  to	  address	  cultural	  property	  and	  why	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  not	  often	  
the	   owners	   of	   their	   knowledge	   and	   traditions	   and	   cannot	   therefore	   protect	   it	  
from	  public	  interest.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  bring	  the	  theoretical	  discourse	  of	  this	  
chapter	  to	  a	  practical	  level,	  reporting	  the	  detail	  of	  a	  New	  Zealand	  claim	  (Wai	  262)	  
that	  is	  today	  considered	  the	  most	  complete	  and	  comprehensive	  study	  existing	  on	  
indigenous	  guardianship	  of	   tangible	  and	   intangible	  knowledge.	  New	  Zealand	   is,	  
in	   fact,	   one	   of	   the	   countries	   which	   has	   tried,	   over	   recent	   years,	   to	   address	  
indigenous	   claims	   and	   find	   workable	   solutions	   that	   would	   guarantee	   the	  
safeguard	  and	  preservation	  of	  indigenous	  Māori	  traditions.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  In	   the	  words	   of	   Dutfield:	   “…	   if	   indigenous	   peoples	   in	  WTO	  member	   states	   are	   required	   to	   accept	   the	  
existence	  of	  patents	  that	  they	  are	  economically	  prevented	  from	  availing	  themselves	  of	  and	  contracts	  that	  
they	  cannot	  realistically	  enforce	  in	  the	  courts,	  why	  should	  their	  own	  knowledge-­‐related	  customary	  regimes	  
including	   property	   rules	   not	   be	   respected	   by	   others?”	   see	   Graham	   Dutfield	   Protecting	   Traditional	  
Knowledge:	  Pathways	  to	  The	  Future	   (International	  Centre	  for	  Trade	  and	  Sustainable	  Development	  (ICTSD),	  




Chapter	  7	  	  
Wai	  262	  	  
	  
This	   chapter	   focuses	   on	   a	   very	   important	   New	   Zealand	   case	   which,	   in	   twenty	  
years,	   has	   analysed	   and	   discussed	   in	   great	   detail	   Māori	   culture	   and	   Māori	  
people’s	  needs	  and	  expectations.	  The	  case	  is	  particularly	  important	  because,	  for	  
the	   first	   time,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   guardians	   of	   knowledge	   (kaitiaki)	   is	   thoroughly	  
studied	  in	  all	  its	  complexity.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  because	  it	  shows	  the	  difficulties	  
in	   accommodating	   indigenous	   claims	   in	   a	   national	   legal	   system	   that	   was	   not	  
created	   to	   include	  Māori	  needs	  and	  expectations.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	  while	   the	  
recommendations	   of	   the	  Waitangi	   Tribunal	  might	   not	   solve	   the	   problems	   that	  
Māori	  communities	  still	  face	  today	  in	  Aotearoa/New	  Zealand,	  they	  are	  important	  
factors	  of	  how	  states	  are	  trying	  to	  listen	  to	  indigenous	  voices	  and	  integrate	  their	  
needs	  within	   their	   national	   legal	   systems.	  Wai	   262	   is	   also	   a	   very	  multifaceted	  
analysis	   of	   the	   heritage	   and	   traditions	   of	   the	   Māori	   people	   of	   Aotearoa-­‐New	  
Zealand.	  Given	  the	  complexity	  and	  extensive	  material	  discussed	  in	  the	  case,	  the	  
thesis	  will	   refer	  mostly	   to	   the	   studies	   that	  are	   closely	   related	   in	   importance	   to	  
guardianship	   and	   sacred/secret	   intangible	   culture	   and	   their	   traditional	  
expressions.	  
	  
7.1	  –	  Historical	  Background	  of	  the	  Claim	  
	  
Wai	  262	  (which	  stands	  for	  Waitangi	  Tribunal	  case	  no	  262	  –	  “The	  Flora	  and	  Fauna	  
and	  Cultural	   Intellectual	  Property	  Claim”)	   is	  probably	  one	  of	   the	  most	   complex	  
cases	  involving	  indigenous	  peoples	  that	  was	  ever	  brought	  to	  a	  national	  tribunal.	  	  
The	  claim	  tells	   the	  story	  of	   the	  peoples	  who	  centuries	  ago	  sailed	   from	  Hawaiki	  
(which	   is	   the	   original	   home	   of	   Māori	   people	   but	   are	   unidentified	   Polynesian	  
islands)1	  going	  West	  to	  the	   land	  of	  the	  ‘long	  cloud’	  –	  Aotearoa.	  The	  Hawaikians	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  “There	  is	  a	  considerable	  debate	  about	  when	  the	  first	  Polynesians	  arrived	  on	  the	  shores	  of	  Aotearoa,	  who	  
they	  were,	  and	  where	  they	  came	  from.	  Many,	  but	  not	  all,	  tribes	  say	  Kupe	  was	  the	  first.	  In	  truth	  there	  were	  
probably	  many	  Kupes	  from	  a	  number	  of	  the	  islands	  in	  eastern	  Polynesia.	  Tohunga	  (scholars)	  of	  the	  ao	  Māori	  
–	  the	  traditional	  Māori	  world	  –	  also	  disagree	  about	  how	  many	  generations	  ago	  the	  first	  explorers	  arrived.	  
They	   recite	   and	   debate	   the	   relevant	   whakapapa,	   weaving	   the	   tatai	   (genealogy)	   back	   and	   forth	   until	   the	  
family	  lines	  come	  to	  resemble	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  DNA	  that	  they	  are	  designed	  to	  convey.	  Those	  who	  belong	  




imported	   in	   the	  new	   land	  unparalleled	  abundance,	  culture,	   science	  and	  system	  
of	  knowledge.	  However,	  given	   the	  difference	   in	  climate	  and	   landscape,	   the	  old	  
Hawaiki	   knowledge	   would	   soon	   struggle	   and	   adapt	   to	   the	   new	   environment	  
thereby	   becoming	   Māori	   culture.	   Old	   technologies	   were	   adapted	   to	   the	   new	  
ecosystem	   and	   new	   ones	   were	   created	   to	   better	   respond	   to	   the	   unique	  
environment	   inhabiting	   Aotearoa.2	  Māori	   represent	   the	   indigenous	   peoples	   of	  
New	  Zealand	  and	  as	  such	  they	  hold	  rangatiratanga3	  rights	  to	  self-­‐determination	  
and	  an	   implicit	  margin	  of	   autonomy	  over	   land,	   identity	   and	  political	   voice	   that	  
come	  with	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination.	  	  
The	  Wai	  262	  claim	  is	  also	  about	  Mātauranga	  Māori.	  As	  explained	  in	  the	  summary	  
of	  the	  final	  report,	  Wai	  262	  is	  about	  “the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Mātauranga	  
Māori	  of	  Kupe’s	  people	  and	  the	  Western	  world	  view	  of	  the	  second	  people	  who	  
arrived	   500	   years	   after	   them”.4 	  In	   the	   Report’s	   own	   words,	   mātauranga	   is	  
considered	  to	  derive	  from	  “mātau”,	  which	  means	  “to	  know”.	  Mātauranga	  can	  be	  
literally	  translated	  as	  “knowing”	  or	  “knowledge”.	  But	  mātauranga	  “encompasses	  
not	  only	  what	  is	  known	  but	  also	  how	  it	  is	  known	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  way	  of	  perceiving	  
and	   understanding	   the	   world,	   and	   the	   values	   or	   systems	   of	   thought	   that	  
underpin	   those	   perceptions”.5	  In	   other	  words,	  mātauranga	  Māori	   refers	   to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
more	  often	  argue	  that	   it	  was	  Whatonga	  and	  his	  grandfather	  Toi	  Te	  Huatahi.	  Even	  within	  those	  traditions,	  
one	  can	  discern	  some	  albeit	  fainter	  voices	  that	  maintain	  there	  were	  already	  Polynesians	  in	  residence	  when	  
both	  Kupe	  and	  Whatonga	  arrived,	  irrespective	  of	  who	  was	  first.	  The	  anthropologists	  and	  archaeologists	  take	  
a	  different	  view	  again.	  They	  say	  the	  arrival	  occurred	  somewhere	  between	  AD	  800	  and	  1300,	  when	  people	  
came	   from	   somewhere	   in	   eastern	   Polynesia	   –	   probably	   the	   Cook	   Islands	   or	   French	   Polynesia.	   These	  
Polynesians	   had	   been	   resident	   in	   the	   Pacific	   for	   around	   6,000	   years,	   and	   had	   explored	   and	   ‘charted’	   the	  
Pacific’s	   vast	   expanse	   completely.	   Anthropologist	   Jared	   Diamond	   describes	   the	   Polynesian	   exploration	   of	  
the	  Pacific	  as	  one	  humanity’s	  greatest	  feats.	  The	   long	  journey	  south	  to	  the	  temperate	  thirty-­‐ninth	  parallel	  
must	  surely	  have	  been	  the	  most	  challenging	  leg	  of	  all.	  The	  supreme	  difficulty	  of	  the	  voyage	  would	  have	  been	  
mitigated	  only	  by	  the	  relative	  size	  of	  the	  target	  –	  at	  least	  compared	  to	  any	  other	  Polynesian	  land	  mass”	  see	  
the	   Summary	   of	   the	   Report:	  Ko	   Aotearoa	   Tēnei:	   A	   Report	   into	   Claims	   Concerning	   New	   Zealand	   Law	   and	  
Policy	  Affecting	  Māori	  Culture	  and	  Identity	  (The	  Waitangi	  Tribunal,	  Wellington,	  2011)	  at	  2.	  
2	  “These	  changes	  reflected	  the	  migration	  from	  small	  islands	  to	  the	  new,	  larger	  ones	  in	  which	  land	  and	  forest	  
had	  a	  much	  more	  powerful	  presence.	  Slowly,	  generation	  upon	  generation,	  as	   the	  people	   reacted	   to	   their	  
new	  environment	  and	  the	  environment	  responded	  to	  its	  new	  residents,	  something	  distinctive	  began	  to	  take	  
shape	  in	  the	  space	  between	  them.	  This	  we	  have	  come	  to	  know	  as	  ‘mātauranga	  Maori’	  –	  the	  unique	  Maori	  
way	   to	   see	   themselves	   and	   the	   world,	   which	   encompasses	   (among	   other	   things)	   Maori	   traditional	  
knowledge	   and	   culture.	   Perhaps	   it	   was	   when	   the	   people	   and	   the	   environment	   reached	   a	   point	   of	  
equilibrium	  that	  the	  former	  felt	  truly	  justified	  in	  calling	  themselves	  tangata	  whenua	  (people	  of	  the	  land)	  and	  
their	  mātauranga	   could	   credibly	  be	   called	  Maori”;	   see	   the	   Summary	  of	   the	  Report:	  Ko	  Aotearoa	  Tēnei:	  A	  
Report	  into	  Claims	  Concerning	  New	  Zealand	  Law	  and	  Policy	  Affecting	  Māori	  Culture	  and	  Identity	  at	  6.	  
3	  Stands	  for:	  chieftainship,	  self-­‐determination,	  the	  right	  to	  exercise	  authority;	   imbued	  with	  expectations	  of	  
right	  behaviour,	  appropriate	  priorities,	  and	  ethical	  decision-­‐making.	  
4	  See	  the	  Summary	  of	  the	  Report:	  Ko	  Aotearoa	  Tēnei:	  A	  Report	  into	  Claims	  Concerning	  New	  Zealand	  Law	  and	  
Policy	  Affecting	  Māori	  Culture	  and	  Identity	  at	  6.	  




knowledge	   and	   to	   the	   way	   of	   knowing.	   It	   includes:	   language,	   whakapapa,6	  
technology,	  systems	  of	  law	  (customary	  laws),	  social	  control,	  systems	  of	  property	  
and	  value	  exchange,	  forms	  of	  expression,	  traditional	  technology	  relating	  to	  food	  
cultivation,	  storage,	  hunting	  and	  gathering,	  knowledge	  of	  plants	  and	  their	  uses,	  
medicine,	   rituals,	   fibres	   and	   all	   the	   general	   properties	   of	   plants	   from	   their	  
habitats,	  growth	  cycles	  and	  sensitivity	  to	  environmental	  change.	  It	  includes	  also	  
carving,	   weaving,	   ta	   moko	   (facial	   and	   body	   tattooing),	   performing	   arts,	  
ceremonial	   dances,	   waiata	   (song),	   whaikōrero	   (formal	   speech	   making)	   and	  
karanga	   (ceremonial	   calling	   or	   chanting).7	  Today	   Aotearoa–New	   Zealand	   is,	   in	  
fact,	  a	   land	   that	   sits	   in	  between	   the	   traditions	  and	  heritages	  of	   the	  Pacific	  and	  
the	  West.	  What	   is	   identified	   as	   biculturalism,	   is	   today	   an	   important	   aspect	   of	  
New	   Zealand	   and	   its	   people’s	   inherited	   values	   that	   still	   struggle	   to	   coexist	  
dynamically.	  
	  
Structurally,	  Wai	  262	  includes	  the	  claims	  of	  six	  individuals	  –	  Haana	  Murray,	  Hema	  
Nui	  a	  Tawahaki	  Witana,	  John	  Hippolite,	  Tama	  Poata,	  Kataraina	  Rimene	  and	  Witi	  
McMath	   on	   behalf	   of	   their	   iwi	   (Te	   Tanawa	   Ngati	   Kuri,	   Ngati	   Porou,	   Ngati	  
Kahungunu	  and	  Ngati	  Wai),	  who	  addressed	  the	  Crown	  on	  the	  matter	  of	  who	  in	  
Aotearoa	  –	  New	  Zealand	  owns	  and	  controls:	  
	  
• mātauranga	   Māori	   (Māori	   world	   view,	   including	   traditional	   culture	   and	  
knowledge);	  
• the	   tangible	   products	   of	   mātauranga	   Māori	   (eg	   traditional	   cultural	   and	  
artistic	  expressions	  –	  taonga8	  works);	  and	  
• the	   unique	   characteristics	   of	   indigenous	   flora	   and	   fauna	   of	   New	   Zealand	  
(called	  taonga	  species).	  
	  
The	   claim	   relates	   to	   the	   “tino	   rangatirantanga	   o	   te	   Iwi	   Māori	   in	   respect	   of	  
indigenous	   flora	   and	   fauna	  me	   o	   ratou	   taonga	   katoa	   (and	   all	   their	   treasures)	  
including	   but	   not	   limited	   to	   mātauranga,	   whakairo	   (carving,	   carved	   object;	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Stands	  for:	  genealogy,	  ancestral	  connections,	  lineage	  
7	  See	  the	  Summary	  of	  the	  Report:	  Ko	  Aotearoa	  Tēnei:	  A	  Report	  into	  Claims	  Concerning	  New	  Zealand	  Law	  and	  
Policy	  Affecting	  Māori	  Culture	  and	  Identity	  at	  22.	  
8 	  It	   stands	   for:	   a	   treasured	   possession,	   including	   property,	   resources,	   and	   abstract	   concepts	   such	   as	  




ornament	  with	  a	  pattern),	  waahi	  tapu	  (places	  sacred	  to	  Māori	  in	  the	  traditional,	  
spiritual,	   religious,	   ritual	   or	   mythological	   sense),	   biodiversity,	   genetics,	   Māori	  
symbols	  and	  designs	  and	  their	  use	  and	  development	  and	  associated	  indigenous,	  
cultural	  and	  customary	  heritage	  rights	  in	  relation	  to	  such	  taonga”.9	  The	  claimants	  
also	   stressed	   how	   they	  were	   “likely	   to	   be	   prejudicially	   affected	   by	   ordinances,	  
Acts,	   regulations,	  Orders	   in	  Council,	  proclamations,	  notices	  and	  other	   statutory	  
instruments,	   and	   the	   policies,	   practices,	   acts	   or	   omissions	   adopted	   by	   or	  
proposed	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   Crown	   and	   further	   as	   set	   out	   in	   this	   statement	   of	  
claim”	  and	  …	  they	  “are	  and	  remain	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  principles	  of	  Te	  Tiriti	  o	  
Waitangi/Treaty	   of	  Waitangi”.10	  Claimants	   argued	   that	   since	   the	   signing	   of	   the	  
Treaty	  “there	  has	  been	  conduct	  or	  omission	  by	  or	  on	  behalf	  of	   the	  Crown	  that	  
have	   prejudicially	   affected	   te	   tino	   rangatiratanga	   o	   te	   Iwi	  Māori	   in	   respect	   of	  
indigenous	  flora	  and	  fauna”11	  which	  has	  been	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Waitangi	  
(see	  next	  section).	  The	  omission	  of	  the	  Crown	  includes:	  
	  
• the	  breaking	  down	  and/or	  active	  removal	  of	  Iwi	  political	  power	  structures	  as	  
exercised	   through	   rangatiratanga,	   including	   in	   particular	   but	   not	   limited	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  “’Taonga’	   in	   this	   claim	   refers	   to	   all	   elements	   of	   tribal	   groups’	   estate,	   both	   material	   and	   non-­‐material,	  
tangible	  and	  intangible”,	  “Reference	  to	  ‘indigenous,	  cultural	  and	  customary	  heritage	  rights’	   in	  this	  claim	  is	  
deemed	  to	  include	  all	  rights	  (including	  intellectual	  and	  property	  rights)	  past,	  present	  and	  future	  in	  relation	  
to	  tanga	  o	  te	  Iwi	  Māori”	  see	  the	  First	  Amended	  Statement	  of	  the	  Claim,	  The	  Waitangi	  Tribunal,	  WAI	  262,	  SOI	  
1.1(a)	  at	  para	  2.1.	  
10	  “The	  Treaty	  of	  Waitangi	  is	  New	  Zealand’s	  founding	  document.	  It	  takes	  its	  name	  from	  the	  place	  in	  the	  Bay	  
of	  Islands	  where	  it	  was	  first	  signed,	  on	  6	  February	  1840.	  This	  day	  is	  now	  a	  public	  holiday	  in	  New	  Zealand.	  The	  
Treaty	   is	   an	   agreement,	   in	  Māori	   and	   English,	   that	  was	  made	   between	   the	   British	   Crown	   and	   about	   540	  
Māori	  rangatira	  (chiefs).	  Growing	  numbers	  of	  British	  migrants	  arrived	  in	  New	  Zealand	  in	  the	  late	  1830s,	  and	  
there	  were	  plans	  for	  extensive	  settlement.	  Around	  this	  time	  there	  were	   large-­‐scale	   land	  transactions	  with	  
Māori,	   unruly	   behaviour	   by	   some	   settlers	   and	   signs	   that	   the	   French	   were	   interested	   in	   annexing	   New	  
Zealand.	  The	  British	  government	  was	   initially	  unwilling	   to	  act,	  but	   it	  eventually	   realised	   that	  annexing	   the	  
country	   could	   protect	   Māori,	   regulate	   British	   subjects	   and	   secure	   commercial	   interests.	   Lieutenant-­‐
Governor	  William	  Hobson	  had	  the	  task	  of	  securing	  British	  sovereignty	  over	  New	  Zealand.	  He	  relied	  on	  the	  
advice	   and	   support	   of,	   among	  others,	   James	  Busby,	   the	  British	  Resident	   in	  New	  Zealand.	   The	  Treaty	  was	  
prepared	  in	  just	  a	  few	  days.	  Missionary	  Henry	  Williams	  and	  his	  son	  Edward	  translated	  the	  English	  draft	  into	  
Māori	  overnight	  on	  4	  February.	  About	  500	  Māori	  debated	  the	  document	  for	  a	  day	  and	  a	  night	  before	  it	  was	  
signed	  on	  6	  February.	  Hobson	  and	  others	  stressed	  the	  Treaty’s	  benefits	  while	  playing	  down	  the	  effects	  of	  
British	  sovereignty	  on	  rangatiratanga	  (chiefly	  authority).	  Reassured	  that	  their	  status	  would	  be	  strengthened,	  
many	  chiefs	  supported	  the	  agreement.	  About	  40	  chiefs,	  starting	  with	  Hōne	  Heke,	  signed	  the	  Māori	  version	  
of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  6	  February.	  By	  September,	  another	  500	  had	  signed	  the	  copies	  of	  the	  document	  that	  were	  
sent	  around	  the	  country.	  Some	  signed	  while	  remaining	  uncertain;	  others	  refused	  or	  had	  no	  chance	  to	  sign.	  
Almost	   all	   signed	   the	  Māori	   text.	   The	  Colonial	  Office	   in	   England	   later	  declared	   that	   the	  Treaty	   applied	   to	  
Māori	  tribes	  whose	  chiefs	  had	  not	  signed.	  British	  sovereignty	  over	  the	  country	  was	  proclaimed	  on	  21	  May	  
1840”	   electronic	   document	   <www.nzhistory.net.nz/politics/treaty/the-­‐treaty-­‐in-­‐brief>	   last	   visited	   on	  
20/06/15;	  See	  also	  the	  First	  Amended	  Statement	  of	  the	  Claim,	  The	  Waitangi	  Tribunal,	  WAI	  262,	  SOI	  1.1(a)	  at	  
para	  2.10	  and	  2.11.	  




the	   removal	   manaakitanga,12	  kaitiakitanga13	  and	   tapu	   of	   te	   Iwi	   Māori	   in	  
respect	   of	   indigenous	   flora	   and	   fauna	  me	   o	   ratou	   tanga	   katoa;	   under	   the	  
following	  Acts	  of	  Parliament:	  
	  
1. The	  Tohunga	  Suppression	  Act	  1909	  
2. The	  Native	  Plants	  Protection	  Act	  1934	  
3. The	  Reserves	  Act	  
4. The	  Wildlife	  Act	  
	  
• the	  loss	  to	  Māori	  of	  cultural,	  spiritual	  and	  medicinal	  knowledge	  and	  concepts	  
found	  in	  indigenous	  flora	  and	  fauna	  …	  as	  a	  result	  of	  these	  breaches;	  
• the	   loss	   and	  alienation	   from	  Māori	  of	   ecosystems	  of	   these	   flora	  and	   fauna	  
including	  their	  lands	  and	  waters;	  
• the	  creation	  of	  ‘reserves’	  by	  the	  Crown	  for	  the	  ‘protection’	  of	  species	  of	  flora	  
and	   fauna	   often	   in	   direct	   denial	   of	   te	   tino	   rangatiratanga	  …	   over	   the	   land	  
concerned;	  
• the	   gazetting	   and	   establishment	   of	   ‘protected	   species’	   by	   the	   Crown	   in	  
denial	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  kaitiakitanga	  which	  is	  implicit	  in	  rangatiratanga;	  
• the	  delegation	  by	  the	  Crown	  of	  regulatory	  powers	  over	  native	  species	  …	  
• the	  selling,	  disposal,	  and	  export	  of	  species	  of	  indigenous	  flora	  and	  fauna	  and	  
/or	  their	  genes	  representing	  the	  genetic	  resources	  of	  Aotearoa	  by	  the	  Crown	  
and	   its	   agents	   or	   by	   other	   parties	   encouraged/permitted/sanctioned	   by	  
actions	   or	   omissions	   of	   the	   Crown	   in	   a	   manner	   contrary	   to	   the	   Treaty	   of	  
Waitangi;	  
• the	  social	  and	  economic	  policies	  of	  successive	  governments	  that	  have	  made	  
it	   impossible	  for	  Māori	  to	  exercise	  effective	  rangatiratanga	  and	  appropriate	  
kaitiakitanga	  in	  relation	  to	  indigenous	  flora	  and	  fauna;	  and	  
• the	   extension	   and	   exercise	   of	   kawanatanga	   (government,	   governorship,	  
authority)	  over	  indigenous	  flora	  and	  fauna	  in	  a	  manner	  which	  is	  inconsistent	  
with	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  Treaty.14	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  It	  translates	  as:	  hospitality,	  kindness,	  generosity,	  support	  -­‐	  the	  process	  of	  showing	  respect,	  generosity	  and	  
care	  for	  others.	  
13	  It	   translates	   as:	   the	   obligation	   to	   nurture	   and	   care	   for	   the	   mauri	   of	   a	   taonga;	   ethic	   of	   guardianship,	  
protection.	  




The	  claimants	  also	  argued	  that	  “the	  denial	  of	  te	  tino	  rangatiratanga	  removed	  the	  
effective	   ability	   of	   Iwi	   to	   give	   expression	   to,	   and	   practice,	   the	   cultural	   and	  
spiritual	  values	  associated	  with	  the	  indigenous	  flora	  and	  fauna	  …”.15	  Such	  denial	  
also	  removed	  any	  Iwi’s	  effective	  ability	  to	  develop	  and	  have	  access	  to	  changing	  
technologies	  “in	  the	  propagation	  and	  utilisation	  of	   indigenous	  flora	  within	  their	  
rohe,	  and	  to	  determine	  the	  indigenous	  cultural	  and	  customary	  heritage	  rights	  of	  
such	  species	  …”.16	  On	  the	  same	  line,	  the	  claimants	  argued	  that	  with	  the	  signing	  
of	   the	   GATT:TRIPS	   Agreement 17 	  the	   government	   of	   New	   Zealand	   has	  
substantially	   prejudiced	   “the	   guarantee	   to	   Māori	   under	   the	   Treaty	   to	   their	  
indigenous	   flora	  and	   fauna”.18	  Claimants,	   in	   fact,	   stressed	  that	  “the	  GATT:TRIPS	  
Agreement	   places	   greater	   emphasis	   on	   the	   economic	   values	   of	   intellectual	  
property	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  other	  values	  important	  to	  indigenous	  peoples	  such	  as	  
communal	   knowledge	   systems	   and	   the	   cultural	   and	   spiritual	   relationship	   that	  
indigenous	  peoples	  have	  with	  their	  natural	  environments”	  (para	  14.6).	  According	  
to	  the	  claimants,	  not	  only	  has	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  brought	  great	  
harm	   to	   the	   traditional	   knowledge	  and	  practices	  of	  Māori	   people	  of	  Aotearoa-­‐
New	  Zealand,	  but	  that	  any	  international	  laws,	  conventions	  and	  legal	  instruments	  
that	   have	   been	   ratified	   after	   1840	   and	   are	   “morally	   and	   legally	   binding”	   (para	  
14.8)	   on	   the	   New	   Zealand	   Government	   are	   inconsistent	   with	   the	   Crown’s	  
obligations	   to	  Māori	   under	   the	   Treaty	   and	   are	   consequently	   in	   breach	   of	   the	  
Treaty.	   The	   claims	   also	   question	   the	  nature	   of	   the	   partnership	   between	  Māori	  
interests	  and	  the	  Crown,	  and	  where	  the	  power	  and	  control	  in	  the	  partnership	  de	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  At	  para	  5.2.	  
16	  At	  para	  5.3.	  
17	  GATT	  -­‐	  General	  Agreement	  on	  Tariffs	  and	  Trade	  (GATT),	  set	  of	  multilateral	  trade	  agreements	  aimed	  at	  the	  
abolition	   of	   quotas	   and	   the	   reduction	   of	   tariff	   duties	   among	   the	   contracting	   nations.	   When	   GATT	   was	  
concluded	  by	  23	  countries	  at	  Geneva,	  in	  1947	  (to	  take	  effect	  on	  Jan.	  1,	  1948),	  it	  was	  considered	  an	  interim	  
arrangement	  pending	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  United	  Nations	  agency	  to	  supersede	  it.	  When	  such	  an	  agency	  failed	  
to	   emerge,	   GATT	  was	   amplified	   and	   further	   enlarged	   at	   several	   succeeding	   negotiations.	   It	   subsequently	  
proved	  to	  be	  the	  most	  effective	  instrument	  of	  world	  trade	  liberalization,	  playing	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  massive	  
expansion	   of	  world	   trade	   in	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   20th	   century.	   By	   the	   time	  GATT	  was	   replaced	   by	   the	  
World	   Trade	   Organization	   (WTO)	   in	   1995,	   125	   nations	   were	   signatories	   to	   its	   agreements,	   which	   had	  
become	  a	  code	  of	  conduct	  governing	  90	  percent	  of	  world	  trade.	  The	  TRIPS	  Agreement	   is	  Annex	  1C	  of	   the	  
Marrakesh	  Agreement	  Establishing	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization,	  signed	  in	  Marrakesh	  (Morocco,	  1994)	  
18 	  At	   para	   14.3.	   Moreover,	   according	   to	   the	   claimants,	   “the	   GATT:TRIPS	   Agreement	   establishes	   and	  
international	   uniform	   and	   universally	   applicable	   intellectual	   property	   standard.	   The	   effect	   of	   these	  
standards	   is	   to	  allow	   the	   international	   commodification	  of	   indigenous	   flora	  and	   fauna	  me	  o	   ratou	   taonga	  
katoa	   without	   reference	   to	   Māori	   as	   the	   original	   owners	   of	   these	   taonga	   (para	   14.5)”.	   The	   GATT:TRIPS	  
Agreement	  places	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  economic	  values	  of	  intellectual	  property	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  other	  
values	  important	  to	  indigenous	  peoples	  such	  as	  communal	  knowledge	  systems	  and	  the	  cultural	  and	  spiritual	  




facto	  lies.	  The	  question	  is	  essentially	  simple	  and	  yet	  incredibly	  complicated:	  can	  
the	  right	  of	  the	  Crown	  democratically	  co-­‐exist	  with	  Māori	  control	  of	  their	  taonga	  
in	  their	  traditional	  way?	  Can	  the	  rights	  expressed	  in	  both	  versions	  of	  the	  Treaty	  
coexist	   and	   be	   equally	   guaranteed?	   These	   fundamental	   questions	  will	   now	   be	  
examined	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  Wai	  262.	  	  
	  
7.2	  –	  The	  Treaty	  of	  Waitangi	  and	  the	  Waitangi	  Tribunal	  
	  
The	  most	   important	   promises	   of	   the	   Treaty	   of	  Waitangi	  which	   are	   relevant	   to	  
Wai	   262	  was	   the	   guarantee	   that	   tino	   rangatiratanga	   of	   iwi	   and	   hapu	   over	   the	  
‘taonga	   katoa’	   would	   be	   protected.	   This	   means	   that	   the	   highest	   chieftainship	  
over	  Māori	  treasured	  things	  would	  be	  inter	  alia	  guaranteed.	  However,	  as	  Claudia	  
Orange	  has	  stated,	   the	  Treaty	  brought	  more	  confusion	   than	  clarification	   to	   the	  
real	   intentions	   of	   its	   ratifications	   by	   rangatira	   since	   its	   creation	   in	   1840.	   The	  
English	   version	   of	   the	   Treaty,	   in	   fact,	   ceded	   to	   Britain	   the	   sovereignty	   of	   New	  
Zealand	   and	   gave	   the	   Crown	   “an	   exclusive	   right	   of	   pre-­‐emption	   as	   the	  Māori	  
people	  wished	  to	  sell”,19	  while	  Māori	  people	  were	  given	  full	  rights	  of	  ownership	  
of	   their	   lands,	   forests,	   fisheries	   and	   taonga	   treasures.	  Māori	   people	  were	   also	  
promised	  the	  rights	  and	  privileges	  of	  British	  subjects	  and	  the	  assurance	  that	  the	  
Crown	  would	  protect	  Māori	  tribes	  from	  the	  invasion	  of	  other	  colonial	  powers.20	  
However	  apparently	  fair,	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  British	  government	  was	  evident	  to	  
the	   English	   representatives:	   the	   Crown	   required	   a	   “cession	   of	   sovereignty,	  
absolute	  control	  over	  all	  land	  matters	  and	  authority	  to	  impose	  law	  and	  order	  on	  
both	   Māori	   and	   non-­‐Māori”. 21 	  According	   to	   Orange,	   the	   difficulties	   of	  
interpretation	  and	  intentionality	  surrounded	  the	  Treaty	  from	  its	  early	  years,	  and	  
most	  of	  them	  have	  not	  been	  settled	  yet.	   In	  her	  book	  –The	  Treaty	  of	  Waitangi	   -­‐	  
she	   presents	   several	   key	   questions	   that	   continue	   to	   receive	   contradicting	  
answers:	  What	  rights	  did	  the	  Treaty	  confer	  or	  confirm?	  What	  responsibilities	  did	  
it	  imply	  for	  both	  contracting	  parties?	  Did	  it	  apply	  to	  all	  Māori	  or	  only	  to	  the	  tribal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Claudia	  Orange	  The	  Treaty	  of	  Waitangi	  (Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  Port	  Nicholson	  Press,	  Wellington,	  1987)	  at	  1.	  
20	  “The	   third	  article,	   conferring	  Crown	  protection	  and	   the	  status	  of	  British	  subjects	  on	  Māori	   […]	   served	  a	  
dual	  purpose:	  its	  placed	  the	  Māori	  under	  British	  law,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  extended	  could	  be	  construed	  a	  
privileges	  of	  some	  significance	  for	  an	  indigenous	  race”	  see	  Claudia	  Orange	  The	  Treaty	  of	  Waitangi	  at	  86.	  




groups	   committed	   by	   their	   chief’s	   agreement?	   Unfortunately,	   the	   Treaty	   was	  
never	   able	   to	   settle	   these	   disputes.	  Much	   of	   the	   confusion	   and	   contradictions	  
came	  form	  the	  bilingual	  format	  in	  which	  the	  Treaty	  was	  created.22	  
Historically,	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Waitangi 23 	  is	   an	   example	   of	   how	   settlers	   used	  
(intentionally	  or	  not)24	  the	  difference	   in	   language	  to	  convince	  Māori	  peoples	  of	  
the	   good	   intentions	   of	   the	   Crown	   and	   legalize	   the	   intentional	   acquisition	   of	  
sovereignty	   over	   the	   land	   they	   traditionally	   occupied.	   Due	   to	   problems	   in	  
translation	   or	   misrepresentation	   that	   shielded	   key	   differences	   in	   the	   two	  
versions,	  what	  Māori	  chiefs	  signed	  in	  the	  Māori	  version,	  did	  not	  reflect	  its	  English	  
equivalent	  (and,	  according	  to	  Orange,	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  British	  
representatives	  in	  loco	  were	  aware	  of	  such	  substantial	  differences	  in	  the	  texts).25	  
In	  fact,	  Māori	  peoples	  signed	  a	  text	  that	  was	  subtly	  and	  yet	  significantly	  different	  
in	   the	  English	   version	  both	   in	   concept	   and	   intention.	   In	   the	  Māori	  	   version	   the	  
description	  of	  collective	  and	  individual	  ownership	  was	  altogether	  omitted	  as	  well	  
as	  the	   idea	  of	  possession	  expressed	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  te	  tino	  rangatiratanga	  (a	  
chief’s	   mana	   is	   his	   rangatiratanga).	   In	   the	   Māori	   language,	   in	   fact,	   tino	  
rangatiratanga	   means	   more	   than	   the	   word	   “possession”	   used	   in	   the	   English	  
version.26	  The	  Māori	   version	   alternates	   tino	   rangatiratanga	   with	   kawanatanga.	  
The	   first	   encompassing	   the	   Māori	   concept	   of	   chieftainship	   and	   the	   second	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Though,	  the	  bilingual	  version	  of	  the	  Treaty	  also	  represents	   its	  strength	  because	  most	  of	  the	  Europeans-­‐
indigenous	  treaties	  were	  written	  in	  English	  (or	  French)	  with	  the	  indigenous	  oral	  version	  disputed.	  
23	  “On	   6	   February	   1840,	   the	   Treaty	   of	  Waitangi	  was	   signed	   at	  Waitangi	   in	   the	   Bay	   of	   Islands	   by	  Hobson,	  
several	  English	  residents,	  and	  approximately	  45	  Māori	  rangatira,	  Hone	  Heke	  being	  the	  first.	  The	  Māori	  text	  
of	  the	  Treaty	  was	  then	  taken	  around	  Northland	  to	  obtain	  additional	  Māori	  signatures	  and	  copies	  were	  sent	  
around	   the	   rest	  of	   the	  country	   for	   signing,	  but	   the	  English	   text	  was	   signed	  only	  at	  Waikato	  Heads	  and	  at	  
Manukau	  by	  39	  rangatira.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  that	  year,	  over	  500	  Māori	  had	  signed	  the	  Treaty.	  Of	  those	  500,	  13	  
were	  women”	  electronic	  document	  <www.waitangi-­‐tribunal.govt.nz/treaty/>	  last	  visited	  on	  15/07/2015.	  
24	  “According	   to	   Hugh	   Carleton,	  William’s	   son-­‐in-­‐law	   and	   biographer,	  Williams	  made	   the	   translation	  with	  
‘the	  assistance	  of	  his	   son	  Edward	  …	  While	   the	   twenty-­‐one-­‐year-­‐old	  Edward	  probably	  had	   the	   facility	  with	  
spoken	  Māori	  that	  someone	  might	  expect	  from	  someone	  who	  has	  spent	  most	  of	  his	  youth	  in	  New	  Zealand,	  
he	  was	  not	  an	  experienced	  translator.	  Nor	  was	  Henry	  Williams	  an	  acknowledged	  expert	  in	  the	  field	  […]	  and	  
there	   is	  no	  evidence	  of	  Māori	   assistance”	   see	  Claudia	  Orange	  The	  Treaty	  of	  Waitangi	   at	   39;	   “The	  English	  
version	  guaranteed	  ‘undisturbed	  possession’	  of	  all	  their	  ‘properties’,	  but	  the	  Māori	  version	  guaranteed	  ‘tino	  
rangatiratanga’	   (full	   authority)	   over	   ‘taonga’	   (treasures,	  which	  may	  be	   intangible).	   It	   is	   known	   that	  Māori	  
chiefs	  would	  not	  have	  signed	  the	  Treaty	  if	  it	  was	  clearly	  specified	  that	  it	  included	  ceding	  all	  sovereignty	  and	  
self-­‐government”	   see	   the	   history	   of	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Waitangi	   at	   <www.nzhistory.net.nz/politics/treaty-­‐of-­‐
waitangi>	  last	  visited	  on	  11/12/2015.	  
25	  “Hobson	   sent	   his	   superiors	   several	   English	   copies,	   each	   with	   slight	   variations.	   On	   one	   copy,	   Williams	  
appended	   a	   certification	   that	   the	   English	   text	  was	   ‘as	   literal	   translation	   of	   the	   Treaty	   of	  Waitangi	   as	   the	  
idiom	  of	  the	  language	  will	  admit	  of’.	  This	  was	  not	  so.	  There	  was	  no	  translation	  of	  the	  Māori	  text,	  nor	  was	  the	  
Māori	  text	  an	  accurate	  translation	  of	  any	  one	  of	  the	  English	  versions”	  see	  Claudia	  Orange	  at	  85.	  




relating	   mostly	   to	   the	   British	   concept	   of	   governorship. 27 	  It	   is	   therefore	  
unsurprising	   that	   Māori	   were	   unaware	   that	   the	   substitution	   for	   kawanatanga	  
would,	   in	   the	   English	   version,	   grant	   total	   annexation	   and	   sovereignty	   of	  Māori	  
territories	   that	   would	   “bring	   international	   recognition	   of	   New	   Zealand	   as	   a	  
British	  colony”.28	  The	  celebrations	  that	  followed	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  in	  fact,	  
were	  in	  “honour	  of	  the	  new	  British	  Colony	  of	  New	  Zealand”.29	  In	  both	  versions,	  
the	   text	  did	  not	   introduce	   the	   idea	  of	  annexation	   that	   the	  British	  had	   in	  mind.	  
The	  Māori	  version	  of	  the	  Treaty	  was	  also	  silent	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Crown	  was	  de	  
facto	   securing	   the	   “exclusive	   control	   over	   all	   transaction	   in	   Māori	   lands”.30	  In	  
other	  words,	  Māori	  people	  could	  only	  sell	  their	  lands	  for	  ridiculous	  prices	  to	  the	  
Crown	  that	  now	  had	  a	  monopoly	  to	  resell	  them	  with	  huge	  profits.31	  Although	  by	  
1840	  Māori	   people	  had	  already	  been	   selling	   land	   to	   settlers	   for	  over	  25	   years,	  
they	  did	  not	  have	  ‘legal’	  knowledge	  of	  the	  British	  common	  law	  of	  property	  and	  
were	  not	  aware	  that	  there	  would	  be	  a	  difference	  between	  national	  sovereignty	  
and	  proprietary	  land	  rights.	  What	  the	  creator	  of	  the	  Treaty	  stressed	  instead	  was	  
the	  idea	  of	  Aotearoa	  becoming	  part	  of	  the	  British	  family	  where	  the	  Queen,	  like	  a	  
mother,	   would	   look	   after	   and	   protect	  Māori	   people	   as	   British	   citizens.	   At	   the	  
time,	   Māori	   people	   were,	   in	   fact,	   more	   concerned	   about	   the	   internal	   fights	  
among	  tribes	  and	  the	  external	  threat	  of	  France	  that	  was	  landing	  on	  their	  shores	  
with	  increasing	  frequency.	  It	  is	  not	  surprising	  therefore	  if	  Māori	  decided	  to	  seek	  
the	  protection	  of	  the	  Crown	  (which	  already	  controlled	  Australia)	  with	  whom	  they	  
had	   had	   a	   longstanding	   trade	   relationship.	   The	   treaty	   would	   guarantee	   a	   Pax	  
Britannica	  among	  the	  numerous	  conflicts	  between	  Māori	  and	  Europeans	  and,	  at	  
the	  same	  time,	  discourage	  the	  conquest	  of	  other	  colonial	  powers.32	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	   only	   with	  Māori	   cooperation,	   could	   Britain	   hope	   to	   keep	   at	   bay	   all	   the	  
foreign	   challenges.	   In	   this	   case,	   only	   a	   sovereignty	   that	   was	   voluntarily	   ceded	  
could	  maintain	  a	  pacific	  presence	  of	  British	  citizens	  on	  New	  Zealand	  soil.	   In	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  “The	   representative	   of	   the	   British	   Crown	   in	   a	   colony	   or	   in	   a	   Commonwealth	   state	   that	   regards	   the	  
monarch	   as	   head	   of	   state”	   at	   <www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/governor>	   last	   visited	   on	  
20/06/2015.	  
28	  See	  Orange	  at	  46.	  
29	  At	  55.	  
30	  At	  42.	  
31	  “The	  British	  government	  wanted	  to	  have	  complete	  control	  over	  all	   land	  transactions.	  Because	  this	  could	  
only	  be	  achieved	  with	  Māori	  agreement,	   the	   treaty’s	   second	  article	   including	  pre-­‐emption	  was	  as	  vital	   to	  
government	  interests	  as	  the	  land	  guarantee	  was	  to	  Māori	  interests”	  see	  Claudia	  Orange	  at	  86	  




Preamble	   to	   the	   English	   version	   it	   is	   stated	   that	   the	   British	   intentions	  were	   to	  
“protect	   Māori	   interests	   from	   the	   encroaching	   British	   settlement,	   provide	   for	  
British	  settlement	  and	  establish	  a	  government	  to	  maintain	  peace	  and	  order”.33	  
While	   the	   Māori	   text	   has	   a	   different	   emphasis.	   It	   suggests	   that	   “the	   Queen's	  
main	   promises	   to	   Māori	   were	   to	   provide	   a	   government	   while	   securing	   tribal	  
rangatiratanga	   (chiefly	   autonomy	   or	   authority	   over	   their	   own	   area)	   and	  Māori	  
land	  ownership	  for	  as	   long	  as	  they	  wished	  to	  retain	   it”.34	  The	  translation	  of	  the	  
articles	  that	  Māori	  signed	  is:	  
	  
Article	  1	  -­‐	  The	  chiefs	  of	  the	  Confederation	  and	  all	  the	  chiefs	  who	  have	  not	  joined	  
that	   Confederation	   give	   absolutely	   to	   the	   Queen	   of	   England	   for	   ever	   the	  
complete	  government	  over	  their	  land.	  	  
Article	  2	  -­‐	  The	  Queen	  of	  England	  agrees	  to	  protect	  the	  chiefs,	  the	  sub	  tribes	  and	  
all	   the	  people	  of	  New	  Zealand	   in	   the	  unqualified	  exercise	  of	   their	   chieftainship	  
over	  their	  lands,	  villages	  and	  all	  their	  treasures.	  But	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  Chiefs	  
of	   the	   Confederation	   and	   all	   the	   Chiefs	   will	   sell	   land	   to	   the	   Queen	   at	   a	   price	  
agreed	  to	  by	  the	  person	  owning	  it	  and	  by	  the	  person	  buying	  it	  (the	  latter	  being)	  
appointed	  by	  the	  Queen	  as	  her	  purchase	  agent.	  	  
Article	  3	  -­‐	  For	  this	  agreed	  arrangement	  therefore	  concerning	  the	  Government	  of	  
the	   Queen,	   the	   Queen	   of	   England	  will	   protect	   all	   the	   ordinary	   people	   of	   New	  
Zealand	   and	   will	   give	   them	   the	   same	   rights	   and	   duties	   of	   citizenship	   as	   the	  
people	  of	  England.35	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 	  See	   the	   History	   of	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Waitangi	   at	   <www.nzhistory.net.nz/politics/treaty/read-­‐the-­‐
Treaty/differences-­‐between-­‐the-­‐texts>	  last	  visited	  on	  12/12/2015.	  
34	  Supra.	  
35	  “In	  the	  Māori	  text	  of	  article	  1,	  Māori	  gave	  the	  British	  a	  right	  of	  governance,	  kawanatanga,	  whereas	  in	  the	  
English	   text,	   Maori	   ceded	   ‘sovereignty’.	   One	   of	   the	   problems	   that	   faced	   the	   original	   translators	   of	   the	  
English	   draft	   of	   the	   Treaty	  was	   that	   'sovereignty'	   in	   the	   British	   understanding	   of	   the	  word	   had	   no	   direct	  
translation	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Māori	   society.	   Rangatira	   (chiefs)	   held	   the	   autonomy	   and	   authority,	  
‘rangatiratanga’,	  over	  their	  own	  domains	  but	  there	  was	  no	  supreme	  ruler	  of	  the	  whole	  country.	  In	  the	  Māori	  
version,	   the	   translators	   used	   the	   inadequate	   term	   ‘kawanatanga’,	   a	   transliteration	   of	   the	   word	  
‘governance’,	  which	  was	  then	   in	  current	  use.	  Māori	  understanding	  of	  this	  word	  came	  from	  familiar	  use	   in	  
the	  New	  Testament	  of	  the	  Bible	  when	  referring	  to	  the	  likes	  of	  Pontious	  Pilate,	  and	  from	  their	  knowledge	  of	  
the	   role	   of	   the	   ‘Kawana’,	   or	   Governor	   of	   New	   South	  Wales,	   whose	   jurisdiction	   then	   extended	   to	   British	  
subjects	   in	   New	   Zealand.	   As	   a	   result,	   in	   this	   article,	   Māori	   believe	   they	   ceded	   to	   the	   Queen	   a	   right	   of	  
governance	   in	   return	   for	   the	   promise	   of	   protection,	   while	   retaining	   the	   authority	   they	   always	   had	   to	  
manage	   their	   own	   affairs.	   The	  Māori	   version	   of	   article	   2	   uses	   the	   word	   ‘rangatiratanga’	   in	   promising	   to	  
uphold	   the	   authority	   that	   tribes	   had	   always	   had	   over	   their	   lands	   and	   taonga.	   This	   choice	   of	   wording	  
emphasises	   status	   and	   authority.	   In	   the	   English	   text,	   the	   Queen	   guaranteed	   to	   Māori	   the	   undisturbed	  
possession	   of	   their	   properties,	   including	   their	   lands,	   forests,	   and	   fisheries,	   for	   as	   long	   as	   they	  wished	   to	  
retain	   them.	   This	   text	   emphasises	   property	   and	   ownership	   rights.	   Article	   2	   provides	   for	   land	   sales	   to	   be	  
effected	   through	   the	   Crown.	   This	   gave	   the	   Crown	   the	   right	   of	   pre-­‐emption	   in	   land	   sales.	   The	  Waitangi	  





While	  the	  English	  version	  is:	  
	  
Article	  1	  -­‐	  The	  Chiefs	  of	  the	  Confederation	  of	  the	  United	  Tribes	  of	  New	  Zealand	  
and	  the	  separate	  and	  independent	  Chiefs	  who	  have	  not	  become	  members	  of	  the	  
Confederation	  cede	  to	  her	  Majesty	  the	  Queen	  of	  England	  absolutely	  and	  without	  
reservation	   all	   the	   rights	   and	   powers	   of	   Sovereignty	   which	   the	   said	  
Confederation	   or	   Individual	   Chiefs	   respectively	   exercise	   or	   possess,	   or	  may	   be	  
supposed	   to	  exercise	  or	   to	  possess	  over	   their	   respective	  Territories	  as	   the	  sole	  
sovereigns	  thereof.	  	  
Article	   2	   -­‐	   Her	  Majesty	   the	  Queen	   of	   England	   confirms	   and	   guarantees	   to	   the	  
Chiefs	  and	  Tribes	  of	  New	  Zealand	  and	  to	  the	  respective	  families	  and	  individuals	  
thereof	  the	  full	  exclusive	  and	  undisturbed	  possession	  of	  their	  Lands	  and	  Estates	  
Forests	  Fisheries	  and	  other	  properties	  which	  they	  may	  collectively	  or	  individually	  
possess	   so	   long	   as	   it	   is	   their	   wish	   and	   desire	   to	   retain	   the	   same	   in	   their	  
possession;	  but	  the	  Chiefs	  of	  the	  United	  Tribes	  and	  the	  individual	  Chiefs	  yield	  to	  
Her	   Majesty	   the	   exclusive	   right	   of	   Pre-­‐emption	   over	   such	   lands	   as	   the	  
proprietors	  thereof	  may	  be	  disposed	  to	  alienate	  at	  such	  prices	  as	  may	  be	  agreed	  
upon	  between	  the	  respective	  Proprietors	  and	  persons	  appointed	  by	  Her	  Majesty	  
to	  treat	  with	  them	  in	  that	  behalf.	  	  
Article	  3	  -­‐	  In	  consideration	  thereof	  Her	  Majesty	  the	  Queen	  of	  England	  extends	  to	  
the	   Natives	   of	   New	   Zealand	   Her	   royal	   protection	   and	   imparts	   to	   them	   all	   the	  
Rights	  and	  Privileges	  of	  British	  Subjects.	  
	  
The	  fundamental	  difference	  is	  that,	  according	  to	  the	  Māori	  version	  (translated	  by	  
Missionary	   Henry	  Williams’	   son	   Edward,	   supra	   footnote	   9),	  Māori	   chiefs	   were	  
retaining	  total	  sovereignty	  over	  their	  land	  and	  their	  Matauranga	  mo	  nga	  Tikanga	  
(traditional	   rules	   for	   conducting	   life,	   custom,	  method,	   rule,	   law),36	  while	   in	   the	  
English	   version	   such	   sovereignty	   could	   be	   pre-­‐emptively	   taken	   away	   by	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
purpose	   of	   this	   provision	   was	   not	   just	   to	   regulate	   settlement	   but	   to	   ensure	   that	   each	   tribe	   retained	  
sufficient	   land	   for	   its	   own	   purposes	   and	   needs”	   see	   The	   Waitangi	   Tribunal	   at	   <www.waitangi-­‐
tribunal.govt.nz/treaty/meaning.asp>	  last	  visited	  on	  06/06/2012.	  
36 	  “…	   pursuant	   to	   Article	   2	   of	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Waitangi,	   they	   (Maori	   chiefs)	   were	   guaranteed	   tino	  
rangatiratanga	  over,	  and	  full	  exclusive	  and	  undisturbed	  possession	  of,	  all	  taonga,	  including	  indigenous	  flora	  
and	  fauna	  within	  their	  rohe,	  recognition	  and	  protection	  of	  Ngati	  Kahungunu	  cultural	  knowledge,	  and	  Ngati	  
Kahungunu	   rongoa.	   This	   guarantee	   included	   the	   right	   and	   obligations	   of	   Ngati	   Kahungunu	   to	   fulfil	   their	  
kaitiaki	   (guardianship)	   responsibilities	   in	   regard	   to	   this	   taonga”	   see	  Wai	  262	  Statement	  of	   Issues	  2.314	   (6	  




Queen	   and	   her	   in	   loco	   representatives.	   Another	   difference	   is	   the	   use	   of	   the	  
words	  ‘citizens’	  in	  the	  Māori	  version	  and	  ‘subjects’37	  in	  the	  English	  one.	  Until	  the	  
1981	   Nationality	   Act,	   the	   people	   who	   under	   British	   law	   were	   considered	  
‘subjects’	  were,	  in	  fact,	  not	  entitled	  to	  the	  same	  rights	  given	  to	  British	  citizens.	  As	  
British	  subjects,	  however,	  Māori	  people	  could	  not	  be	  pre-­‐emptively	  dispossessed	  
of	   their	   traditional	   land	   as	   confirmed	   in	   the	  Māori	   version	   of	   Art	   3.38	  Another	  
difference	   is	   that,	  between	  the	  English	  and	  the	  newly	   translated	  version	  of	   the	  
Treaty,	  no	  intention	  was	  ever	  manifested	  by	  the	  Crown	  to	  mend	  the	  mistake	  or	  
to	   genuinely	   consider	   the	  Māori	   version	   instead	   of	   the	   English	   one,	   following	  
through	  the	  recognition	  of	  landownership	  of	  Māori	  people	  in	  Aotearoa.	  Since	  its	  
creation,	  the	  valid	  version	  of	  the	  Treaty	  was	  implicitly	  assumed	  to	  be	  the	  English	  
one,	   regardless	  of	  what	  Māori	   people	   thought	   they	  had	   signed	  or	  understood.	  
On	  a	  different	  note,	  years	   later,	   the	  Crown	  responded	  to	   the	  Māori	  allegations	  
explaining	  that	  the	  Treaty	  was	  never	  intended	  to	  become	  a	  binding	  instrument,	  
so	   the	   language	   used	   was	   inconsequential.	   However,	   in	   the	   words	   of	   Joseph	  
Phillimore	   Esq39	  the	   Treaty	   of	   Waitangi	   is	   “of	   binding	   obligation	   on	   the	   two	  
contracting	  parties,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  corner	  stone,	  on	  which	  
all	   our	   relations,	  with	   the	   Islands	   of	  New	  Zealand,	  must	   be	   founded”.40	  Having	  
said	  this,	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  the	  Treaty	  back	  in	  1840	  is	  still	  not	  clear.	  Clearly,	  the	  
main	   intent	  of	  the	  Treaty,	   from	  the	  English	  perspective,	  was	  to	  establish	  a	  new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  “Within	   the	   British	   Empire,	   the	  main	   class	   of	   people	  who	  were	   not	   British	   subjects	  were	   the	   rulers	   of	  
native	  states	  formally	  under	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  British	  Crown,	  and	  their	  peoples.	  Although	  their	  countries	  
may	  for	  all	  practical	  purposes	  have	  been	  ruled	  by	  the	  imperial	  government,	  such	  persons	  are	  considered	  to	  
have	  been	  born	  outside	   the	  sovereignty	  and	  allegiance	  of	   the	  British	  Crown,	  and	  were	   (and,	  where	   these	  
persons	   are	   still	   alive,	   still	   are)	   known	   as	   British	   protected	   persons”	   see	   at	  
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_subject>;	  “Until	  1949,	  nearly	  everyone	  with	  a	  close	  connection	  to	  the	  
United	   Kingdom	   was	   called	   a	   British	   subject.	   And	   all	   citizens	   of	   Commonwealth	   countries	   were	   British	  
subjects	  until	  January	  1983.	  Since	  that	  date,	  very	  few	  categories	  of	  people	  have	  qualified	  as	  British	  subjects”	  
<http://ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/britishcitizenship/othernationality/britishsubjects/>	   last	   visited	   on	  
06/06/2012.	  
38	  See	  electronic	  document	  
<http://ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/britishcitizenship/othernationality/britishsubjects/>	  last	  visited	  on	  
06/06/2012.	  
39	  “Joseph	   Phillimore	  was	   a	   well-­‐known	   lawyer,	   an	  MP	   and,	   at	   one	   time,	   regius	   professor	   of	   civil	   law	   at	  
Oxford	   University.	   Phillimore's	   liberal	   national	   politics	   and	   international	   legal	   expertise	   made	   him	   an	  
appropriate	  and	  authoritative	  source	  for	  the	  APS.	  That	   is,	   the	  Dictionary	  of	  National	  Biography	  notes	  that	  
"during	  his	  parliamentary	  career	  he	  distinguished	  himself	  by	  his	  able	  advocacy	  of	  catholic	  emancipation	  and	  
his	   luminous	   expositions	   of	   international	   law”.	  His	   son,	   Sir	   Robert	   Joseph	   Phillimore,	  was	   a	   distinguished	  
jurist	   and	   scholar	   and	   wrote	   a	   famous,	   four-­‐volume	   Commentaries	   on	   International	   Law	   (1854-­‐61)	   see	  
Dictionary	  of	  National	  Biography,	  1070-­‐1074.	  




British	   sovereign	  by	   a	   valid	   ‘treaty	  of	   cession’.41	  During	   the	  negotiations	  of	   the	  
Treaty,	  Māori	  people	  were	  repeatedly	  told	  that	  they	  had	  “given	  the	  Queen	  the	  
‘hokonga’	   (selling)	   only,	   and	   that	   in	   the	  Māori	   text	   of	   the	   Treaty	   this	   did	   not	  
constitute	  a	   cession	  of	   the	   ‘sole	  and	  exclusive	   right	  of	  purchase’”.42	  How	  could	  
the	   cession	   of	   native	   lands	   be	   legal	   if	   the	   signatories	   to	   the	   Treaty	   were	   not	  
aware	   they	  were	  actually	   giving	  away	   their	  own	   sovereignty?	  What	   legal	   value	  
has	   the	   fact	   that	  Māori	   chiefs	  did	  actually	   sign	   the	  Māori	  version	  of	   the	  Treaty	  
with	   its	   substantial	   conceptual	   and	   legal	   differences	   and	   the	   implications	   that	  
arise?	  
According	   to	   the	   Vienna	   Convention	   on	   the	   Law	   of	   Treaties	   (1969):	   “When	   a	  
treaty	   has	   been	   authenticated	   in	   two	   or	   more	   languages,	   the	   text	   is	   equally	  
authoritative	   in	   each	   language,	   unless	   the	   treaty	   provides	   or	   the	   parties	   agree	  
that,	   in	   case	   of	   divergence,	   a	   particular	   text	   shall	   prevail”.43	  This	   means	   that,	  
regardless	  of	   the	   intentions	  of	   the	  parties	  at	   the	   time	  of	   the	   ratification,	   today	  
both	   versions	   of	   the	   Treaty	   of	  Waitangi	   should	   be	   considered	   effective	   unless	  
both	  parties	  agree	  otherwise.	  Which	  brings	  us	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  assumption	  of	  
the	   Crown	   that	   the	   Treaty	   is	   just	   a	   piece	   of	   paper	   with	   no	   legal	   standing	   or	  
authority	  can	  be	  considered	  inconsistent	  with	  international	  law;	  especially	  in	  the	  
light	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  much	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties	  today	  
forms	  customary	  international	   law44	  and	  New	  Zealand	  signed	  the	  Convention	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  See	  Orange	  at	  87.	  
42	  See	  Official	  Documents	  Relative	  to	  Native	  Affairs	  and	  Land	  Purchases	  in	  the	  North	  Island	  of	  New	  Zealand	  
electronic	  document	  <http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tei-­‐source/TurEpit.xml>	  last	  visited	  on	  29/05/2015.	  
43	  Vienna	   Convention	   on	   the	   Law	   of	   Treaties	   1969,	   Article	   33.3	   states	   that:	   “The	   terms	   of	   the	   treaty	   are	  
presumed	  to	  have	  the	  same	  meaning	  in	  each	  authentic	  text”,	  while	  Article	  33.4	  affirms	  that:	  “Except	  where	  
a	   particular	   text	   prevails	   in	   accordance	   with	   paragraph	   1,	   when	   a	   comparison	   of	   the	   authentic	   texts	  
discloses	  a	  difference	  of	  meaning	  which	  the	  application	  of	  articles	  31	  and	  32	  does	  not	  remove,	  the	  meaning	  
which	  best	  reconciles	  the	  texts,	  having	  regard	  to	  the	  object	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  treaty,	  shall	  be	  adopted”.	  	  
44	  “In	   short,	   the	   law	   of	   treaties	   is	   not	   itself	   dependent	   on	   treaty,	   but	   is	   part	   of	   general	   customary	  
international	  law.	  Queries	  might	  arise	  if	  the	  law	  of	  treaties	  were	  embodied	  in	  a	  multilateral	  convention,	  but	  
some	   States	   did	   not	   become	   parties	   to	   the	   convention,	   or	   became	   parties	   to	   it	   and	   then	   subsequently	  
denounced	  it;	  for	  they	  would	  in	  fact	  be	  or	  remain	  bound	  by	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  treaty	  in	  so	  far	  as	  these	  
embodied	  customary	   international	   law	  de	   lege	   lata.	  No	  doubt	  this	  difficulty	  arises	  whenever	  a	  convention	  
embodies	  rules	  of	  customary	  international	  law.	  In	  practice,	  this	  often	  does	  not	  matter.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  law	  
of	  treaties	  it	  might	  matter	  —	  for	  the	  law	  of	  treaties	  is	  itself	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  force	  and	  effect	  of	  all	  treaties.	  It	  
follows	   from	   all	   this	   that	   if	   it	   were	   ever	   decided	   to	   cast	   the	   Code,	   or	   any	   part	   of	   it,	   in	   the	   form	   of	   an	  
international	  convention,	  considerable	  drafting	  changes,	  and	  possibly	  the	  omission	  of	  some	  material,	  would	  
almost	  certainly	  be	  required”	  eleventh	  session	  to	  the	  General	  Assembly	  (1959),	  	  
see	   International	   Law	   Commission	   electronic	   document	  	  
<http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Tem




1970	   and	   ratified	   it	   in	   1971.45	  It	   is	   true	   that	   the	   Vienna	   Convention	   does	   not	  
extend	  to	  national	  treaties,	  however,	  the	  parties	  that	  entered	  the	  treaty	  were	  de	  
facto	  two	  nations:	  the	  British	  and	  the	  Māori	  	  nations.46	  
In	  1975	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Waitangi	  Act	  set	  up	  the	  Waitangi	  Tribunal.	  The	  Tribunal	  is	  
“a	  permanent	  commission	  of	  inquiry	  charged	  with	  making	  recommendations	  on	  
claims	   brought	   by	   Māori	   relating	   to	   actions	   or	   omissions	   of	   the	   Crown	   that	  
potentially	   breach	   the	   promises	   made	   in	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Waitangi”.47	  If	   a	   claim	  
meets	   the	   requirements	   set	   down	   by	   the	   Tribunal,	   it	   is	   given	   a	   number	   and	  
proceed	   to	   the	   hearings.48	  Normally	   the	   claims	   brought	   to	   the	   Tribunal	   are	  
complaints	   that	   the	  Crown	  has	   breached	   the	   Treaty	   of	  Waitangi	   “by	   particular	  
actions,	   inactions,	   laws,	   or	   policies	   and	   that	   Māori	   have	   suffered	   prejudice	  
(harmful	  effects)	  as	  a	  result”.49	  The	  recommendations	  are	  not	  legally	  binding	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Supra.	  
46	  “The	   Vienna	   Convention	   on	   the	   Law	   of	   Treaties	   of	   1969	   (VCLT)	  is	   the	   main	   instrument	   that	   regulates	  
treaties.	  It	  defines	  a	  treaty	  and	  relates	  to	  how	  treaties	  are	  made,	  amended,	  interpreted,	  how	  they	  operate	  
and	  are	  terminated.	   It	  does	  not	  aim	  to	  create	  specific	  substantive	  rights	  or	  obligations	  for	  parties	  –	  this	   is	  
left	  to	  the	  specific	  treaty	  (i.e.	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  Diplomatic	  Relations	  creates	  rights	  and	  obligations	  
for	  States	  in	  their	  diplomatic	  relations).	  VCLT	  governs	  treaties	  irrespective	  of	  its	  subject	  matter	  or	  objectives	  
–	   eg:	   treaties	   to	   regulate	   conduct	   of	   hostilities	   (Geneva	   Conventions	   on	   1949);	   treaties	   setting	   up	   an	  
international	  organisation	  (UN	  Charter	  of	  1945);	  and	  treaties	  regulating	  matters	  between	  States	  and	  other	  
parties	   on	   the	   law	   of	   the	   sea	   (UN	   Convention	   on	   the	   Law	   of	   the	   Sea	   of	   1982).	   The	   VCLT	   relates	   only	   to	  
treaties	  concluded	  between	  States	  who	  are	  parties	  to	  the	  VCLT,	  and	  for	  treaties	  that	  entered	  into	  force	  after	  
the	  VCLT	  came	  into	  force	  (The	  VCLT	  came	  into	  force	  in	  1980.	  See	  Article	  4	  of	  the	  VCLT).	  NB:	  this	  does	  not	  
prevent	  a	  provision	  of	  the	  VCLT	  that	  reflects	  customary	  international	  law	  from	  applying	  to	  a	  treaty	  even	  if	  it	  
does	   not	  meet	   the	   above	   requirements.	   In	   the	  Kasikili/Sedudu	   Island	   Case	   the	   ICJ	   held	   that	   Article	   31	   of	  
the	  VCLT	  on	  treaty	  interpretations	  reflected	  customary	  international	  law	  and	  that	  therefore	  applied	  despite	  
the	  fact	  that	  both	  Botswana	  and	  Namibia	  were	  not	  parties	  to	  the	  VCLT	  and	  the	  treaty	  in	  question	  entered	  
into	  force	  in	  1890”	  see	  electronic	  document	  
<https://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com/2013/05/26/law-­‐of-­‐treaties-­‐vienna-­‐convention-­‐on-­‐law-­‐of-­‐
treaties-­‐1969/>	  last	  visited	  on	  20/06/2015.	  
47 	  See	   the	   Waitangi	   Tribunal	   at	   <www.justice.govt.nz/tribunals/waitangi-­‐tribunal>	   last	   visited	   on	  
01/07/2015.	  
48	  “Any	  Māori	   person	   may	   submit	   a	   claim	   to	   the	  Waitangi	   Tribunal.	   (For	   this	   purpose,	   a	   'Māori	   person'	  
includes	   someone	  who	   is	   descended	   from	   a	  Māori.)	   A	   claim	  may	   be	   submitted	   on	   behalf	   of	   a	   group	   of	  
Māori,	  including	  an	  organisation	  such	  as	  a	  rūnanga,	  but	  an	  organisation	  may	  not	  be	  a	  claimant	  on	  its	  own.	  
The	  Waitangi	  Tribunal	  may	  inquire	  only	   into	  certain	  matters.	  Section	  6	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Waitangi	  Act	  1975	  
sets	  out	  the	  grounds	  for	  making	  a	  claim.	  First,	  a	  claim	  must	  relate	  to	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  following	  matters:	  
an	   Act	   of	   Parliament,	   an	   ordinance,	   a	   regulation,	   or	   another	   statutory	   instrument;	   a	   practice	   or	   policy	  
adopted	  or	  proposed	  by	  or	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Crown;	  an	  action	  or	  omission	  by	  or	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Crown,	  or	  
proposed	   by	   or	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   Crown.	   Secondly,	   the	   claimant	  must	   demonstrate	   how	   the	   law,	   or	   the	  
practice,	  policy,	  action,	  or	  omission	  of	  the	  Crown:	  is	  or	  was	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  
Waitangi;	   and	   has	   prejudicially	   affected	   the	   claimant,	   or	   the	   group	   on	   whose	   behalf	   the	   claim	   is	   made.	  
Claims	  may	  relate	  to	  Treaty	  breaches	  dating	  back	  to	  6	  February	  1840,	  when	  the	  Treaty	  was	  signed”	  see	  The	  
Waitangi	   Tribunal	   at	   <www.justice.govt.nz/tribunals/waitangi-­‐tribunal/the-­‐claims-­‐process/making-­‐a-­‐claim>	  
last	  visited	  on	  12/12/2015.	  
49	  “Claims	  need	  to	  be	  comprehensive	  -­‐	  that	  is,	  cover	  all	  the	  matters	  at	  issue	  between	  the	  claimants	  and	  the	  
Crown	  -­‐	  and	  they	  need	  to	  be	  proven	  -­‐	  that	  is,	  supported	  by	  evidence	  of	  a	  standard	  that	  the	  Tribunal	  will	  find	  
convincing.	   The	   Crown	   has	   an	   opportunity	   to	   challenge	   evidence	   by	   cross-­‐examining	   witnesses,	   and	   to	  
submit	   evidence	   of	   its	   own.	   When	   receiving	   historical	   evidence,	   the	   Tribunal	   requires	   reports	   from	  
professional	   historians.	  When	   receiving	   traditional	   evidence,	   the	   Tribunal	   requires	   reports	   based	   at	   least	  




the	   Government	   of	   New	   Zealand,	   however,	   often	   it	   implements	   the	  
recommendations	   to	   a	   certain	   degree.	   The	   only	   binding	   recommendation	   that	  
the	  Tribunal	  can	  make	  is	  an	  interim	  recommendation	  for	  the	  first	  90	  days.50	  The	  
Tribunal	   is	   the	   key	   instrument	   to	   “examine	   any	   claim	   by	   a	  Māori	   or	   group	   of	  
Māori	   who	   may	   have	   been	   prejudiced	   by	   laws	   and	   regulations	   or	   by	   acts,	  
omissions,	   policies,	   or	   practices	   of	   the	   Crown	   since	   1840	   that	   are	   inconsistent	  
with	   the	  principles	  of	   the	  Treaty	  of	  Waitangi”.51	  Frequently,	   such	   inconsistency	  
includes	  the	  failure	  to	  protect	  kaitiakitanga.	  As	  stressed	  on	  several	  occasions	  by	  
the	  Waitangi	  Tribunal,52	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  Crown	  at	  the	  time	  of	  ratification	  
“was	  intended	  to	  be	  qualified	  by	  the	  Crown	  obligation	  to	  actively	  protect	  Māori	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
other	  types	  of	  evidence	  are	  all	  important	  in	  a	  Tribunal	  inquiry”	  at	  <www.justice.govt.nz/tribunals/waitangi-­‐
tribunal>	  last	  visited	  on	  01/07/2015.	  
50	  “This	  period	  is	  intended	  to	  allow	  the	  Crown	  and	  the	  claimants	  to	  reach	  a	  negotiated	  settlement	  in	  place	  
of,	  or	  incorporating	  aspects	  of,	  the	  Tribunal's	  binding	  recommendation.	  If	  a	  settlement	  is	  reached	  in	  the	  90-­‐
day	  period,	   the	  Tribunal	   amends	   its	   recommendation	   to	   give	  effect	   to	   the	   terms	  of	   the	   settlement.	   If	   no	  
settlement	   is	   reached	   in	   that	   period,	   the	   interim	   binding	   recommendation	   takes	   full	   effect	   and	  must	   be	  
implemented	   by	   the	   Crown”	   at	   <www.justice.govt.nz/tribunals/waitangi-­‐tribunal/about/frequently-­‐asked-­‐
questions>	  last	  visited	  on	  01/07/2015.	  
51	  See	   at	   <www.justice.govt.nz/tribunals/waitangi-­‐tribunal/about/frequently-­‐asked-­‐questions>	   last	   visited	  
on	  01/07/2015.	  
52	  “The	  Waitangi	  Tribunal	  was	  set	  up	   in	  1975	  at	  a	  time	  when	  protests	  about	  unresolved	  Treaty	  grievances	  
were	  growing	  and,	  in	  some	  instances,	  taking	  place	  outside	  the	  law.	  By	  establishing	  the	  Tribunal,	  Parliament	  
provided	  a	  legal	  process	  by	  which	  Māori	  Treaty	  claims	  could	  be	  investigated.	  The	  Waitangi	  Tribunal	  inquiry	  
process	  contributes	  to	  the	  resolution	  of	  Treaty	  claims	  and,	  in	  that	  way,	  to	  the	  reconciliation	  of	  outstanding	  
issues	   between	  Māori	   and	   Pākehā.	   The	  Waitangi	   Tribunal	   was	   established	   by	   an	   Act	   of	   Parliament,	   the	  
Treaty	   of	  Waitangi	   Act	   1975.	  While	   that	   Act	   is	   the	  main	   statute	   governing	   the	   Tribunal,	   there	   are	   other	  
statutes	  that	  regulate	  or	  affect	  how	  it	  works,	  including	  the	  Commissions	  of	  Inquiry	  Act	  1908,	  the	  Treaty	  of	  
Waitangi	  (State	  Enterprises)	  Act	  1988,	  and	  the	  various	  statutes	  that	  give	  effect	  to	  Treaty	  claim	  settlements.	  
The	  Waitangi	  Tribunal	  is	  part	  of	  New	  Zealand's	  judicial	  system,	  which	  comprises	  a	  range	  of	  bodies,	  including:	  
the	   general	   courts	   (including	   the	   District	   Court,	   the	   High	   Court,	   and	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal);	   a	   number	   of	  
specialist	   courts	   (including	   the	  Māori	   Land	   Court,	   the	   Family	   Court,	   and	   the	   Environment	   Court);	   various	  
tribunals	   (including	   the	   Disputes	   Tribunal	   and	   the	   Residential	   Tenancies	   Tribunal);	   and	   temporary	  
commissions	   of	   inquiry,	   royal	   commissions	   of	   inquiry,	   and	   so	   forth,	  which	   are	   established	   to	   inquire	   into	  
specific	  matters.	  The	  Waitangi	  Tribunal	  is	  unusual	  in	  that	  it	  was	  established	  as	  a	  permanent	  commission	  of	  
inquiry.	   For	   this	   reason,	   it	   differs	   from	  a	   court	   in	   several	   important	   respects:	  Generally,	   the	   Tribunal	   has	  
authority	   only	   to	   make	   recommendations.	   In	   certain	   limited	   situations,	   the	   Tribunal	   does	   have	   binding	  
powers,	  but	   in	  most	   instances,	   its	   recommendations	  do	  not	  bind	   the	  Crown,	   the	  claimants,	  or	  any	  others	  
participating	  in	  its	  inquiries.	  In	  contrast,	  courts	  can	  make	  rulings	  that	  bind	  the	  parties	  to	  whom	  they	  relate.	  
The	   Tribunal's	   process	   is	   more	   inquisitorial	   and	   less	   adversarial	   than	   that	   followed	   in	   the	   courts.	   In	  
particular,	  it	  can	  conduct	  its	  own	  research	  so	  as	  to	  try	  to	  find	  the	  truth	  of	  a	  matter.	  Generally,	  a	  court	  must	  
decide	  a	  matter	   solely	  on	   the	  evidence	  and	   legal	   arguments	   that	   the	  parties	  present	   to	   it.	   The	  Tribunal's	  
process	   is	   flexible	  –	   the	  Tribunal	   is	  not	  necessarily	   required	   to	   follow	  the	   rules	  of	  evidence	   that	  generally	  
apply	  in	  the	  courts,	  and	  it	  may	  adapt	  its	  procedures	  as	  it	  thinks	  fit.	  For	  example,	  the	  Tribunal	  may	  follow	  'te	  
kawa	  o	   te	  marae'.	   In	  contrast,	   the	  procedure	   in	  courts	   is	  much	   less	   flexible,	  and	   there	  are	  normally	   strict	  
rules	  of	  evidence	  to	  be	   followed.	  The	  Tribunal	  does	  not	  have	   final	  authority	   to	  decide	  points	  of	   law.	  That	  
power	  rests	  with	  the	  courts.	  However,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Waitangi	  Act	  1975,	  the	  Tribunal	  has	  
exclusive	  authority	  to	  determine	  the	  meaning	  and	  effect	  of	  the	  Treaty	  as	  it	  is	  embodied	  in	  both	  Māori	  and	  
English	   texts.	   The	   Tribunal	   has	   a	   limited	   power	   to	   summons	   witnesses,	   require	   the	   production	   of	  
documents,	   and	   maintain	   order	   at	   its	   hearings.	   But	   it	   does	   not	   have	   a	   general	   power	   to	   make	   orders	  
preventing	   something	   from	   happening	   or	   compelling	   something	   to	   happen.	   Nor	   can	   it	   make	   a	   party	   to	  





rangatiratanga”53	  and,	   consequently,	   kaitiakitanga.	   In	   the	   human	   realm,	   those	  
who	  have	  mana	  (or	  to	  use	  Treaty	  terminology,	  rangatiratanga)	  must	  exercise	  it	  in	  
accordance	  with	  the	  values	  of	  kaitiakitanga.	  In	  fact,	  tino	  rangatirantanga	  includes	  
the	   rights	   of	   kaitiaki	   to	   protect	   taonga	   works	   and	   species	   and	   to	   make	   and	  
enforce	  laws	  and	  customs	  in	  relation	  to	  them.	  	  
	  
7.3	  -­‐	  Tino	  Rangatiratanga	  –	  An	  All-­‐Encompassing	  Concept	  
	  
According	  to	  the	  statement	  of	  claim,54	  tino	  rangatiratanga	  o	  te	  Iwi	  Māori	  is:	  	  
	  
…	  the	  authority	  residing	  within	  and	  exercised	  by	  te	  Iwi	  Māori	  o	  Aotearoa	  me	  te	  
Waipounamu/Rekohu	   prior	   to	   the	   arrival	   of	   the	   colonial	   government	   which	  
included	  but	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  full	  and	  exclusive	  rights	  and	  responsabilities	  of	  
manaakitanga,	   kaitiakitanga	   and	   tapu	   and	   the	  development	  of	   these	   rights.	   Te	  
tino	   rangatiratanga	  ot	   te	   Iwi	  Māori	   incorporates	   a	   right	   of	   development	  which	  
permits	  the	  Iwi	  to	  conserve,	  utilise	  and	  exercise	  rights	  over	  indigenous	  flora	  and	  
fauna	  me	  o	  ratou	  taonga	  katoa.	  
	  
According	  to	  the	  Report	  on	  Wai	  262,	  tino	  rangatiratanga	  incorporates:	  
	  
§ decision-­‐making	   authority	   over	   the	   conservation,	   control	   of,	   and	  
proprietorial	   interests	   in	   natural	   resources	   including	   indigenous	   flora	   and	  
fauna	  me	  o	  rātou	  taonga	  katoa	  (Claim	  1.1(a)	  para	  2.5(a));	  
§ the	  right	  to	  determine	   indigenous	  cultural	  and	  customary	  heritage	  rights	   in	  
the	   knowledge	   and	   use	   of	   indigenous	   flora	   and	   fauna	   me	   o	   rātou	   taonga	  
katoa	  (Claim	  1.1(a)	  para	  2.5(b));	  
§ the	   right	   to	   protect,	   enhance	   and	   transmit	   the	   cultural,	   medicinal	   and	  
spiritual	  knowledge	  and	  concepts	  found	  in	  the	  life	  cycles	  of	  indigenous	  flora	  
and	  fauna	  (Claim	  1.1(a)	  para	  2.5(e));	  
§ a	  right	  to	  environmental	  well-­‐being	  dependent	  upon	  the	  nurturing	  and	  wise	  
use	  of	  indigenous	  flora	  and	  fauna	  (Claim	  1.1(a)	  para	  2.5(f));	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Waitangi	  Tribunal	  The	  Ngai	  Tahu	  Report	  at	  237.	  





§ the	   right	   to	   participate	   in,	   benefit	   from	   and	   make	   decisions	   about	   the	  
application,	  development,	  uses	  and	  sale	  of	  me	  o	  ratou	  taonga	  katoa55	  (Claim	  
1.1(a)	  para	  2.5(g));	  and	  
§ the	   rights	   to	   protect,	   enhance	   and	   transmit	   the	   cultural	   and	   spiritual	  
knowledge	   and	   concepts	   found	   in	   me	   o	   ratou	   taonga	   katoa	   (Claim	   1.1(a)	  
para	  2.5(h)).	  
	  
In	   general,	   tino	   rangatiratanga	   traditionally	   provides	   the	   basis	   for	   Māori	   self-­‐
determination	  and	  autonomy	  by	  securing	  control	  over	  resource	  use	  and	  decision	  
making	   as	   implicitly	   inherent	   in	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination.	   The	   word	  
rangatiratanga	  derives	   from	  ‘rangatira’	  which	  denotes	  the	  paramount	  authority	  
of	  the	  chief	  within	  Māori	  societies.	  Tino	  brings	  emphasis	  to	  an	  already	  powerful	  
concept.	  According	  to	  Orange,	  tino	  rangatiratanga	  was	  used	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  
the	   1835	   Declaration	   of	   Independence	   by	   Māori	   chiefs	   and	   in	   1840	   was	  
consequently	   recognised	   by	   Britain	   during	   the	   negotiations	   and	   signing	   of	   the	  
Treaty	   of	  Waitangi.	  Maaka	   and	   Fleras	   argue	   that	   until	   the	   nineteenth	   century	  
tino	  rangatiratanga	  was	  mostly	  used	  by	  the	  missionaries	  to	  convey	  among	  Māori	  
the	   biblical	   concept	   of	   ‘kingdom’.56 	  However,	   its	   importance	   grew	   after	   its	  
iconographic	  meaning	  was	  incorporated	  in	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Waitangi.	  From	  then	  on	  
the	   words	   started	   encompassing	   the	   concept	   of	   “Māori	   sovereignty,	   Māori	  
nation,	   iwi	  nationhood,	   independent	  power,	  full	  chiefly	  authority,	  chiefly	  mana,	  
strong	   leadership,	   independence,	   supreme	   rule,	   self-­‐reliance,	  Māori	   autonomy,	  
tribal	   autonomy,	   absolute	   chieftainship,	   self-­‐management	   and	   trusteeship”.57	  
Today	   tino	   rangatiratanga	   is	   considered	  as	  best	   represented	  by	   the	   indigenous	  
peoples’	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  and	  the	  right	  to	  autonomy	  that	  comes	  with	  
it.	  As	  Maaka	  and	  Fleras	  explain,	  “tino	  rangatiratanga	  constitutes	  a	  collective	  and	  
inherent	   authority	   that	   justifies	   Māori	   claims	   to	   Māori	   models	   of	   self-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  “Me	  o	  ratou	  taonga	  katoa	  includes	  buti	  t	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  whakairo,	  rongoa	  Māori,	  wahi	  tapu,	  pa	  sites	  and	  
Māori	   cultural	   images,	   designs	   and	   symbols	   and	   associated	   indigenous,	   cultural	   and	   customary	   heritage	  
rights	  in	  relation	  to	  such	  taonga”	  see	  the	  First	  Amended	  Statement	  of	  the	  Claim,	  The	  Waitangi	  Tribunal,	  WAI	  
262,	  SOI	  1.1(a)	  at	  para	  2.9.	  
56	  See	   Roger	   Maaka	   and	   Augie	   Fleras	   The	   Politics	   of	   Indigeneity:	   Challenging	   the	   State	   in	   Canada	   and	  
Aotearoa	  New	  Zealand	  (University	  of	  Otago	  Press,	  Dunedin,	  2005)	  at	  101.	  
57	  “Depending	  on	  the	  criteria	  or	  context,	  tino	  rangatiratanga	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  justify	  initiatives	  as	  varied	  
as	   Māori	   empowerment,	   absolute	   ownership	   and	   control	   within	   a	   Māori	   idiom,	   biculturalism	   and	  
partnership,	  Māori	  control	  over	  Māori	  things	  within	  a	  Māori	  value	  system,	  restoration	  of	  Māori	  mana,	  self-­‐





determination	   autonomy	   over	   culture	   and	   identity,	   development	   of	   land	   and	  
resources,	   improvement	  of	  Māori	   lives	   and	   life-­‐chances,	   and	  a	   commitment	   to	  
autonomy	   in	   partnership	   with	   the	   Crown”. 58 	  In	   other	   words,	   the	   asserted	  
absolute	  authority	  of	  the	  Crown	  is	  not	  so	  absolute,	  especially	   in	  case	  the	  rights	  
guaranteed	   to	   Māori	   people	   by	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Waitangi	   would	   make	   them	  
constitutional	  partners	   in	   the	   joint	   sovereignty	  over	  Aotearoa-­‐New	  Zealand.	  As	  
international	  law	  has	  recently	  expressed	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Declaration	  on	  
the	  Right	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  (Art	  3	  and	  4),59	  indigenous	  peoples’	  right	  to	  self-­‐
determination	  is	  an	  inherent	  right	  they	  possess,	  which	  gives	  them	  the	  autonomy	  
and	  authority	  to	  own,	  possess,	  protect	  and	  manage	  their	  culture	  and	  traditions	  
without	   formal	   interference	   by	   the	   state.60	  Although	   tino	   rangatiratanga	   is	   a	  
term	  that	  originated	  in	  New	  Zealand,	  the	  logic	  behind	  it	  is	  commonly	  shared	  by	  
the	   indigenous	   peoples	   of	   the	   world	   and	   includes	   all	   those	   entitlements	   and	  
rights	   that	   inherently	   come	  with	   the	  principle	  of	  original	  occupancy	  and	  native	  
title	  and	  everything	  that	  it	   includes.	  Indeed,	  it	   includes	  the	  idea	  that	  things	  and	  
places	   cannot	   be	  owned	  or	   possessed	   as	   in	   the	  Western	   idea	  of	   exclusive	   and	  
undisturbed	  possession.	  Māori	  people,	   like	  most	  of	  the	  indigenous	  traditions	  of	  
the	  world,	   consider	   themselves	   the	   guardians	  of	   the	   land	   and	  of	   all	   the	   things	  
that	   surround	   them.	   The	   substantial	   difference	   is	   between	   the	   concept	   of	  
ownership	  versus	  that	  of	  kaitiakitanga	  (see	  chapter	  4).	  
The	  statement	  of	  claim	  asserts	  that	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Waitangi	  “reaffirms,	  preserves	  
and	  guarantees	  the	  continuing	  authority	  of	  te	  tino	  rangatiratanga	  o	  te	  iwi	  Māori	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  At	  102.	  
59	  UNDRIP,	   Art	   3	   –	   “Indigenous	   peoples	   have	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination.	   By	   virtue	   of	   that	   right	   they	  
freely	  determine	  their	  political	  status	  and	  freely	  pursue	  their	  economic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  development”;	  
Art	  4	  –	  “Indigenous	  peoples,	   in	  exercising	  their	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination,	  have	  the	  right	  to	  autonomy	  or	  
self-­‐government	   in	   matters	   relating	   to	   their	   internal	   and	   local	   affairs,	   as	   well	   as	   ways	   and	   means	   for	  
financing	  their	  autonomous	  functions”.	  
60	  Several	  international	  instruments	  include	  provisions	  that	  recognise	  the	  rights	  of	  indigenous	  peoples:	  
• Agenda	   21	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   Conference	   on	   Environment	   and	   Development	   (Brazil,	   1992)	  
recognises	   indigenous	   peoples’	   right	   to	   development	   and	   to	   respect	   and	   safeguard	   their	  
traditional	  knowledge	  and	  practices;	  
• Universal	  Declaration	  on	  Human	  Rights	  –	  Art	  17;	  
• International	   Convention	   on	   Civil	   and	   Political	   Rights	   –	   Common	   Art	   1	   recognises	   the	   right	   of	  
people	  to	  claim	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  (NZ	  is	  signatory);	  
• Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	  –	  Article	  8(j);	  
• UN	  DRIP;	  
• Mataatua	  Declaration	  –	  Preamble	  and	  clause	  2.1,	  2.7,	  2.3;	  and	  




in	  and	  over	  indigenous	  flora	  and	  fauna”61	  and	  as	  a	  consequence	  the	  Crown	  has	  a	  
continuing	  obligation	  to	  ‘take	  active	  and	  positive	  steps’	  to	  assist	  Māori	  people	  in	  
the	   preservation	   of	   te	   tino	   rangatiratanga	   o	   te	   Iwi	   Māori	   in	   respect	   of	   their	  
taonga.62	  According	   to	   the	   Report,	   the	   two	   categories	   of	   taonga	   give	   rise	   to	  
different	   Treaty	  obligations	   and	   interests:	   first	   of	   all,	   as	   in	   the	   case	  of	  most	   of	  
indigenous	   peoples’	   cultural	   heritage	   all	   over	   the	  world,	   taonga	  were	  wrongly	  
and	  unlawfully	   taken	   away	   from	  Māori	   people	   or	   recently	   rediscovered	   locked	  
down	   in	  museums	  or	   institutions;	   in	  both	  cases,	   iwi	  maintain	  “a	  rangatiratanga	  
interest	  in	  them,	  for	  the	  items	  were	  never	  willingly	  alienated”.63	  The	  second	  case	  
involves	  all	  the	  taonga	  that	  were	  “willingly	  sold	  or	  gifted	  by	  Māori”.64	  In	  this	  case	  
too	  much	   on-­‐going	   cultural	   and	   spiritual	   relationship	   between	   iwi	   and	   taonga	  
persists	  and	  consequently	  also	  Treaty	  interests	  remain	  in	  place;	  although	  there	  is	  
no	   expectation	   attached	   to	   have	   them	   returned	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   taonga	  
unlawfully	   taken	   away.	   Following	   the	   rights	   and	   obligations	   inscribed	   in	   the	  
Treaty,	   kaitiaki	   are	   still	   entitled	   to	   ‘exercise’	   their	   relationship	  with	   the	   taonga	  
willingly	  sold	  or	  gifted.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  taonga	  taken	  or	  lost,	  Māori	  Treaty	  right	  
to	   tino	   rangatiratanga	   should	   apply.65	  However,	   as	   history	   proves,	   the	   promise	  
inscribed	   within	   the	   Treaty	   was	   not	   only	   never	   kept,	   but	   after	   many	   years	   of	  
social,	   economic	   and	   cultural	   discrimination	   and	   loss	   of	  Māori	   knowledge	   and	  
alien	  management	  over	  the	  knowledge,	  Māori	  people	  are	  still	  questioning	  their	  
rights	  over	  their	  culture	  and	  resources	  as	  stated	  in	  the	  Treaty.	  In	  this	  regard,	  Wai	  
262	   is	   complex	   and	   multifaceted	   because	   it	   tries	   to	   address	   who	   owns	   and	  
controls	   Maori	   culture	   and	   identity	   and	   why.	   This	   underlines	   the	   fact	   that	   in	  
Aotearoa/New	  Zealand,	  Māori	   people	   are	   not	   necessarily	   the	  one	  who	   control	  
and	  own	  Māori	   culture	  and	   its	  expressions.	  As	   for	  a	   shared	  destiny	  among	   the	  
indigenous	   peoples	   of	   the	   world,	   indigenous	   communities,	   in	   fact,	   do	   not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  The	  First	  Amended	  Statement	  of	  the	  Claim,	  The	  Waitangi	  Tribunal,	  WAI	  262,	  SOI	  1.1(a)	  at	  para	  3.1.	  
62	  At	  para	  3.1.	  
63	  See	  Ko	   Aotearoa	   Tēnei:	   A	   Report	   into	   Claims	   Concerning	   New	   Zealand	   Law	   and	   Policy	   Affecting	  Māori	  
Culture	  and	  Identity	  Vol	  2	  (The	  Waitangi	  Tribunal,	  Wellington,	  2011)	  at	  504.	  
64	  At	  505.	  
65	  “If	   an	   object	   is	   indeed	   found	   to	   have	   been	   wrongfully	   transferred,	   the	   iwi	  maintains	   a	   rangatiratanga	  
interest	   in	   it,	   with	   all	   its	   implications	   of	   control	   and	   authority.	   …	   no	   other	   interests	   can	   override	   the	  
unextinguished	   rangatiratanga	   interest	   in	   taonga	   that	  have	  been	  wrongfully	  acquired	  or	   retained	  and	  are	  
now	  held	  by	  our	  national	  museum,	  Te	  Papa.	  These	  must	  be	  offered	  to	  kaitiaki,	  and	  this	  process	  seems	  to	  be	  
under	  way”	  see	  Ko	  Aotearoa	  Tēnei:	  A	  Report	  into	  Claims	  Concerning	  New	  Zealand	  Law	  and	  Policy	  Affecting	  




necessarily	  possess	  their	  own	  culture	  and	  therefore	  are	  not	  responsible	   for	  the	  
future/destiny	  of	  their	  own	  knowledge	  (see	  Chapter	  7,	  8	  and	  9).	  	  
With	   the	   imposition	   of	   common	   law	   and	   property	   rights,	   traditional	   forms	   of	  
knowledge	  failed	  to	  be	  included	  into	  the	  Western	  legal	  systems	  and,	  unprotected	  
and	  unprotectable,	   have	  been	   forced	   to	  be	   subjected	   to	   too	  many	   alien	   rights	  
that	  structurally	   failed	  to	  safeguard	   indigenous	  TK	  and	  cultural	  expression	  from	  
any	   form	  of	  exploitation,	   colonization	  and	  economic	  monopoly.	  While	  Wai	  262	  
recommendations	  speak	  at	  length	  of	  ‘partnership’,	   it	  seems	  that	  such	  a	  word	  is	  
still	   a	   long	  way	   from	   becoming	   a	   reality.	  Most	   of	   the	   time,	   in	   fact,	  Māori	   and	  
kaitiaki	  are	   left	  outside	  of	  any	  decision-­‐making	  over	  their	  taonga.	  Māori	  do	  not	  
attend	  museums’	  board	  meetings,	   they	  do	  not	  directly	  access	   their	   taonga	  and	  
cannot	  provide	  appropriate	  spiritual	  protection.	  Although	  Māori	  representatives	  
are	  present	  within	  the	  biggest	  cultural	  institutions	  of	  New	  Zealand	  such	  as	  the	  Te	  
Papa	   Museum,	   there	   is	   no	   statutory	   requirement	   for	   Māori	   presence	   in	   the	  
Crown	   Research	   Institutions;	   which	   is	   highly	   incomprehensible,	   given	   the	   fact	  
that	   the	   vast	   amount	   of	  Māori	   heritage	   is	   today	   stored	   in	   national	   museums,	  
foundations	  and	  institutions.66	  When	  the	  Crown	  refers	  to	  property	  of	  the	  Crown,	  
it	   implies	   a	   confiscation	   of	  Māori	   taonga	   and	   associated	  mātauranga	  Māori	   as	  
well	  as	  the	  appropriation	  of	  rangatiratanga	  interests.	  What	  the	  claimants	  of	  Wai	  
262	  tried	  to	  explain	  in	  20	  years	  of	  efforts,	   is	  that	  Māori	  symbols,	  stories,	  songs,	  
dances	   and	   remedies	   have	   been	   over	   the	   years	   commodified	   by	   “people	  who	  
have	  no	  traditional	  claim	  to	  them”,67	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  Māori	  people	  lost	  much	  of	  
their	   control	   over	   their	   own	   knowledge	   and	   its	   evolution.	   The	   claimants	  
explained,	   with	   great	   consistency,	   that	   over	   time	   the	   role	   of	   the	   kaitiaki	   was	  
diluted	  and	  their	  power	  over	  taonga	  species	  and	  taonga	  works	  was	  consequently	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  Such	   as	   Archives	   New	   Zealand,	   NZ	   National	   Library,	   TVNZ,	   Radio	   New	   Zealand,	   Te	   Papa	   Tongarewa,	  
Auckland	  Museum,	  Creative	  New	  Zealand;	  for	  further	  information	  see	  chapter	  6	  of	  the	  Ko	  Aotearoa	  Tēnei:	  A	  
Report	  into	  Claims	  Concerning	  New	  Zealand	  Law	  and	  Policy	  Affecting	  Māori	  Culture	  and	  Identity	  Vol	  2.	  
67	  “…	  native	   flora	   and	   fauna	  upon	  which	   their	   culture	   and	   identity	  have	  been	  built	   have	  been	   controlled,	  
modified,	   and	  privatised	  by	  people,	   companies,	   or	   government	   agencies	  who	  have	  no	   affinity	  with	   those	  
things,	  and	  they	  complain	  that	  Maori	  now	  must	  seek	  Crown	  permission	  even	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  or	  use	  them	  
for	  cultural	  purposes.	  The	  claimants	  say	  they	  have	  no	  control	  over	  the	  physical	  and	  spiritual	  well-­‐being	  of	  
the	   lands	   and	  waters	   in	   their	   traditional	   territories.	   They	   say	   that	   their	   traditional	   healing	  practices	  were	  
actively	  suppressed	  by	  the	  Tohunga	  Suppression	  Act	  and	  the	  Crown	  still	  offers	  them	  no	  real	  support.	  They	  
say	   the	  Crown	  has	   taken	  direct	  ownership	  and	  control	  of	  matauranga	  Maori	   through	   its	  various	  agencies,	  
and	  Maori	  have	  been	  excluded”	  see	  the	  Summary	  of	  the	  Report:	  Ko	  Aotearoa	  Tēnei:	  A	  Report	   into	  Claims	  




reduced	  to	  a	  point	  that	  they	  could	  no	  longer	  intervene	  on	  matters	  that	  involved	  
mātauranga	  Māori	  and	  taonga.	  	  
	  
Who	   are	   the	   kaitiaki	   and	   why	   is	   their	   role	   so	   important?	   One	   of	   the	   core	  
principles	   of	   tikanga	   Māori	   (Māori	   customary	   laws	   and	   Maori	   customs	   and	  
traditions	   that	   have	   been	   handed	   down	   through	   the	   passage	   of	   time	   from	  
ancestors)	   is	   that	   of	   ‘kaitiakitanga’	   which	   is	   translated	   as	   guardianship	   or	  
stewardship.	  Māori	   apply	   kaitiakitanga	  over	  people,	   lands,	   villages	   and	   taonga.	  
Lai	  summarises	  the	  concept	  by	  describing	  kaitiakitanga	  as:68	  	  	  
	  
…	  an	  obligation	  that	  arises	  from	  [Māori]	  kin	  relationship,	  not	  only	  to	  people,	  but	  
also	   to	   things	   that	   are	   believed	   to	   have	   a	   kin	   relationship	   according	   to	  Māori	  
myths,	   legends	  and	  belief	  system.	   It	  can,	   thus,	  encompass	   land,	  waters,	  plants,	  
wildlife	  and	  cultural	  works;	  and	  also	  intangible	  things	  such	  as	  language,	  identity,	  
culture	   and	   mātauranga	  Māori.	   The	   obligation	   includes	   the	   care	   of	   both	   the	  
physical	  and	  spiritual,	  requiring	  the	  nurturing	  of	  mauri	  (the	  life	  force).	  Those	  that	  
have	   the	   mana	   (authority,	   power	   or	   supernatural	   force)	   to	   carry	   the	  
responsibilities	  are	  called	  kaitiaki,	  which	  may	  be	  an	  individual,	  whānau	  (family),	  
hapū	   (sub-­‐tribe)	   or	   iwi.	   The	   kaitiaki	   are	   not	   responsible	   only	   for	   the	   taonga	  
works,	   species	  and	  mātauranga	  Māori,	   they	  are	  also	  entitled	   to	   the	  benefits	  of	  
the	  cultural	  and	   spiritual	   sustenance	   therefrom.	  This	   can	   include	   the	  economic	  
benefits,	  if	  the	  commercialisation	  is	  in	  accordance	  with	  mātauranga	  Māori.	  	  
	  
The	  next	  section	  is	  dedicated	  to	  a	  detailed	  description	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  kaitiaki	  
in	   the	  Māori	   world	   (based	   on	   the	   documents	   of	  Wai	   262)	   and	   how	   their	   role	  






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  Jessica	  Christine	  Lai	  Indigenous	  Cultural	  Heritage	  and	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights:	  Learning	  from	  the	  New	  




7.4	  -­‐	  Kaitiakitanga,	  Taonga	  Works,	  Taonga	  Species	  and	  the	  Laws	  of	  Aotearoa-­‐
New	  Zealand	  for	  the	  Preservation	  of	  Māori	  Culture	  
	  
As	  for	  most	  indigenous	  communities	  of	  the	  world,	  a	  striking	  difference	  between	  
Western	  values	  and	  indigenous	  ones	  defines	  them.	  On	  top	  of	  that,	  cross-­‐cultural	  
communication	   is	   never	   an	   easy	   task,	   especially	   when	   a	   language	   is	   imposed	  
upon	  a	  foreign	  set	  of	  values	  and	  traditions	  that	  were	  never	  expressed	  with	  that	  
language.	   As	   seen	   in	   chapter	   4,	   most	   of	   the	   problems	   faced	   by	   indigenous	  
peoples	   yesterday	   and	   today	   come	   from	   translating	   indigenous	   values	   and	  
traditions	  into	  a	  language	  comprehensible	  to	  the	  Western	  world.	  Whether	  this	  is	  
fair	  or	  not,	  is	  another	  story.	  That	  is	  why	  extensive	  parts	  of	  the	  Report	  have	  been	  
dedicated	  to	  the	  description	  of	  Māori	  culture	  and	  traditions	  in	  terms	  that	  could	  
be	  understood	  by	  Westerners	  and	  indigenous	  peoples.	  According	  to	  the	  Report,	  
with	   taonga	   works	   Māori	   people	   consider	   all	   the	   technologies	   and	   arts	  
associated	   with	   traditional	   Māori	   life,	   such	   as,	   mōteatea	   (traditional	   Māori	  
chants	   utilising	   song	   poetry	   and	   melodies	   of	   limited	   range),	   patere	   (rhythmic	  
chant	  with	  a	  more	  secular	  purpose	  than	  the	  karakia),	  carving,	  weaving,	  painting,	  
constructions,	   crafts,	   stories,	   dramas	   and	   musical	   works.	   They	   include	   artistic	  
and	   literary	   works,	   carving,	   weaving,	   paintings,	   crafts,	   written	   works,	   graphic	  
works,	   musical	   works,	   oral	   traditions,	   performing	   arts,	   symbols,	   images	   and	  
designs,	  artefacts	  and	  the	  mauri	  of	  the	  taonga	  works	  “where	  the	  work	  reflects	  in	  
some	  way	  the	  culture	  and/or	  identity	  of	  the	  kaitiaki	  of	  the	  work	  and	  includes	  the	  
knowledge,	  skills,	  cultural	  and	  spiritual	  values	  upon	  which	  the	  work	  is	  based”.69	  
The	   Report	   defines	   taonga	   species	   as	   including	   genetic	   (genetic	   information	  
encoded	   in	   the	   DNA	   sequence	   located	   in	   the	   cell)	   and	   biological	   (physical	  
material	   that	  makes	  up	   the	  microorganism,	  plant	  or	  animal)	   resources	  and	   the	  
traditional	   knowledge	  developed	   to	  deal	  with	   such	   resources.70	  Taonga	  are	   the	  
products	   of	   mātauranga	   Māori	   and	   as	   such	   “embody	   key	   Māori	   cultural	  
attributes	   such	   as	  mana,	   tapu,	   and	  mauri.	  Many	   have	   been	  made	   under	   tapu,	  
fought	  over	   in	  battle,	  gifted	  to	  consolidate	   important	  alliances	  or	   relationships,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  See	  Wai	   262,	   2.314	   The	   Flora	   and	   Fauna	   and	   Cultural	   Intellectual	   Property	   Claim,	   Statement	   of	   Issues	  
(Waitangi	  Tribunal,	  Wellington,	  2006)	  at	  6.	  
70	  For	   further	   information	   see	   the	   Summary	   of	   the	   Report:	   Ko	   Aotearoa	   Tēnei:	   A	   Report	   into	   Claims	  




carved	   to	   represent	   ancestors,	   and	   so	   on.	  …	   the	   objects	   have	   a	  whakapapa	  of	  
their	   own	   that	   links	   them	   to	   the	   tribal	   ancestors	   who	   are	   depicted	   or	   who	  
created	   them”.71	  Some	   taonga	   are	   very	   ancient	   while	   some	   others	   are	   more	  
modern,	   depending	   on	   their	   evolution	   over	   time.	   They	   can	   be	   tangible	   or	  
intangible,	  or	  both	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Taonga	  works	  can	  also	  be	  variably	  sacred	  
and	   protected	   by	   different	   levels	   of	   secrecy.	   As	   it	   will	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   next	  
chapters,	   the	   more	   secret	   the	   knowledge	   safeguarded,	   the	   more	   difficult	   it	  
becomes	  to	  protect	  it.	  To	  be	  held	  in	  secrecy	  the	  knowledge	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  
old	  or	  intangible.	  It	  can	  be	  fairly	  new	  and	  inclusive	  of	  sacred	  cultural	  expressions	  
(taonga	  works).	  
Newly-­‐created	   artistic	   and	   cultural	   works	   or	   new	   knowledge	   associated	   to	  
taonga	   species	   are	  worthy	  of	   the	   same	   status	   as	   the	  ancient	  ones.	   The	  Report	  
explains	  that	  “while	  age	  can	  certainly	   intensify	  the	  mauri	  of	  an	  artwork,	  taonga	  
status	  depends	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  work	  embeds	  korero	  and	  invokes	  tribal	  
ancestors”. 72 	  However,	   contemporary	   art	   or	   knowledge,	   which	   has	   no	  
whakapapa,	   no	   korero	   and	   associated	   kaitiaki,	   is	   commonly	   addressed	   as	  
‘taonga-­‐derived’	   and	   falls	   into	   a	   completely	   different	   category	  with	   associated	  
rights	   and	  obligations.	  What	   taonga	   species	   and	  works	  have	   in	   common	   is	   the	  
kaitiakitanga	   system	  of	   guardianship	   that	   safeguard	   them.	  Kaitiakitanga	   is	   “the	  
obligation,	   arising	   from	   the	  kin	   relationship,	   to	  nurture	  or	   care	   for	  a	  person	  or	  
thing”.73 	  The	   perpetual	   kaitiaki	   relationship	   with	   taonga	   works	   and	   species,	  
mātauranga	  and	  all	  the	  treasures	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  guardians	  in	  most	  of	  
the	  world	  indigenous	  societies	  (see	  chapter	  2).	  Each	  taonga	  work	  has	  a	  kaitiaki,	  a	  
person	   or	   entity	   that,	   because	   of	   lineage	   and	   calling,	   has	   an	   obligation	   to	  
safeguard	   the	   taonga	   and	   the	   mātauranga	   that	   underlines	   it.	   “Kaitiaki	   can	   be	  
spiritual	   guardians	   existing	   in	   non-­‐human	   form.	   They	   can	   include	   particular	  
species	   that	   are	   said	   to	   care	   for	   a	   place	   or	   a	   community	   …	   Every	   forest	   and	  
swamp,	  every	  bay	  and	  reef,	  every	  tribe	  and	  village	  …	  anything	  of	  any	  importance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  See	  Ko	   Aotearoa	   Tēnei:	   A	   Report	   into	   Claims	   Concerning	   New	   Zealand	   Law	   and	   Policy	   Affecting	  Māori	  
Culture	  and	  Identity	  Vol	  2	  at	  504.	  
72	  At	  514.	  
73	  Summary	  of	  the	  Report:	  Ko	  Aotearoa	  Tēnei:	  A	  Report	  into	  Claims	  Concerning	  New	  Zealand	  Law	  and	  Policy	  




to	  all	  in	  tea	  o	  Māori	  has	  these	  spiritual	  kaitiaki”.74	  But	  people	  can	  also	  be	  kaitiaki	  






§ Develop	  and/or	  transmit	  
	  
Kaitiaki	   have	   the	   responsibility	   to	   protect	   the	   whakapapa75	  and	   korero	   of	   the	  
work	  from	  any	  form	  of	  misuse	  and	  illicit	  exploitation.	  Their	  duty	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  
safeguard	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  work	  but	  also	  the	  knowledge	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  work,	  
and	  pass	  it	  to	  future	  generation	  intact.	  Their	  role	  is	  not	  just	  about	  responsibility,	  
but	  it	  is	  rather	  a	  life	  mission	  in	  which	  the	  guardians	  are	  allocated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
their	   skills	   or	   genealogy	   and	   the	   customary	   laws	   of	   the	   community.	   As	   such,	  
kaitiaki	   are	   consequently	   entitled	   to	   “benefit	   of	   the	   cultural	   and	   spiritual	  
sustenance	   the	   taonga	   works	   provide	   to	   their	   community”. 76 	  During	   the	  
hearings,	  the	  claimants	  stressed	  the	  fact	  that	  not	  only	  taonga	  works	  had	  kaitiaki,	  
but	  most	  of	  the	  country’s	   indigenous	  species	  –	  if	  not	  all	  -­‐	  and	  healing	  remedies	  
and	   the	   knowledge	   associated	   with	   them	   were	   subjected	   to	   a	   system	   of	  
guardianship/kaitiakitanga.	   In	   this	   case,	   kaitiaki	   are	   considered	   those	   people	  
within	   the	   community	   that	   can	   feel	   the	   life	   force	   (mauri)	   that	   resides	   inside	  
objects	   and	   species	   and	   are	   able	   to	   communicate	  with	   it.	   This	  means	   that	   not	  
everybody	   can	   become	   a	   kaitiaki.	   Accordingly,	   the	   claimants	   argued	   that	   New	  
Zealand	  law	  ‘must’	  recognise	  the	  important	  relationship	  existing	  between	  kaitiaki	  
and	  taonga	  species	  and	  should	  be	  given	  decisive	  say	  over	  the	  commercialization	  
of	  taonga	  species	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  customary	  laws	  and	  values	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  Supra	  at	  22-­‐23.	  
75	  “Whakapapa	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  ‘genealogical	  descent	  of	  all	  living	  things	  from	  the	  gods	  to	  the	  present	  time.	  
Since	  all	  living	  things	  including	  rocks	  and	  mountains	  are	  believed	  to	  possess	  whakapapa,	  it	  is	  further	  defined	  
as	  "a	  basis	  for	  the	  organisation	  of	  knowledge	  in	  the	  respect	  of	  the	  creation	  and	  development	  of	  all	  things’,	  …	  
Hence,	  whakapapa	  also	  implies	  a	  deep	  connection	  to	  land	  and	  the	  roots	  of	  one’s	  ancestry.	  In	  order	  to	  trace	  
one’s	   whakapapa	   it	   is	   essential	   to	   identify	   the	   location	  where	   one’s	   ancestral	   heritage	   began;	   you	   can’t	  
trace	  it	  back	  any	  further.	  Whakapapa	  links	  all	  people	  back	  to	  the	  land	  and	  sea	  and	  sky	  and	  outer	  universe,	  
therefore,	   the	   obligations	   of	   whanaungatanga	   extend	   to	   the	   physical	   world	   and	   all	   being	   in	   it”	   see	   at	  
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whakapapa>	  last	  visited	  on	  18/02/2013.	  
76	  See	  Ko	   Aotearoa	   Tēnei:	   A	   Report	   into	   Claims	   Concerning	   New	   Zealand	   Law	   and	   Policy	   Affecting	  Māori	  




the	  community.	  In	  the	  case	  that	  commercialization	  would	  be	  allowed	  by	  kaitiaki	  
(by	   prior-­‐informed	   consent	   system),	   then	   their	   participation	   in	   the	   benefit	  
sharing	  should	  be	  guaranteed.	   In	  many	  cases	   the	  response	  brought	   forward	  by	  
the	  Crown	  and	  National	   Institutions	  as	  Museums,	  Libraries	  and	  Archives	   is	   that	  
taonga	  works	  and	  knowledge	  associated	  with	  taonga	  is	  well	  kept	  and	  preserved	  
and	  Māori	  people	  should	  be	  happy	  that	  institutions	  are	  preserving	  their	  heritage	  
for	   future	  generations.	  However,	  what	  the	  argument	   is	  missing	   is	   that	  not	  only	  
much	  of	  that	  taonga	  was	  not	  supposed	  to	  ‘widely’	  circulate,	  but	  once	  locked	  into	  
institutions,	   they	   might	   not	   be	   looked	   after	   spiritually	   as	   they	   would	   if	   they	  
remained	   in	   the	   custody	  of	   kaitiaki.	   Indeed,	   not	   only	   do	   such	   institutions	  have	  
few	   Māori	   staff	   that	   can	   look	   after	   the	   taonga,	   but	   it	   is	   often	   not	   clear	   or	  
guaranteed	  that	   they	  possess	  sufficient	  knowledge	  of	  Māori	  protocols	  over	   the	  
sacred	  knowledge	  associated	  with	  the	  taonga.77	  
As	   for	  many	  of	   indigenous	  peoples’	   claims,	   their	   requests	   often	   clash	  with	   the	  
Western	   understanding	   of	   what	   constitutes	   values,	   ethics	   and	   morality.	   In	  
Western	   societies,	   the	   universe	   is	   not	   explained	   by	   spiritual	   forces	   translated	  
into	  words,	  symbols,	  knowledge	  and	  traditions.	  Science78	  examines	  and	  explains	  
the	   universe	   and	   its	   phenomena.	  What	   eludes	   science	   is	   consequently	   denied.	  
The	  scientific	  method	   is	  empirical;	   in	  other	  words,	   it	  heavily	   relies	  on	  evidence	  
that	  can	  be	  ‘directly	  observed	  and	  sensed’.79	  Science	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  non-­‐
physical	  forces,	  and	  carefully	  avoids	  any	  contact	  with	  knowledge	  that	  cannot	  be	  
directly	   tested.	   The	   fact	   that	   Western	   societies	   decided	   to	   limit	   their	  
understanding	  of	  life	  to	  science,	  while	  explaining	  the	  non-­‐physical	  world	  through	  
religion,	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  such	  a	  decision	   is	  correct	  and	   legitimate.	  The	   fact	  
that	  all	   indigenous	  societies	  of	  the	  world	  traditionally	  recognise	  a	  life	  force	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  	   See	  Ko	  Aotearoa	  Tēnei:	  A	  Report	   into	  Claims	  Concerning	  New	  Zealand	   Law	  and	  Policy	  Affecting	  Māori	  
Culture	  and	  Identity,	  Vol	  2	  at	  Chapter	  6.	  
78	  “The	   word	   science	   comes	   from	   the	   Latin	   ‘scientia’,	   meaning	   knowledge.	   How	   do	   we	   define	   science?	  
According	  to	  Webster's	  New	  Collegiate	  Dictionary,	  the	  definition	  of	  science	  is	  ‘knowledge	  attained	  through	  
study	  or	  practice’,	  or	  ‘knowledge	  covering	  general	  truths	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  general	  laws,	  esp.	  as	  obtained	  
and	   tested	   through	   scientific	   method	   [and]	   concerned	   with	   the	   physical	   world’.	   ‘What	   does	   that	   really	  
mean?	   Science	   refers	   to	   a	   system	   of	   acquiring	   knowledge.	   This	   system	   uses	   observation	   and	  
experimentation	  to	  describe	  and	  explain	  natural	  phenomena.	  The	  term	  science	  also	  refers	  to	  the	  organized	  
body	  of	  knowledge	  people	  have	  gained	  using	  that	  system.	  Less	  formally,	  the	  word	  science	  often	  describes	  
any	   systematic	   field	   of	   study	   or	   the	   knowledge	   gained	   from	   it’”	   see	   at	  
<www.sciencemadesimple.com/science-­‐definition.html>	  last	  visited	  on	  15/07/2015	  
79	  For	   further	   information	   see	   the	   Summary	   of	   the	   Report:	   Ko	   Aotearoa	   Tēnei:	   A	   Report	   into	   Claims	  




permeates	  everything,	  is	  living	  proof	  that	  at	  some	  stage,	  societies	  were	  united	  in	  
a	  common	  belief	  that	  everything	  is	  imbued	  with	  spiritual	  force	  and	  everything	  is	  
the	  result	  of	  forces	  that	  transcend	  any	  empirical	  observation	  or	  testing.	  The	  fact	  
that	  some	  societies	  evolved	  outside	  this	  collective	  unconscious	  belief,	  does	  not	  
delegitimize	   their	   very	   existences	   and	   reasons	   for	   existing.	   Compared	   to	   the	  
history	  of	  the	  world,	  science	  is,	  in	  fact,	  a	  very	  late	  acquisition.	  Ancient	  cultures	  of	  
the	   world	   lived	   their	   lives	   holistically,	   following	   holistic	   values	   and	   laws	   (see	  
Chapters	  2,	  3,	  4	  and	  5).	  
Given	  the	  importance	  of	  protecting	  the	  life	  force	  and	  its	  de-­‐codified	  symbolism,	  
kaitiaki	  should	  be	  primarily	  involved	  in	  the	  management	  of	  the	  taonga	  species	  as	  
custodians	   of	   the	   spiritual	   values	   encoded	   within	   the	   species	   itself	   and	   its	  
utilization.	  As	  such,	  according	  to	  Wai	  262	  claimants,	  bio-­‐prospectors	  “should	  not	  
use	   the	  mātauranga	  Māori	  associated	  with	   taonga	  species	  without	   the	  consent	  
of	  the	  kaitiaki”,80	  and	  use	  the	  species	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  values	  
of	  the	  kaitiaki	  and	  the	  customary	  laws	  of	  the	  community.	  Consequently,	  kaitiaki	  
still	  retain	  their	  on-­‐going	  cultural	  relationship	  with	  their	  taonga	  regardless	  of	  the	  
circumstances	  of	   the	  alienation	  of	   the	   taonga.	  Kaitiaki	   reserve	  also	   the	   right	  of	  
veto	   over	   the	   usage	   of	   the	   species	   in	   order	   to	   protect	   the	   integrity	   of	   such	  
relationship	  and	  the	  spiritual	  values	  that	  are	  encoded	   in	  the	  species	  and	   in	   the	  
relationship	   itself.	   The	  argument	   claimants	  used	   to	   justify	   this	   assertion	   is	   that	  
the	  “kaitiaki	   relationship	  with	  taonga	  species	   is	  so	  all-­‐encompassing	   it	  amounts	  
to	   ownership	   of	   the	   genetic	   resources	   of	   that	   species”.81	  On	   the	   same	   line,	  
however,	  the	  Crown	  and	  representatives	  of	  New	  Zealand	  agencies	  replied	  that	  it	  
would	   be	   risky	   to	   grant	   exclusive	   rights	   to	   Māori	   people	   and	   kaitiaki.	   	   The	  
granting	  of	  exclusive	   rights	  would,	   in	   fact,	   impede	  the	  development	  of	  science,	  
economy	  and	  knowledge	   in	   general.	   The	  Crown	  also	   responded	   that	   life	   forms	  
are	  the	  patrimony	  of	  humanity	  and	  cannot	  belong	  to	  anyone.	  Article	  27.3	  (b)	  of	  
the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  states	  that	  “members	  may	  also	  exclude	  from	  patentability	  -­‐	  
plants	   and	   animals	   other	   than	   micro-­‐organisms,	   and	   essentially	   biological	  
processes	  for	  the	  production	  of	  plants	  or	  animals	  other	  than	  non-­‐biological	  and	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microbiological	  processes.	  However,	  members	  shall	  provide	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  
plant	  varieties	  either	  by	  patents	  or	  by	  an	  effective	  sui	  generis	  system	  or	  by	  any	  
combination	   thereof,	   which	   seems	   to	   indicate	   that	   life	   forms	   cannot	   be	  
subjected	   to	   property	   rights,	   because	   they	   represent	   the	   common	   heritage	   of	  
mankind	   and	   as	   such	   anyone	   can	  use	   them	  without	   exclusive	   rights.	  However,	  
what	   can	   be	   safeguarded	   is	   the	   knowledge	   (spiritual	   and	   scientific)	   associated	  
with	   the	   life	   form.	   Articles	   15	   and	   8(j)82	  of	   the	   CBD	   urges	   states	   to	   make	   a	  
workable	  distinction	  between	  the	  “bare	  genetic	  resources”83	  and	  any	  traditional	  
knowledge	  associated	   to	   the	   resource,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   guardians	  who	  make	   the	  
survival	   of	   the	   knowledge	   possible.	   On	   this	   regard,	   the	   Crown	   explained	   that	  
while	   it	   is	   legitimate	   to	   respect	   the	   knowledge	   and	   the	   relationship	   between	  
kaitiaki	   and	   the	   resources	   and	   everything	   it	   includes,	   there	   is	   no	   reasonable	  
justification	  to	  grant	  direct	  exclusive	  rights	  over	  the	  resource	  itself.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	  Wai	  262	  claimants	  argued	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  resources	  and	  
the	  kaitiaki	   is	   traditionally	  so	   ‘special’	  and	  exclusive	   that	   it	  extends	   to	  both	   the	  
genetic	   and	   biological	   resources	   of	   the	   taonga	   species.	   Consequently,	   kaitiaki	  
could	   claim	   property	   rights	   over	   the	   resources	   inhabiting	   the	   territories	   they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  CBD	   Article	   8	   (j)	   (j)	   Subject	   to	   its	   national	   legislation,	   respect,	   preserve	   and	   maintain	   knowledge,	  
innovations	  and	  practices	  of	  indigenous	  and	  local	  communities	  embodying	  traditional	  lifestyles	  relevant	  for	  
the	  conservation	  and	   sustainable	  use	  of	  biological	  diversity	  and	  promote	   their	  wider	  application	  with	   the	  
approval	  and	  involvement	  of	  the	  holders	  of	  such	  knowledge,	  innovations	  and	  practices	  and	  encourage	  the	  
equitable	   sharing	   of	   the	   benefits	   arising	   from	   the	   utilization	   of	   such	   knowledge,	   innovations	   and	  
practices:(k)	  Develop	  or	  maintain	  necessary	  legislation	  and/or	  other	  regulatory	  provisions	  for	  the	  protection	  
of	   threatened	   species	   and	   populations:	   (1)	  Where	   a	   significant	   adverse	   effect	   on	   biological	   diversity	   has	  
been	   determined	   pursuant	   to	   Article	   7,	   regulate	   or	   manage	   the	   relevant	   processes	   and	   categories	   of	  
activities:	   and	   (m)	   Cooperate	   in	   providing	   financial	   and	  other	   support	   for	   in-­‐situ	   conservation	  outlined	   in	  
subparagraphs(a)to	  (1)above,	  particularly	  to	  developing	  countries.	  
Article	   15	   -­‐	   Access	   to	  Genetic	   Resources	   -­‐	  1.	   Recognizing	   the	   sovereign	   rights	   of	   States	   over	   their	   natural	  
resources,	  the	  authority	  to	  determine	  access	  to	  genetic	  resources	  rests	  with	  the	  national	  governments	  and	  
is	  subject	  to	  national	  legislation.2.	  Each	  Contracting	  Party	  shall	  endeavour	  to	  create	  renditions	  to	  facilitate	  
access	  to	  genetic	  resources	  for	  environmentally	  sound	  uses	  by	  other	  Contracting	  Parties	  and	  not	  to	  impose	  
restrictions	  that	  run	  counter	  to	  the	  objectives	  of	  this	  Convention.	  3.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  Convention,	  the	  
genetic	  resources	  being	  provided	  by	  a	  Contracting	  Party,	  as	  referred	  to	  in	  this	  Article	  and	  Articles	  16	  and	  19,	  
are	  only	  those	  that	  are	  provided	  by	  Contracting	  Parties	  that	  are	  countries	  of	  origin	  of	  such	  resources	  or	  by	  
the	  Parties	  that	  have	  acquired	  the	  genetic	  resources	  in	  accordance	  with	  this	  Convention.	  4.	  Access,	  where	  
granted,	  shall	  be	  on	  mutually	  agreed	  terms	  and	  subject	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  this	  Article.	  5.	  Access	  to	  genetic	  
resources	   shall	   be	   subject	   to	   prior	   informed	   consent	   of	   the	   Contracting	   Party	   providing	   such	   resources,	  
unless	  otherwise	  determined	  by	  that	  Party.	  6.	  Each	  Contracting	  Party	  shall	  endeavour	  to	  develop	  and	  carry	  
out	   scientific	   research	   based	   on	   genetic	   resources	   provided	   by	   other	   Contracting	   Parties	   with	   the	   full	  
participation	   of,	   and	   where	   possible	   in.	   such	   Contracting	   Parties.	   7.	   Each	   Contracting	   Party	   shall	   take	  
legislative,	  administrative	  or	  policy	  measures,	  as	  appropriate,	  and	  in	  accordance	  with	  Articles	  16	  and	  19	  and,	  
where	  necessary,	  through	  the	  financial	  mechanism	  established	  by	  Articles	  20	  and	  21	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  sharing	  
in	   a	   fair	   and	   equitable	   way	   the	   results	   of	   research	   and	   development	   and	   the	   benefits	   arising	   from	   the	  
commercial	  and	  other	  utilization	  of	  genetic	  resources	  with	  the	  Contracting	  Party	  providing	  such	  resources.	  
Such	  sharing	  shall	  be	  upon	  mutually	  agreed	  terms.	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traditionally	  occupied.	  Any	  scientific	  manipulation	  of	  the	  resource	  would	  infringe	  
the	   spiritual	   integrity	   of	   the	   species	   and	   corrupt	   the	   relationship	   that	   kaitiaki	  
traditionally	   had	   with	   it.	   Having	   said	   this,	   whether	   kaitiaki	   can	   claim	   property	  
rights	  over	  the	  species	  is	  another	  story.	  Common	  law	  and	  common-­‐law-­‐derived	  
systems	  do	  not	  recognise	  information	  as	  property.	  As	  it	  will	  be	  explained	  in	  more	  
detail	   in	   the	   last	   and	   concluding	   chapter,	   information,	   being	   it	   tangible,	  
intangible	  or	  secret	  does	  not	  possess	  the	  same	  property	  rights	  granted	  to	  private	  
property.	  Consequently,	  kaitiaki	  do	  not	  own	  what	  they	  protect.	  Their	  role	  implies	  
a	   duty	   of	   care	   that	   includes	   rights	   and	   obligations	   in	   relation	   to	   their	   taonga	  
works,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  property	  rights	  implying	  ownership.	  Kaitiaki	  themselves	  
do	  not	  attach	  property	  rights	  to	  their	  role	  because	  it	  is	  not	  included	  within	  their	  
system	  of	  customary	   laws.	  However,	  according	   to	   the	  Report,	   the	   longstanding	  
and	   special	   associations	   with	   taonga	   works	   give	   kaitiaki	   rights	   that	   arise	   from	  
their	   perpetual	   relationship.	   As	   such,	   the	   main	   concern	   of	   the	   claimants	   was	  
whether	   the	   IP	   system	   in	   Aotearoa-­‐New	   Zealand	   should	   recognise	   and	  
incorporate	  kaitiakitanga	  into	  the	  national	  IP	  system	  (in	  relation	  to	  taonga	  works	  
and	   mātauranga	   Māori)	   especially	   in	   light	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   IP	   laws	   are	   not	  
designed	   to	   recognise	   and	  protect	   the	   ‘perpetual’	   relationship	  of	   kaitiaki.	   They	  
asserted	  that	  the	  New	  Zealand	  IP	  system	  should	  reasonably	  accommodate	  Māori	  
interests	  over	  their	  resources	  and	  associated	  knowledge.	  
As	   explained	   in	  more	  detail	   in	   the	  next	   chapters,	   from	   their	   creation,	   IP	   rights	  
have	   been	   designed	   to	   reward	   the	   creativity	   translated	   into	   a	   product	   of	   the	  
mind	   in	   the	   fields	   of	   art,	   technology	   or	   science	   with	   exclusive	   rights	   over	   the	  
production	   for	   a	   set	   period	   of	   time.	   The	   idea	   was	   to	   reward	   creators	   and	  
encourage	  them	  to	  share	  their	  product	  with	  the	  world	  at	   large	  for	  a	  temporary	  
commercial	  benefit	  after	  which	  everyone	  could	  use	  the	  creation	  freely.	  IP	  rights	  
are	  never	  absolute,	  but	  constantly	  stretched	  between	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  creator	  
in	  receiving	  a	  fair	  reward	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  his/her	  mind,	  and	  the	  wider	  interest	  
of	  the	  community	  who	  will	  benefit	  from	  the	  advancement	  of	  their	  knowledge.	  In	  
this	   regard,	   property	   focuses	   on	   the	   rights	   of	   the	   owners	   within	   the	   wider	  




kinship”,84	  and	  how	  this	  obligations	  are	  performed	  in	  accordance	  with	  customary	  
laws	  of	  the	  community.	  The	  fundamental	  difference	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  kaitiaki,	  
like	  most	  of	  the	  guardians	  of	  knowledge	  present	  in	  indigenous	  communities,	  do	  
not	  own	   the	  knowledge	  but	  perform	  acts	   that	   can	  be	   fundamentally	   similar	   to	  
those	   intrinsically	   attached	   to	   the	   creator’s	   rights:	   protect,	   preserve,	   control,	  
regulate,	  use,	  develop	  and/or	  transmit.	  The	  only	  aspects	  that	  are	  fundamentally	  
different	   between	   the	   creator’s	   rights	   and	   kaitiakitanga	   are	   those	   involving	  
economic	  rights.	  In	  fact,	  while	  the	  major	  justification	  for	  IP	  law	  is	  fundamentally	  
economic,	   kaitiakitanga	   duties	   and	   obligations	   do	   not	   include	   a	   system	   of	  
incentive	   and	   rewards	   and	   economic	   exploitation,	   but	   rather	   attaches	   moral	  
values	  and	  spiritual	  awareness	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  knowledge	  safeguarded.	  As	  such,	  
kaitiakitanga	  values	  and	  duties	  have	  no	  expiring	  date.	  They	  exist	  since	  and	  for	  as	  
long	   as	   the	   knowledge	   exists.	   The	   other	   key	   difference	   is	   that	   the	   kaitiaki	  
obligation	   is	  permanent	  and	  passed	  down	  to	  future	  generations	  while	  creators’	  
personal	   rights	   over	   their	   works	   expire	   after	   a	   set	   time.	   Another	   important	  
aspect	   is	   that	   the	   ‘community’	   benefits	   from	   the	  duties	   and	  obligations	   of	   the	  
kaitiaki	   who	   protect	   the	   knowledge.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   preservation	   of	   the	  
knowledge	  resides	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   is	  protected	   in	   the	  custody	  of	   the	  kaitiaki,	  
and	  not	  in	  its	  wider	  circulation.	  Only	  kaitiaki’s	  management	  over	  the	  knowledge	  
and	  its	  usage	  can	  guarantee	  the	  respect	  of	  the	  spiritual	  values	  intrinsic	  within	  the	  
knowledge.	   In	   the	   Māori	   world,	   nothing	   is	   fundamentally	   distinct	   from	   the	  
creation	   process,	   and	   consequently	   nothing	   exists	  without	   embodying	   spiritual	  
values	  and	  metaphorical	  language	  whose	  interpretation	  is	  not	  necessarily	  known	  
by	  most	   but	   rather	   by	   few.85	  Given	   the	   continuity	   of	  Māori	   traditions,	   kaitiaki	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  Summary	  of	  the	  Report:	  Ko	  Aotearoa	  Tēnei:	  A	  Report	  into	  Claims	  Concerning	  New	  Zealand	  Law	  and	  Policy	  
Affecting	  Māori	  Culture	  and	  Identity	  Vol	  1	  at	  46.	  
85	  “Māori	   culture	   as	   we	   know	   it	   today	   is	   a	   creation	   of	   its	   environment	   …	   The	   elements	   that	   make	   it	  
distinctive	  in	  the	  world	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  relationship	  kaitiaki	  [guardians]	  built	  up	  with	  the	  land,	  water,	  
flora,	  and	  fauna	  of	  this	  place.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  mauri,	  or	  inner	  well-­‐being	  of	  land	  and	  water	  spaces,	  and	  the	  
whakapapa	  [genealogy]	  of	  flora	  and	  fauna	  do	  not	  just	  serve	  to	  articulate	  the	  human	  relationships	  with	  these	  
things;	  they	  are	  building	  blocks	  of	  an	  entire	  world	  view	  and	  of	  Māori	  identity	  itself.	  They	  play	  a	  similar	  role	  
to	  the	  core	  definers	  of	  Western	  culture	  such	  as	  the	  arts,	  democracy,	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  and	  so	  forth.	  But	  while	  
the	  more	  human-­‐centred	  Western	  culture	  tends	  to	  define	  itself	  by	  reference	  to	  its	  own	  thought	  and	  labour,	  
Māori	   culture	   relies	   on	   pre-­‐existing,	   pre-­‐human	   definers	   –	  mountains,	   rivers,	   plants,	   animals,	   and	   so	   on.	  
Māori	  culture	  seeks	  to	  reflect	  rather	  than	  dominate	  its	  surroundings.	  That	  is	  why	  the	  relationship	  between	  
humans	   and	   taonga	   species	   is	   a	   definer	   of	   Māori	   culture	   itself.	   It	   is	   a	   preoccupation	   of	   the	   body	   of	  
distinctive	   Māori	   knowledge	   that	   today	   we	   call	   mātauranga	   Māori”	   see	   Summary	   of	   the	   Report:	   Ko	  
Aotearoa	  Tēnei:	  A	  Report	  into	  Claims	  Concerning	  New	  Zealand	  Law	  and	  Policy	  Affecting	  Māori	  Culture	  and	  




have	  a	  perpetual	   relationship	  with	   taonga	  works.	   Their	   responsibilities	   include,	  
but	   are	   not	   limited	   to,	   the	   preservation	   of	   the	   traditions	   as	   they	   have	   been	  
transmitted	   since	   creation.	   This	   transmission	   is	  mostly	   oral	   and	   of	   old	   lineage.	  
Although	   taonga	  works	  might	  differ	  one	   from	  another,	   they	  are	  all	  products	  of	  
mātauranga	  Māori,	  and	  are	  all	   intellectual	  creations	  of	  Māori	  peoples,	  whether	  
dead	   or	   alive.	   Moreover,	   all	   taonga	   works	   and	   their	   spiritual	   traditions	   have	  
kaitiaki,	   which	  means	   that	   there	   are	   living	   individuals	   or	   groups	   of	   individuals	  
that	  have	  a	  duty	  of	  care	  over	  the	  spirituality	  and	  the	  works	   in	  accordance	  with	  
tikanga	  Māori.	  According	  to	  the	  Wai	  262	  Report,	  taonga	  works	  have	  kaitiaki	  for	  
very	  important	  reasons:	  86	  	  	  
	  
…	  they	  have	  whakapapa	  –	  the	  quintessential	  element	  of	  anything	  important	  in	  te	  
ao	  Māori.	  By	   this	  we	  mean	  taonga	  works	  bring	  ancestors	   to	   life.	  The	  ancestors	  
may	  be	   the	   composers	   or	   artists	  who	   created	   the	  works	   or,	  more	   usually,	   the	  
ancestors	   will	   be	   embedded	   in	   some	   way	   in	   the	   work.	   The	   second	   reason	   is	  
these	  ancestors	  are	  brought	  to	  life	  in	  a	  context	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  taonga	  work	  tells	  an	  
important	   story	   or	   teaches	   an	   important	   lesson,	   using	   the	   ancestor	   as	   its	  
fulcrum.	  …	  It	   is	  these	  characteristics	  that	  cause	  Māori	  to	  say	  that	  taonga	  works	  
have	  mauri	  -­‐	  they	  live	  –	  and	  that	  the	  primary	  obligation	  of	  kaitiaki	   is	  to	  protect	  
the	  mauri	  of	  the	  taonga	  work.	  	  
	  
The	   fact	   that	  Māori	   do	   not	   often	   have	   control	   over	   their	   taonga	   and	   the	  New	  
Zealand	   IP	   laws	   do	   not	   enforce	   any	   protection	   over	   Māori	   TK	   and	   cultural	  
expression	  can	  greatly	  harm	  the	  spiritual	  nature	  of	  taonga	  works	  and,	  over	  time,	  
corrupt	   their	   transmission.	   According	   to	   Māori’s	   culture	   and	   mythology	   “the	  
greater	   the	   antiquity,	   the	   greater	   the	  mana	  of	   the	   taonga	  work	   because	   of	   its	  
closer	  connection	  in	  time	  to	  the	  ancestors	  who	  provide	  the	  community	  with	   its	  
identity,	  and	  because	  of	  the	  number	  of	  generations	  who	  will	  have	  cared	  for	  and	  
revered	   it”. 87 	  Conversely,	   as	   explained	   previously,	   taonga	   works	   are	   not	  
necessarily	   ancient,	   but	   are	   created	   continuously	   as	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   the	  
culture	  of	  Māori	  people	  and	  traditions.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  IP	  laws,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Supra	  at	  81.	  




while	   it	   is	  easy	   to	  grant	  protection	   to	  newly	  created	   taonga	  works	   (though	   the	  
protection	   will	   be	   still	   limited	   in	   time),	   it	   might	   not	   be	   as	   easy	   to	   guarantee	  
protection	  to	   the	  mana	  underlying	  the	  work	  and	  everything	  else	   that	   is	  part	  of	  
the	   intangible	   of	   the	   expression	   (eg	   sacred	   information).	   On	   the	   same	   line,	   it	  
might	  also	  be	  impossible	  to	  grant	  any	  right	  to	  the	  kaitiaki	  who	  safeguarded	  and	  
transmitted	   the	  mana	   intrinsic	   in	   the	  work	  as	  conceived	  by	  Māori	  people	  since	  
time	  immemorial.	  Their	  role	  is	  to	  protect	  the	  intrinsic	  spiritual	  value	  of	  the	  work	  
from	   misuse.	   In	   theory,	   new	   taonga	   works	   can	   be	   created	   only	   under	   the	  
approval	  and	  supervision	  of	  kaitiaki	  who,	  not	  only	  protect	  the	  physical	   integrity	  
of	   the	  work,	  but	  pass	  the	  work,	   the	  responsibility	  and	  the	  knowledge	  to	   future	  
generations.	   Obviously,	   the	   value	   of	   such	   a	   line	   of	   transmission	   rests	   in	   the	  
incorruption	  of	   its	   spiritual	   traditions	   as	   known	  and	   safeguarded	  by	   kaitiaki.	   In	  
order	  to	  do	  that,	  Māori	  people	  need	  to	  have	  the	  full	  control	  over	  their	  traditions	  
and	  culture.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  object	  of	  the	  Wai	  262	  claim	  was	  to	  “acknowledge,	  
respect	  and	  restore	  the	  tino	  rangatiratanga	  and	  mauri	  or	  life	  force	  embodied	  in	  
the	  laws,	  customs	  and	  values	  of	  the	  claimants	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  indigenous	  flora	  
and	   fauna	  me	  o	   rātou	   taonga	   katoa”	   (Claim	   1.1(g)	   para	   2.8)	   and	   all	   the	   rights	  
associated	  to	  that.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  claimants	  stressed	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Crown	  
had	   not	   respected	   Māori	   rights	   of	   manaakitanga,	   kaitiakitanga	   and	   te	   tino	  
rangatiratanga,	   and	   failed	   to	   “provide	   for	   and	   protect	   the	   existing	   systems	   of	  
mātauranga	   Māori	   exercised	   by	   Ngāti	   Kuri,	   Te	   Rarawa	   and	   Ngāti	   Wai”. 88	  
According	   to	   the	   claimants,	   in	   1840	   Ngāti	   Kahungunu	   held	   collectively	   and	  
individually	  a	  wide	  body	  of	  knowledge	  that	  included	  “indigenous	  flora	  and	  fauna,	  
arts,	   crafts,	   history,	   waiata,	   language	   and	   all	   other	   cultural	   property	   and	  
traditions”89 	  of	   which	   Ngāti	   Kahungunu	   were	   kaitiaki.	   The	   Ngāti	   Kahungunu	  
asserted	  that	  the	  Crown	  had	  violated	  their	  right	  to	  protect,	  transmit	  and	  benefit	  
from	  the	  development	  of	  their	  cultural	  knowledge	  (Claim	  1.1(d)	  paras	  9-­‐10).	  
The	   same	   allegation	   was	   formally	   reported	   by	   the	  Ngāti	   Koata	  Ngāti	   Wai,	   Te	  
Rarawa	   and	   Ngāti	   Kuri	   communities.	   In	   other	   words,	   what	   Māori	   people	  
suggested	   in	   their	   totality	   or	   among	   specific	   communities	   is	   that,	   since	   the	  
signing	   of	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Waitangi,	   the	   Crown	   has	   failed	   to	   recognise	   their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  See	  Wai	  262	  -­‐	  Draft	  Statement	  of	  Issues	  (December	  2005)	  at	  33.	  




fundamental	  right	  to	  culture	  as	  stated	  in	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Waitangi	  (Art	  2)	  as	  well	  as	  
in	   several	   other	   international	   instruments	   of	   which	   Aotearoa/New	   Zealand	   is	  
party.	  
	  
7.5	  –	  The	  Response	  of	  the	  Crown	  and	  the	  Recommendations	  of	  the	  Waitangi	  
Tribunal	  
	  
The	  Crown	  responded	  to	  the	  allegations	  presented	  by	  the	  claimants	  of	  Wai	  262	  
by	   reminding	   the	   Tribunal	   that	   tino	   rangatiratanga	   cannot	   apply	   to	   general	  
circumstances,	  such	  as	  oral	  traditions	  and	  traditional	  management	  of	  resources	  
and	  taonga	  species,	  and	  Māori	  people	  are	  entitled	  to	  tino	  rangatirantanga	  over	  
property	   and	   resources	   controlled	   and	  owned	  by	   them.	  One	  of	   the	   arguments	  
used	  by	   the	  Crown	  was	   that	   the	   “promise	  of	   tino	   rangatiratanga”	   contained	   in	  
Art	   2	   of	   the	   Treaty	   did	   not	   de	   facto	   include	   and	   guarantee	   property	   and/or	  
proprietary	  rights	  and/or	  interests	  of	  a	  kind	  that	  was	  not	  known	  to,	  recognized,	  
or	  capable	  of	  protection	  by	  English	   law	  in	  1840	  (Paper	  2.256:	  42).	  The	  fact	  that	  
Māori	  people	  had	  customary	   laws	  of	   long	  lineage	  that	  actually	  safeguarded	  the	  
transmission	  and	  management	  of	  tino	  rangatiratanga	  and	  everything	  included	  by	  
it,	  was	   regarded	  by	   the	  Crown	  as	   inconsequential.	   Indeed,	   as	   reminded	  by	   the	  
Crown,	   the	  English	   law	   in	  1840	  did	  not	  generally	   recognize	  private	  property	  or	  
proprietary	  rights	  in:	  
	  
(a)	   flora	   (except	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   such	   rights	   arose	   as	   an	   incident	   of	   the	  
ownership	  of	   the	   land	  upon	  which	   the	   flora	  grew)	  or	   in	  undomesticated	   fauna	  
(SOR:	  43.1);	  
(b)	  landscapes	  and	  scenery	  per	  se	  (SOR:	  43.2.1);	  
(c)	  folklore,	  oral	  history	  and	  oral	  traditions	  (SOR:	  43.2.2);	  
(d)	  information	  per	  se	  (SOR:	  43.2.3);	  
(e)	  language	  per	  se	  (SOR:	  43.2.4);	  
(f)	  the	  human	  form	  (whether	  specific	  or	  general)	  (SOR:	  43.2.5);	  and	  
(g)	  human	  or	  animal	  tissue,	  genes	  or	  DNA	  (SOR:	  43.2.6).90	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




In	  other	  words,	   the	  fact	  that	  English	   law	  did	  not	   include	  these	  forms	  of	  private	  
property	   defeats	   the	   attempts	   of	   the	   Treaty	   to	   guarantee	   Māori	   tino	  
rangatiratanga,	  but	   it	  does	  not	   seem	  to	  defeat	   the	  possessions	   that	   the	  Crown	  
acquired	  with	   the	  Treaty.	  This	  means	   that	  even	  though	  English	   law	  at	   the	   time	  
had	  not	   developed	   to	   include	   these	   categories	   of	   private	   intellectual	   property,	  
the	  fact	  that	  Māori	  people	  had	  developed	  a	  whole	  sets	  of	  rules	  and	  obligations	  
protecting	  their	  traditions	  was	  still	  regarded	  as	  inconsequential	  even	  if	  no	  other	  
law	  existed	  to	  counterbalance	  or	  defeat	  the	  complexity	  of	  Māori	  customary	  laws,	  
including	   those	   regulating	   intellectual	   property	   and	   kaitiakitanga,	   created	   by	  
Māori	  people.	  It	  seems	  that	  double	  standards	  consistently	  determine	  indigenous	  
peoples’	   destinies	   all	   over	   the	  world.	   So,	   if	  Māori	   people	   are	   entitled	   to	   “tino	  
rangatiratanga	   over	   property	   and	   resources	   controlled	   and	   owned	   by	   them”,	  
what	   is	   the	   participation	   of	   kaitiaki	   themselves	   in	   the	   exploitation	   (and	   not	  
preservation)91 	  of	   taonga	   works	   and	   mātauranga	   Māori?	   What	   are	   kaitiaki’s	  
property	   rights	   over	   taonga	   works	   and	   mātauranga	   Māori	   –	   if	   any?	   Does	  
perpetual	  custody	  guarantee	  property	  rights	  over	  taonga	  works	  and	  mātauranga	  
Māori?	  Can	  exclusive	  control	  over	  knowledge	  be	  considered	  a	  form	  of	  property?	  
Does	   the	   right	   to	   traditionally-­‐owned	  or	   controlled	   territories	  extend	   to	  all	   the	  
resources	   included	   within	   the	   borders	   of	   the	   territories?	   As	   shown	   in	   the	  
previous	   pages,	   the	   perpetual	   relationship	   of	   kaitiaki	   with	   taonga	   works	   gives	  
rise	  to	  rights	  and	  obligations	  which	  do	  not	  fall	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  property	  rights	  
as	  defined	  by	  Western	  common	  law,	  but	  give	  them	  authority	  in	  determining	  the	  
destiny	  of	  Māori	  traditions	  as	  stated	  in	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Waitangi.92	  Whether	  kaitiaki	  
authority	   is	   respected,	   is	   another	   story.	   The	   Crown	   argued	   that	   New	   Zealand	  
current	   IP	   laws	   accommodated	  Māori	   interests	   ‘sufficiently’,	   and	   that	   creating	  
laws	  that	  would	  give	  exclusive	  rights	  to	  Māori	  people	  would	  limit	  innovation	  and	  
“deprive	  others	  of	  access	  to	  the	  knowledge	  and	  ideas	  which	  underpin	  or	  inspire	  
the	   creation	   of	   new	   works”.93	  The	   argument	   brought	   forward	   by	   the	   Crown	  
seems	  to	  be	  slightly	  discriminatory.	  In	  other	  words,	  while	  in	  Western	  societies	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  The	  report	  speaks	  of	  exploitation	  and	  not	  preservation	  of	  Maori	  TK	  and	  TCEs.	  
92	  Article	   2	   of	   the	  Māori	   verion	   of	   the	   Treaty	   states	   that:	  …	   The	  Queen	  of	   England	   agrees	   to	   protect	   the	  
chiefs,	   the	   sub	   tribes	  and	  all	   the	  people	  of	  New	  Zealand	   in	   the	  unqualified	  exercise	  of	   their	   chieftainship	  
over	  their	  lands,	  villages	  and	  all	  their	  treasures.	  
93	  Summary	  of	  the	  Report:	  Ko	  Aotearoa	  Tēnei:	  A	  Report	  into	  Claims	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  Law	  and	  Policy	  




creator/inventor	   has	   the	   option	   to	   keep	   his/her	   work/invention	   for	  
himself/herself	  or	   to	  bring	   it	   to	   the	  public	  making	  a	  profit	  out	  of	   it,	   indigenous	  
peoples	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  the	  same	  option.	  Their	  knowledge	  is	  valuable	  and	  it	  
should	  enter	  the	  public	  domain	  so	  that	  everyone	  could	  benefit	  from	  it	  (especially	  
national	   and	   international	   multinationals).	   In	   other	   words,	   centuries	   of	  
customary	  laws	  and	  perpetual	  control	  over	  the	  knowledge	  by	  kaitiaki	  counts	  for	  
nothing.	  The	  Crown	  also	  stressed	  that	  the	  membership	  of	  Aotearoa-­‐New	  Zealand	  
in	   important	   international	   agreements,	   such	   as	   the	  World	   Trade	   Organization	  
and	   the	   Convention	   on	   Biological	   Diversity,	   sometimes	   trumps	   the	   national	  
attempts	   to	   create	   sui	   generis	   legislation	   specifically	   designed	   to	   include	  
indigenous	   peoples’	   rights.	   As	   will	   be	   seen	   later	   in	   the	   thesis,	   both	   the	   TRIPS	  
Agreement	   and	   the	   Convention	   on	   Biological	   Diversity	   set	   high	   minimum	  
standards	  that	  leave	  enough	  space	  for	  states	  to	  create	  sui	  generis	  legislation	  that	  
would	  better	  accommodate	  indigenous	  claims	  within	  national	  borders.	  To	  nullify	  
the	  creation	  of	   such	   legislation	  on	   the	  pretense	   that	   they	  will	  not	   comply	  with	  
the	   Agreements’	   minimum	   standards	   sounds	   a	   bit	   like	   an	   excuse	   to	   carry	   on	  
avoiding	   the	   problem.	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	   main	   concern	   of	   the	   Tribunal	   to	   be	  
addressed	   remained	   to	   what	   extent	   the	   “guarantee	   of	   tino	   rangatiratanga	  
should	  be	  used	  to	  offer	  a	  reasonable	  level	  of	  control	  to	  Māori	  over	  mātauranga	  
Māori,	  taonga	  works	  and	  taonga	  species”.94	  The	  Report,	  in	  fact,	  stresses	  that	  the	  
kaitiaki	   relationship	   is	   the	   key	   element	   and	   it	   is	   what	   should	   ultimately	   be	  
protected.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   taonga	   works,	   the	   Tribunal	   agreed	   that	   every	   claim	  
should	  be	  addressed	  in	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  three	  stages	  process:95	  	  
	  
• understanding	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   kaitiaki	   and	   the	   particular	  
mātauranga	  Māori,	  taonga	  work	  or	  taonga	  species;	  
• identifying	  any	  other	  valid	   interests	   in	   the	  mātauranga	  Māori,	   taonga	  work	  
or	  taonga	  species;	  and	  
• balancing	  the	  other	  interests	  against	  those	  of	  the	  kaitiaki.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Jessica	  Christine	  Lai	  Indigenous	  Cultural	  Heritage	  and	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights:	  Learning	  from	  the	  New	  
Zealand	  Experience?	  at	  232.	  




In	  this	  scenario,	  according	  to	  the	  Tribunal,	  a	  legal	  framework	  should	  be	  created	  
ad	  hoc	  to	  allow	  kaitiaki	  to	  prevent	  any	  misappropriation,	  misuse	  and	  derogatory	  
public	  use	  of	  the	  taonga	  works	  and	  the	  spiritual	  secret	  knowledge	  they	  embody	  
if	   it	   can	   be	   proved	   that	   the	  mātauranga	   Māori	   is	   closely	   held,	   and	   its	   use	   is	  
inconsistent	  with	  “the	  integrity	  or	  mauri	  of	  either	  the	  work	  or	  mātauranga”.96	  
However,	  in	  her	  book	  Lai97	  argues	  that	  the	  Tribunal	  did	  not	  enter	  into	  any	  clear	  
explanation	   of	   what	   ‘closely	   held’	   means	   and	   whether	   the	   misuse	   of	   Māori	  
culture	  could	  happen	  within	  the	  Māori	  community	   itself.	  Article	  2	  of	  the	  Treaty	  
protects	   the	   kaitiaki	   relationship.	   As	   such,	   while	   the	   kaitiaki	   have	   no	   say	   in	  
knowledge	   that	   has	   already	   entered	   the	   public	   domain	   (although	   the	   kaitiaki	  
relationship	  with	  such	  knowledge	  might	  still	  be	  in	  force),	  they	  should	  be	  able	  to	  
challenge	  the	  future	  commercialization	  of	  their	  culture.	  However,	   if	   the	  kaitiaki	  
did	   not	   perform	   their	   duty	   of	   care	   according	   to	   their	   customary	   laws	   and	  
consequently	   failed	   to	   hold	   their	   culture	   closely,	   letting	   it	   flow	   into	   the	   public	  
domain,	  no	  right	  to	  object	  to	  any	  future	  commercialization	  should	  be	  granted.98	  
On	   the	   same	   line,	   the	   Counsel	   for	   the	   claimants99 	  argued	   that	   the	   “mana	  
(authority,	  prestige,	  reputation	  and	  spiritual	  power)	  should	  be	  returned	  to	  those	  
who	   have,	   by	   whakapapa	   (genealogy,	   ancestral	   connections	   and	   lineage)	   and	  
membership	  of	  the	  relevant	  iwi	  or	  hapu,	  inherited	  the	  right	  to	  exercise	  the	  role	  
of	  owner	  and	  kaitiaki”.100	  In	  order	  to	  do	  that,	  the	  Tribunal	  recognized	  that	  a	  new	  
process	   of	   communication	   and	   consultation	   between	   the	   Crown	   and	   Māori	  
representatives	   should	   be	   established.	   This	   ‘Process	   of	   Engagement’	   between	  
the	  kaitiaki	  and	  the	  Crown	  would	  be	  “designed	  to	  identify	  the	  means	  of	  resolving	  
the	   claim	   issues”. 101 	  Counsel	   proposed	   the	   creation	   of	   eight	   Crown-­‐funded	  
working	  groups	   that	  would	  develop	   solutions	   to	   the	   issues	  brought	   forward	  by	  
the	  Wai	  262	  enquiry	  under	   the	   supervision	  of	  a	   coordinating	  group	  comprising	  
representatives	   of	   the	   claimants,	   the	   Crown,	   other	   iwi,	   Crown	   Research	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Ko	  Aotearoa	  Tēnei:	  A	  Report	  into	  Claims	  Concerning	  New	  Zealand	  Law	  and	  Policy	  Affecting	  Māori	  Culture	  
and	  Identity	  Vol	  1	  at	  84.	  
97	  See	   Lai	   Indigenous	   Cultural	   Heritage	   and	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights:	   Learning	   from	   the	   New	   Zealand	  
Experience?.	  
98	  At	  240.	  
99	  Counsel	  for	  Nagati	  Koata,	  see	  Chapter	  9	  in	  Ko	  Aotearoa	  Tenei:	  Te	  Taumata	  Tuarua	  -­‐	  A	  Report	  into	  Claims	  
Concerning	  New	  Zealand	  Law	  and	  Policy	  Affecting	  Maori	  Culture	  and	  Identity	  Vol	  2.	  
100	  See	  Ko	   Aotearoa	   Tenei:	   Te	   Taumata	   Tuarua	   -­‐	   A	   Report	   into	   Claims	   Concerning	  New	   Zealand	   Law	   and	  
Policy	  Affecting	  Maori	  Culture	  and	  Identity	  Vol	  2	  at	  701.	  




Institutes,	   and	   the	   public.102	  The	   Tribunal	   also	   recommended	   the	   creation	   of	   a	  
commission	  (Māori	  Law	  Reform	  Commission)	  with	  the	  mandate	  to	  deal	  with	  any	  
complains	   regarding	   the	   use	   of	   taonga	   works,	   taonga-­‐derived	   works	   and	  
mātauranga	  Māori	  and	   to	  “produce	   for	   iwi	  and	   the	  Crown	  proposals	   to	   reform	  
the	   law	  of	  Aotearoa	   to	  provide	   full	   and	  balanced	   relief	   from	  any	  Crown	  Treaty	  
breaches	   found	   by	   the	   Tribunal”.103	  Although	   the	   commission	   would	   not	   have	  
any	   capacity	   to	   create	   new	   IPR	   laws	   or	   establish	   property	   rights	   for	   kaitiaki,	   it	  
would	   be	   a	   sui	   generis	   system	   capable	   of	   operating	   outside	   existing	   IP	   law	   by	  
recognizing	   the	   kaitiaki	   perpetual	   relationship.	   In	   this	   system,	   the	   kaitiaki	  
relationships	   would	   be	   weighted	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   and	   depending	   on	  
circumstances.104	  As	  clearly	  explained	  by	  Lai,	  the	  commission	  would	  “specifically	  
relate	   to	   the	   Treaty	   obligation	   to	   protect	   tino	   rangatiratanga	   (rather	   than	  
exclusive	   and	   undisturbed	   possession)	   over	   taonga.	   The	   proposed	   framework	  
would	   create	   a	   statutory	   participatory	   right	   in	   making	   decisions	   over	   the	  
commercial	   use	   of	   the	   taonga	   works	   and	   closely-­‐held	  mātauranga	  Māori.	   The	  
right	  would	  be	  potentially	  perpetual,	  dependent	  on	  the	  kaitiaki	  relationship”.105	  	  
The	   Tribunal	   recognized	   that	  New	  Zealand	   IP	   laws	   are	  not	   designed	   to	   include	  
the	  interests	  of	  kaitiaki,	  therefore	  they	  cannot	  be	  considered	  the	  only	  means	  to	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  At	  701.	  
103	  At	  701.	  
104	  “This	  includes	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  objective-­‐based,	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  system.	  Its	  practical	  outcome	  should	  be	  to	  
provide	   a	   balanced	  way	   to	   prevent	   any	   derogatory	   or	   offensive	   public	   use	   of	  mātauranga	  Māori,	   taonga	  
works,	  or	  taonga-­‐derived	  works,	  and	  to	  provide	  an	  effective	  way	  for	  commercial	  users	  to	  consult	  kaitiaki	  or	  
seek	   their	   consent	   where	   the	   kaitiaki	   relationship	   warrants	   it.	   The	   core	   mechanism	   to	   bring	   this	   about	  
would	   be	   a	   commission	   composed	   of	   experts	   in	   mātauranga	   Māori,	   IP	   law,	   commerce,	   science,	   and	  
stewardship	   of	   taonga	   works	   and	   documents,	   assisted	   by	   a	   secretariat	   drawn	   from	   the	   same	   areas	   of	  
expertise.	  A	  very	  important	  function	  of	  such	  a	  commission	  would	  be	  to	  educate	  prospective	  users	  of	  taonga	  
works	  and	  mātauranga	  Māori,	  and	  to	  facilitate	  early	  consultation	  between	  aspiring	  users	  and	  kaitiaki.	  …	  The	  
commission	  could	  achieve	  these	  ends	  by	  drawing	  up	  guidelines	  for	  best	  practice,	  making	  declaratory	  rulings	  
where	  these	  are	  sought,	  and	  developing	  a	  register	  of	  kaitiaki	  for	  particular	  works.	  We	  [the	  Tribunal]	  expect	  
it	   would	   become	   the	   first	   port	   of	   call	   for	   prospective	   users,	   providing	   them	   with	   essential	   advice	   and	  
guidance.	   In	   these	  ways,	   the	   system	  would	   focus	   on	   providing	   early	   certainty	   and	   ought	   to	   avoid	   undue	  
interference	   in	   research,	   creativity,	   beneficial	   uses,	   and	   the	   mutual	   enriching	   of	   our	   cultures.	   The	  
commission	  would	  adjudicate	  disputes.	  An	  objection-­‐based	  system,	   in	  which	  the	  commission	  balances	  the	  
kaitiaki	  interest,	  the	  interests	  of	  existing	  and	  prospective	  IP	  owners,	  and	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  community	  in	  
development	   and	   beneficial	   uses,	   would	   be	   a	   principled	   and	   transparent	   way	   to	   determine	   how	   much	  
protection	  should	  be	  accorded	  the	  kaitiaki	  interest	  in	  any	  particular	  case.	  In	  legislating	  for	  the	  commission	  
process,	  we	   recommend	   that	   anyone	   should	   be	   able	   to	   object	   to	   offensive	   or	   derogatory	   public	  uses	   of	  
taonga	  works,	  taonga-­‐derived	  works,	  and	  mātauranga	  Māori.	  We	  also	  recommend	  that	  only	  kaitiaki	  could	  
make	  other	  kinds	  of	  objection	  to	  commercial	  use,	  and	  then	  only	  for	  taonga	  works	  and	  mātauranga	  Māori.	  
The	  commission’s	  decisions	  should	  be	  enforceable	  in	  the	  courts.	  Kaitiaki	  would	  need	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  
status,	  either	  through	  the	  register	  or	  before	  the	  commission,	  with	  opportunity	  for	  others	  to	  challenge	  that	  
status”	  see	  Ko	  Aotearoa	  Tenei:	  Te	  Taumata	  Tuarua	  -­‐	  A	  Report	  into	  Claims	  Concerning	  New	  Zealand	  Law	  and	  
Policy	  Affecting	  Maori	  Culture	  and	  Identity	  Vol	  2	  at	  702-­‐703.	  




protect	  the	  kaitiaki	  relationship	  with	  mātauranga	  Māori	  and	  taonga	  works.	  Such	  
protection,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   represents	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   Treaty	   of	  Waitangi	  
that	   guarantees	   tino	   rangatiratanga	   (authority	   and	   control	   over	   taonga).	   The	  
creation	  of	  a	  commission	  could	  collide	  with	  existing	   laws	  and	  would	  guarantee	  
the	   revocation	   and	   rejection	   of	   IP	   marks	   that	   are	   held	   in	   custody	   or	   are	  
derogatory	  and	  offensive	  for	  a	  very	  limited	  section	  of	  the	  community,	  preventing	  
the	   rest	  of	   the	  people	   from	  benefiting	   from	   the	   circulating	  of	   the	   information.	  
This	   would	   also	   introduce	   in	   New	   Zealand	   subjective	   standards	   of	   analysis	  
according	   to	  which	   situations	   related	   to	  Māori	   culture	   should	  be	   judged	  under	  
different	   parameters.	   However	   critical	   this	   scenario	   might	   be,	   the	  
recommendations	  brought	   forward	  by	   the	  Tribunal	  are	  designed	   for	  a	   country,	  
like	  New	  Zealand,	  that	  is	  based	  on	  biculturalism.	  Biculturalism	  itself	  implies	  that	  
two	  national	   cultures	  must	   find	   the	  way	   to	  coexist	   in	   the	   shared	   territory	   they	  
inhabit.	   Such	   co-­‐habitation	   would	   not	   clash	   with	   the	   international	   obligations	  
that	   bind	   New	   Zealand	   to	   international	   agreements.	   TRIPS’s	   high-­‐minimum	  
standards,	   for	   example,	   are	   not	   inconsistent	  with	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   sui	   generis	  
system	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   kaitiaki	   relationship.	   Obviously	   the	   new	   system	  
would	   have	   to	   work	   with	   or	   integrate	   the	   existing	   IP	   system	   or	   support	   the	  
creation	   of	   a	   new	   one. 106 	  Although	   the	   recommendations	   present	   obvious	  
limitations,	   they	   nonetheless	   represent	   an	   important	   step	   forward	   for	   future	  
legal	   considerations	   on	   indigenous	   guardianship.	   It	   is	   true	   that	   the	   role	   of	   the	  
Waitangi	   Tribunal	   is	   not	   to	   draft	   comprehensive	   legal	   solutions,	   but	   rather	   to	  
provide	  recommendations	  and	  directions	  to	  policymakers	  regarding	  the	  practical	  
application	  of	  Treaty	  Principles.	  However,	  the	  Tribunal’s	  Report	  provides	  in	  clear	  
language	  an	   in	  depth	  analysis	  of	  Māori	   culture	  and	  what	   role	   the	  guardians	  of	  
knowledge	  play	  within	  their	  communities,	  what	  information	  they	  have	  in	  custody	  
and	  how	  their	  duty	  of	  care	  can	  be	  safeguarded	  from	  external	  abuse,	  misuse	  and	  
exploitation.	  The	  only	  great	  limitations	  that	  the	  recommendations	  have	  included	  
are:	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1. the	  conclusion	  that	  it	  is	  not	  appropriate	  to	  see	  the	  kaitiaki	  relationship	  with	  
taonga	  works	  and	  species	  as	  one	  of	  exclusive	  ownership;107	  
2. kaitiaki	  would	  “need	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  status,	  either	  through	  the	  register	  
or	   before	   the	   commission,	   with	   opportunity	   for	   others	   to	   challenge	   that	  
status”.	   In	   other	   words,	   kaitiaki	   do	   not	   benefit	   from	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐
determine	  what	  their	  traditional	  status	  as	  guardians	  entails	  and	  why;	  and	  
3. the	   inconclusive	   analysis	   of	   the	   role	   of	   the	   kaitiaki	   when	   it	   involves	   high	  
levels	   of	   secrecy	   for	   the	   preservation	   of	   spiritual	   traditions.	   In	   the	   case	   of	  
sacred/secret	   knowledge,	   the	   Tribunal	   suggests	   that	   the	   best	   way	   to	  
safeguard	   it	   is	   to	  keep	   it	   secret.	  However,	  as	  discussed	   in	   the	  previous	  and	  
next	  chapters,	  most	  of	  the	  information	  protected	  by	  kaitiaki	  is	  very	  sensitive	  
and	  the	  only	  way	  to	  preserve	   it	  and	  protect	   it	   is	   to	  keep	   it	   secret	   from	  the	  
rest	  of	  the	  community	  and	  the	  public.	  
	  
It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  Tribunal’s	  recommendations	  advocate	  the	  amendment	  of	  New	  
Zealand	   relevant	   laws	   to	   give	   the	   kaitiaki	   relationship	   formal	   protection,	  
however,	   they	   also	   need	   to	   find	   a	   compromise	   with	   national	   legislation	   and	  
Māori	  expectations.	  
As	  the	  next	  chapters	  will	  show,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  amend	  a	  legal	  system	  that	  was	  not	  
originally	   inclusive	   of	   indigenous	   peoples’	   needs	   and	   expectations.	   Although	  
indigenous	   culture	   is	   today	   widely	   discussed	   within	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	  
Human	   Rights	   systems,108	  its	   intangible	   aspects	   still	   struggle	   to	   find	   effective	  
protection.	   In	   the	  Western	   IPR	   legal	  system,	   intangible	  sacred	   information	  held	  
closely	  and	  secretly	  by	  custodians	  struggle	  to	  find	  protection.	  First,	  because	  it	  is	  
difficult	   to	  describe	  what	  constitutes	   intangible	  secret	   information/culture,	  and	  
second	   because	   intangible	   knowledge	   can	   widely	   differ	   from	   one	   indigenous	  
community	   to	  another.	  As	   the	   thesis	  will	  progressively	   show,	   secrecy	   itself	   can	  
become	  the	  key	  factor	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  secret,	  
intangible	   knowledge	   (and	   its	   tangible	   expressions)	   that	   is	   today	   still	   in	   the	  
custody	  of	  indigenous	  custodians.	  
This	   chapter	   has	   discussed	   the	   specific	   case	   of	   guardianship	   in	   Aotearoa-­‐New	  
Zealand	  and	  how	  New	  Zealand	  is	  struggling	  to	  accommodate	  Māori	  claims.	  It	  has	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also	   shown	   how,	   in	   most	   of	   the	   cases,	   modern	   NZ	   IP	   law	   is	   ineffective	   in	  
safeguarding	   indigenous	   sacred/secret	   knowledge	   held	   by	   the	   guardians.	   The	  
next	   chapter	  will	   present	   and	  discuss	   in	  detail	   the	   international	   IP	   law	   system,	  
focusing	  on	  what	  is	  just	  about	  being	  done	  and	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  done	  to	  include	  
in	  its	  statutory	  regulations	  the	  protection	  of	  indigenous	  intangible	  culture.	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Chapter	  8	  
	  
International	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law:	  An	  Ineffective	  System	  to	  
Safeguard	  Indigenous	  Culture	  
	  
This	  chapter	   is	  an	  overview	  of	   the	   IP	   legal	   system.	  While	  chapter	  5	  and	  6	  have	  
addressed	   indigenous	   peoples’	   cultures	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   international	  
and	   human	   rights	   law	   with	   a	   reference	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   human	   rights	   and	  
intellectual	  property	  laws,	  while	  traditionally	  distant,	  are	  narrowing	  their	  gap	  to	  
a	   more	   effective	   protection	   to	   indigenous	   cultures,	   this	   chapter	   and	   the	   next	  
focus	   on	   intellectual	   property	   law.	   Attempts	   are	   being	   made	   to	   modify	  
intellectual	  property	  law	  to	  include	  and	  accommodate	  indigenous	  claims	  related	  
to	   secret	   knowledge	  and	  practices,	   but	   there	   remains	   considerable	  work	   to	  be	  
done.	  
	  
8.1	  -­‐	  The	  World	  Intellectual	  Property	  Organization	  and	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  
	  
The	   World	   Intellectual	   Property	   Organization	   (WIPO)	   considers	   Intellectual	  
Property1	  to	   be	   “creations	   of	   the	   mind	   such	   as	   inventions,	   industrial	   designs,	  
literary	   and	   artistic	   works,	   symbols,	   and	   names	   and	   images”.2	  In	   1967,	   the	  
Convention	   Establishing	   the	  World	   Intellectual	   Property	   Organization	   gave	   the	  
following	  list	  of	  subject	  matters	  protected	  by	  intellectual	  property	  rights:	  3	  
	  
§ literary,	  artistic	  and	  scientific	  works	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  “Intellectual	  property	   (IP)	   refers	   to	  creations	  of	   the	  mind,	   such	  as	   inventions;	   literary	  and	  artistic	  works;	  
designs;	   and	   symbols,	   names	   and	   images	   used	   in	   commerce.	   IP	   is	   protected	   in	   law	   by,	   for	  
example,	  patents,	  copyright	  and	  trademarks,	  which	   enable	   people	   to	   earn	   recognition	   or	   financial	   benefit	  
from	  what	  they	  invent	  or	  create.	  By	  striking	  the	  right	  balance	  between	  the	  interests	  of	  innovators	  and	  the	  
wider	  public	   interest,	   the	   IP	  system	  aims	  to	   foster	  an	  environment	   in	  which	  creativity	  and	   innovation	  can	  
flourish”	  see	  WIPO	  at	  <www.wipo.int/about-­‐ip/en/>.	  
2	  “The	  notion	  ‘intellectual	  property’	  is	  defined	  in	  the	  Convention	  Establishing	  the	  World	  Intellectual	  Property	  
Organization	  (WIPO),	  1967	  to	  include	  rights	  relating	  to:	  literary,	  artistic	  and	  scientific	  works;	  performances	  
of	   performing	   artists,	   sound	   recordings,	   and	   broadcasts;	   inventions	   in	   all	   fields	   of	   human	   endeavour;	  
scientific	   discoveries;	   industrial	   designs;	   trademarks,	   service	   marks,	   and	   commercial	   names	   and	  
designations;	  protection	  against	  unfair	  competition;	  and,	  all	  other	  rights	  resulting	  from	  intellectual	  activity	  
in	  the	  industrial,	  scientific,	  literary	  or	  artistic	  fields”	  see	  Johanna	  Gibson	  Community	  Resources	  (Ashgate,	  UK	  
and	  USA,	  2005)	  at	  11.	  
3	  See	  WIPO	  “Understanding	  Copyright	  and	  Related	  Rights”	  at	  <www.wipo.int/about-­‐ip/en/>	   last	  visited	  on	  
19/08/2012.	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§ performances	  of	  performing	  artists,	  phonograms,	  and	  broadcasts	  	  
§ inventions	  in	  all	  fields	  of	  human	  endeavour	  	  
§ scientific	  discoveries	  	  
§ industrial	  designs	  	  
§ trademarks,	  service	  marks,	  and	  commercial	  names	  and	  designations	  	  
§ protection	  against	  unfair	  competition	  	  
§ and	   “all	   other	   rights	   resulting	   from	   intellectual	   activity	   in	   the	   industrial,	  
scientific,	  literary	  or	  artistic	  fields”.	  
	  
WIPO	  recognises	  several	  international	  standards	  that	  can	  today	  be	  identified	  and	  
used	  as	  relevant	  background	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  TK	  and	  TCEs:	  	  
	  
− The	  Berne	  Convention	  (1886,	  last	  amended	  in	  1979)	  –	  economic	  and	  moral	  rights	  in	  
artistic	   and	   literary	   works	   where	   these	   are	   expressions	   of	   traditional	   cultures,	  
including	   anonymous	   and	   unpublished	   anonymous	   works	   (Article	   15)	   and	   the	  
possibility	  of	  protecting	  unfixed	  works	  (Article	  2(2));	  
− The	   Paris	   Convention	   (1883,	   last	   amended	   in	   1979)	   –	   protection	   of	   collective	   and	  
certification	   marks,	   protection	   of	   armorial	   bearings,	   flags,	   other	   State	   emblems,	  
official	   signs	   and	   hallmarks	   (Article	  6ter),	   the	   protection	   of	   industrial	   designs,	   the	  
protection	  of	  patents	  on	  innovation	  in	  a	  traditional	  context,	  and	  the	  suppression	  of	  
unfair	   competition	   (including	   false	   indications	   that	   products	   are	   traditional	   or	  
associated	  with	  an	  indigenous	  or	  local	  community);	  
− The	  WIPO	  Performances	  and	  Phonograms	  Treaty	  (WPPT,	  1996)	  –	  the	  protection	  of	  
performances	  as	  expressions	  of	  folklore;	  	  
− The	   Lisbon	   Agreement	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Appellations	   of	   Origin	   and	   their	  
International	   Registration	   (1958,	   last	   amended	   in	   1979)	   –	   the	   protection	   of	  
appellations	  of	  origin	  related	  to	  products	  that	  embody	  traditional	  knowledge	  or	  are	  
associated	  with	  traditional	  cultures;	  
− The	  Madrid	  Agreement	  Concerning	  the	  International	  Registration	  of	  Marks	  (and	  the	  
Madrid	   Protocol)	   (1891,	   last	   amended	   in	   1979)	   –	   the	   protection	   of	   certification	  
marks	  relating	  to	  products	  of	  traditional	  origin;	  
− The	  Patent	  Cooperation	  Treaty	  (1970,	  last	  modified	  in	  2001)	  –	  the	  PCT	  system	  may	  
be	  used	  to	  facilitate	  protection	  for	  innovations	  within	  a	  traditional	  context;	  and	  the	  
minimum	  documentation	   specified	  under	   the	  PCT	   is	  being	  expanded	   to	   give	  more	  
explicit	  recognition	  of	  TK	  as	  prior	  art;	  
− The	   Strasbourg	   Convention	   on	   the	   IPC	   (1971,	   last	   amended	   in	   1979)	   –	   the	  
International	  Patent	  Classification	  has	  recently	  been	  revised	  to	  take	  better	  account	  
of	  TK	  subject	  matter,	  and	  further	  proposals	  are	  under	  development;	  
− The	  WTO	   TRIPS	   Agreement	   (1994)	   –	   a	   range	   of	   IP	   rights	   recognized	   under	   TRIPS	  
have	   been	   reported	   as	   applicable	   to	   traditional	   subject	   matter;	   apart	   from	   those	  
categories	  noted	  above,	  TRIPS	  provides	   for	   two	  categories	  of	  protection	   that	  have	  
been	   used	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   subject	   matter	   associated	   with	   TK	   and	  
TCEs	   -­‐	   geographical	   indications	   (a	   category	   broader	   in	   scope	   than	   appellations	   of	  
origin)	   and	   undisclosed	   information	   (confidential	   information	   or	   trade	   secrets),	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linking	  both	  forms	  of	  protection	  to	  the	  suppression	  of	  unfair	  competition	  under	  the	  
Paris	  Convention.4	  
	  
IP	   law	   promotes	   progress	   and,	   therefore,	   it	   does	   not	   protect	   an	   idea,	   but	   its	  
reproduction	  along	  with	  the	   intrinsic,	  economic	  value	   it	  can	  have	  once	  entered	  
into	  the	  public	  domain.	  The	  value	  given	  to	  the	  reproduction	  of	  the	  idea	  reflects	  
European	   economic,	   moral	   and	   legal	   standards	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   creation	   of	  
Copyright	   and	   Patent	   law 5 	  (and	   their	   ensuing	   revisions).	   In	   their	   history,	  
Copyright	  and	  Patent	  Laws	  had	  a	  different	  evolution	  from	  the	  other	  IP	   laws	  (eg	  
trademarks,	  certification	  marks,	  trade	  secrets	  etc).	  They	  emphasise	  the	  rights	  of	  
individual	   ‘authors’	   and	   ‘inventors’	   of	   new	   works	   and	   industrial	   property	   and	  
guarantee	  temporary	  monopoly	  rights	  over	  the	  creation/invention.	  WIPO	  defines	  
inventions	  as	  “new	  solutions	  to	  technical	  problems”,6	  whereas	  copyright	  protects	  
only	   “the	   form	  of	  expression	  of	   ideas,	  not	   the	   ideas	   themselves.	   The	   creativity	  
protected	  by	  copyright	  law	  is	  creativity	  in	  the	  choice	  and	  arrangement	  of	  words,	  
musical	  notes,	  colors	  and	  shapes”.7	  The	  property	  rights	  guarantee	  the	  owner	  the	  
utilization	  of	  his	  product	  as	  he	  wishes,	  and	  hinder	  the	  utilization	  of	  the	  product	  
by	  third	  parties.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  both	  the	  Paris	  Convention	  
for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Industrial	   Property8	  and	   the	   Berne	   Convention	   for	   the	  
Protection	   of	   Literary	   and	   Artistic	  Works9	  do	   not	   include	   in	   their	   language	   any	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 	  WIPO	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	  
Knowledge	  and	  Folklore	  (Genève,	  2007)	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/11/9	  at	  17.	  
5	  “The	  history	  of	  patents	  does	  not	  begin	  with	  inventions,	  but	  rather	  with	  royal	  grants	  by	  Queen	  Elizabeth	  I	  
(1558-­‐1603)	  for	  monopoly	  privileges	  ...	  Approximately	  200	  years	  after	  the	  end	  of	  Elizabeth's	  reign,	  however,	  
a	   patent	   represents	   a	   legal	   [right]	   obtained	   by	   an	   inventor	   providing	   for	   exclusive	   control	   over	   the	  
production	   and	   sale	   of	   his	  mechanical	   or	   scientific	   invention	   ...	   [demonstrating]	   the	   evolution	   of	   patents	  
from	   royal	   prerogative	   to	   common-­‐law	   doctrine”	   see	   Adam	   Mossoff	   “Rethinking	   the	   Development	   of	  
Patents:	  An	  Intellectual	  History,	  1550-­‐1800”	  (2001)	  52	  Hastings	  Law	  Journal	  at	  1255.	  
6	  “These	  new	  solutions	  are	  ideas,	  and	  are	  protected	  as	  such;	  protection	  of	  inventions	  under	  patent	  law	  does	  
not	   require	   that	   the	   invention	   be	   represented	   in	   a	   physical	   embodiment.	   The	   protection	   accorded	   to	  
inventors	  is,	  therefore,	  protection	  against	  any	  use	  of	  the	  invention	  without	  the	  authorization	  of	  the	  owner”	  
see	   WIPO	   “Understanding	   Copyright	   and	   Related	   Rights”	   at	   5	   see	   electronic	   document	  
<www.wipo.int/about-­‐ip/en/>	  last	  visited	  on	  29/11/2012.	  
7	  “So	  copyright	  law	  protects	  the	  owner	  of	  property	  rights	  against	  those	  who	  copy	  or	  otherwise	  take	  and	  use	  
the	  form	  in	  which	  the	  original	  work	  was	  expressed	  by	  the	  author”	  supra.	  
8	  “The	  Paris	   Convention	   applies	   to	   industrial	   property	   in	   the	  widest	   sense,	   including	  patents,	   trademarks,	  
industrial	  designs,	  utility	  models	  (a	  kind	  of	  ‘small-­‐scale	  patent’	  provided	  for	  by	  the	  laws	  of	  some	  countries),	  
service	  marks,	   trade	  names	   (designations	  under	  which	  an	   industrial	  or	  commercial	  activity	   is	  carried	  out),	  
geographical	   indications	   (indications	   of	   source	   and	   appellations	   of	   origin)	   and	   the	   repression	   of	   unfair	  
competition.	  The	  Paris	  Convention,	   concluded	   in	  1883,	  was	   revised	  at	  Brussels	   in	  1900,	  at	  Washington	   in	  
1911,	   at	   The	   Hague	   in	   1925,	   at	   London	   in	   1934,	   at	   Lisbon	   in	   1958	   and	   at	   Stockholm	   in	   1967,	   and	   was	  
amended	  in	  1979	  <www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary_paris.html>	  last	  visited	  on	  15/07/2015.	  
9	  The	  Berne	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Literary	  and	  Artistic	  Works	  of	  September	  9,	  1886,	  completed	  
at	   PARIS	   on	   May	   4,	   1896,	  revised	   at	   Berlin	   on	   November	   13,	   1908,	  completed	   at	   Berne	   on	   March	   20,	  
1914,	  revised	  at	  Rome	  on	  June	  2,	  1928,	  at	  Brussels	  on	  June	  26,	  1948,	  at	  Stockholm	  on	  July	  14,	  1967,	  and	  at	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exhaustive	   definition	   of	   ‘inventions’,	   ‘industrial	   designs’	   or	   ‘literary	   and	   artistic	  
works’.	   WIPO	   explains	   that	   copyright	   law	   generally	   includes	   two	   types	   of	  
protection:	   “economic	   rights	   allow	   the	   rights	   owner	   to	   derive	   financial	   reward	  
from	  the	  use	  of	  his	  works	  by	  others.	  Moral	  rights	  allow	  the	  author	  to	  take	  certain	  
actions	   to	   preserve	   the	   personal	   link	   between	   himself	   and	   the	   work”.10	  Like	  
copyrights,	   patents11	  are	   granted	   for	   inventions	   and	   are	   limited	   in	   time	   (20	  
years).	  On	  a	  different	  line,	  the	  other	  set	  of	  IP	  laws,	  including	  certification	  marks	  
and	   trademarks,	   are	   potentially	   unlimited	   in	   time	   and	   they	   do	   not	   confer	  
monopoly	  rights,	  but	  they	  limit	  the	  use	  of	  certain	  symbology	  to	  the	  people	  of	  a	  
defined	  group,	  or	  geographical	  location.	  Certification	  marks	  do	  not	  focus	  only	  on	  
individuals,	   but	   include	   groups	   of	   individuals	   that	   participate	   in	   the	   creation	  
process.	  	  
Intellectual	  Property	  rights	  (IPR,	  mostly	  copyrights	  and	  patents)	  have	  existed	  for	  
a	  very	   long	  time	  and	  are	  historically	  the	  result	  of	  national	   laws	  that,	  over	  time,	  
have	  been	  translated	  and	  enforced	  at	  the	  international	  level	  as	  well.12	  According	  
to	   Blakeney,	   in	   some	   countries	   IPR	   exist	   not	   only	   because	   of	   national	  
jurisdictions,	   but	   as	   a	   result	   of	   international	   treaties,	   conventions,	   agreements	  
that	  have	  set	  the	  standards	  for	  the	  national	  jurisdictions	  consequently.13	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Paris	   on	   July	   24,	   1971,	  and	   amended	   on	   September	   28,	   1979	  
<www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=283698>	  last	  visited	  on	  15/07/2015.	  
10	  “Most	  copyright	  laws	  state	  that	  the	  author	  or	  rights	  owner	  has	  the	  right	  to	  authorize	  or	  prevent	  certain	  
acts	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  work.	  The	  rights	  owner	  of	  a	  work	  can	  prohibit	  or	  authorize:	  its	  reproduction	  in	  various	  
forms,	  such	  as	  printed	  publications	  or	  sound	  recordings;	  the	  distribution	  of	  copies;	  its	  public	  performance;	  
its	  broadcasting	  or	  other	  communication	  to	  the	  public;	   its	  translation	  into	  other	  languages;	   its	  adaptation,	  
such	  as	  a	  novel	  into	  a	  screenplay”	  see	  electronic	  document	  <www.wipo.int/about-­‐ip/en/>.	  	  
11	  A	  patent	  is	  “an	  exclusive	  right	  granted	  for	  an	  invention,	  which	  is	  a	  product	  or	  a	  process	  that	  provides,	  in	  
general,	  a	  new	  way	  of	  doing	  something,	  or	  offers	  a	  new	  technical	  solution	  to	  a	  problem.	  To	  get	  a	  patent,	  
technical	  information	  about	  the	  invention	  must	  be	  disclosed	  to	  the	  public	  in	  a	  patent	  application”	  see	  WIPO	  
at	  <www.wipo.int/patents/en/>	  last	  visited	  on	  15/07/2015.	  
12	  “The	   legal	   sources	   of	   international	   law	   which	   are	   applicable	   to	   the	   international	   intellectual	   property	  
regime,	  as	  well	  as	  all	  other	  fields	  of	  inter-­‐	  national	  law,	  are	  conveniently	  set	  out	  in	  Article	  38	  of	  the	  Statute	  
of	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  This	  Article	  provides	  that	  the	  Court,	  in	  resolving	  the	  disputes	  which	  are	  
referred	   to	   it,	   shall	   apply:	   1.	   international	   conventions,	   whether	   general	   or	   particular,	   establishing	   rules	  
expressly	   recognised	   by	   the	   contesting	   states;	   2.	   international	   custom,	   as	   evidence	   of	   a	   general	   practice	  
accepted	  as	  law;	  3.	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  law	  recognized	  by	  civilized	  nations;	  4.	  Subject	  to	  the	  provisions	  
of	   Article	   59[which,	   inter	   alia,	   allows	   the	   court	   to	   call	   witnesses	   and	   experts]	   judicial	   decisions	   and	   the	  
teachings	   of	   the	   most	   highly	   qualified	   publicists	   of	   the	   various	   nations,	   as	   subsidiary	   means	   for	   the	  
determination	  of	  rules	  of	  law”	  see	  Michael	  Blakeney	  “International	  Intellectual	  Property	  Jurisprudence	  After	  
TRIPs”	  in	  David	  Vaver	  and	  Lionel	  Bently	  (eds)	  Intellectual	  Property	  in	  the	  New	  Millennium:	  Essays	  in	  Honor	  of	  
William	  R.	  Cornish	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  2010)	  at	  3.	  
13	  See	  Michael	  Blakeney	  “International	  Intellectual	  Property	  Jurisprudence	  After	  TRIPs”	  at	  3.	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Article	   6bis	   of	   the	   Berne	   Convention	   confers	   moral	   rights	   to	   creative	  
productions.14	  Contrary	  to	  copyright	  and	  patent	   law,	  moral	  rights	  do	  not	  confer	  
an	  economic	   right	   to	   the	  author	  of	  a	  work,	  but	  grant	  protection	  to	   the	  honour	  
and	  reputation	  of	  the	  author	  by	  preventing	  “any	  distortion,	  mutilation	  or	  other	  
modification	  of,	   or	  other	  derogatory	  action”.	   The	   fact	   that	  moral	   rights	  do	  not	  
confer	  economic	  value	  to	  the	  product	  of	  the	  mind	  even	  once	  the	  economic	  right	  
over	   it	   is	   transferred	   could	   serve	   indigenous	   peoples’	   interests	   over	   their	  
knowledge;	   however,	   moral	   rights	   are	   only	   granted	   to	   individual	  
creators/authors,	   and	   are	   limited	   in	   time	   at	   least	   until	   “the	   expiring	   of	   the	  
economic	   rights”	   of	   the	   creation	   they	   protect.	   Article	   9.2	   of	   the	   Berne	  
Convention	   encourages	   states	   “to	   permit	   the	   reproduction	   of	   such	   works	   in	  
certain	   special	   cases,	   provided	   that	   such	   reproduction	  does	  not	   conflict	  with	   a	  
normal	   exploitation	   of	   the	   work	   and	   does	   not	   unreasonably	   prejudice	   the	  
legitimate	  interests	  of	  the	  author”.	  However,	  as	  explicitly	  stated,	  the	  article	  does	  
not	   include	   collective	   authorship	   over	   sacred	   and	   secret	   knowledge	   because	   it	  
does	  not	  address	  culture	  holistically.	  	  
In	   recent	   years	   IP	  has	  been	   called	  upon	   to	   address	  many	   issues	  on	   indigenous	  
peoples’	   knowledge	  as	  well	   as	   its	  misuse	  and	  misappropriation,	  while	   trying	   to	  
stretch	   the	   borders	   of	   its	   judicial	   applicability	   to	   include,	   very	   marginally,	  
indigenous	   peoples’	   interests.	   The	   issue	   of	   IP	   protection	   of	   indigenous	   culture	  
and	   knowledge	   was,	   for	   example,	   already	   raised	   in	   1967	   at	   the	   Stockholm	  
revision	   of	   the	   Berne	   Convention	   when	   Article	   15(4)15	  of	   the	   Convention	   was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Article	  6bis	  of	  the	  Berne	  Convention	  states	  that:	  “(1)	  Independently	  of	  the	  author's	  economic	  rights,	  and	  
even	  after	  the	  transfer	  of	  the	  said	  rights,	  the	  author	  shall	  have	  the	  right	  to	  claim	  authorship	  of	  the	  work	  and	  
to	  object	  to	  any	  distortion,	  mutilation	  or	  other	  modification	  of,	  or	  other	  derogatory	  action	  in	  relation	  to,	  the	  
said	  work,	  which	  would	  be	  prejudicial	   to	  his	  honor	  or	   reputation.	   (2)	   The	   rights	   granted	   to	   the	  author	   in	  
accordance	  with	  the	  preceding	  paragraph	  shall,	  after	  his	  death,	  be	  maintained,	  at	   least	  until	   the	  expiry	  of	  
the	  economic	  rights,	  and	  shall	  be	  exercisable	  by	  the	  persons	  or	  institutions	  authorized	  by	  the	  legislation	  of	  
the	   country	  where	   protection	   is	   claimed.	   However,	   those	   countries	  whose	   legislation,	   at	   the	  moment	   of	  
their	   ratification	   of	   or	   accession	   to	   this	   Act,	   does	   not	   provide	   for	   the	   protection	   after	   the	   death	   of	   the	  
author	  of	  all	  the	  rights	  set	  out	  in	  the	  preceding	  paragraph	  may	  provide	  that	  some	  of	  these	  rights	  may,	  after	  
his	  death,	  cease	  to	  be	  maintained”.	  
15	  Article	  15(4)	  of	  the	  Berne	  Convention	  as	  incorporated	  into	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  is	  mainly	  directed	  at	  the	  
protection	  of	   folklore.	   It	   deals	  with	  unpublished	  works	  where	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   author	   is	   unknown,	  but	  
where	   there	   is	  every	  ground	  to	  presume	  that	  he	  or	   she	   is	  a	  national	  of	  a	  given	  WTO	  Member.	   	   In	   such	  a	  
situation	   the	   Member	   concerned	   may	   designate	   a	   competent	   authority	   to	   protect	   the	   interests	   of	   the	  
author.	   Other	   Members	   should	   be	   informed	   about	   this	   authority	   by	   means	   of	   a	   notification	   giving	   full	  
information’	  see	  Council	  for	  Trade-­‐Related	  Aspects	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights,	  Notification	  Provisions	  of	  
Intellectual	   Property	   Convention	   Incorporated	   by	   Reference	   Into	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement	   but	   not	   Explicitly	  
Referred	   to	   in	   it,	  World	  Trade	  Organization	   (1995);	   for	   further	   information	  on	   the	  Stockholm	  revision	  see	  
Eva	   Hemmungs	   Wirtén	   “Colonial	   Copyright,	   Postcolonial	   Publics:	   The	   Berne	   Convention	   and	   the	   1967	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revised	   to	   include	   the	   case	   of	   “unpublished	   works	   where	   the	   identity	   of	   the	  
author	  is	  unknown”.16	  Although	  the	  revision	  took	  into	  consideration	  the	  case	  of	  
unknown	  authorship,	   it	   still	   referred	   to	   individual	   authorship	   and	  not	   to	   group	  
authorship	  and	  communally	  owned/safeguarded	  knowledge	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  
guardians	  of	  knowledge	  or	  TK	  holders.	  	  
Arguably,	  it	  is	  today	  pointless	  to	  criticize	  the	  original	  objectives	  of	  IP	  laws,	  given	  
the	  fact	  that,	  since	  its	  creation,	  it	  was	  never	  expected	  to	  include	  the	  intellectual	  
and	  cultural	  rights	  of	  the	  minorities	  or	  other	  distinct	  cultures.	  What	  can	  be	  done	  
is	  to	  accept	  the	  unsuitability	  of	  a	  system	  and	  work	  to	  reform	  it	   in	  a	  way	  that	   is	  
inclusive	   of	   the	   rights	   of	   minorities.	   The	   real	   question	   is:	   do	   states	   and	  
governments	   have	   actually	   any	   sincere	  desire	   to	   reform	   IP	   laws	   to	   include	   the	  
cultural	  rights	  of	  indigenous	  peoples?	  Or	  do	  they	  rather	  prefer	  to	  ‘pretend’	  they	  
are	   actually	   working	   towards	   the	   development	   of	   an	   egalitarian	   system	  
embracing	  all	  cultural	  diversity	  of	  the	  world?	  One	  of	  the	  solutions	  suggested	  at	  
the	   national	   and	   international	   level	   to	   bridge	   the	   ethical	   and	   legal	   divide	  
between	  Western	  IP	  laws	  and	  indigenous	  peoples’	  products	  of	  the	  mind	  includes	  
the	   creation	   of	   sui	   generis	   laws	   that	   would	   take	   into	   consideration,	   in	   an	  
inclusive	   way,	   the	   customary	   laws	   that	   have	   traditionally	   managed	   the	  
circulation	  of	   information	  (spiritual	  and	  non)	  within	  the	  community.17	  However,	  
in	  this	  case,	  it	  is	  often	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  not	  fair	  for	  the	  general	  market	  to	  create	  
sui	   generis	   regulations	   granting	   exclusive	   rights	   to	   indigenous	   guardians	   of	  
knowledge	  and	  TK	  holders.	  This	  argument	  seems	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  idealist	  idea	  of	  
an	  egalitarian	  world	  where	  everybody	  has	  similar	  political,	  economic	  and	  cultural	  
rights.	  However,	  the	  arguments	  cannot	  stand	  on	  the	  logic	  of	   its	  own	  reasoning:	  
Western	   monopoly	   created	   a	   legal	   system	   that	   did	   not	   include	   the	   rights	   of	  
indigenous	   peoples.	   Not	   only	   that,	   but	   over	   the	   centuries	   Western	   societies	  
failed	  to	  amend	  the	  legislation	  they	  had	  created	  in	  order	  to	  include	  the	  rights	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Stockholm	  Diplomatic	  Conference	  Revisited”	  electronic	  document	  <www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-­‐ed/vol7-­‐
3/wirten.asp>	  	  last	  visited	  on	  30/11/2012.	  
16	  Article	  15.4	  (a)	  In	  the	  case	  of	  unpublished	  works	  where	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  author	  is	  unknown,	  but	  where	  
there	   is	  every	  ground	   to	  presume	  that	  he	   is	  a	  national	  of	  a	  country	  of	   the	  Union,	   it	   shall	  be	  a	  matter	   for	  
legislation	  in	  that	  country	  to	  designate	  the	  competent	  authority	  who	  shall	  represent	  the	  author	  and	  shall	  be	  
entitled	  to	  protect	  and	  enforce	  his	  rights	  in	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  Union’	  as	  revised	  in	  1967.	  
17	  See	  Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Genetic	  Resources,	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  
and	  Folklore	  Twenty-­‐Seventh	  Session	  (Genève,	  2014)	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/27/1	  PROV.	  3;	  Intergovernmental	  
Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Folklore	   Twenty-­‐
Eighth	  Session	  (Genève,	  2014)	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/28/5.	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the	  minorities	   (IP	   laws	   are	   in	   fact	   a	   set	   of	   laws	   that	   have	   been	   circulating	   for	  
centuries).18	  This	  explains	  why	  it	  is	  today	  so	  challenging	  for	  WIPO	  to	  amend	  the	  
IP	  international	  system.	  To	  this	  end,	  in	  2008	  WIPO	  conducted	  a	  Gap	  Analysis	  to	  
identify	  the	  gaps	  within	  the	  IP	  system	  that	  are	  currently	  preventing	  any	  effective	  
protection	  of	  indigenous	  TK	  and	  TCEs.	  Gaps	  have	  been	  identified	  in	  the	  definition	  
of	  TK	  and	  TCE.	  WIPO	  summarised	  such	  gaps	  as	  the	  failure	  to:	  	  
	  
• Recognise	  the	  intrinsic	  value	  of	  TK	  systems.	  	  
• Recognise	  that	  TK	  systems	  are	  valuable	  forms	  of	  innovation.	  	  
• Promote	  respect	  for	  TK	  systems	  and	  the	  cultural	  and	  spiritual	  values	  of	  the	  
holders	  of	  TK.	  	  
• Respect	  the	  rights	  of	  holders	  and	  custodians	  of	  traditional	  knowledge.	  	  
• Promote	  conservation	  and	  preservation	  of	  traditional	  knowledge.	  	  
• Strengthen	   traditional	   knowledge	   systems,	   including	   supporting	   continuing	  
the	  customary	  use,	  development,	  exchange	  and	   transmission	  of	   traditional	  
knowledge.	  	  
• Support	   continuing	   innovation	   within	   traditional	   knowledge	   systems	   and	  
encouraging	  innovation	  derived	  from	  the	  traditional	  knowledge	  base.	  	  
• Support	  the	  safeguarding	  and	  preservation	  of	  traditional	  knowledge.	  	  
• Repress	   misappropriation	   and	   unfair	   and	   inequitable	   uses	   of	   traditional	  
knowledge,	   and	   promote	   equitable	   benefit-­‐sharing	   from	   traditional	  
knowledge.	  	  
• Ensure	   that	   access	   and	   use	   of	   traditional	   knowledge	   is	   subject	   to	   prior	  
informed	  consent.	  	  
• Promote	   sustainable	   community	   development	   and	   legitimate	   trading	  
activities	  based	  on	  traditional	  knowledge	  systems.	  	  
• Curtail	   the	   grant	   or	   exercise	   of	   improper	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   over	  
traditional	  knowledge.19	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 	  See	   history	   of	   intellectual	   property	   laws	   electronic	   document	  
<www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/wipolex/en/notes/gb.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  15/07/2015.	  
19 	  WIPO	   Secretariat,	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	  
Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Folklore:	   The	   Protection	   Of	   Traditional	   Knowledge:	   Draft	   Gap	   Analysis,	  WIPO,	  
13th	   Session	   (Geneva,	   13-­‐17	   October	   2008)	   WIPO/GRTKF/	   IC/13/5(b)	   at	   24-­‐25	   electronic	   document	   <	  
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_13/wipo_grtkf_ic_13_4_b_rev.pdf>	   last	   visited	   on	  
12/08/2017.	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In	   the	   specific,	   gaps	   within	   the	   legal	   system	   have	   been	   identified.	   WIPO	   has	  
consequently	  provided	  a	  list	  of	  options	  to	  address	  these	  gaps	  such	  as:	  
	  
(i)	  A	  binding	  international	  instrument	  or	  instruments.	  
(ii)	   Authoritative	   or	   persuasive	   interpretations	   or	   elaborations	   of	   existing	   legal	  
instruments.	  
(iii)	  A	  non-­‐binding	  normative	  international	  instrument	  or	  instruments.	  
(iv)	   A	   high-­‐level	   political	   resolution,	   declaration	   or	   decision,	   such	   as	   an	  
international	   political	   declaration	   espousing	   core	   principles,	   stating	   a	   norm	  
against	   misappropriation	   and	   misuse,	   and	   establishing	   the	   needs	   and	  
expectations	  of	  TCE/TK	  holders	  as	  a	  political	  priority.	  
(v)	  Strengthened	  international	  coordination	  through	  guidelines	  or	  model	  laws.	  
(vi)	  Coordination	  of	  national	  legislative	  developments.	  
(vii)	  Coordination	  and	  cooperation	  on	  capacity	  building	  and	  practical	  initiatives.20	  
	  
As	  the	  list	  shows,	  the	  creation	  of	  legislation	  successfully	  safeguarding	  indigenous	  
cultures	  is	  still	  a	  work	  in	  progress.	  Awareness	  about	  existing	  gaps	  does	  exist,	  but	  
it	  needs	  to	  be	  translated	  into	  effective	  amendments	  of	  the	  IP	  system	  nationally	  
and	   internationally.	   Indeed,	   only	   the	   joint	   cooperation	   of	   states	   would	   bring	  
comprehension	   and	   comprehensible	   harmonisation	   of	   indigenous	   needs	   and	  
expectations.	  
	  
As	   we	   have	   seen	   in	   the	   chapter	   on	   Wai	   262,	   states	   and	   international	  
organizations	  are	  today	  trying	  to	  amend	  this	  ongoing	   injustice	   for	  a	   few	  simple	  
non-­‐altruistic	   reasons:	   indigenous	   voices	   are	   today	   strong;	   more	   international	  
human	   rights	   instruments	   recognize	   the	   fundamental	   rights	   of	   indigenous	  
peoples;	   and	   some	   world	   groups	   of	   indigenous	   stakeholders	   have	   become	  
successful	   and	   educated	   on	   their	   political	   and	   economic	   rights.	   According	   to	  
WIPO,	  existing	  IP	  law	  systems	  have	  already	  acknowledged	  customary	  laws,	  as	  a	  
specific	  point	  of	  reference	  and	  as	  an	  autonomous	  system	  of	  laws	  used	  by	  specific	  
ethnic	   groups. 21 	  	   As	   such,	   given	   the	   limited	   referentiality	   that	   indigenous	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Supra.	  
21	  See	  WIPO	   “Customary	   Law,	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Intellectual	   Property:	   An	  Outline	   of	   the	   Issues”	  
(2013)	   at	   <www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/resources/pdf/overview_customary_law.pdf>	   last	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customary	   laws	   have,	   they	   can	   only	   play	   a	   role	   of	   exceptions	   and	   advisory	  
mechanisms	   to	   existing	   laws,	   sui	   generis	   or	   not,	   and	   only	   in	   those	   countries	  
which	   recognise	   indigenous	   customary	   laws	   as	   a	   legal	   body	   of	   laws.22	  As	  Dove	  
suggests	  the	  originating	  communities	  of	  the	  TCE	  and	  TK	  and	  the	  ones	  who	  guard	  
the	   knowledge	   should	   have	   a	   say	   on	   what	   constitute	   the	   TK	   that	   needs	  
protection	  and	  explain	  in	  their	  own	  voices	  why	  their	  own	  traditions	  and	  symbols	  
can	   be	   used	   (when	   required).23	  Dove	   rightly	   recognises	   that	   TK	   has	   holistic	  
distinctive	   qualities	   that	   alone	   should	   require	   the	   presence	   and	   supervision	   of	  
the	  guardians	  of	  knowledge	  and	  TK	  holders.	  On	  the	  same	  line,	  Taubman	  argues	  
that	   examples	   of	   “responsible	   custodianship”	   over	   TK	   “within	   customary	   laws	  
systems	   can	   itself	   be	   a	   model	   for	   a	   comprehensive	   blending	   of	   rights	   and	  
obligations”24	  embracing	  the	  complexity	  of	  TK	  manifestations	  that	  a	  state	  could	  
implement	   on	   a	   larger	   scale.	   As	   Correa	   rightly	   points	   out	   in	   his	   report	   for	   the	  
World	   Health	   Organization25 ,	   (in	   his	   article	   he	   refers	   mostly	   to	   traditional	  
medicine,	  but	  the	  same	  argument	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  TK	  in	  general)	  only	  those	  
who	  guard	  the	  knowledge	  and	  manage	   its	  use	  within	  the	  community	  can	  know	  
what	  kind	  of	  sui	  generis	   legislation	  could	  effectively	  safeguard	  their	  culture	  and	  
guarantee	  property	  rights	  not	  to	  those	  who	  receive	  the	  knowledge,	  but	  to	  those	  
who	  guard	  it	  and	  transmit	  it.	  	  
In	   the	   Bulun	   Bulun	   case26	  the	   court	   extended	   copyright	   protection	   to	   cover	  
original	  new	  artworks	  based	  on	  existing	  TK,	  giving	  recognition	  to	  the	  traditional	  
practices	   in	   use	   within	   the	   Ganalbingu	   people.	   The	   Federal	   Court	   of	   Australia	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
visited	   on	   05/02/15;	   see	   also	   Brendan	  M	   Tobin	   “Bridging	   the	  Nagoya	   Compliance	  Gap:	   the	   Fundamental	  
Role	   of	   Customary	   Law	   in	   Protection	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples’	   Resource	   and	   Knowledge	  Rights”	   (2013)	   9	   2	  
Law,	   Environment	   and	   Development	   Journal	   electronic	   document	   <www.lead-­‐
journal.org/content/13142.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  05/02/15.	  
22	  See	  WIPO	   “Customary	   Law,	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Intellectual	   Property:	   An	  Outline	   of	   the	   Issues”	  
(2013)	   at	   23	   at	   <www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/resources/pdf/overview_customary_law.pdf>	   last	  
visited	   on	   05/02/15;	   see	   also	   Brendan	  M	   Tobin	   “Bridging	   the	  Nagoya	   Compliance	  Gap:	   the	   Fundamental	  
Role	  of	  Customary	  Law	  in	  Protection	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples'	  Resource	  and	  Knowledge	  Rights”.	  
23	  Michael	   R	   Dove	   “Center,	   Periphery,	   and	   Biodiversity:	   a	   Paradox	   of	   Governance	   and	   a	   Development	  
Challenge”	  in	  Stephen	  Bush	  and	  Doreen	  Stabinsky	  (eds)	  Valuing	  Local	  Knowledge	  (Island	  Press,	  1996)	  at	  41.	  
24	  	  Antony	  Taubman	  “Saving	  the	  Village:	  Conserving	  Jurisprudential	  Diversity	  in	  the	  International	  Protection	  
of	  Traditional	  Knowledge”	  in	  Keith	  E	  Maskus	  and	  Jerome	  H	  Reichman	  (eds)	   International	  Public	  Goods	  and	  
Transfer	   of	   Technology	   Under	   a	   Globalized	   Intellectual	   Property	   Regime	   (Cambridge	   University	   Press,	  
Cambridge,	  2005)	  at	  543.	  
25	  Carlos	   M	   Correa	   Protection	   and	   Promotion	   of	   Traditional	   Medicine	   Implications	   for	   Public	   Health	   in	  
Developing	   Countries	   (University	   of	   Buenos	   Aires,	   2002)	   electronic	   document	  
<http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Js4917e/>	  last	  visited	  on	  03/12/12.	  
26	  John	  Bulun	  Bulun	  &	  Anor	  v	  R	  &	  T	  Textiles	  Pty	  Ltd	  ('Bulun	  Bulun)	  FCA	  3	  September	  1998	  per	  Federal	  Court	  
of	  Australia	  Von	  Doussa.	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recognized	   that	   Mr	   Bulun	   Bulun’s	   artwork	   was	   original	   and	   held	   that	   the	  
copyright	  of	   the	  work	   resided	  with	  him	  as	  distinct	  creator.	  However,	   the	  Court	  
did	  not	   recognize	   communal	   title	   to	   the	  work	  held	  and	   the	   joint	   authorship	  of	  
the	   community.	   The	   Court	   dismissed	   communal	   title,	   but	   recognized	   the	  
fiduciary	  relationship	  between	  the	  artist	  and	  his	  clan	  that	  had	  granted	  Mr	  Bulun	  
Bulun	   the	   permission	   to	   use	   the	   ritual	   knowledge	   of	   the	   clan	   as	   spiritual	   and	  
symbolic	   embodiment	   of	   the	   artwork.	   In	   this	   case,	   however,	   the	   fiduciary	  
relationship	   between	   artist	   and	   clan	   was	   not	   substantial	   enough	   to	   give	  
copyright	   rights	   to	   the	   community	   as	   a	   whole	   or	   to	   the	   guardians	   of	   the	  
knowledge	  as	  a	  fiduciary	  group.	  	  
	  
Intellectual	   Property	   law	   is	   concerned	   with	   the	   creation	   itself	   rather	   than	   the	  
knowledge	   that	   resulted	   in	   the	   creation.	   For	   the	   Western	   world	   it	   does	   not	  
matter	  who	  has	  the	  idea;	  the	  right	  rests	  on	  the	  person	  who	  fixes	  the	  idea	  while	  
the	   market	   decides	   the	   value	   of	   the	   product.	   Under	   IP	   law	   an	   “essentially	  
objective	   external	   standard”27	  is	   applied	   to	   determine	  whether	   the	   product	   of	  
the	  mind	  in	  question	  complies	  with	  a	  specific	  criteria	  utilized	  by	  the	  IP	  legislation;	  
and	  the	  eligibility	  of	  the	  subject	  matter	  is	  not	  necessarily	  defined	  by	  the	  context	  
of	   its	   origin	   or	   whether	   one	   or	   more	   persons	   participated	   in	   its	  
creation/invention.	   In	   indigenous	   societies,	   spiritual	   values	   vary	   from	   one	  
community	   to	   another;	   and	   some	   knowledge	   cannot	   be	   utilized	   outside	   the	  
cultural	   context	   of	   the	   community.	   In	   this	   case,	   only	   the	   custodians	   of	   the	  
knowledge	   know	   the	   commercial	   value	   of	   the	   knowledge.	   The	   right	   holder	  
among	   indigenous	   peoples	   is	   the	   one	   who	   has	   custody	   over	   the	   knowledge,	  
without	   owning	   it;	   its	   perception	   of	   the	   value	   of	   the	   knowledge	   might	   be	  
subjective	  or	  traditionally	  transmitted	  with	  the	  knowledge	  and	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  
with	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   knowledge	   is	   original	   or	   not,	   or	   if	   an	   invention	   is	   non-­‐
obvious.	  The	  eligibility	  given	  to	  the	  transmission	  of	  the	  information	  encrypted	  in	  
the	   knowledge	   is	   based	   on	   customary	   laws	   that	   control	   the	   transmission	   and	  
determine	  who	  is	  entitled	  to	  receive	  the	  information.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Antony	  Taubman	  “Saving	  the	  Village:	  Conserving	  Jurisprudential	  Diversity	  in	  the	  International	  Protection	  
of	  Traditional	  Knowledge”	  at	  540.	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8.2	  –	  Sui	  Generis	  Laws	  Implemented	  at	  National	  Level	  
	  
A	   sui	   generis	   system	   means	   “one	   that	   is	   of	   its	   own	   kind”.	   In	   the	   case	   of	  
indigenous	   TK	   it	   refers	   to	   “the	   creation	   of	   a	   new	   national	   law	   or	   the	  
establishment	  of	  international	  norms	  that	  would	  afford	  protection	  to	  intellectual	  
property	  dealing	  with	  genetic	  resources	  -­‐or	  biodiversity	  -­‐	  and	  the	  biotechnology	  
that	  might	  result.	  It	  also	  refers	  to	  a	  law	  that	  might	  protect	  creations,	  inventions,	  
models,	   drawings,	   designs,	   innovations	   contained	   in	   images,	   figures,	   symbols,	  
petroglyphs,	   art,	   music,	   history	   and	   other	   traditional	   artistic	   expressions”.28	  In	  
general	   sui	   generis	   laws	   refer	   to	   TEK	   (traditional	   ecologic	   knowledge)	   and	  
biodiversity.	   They	   mostly	   refer	   to	   the	   tangible	   aspect	   of	   TK,	   leaving	   out	   any	  
effective	  consideration	  for	  the	  intangible,	  secret	  aspect	  that	  TK	  might	  have.	  
Some	  countries	  have	  today	  created	  sui	  generis	  laws	  based	  on	  benefit	  sharing	  and	  
prior	   informed	  consent	   to	  safeguard	  the	   indigenous	  TK	  present	   in	   their	  soil.	  To	  
give	   few	  examples,	  Guatemalan	   law	  has	   revised	   its	  national	   law	  to	   include	  and	  
protect	  TK	  as	  part	  of	  the	  national	  heritage,	  preventing	  outsiders	  to	  dispose	  of	  it	  
through	   contracts	   and	   arrangements.	   Panama	   established	   Law	   no.	   20	   (June	  
2000)	   covering	   ‘indigenous	   peoples’	   creations,	   such	   as	   inventions,	   designs	   and	  
innovations,	   cultural	   historical	   elements,	   music,	   art	   and	   traditional	   artistic	  
expressions’	   where	   “collective	   exclusive	   rights	   are	   accorded	   to	   registered	  
elements	   of	   traditional	   knowledge”. 29 	  In	   1997,	   Philippines	   enacted	   the	  
Indigenous	  Peoples’	  Rights	  Act	  which	  protects	  indigenous	  communities’	  rights	  in	  
general	   “including	   their	   rights	   in	   traditional	   knowledge,	   including	   the	   rights	   to	  
limit	  the	  access	  of	  researchers	   into	  their	  ancestral	  domains/lands	  or	  territories,	  
to	  be	  designated	  as	  sources	  of	  information	  in	  whatever	  writings	  and	  publications	  
resulting	  from	  research,	  and	  to	  receive	  royalties	   from	  the	   income	  derived	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  International	   Intellectual	   Property	   Institute	   (IIPI)	   “Is	   a	   Sui	   Generis	   System	   Necessary?”	   (2004)	   at	   1	  
electronic	   document	   <http://iipi.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2010/07/NewYork011404.pdf>	   last	   visited	   on	  
25/04/2017	  
29 	  WIPO	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	  
Knowledge	  and	  Folklore	  (Genève,	  2002)	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/7.	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any	   of	   the	   researches	   conducted	   and	   resulting	   publications”. 30 	  Costa	   Rica	  
Biodiversity	   Law	   was	   created	   to	   provide	   compensation	   for	   the	   knowledge,	  
practices	  and	  innovations	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  local	  communities.31	  Other	  
sui	   generis	   national	   legislation	   include	   the	   African	   Model	   Law,	   the	   Indian	  
Biodiversity	  Act,	   the	  Peruvian	   sui	   generis	   law	  No	  27,811	   (2002)	   and	   the	  Pacific	  
Model	  Law	  (2002).	  	  
In	  general,	  WIPO	   recognises	   fifteen	  key	  elements	   to	  sui	  generis	   legislation	   that	  
should	  be	  achieved	  through	  the	  implementation	  of	  such	  laws:	  32	  
	  
(1)	  What	  the	  policy	  objectives	  of	  the	  sui	  generis	  are;	  
(2)	  The	  reasons	  why	  the	  subject	  matter	  should	  be	  protected	  by	  a	  sui	  generis	  system;	  
(3)	  Under	  which	  conditions	  TK	  should	  be	  accessed;	  
(4)	  Which	  circumstances	  should	  require	  the	  protection	  of	  TK;	  
(5)	  How	  broad	  the	  scope	  of	  rights	  should	  be;	  
(6)	  Who	  the	  right	  holder	  should	  be	  and	  why;	  
(7)	  How	  such	  right	  should	  be	  acquired;	  
(8)	  Expiration	  date	  and	  reasons	  why	  the	  right	  can	  be	  loss;	  
(9)	  Sanctions	  and	  enforcement	  of	  the	  right;	  
(10)	  Registration	  mechanisms	  and	  other	  procedures	  for	  the	  acquisition	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Similar	   provisions	   were	   introduced	   in	   Samoa,	   Venezuela,	   Peru,	   India,	   Vietnam,	   Bolivia,	   Costa	   Rica	   and	  
Brazil.	  See	  WIPO	  Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Genetic	  Resources,	  Traditional	  
Knowledge	  and	  Folklore	  (Genève,	  2002)	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/7.	  	  
31 	  See	   Costa	   Rica	   Biodiversity	   Law	   No	   7788	   electronic	   document	  
<www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=208691>	  last	  visited	  on	  4/03/2017	  
32	  “In	  the	  WIPO	  Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	   Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Genetic	  Resources,	  Traditional	  
Knowledge	  and	  Folklore	   (2003)	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/INF/4	   it	   is	  specified	  that:	   ‘the	  sui	  generis	  measures	  
and	   laws	  analysed	   in	  this	  document	  constitute	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  policy	  choices	  made	  by	  the	  countries	  with	  
regard	  to	  the	  legal	  protection	  of	  TK.	  Since	  the	  information	  provided	  in	  Part	  2	  of	  the	  Annex	  is	  highly	  detailed	  
and	  may	  not	  display	  the	  fundamental	  policy	  approaches	  of	  these	  measures	  in	  a	  simple	  format,	  Part	  1	  of	  the	  
Annex	  summarizes	  the	  basic	  policy	  approaches	  which	  were	  taken	  by	  the	  national	  measures.	  	  These	  choices,	  
and	   the	   considerations	   underlying	   them,	   are	   reflected	   in	   the	   Summary	   Table	   of	   Part	   1	   by	   describing	   the	  
following	  aspects	  of	  the	  respective	  measures:	  (a)	  most	  sui	  generis	  measures	  for	  TK	  combine	  two	  basic	  legal	  
concepts	  to	  govern	  the	  use	  of	  TK:	  (1)	  the	  regulation	  of	  access	  to	  TK,	  and	  (2)	  the	  grant	  of	  exclusive	  rights	  for	  
TK.	  This	  combination	  reflects	  the	  two	  major	  legal	  frameworks	  within	  which	  most	  measures	  are	  adopted	  and	  
implemented:	   intellectual	   property	   frameworks	   and	   access	   and	   benefit-­‐sharing	   arrangements.	   In	   many	  
cases,	  access	  regulation	  for	  TK	  is	  part	  of	   larger	  access	  and	  benefit-­‐sharing	  frameworks	  which	  apply	  also	  to	  
genetic	  or	  biological	  resources.	  The	  first	  row	  of	  the	  Summary	  Table	  therefore	  describes	  the	  basic	  legal	  and	  
policy	  frameworks	  in	  which	  the	  measure	  was	  taken,	  including	  also,	  if	  relevant,	  unfair	  competition	  policy	  and	  
indigenous	  rights;	  (b)	  sui	  generis	  measures	  combine	  diverse	  conceptual	  and	  policy	  tools	  to	  customize	  legal	  
protection	  for	  TK.	  These	  conceptual	  and	  policy	  tools	  include	  (1)	  the	  regulation	  of	  access	  to	  TK,	  (2)	  the	  grant	  
of	   exclusive	   rights	   for	   TK,	   (3)	   concepts	   from	   the	   law	   on	   the	   repression	   of	   unfair	   competition	   and	   (4)	  
references	  to	  customary	  laws	  of	  indigenous	  and	  local	  communities.	  The	  second	  row	  of	  the	  Summary	  Table	  
thus	  describes	   these	  basic	   legal	  and	  policy	   tools	   that	  were	  utilized	   in	   the	  various	   laws	  and	  measures”	  see	  
WIPO	  Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Genetic	  Resources,	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  
and	  Folklore	  (Genève,	  2003)	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/INF/4	  at	  1	  and	  3.	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maintenance	  of	  rights;	  
(11)	  Regulations	  defining	  the	  access	  and	  benefit-­‐sharing	  of	  TK	  (Mutually	  agreed	  
terms	  and	  prior	  informed	  consent);	  
(12)	  Introduction	  of	  defensive	  protection;	  
(13)	  The	  introduction	  of	  regional	  and	  international	  protection,	  including	  the	  problem	  
of	  so-­‐called	  “Regional	  Traditional	  Knowledge”;	  
(14)	   The	   creation	   of	   institutional	   arrangements	   where	   the	   policies,	   systems,	   and	  
processes	   that	   sui	   generis	   law	   use	   to	   legislate,	   plan	   and	   manage	   their	   activities	  
efficiently;	  and	  
(15)	  Recognition	  of	  customary	  laws	  and	  protocols	  of	  indigenous	  peoples.	  	  
	  
And	  yet,	  though	  the	  list	  above	  seems	  exhaustive,	  WIPO	  recognises	  the	  inherent	  
difficulty	   in	   creating	   effective	   sui	   generis	   legislation	  protecting	   TK	   and	   in	   those	  
countries	  implementing	  such	  laws	  or	  thinking	  of	  creating	  sui	  generis	   laws	  WIPO	  
asks	  how	  such	  law:	  	  	  
	  
…	  defines/Identifies	  the	  policy	  objective	  of	  the	  protection;	  identifies	  the	  subject	  
matter;	   identifies	   the	   criteria	   the	   subject	  matter	  must	  meet	   as	   a	   condition	   for	  
protection;	  identifies	  the	  owner;	  defines	  the	  rights	  conferred	  on	  the	  owner	  and	  
the	   exceptions;	   establishes	   the	   procedures	   and	   formalities	   for	   acquisition	   and	  
maintenance	  of	  the	  	  rights	  conferred;	  enforces	  the	  rights:	  i.e.	  effectively	  permits	  
action	  where	  there	   is	  an	   infringement	   	  of	  the	  rights	  conferred;	  defines	  how	  the	  
rights	  are	  lost	  or	  expire;	  and	  interacts	  with,	  overlaps	  or	  complements	  existing	  IP	  
standards.33	  
	  
In	  fact,	  WIPO	  is	  today	  aware	  that	  there	  are	  effective	  problems	  in	  implementing	  a	  
sui	  generis	  system.	  They	  include	  “the	  diversity	  of	  the	  subject	  matter,	  identifying	  
the	   owner	   of	   the	   rights,	   procedures	   and	   formalities	   for	   the	   acquisition	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  International	   Intellectual	  Property	   Institute	   (IIPI)	   “Is	  a	  Sui	  Generis	  System	  Necessary?”	   (2004)	  electronic	  
document	   <http://iipi.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2010/07/NewYork011404.pdf>	   last	   visited	   on	   25/04/2017;	  
see	   also	  WIPO	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	  Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	  
Knowledge	  and	  Folklore	  “Comparative	  Summary	  of	  Sui	  Generis	  Legislation	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Traditional	  
Cultural	  Expressions”	  (Génève,	  2003)	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/INF/3.	  
.	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maintenance	  of	   the	   rights	   conferred,	  and	   time	   limits	   conferred	  on	   the	   right”.34	  
Consequently,	  in	  considering	  indigenous	  TK	  and	  sui	  generis	  laws,	  WIPO	  admits:	  
	  
• Problems	  in	  identifying	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  right	  are	  obvious	  and	  go	  to	  the	  idea	  
of	  community	  and	  shared	  knowledge	  	  
• Many	   communities	   might	   have	   problems	   meeting	   formal	   requirements	   to	  
acquire	  and	  maintain	  rights.	  	  
• …	   in	   a	   strict	   sense	   TK	   is	   not	   a	   temporary	   concept.	  …	   sui	   generis	   legislation	  
makes	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  the	  TK	  and	  an	  invention	  stemming	  from	  its	  
use.	  Therefore	  what	  is	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  is	  the	  invention	  and	  the	  patent	  is	  
granted	  or	   expires	  on	   that	   invention	  not	   the	   traditional	   knowledge.	  But	   TK	  
and	   the	   products	   invention	   stemming	   from	   it	   are	   sometimes	  
indistinguishable,	  thus	  this	  neat	  distinction	  does	  not	  always	  apply.	  
• …	   [There	   might]	   be	   considerable	   overlap	   with	   existing	   IP	   laws.	   This	   leads	   to	  
confusion	   for	   litigants,	  uncertainty	   in	   the	   law	  and	   if	   it	   is	  possible	   to	   rely	  on	  
the	  provisions	  of	  an	  existing	  law,	  it	  is	  undesirable	  and	  unnecessary	  to	  create	  
another	  law.	  	  
• Insofar	  as	  a	  sui	  generis	  system	  might	  add	  constraints	  to	  existing	  laws,	  for	  example,	  
the	   Patent	   law	   of	   a	   country,	   this	   might	   make	   the	   law	   inconsistent	   with	  
International	  Agreements	  such	  as	  TRIPS.	  	  
• Where	   breach	   of	   a	   contract	   will	   result	   in	   similar	   sanctions	   being	   imposed	   by	   a	  
court	  that	  might	  be	  prescribed	  by	  a	  sui	  generis	  law,	  why	  create	  the	  law?35	  	  
	  
While	  framing	  the	  limitations	  of	  sui	  generis	  legislation,	  WIPO,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
recognises	   the	   importance	   to	   develop	   suggestions	   for	   “the	   adoption	   of	  
international	   standards	   that,	   by	   undertaking	   a	   harmonized	   approach,	   could	  
enhance	   international	   protection,	   avoid	   free	   riding	   and	   misappropriation,	   and	  
reduce	   distortions	   and	   impediments	   to	   international	   trade	   of	   products	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  At	  3.	  
35	  Supra	  at	  3-­‐4.	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services	   incorporating	   traditional	   knowledge.	   Equally,	   development	   of,	   and	  
experience	  with,	  non-­‐binding	  guidelines	  or	   recommendations	   to	  guide	  national	  
systems	   may	   lead	   to	   a	   greater	   sharpening	   of	   understanding	   of	   the	   essential	  
elements	   of	   a	   successful,	   workable	   and	   effective	   national	   system,	   that	  may	   in	  
turn	  feed	   into	  the	   identification	  of	   international	  standards”.36	  In	  considering	  sui	  
generis	   laws	  WIPO	   instructed	   that	   the	   development	   of	   national	   policies	   on	   TK	  
and	  TCEs	  would	  require	  that	  the	  following	  question	  should	  be	  answered:	  
	  
•	  What	  TK	  and	  TCEs	  should	  be	  protected?	  What	  form	  and	  characteristics	  do	  TK	  
and	  TCEs	  have?	  	  
•	  What	  objectives	  are	  sought	  to	  be	  achieved	  through	  according	  IP	  protection?	  	  
•	   Who	   should	   benefit	   from	   any	   such	   protection	   or	   who	   holds	   the	   rights	   to	  
protectable	  TK/TCEs?	  	  
•	   What	   forms	   of	   behavior	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   protectable	   TK/TCEs	   should	   be	  
considered	  unacceptable/illegal?	  	  
•	   How	   can	   the	   existing	   IP	   system	   be	   used	   to	   protect	   TK	   and	   TCE-­‐related	  
interests?	  	  
•	  Are	  there	  gaps	  in	  the	  protection	  available,	  and	  if	  so,	  could	  those	  gaps	  be	  filled	  
by	  adapting	  the	  existing	  IP	  framework,	  or	  would	  TK	  and	  TCEs	  be	  better	  protected	  
by	  a	  distinct	  sui	  generis	  system?	  	  
•	   For	   how	   long	   should	   protection	   be	   accorded?	   •	   Should	   there	   be	   any	  
formalities?	  	  
•	  Should	  there	  be	  any	  exceptions	  or	  limitations	  to	  rights	  attaching	  to	  protectable	  
TK/TCEs?	  	  
•	   What	   sanctions	   or	   penalties	   should	   apply	   to	   behavior	   or	   acts	   considered	  
unacceptable/illegal?	  	  
•	  Should	  newly	  recognized	  rights	  in	  TK	  and	  TCEs	  have	  retrospective	  effect?	  	  
•	  How	  should	  foreign	  rights	  holders/	  beneficiaries	  be	  treated?37	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 	  WIPO	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	  
Knowledge	   and	   Folklore	   “Elements	   of	   a	   Sui	   Generis	   System	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Traditional	   Knowledge	  
(Genève,	  2002)	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/8.	  
37	  WIPO	   “Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Traditional	   Cultural	  
Expressions”	  (2015)	  at	  37	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Certainly,	  the	  creation	  of	  sui	  generis	  laws	  to	  safeguard	  indigenous	  cultures	  is	  an	  
effective	   way	   to	   fill	   the	   gaps	   that	   current	   international	   and	   national	   IP	   laws	  
present	   when	   addressing	   indigenous	   claims	   related	   to	   sacred	   and	   secret	  
knowledge;	   and	   yet,	   even	   if	   the	   idea	   of	   creating	   sui	   generis	   legislation	   is	  
conceptually	   and	   ethically	   fair,	   however,	   every	   sui	   generis	   law	   created	   by	   a	  
country	   can	   only	   work	   within	   its	   borders	   and	   have	   no	   extended	   legal	  
enforceability	   in	  other	  countries	  that	  do	  not	  recognize	  the	  same	  rights.	  And,	  as	  
we	   all	   know	   too	   well,	   most	   of	   the	   cultural	   piracy	   taking	   place	   today	   happens	  
within	   the	   borders	   of	   developed	   countries	   like	   the	  United	   States,	  which	   so	   far	  
have	   shown	   no	   interest	   in	   creating	   legislation	   that	   would	   favour	   indigenous	  
peoples’	   economic	   and	   cultural	   rights.	   As	   will	   become	   evident	   in	   the	   next	  
chapter,	   the	   same	  geographical	   limitation	  applies	   to	   the	  Archives	   and	   Libraries	  
that	  today	  collect	  indigenous	  culture	  and	  knowledge.	  While	  WIPO	  suggests	  that	  
Collections	   and	   Archives	   can	   protect	   indigenous	   art,	   and	   work	   as	   prior	   art,	  
proving	   that	   the	   production	   of	   a	   certain	   tangible	   object	   copied	   or	   stolen	   from	  
indigenous	   peoples	   is	   not	   new	   per	   se,	   however,	   the	   protection	   of	   indigenous	  
cultures	   remains	   fundamentally	   limited	   to	   its	   fixability	   and	   to	   the	   country	   that	  
collects	  the	  knowledge.	  In	  addition	  to	  that,	  the	  idea	  of	  recording	  the	  knowledge	  
finds	   little	   applicability	   to	   the	   intangible,	   sacred	   and	   secret	   heritage	   of	  
indigenous	   peoples.	   The	   next	   chapter	   will	   expand	   and	   complete	   this	   brief	  
introduction	  of	   the	  world	  of	   intellectual	  property	  and	  explain	  why,	  as	  of	   today,	  
indigenous	   secret	   knowledge	   and	   the	   role	   played	   by	   the	   guardians	   in	  








IP	  Laws	  and	  the	  Protection	  of	  Guardianship	  and	  Intangible	  Sacred	  
Knowledge:	  An	  Important	  Work	  in	  Progress	  
	  
In	   its	  complex	  significance,	  TK	   includes	   tangible	  knowledge,	   traditional	  ecologic	  
and	  medicinal	   knowledge	   -­‐	   the	   information	   indigenous	   peoples	   have	   gathered	  
over	  the	  centuries	  of	  a	  close	  relationship	  with	  the	  environment	  and	  its	  resources	  
–	  and	  the	  intangible	  forces	  that	  are	  inherently	  present	  in	  such	  healing	  remedies	  
(intangible	   knowledge),	   including	   the	   protocols	   used	   for	   their	   prescription	   and	  
utilization.	   The	   connection	   to	   land	   is	   essential	   in	   indigenous	   societies	   because	  
land	  is	  the	  place	  where	  the	  ancestors	  rest	  and	  are	  reunited	  with	  Mother	  Earth;	  
whereas	  Earth	  is	  perceived	  as	  a	  living	  being	  “whose	  activity	  radiates	  and	  respond	  
to	  human	  activity,	   so	   that	   all	   life	   could	  exist	   in	  harmony”.1	  In	  Dutfield’s	  words,	  
indigenous	  ecologic	  knowledge,	  TK	  and	  TCEs	  today	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  
global	  economy.2	  As	  such:	  	  
	  
Traditional	   peoples	   and	   communities	   are	   responsible	   for	   the	   discovery,	  
development,	   and	   preservation	   of	   a	   tremendous	   range	   of	   medicinal	   plants,	  
health-­‐giving	  herbal	   formulations,	  and	  agricultural	  and	   forest	  products	   that	  are	  
traded	  internationally	  and	  generate	  considerable	  economic	  value.3	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  that,	  indigenous	  peoples	  depended	  so	  much	  on	  the	  natural	  world	  
because	   they	  had	  no	  scientific	   tools	   to	  develop	  other	   forms	  of	  knowledge	   that	  
could	  help	   them	  maintain	   the	  well	   being	  of	   the	   community.	   The	  natural	  world	  
held	   all	   the	   resources	   that	   indigenous	   peoples	   thought	   necessary	   and	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  For	  further	  information	  see	  Julian	  Kunnie	  “The	  Future	  of	  Our	  World”	  in	  Jennifer	  IM	  Reid	  (ed)	  Religion	  and	  
Global	  Culture	  (Lexington	  Books,	  Oxford	  and	  New	  York,	  2004).	  
2	  “But	   accurately	   estimating	   the	   full	   value	   of	   TK	   in	  monetary	   terms	   is	   impossible,	   because	   TK	   is	   often	   an	  
essential	   component	   in	   the	  development	  of	  other	  products	  and	  because	  most	  TK-­‐derived	  products	  never	  
enter	  modern	  markets”	  see	  UN	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development,	  Systems	  and	  National	  Experiences	  
for	  Protecting	   Traditional	   Knowledge,	   Innovations	   and	   Practices:	   Background	   Note	   by	   the	   UNCTAD	  
Secretariat,	   Agenda	   Item	   3,	   at	   6	   see	   UN	   Doc	   TD/B/COM.1/EM.13/2	   (2000)	   electronic	   document	  
<www.unctad.org/trade_env/index.htm>	  last	  visited	  on	  02/01/2013.	  
3	  Graham	   Dutfield	   “TRIPS-­‐related	   Aspects	   of	   Traditional	   Knowledge”	   (2001)	   33	   Case	   Western	   Reserve	  
Journal	   of	   International	   Law	   electronic	   document	   <www.academia.edu/860241/TRIPS-­‐




“principle	  of	  walking	  in	  step	  with	  the	  natural	  world”4	  is	  still	  today	  fundamental	  in	  
many	   indigenous	   societies.	   The	   closeness	   with	   nature	   and	   the	   respect	   of	   its	  
rhythms	  however,	   has	   nothing	   to	   do	  with	   the	   romanticized	   idea	  of	   indigenous	  
societies	   “devoid	   of	   conflict	   and	   contradiction”.5	  It	   just	   means	   that	   over	   time,	  
indigenous	  peoples	   have	  developed	  a	   set	   of	   useful	   information	  on	  how	   to	  use	  
natural	  compounds	  to	  cure	  many	  illnesses.	  Since	  such	  knowledge	  is	  the	  result	  of	  
centuries	   of	   attempts	   and	   experiments,	   it	   is	   incredibly	   valuable	   for	   the	  
community	   and,	   often	   unfortunately,	   for	   the	   world	   at	   large	   which,	   today,	   is	  
trying	   to	   take	  a	   shortcut	   in	  empirical	   knowledge	  by	   stealing	  and	  commodifying	  
indigenous	   knowledge	   for	   the	  market.	  According	   to	  Kunnie,	  6	  today	   the	  25%	  of	  
the	  world’s	  medicinal	  products	  derive	  from	  “traditional	   indigenous	  forests”	  and	  
the	  “thousands	  of	  herbs,	  leaves,	  roots,	  and	  plants	  that	  served	  as	  medicinal	  cures	  
for	   indigenous	   peoples	   for	   millennia	   are	   now	   being	   expropriated,	   essentially	  
stolen,	   by	   the	   large	  Western	   biotech	   and	  pharmaceutical	   corporations	   -­‐	   all	   for	  
maximal	   profit”.	   Indeed,	   it	   would	   take	   years	   of	   frustrating	   experimentation	   in	  
laboratories	   to	   reach	   the	   same	   level	   of	   herbal	   and	   medicinal	   knowledge	   that	  
indigenous	   peoples	   hold.	   Some	   valuable	   TK	   may	   in	   fact	   survive	   only	   in	   the	  
secrecy	  and	  limitation	  of	  its	  transmission.	  Holders	  of	  knowledge	  might	  succeed	  in	  
safeguarding	   the	   disclosure	   of	   their	   knowledge	   by	   resorting	   to	   unfair	  
competition	   laws,	   which	   do	   not	   require	   prior	   registration	   or	   other	   legal	  
formalities.	  According	  to	  Correa,7	  in	   fact,	  “most	   laws	  require,	  as	  a	  condition	  for	  
protection,	   that	   the	   person	   in	   control	   of	   the	   information	   adopt	   the	   steps	  
necessary,	   under	   the	   relevant	   circumstances,	   to	   keep	   the	   information	  
confidential”8.	  	  
	  
The	   present	   chapter	   will	   analyse	   in	   more	   detail	   IP	   laws	   and	   how	   indigenous	  
peoples	  can	  use	  the	  system	  in	  place	  to	  safeguard	  their	  culture.	  This	  chapter	  will	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Julian	  Kunnie	  “The	  Future	  of	  Our	  World”	   in	   Jennifer	   IM	  Reid	   (ed)	  Religion	  and	  Global	  Culture	   (Lexington	  
Books,	  Oxford	  and	  New	  York,	  2004)	  at	  131.	  
5	  “Like	   all	   of	   the	   human	   community,	   Indigenous	   peoples’	   cultures	   were	   and	   are	   fraught	   with	   pain	   and	  
conflict	   as	   they	   struggle	   to	   shape	   sociocultural	   environments	   and	   live	   in	   increasingly	   complex	   societies”	  
supra	  at	  131.	  
6	  Kunnie	  at	  139.	  
7	  Carlos	   M	   Correa	   “Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Intellectual	   Property”	   (The	   Quaker	   United	   Nations	   Office	  
(QUNO),	  Genève,	  2001).	  




address	  the	  intangible	  sacred	  knowledge	  held	  by	  the	  guardians	  and	  the	  tangible	  
aspects	   of	   it.	   Indigenous	   culture	   and	   TK	   is	   a	   stratified	   system	   of	   interrelated	  
knowledge	  and	   information	   that	  does	  not	  always	  need	   to	   remain	  secret.	  Some	  
aspects	   of	   the	   secret	   intangible	   information,	   in	   fact,	   can	   be	   shared	   with	   the	  
public.	  In	  that	  case,	  IP	  laws	  can	  be	  of	  some	  help.	  This	  chapter	  will	  start	  discussing	  
the	   Agreement	   on	   Trade-­‐Related	   Aspects	   of	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	   (the	  
TRIPS	   Agreement)	   as	   the	   complex	   system	   of	   high	   minimum	   standards	   of	  
intellectual	  property	   rights	   that	  apply	   to	  all	  member	  states	  of	   the	  World	  Trade	  
Organisation.	   This	   chapter	   will	   also	   analyse	   broadly	   and	   in	   more	   detail	   the	   IP	  
provisions	  that	  can,	  in	  actual	  fact,	  protect	  indigenous	  knowledge.	  Unfortunately,	  
most	  of	   the	   arguments	  will	   prove	   that,	   as	  of	   today,	   IP	   laws	  are	   still	   unsuitable	  
solutions	   to	   the	   preservation	   of	   indigenous	   intangible	   cultures	   and	   especially	  
their	  sacred/secret	  knowledge.	  
	  
9.1	  -­‐	  The	  TRIPS	  Agreement:	  The	  High	  Minimum	  Standards	  That	  Govern	  the	  
World	  and	  the	  Indigenous	  Guardians	  of	  Intangible	  Knowledge	  	  
	  
The	   Agreement	   on	   Trade-­‐Related	   Aspects	   of	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	   (the	  
TRIPS	   Agreement)	   was	   introduced	   and	   administered	   by	   the	   World	   Trade	  
Organization	   (WTO)	   as	   an	   international	   agreement	   that	   sets	   high	   minimum	  
standards	   for	  most	  of	   the	  existing	   forms	  of	   intellectual	  property	   regulations	  as	  
applied	   to	  WTO	  member	   states.	   It	   was	   introduced	   in	   1994	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
Uruguay	  Round	  of	  the	  General	  Agreement	  on	  Tariffs	  and	  Trade	  (GATT).	  The	  TRIPS	  
Agreement	  incorporates	  most,	  but	  not	  all,	  the	  provisions	  discussed	  by	  the	  Berne	  
and	  Paris	  Conventions	  and	  goes	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  those	  two	  Conventions	  by	  
establishing	  higher	  and	  more	  specific	  norms	  safeguarding	  IP.	  It	  addresses	  seven	  
categories	  of	  intellectual	  property:	  copyright	  and	  related	  rights	  (copyright	  rights,	  
covering	  content	  producers	  including	  performers,	  producers	  of	  sound	  recordings	  
and	   broadcasting	   organizations),	   patents,	   trademarks	   and	   service	   marks,	  
geographical	   indications,	   undisclosed	   information	   or	   trade	   secrets,	   new	   plant	  




of	   origin.9	  The	   Agreement	   sets	   the	   minimum	   standards	   by	   requiring	   member	  
states	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   newest	   versions	   of	   the	   Paris	  
Convention	  and	  the	  Berne	  Convention.	  When	  considering	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement,	  
the	   fundamental	   question	   to	   be	   asked	   is:	   does	   the	   Agreement	   ‘adequately’	  
protect	   indigenous	   peoples’	   TK	   and	   TCEs,	   especially	   the	   intangible	   aspect	   of	  
them?	  	  
Though	  there	  is	  today	  consensus	  within	  WIPO	  and	  in	  the	  TRIPS	  Council	  that	  the	  
Agreement	   should	   be	   revised	   to	   include	   specific	   regulations	   tailor-­‐made	   to	  
safeguard	   indigenous	   cultures	   and	   the	   resources	   in	   their	   custody,	   such	  
expectations	   have	   so	   far	   brought	   little	   visible	   results. 10 	  Much	   of	   TK	   and	  
indigenous	  culture	   is,	   in	   fact,	   too	  old	  or	  already	   in	   the	  public	  domain	  and	  does	  
not	   qualify	   for	   traditional	   IP	   protection.	  Most	   of	   it	   is	   intangible	   and	   sacred.	   In	  
addition	   to	   that,	   and	   in	  most	   cases,	   the	   author	   or	   inventor	   is	   not	   identifiable,	  
which	   means	   that	   no	   ‘rights	   holder’	   can	   claim	   property	   rights	   over	   the	  
intellectual	  property.	  In	  other	  cases,	  the	  claimed	  rights	  reside	  in	  the	  custodian	  of	  
the	  knowledge	  who	  acts	  as	  guardian	  of	  both	  the	  knowledge	  and	  the	  product	  of	  
the	  knowledge.	  Traditional	  intellectual	  property	  law	  does	  not	  address	  the	  rights	  
of	   the	   guardians	   of	   knowledge.	   Broadly	   speaking,	   the	   system	   created	   by	   the	  
TRIPS	   recognises	   a	   level	   of	   protection	   of	   information	   of	   commercial	   use	   only	  
‘after’	   the	   knowledge	   has	   been	   brought	   to	   the	   public,	   which	   is	   what	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  “High	  Minimum	  Standards	  -­‐	   In	  respect	  of	  each	  of	  the	  main	  areas	  of	   intellectual	  property	  covered	  by	  the	  
TRIPS	  Agreement,	   the	  Agreement	   sets	   out	   the	  minimum	   standards	   of	   protection	   to	   be	   provided	  by	   each	  
Member.	  Each	  of	   the	  main	  elements	  of	  protection	   is	  defined,	  namely	  the	  subject-­‐matter	  to	  be	  protected,	  
the	   rights	   to	   be	   conferred	   and	   permissible	   exceptions	   to	   those	   rights,	   and	   the	   minimum	   duration	   of	  
protection.	  The	  Agreement	  sets	  these	  standards	  by	  requiring,	   first,	   that	  the	  substantive	  obligations	  of	   the	  
main	   conventions	   of	   the	   WIPO,	   the	   Paris	   Convention	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Industrial	   Property	   (Paris	  
Convention)	  and	  the	  Berne	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Literary	  and	  Artistic	  Works	  (Berne	  Convention)	  
in	   their	  most	   recent	   versions,	  must	   be	   complied	  with.	  With	   the	   exception	  of	   the	  provisions	  of	   the	  Berne	  
Convention	  on	  moral	   rights,	  all	   the	  main	  substantive	  provisions	  of	   these	  conventions	  are	   incorporated	  by	  
reference	  and	  thus	  become	  obligations	  under	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  between	  TRIPS	  Member	  countries.	  The	  
relevant	  provisions	  are	  to	  be	  found	  in	  Articles	  2.1	  and	  9.1	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement,	  which	  relate,	  respectively,	  
to	   the	  Paris	   Convention	   and	   to	   the	  Berne	  Convention.	   Secondly,	   the	   TRIPS	  Agreement	   adds	   a	   substantial	  
number	  of	  additional	  obligations	  on	  matters	  where	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  conventions	  are	  silent	  or	  were	  seen	  as	  
being	  inadequate.	  The	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  is	  thus	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  Berne	  and	  Paris-­‐plus	  agreement”	  
see	   World	   Trade	   Organization	   <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm>	   last	   visited	   on	  
16/02/2015.	  
10 	  See	   electronic	   documents	   at	   <https://tkbulletin.wordpress.com/category/2-­‐international-­‐
organisations/trips/>	   last	   visited	   on	   15/07/2015;	   see	   also	   WIPO	   “Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Sustainable	  
Development:	   	   Documentation	   and	   Registration	   of	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Traditional	   Cultural	  






customary	  laws	  of	  indigenous	  societies	  prevent	  the	  TK	  holders	  and	  guardians	  to	  
do.	   In	   the	   eyes	   of	   developing	   countries,11	  the	   TRIPS	   promotes	   the	   piracy	   of	  
indigenous	  TK	  and	  TCEs.	  Many	  of	  the	  developing	  countries	  are	  firmly	  aware	  that,	  
at	  this	  moment	  in	  time,	  and	  with	  the	  IPR	  laws	  currently	  circulating	  in	  the	  world,	  it	  
is	   impossible	   to	   defeat	   piracy	   and	  misappropriation.	   That	   is	  why,	   according	   to	  
Dutfield,12	  developing	  countries	  are	  seeking	  to	  create	  new	  standards	  of	  IP	  laws	  to	  
be	   inserted	   within	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement	   which	   would	   give	   harmonization	   of	  
meaning	  and	   intent	   to	   the	   international	   system	  of	   IP	   laws.	  The	   idea	   that	  TRIPS	  
does	   not	   benefit	   developing	   countries’	   interests	   is	   not	   new	   to	   the	   table	   of	  
negotiations.13 	  Though	   the	   nature	   of	   TRIPS	   indeed	   reflects	   the	   one	   of	   any	  
multilateral	   treaty,	   it	   unfortunately	   also	   reflects	   the	   longstanding	  global	  power	  
hierarchies	   today	   present	   in	   the	   world.	   As	   explained	   by	   Arewa, 14 	  “such	  
hierarchies	  are	  in	  large	  part	  a	  consequence	  of	  historical	  patterns	  of	  relationship,	  
particularly	   hierarchies	   of	   culture	   and	   power”.	   In	   other	   words,	   developed	  
countries	   are	   advantaged	   by	   the	   TRIPS	   more	   than	   developing	   countries.	   The	  
general	  feeling	  is	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  safeguard	  the	  rights	  of	  traditional	  communities	  
living	  within	   their	  borders,	  developing	  countries	  might	  need	  to	  get	  concessions	  
from	   developed	   countries.	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement	   requires	   that	  
WTO	   member	   States	   incorporate	   high	   minimum	   standards	   of	   intellectual	  
property	   protection	   into	   their	   domestic	   laws.	   As	   explained	   by	   Reichman	   in	   his	  
articles:15	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 	  See	   the	   list	   of	   developing	   countries	   electronic	   document	   <www.isi-­‐
web.org/component/content/article/5-­‐root/root/81-­‐developing>	  last	  visited	  on	  15/07/2015.	  
12	  Graham	   Dutfield	   “TRIPS-­‐related	   Aspects	   of	   Traditional	   Knowledge”	   (2001)	   33	   Case	   Western	   Reserve	  
Journal	   of	   International	   Law	   electronic	   document	   <www.academia.edu/860241/TRIPS-­‐
related_Aspects_of_Traditional_Knowledge>	  last	  visited	  on	  26/12/2012.	  
13	  Dutfield	  supra.	  
14	  “Hierarchies	  of	  culture	  reflect	  nineteenth	  century	  evolutionary	  assumptions	  about	  the	  relative	  status	  of	  
different	  cultures.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  such	  hierarchies,	  a	  relative	  ranking	  of	  cultures	  became	  predominant	  in	  the	  
nineteenth	   century.	   These	   evolutionary	   rankings	   assumed	   that	   all	   societies	   moved	   through	   an	   identical	  
progression	   from	   ‘savagery’	   to	   ‘barbarism’	   to	   ‘civilization’,	   and	   that	   European	   countries	   represented	  
“civilization”,	  or	  the	  apex	  of	  these	  rankings.	  Most	  current	  Third	  World	  countries	  were	  ranked	  on	  the	  lower	  
rungs	  of	  this	  evolutionary	  ladder	  by	  those	  at	  the	  top.	  …	  Such	  hierarchies	  became	  a	  justification	  for	  political	  
domination	  and	  suppression.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  global	  political	  structures	  that	  emerged	  in	  then	  nineteenth	  
century	   based	  on	   colonialism,	   for	   example,	   those	  who	   lived	   in	   cultures	   that	  were	  deemed	   less	   advanced	  
were	   often	   denied	   the	   opportunity	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   negotiations	   of	   accords	   and	   agreements	   that	  
directly	  concerned	  them”	  see	  Olufunmilayo	  B	  Arewa	  “TRIPS	  and	  Traditional	  Knowledge:	  Local	  Communities,	  
Local	  Knowledge,	  and	  Global	  Intellectual	  Property	  Frameworks”	  (2006)	  10	  2	  Marquette	  Intellectual	  Property	  
Law	  Review	  156	  at	  159.	  
15	  Jerome	  H	  Reichman	  “The	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  Comes	  of	  Ages:	  Conflict	  or	  Cooperation	  with	  the	  Developing	  
Countries?”	   (2000)	   2	  Case	  Western	  Reserve	   Journal	  of	   International	   Law	   441	   at	   442	  electronic	   document	  





…	   the	   international	  minimum	   standards	   of	   intellectual	   property	   protection	   set	  
out	   in	   the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  will	   eventually	  determine	   the	   level	  of	   competition	  
for	   knowledge	   goods	   that	   are	   sold	   or	   licensed	   on	   the	   global	   market	   that	  
emerged	  from	  the	  Agreement	  Establishing	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization.	  	  
	  
Even	   if	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement	   is	   based	   on	   the	   Paris	   and	   Berne	   Conventions,	   it	  
strategically	  prefers	  to	  set	  high	  international	  minimum	  standards	  that	  would	  be	  
achievable	   by	   every	   country. 16 	  Though	   the	   list	   of	   such	   standards	   is	   quite	  
thorough,	  it	  does	  not	  contain	  preferential	  or	  differential	  measures	  for	  developing	  
countries	  and	  leaves	  to	  states	  to	  implement	  the	  standards	  within	  their	  borders.	  
In	   this	   case,	   as	   clearly	   explained	   by	   Reichman,	  17	  the	   “costs	   of	   building	   and	  
staffing	   intellectual	   property	   systems,	   including	   patent	   offices	   and	   other	  
administrative	   agencies,	   constitute	   a	   palpable	   drain	   on	   very	   scarce	   resources”	  
which,	  added	  to	  the	  expense	  to	  send	  delegations	  to	  the	  WTO,	  WIPO	  and	  other	  
bodies’	  meetings,	  could	  hinder	  the	  capacity	  of	  states	  to	  effectively	  benefit	  from	  
TRIPS	  provisions	  or	  participating	  in	  their	  discussion	  and	  modification.	  In	  this	  case,	  
and	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  indigenous	  peoples	  live	  in	  developing	  countries,	  the	  
influence	   that	   representatives	   from	   developing	   countries	   could	   have	   in	   the	  
discussion	   of	   topics	   that	   directly	   affect	   them	   could	   be	   watered	   down	   to	  
insignificant	   non-­‐effecting	   levels.	   Article	   1.1	   of	   the	   TRIPS18	  explains	   that	   states	  
shall	   give	  effect	   to	   the	  provisions	  of	   the	  Agreement,	  but	   they	   shall	   “be	   free	   to	  
determine	   the	   appropriate	   method	   of	   implementing	   the	   provisions	   of	   this	  
Agreement	  within	  their	  own	  legal	  system	  and	  practice”.	  19	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  up	  
to	   states	   to	  decide	  when	  and	  how	   to	   implement	   the	   standards	  of	   the	  TRIPS	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  TRIPS	   Agreement	   “imposed	   a	   comprehensive	   set	   of	   relatively	   high	   international	   minimum	   standards	  
governing	  copyrighted	  literary	  and	  artistic	  works	  (including	  computer	  programs),	  rights	  related	  to	  copyright	  
law	   (including	   sound	   recordings),	   patents,	   trademarks,	   geographical	   indications	   of	   origin,	   trade	   secrets,	  
industrial	   designs,	   integrated	   circuits	   designs	   and	   even	   (indirectly)	   unfair	   competition.	   It	   does	   not	   cover	  
competition	   law,	   as	   such,	   although	   it	   touches	   on	   related	   issues,	   especially	   licensing	   agreements”	   see	  
Reichman	  at	  443.	  
17	  At	  450.	  
18	  “Members	  shall	  give	  effect	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  this	  Agreement.	  Members	  may,	  but	  shall	  not	  be	  obliged	  
to,	  implement	  in	  their	  law	  more	  extensive	  protection	  than	  is	  required	  by	  this	  Agreement,	  provided	  that	  such	  
protection	  does	  not	  contravene	  the	  provisions	  of	  this	  Agreement.	  Members	  shall	  be	  free	  to	  determine	  the	  
appropriate	  method	  of	   implementing	   the	  provisions	  of	   this	  Agreement	  within	   their	  own	   legal	   system	  and	  
practice”.	  
19	  For	   further	   information	   see	   Jerome	   H	   Reichman	   “The	   TRIPS	   Agreement	   Comes	   of	   Ages:	   Conflict	   or	  




their	   national	   legislation.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   undisclosed	   information,	   states	   could	  
expand	   and	   interpret	   the	   regulation	   in	   ways	   that	   could	   provide	   broader	  
protection	   for	   sensitive	   information	   held	   by	   indigenous	   peoples	   (this	   will	   be	  
discussed	  more	  thoroughly	  in	  the	  final	  chapter).	  This	  means	  that	  states	  which	  are	  
really	   keen	   to	   safeguard	   indigenous	   knowledge	   might	   expand	   the	   minimum	  
standard	  of	  TRIPS	  to	  include	  indigenous	  interests.	  However,	  what	  happens	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  states	  that	  have	  no	  actual	  interest	  in	  modifying	  their	  national	  legislation	  
to	   expand	   TRIPS	   international	   high	  minimum	   standards	   to	   a	   level	   that	   is	  more	  
suitable	  for	  indigenous	  holders	  of	  knowledge?	  	  
According	  to	  Dutfield,	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  no	  mention	  of	   indigenous	  TK	  in	  the	  
TRIPS	  does	  not	  prevent	  states	  from	  enacting	  legislation	  to	  protect	  such	  category	  
of	  knowledge.20	  In	  theory	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  establishes	  minimum	  standards21	  
for	   at	   least	   six	   categories	   of	   intellectual	   property	   that	   are	   relevant	   to	   the	  
protection	  of	  TK	  and	  TCEs:	  
	  
• Copyrights	  and	  Related	  rights	  (Section	  1);	  
• Industrial	  designs	  (Section	  4);	  
• Patents	  (Section	  5);	  
• Undisclosed	  information	  (Section	  7);	  
• Trademarks	  (Section	  2);	  and	  
• Geographical	  indication	  (Section	  3);	  
	  
It	  is	  generally	  known	  that	  copyrights	  and	  related	  rights,	  patents,	  trademarks	  and	  
geographical	   indications	   provide	   little	   protection	   to	   the	   knowledge	   in	   the	  
custody	  of	  indigenous	  guardians.	  The	  requirements	  for	  application	  under	  TRIPS,	  
in	  fact,	  are	  subjected	  to	  the	  Paris	  Convention	  (1967)	  and	  the	  Berne	  Convention	  
(1971).	   Both	  Conventions	   do	  not	   include	   indigenous	   peoples	   in	   their	   discourse	  
and	   in	   doing	   so,	   they	   set	   standards	   that	   are	   impossible	   to	   be	   respected	   by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Graham	   Dutfield	   “TRIPS-­‐related	   Aspects	   of	   Traditional	   Knowledge”	   (2001)	   33	   Case	   Western	   Reserve	  
Journal	   of	   International	   Law	   electronic	   document	   <www.academia.edu/860241/TRIPS-­‐
related_Aspects_of_Traditional_Knowledge>	  last	  visited	  on	  26/12/2012.	  
21 	  In	   the	   words	   of	   Reichman	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement	   imposes	   “a	   comprehensive	   set	   of	   relatively	   high	  
international	   minimum	   standards	   governing	   copyrighted	   literary	   and	   artistic	   works	   (including	   computer	  
programs),	   rights	  related	  to	  copyright	   law	  (including	  sound	  recordings),	  patents,	   trademarks,	  geographical	  
indications	  of	  origin,	  trade	  secrets,	  industrial	  designs,	  integrated	  circuit	  designs	  and	  even	  (indirectly)	  unfair	  
competition.	   It	  does	  not	   cover	   competition	   law,	  as	   such,	   although	   it	   touches	  on	   related	   issues,	  especially	  




indigenous	   peoples	   for	   the	   simple	   reason	   that,	   in	   indigenous	   societies,	   culture	  
evolves	   and	   is	   transmitted	   in	   ways	   that	   are	   often	   totally	   different	   from	   the	  
Western	  ones	  (see	  chapters	  2	  and	  6).	  
	  
9.1.1	  -­‐	  Patent	  Law	  
	  
The	  elements	  of	  patents’	  early	  history	  that	  we	  have	  inherited	  today	  include:	  
	  
• the	  patent	  system	  as	  a	  mechanism	  to	  encourage	  innovation;	  
• the	   notion	   of	   social	   contract	   between	   state	   and	  patentee,	  with	   corresponding	  
obligations	  on	  both	  sides;	  
• the	  centrality	  of	  monopoly	  to	  the	  regulation	  of	  that	  contract;	  
• the	  desire	  for	  a	  balance	  of	  interests	  as	  between	  society	  and	  the	  patentee;	  and	  
• the	   idea	   that	   the	   monopoly	   should	   rightly	   go	   to	   the	   inventor	   of	   the	   new	  
creation.22	  
	  
As	  such,	  patents	  grant	  monopoly	  and	  property	   rights	  over	   inventions.	  They	  are	  
granted	  for	  new,	  useful	  and	  non-­‐obvious	  inventions	  for	  a	  period	  of	  20	  years	  from	  
the	   filing	   date	   of	   a	   patent	   application.	   Art	   27.1	   of	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement	  
recognises	  as	  patentable	  subject	  matter:	  	  
	  
…	  patents	  shall	  be	  available	  for	  any	   inventions,	  whether	  products	  or	  processes,	  
in	  all	  fields	  of	  technology,	  provided	  that	  they	  are	  new,	  involve	  an	  inventive	  step	  
and	  are	  capable	  of	  industrial	  application.	  …	  patents	  shall	  be	  available	  and	  patent	  
rights	  enjoyable	  without	  discrimination	  as	  to	  the	  place	  of	  invention,	  the	  field	  of	  
technology	  and	  whether	  products	  are	  imported	  or	  locally	  produced.	  
	  
The	   applicability	   of	   patent	   law	   is	   clearly	   limited	   to	   those	   innovations	   that	   are	  
new,	  non-­‐obvious	  and	  capable	  of	   industrial	   application.	  The	  monopoly	  granted	  
by	  patent	  law	  is	  strictly	  economic	  and	  limited	  in	  time.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Hector	  MacQueen,	   Charlotte	  Waelde	   and	   others	  Contemporary	   Intellectual	   Property	   (Oxford	  University	  




In	  the	  case	  of	   indigenous	  peoples,	  words	   like	   ‘inventive	  step’,	   ‘new’,	  capable	  of	  
industrial	  application’,	  ‘non-­‐obvious’	  and	  ‘useful’	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  applicable	  to	  
indigenous	  culture.	  On	  the	  same	  line,	  patentability	  requires	  that	  the	  information	  
is	  disclosed	  during	  the	  application	  process.	  This	  means	  that	  indigenous	  ecologic	  
secret	  knowledge	   transmitted	  orally	  and	  over	   long	  periods	  of	   time	  will	  unlikely	  
benefit	  from	  patent	  law	  protection.	  Article	  29.1	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  requires	  
that	  applicants	  disclose	   sufficient	  and	  clear	   information	  about	   the	   invention	   so	  
that	  someone	  else	  “skilled	  in	  the	  art”	  might	  reproduce	  the	  product	  or	  complete	  
the	   process. 23 	  The	   approach	   is	   clearly	   focused	   on	   the	   profitability	   of	   the	  
invention,	  and	  gives	  little	  space	  to	  any	  holistic	  alternative	  approach.	  This	  means	  
that	   the	   knowledge	   attached	   to	   traditional	   remedies	   and	   related	   knowledge	  
must	   be	   put	   out	   there	   to	   be	   reproduced	   by	   others	  without	   benefit	   sharing	   or	  
prior	   informed	   consent.	   Someone	   once	   said	   “knowledge	   itself	   is	   power”.24	  
Disclosing	   knowledge	   not	   only	   gives	   others	   the	   power	   embodied	   in	   the	  
knowledge,	   but	   also	   the	   resources	   to	   make	   a	   personal	   profit	   out	   of	   the	  
knowledge	   that	   belonged	   to	   indigenous	   peoples.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Art	   27.2	  
allows	  states	  to:	  	  
	  
…	  exclude	  from	  patentability	  inventions,	  the	  prevention	  within	  their	  territory	  of	  
the	  commercial	  exploitation	  of	  which	  is	  necessary	  to	  protect	  the	  ordre	  public	  or	  
morality,	   including	   to	  protect	  human,	  animal	  or	  plant	   life	  or	  health	  or	   to	  avoid	  
serious	  prejudice	  to	  the	  environment,	  provided	  that	  such	  exclusion	  is	  not	  made	  
merely	  because	  the	  exploitation	  is	  prohibited	  by	  their	  law.	  	  
	  
However,	   the	   Agreement	   does	   not	   define	   what	   constitute	   “ordre	   public	   and	  
morality”,	   and	   to	   give	   states	   the	   flexibility	   to	   decide	   the	   parameters	   can	   be	  
potentially	   risky.25	  Article	   27.3(b)	   of	   the	   TRIPS,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   follows	   the	  
European	  Patent	   System	  of	  1973	  and,	   inter	   alia,	   encourages	  member	   states	   to	  
“provide	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  plant	  varieties	  either	  by	  patents	  or	  by	  an	  effective	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Art	   1:	  “Members	   shall	   require	   that	   an	   applicant	   for	   a	   patent	   shall	   disclose	   the	   invention	   in	   a	   manner	  
sufficiently	   clear	  and	  complete	   for	   the	   invention	   to	  be	   carried	  out	  by	  a	  person	   skilled	   in	   the	  art	  and	  may	  
require	  the	  applicant	  to	  indicate	  the	  best	  mode	  for	  carrying	  out	  the	  invention	  known	  to	  the	  inventor	  at	  the	  
filing	  date	  or,	  where	  priority	  is	  claimed,	  at	  the	  priority	  date	  of	  the	  application”.	  
24	  Sir	  Francis	  Bacon	  Meditationes	  Sacrae	  (1597).	  
25	  For	  further	  information	  see	  John	  Mugabe	  “Intellectual	  Property	  Protection	  and	  Traditional	  Knowledge”	  at	  




sui	  generis	   system	   or	   by	   any	   combination	   thereof”.	   This	   means	   that	   member	  
states	   must	   generally	   provide	   reasonable	   patent	   or	   sui	   generis	   protection	   for	  
microorganisms	   and	   for	   “nonbiological	   and	  microbiological	   processes”	   but	   not	  
for	   all	   life	   forms.	   The	   fact	   that	  much	   is	   left	   to	   states	  on	  how	   to	   guarantee	   the	  
safeguarding	   of	   the	   life	   forms	   present	   in	   their	   soil	   is,	   however,	   risky	   and	  
counterproductive.	  Not	   only	  might	   states	   decide	   not	   to	   implement	   regulations	  
safeguarding	  indigenous	  peoples’	  social	  and	  cultural	  rights	  but,	  as	  it	  is	  explained	  
in	  the	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Sub-­‐Commission	  on	  Human	  
Rights	  -­‐	  Resolution	  2000/7:26	  
	  
…	   actual	   or	   potential	   conflicts	   exist	   between	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   TRIPS	  
Agreement	  and	  the	  realization	  of	  economic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  rights	  in	  relation	  
to,	  inter	  alia,	  impediments	  to	  the	  transfer	  of	  technology	  to	  developing	  countries,	  
the	  consequences	  for	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  the	  right	  to	  food	  of	  plant	  variety	  rights	  
and	   the	   patenting	   of	   genetically	   modified	   organisms,	   “bio-­‐piracy”	   and	   the	  
reduction	   of	   communities’	   (especially	   indigenous	   communities’)	   control	   over	  
their	  own	  genetic	  and	  natural	  resources	  and	  cultural	  values,	  and	  restrictions	  on	  
access	   to	   patented	  pharmaceuticals	   and	   the	   implications	   for	   the	   enjoyment	   of	  
the	  right	  to	  health.	  	  
	  
In	   other	   words,	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement	   sets	   standards	   that,	   while	   reflective	   of	  
international	   and	   national	   IPR	   laws	   built	   on	   the	  model	   of	   the	   Berne	   and	   Paris	  
Conventions,	   are	   not	   in	   line	   with	   fundamental	   human	   rights	   standards	   as	  
expressed	  in	  the	  UDHR	  (Art	  27.2)	  as	  well	  as	  ILO	  Convention	  169,	  UNDRIP,	  ICESCR	  
and	   ICCPR,	  which	  guarantee	  the	  rights	  to	   life,	   to	  property,	   to	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  
one’s	  own	  cultural	   life,	   the	   right	  of	  everyone	   to	  enjoy	   the	  benefits	  of	   scientific	  
progress	  and	  its	  applications,	  the	  right	  to	  health,	  the	  right	  to	  food,	  and	  the	  right	  
to	  self-­‐determination.	  The	  Resolution	  explains	  that:27	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Office	   for	   The	   High	   Commissioner	   for	   Human	   Rights,	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	   and	   Human	   Rights	  
Sub-­‐Commission	   on	   Human	   Rights	   -­‐	   Resolution	   2000/7	   electronic	   document	  
<www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/SRHRL/PDF/IHRDArticle15/E-­‐CN_4-­‐SUB_2-­‐RES-­‐2000-­‐7_Eng.pdf>	   last	  
visited	  on	  16/02/2015.	  
27	  “Requests	  Governments	  to	   integrate	   into	  their	  national	  and	   local	   legislations	  and	  policies,	  provisions,	   in	  
accordance	  with	   international	   human	   rights	  obligations	   and	  principles,	   that	  protect	   the	   social	   function	  of	  
intellectual	  property’,	   ‘Requests	   intergovernmental	  organizations	   to	   integrate	   into	   their	  policies,	  practices	  
and	  operations,	  provisions,	   in	  accordance	  with	   international	  human	   rights	  obligations	  and	  principles,	   that	  





…	  since	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  does	  not	  adequately	  reflect	  
the	  fundamental	  nature	  and	  indivisibility	  of	  all	  human	  rights,	  including	  the	  right	  
of	  everyone	  to	  enjoy	  the	  benefits	  of	  scientific	  progress	  and	  its	  applications,	  the	  
right	   to	  health,	   the	   right	   to	   food	  and	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination,	   there	  are	  
apparent	  conflicts	  between	  the	   intellectual	  property	  rights	  regime	  embodied	   in	  
the	  TRIPS	  Agreement,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  international	  human	  rights	  law,	  on	  
the	   other	   hand.	   Consequently,	   states	   should	   give	   primacy	   of	   human	   rights	  
obligations	  over	  economic	  policies	  and	  agreements.	  
	  
This	  means	  that	  the	  set	  of	  rights	  recognised	  to	  belong	  to	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  
not	  respected	  under	  TRIPS.	  Which	  includes	  the	  above	  and	  what	  today	  is	  believed	  
to	   form	   the	   cultural	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   and	   non-­‐indigenous	   peoples.	   On	   a	  
practical	  level,	  when	  analysing	  the	  scope	  of	  Art	  27.3	  (b)	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  
on	  plant	  varieties,	  Mugabe	  explains	  that	  the	  terms	  “effective	  sui	  generis	  system”	  
used	   in	   the	  article	  are	  essentially	   controversial.28	  First,	   there	   is	  no	  definition	  of	  
‘effectiveness’,	  which	  means	  that	  any	  state	  can	  argue	  in	  favour	  of	  their	  national	  
system	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   interpretation	   it	   gives	   to	   the	   word	   ‘effectiveness’;	  
second,	   too	   much	   decision	   making	   is	   left	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   national	   legislation,	  
which	  means	   that,	   in	   the	   case	   states	   are	  not	   keen	   to	   implement	   ‘effective’	   sui	  
generis	   legislation,	  there	  is	  not	  much	  that	  can	  be	  done	  to	  address	  the	  problem.	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   as	   Mugabe	   explains,	   the	   open	   interpretation	   of	   the	   term	  
‘effective	  sui	  generis	  system’	  allows	  developing	  countries	  to	  engage	  in	  “devising	  
and	  promoting	  non-­‐patent	  measures”	  that	  would	  safeguard	  indigenous	  peoples’	  
knowledge.29 	  Unfortunately,	   national	   legislation	   can	   only	   prevent	   a	   patent’s	  
application	  within	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  state.	  They	  have	  no	  say	  in	  case	  the	  patent	  is	  
issued	   within	   the	   territorial	   borders	   of	   a	   state	   different	   from	   the	   one	   that	  
originated	  the	  knowledge.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  to	  fulfil	  the	  duty	  under	  article	  2,	  paragraph	  1,	  article	  11,	  paragraph	  
2,	  and	  article	  15,	  paragraph	  4,	  to	  cooperate	  internationally	  in	  order	  to	  realize	  the	  legal	  obligations	  under	  the	  
Covenant,	  including	  in	  the	  context	  of	  international	  intellectual	  property	  regimes”	  (para	  5,6	  and	  7)	  electronic	  
document<www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/c462b62cf8a07b13c12569700046704e?Opendocum
ent>	  last	  visited	  on	  02/01/2013.	  
28	  See	   John	   Mugabe	   “Intellectual	   Property	   Protection	   and	   Traditional	   Knowledge”	   electronic	   document	  
<www.oapi.wipo.net/export/sites/www/tk/en/hr/.../pdf/mugabe.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  26/12/2012.	  




9.1.2	  -­‐	  Copyright	  Law	  
	  
In	  general,	  Copyright	  law	  protects:30	  
	  
• literary	  works	  such	  as	  novels,	  poems,	  plays,	  reference	  works,	  newspaper	  
articles;	  
• computer	  programs,	  databases;	  
• films,	  musical	  compositions,	  and	  choreography;	  
• artistic	  works	  such	  as	  paintings,	  drawings,	  photographs,	  and	  sculpture;	  and	  
• architecture;	  and	  advertisements,	  maps,	  and	  technical	  drawings.	  
	  
The	  artistic	  works	  must	  be	  original	  and	  fixed.31	  According	  to	  WIPO:32	  
	  
The	  expression	  copyright	  refers	  to	  the	  main	  act	  which,	  in	  respect	  of	  literary	  and	  
artistic	  creations,	  may	  be	  made	  only	  by	  the	  author	  or	  with	  his	  authorization.	  That	  
act	  is	  the	  making	  of	  copies	  of	  the	  work.	  The	  expression	  author’s	  rights	  refers	  to	  
the	  creator	  of	  the	  artistic	  work,	  its	  author.	  It	  thus	  underlines	  the	  fact,	  recognized	  
in	  most	  laws,	  that	  the	  author	  has	  certain	  specific	  rights	  in	  his	  creation	  which	  only	  
he	  can	  exercise.	  
	  
Article	  9	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement,	  which	  deals	  with	  Copyright	  not	  only	  requests	  
full	   compliance	  with	  “Article	  1	   through	  21	  of	   the	  Berne	  Convention	   (1971)	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See	   WIPO	   at	   <www.wipo.int/copyright/en/>	   last	   visited	   on	   13/07/2015;	   and	   WIPO	   at	  
<www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/909/wipo_pub_909.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  13/07/2015. 
31	  Article	  2	  of	  the	  Berne	  Convention	  states	  that:	  “(1)	  The	  expression	  ‘literary	  and	  artistic	  works’	  shall	  include	  
every	  production	   in	   the	   literary,	   scientific	   and	  artistic	   domain,	  whatever	  may	  be	   the	  mode	  or	   form	  of	   its	  
expression,	  such	  as	  books,	  pamphlets	  and	  other	  writings;	  lectures,	  addresses,	  sermons	  and	  other	  works	  of	  
the	  same	  nature;	  dramatic	  or	  dramatico-­‐musical	  works;	  choreographic	  works	  and	  entertainments	  in	  dumb	  
show;	  musical	  compositions	  with	  or	  without	  words;	  cinematographic	  works	  to	  which	  are	  assimilated	  works	  
expressed	  by	  a	  process	  analogous	  to	  cinematography;	  works	  of	  drawing,	  painting,	  architecture,	  sculpture,	  
engraving	   and	   lithography;	   photographic	   works	   to	   which	   are	   assimilated	   works	   expressed	   by	   a	   process	  
analogous	  to	  photography;	  works	  of	  applied	  art;	  illustrations,	  maps,	  plans,	  sketches	  and	  three-­‐dimensional	  
works	   relative	   to	   geography,	   topography,	   architecture	   or	   science.	   (2)	   It	   shall,	   however,	   be	   a	   matter	   for	  
legislation	   in	   the	   countries	  of	   the	  Union	   to	  prescribe	   that	  works	   in	   general	  or	   any	   specified	   categories	  of	  
works	   shall	   not	   be	   protected	   unless	   they	   have	   been	   fixed	   in	   some	   material	   form.	   (3)	   Translations,	  
adaptations,	  arrangements	  of	  music	  and	  other	  alterations	  of	  a	  literary	  or	  artistic	  work	  shall	  be	  protected	  as	  
original	  works	  without	  prejudice	  to	  the	  copyright	  in	  the	  original	  work.	  (4)	  It	  shall	  be	  a	  matter	  for	  legislation	  
in	   the	   countries	   of	   the	  Union	   to	   determine	   the	   protection	   to	   be	   granted	   to	   official	   texts	   of	   a	   legislative,	  
administrative	  and	  legal	  nature,	  and	  to	  official	  translations	  of	  such	  texts.	  (5)	  Collections	  of	  literary	  or	  artistic	  
works	  such	  as	  encyclopaedias	  and	  anthologies	  which,	  by	  reason	  of	  the	  selection	  and	  arrangement	  of	  their	  
contents,	  constitute	  intellectual	  creations	  shall	  be	  protected	  as	  such,	  without	  prejudice	  to	  the	  copyright	  in	  
each	  of	  the	  works	  forming	  part	  of	  such	  collections”.	  
32	  See	  WIPO	   electronic	   document	   <www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/909/wipo_pub_909.pdf>	  




the	   Appendix	   thereto”,	   but	   guarantees	   protection	   to	   “expressions	   and	   not	   to	  
ideas,	  procedures,	  methods	  of	  operation	  or	  mathematical	  concepts	  as	  such”.	  	  
As	  seen	  before,	  most	  of	  indigenous	  culture	  is	  important	  for	  its	  intrinsic	  meaning	  
and	   not	   for	   the	   economic	   value	   it	   would	   hold	   once	   commodified.	   As	   such,	  
nothing	  that	  resides	  in	  the	  intangible	  world	  can	  find	  any	  protection	  under	  Art	  9	  
of	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement.	  And,	  as	  well	  described	  in	  the	  present	  work,	  most	  of	  the	  
intrinsic	   value	   of	   indigenous	   cultures	   resides	   in	   the	   intangibility	   of	   the	   idea	  
(sacred/spiritual	   or	   not)	   that	   inspired	   the	   final	   product.	   Therefore,	   the	   TRIPS	  
Agreement	  fails	  to	  safeguard	  indigenous	  cultural	  rights	  such	  as:	  
	  
§ the	  right	  to	  protection	  of	  artistic,	  literary	  and	  scientific	  works;	  
§ the	  right	  to	  develop	  a	  culture;	  
§ the	  right	  to	  respect	  the	  cultural	  identity;	  
§ the	  right	  of	  minority	  peoples	  to	  respect	  for	  identity,	  traditions,	  language,	  and	  
cultural	  heritage;	  
§ the	  right	  of	  a	  people	  to	  its	  own	  artistic,	  historical,	  and	  cultural	  wealth;	  and	  
§ the	  right	  of	  people	  not	  to	  have	  an	  alien	  culture	  imposed	  on	  them.	  
	  
As	   Dutfield	   points	   out	   in	   his	   articles,	   the	   unsuitability	   of	   IPR	   laws	   and	   the	  
minimum	   standards	   enforced	   by	   the	   TRIPS	   could	   be	   resolved	   if	   there	  was	   the	  
actual	  will	  to	  do	  so.33	  The	  fact	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  often	  not	  informed	  of	  
the	  discussions	  and	  decisions	   taken	  at	   the	  national	  and	   regional	   level	   involving	  
their	  TK	  and	  cultural	  resources	  is	  a	  clear	  indication	  of	  that.	  Moreover,	  it	  prevents	  
indigenous	  peoples	  from	  having	  any	  say	  in	  the	  decisions	  affecting	  their	  lives	  and	  
cannot	   therefore	   have	   any	   significant	   impact	   on	   the	   reasoning	  of	   the	  Western	  
law	   purists	   who	   believe	   that	   everything	   should	   be	   based	   on	   a	   Western	   legal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  “Given	   the	   way	   copyright	   has	   been	   transformed	   to,	   for	   example,	   treat	   computer	   programs	   as	   literary	  
works,	   it	  hardly	  seems	  radical	   to	  extend	  the	  definition	  of	  copyrightable	  subject	  matter	   to	  unfixed	  cultural	  
expressions	   or	   even	   to	   create	   a	   new	   IPR	   based	   on	   copyright	   for	   such	   an	   end”	   …	   “However,	   the	   most	  
powerful	   actors	   in	   international	   IPR	   negotiations	   are	   still	   resistant	   to	   the	   idea	   of	  modifying	   international	  
copyright	   rules	   to	  more	  effectively	  protect	   folklore.	  And	   to	  date,	  developing	   country	  proposals	   to	   reform	  
TRIPS	  to	  protect	  TK	  have	  paid	   little	  attention	  to	  copyright”	  see	  Graham	  Dutfield	  “TRIPS-­‐related	  Aspects	  of	  
Traditional	  Knowledge”	  (2001)	  33	  Case	  Western	  Reserve	  Journal	  of	   International	  Law	  electronic	  document	  





model.34	  Copyright	  law	  also	  forces	  indigenous	  peoples	  to	  count	  on	  a	  legal	  system	  
that,	   contrary	   to	   their	   customary	   laws,	   does	   not	   protect	   the	   secrecy	   and	  
intangibility	  of	  the	  information	  in	  the	  custody	  of	  the	  guardians.	  
	  
9.1.3	  –	  Undisclosed	  Information	  
	  
Concerning	   secret	   knowledge	   and	   secret	   information,	   the	   only	   protection	  
guaranteed	   by	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement	   is	   Article	   39,	   which	   provides	   that	   WTO	  
members	   must	   protect	   undisclosed	   information	   and	   data	   submitted	   to	  
governments	   as	   a	   means	   to	   “ensure	   effective	   protection	   against	   unfair	  
competition	  as	  provided	  in	  Art	  10	  bis	  of	  the	  Paris	  Convention”.35	  Article	  39.2	  of	  
the	   TRIPS	   Agreement	   states	   that	   “natural	   and	   legal	   persons	   shall	   have	   the	  
possibility	   of	   preventing	   information	   lawfully	   within	   their	   control	   from	   being	  
disclosed	  to,	  acquired	  by,	  or	  used	  by	  others	  without	   their	  consent	   in	  a	  manner	  
contrary	  to	  honest	  commercial	  practice”.	  So	  long	  as	  such	  information:	  	  
	  
(a)	   is	  secret	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	   is	  not,	  as	  a	  body	  or	  in	  the	  precise	  configuration	  
and	  assembly	  of	  its	  components,	  generally	  known	  among	  or	  readily	  accessible	  to	  
persons	   within	   the	   circles	   that	   normally	   deal	   with	   the	   kind	   of	   information	   in	  
question;	  	  
(b)	  has	  commercial	  value	  because	  it	  is	  secret;	  and	  	  
(c)	  has	  been	  subject	  to	  reasonable	  steps	  under	  the	  circumstances,	  by	  the	  person	  
lawfully	  in	  control	  of	  the	  information,	  to	  keep	  it	  secret.	  	  
	  
Undisclosed	  information	  and	  unfair	  competition	  in	  theory	  provide	  the	  holder	  of	  
knowledge	   with	   some	   form	   of	   protection;	   however	   they	   do	   not	   provide	   the	  
holder	  of	  secret	   information	  with	  an	  exclusive	  right	  to	  the	   information	   itself.	   In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  As	   introduced	   in	   chapter	   5,	   In	   fact,	   and	   not	   surprisingly,	   indigenous	   peoples	   are	   most	   of	   the	   times	  
formally	   and	   deliberately	   excluded	   from	   those	   avenues	   where	   issues	   important	   to	   them	   are	   discussed	  
(TRIPS	   included).	  They	  have	  no	  voice	   to	  actually	  present	   the	   real	  nature	  of	   the	   issue	  as	   it	   is	  perceived	  by	  
them,	  and	  have	  no	  vote	  power	  to	   influence	  whatsoever	  the	  decisions	  that	  will	  ultimately	  affect	  their	   lives	  
and	  the	  survival	  of	  their	  tangible	  and	  intangible	  cultures.	  
35	  “Because	   the	   Paris	   Convention	   did	   not	   extend	   the	   repression	   of	   unfair	   competition	   to	   acts	   involving	  
unauthorized	  use	  of	  test	  data	  in	  absence	  of	  fraud,	  the	  language	  of	  Article	  39	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  seems	  
to	  indicate	  that	  its	  actual	  purpose	  is	  to	  expand	  the	  examples	  listed	  in	  Article	  10	  bis	  of	  the	  Paris	  Convention	  
and	  which	  illustrate	  the	  various	  modalities	  of	  acts	  of	  unfair	  competition	  that	  must	  be	  repressed”	  see	  Nuno	  
Pires	  de	  Carvalho	  The	  TRIPS	  Regime	  of	  Antitrust	  and	  Undisclosed	  Information	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International,	  The	  




general,	   they	   only	   prevent	   acts	   of	   disclosure,	   acquisition	   and	   use	   without	  
consent	   and	   contrary	   to	   honest	   business	   practice	   within	   a	   competition	  
environment.	  Any	  undisclosed	   information	  which	  holds	   economic	   value	   can	  be	  
considered	  trade	  secrets.	  While	  patents	  cover	  inventions	  that	  are	  “useful,	  novel	  
and	  non-­‐obvious	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  existing	  knowledge”36	  (see	  also	  Art	  27	  of	  the	  
TRIPS	  Agreement),	  and	  copyrights	  protect	  original,	  fixed	  artistic	  creations,	  trade	  
secrets	   law	   can	   cover	   any	   useful	   information	   seeking	   protection	   for	   unspecific	  
length	  of	  time.	  However,	  the	  information	  seeking	  protection	  under	  trade	  secret	  
law	  needs	  to	  have	  actual	  or	  potential	  economic	  value.	  The	  information	  needs	  to	  
be	   inherently	   ‘technological’	   and	   no	   individual	   creator	   of	   the	   trade	   secret	   is	  
required	  neither	  to	  file	  a	  formal	  application	  to	  be	  entitled	  to	  its	  protection.37	  In	  
addition	  to	  that,	  the	  secrecy	  covered	  by	  trade	  secret	  is	  not	  absolute,	  but	  relative,	  
and	   it	   can	   therefore	   protect	   relatively	   secret	   TK	   and	   only	   as	   long	   as	   the	  
information	   has	   technological	   connotation	   and	   an	   economic	   value.	   Again,	   the	  
intangible,	  sacred	  aspect	  of	  indigenous	  cultures	  seems	  to	  remain	  unprotected	  by	  
the	   laws	   of	   undisclosed	   information	   and	   trade	   secrets.	   In	   a	   practical	  way,	   and	  
given	  that	  much	  of	  indigenous	  culture	  is	  of	  old	  lineage	  and	  traditional	  per	  se,	  its	  
reproduction	  could	  be	  blocked	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  the	  reproduction	  is	  based	  
on	   a	   pre-­‐existing	   idea	   which	   is	   stolen	   or	   unlawfully	   reproduced.	   As	   the	   next	  
section	  will	  prove,	  to	  claim	  prior	  art	  over	  reproduced	  knowledge	  could	  work	  to	  
prevent	   the	   circulation	   of	   the	   reproduction,	   but	   it	   does	   not	   safeguard	   the	  
sacred/secret	   idea/knowledge/information	   that	   is	   being	   disclosed.	   Secrecy,	   in	  






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  “An	  invention	  must	  meet	  several	  criteria	   if	   it	   is	  to	  be	  eligible	  for	  patent	  protection.	  These	   include,	  most	  
significantly,	  that	  the	  invention	  must	  consist	  of	  patentable	  subject	  matter,	  the	  invention	  must	  be	  industrially	  
applicable	  (useful),	  it	  must	  be	  new	  (novel),	  it	  must	  exhibit	  a	  sufficient	  ‘inventive	  step’	  (be	  non-­‐obvious),	  and	  
the	  disclosure	  of	  the	  invention	  in	  the	  patent	  application	  must	  meet	  certain	  standards”	  see	  WIPO	  Intellectual	  
Property	  Handbook:	  Policy,	  Law	  and	  Use	  (2008)	  at	  para	  2.6.	  
37	  	  For	   further	   information	  on	   the	  subject	   see	  Deepa	  Varadarajan	  “A	  Trade	  Secret	  Approach	   to	  Protecting	  
Traditional	   Knowledge”	   electronic	   document	   <www.yjil.org/print/volume-­‐36-­‐issue-­‐2/a-­‐trade-­‐secret-­‐




9.2	  -­‐	  Traditional	  Knowledge,	  Archives	  and	  Prior	  Art	  
	  
Over	   the	   years,	  WIPO	   has	   tried	   to	   bridge	   the	   gap	   that	   still	   divides	   indigenous	  
peoples’	   TK	   and	   IP	   laws	   by	   becoming	  more	   aware	   and	   inclusive	   of	   indigenous	  
peoples’	   cultural	   expectations.	   One	   of	   the	   improvements	   is	   the	   understanding	  
that	   indigenous	  peoples’	   culture	   is	   not	   a	   commodity	   and	   cannot	  be	   treated	   as	  
such.	   The	   holders	   of	   knowledge	   are	   not	   necessarily	   the	   whole	   indigenous	  
community	  where	   the	  knowledge	  exists,	  but	   rather	  some	  selected	  members	  of	  
it;	   the	   custodian	   is	   not	   necessarily	   the	   creator;	   and	   the	   creation	   might	   not	  
constitute	   property	   but	   exists	   outside	  Western	   stereotypes.	  WIPO	  agrees	   that,	  
while	  the	   idea	  of	   ‘protection’	   is	  a	  defensive	  mechanism	  necessary	  to	  guarantee	  
the	  economic	  value	  of	  a	  production,	  when	   it	  comes	  to	   indigenous	  peoples,	   the	  
notion	  of	  protection	  alone	   is	  not	  enough.	   Indigenous	  peoples	  need	   ‘protection’	  
of	  material	  (tangible)	  and	  non-­‐material	  (intangible)	  forms	  from	  unauthorized	  use	  
made	   by	   third	   parties;	   but	   they	   also	   need	   the	   ‘preservation/survival’	   of	   their	  
cultures.	  Preservation	   includes	  the	  conservation	  of	  the	   living	  cultural	  and	  social	  
context	  that	  created	  the	  TK	  and	  TCEs	  so	  that	  the	  complex	  structure	  of	  indigenous	  
societies	   and	   customary	   laws	   is	  maintained;	   as	  well	   as	   the	  preservation	  of	   the	  
spiritual,	   holistic	   traditions	   of	   the	   community.38 	  WIPO’s	   suggestions	   for	   the	  
preservation	   of	   indigenous	   knowledge	   are	   often	   unrealistic	   and	   unpractical,	   if	  
not	   unethical.	   In	   order	   to	   preserve	   their	   culture,	   and	   make	   sure	   that	   the	  
preservation	  process	   happens	  without	   fail,	  WIPO	   recommends	   that	   indigenous	  
peoples	  should	  fix	  and	  document	  their	  cultures	  and,	  what	  is	  worse,	  their	  sacred	  
and	   secret	   knowledge.39	  So,	   first	  WIPO	   suggests	   that	   the	   only	  way	   to	   preserve	  
indigenous	  culture	  is	  to	  maintain	  the	  social	  and	  traditional	  structure	  from	  which	  
the	   knowledge	   originated;	   then	   it	   suggests	   to	   dismantle	   that	   very	   same	  
traditional	   structure	   by	   documenting	   a	   culture	   that,	   more	   often	   than	   not,	   is	  
profoundly	  holistic,	  often	  sacred,	  orally	  transmitted	  and	  guarded	  by	  few.	  Again,	  
WIPO	   unrealistically	   proposes	   to	   preserve	   the	   knowledge	   by	   bringing	   it	   to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  See	   WIPO	   Practical	   Workshop	   for	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   and	   Local	   Communities	   on	   IP	   and	   Traditional	  
Knowledge	  Doc	  WIPO/IPTK/GE/14;	  see	  Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Genetic	  
Resources,	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  and	  Folklore	  at	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/23/INF/8.	  
39	  See	   WIPO	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	  




public	   domain,	   which	   is	   the	   place	   where	   TK	   and	   TCEs	   are	   today	   exploited.	   In	  
addition	   to	   that,	   the	   idea	   that	   third	   parties	   would	   be	   responsible	   to	   preserve	  
indigenous	  peoples’	  culture	  is	  very	  challenging.	  Third	  parties’	  unrestricted	  access	  
to	   indigenous	   peoples’	   TK	   and	   TCEs	   could	   not	   only	   go	   against	   the	   ethical	   and	  
moral	   values	   of	   the	   community	   that	   originated	   the	   knowledge,	   but	   the	  
registration	   by	   third	   parties	   of	   restricted	   spiritual	   information	   without	   the	  
authorization	  of	  the	  custodians	  of	  the	  knowledge	  is	  ethically	  and	  morally	  wrong	  
regardless	  of	  the	  intention	  of	  those	  who	  document	  the	  culture.	  The	  preservation	  
of	   indigenous	   knowledge	   can	   only	   be	   guaranteed	   if	   the	   persons	   within	   the	  
community	   who	   have	   traditionally	   been	   responsible	   for	   its	   conservation	   and	  
transmission	   can	   manage	   it.	   WIPO	   recognises	   that	   the	   tension	   related	   to	   the	  
preservation	  of	  indigenous	  culture	  occurs:40	  
	  
…	  most	  obviously	  when	  preservation	  is	  undertaken	  without	  the	  authorization	  of	  
the	  traditional	  owner	  or	  custodian.	  For	  example,	  the	  unauthorized	  recording	  of	  
performances	  of	  expressions	  of	  folklore	  or	  the	  documentation	  or	  dissemination	  
without	   consent	   of	   traditional	   medical	   knowledge	   that	   may	   be	   considered	  
confidential	   or	   secret;41	  or	   …	   when	   the	   process	   of	   preservation	   is	   undertaken	  
with	   the	   consent	   or	   involvement	   of	   the	   TK	   holder,	   but	   the	   TK	   and	   TCE	   is	  
unwittingly	  or	   incidentally	  undermines	  protection	  of	  TK	  or	  TCEs	  -­‐	  this	  can	  occur	  
when	   material	   is	   recorded	   or	   documented	   without	   full	   understanding	   of	   the	  
implications.	   	   Hence	   the	   process	   of	   preservation	   can	   be	   in	   tension	   with	   the	  
desire	   to	  protect	  TK	  and	  TCEs	  when	  disclosure,	   recording	  or	  documentation	  of	  
this	   material	   undermines	   interests	   and	   precludes	   potential	   IP	   rights,	   and	  may	  
place	  it	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  without	  the	  originating	  community’s	  or	  TK	  holder’s	  
awareness	  of	  or	  consent	  to	  the	  full	  implications	  of	  preservation.	  	  
	  
In	   other	   words,	  WIPO	   recognises	   that	   conflicts	   can	   arise	   any	   time	   the	   holistic	  
culture	  of	   indigenous	  peoples	   is	  managed	  by	   third	  parties	  who	  might	  not	  have	  
the	   proper	   resources	   (cultural,	   moral,	   traditional,	   linguistic	   etc)	   to	   fully	  
understand	  the	  culture	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  manage.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  See	  WIPO	  supra	  at	  29.	  
41	  See	   WIPO	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	  




In	  its	  2007	  report,	  42	  WIPO	  claims	  again	  that,	  in	  recognition	  of	  “its	  importance	  as	  
part	   of	   the	   collective	   cultural	   heritage	   of	   humanity”,	   indigenous	   TK	   and	   TCEs	  
should	   be	   made	   available	   to	   a	   wider	   public.	   The	   assertion	   is	   unequivocal;	   it	  
means	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  should	  disregard	  traditional	  customary	  laws	  and	  
bring	  to	  that	  very	  same	  public	  domain	  that	  destroyed	  their	  culture	  what	  is	  left	  of	  
their	  traditions,	  with	  the	  risk	  to	  see	  their	  TK	  and	  TCEs	  exploited	  even	  further.43	  
The	   idea	  proposed	  by	  WIPO	  goes	  against	  a	   series	  of	   regulations	   that	   recognise	  
indigenous	  peoples’	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  and	  freedom	  to	  dispose	  of	  their	  
cultures	   as	   they	   so	   decide.44	  It	   is	   possible	   that	   what	   WIPO	   is	   implying	   is	   the	  
recognition	   of	   profoundly	   unfair	   measures	   that	   today	   form	   part	   of	   the	  
international	  and	  national	  intellectual	  property	  system	  that	  was	  created	  to	  serve	  
the	  economic	  needs	  of	  the	  creative	  and	  technological	  production	  of	  the	  Western	  
elite.	  What	  WIPO	   seems	   to	   suggest	   is	   that	   the	   system	   is	   well	   established	   and	  
functioning	  and	  the	  fact	  that	   indigenous	  voices	  are	  today	  stronger	  than	  before,	  
forces	  states	  to	  take	  unprecedented	  measures	  to	  include	  indigenous	  voices	  into	  
an	   IP	   system	   that	   was	   not	   created	   to	   include	   them.	   In	   fact,	   the	   system	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  See	   WIPO	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	  
Knowledge	  and	  Folklore	  (Genève,	  2007)	  see	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/11/9	  at	  25.	  
43 	  At	   page	   11	   of	   the	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	  
Traditional	  Knowledge	  and	  Folklore	  (2014)	  it	  is	  restated	  that:	  “[Member	  States]/[Contracting	  Parties]	  should	  
[endeavour	   to],	   subject	   to	   and	   consistent	   with	   national	   and	   customary	   law:	   (a)	   facilitate/encourage	   the	  
development	   national	   traditional	   knowledge	   databases	   for	   the	   defensive	   protection	   of	   traditional	  
knowledge,	  [including	  through	  the	  prevention	  of	  the	  erroneous	  grant	  of	  patents],	  and/or	  for	  transparency,	  
certainty,	   conservation	   purposes	   and/or	   transboundary	   cooperation;	   (b)	   [facilitate/encourage,	   as	  
appropriate,	  the	  creation,	  exchange	  and	  dissemination	  of,	  and	  access	  to,	  databases	  of	  genetic	  resources	  and	  
traditional	   knowledge	   associated	   with	   genetic	   resources;]”	   see	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	  
Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Folklore	   (Twenty-­‐Eighth	   Session,	  
Genève,	  2014)	  at	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/28/5.	  
44	  Article	  13	  of	   the	  UNDRIP	   states	   that	   “indigenous	  peoples	  have	   the	   right	   to	   revitalize,	  use,	  develop	  and	  
transmit	  to	  future	  generations	  their	  histories,	   languages,	  oral	  traditions,	  philosophies,	  writing	  systems	  and	  
literatures,	  and	  to	  designate	  and	  retain	  their	  own	  names	  for	  communities,	  places	  and	  persons”;	  Article	  31	  is	  
very	  clear	  about	   indigenous	  rights	  over	  their	  culture	  by	  stating	  that	  “indigenous	  peoples	  have	  the	  right	  to	  
maintain,	  control,	  protect	  and	  develop	  their	  cultural	  heritage,	  traditional	  knowledge	  and	  traditional	  cultural	  
expressions,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  manifestations	  of	  their	  sciences,	  technologies	  and	  cultures,	  including	  human	  and	  
genetic	   resources,	   seeds,	   medicines,	   knowledge	   of	   the	   properties	   of	   fauna	   and	   flora,	   oral	   traditions,	  
literatures,	  designs,	  sports	  and	  traditional	  games	  and	  visual	  and	  performing	  arts.	  They	  also	  have	  the	  right	  to	  
maintain,	   control,	   protect	   and	   develop	   their	   intellectual	   property	   over	   such	   cultural	   heritage,	   traditional	  
knowledge,	  and	  traditional	  cultural	  expressions”; Article	  3	  of	   ILO	  169	  recommend	  states	   that	  “Indigenous	  
and	   tribal	   peoples	   shall	   enjoy	   the	   full	   measure	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   fundamental	   freedoms	   without	  
hindrance	  or	  discrimination”	  whereas	  Article	  7.1	  recognizes	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  “shall	  have	  the	  right	  to	  
decide	  their	  own	  priorities	  for	  the	  process	  of	  development	  as	   it	  affects	  their	   lives,	  beliefs,	   institutions	  and	  
spiritual	   well-­‐being	   and	   the	   lands	   they	   occupy	   or	   otherwise	   use,	   and	   to	   exercise	   control,	   to	   the	   extent	  
possible,	   over	   their	   own	   economic,	   social	   and	   cultural	   development”;	   Article	   8	   of	   ILO	   169	   recommends	  
states	  “in	  applying	  national	  laws	  and	  regulations	  to	  the	  peoples	  concerned,	  due	  regard	  shall	  be	  had	  to	  their	  
customs	   or	   customary	   laws”	   and	   “these	   peoples	   shall	   have	   the	   right	   to	   retain	   their	   own	   customs	   and	  
institutions,	  where	  these	  are	  not	  incompatible	  with	  fundamental	  rights	  defined	  by	  the	  national	  legal	  system	  





should	  accommodate	  indigenous	  claims	  is	  ill	  suited	  to	  discuss	  them	  or	  to	  resolve	  
the	  disputes	  involving	  indigenous	  peoples	  TK	  and	  TCEs.	  
It	   is	   today	   widely	   suggested	   that	   the	   creation	   of	   digital	   libraries	   and	   national	  
archives	   could	   safeguard	   indigenous	   peoples’	   cultures	   preserving	   them	   from	  
disappearance	   and,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	  work	   as	   ‘prior	   art’.	   The	   idea	   of	   creating	  
digital	  libraries	  documenting	  TK	  and	  TCEs	  would,	  in	  fact,	  help	  indigenous	  peoples	  
to	   prove	   that	   the	   art	   being	   exploited	   by	   outsiders	   constitutes	   prior	   art.45	  This	  
would	   eventually	   defeat	   any	   attempt	   to	   patent	   or	   copyright	   indigenous	  
knowledge	   by	   proving	   that	   novelty	   on	   the	   disclosed	   information	   has	   no	   legal	  
basis.	  Patent	  law	  indeed	  requires	  that	  the	  invention	  presents	  an	  innovative	  step,	  
with	  a	   level	  of	  novelty46	  and	   industrial	   applicability,47	  and	   the	  proof	  of	   the	  pre-­‐
existence	  of	  the	  information	  included	  in	  the	  invention	  can	  hinder	  its	  patentability	  
and	   the	   monopoly	   it	   grants.	   The	   famous	   Turmeric	   (United	   States	   Patent	   No.	  
5,401.504)	   and	  Ayahuasca	   (Banisteriopsis	   Caapi,	  United	   States	   Plant	   Patent	  No	  
5,751)	  cases,	  among	  others,	  are	  two	  very	  famous	  examples	  in	  which	  the	  patent	  
system	   was	   stretched	   to	   its	   limits	   and	   “failures	   in	   the	   prior	   art	   search	   and	  
examination	   process	   paved	   the	  way	   to	   questionable	   patents	   being	   granted”.48	  
The	   only	   reason	   why	   the	   patents	   were	   revoked	   is	   because	   there	   was	   vast	  
documentation	  attesting	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  compounds	  and	  their	  healing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  “An	  invention	  is	  new	  if	  it	  is	  not	  anticipated	  by	  the	  prior	  art.	  ‘Prior	  art’	  is,	  in	  general,	  all	  the	  knowledge	  that	  
existed	   prior	   to	   the	   relevant	   filing	   or	   priority	   date	   of	   a	   patent	   application,	   whether	   it	   existed	   by	  way	   of	  
written	  or	  oral	  disclosure.	  The	  question	  of	  what	  should	  constitute	  ‘prior	  art’	  at	  a	  given	  time	  is	  one	  which	  has	  
been	  the	  subject	  of	  some	  debate”	  see	  WIPO	  Intellectual	  Property	  Handbook	  (2004)	  at	  para	  2.15;	  The	  Patent	  
Regulation	  Treaty	  defines	  prior	  art	  as	  “relevant	  prior	  art	   shall	   consist	  of	  everything	  which	  has	  been	  made	  
available	  to	  the	  public	  anywhere	  in	  the	  world	  by	  means	  of	  written	  disclosure	  (including	  drawings	  and	  other	  
illustrations)	  and	  which	   is	  capable	  of	  being	  of	  assistance	   in	  determining	  that	  the	  claimed	  invention	   is	  or	   is	  
not	  new	  and	  that	  it	  does	  or	  does	  not	  involve	  an	  inventive	  step	  (i.e.,	  that	  it	  is	  or	  is	  not	  obvious),	  provided	  that	  
the	  making	  available	  to	  the	  public	  occurred	  prior	  to	  the	  international	  filing	  date”	  see	  Rule	  33	  (a).	  
46	  “It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  novelty	   in	  patent	   law	  means	   little	  more	  than	  that	   the	  claimed	   invention	   is	  not	  
disclosed	   in	   the	   ‘prior	  art’.	  What	  counts	  as	  prior	  art	  and	  how	  novelty	  and	  non-­‐obviousness	  are	  defined	   in	  
various	  patent	   systems	  around	   the	  world	   is	  highly	   variable.	   In	   some	   regimes,	  patent	  protection	  has	  been	  
granted	  for	  elements	  of	  TK,	  or	   innovations	  based	  on	  TK.	   In	  cases	  where	  the	  patents	  have	  been	  sought	  by	  
third	   parties	   without	   the	   prior	   consent	   and	   involvement	   of	   TK	   holders,	   there	   has	   been	   considerable	  
controversy”	   see	   Charles	   McManis	   and	   Yolanda	   Teran	   “Trends	   and	   Scenarios	   in	   the	   Legal	   protection	   of	  
Traditional	   Knowledge”	   in	   Tzen	   Wong	   and	   Graham	   Dutfield	   (eds)	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Human	  
Development	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  2012)	  at	  150.	  
47	  Art	  27.1	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  states	  that:	  “Subject	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  paragraphs	  2	  and	  3,	  patents	  shall	  be	  
available	  for	  any	  inventions,	  whether	  products	  or	  processes,	   in	  all	   fields	  of	  technology,	  provided	  that	  they	  
are	   new,	   involve	   an	   inventive	   step	   and	   are	   capable	   of	   industrial	   application.	   Subject	   to	   paragraph	  4	   of	  
Article	  65,	   paragraph	  8	  of	  Article	  70	   and	  paragraph	  3	  of	   this	  Article,	   patents	   shall	   be	   available	   and	  patent	  
rights	   enjoyable	  without	  discrimination	  as	   to	   the	  place	  of	   invention,	   the	   field	  of	   technology	  and	  whether	  
products	  are	  imported	  or	  locally	  produced”.	  
48	  See	  Manuel	   Ruiz	  The	   International	  Debate	   on	   Traditional	   Knowledge	  as	   Prior	  Art	   in	   the	  Patent	   System:	  




properties.	  The	  documentation	  submitted	  by	  indigenous	  peoples	  worked	  as	  prior	  
art	  and	  invalidated	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  remedy	  was	  new	  and	  involved	  an	  inventive	  
step.	  What	   happens	   in	   cases	  when	   such	   documentation	   does	   not	   exist?	  What	  
happens	  in	  the	  case	  of	  knowledge	  that	  is	  not	  recorded	  because	  it	  is	  too	  sacred	  to	  
be	  fixed	  in	  material	  form?	  
Indeed,	  there	  is	  today	  a	  general	  trend,	  especially	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  to	  push	  to	  
consider	  ‘ecological’	  knowledge	  held	  by	  custodians	  as	  part	  of	  the	  national	  public	  
domain	   in	   total	   disregard	   of	   what	   indigenous	   custodians	   of	   knowledge	   may	  
think.	  The	  assumption	  is,	  in	  fact,	  pushed	  through	  without	  the	  formal	  consent	  of	  
the	   custodians	   of	   the	   knowledge.	   Unquestionably,	   the	   discourse	   has	   no	  
reasonable	   groundings;	   indigenous	   peoples	   developed	   their	   ecological	  
knowledge	   over	   centuries	   of	   attempts	   and	   tests	   on	   their	   own	   skin,	   often	  with	  
very	   harmful	   results.	   Theirs	   is	   the	   development	   of	   compounds	   that	   work	   in	  
synergy	  with	  other	  compounds	  to	  heal	  the	  human	  body	  and	  soul.	  Theirs	  are	  the	  
steps	  that	  were	  taken	  to	  the	  acquisition	  of	  the	  knowledge;	  theirs	  the	  restrictions	  
they	  put	  into	  place	  to	  safeguard	  the	  knowledge	  and	  its	  usage.	  Western	  societies	  
pretend	   to	   arrive	   centuries	   later	   and	   claim	   a	   knowledge	   they	   never	   helped	   to	  
create,	  on	  the	  sole	  basis	   that	   they	  have	  the	  power	  and	  resources	   to	  do	  so	  and	  
society	  at	  large	  might	  benefit	  from	  the	  mass	  distribution	  of	  the	  compound.	  From	  
a	   logical	  and	  moral	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  argument	  does	  not	  make	  any	  sense.	  The	  
fact	   that	  Western	   societies’	   tailor-­‐made	   laws	   enforcing	   the	   total	   illogicality	   of	  
such	  presumptions	  indicates	  the	  protraction	  of	  a	  moral	  and	  economic	  monopoly	  
that	   would	   always	   defeat	   indigenous	   claims.	   According	   to	   the	   Human	  
Development	  Report	  2004:	  Cultural	   Liberty	   in	  Today’s	  Diverse	  World	  published	  
by	   the	  UNDP	   (United	  Nations	  Development	  Program),49	  misappropriation	  of	   TK	  
and	   TCEs	   does	   not	   need	   to	   be	   deliberate	   in	   order	   to	   be	   seriously	   harmful	   for	  
indigenous	  communities.	  In	  many	  cases:  
 
…	  it	  arises	   from	  mistakenly	   treating	   traditional	  knowledge	  as	  part	  of	   the	  public	  
domain,	   where	   intellectual	   property	   protection	   does	   not	   apply.	   Traditional	  
knowledge,	  because	  it	   is	  known	  publicly	  within	  the	  community	  (and	  sometimes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  The	   Human	   Development	   Report	   2004:	   Cultural	   Liberty	   in	   Today’s	   Diverse	  World	   electronic	   document	  




outside	   it),	   is	   more	   prone	   to	   appropriation	   without	   compensation	   to	   the	  
community	  that	  developed	  it	  than	  are	  other	  types	  of	  intellectual	  property.50	  
	  
Even	   if	   indigenous	  peoples	  were	  actually	   keen	   to	   share	   the	  knowledge	   in	   their	  
custody	  that	  is	  not	  sacred	  and	  secret,	  this	  would	  implicate	  their	  management	  of	  
the	   knowledge,	   the	  prior	   informed	   consent	   in	   the	  utilisation	  of	   the	   knowledge	  
and	   the	   benefit	   sharing	   once	   the	   knowledge	   acquires	   value	   in	   the	   general	  
marketplace.	   It	   would	   also	   imply	   that	   some	   of	   the	   more	   sensible	   cultural	  
information	   must	   remain	   secret	   and	   shared	   only	   by	   very	   few	   within	   the	  
indigenous	   community.	   In	   addition	   to	   that,	   community	   management	   of	  
resources	  and	  TK	  might	  vary	  greatly	  among	  communities	  of	  the	  same	  areas,	  and	  
they	  might	  as	  well	   consider	   the	  concept	  and	  usage	  of	   ‘property	   rights’	   forming	  
Western	   IP	   laws	  as	   totally	   inapplicable	  and	   inadequate	   to	   their	  TK	  and	  TCEs	   to	  
the	  point	   that,	   in	   some	  cases,	   custodians	  of	   knowledge	  have	   “actively	  pursued	  
enforcement	  of	   their	   customary	  entitlements	  against	   third	  parties	  dealing	  with	  
these	  artefacts	  allegedly	  without	  their	  consent”.51	  While	  Western	  societies	   limit	  
their	  interest	  in	  the	  production	  of	  goods,	  linking	  profitability	  to	  the	  speed	  of	  the	  
mass	   production,	   for	   indigenous	   peoples	   the	   TCE	   is	   the	   cultural	   result	   of	  
transmitted	   and	  evolving	   crafting	   skills	   imbued	  with	   traditional	   knowledge	   and	  
holistic	   forces.	   The	   fixation	  of	   a	   design	  might	   pass	   through	   a	   complex	   array	   of	  
approvals	  by	  elders	  and	  custodians	  whose	  duty	  is	  to	  control	  the	  correct	  usage	  of	  
the	   intangible	   information	   embodied	   in	   the	   design.	   When	   Western	   societies	  
suggest	   that	   the	   fixation	  and	  storage	  of	   sensible	   indigenous	   information	  would	  
be	   useful	   to	   hinder	   the	   granting	   of	   patent	   and	   copyright	   rights	   over	   TK,	  
traditional	  ecologic	  knowledge	  and	  TCEs,	  they	  purposefully	  ignore	  the	  fact	  that,	  
in	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  indigenous	  peoples	  should	  put	  the	  knowledge	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  
strangers,	   where	   the	   utilisation,	   the	   prior	   informed	   consent	   and	   the	   benefit	  
sharing	  are	  not	  necessarily	  guaranteed,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  respect	  for	  the	  intangible	  
spiritual	  information	  encoded	  in	  the	  design.	  Such	  an	  action	  could	  also	  be	  in	  total	  
breach	   of	   the	   sacred	   customs	   of	   the	   community	   and	   the	   customary	   laws	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  UNDP	  The	  Human	  Development	  Report	  2004:	  Cultural	  Liberty	  in	  Today’s	  Diverse	  World	  (2005).	  	  
51	  See	   Haidy	   Geismar	   “Copyright	   in	   Context:	   Carvings,	   Carvers,	   and	   Commodities	   in	   Vanuatu”	   (2005)	   5	   1	  




protect	  it.52	  In	  addition	  to	  that,	  most	  of	  the	  legal	  books	  limit	  TK	  to	  a	  generalized	  
corpus	   of	   ecological	   information,	   whereas	   TK	   is	   a	   rather	   more	   complex	  
phenomena	  sometimes	  known	  by	  very	  few	  within	  the	  community	  and	  carefully	  
guarded	  (see	  Chapter	  3);	  or	  it	  can	  be	  an	  ensemble	  of	  information	  shared	  within	  
the	   community	   or	  with	   neighbouring	   communities	   living	   in	   the	   same	   area	   and	  
using	   the	   same	   natural	   remedies. 53 	  Therefore,	   the	   disclosure	   of	   sensitive	  
information,	  be	  it	  in	  medicines,	  crafts,	  art,	  dances,	  songs	  or	  any	  other	  intangible	  
information	   contained	   in	   the	   tangible,	   would	   have	   the	   same	   result	   of	  
undermining	  the	  cultural	  identity	  and	  survival	  of	  a	  community	  whose	  sustenance	  
and	  traditionality	  depends	  on	  the	  expressions	  of	  its	  culture.	  	  
The	  UNDP	  Human	  Development	  Report	  recognises	  the	  importance	  to	  respect	  the	  
different	  cultures	  that	  inhabit	  the	  world	  without	  imposing	  asymmetric	  power	  so	  
that	  some	  cultures	  do	  not	  impose	  on	  others,54	  and	  stresses	  that	  “the	  traditional	  
knowledge	   of	   indigenous	   groups	   has	   attributes	   of	   communal	   ownership	   and	  
sometimes	   has	   spiritual	   significance.	   Intellectual	   property	   regimes	   fail	   to	  
recognize	  either	  the	  community	  ownership	  or	  spiritual	  significance	  of	  traditional	  
knowledge”. 55 	  WIPO	   and	   members	   states	   have	   identified	   several	   ways	   to	  
improve	  the	  status	  of	  TK	  as	  prior	  art	  such	  as,	  inter	  alia,	  measures	  for:	  	  
	  
(1)	   the	   classification	   of	   traditional	   knowledge	   documentation	   in	   patent	  
documents	   and	   non-­‐patent	   literature,	   in	   particular	   through	   the	   International	  
Patent	  Classification;	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  Referring	   to	   indigenous	   customs,	   Article	   23	   of	   ILO	   169	   affirms	   that	   “handicrafts,	   rural	   and	   community-­‐
based	   industries,	   and	   subsistence	   economy	   and	   traditional	   activities	   of	   the	   peoples	   concerned,	   such	   as	  
hunting,	   fishing,	   trapping	   and	   gathering,	   shall	   be	   recognized	   as	   important	   factors	   in	   the	  maintenance	   of	  
their	   cultures	   and	   in	   their	   economic	   self-­‐reliance	   and	   development.	   Governments	   shall,	   with	   the	  
participation	  of	  these	  people	  and	  whenever	  appropriate,	  ensure	  that	  these	  activities	  are	  strengthened	  and	  
promoted”.	  
53	  “TK	   is	   diverse	   in	   its	   nature,	   and	   is	   often	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   the	   life,	   laws,	   customs	   and	   culture	   of	   the	  
communities	  that	  develop	  and	  maintain	  it.	  For	  some	  communities,	  illegitimate	  use	  of	  their	  TK	  is	  offensive	  or	  
disturbing,	   and	   this	   includes	   the	   grant	   of	   patents	   that	   improperly	   include	   TK	   within	   their	   scope.	   TK	   is	  
frequently	   the	   result	  of	  distinct	  and	  valuable	  knowledge	   systems	  and	   the	   intellectual	  development,	  often	  
with	  a	  strong	  empirical	  and	  practical	  element,	  and	  is	  considered	  by	  many	  to	  have	  practical	  and	  technological	  
value,	  as	  well	  as	  having	  broader	  cultural	  value	  and	  significance	  for	  the	  communities	  that	  develop,	  preserve	  
and	  maintain	  TK	  through	  traditional	  mechanisms”	  see	  WIPO	  Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	  Intellectual	  
Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Folklore	   (2006)	   Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/8	   at	  
para	  2.	  
54	  “The	   unequal	   economic	   and	   political	   powers	   of	   countries,	   industries	   and	   corporations	   cause	   some	  
cultures	  to	  spread,	  others	  to	  wither”	  see	  UNDP	  The	  Human	  Development	  Report	  2004:	  Cultural	  Liberty	   in	  
Today’s	  Diverse	  World	   (2005)	  89	  electronic	  document	   <hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr04_complete.pdf>	   last	  
visited	  on	  27/11/2012.	  




(2)	   the	   integration	   of	   traditional	   knowledge-­‐related	   periodicals	   in	   minimum	  
documentation	  lists	  for	  non-­‐patent	  literature;	  	  
(3)	  the	  further	  evolution	  of	  search	  and	  examination	  procedures;	  and	  	  
(4)	   increased	   searching	   of	   databases	   and	   digital	   libraries	   containing	   traditional	  
knowledge	  documentation	  data.56 	  	  
	  
Given	   the	   possibilities	   described	   by	  WIPO	   above,	   the	   creation	   of	   national	   and	  
regional	  databases	  and	  archives	  could	  be	  unworkable	   in	  the	   long	  run	  and	  bring	  
more	  harm	  than	  benefit	  to	  indigenous	  communities.	  First,	  while	  the	  archives	  and	  
digital	  databases	  could	  be	  regularly	  searched	  by	  Patent	  Offices	  all	  over	  the	  world	  
to	  assess	  the	  novelty	  of	  the	  product	  whose	  patent	  is	  pending,	  documentation	  of	  
the	  knowledge	  will	  not,	  in	  fact,	  guarantee	  the	  benefit	  sharing	  with	  the	  holders	  of	  
the	   knowledge	   in	   question.	   Then,	   as	   clearly	   questioned	   by	   Dutfield	   in	   his	  
article:57	  “How	   would	   TK	   have	   to	   be	   described	   in	   order	   to	   constitute	   novelty-­‐
destroying	  prior	  art?”	  Dutfield	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  plant	  compounds	  that,	  once	  
isolated	   and	  mixed	  with	   other	   natural	   or	   non-­‐natural	   remedies,	   can	   present	   a	  
degree	  of	  newness	  that	  will	  make	  the	  new	  remedy	  eligible	  for	  patenting.	  The	  fact	  
that	  the	  compound	  is	  isolated	  and	  mixed	  with	  new	  compounds	  might	  not	  change	  
the	   fact	   that	   the	   intrinsic	  properties	  of	   the	  compound	  were	  detected	  and	  used	  
first	   by	   the	   indigenous	   community	   which	   firstly	   understood	   its	   properties.	  
Biologically,	   compounds	  might	  be	  mixed	  with	  other	   genes	   and	   yet	  maintaining	  
the	   same	   characteristics	   they	   originally	   had	   in	   isolation.	   As	   pointed	   out	   by	  
Dutfield,	  58	  in	   fact,	   one	   can	   win	   the	   novelty	   argument	   by	   just	   changing	   “the	  
substance	  of	  life-­‐form	  in	  some	  way	  such	  as	  by	  adding	  something	  to	  it	  (eg	  a	  gene),	  
subtracting	  something	  from	  it	   (eg	  purifying	   it),	  mixing	   it	  with	  something	  else	  to	  
create	  a	  new	  or	  synergetic	  effect,	  or	  structurally	  modifying	  it	  so	  that	  it	  differs	  in	  
an	   identifiable	  manner	   from	  what	   it	   was	   before”.	   He	   also	   reminds	   the	   reader	  
that	   in	   some	   jurisdictions,	   it	   is	   actually	   possible	   to	   get	   a	   patent	   on	   a	   natural	  
substance	  by	  simply	  describing	  it	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  a	  language	  of	  biochemistry,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 	  WIPO	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	  
Knowledge	  and	  Folklore	  (2001)	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/6	  at	  para	  68.	  
57	  Graham	  Dutfield	  “Legal	  and	  Economic	  Aspects	  of	  Traditiional	  Knowledge”	  in	  Keith	  E	  Maskus	  and	  Jerome	  H	  
Reichman	   (eds)	   International	   Public	   Goods	   and	   Transfer	   of	   Technology	   Under	   a	   Globalized	   Intellectual	  
Property	  Regime	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  2005)	  at	  510.	  
58	  See	   Graham	   Dutfield	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	   and	   the	   Life	   Science	   Industries:	   a	   Twentieth	   Century	  




which	   would	   dismiss	   centuries	   of	   oral	   transmission	   and	   description	   of	   the	  
substance	   and	   its	   use. 59 	  On	   a	   more	   local	   level,	   the	   sharing	   of	   restricted	  
information	  in	  databases	  could	  cause	  great	  harm	  to	  the	  community	  and	  to	  those	  
who	   are	   appointed	   as	   guardians	   of	   the	   knowledge,	   and	   facilitate	   a	   process	   of	  
exploitation	  that	   indigenous	  peoples	  are	   trying	   to	  prevent.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  
that	  the	  creation	  of	  archives	  and	  databases	  of	  TK	  is	  entirely	  wrong.	  The	  Yekuna	  
peoples	   of	   the	   Amazon	   basin,	   for	   example,	   have	   developed	   a	   cultural	   archive	  
that	   is	   used	   for	   pedagogic	   purposes	   in	   schools	   to	   educate	   children	   to	   the	  
ceremonies	  and	  traditions	  of	  the	  community	  and	  defend	  the	  TK	  from	  any	  form	  of	  
unlawful	   exploitation.60	  The	   same	   happened	   in	   India,	   with	   the	   institution	   of	   a	  
navigable	  computerised	  database	  (known	  as	  the	  TKDL)	  of	  documented	  TK	  related	  
to	   medical	   remedies	   and	   plants	   which	   contains	   approximately	   thirty	   million	  
entries	   of	   Indian	   TK.	   The	   initiative	  was	   organized	  by	   the	  Department	   of	   Indian	  
Systems	   of	   Medicine	   and	   Homeopathy,	   and	   supervised	   by	   an	   interdisciplinary	  
task	   force.61	  The	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   Resource	   Classification	   (TKRC,	   2001)62	  
was	  created	  as	  an	  Indian	  digital	  knowledge	  repository	  of	  traditional	  knowledge,	  
especially	   medicinal	   plants	   and	   formulations	   used	   in	   medicine.	   Today,	   it	  
represents	   an	   “innovative,	   structured	   classification	   system	   that	   has	   been	  
designed	  to	  facilitate	  the	  systematic	  arrangement,	  dissemination	  and	  retrieval	  of	  
the	   information	   in	   the	   traditional	   knowledge”	   and	   it	   simplifies	   the	   access	   to	  
traditional	  knowledge,	  remedies	  and	  practices.63	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Dutfield	  supra.	  
60	  See	   Jo	   Recht	   “Hearing	   Indigenous	   Voices,	   Protecting	   Indigenous	   Knowledge”	   (2009)	   16	   International	  
Journal	  of	  Cultural	  Property	  233	  at	  242.	  
61	  	   “For	   this	   objective,	   a	   national	   task	   force	   has	   been	   created	  which	   has	   already	   collected	   and	  processed	  
various	   published	   data	   on	   traditional	   medicinal	   plants.	   It	   is	   supposed	   that	   the	   data	   collection	   will	   be	  
included	  in	  the	  worldwide	  intellectual	  property	  digital	   library	  to	  constitute	  searchable	  prior	  art.	  Annex	  I	  to	  
this	  document	  includes	  an	  extract	  of	  the	  data	  showing	  basic	  contents	  of	  TKDL	  …	  With	  a	  view	  to	  facilitating	  
access	   to	   TKDL,	   the	   task	   force	   has	   also	   elaborated	   the	   draft	   of	   the	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   Resources	  
Classification	   (TKRC)	   relating	   to	   traditional	   medicine	   in	   India.	   Its	   extract	   is	   shown	   in	   Annex	   II	   to	   this	  
document.	  The	  development	  of	  TKRC	  has	  been	  influenced,	  to	  a	  considerable	  extent,	  by	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  
IPC”	  see	  WIPO	  Special	  Union	  for	  the	  International	  patent	  Classification	  (IPC	  UNION)	  Committee	  of	  Experts	  
(2001)	  Doc	  IPC/CE/30/9	  <www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/classifications/en/ipc.../ipc_ce_30_9.pdf>	  last	  visited	  
on	  25/09/2012.	  
62	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  Resource	  Classification	  (TKRC)	  electronic	  document	  
<www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl/langdefault/common/TKRC.asp>	  last	  visited	  on	  19/10/2012.	  
63	  “The	  TKRC	  is	  based	  on	  the	  International	  patent	  Classification	  system	  (IPC),	  with	  the	  information	  classified	  
under	  section,	  class,	  subclass,	  group	  and	  subgroup	  for	  the	  convenience	  of	  its	  use	  by	  the	  international	  patent	  
examiners”	  see	  Report	  of	  the	  Commission	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  -­‐	  Integrating	  Intellectual	  Property	  
Rights	  and	  Development	  Policy,	  at	  Chapter	  4	  –	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  and	  Geographical	  Indications	  (London	  




The	   archives	   could	   indeed	  work	   for	   the	   knowledge	   that	   is	   entering	   the	   public	  
domain	   (or	   at	   risk	   to	   enter	   it)	   and	   is	   fundamentally	   of	   a	   tangible	   nature.	  
However,	   archives	   would	   be	   of	   no	   use	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   intangible	  
aspects	   of	   the	   tangible.	   In	  most	   cases	   it	   would	   indeed	   be	   highly	   immoral	   and	  
unlawful	  (according	  to	  tribal	  laws)	  to	  share	  sacred/secret	  knowledge	  with	  all	  the	  
members	   of	   the	   community	   who	   are	   not	   supposed	   to	   know	   about	   such	  
knowledge.	   The	   same	   applies	   for	   the	   sacred	   rituals	   in	  which	   the	   knowledge	   is	  
used	   or	   disclosed.	   Moreover,	   in	   order	   to	   guarantee	   the	   success	   of	   such	  
initiatives,	  indigenous	  peoples	  should	  be	  the	  ones	  developing	  and	  managing	  the	  
archive	   according	   to	   their	   traditions	   and	   customs.	   Today,	   in	   fact,	   most	   of	   the	  
material	  in	  the	  possession	  of	  institutions,	  archives	  and	  libraries	  is	  not	  owned	  by	  
indigenous	   peoples,	   but	   rather	   by	   the	   people	   who	   actually	   collected,	   fixed	   or	  
reproduced	   the	   information.	   This	   creates	   great	   dilemmas	   on	   ‘who’	   owns	   the	  
documents.	  These	  documentations,	  most	  of	  the	  time,	  exist	  because	  of	  historical	  
and	   cultural	   forces	   that	   pushed	   to	   study	   and	   record	   indigenous	   traditions	   in	  
ancient	   and	   more	   recent	   times.	   Quite	   interesting	   is	   the	   example	   of	   National	  
Archives	   in	  New	  Zealand.	  Stored	  records	  and	  cultural	  expressions	  are	  governed	  
by	   the	   Public	   Records	   Act	   (2005),	   which	   is	   trying	   to	   encourage	   the	   spirit	   of	  
partnership	   and	   goodwill	   between	   Māori	   and	   non-­‐Māori	   as	   envisaged	   in	   the	  
ideals	   of	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Waitangi.	   In	   New	   Zealand,	   TK	   is	   stored	   as	   ‘sensitive	  
information’	  and	  as	  such	  it	  would	  involve	  the	  use	  of	  practices	  that	  are	  not	  usually	  
necessary	   in	   the	   case	   of	   information.	  However,	   all	   the	   restrictions	   imposed	   by	  
the	   Public	   Records	   Act	   (which	   are	   not	   substantially	   impressive	   anyway)	   are	  
overridden	  by	   the	  Official	   Information	  Act	   (1982),	  which	  prevails	   in	   the	  case	  of	  
archived	   documentation	   and	   heritage.64	  As	   seen	   in	   chapter	   7,	   the	   claimants	   of	  
the	  Wai	  262	  case	  argued	  that	  a	  “considerable	  amount	  of	  mātauranga	  is	  held	  by	  
the	  National	  Library	  and	  Archives	  New	  Zealand	  …	  and	  that	  this	  often	  touches	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  “…	   the	  Public	  Records	  Act	  …	  only	   requires	   ‘appropriate	  account’	   to	  be	   taken	  of	   the	  Treaty	  of	  Waitangi.	  
Counsel	   submitted	   that	   the	  Act’s	   ‘overriding	  principles’	   of	   public	   access	   has	   the	   clear	   potential	   to	   collide	  
with	  Māori	  concerns.	  Access	  restrictions	  are	  determined	  by	  depositing	  agencies	  and	  there	  is	  no	  requirement	  
for	  Māori	  to	  determine	   issues	  of	  access.	  Nor	   is	  there	  currently	  any	   ‘provision	  for	   iwi	  Māori	  to	  be	   in	  direct	  
position	  to	  exercise	  kaitiakitanga	  with	  respect	  to	  these	  documents’.	  Counsel	  felt	  that	  Archives	  New	  Zealand	  
staff	   was	   “attuned”	   to	   issues	   around	   who	   holds	   ‘the	  mana	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   archival	   material’	   …	   but	   the	  
ultimate	   reality	   is	   that	   the	   legislation	   –	   including	   the	   overriding	   Official	   Information	   Act	   –	   ultimately	  
determines	   their	   actions”	   see	  Ko	  Aotearoa	  Tēnei:	  A	  Report	   into	  Claims	  Concerning	  New	  Zealand	   Law	  and	  





sensitive	   information	   around	   rongoā,	   whakapapa,	   and	   other	   confidential	  
mātauranga”.65	  In	   addition	   to	   that,	  Māori	   people	   have	   serious	   concerns	   about	  
the	   long-­‐term	   protection	   of	   this	   material.	   As	   previously	   stressed,	   IPR	   law	   is	  
limited	   in	   time,	   whereas	   indigenous	   culture	   has	   no	   expiry	   date.	   And	   its	  
importance	  and	  spiritual	  value	  does	  not	  necessarily	  fade	  over	  time.	  Furthermore,	  
such	  institutions	  often	  interfere	  dramatically	  with	  the	  duties	  of	  the	  guardians	  to	  
safeguard	  the	  knowledge	  stored.	  Instead	  of	  supporting	  the	  guardians’	  access	  and	  
involvement	  with	  the	  management	  of	  Māori	  heritage,	  the	  boards’	  meetings	  most	  
of	   the	   time	   do	   not	   involve	   the	   guardians	   in	   the	   decision	   making.	   Wai	   262	  
claimants	   argued	   that	   kaitiaki	   (guardians)	   should	   be	   fully	   involved	   in	   any	  
decisions	   relating	   to	   their	   TK	   and	   TCEs	   and	   “databases,	   registers	   and	   other	  
repositories	   of	   traditional	   knowledge	  must	   be	   highly	   confidential	   so	   as	   not	   to	  
facilitate	   misappropriation	   and	   misuse”.66	  Who	   should	   facilitate	   Māori	   access	  
and	   management	   of	   their	   own	   inheritance?	   According	   to	   the	   partnership	  
principle	   envisaged	   by	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Waitangi,	   the	   Crown	   should	   allow	   and	  
facilitate	   the	   kaitiaki	   relationship	   with	   their	   heritage	   and	   the	   mātauranga	  
embodied,	  and	  it	  should	  enable	  kaitiaki	  to	  discharge	  their	  obligations	  to	  Māori	  TK	  
and	  TCEs.	  	  
The	  idea	  that	  democratic	  societies	  should	  grant	  freedom	  of	  access	  to	  information	  
should	  not	  trump	  indigenous	  peoples’	  right	  to	  their	  cultures	  and	  to	  the	  survival	  
of	  their	  traditions	  as	  conceived	  by	  them	  holistically.	  The	  sensitivity	  of	  indigenous	  
culture	  does	  not	  decrease	  over	  time	  and	  most	  of	  it	  should	  never	  enter	  the	  public	  
domain.67	  The	  Wai	   262	   Report	   suggests	   that	   documentary	   mātauranga	   should	  
“remain	  as	  open	  to	  the	  public	  as	  it	  is	  at	  present”,	  however,	  “where	  users	  plan	  to	  
exploit	  mātauranga	  for	  commercial	  gain,	  they	  would	  either	  consult	  with	  kaitiaki	  
or	   seek	   kaitiaki	   consent	   (as	   appropriate)	   before	   doing	   so”.68	  Treaty	   provisions	  
and	  the	  language	  often	  used	  in	  the	  Report	  sound	  vaguely	  patronizing.	  It	  suggests	  
that	   the	   Crown	   is	   doing	   Māori	   a	   favour	   by	   trying	   to	   include	   them	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  At	  533.	  
66	  Ko	  Aotearoa	  Tēnei:	  A	  Report	  into	  Claims	  Concerning	  New	  Zealand	  Law	  and	  Policy	  Affecting	  Māori	  Culture	  
and	  Identity	  Vol	  2.	  
67	  Next	  chapter	  will	  discuss	  why	  freedom	  of	  expression	  cannot	  be	  used	  as	  an	  argument	  to	  justify	  the	  forced	  
entrance	  of	  indigenous	  TK	  and	  cultures	  within	  the	  public	  domain.	  
68	  See	  Ko	   Aotearoa	   Tēnei:	   A	   Report	   into	   Claims	   Concerning	  New	   Zealand	   Law	   and	   Policy	   Affecting	  Māori	  




management	  of	  New	  Zealand	  heritage.	  The	  Crown’s	  attempt	  to	  set	  the	  argument	  
seems	  quite	  inconsistent.	  Given	  that	  most	  of	  what	  is	  today	  stored	  in	  archives	  and	  
museums	  is	  of	  dubious	  provenance	  and	  most	  likely	  stolen,	  this	  seems	  to	  suggest	  
that	   the	   mentality	   of	   the	   colonizer	   that	   arrived	   and	   took	   over	   everything	  
including	   any	   civil,	   political	   and	   cultural	   right	   of	   any	   pre-­‐existing	   societies,	   is	  
today	  still	   too	  alive,	  well	  and	  vigilant.	  The	  truth	   is	   that,	   in	  2015,	   in	  many	  cases,	  
indigenous	  peoples	  do	  not	  have	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determine	  how	  to	  preserve	  their	  
knowledge,	  while	   they	   seem	   to	   have	   no	   say	   in	   the	  management	   of	   their	   own	  
heritage.	   In	   addition	   to	   that,	   a	   question	   arises:	   who	   decides	   what	   is	  
‘appropriate’?	  And	  what	  is	  the	  comparative	  element	  that	  sets	  the	  benchmark	  for	  
what	  can	  be	  considered	  ‘appropriate’?	  Arguably,	  a	  basic,	  logical,	  guiding	  principle	  
to	  ensure	  that	  the	  databases	  are	  managed	  properly	  and	  fairly	  would	  be	  to	  make	  
sure	  to	  obtain	  the	  prior	  informed	  consent	  from	  the	  indigenous	  peoples	  who	  hold	  
the	   knowledge	   or	   are	   responsible	   for	   its	   protection.	   Unfortunately,	   it	   is	   often	  
difficult	  to	  determine	  who	  is	  the	  person	  or	  group	  of	  persons	  responsible	  for	  the	  
reproduction	  of	  the	  knowledge.	  Moreover,	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  provisions	  managing	  
the	  creation	  of	  the	  databases	  does	  not	  extend	  beyond	  the	  national	  borders,	  and	  
what	  is	  protected	  by	  law	  in	  a	  country,	  might	  not	  be	  in	  another.	  This	  means	  that	  
the	   prevention	   of	   unfair	   exploitation	   would	   be	   limited	   to	   the	   territory	   that	  
instituted	  the	  Digital	  Library,	  but	  not	  in	  other	  countries	  that	  can	  obtain	  access	  to	  
the	   library.	   In	   addition	   to	   that,	   states	   like	   the	   United	   States	   simply	   do	   “not	  
recognize	  undocumented	  knowledge	  held	  only	  abroad	  as	  prior	  art”.69	  
From	  a	  moral/ethical	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  creation	  of	  archives	  and	  digital	   libraries	  
create	   difficulties	   that	   involve	   the	   intersection	   between	   how	   the	  Western	   and	  
the	   indigenous	   societies	   perceive	   culture	   and	   heritage,	   and	   consequently	   how	  
they	   believe	   culture	   should	   be	   accessed,	   controlled	   and	   owned.	   Most	   of	   the	  
debate	   concerns	   the	  Western	   idea	   of	   free	   access	   to	   information.	   The	   idea	   of	  
total	  free	  access	  to	  information	  is	  possible	  in	  theory;	  in	  fact,	  many	  documents	  in	  
the	  hands	  of	  government	  and	  agencies	  controlled	  by	  elites,	  are	  classified	  and	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  “Although	  the	  law	  does	  not	  allow	  an	  applicant	  to	  receive	  a	  patent	  if	  ‘he	  did	  not	  himself	  invent	  the	  subject	  
matter	   sought	   to	   be	   patented’,	   there	   is	   a	   danger	   that	  many	   people	  will	   simply	   copy	   this	   knowledge	   and	  
claim	  they	  have	  come	  up	  with	  a	  new	  invention”	  see	  Graham	  Dutfield	  ‘TRIPS-­‐related	  Aspects	  of	  Traditional	  
Knowledge’	   (2001)	   33	   Case	   Western	   Reserve	   Journal	   of	   International	   Law	   at	   262	   electronic	   document	  





accessible	  by	  the	  population	  at	  large.	  What	  ‘free	  access	  to	  information’	  means	  is	  
that	   people	   in	   charge	   decide	  what	   and	   how	   information	   can	   be	   accessed.	   The	  
fact	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  never	  structured	  themselves	  into	  a	  system	  of	  ‘free	  
access	   to	   information’	   means	   little	   or	   nothing	   to	   the	   national	   policies	   of	  
developed	  countries.	  As	  clearly	  pointed	  out	  by	  Taubman:	  70	  
	  
Many	   local	   and	   indigenous	   communities	   are	   concerned	   that	   growing	   global	  
interest	  in	  their	  TK	  and	  traditional	  cultural	  expressions	  is	  not	  matched	  by	  respect	  
for	  the	  customs,	  laws	  and	  beliefs	  that	  identify	  and	  sustain	  their	  communities	  and	  
that	   shape	   the	   very	   heritage	   that	   appeals	   to	   external	   consumers.	   Initiatives	   to	  
safeguard,	   for	   instance	   through	   documenting	   and	   publishing	   it,	   may	   in	   fact	  
amount	  to	  a	  betrayal	  of	  sacred	  or	  social	  duties	  to	  protect	  their	  heritage,	  to	  the	  
detriment	  of	  customary	  means	  of	  preserving	  and	  passing	  on	  TK.	  It	  may	  amount	  
to	  unwanted	  transfer	  of	  treasured	  knowledge	  to	  the	  public	  domain,	  or	  to	  passing	  
on	   to	  external	   interests	  who	  are	  not	  bound	  by	   the	   traditions	  embedded	   in	   the	  
knowledge	  that	  define	  its	  spiritual	  and	  ethical	  context.	  	  
	  
What	   happens	   if	   indigenous	   peoples	   decide	   to	   restrict	   the	   access	   to	   the	  
knowledge	  archived?	  Especially	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  much	  of	  the	  recorded	  culture	  
was	   registered	   without	   consent	   from	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   guardians	   of	  
knowledge	   during	   colonial	   time	   and	   is	   of	   sacred/secret	   nature?	   According	   to	  
Anderson71	  	  (quoting	  Lynch72):	  	  
	  
…	  although	  archives	  continue	  to	  be	  valuable	  facilities,	  the	  practices	  and	  struggles	  
associated	  with	  composing,	  assembling	  and	  controlling	  access	  to	  documents	  play	  
substantive	  role	  in	  history	  as	  well	  as	  the	  scholarly	  reconstruction	  of	  history.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Antony	  Taubman	  “Saving	  the	  Village:	  Conserving	  Jurisprudential	  Diversity	  in	  the	  International	  Protection	  
of	  Traditional	  Knowledge”	  in	  Keith	  E	  Maskus	  and	  Jerome	  H	  Reichman	  (eds)	  International	  Public	  Goods	  and	  
Transfer	   of	   Technology	   Under	   a	   Globalized	   Intellectual	   Property	   Regime	   (Cambridge	   University	   Press,	  
Cambridge,	  2005)	  at	  522.	  
71	  Jane	  Anderson	   “Access	   and	  Control	   of	   Indigenous	  Knowledge	   in	   Libraries	   and	  Archives:	  Ownership	   and	  
Future	  Use”	  at	  16	  electronic	  document	  <andersonip.info/PDF/Anderson_AccessControl.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  
03/10/2012	  
72	  Michael	   Lynch	   “Archives	   in	   formation:	   Privileged	   spaces,	   popular	   archives,	   and	   paper	   trails"	   (1999)	   22	  




And	  yet,	  libraries	  and	  archives	  can	  also	  be	  examples	  of	  the	  historical	  struggle	  that	  
occurred	   between	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   colonizers/missionaries	   during	  
colonization	   time.	   In	   Australia,	   for	   example,	   there	   is	   a	   huge	   collection	   of	  
photographic	  material	  where	  Aborigines	  are	  often	  represented	  in	  compromised	  
and	   degrading	   positions.	   Not	   only	   can	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   material	   be	   very	  
sensitive,	   but	   indigenous	   peoples	   have	   no	   property	   rights	   over	   it	   and	   have	  
therefore	   no	   say	   in	   its	   management.	   One	   could	   argue	   that	   it	   is	   historically	  
important	  to	  collect	  documents	  that	  show	  how	  indigenous	  peoples	  were	  treated	  
during	  and	  after	  colonization;	  however,	  it	  might	  also	  be	  legitimate	  to	  argue	  that	  
the	   descendants	   of	   the	   people	   represented	   in	   photographs	   and	   documents	  
might	  consider	   it	  highly	  offensive	  to	  see	  their	  ancestors	  portrayed	   in	  racist	  and	  
degrading	  contexts.	  The	   idea	  of	   translating	  TK	   into	  a	   ‘public’	   good	   remains	  not	  
applicable	  to	  indigenous	  peoples.	  
Given	  the	  inapplicability	  of	  WIPO’s	  ideas	  in	  the	  field	  of	  preservation	  (making	  the	  
knowledge	  public),	  in	  most	  cases,	  only	  defensive	  protection	  mechanisms	  remain	  
available	   to	   indigenous	   peoples.	   The	   WIPO	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	  
recognises	  several	  different	  concepts	  of	  protection	  to	  be	  used	  against:	  73	  
	  
§ unauthorized	  commercial	  exploitation	  of	  TK	  or	  TCEs;	  
§ insulting,	  degrading	  or	  culturally	  offensive	  use	  of	  this	  material;	  
§ false	   or	   misleading	   indications	   that	   there	   is	   a	   relationship	   with	   the	  
communities	  in	  which	  the	  material	  has	  originated;	  and	  
§ failure	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  source	  of	  material	  in	  an	  appropriate	  way.	  
	  
While	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  apply	  these	  measures	  to	  TK	  that	  has	  already	  entered	  the	  
public	  domain	  (lawfully	  or	  not),	  the	  ideas	  proposed	  by	  WIPO	  are	  unrealistic	  and	  
slightly	  neo-­‐colonialist.	  Even	  if	  over	  the	  years	  WIPO	  has	  been	  active	  in	  recording	  
many	   “initiatives	   of	   indigenous	   and	   local	   communities	   and	   other	  
national/regional	   institutions	   have	   documented	   large	   amounts	   of	   traditional	  
knowledge	  in	  order	  to	  conserve	  it	  and	  to	  avoid	  its	  disappearance”,74	  however,	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Genetic	  Resources,	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  and	  
Folklore	  (Twelfth	  Session,	  Genève,	  2008)	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/12/5(b).	  
74	  See	   WIPO	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	  




also	   recognizes	   that,	   although	   the	   “initiatives	   have	   developed	   extensive	  
compilations	   and	   traditional	   knowledge	  databases”,	   they	   “have	  not	   elaborated	  
intellectual	   property	  options	  or	   strategies	   to	  protect	   the	   traditional	   knowledge	  
itself	  or	  its	  compilations”.75	  WIPO,	  in	  fact,	  pretends	  that	  indigenous	  people	  bring	  
out	   from	   their	   traditional	  milieu	   knowledge	   that	  was	   never	   supposed	   to	   enter	  
the	  public	  domain,	  and	   share	   it	  with	  outsiders	   that	  might	  have	   the	  means	  and	  
economic	   resources	   to	   exploit	   it.	   In	   doing	   so,	   indigenous	  peoples	   should	  often	  
translate	  and	  fix	  information	  using	  a	  language	  that	  is	  not	  theirs	  and	  codifications	  
that	   exist	   for	   the	  written	  word,	   but	   not	   in	   the	   case	   of	   oral	   transmission,76	  and	  
identifying	  an	  author/creator	  that	  does	  not	  de	  facto	  exist.	  In	  most	  cases	  the	  non-­‐
fixability	  of	  information	  or	  unfixed	  material	  in	  general	  cannot	  count	  as	  prior	  art,	  
and	  when	  international	  law	  does	  indeed	  consider	  unwritten	  material	  as	  prior	  art,	  
it	  still	  considers	  it	  enforceable	  only	  in	  case	  the	  knowledge	  has	  been	  made	  public	  
and	   available	   before	   the	   filing	   date	   of	   the	   patent	   or	   copyright.	   The	   Patent	  
Cooperation	  Treaty	  (PCT),77	  for	  example,	  considers	  the	  unwritten	  disclosure	  as:78	  	  
	  
(b)	  when	  any	  written	  disclosure	   refers	   to	   an	  oral	   disclosure,	   use,	   exhibition,	   or	  
other	   means	   whereby	   the	   contents	   of	   the	   written	   disclosure	   were	   made	  
available	   to	   the	   public,	   and	   such	  making	   available	   to	   the	   public	   occurred	   on	   a	  
date	   prior	   to	   the	   international	   filing	   date,	   the	   international	   search	   report	   shall	  
separately	  mention	   that	   fact	   and	   the	   date	   on	  which	   it	   occurred	   if	   the	  making	  
available	  to	  the	  public	  of	  the	  written	  disclosure	  occurred	  on	  a	  date	  which	  is	  the	  
same	  as,	  or	  later	  than,	  the	  international	  filing	  date.	  	  
	  
Article	  18	  of	  the	  Berne	  Convention	  gives	  eligibility	  to	  protection	  to	  “(1)	  all	  works	  
which,	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  its	  coming	  into	  force,	  have	  not	  yet	  fallen	  into	  the	  public	  
domain	   in	   the	   country	  of	  origin	   through	   the	  expiry	  of	   the	   term	  of	  protection”,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  See	  supra.	  
76	  According	  to	  Manuel	  Ruiz	  “it	  seems	  clear	  that	  oral	  disclosure,	  use,	  exhibition	  or	  other	  means	  of	  disclosure	  
will	   only	   be	   considered	   relevant	   during	   an	   international	   search	   if	   they	   are	   substantiated	   by	   written	  
disclosure.	  Indeed,	  as	  important	  (and	  common)	  as	  oral	  traditions	  might	  be	  among	  indigenous	  communities,	  
there	  are	  practical	  aspects	  of	  patent	  searching	  procedures	  which	  would	  make	  it	  necessary	  to	  evidence	  and	  
substantiate	   traditional	  knowledge	  and	  practices	   in	  some	  written	   form”	  see	  “The	   International	  Debate	  on	  
Traditional	  Knowledge	  as	  Prior	  Art	  in	  the	  Patent	  System:	  Issues	  and	  Options	  for	  Developing	  Countries”	  CIEL	  
(Centre	  for	  International	  Environmental	  Law,	  2004)	  at	  para	  35.	  
77 	  Patent	   Cooperation	   Treaty	   (Washington	   on	   19	   June	  1970)	   amended	   on	   28	   September	  1979,	  
modified	  on	  3	  February	  1984,	  and	  on	  3	  October	  2001.	  As	  in	  force	  from	  April	  1,	  2002)	  




which	  obviously	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  all	  knowledge	  that	  has	  been	  circulating	  among	  
indigenous	  communities	   for	  a	   long	   time.	   In	  addition	   to	   that,	  much	  of	   the	  mass	  
production	   of	   traditional	   designs	   is	   not	   produced	  within	   the	   national	   borders,	  
and	   therefore	   not	   protectable	   by	   national	   jurisdictions.	   Having	   said	   that,	  
however,	  there	  is	  no	  international	  harmonization	  of	  what	  constitutes	  prior	  art.	  In	  
this	  regard,	  WIPO	  suggests	  that	  there	  should	  be	  an	   international	  agreement	  on	  
what	  constitutes	  prior	  art	  and	  it	  recognises	  three	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  disclosure	  of	  
information	  can	  constitute	  prior	  art:79	  
	  
• by	   a	   description	   of	   the	   invention	   in	   a	   published	   writing	   or	   publication	   in	  
other	  form;	  
• by	  a	  description	  of	   the	   invention	   in	  spoken	  words	  uttered	   in	  public,	   such	  a	  
disclosure	  being	  called	  an	  oral	  disclosure;	  and	  
• by	   the	  use	  of	   the	   invention	   in	  public,	  or	  by	  putting	   the	  public	   in	  a	  position	  
that	  enables	  any	  member	  of	   the	  public	   to	  use	   it,	   such	  a	  disclosure	  being	  a	  
“disclosure	  by	  use”.	  
	  
However,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  WIPO	  acknowledges	  the	  difficulty	  of	  circumscribing	  
what	  constitutes	  prior	  art	  and	  questions:80	  
	  
• is	  prior	  art	  counted	  if	  it	  is	  only	  available	  in	  foreign	  languages	  (including	  dead	  
languages),	  or	  minority	  languages?	  (or	  indigenous	  languages,	  songs,	  stories);	  
• if	  prior	  art	  must	  be	  ‘published’	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account,	  what	  criteria	  apply	  
for	  prior	  art	  to	  be	  an	  eligible	  form	  of	  publication?;81	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  WIPO	   Intellectual	  Property	  Handbook	   (2004)	  at	  para	  2.17;	  see	  also	  WIPO	  Intergovernmental	  Committee	  
on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Folklore	   (2001)	   Doc	  
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/6.	  
80	  Questionnaire	   on	   Recognition	   of	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Genetic	   Resources	   in	   the	   Patent	   System	  
Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	   Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Genetic	  Resources,	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  and	  
Folklore	  (2004)	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/Q.5.	  	  
81	  “What	  counts	  as	  publication	  or	  public	  availability	  on	  the	  internet	  or	  on	  other	  digital	  networks?	  Is	  there	  a	  
requirement	   for	  networks	   to	  be	  publicly	  accessible?	   Is	  material	  on	  proprietary	   (pay	   for	  use)	  databases	  or	  
digital	  networks	  included	  as	  potential	  prior	  art?	  Does	  this	  apply	  to	  databases	  or	  networks	  that	  are	  private,	  
for	  example	  accessible	  only	  by	  members	  of	  a	  particular	  community,	  or	  employees	  of	  a	  particular	  company,	  
university	  or	   research	   institute?	  What	  conditions	  apply	   for	  material	  uploaded	  on	  the	   Internet	  to	  be	  taken	  
into	   account	   as	   prior	   art?”	   see	   Questionnaire	   on	   Recognition	   of	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Genetic	  
Resources	   in	   the	   Patent	   System	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Genetic	  
Resources,	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Folklore	   (2004)	   Doc	   WIPO/GRTKF/IC/Q.5	   electronic	   document	  




• if	  an	  element	  of	  TK	  (including	  TK	  associated	  with	  certain	  genetic	  resources)	  is	  
considered	   available	   to	   or	   accessible	   by	   the	   public	   outside	   the	   original	  
community	  that	  holds	  the	  TK,	  but	  the	  skills	  to	  interpret	  or	  practice	  the	  art	  of	  
TK	  are	   limited	   to	   the	  community	  only,	  how	  would	   the	  person	  skilled	   in	   the	  
art	  be	  assessed	  for	  the	  determination	  of	  inventive	  step?	  
	  
Going	  back	  to	  the	  point	  described	  above,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  understand	  why	  TK	  cannot	  
account	  as	  prior	  art.82	  WIPO	  suggests	  that:83	  
	  
…	   a	   document	   will	   only	   destroy	   the	   novelty	   of	   any	   invention	   claimed	   if	   the	  
subject	  matter	   is	   explicitly	   contained	   in	   the	   document.	   The	   subject	  matter	   set	  
forth	   in	  a	  claim	  of	  an	  application	  under	  examination	   is	   thus	  compared	  element	  
by	  element	  with	  the	  contents	  of	  each	  individual	  publication.	  Lack	  of	  novelty	  can	  
only	  be	   found	   if	   the	  publication	  by	   itself	   contains	  all	   the	  characteristics	  of	   that	  
claim,	  that	  is,	  if	  it	  anticipates	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  the	  claim.	  	  
	  
Again	  the	  whole	  discourse	  seems	  totally	  useless	  when	  applied	  to	  the	  knowledge	  
held	  by	   the	   guardians	  of	   knowledge	  whose	  duty	  of	   care	  has	   traditionally	   been	  
bound	  to	  secrecy	  or	  limited	  sharing	  among	  the	  community.	  And	  again,	  the	  focus	  
of	  IP	  law	  is	  to	  give	  exclusive	  rights	  to	  the	  product	  of	  the	  idea,	  and	  not	  to	  the	  idea	  
itself;	   which	  means	   that	   ‘knowledge’	   is	   still	   unprotected	   by	   law.	   How	   can	   the	  
knowledge	   in	   the	   possession	   of	   the	   guardians	   be	   recorded	   in	   a	   way	   that	   can	  
count	   as	   prior	   art?	   What	   legitimacy	   has	   the	   knowledge	   transmitted	   among	   a	  
limited	  number	  of	  selected	  people?	  	  
Arguably,	   information	   held	   by	   the	   guardians	   can	   be	   gathered	   with	   difficulty	  
(especially	   the	   very	   ancient	   and	   spiritual	   knowledge)	   and	   might	   have	  
deteriorated	  over	  time.	  Secondly,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  indigenous	  culture,	  it	  is	  often	  
impossible	   to	   determine	   who	   the	   author	   of	   the	   TK	   is.	   And	   even	   if	   the	   art	   is	  
registered	   as	   prior	   art,	   the	   name	   of	   the	   creator	   or	   creators	   is	   still	   required	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  It	  is	  often	  unfixed;	  the	  knowledge	  is	  shared	  within	  the	  community	  only	  and	  often	  among	  a	  limited	  number	  
of	  people	  within	  the	  same	  community;	  the	  term	  ‘public’	  has	  often	  no	  connotation	  for	  indigenous	  peoples’	  
TK.	  Their	  knowledge	   is	  often	  not	   shared	  with	   the	  public,	  and	  possibly	  never	  will	  be;	   the	   term	   ‘public’	  has	  
often	  no	  connotation	  for	  indigenous	  peoples’	  TK.	  Their	  knowledge	  is	  often	  not	  shared	  with	  the	  public,	  and	  
possibly	  never	  will	  be.	  




implement	  such	  a	  claim.	  On	  the	  topic,	  the	  Berne	  Convention	  says	  nothing	  about	  
knowledge	  or	  art	  orally	   transmitted	  and	  shared	  by	  a	   limited	  number	  of	  people	  
and	  only	  within	  a	  specific	  community.	  In	  addition	  to	  that,	  the	  registration	  of	  the	  
knowledge	  in	  accordance	  with	  Western	  IP	  laws	  is	  a	  limitation	  that	  is	  against	  most	  
of	   the	   existing	   jurisprudence	   that	   advocates	   the	   freedom	   of	   everyone	   to	  
participate	   in	   the	   cultural	   life	   of	   the	   community	   and	   manage	   such	   culture	  
according	  to	  the	  values	  and	  laws	  that	  survive	  within	  the	  community	  as	  stated	  in	  
Art	  27	  of	  the	  ICCPR.84	  If	  prior	  art	  cannot	  be	  used	  to	  safeguard	  indigenous	  TK	  and	  
TCEs,	  what	  else	  can	  be	  suggested	  as	  a	  defensive	  mechanism?	  
In	   his	   article	   Correa 85 	  suggests	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   regime	   preventing	   the	  
misappropriation	   of	   TK	   based	   on	   three	   main	   elements:	   documentation	   of	   TK,	  
proof	   of	   origin	   or	  materials	   and	   prior	   informed	   consent.	   Correa	   refers	   to	   two	  
United	  Nations	  documents	   that	   support	  his	  misappropriation	   regime.	  CBD-­‐COP	  
Decision	  V/1686	  requests	  parties	  to:	  	  
	  
…	   support	   the	   development	   of	   registers	   of	   traditional	   knowledge,	   innovations	  
and	   practices	   of	   indigenous	   and	   local	   communities	   embodying	   traditional	  
lifestyles	  relevant	  for	  the	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  of	  biological	  diversity	  
through	  participatory	  programmes	  and	  consultations	  with	   indigenous	  and	   local	  
communities,	  taking	  into	  account	  strengthening	  legislation,	  customary	  practices	  
and	   traditional	   systems	   of	   resource	   management,	   such	   as	   the	   protection	   of	  
traditional	  knowledge	  against	  unauthorized	  use.	  	  
	  
The	   second	  UN	  document	   that	   inspired	  Correa	   is	   the	  Principles	   and	  Guidelines	  
for	   the	  Protection	  of	   the	  Heritage	  of	   Indigenous	  Peoples	  elaborated	   in	  1995	  by	  
Erica-­‐Irene	   Daes. 87 	  According	   to	   Dutfield,	   Correa’s	   misappropriation	   regime	  
should	  incorporate	  also:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  Article	  27:	   “In	   those	  States	   in	  which	  ethnic,	   religious	  or	   linguistic	  minorities	  exist,	  persons	  belonging	   to	  
such	  minorities	  shall	  not	  be	  denied	  the	  right,	  in	  community	  with	  the	  other	  members	  of	  their	  group,	  to	  enjoy	  
their	  own	  culture,	  to	  profess	  and	  practise	  their	  own	  religion,	  or	  to	  use	  their	  own	  language”.	  
85	  Carlos	  M	   Correa	   “Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Intellectual	   Property”	   (The	   Quaker	   United	   Nations	   Office	  
(QUNO),	  Genève,	  2001).	  
86	  See	  CBD,	  COP	  5	  Decision	  V/16	  electronic	  document	  <www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=7158>	  last	  visited	  on	  
10/12/2012.	  
87	  Principle	   26	   –	   “National	   laws	   should	   deny	   to	   any	   person	   or	   corporation	   the	   right	   to	   obtain	   patent,	  
copyright	   or	   other	   legal	   protection	   for	   any	   element	   of	   indigenous	   peoples'	   heritage	   without	   adequate	  





- the	  concept	  of	  unfair	  competition;	  
- moral	  rights;	  and	  
- cultural	  rights.	  
	  
Indeed,	  unfair	  competition	  could	  be	  used	  in	  those	  cases	  when	  TK	  holders	  engage	  
in	   commercial	   activities	   related	   to	   know-­‐how,	   medicinal	   plants,	   artworks	   and	  
handicrafts	   when	   the	   trade	   of	   the	   above	   is	   affected	   by	   unfair	   practices	  
committed	  by	  others.	  Article	  10bis88	  of	  the	  Paris	  Convention	  describes	  which	  acts	  
constitute	  unfair	  competition	  and	  why.	  While	  the	  article	  is	  useful	  in	  cases	  where	  
indigenous	   peoples	   engage	   in	   commerce	   in	   their	   own	   goods,	   it	   produces	  
inappropriate	   results	   in	   cases	   where	   the	   knowledge	   is	   undisclosed	   and	   still	   in	  
possession	  of	  the	  guardians	  of	  knowledge.	  Someone	  could	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  no	  
harm	   if	   indigenous	   knowledge,	  which	   is	   not	   commercialised	   or	   intended	   to	   be	  
commercialised,	   reaches	   the	   general	   market	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   those	   who	  
accelerated	   the	   process.	   This	   would	   imply	   that,	   if	   indigenous	   holders	   did	   not	  
intend	  to	  benefit	  from	  commercial	  exploitation	  of	  their	  culture,	  it	  is	  not	  unfair	  if	  
someone	   else	   does.	   This	   reasoning	   in	   not	   only	   unethical,	   but	   involves	   the	  
misappropriation	   of	   indigenous	   culture	   and	   infringes	   a	   whole	   set	   of	   cultural	  
rights	   that	   can	   be	   found	   in	   different	   international	   laws	   and	   that	   can	   be	  
summarised	  as:	  	  
	  
• the	  right	  to	  protection	  of	  artistic,	  literary	  and	  scientific	  works;	  	  
• the	  right	  to	  develop	  a	  culture;	  	  
• the	  right	  to	  respect	  for	  cultural	  identity;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sharing	  of	   ownership,	   control,	   use	   and	  benefits”;	   Principle	   27.	   “National	   laws	   should	   ensure	   the	   labelling	  
and	  correct	  attribution	  of	  indigenous	  peoples'	  artistic,	  literary	  and	  cultural	  works	  whenever	  they	  are	  offered	  
for	   public	   display	   or	   sale.	   Attribution	   should	   be	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   trademark	   or	   an	   appellation	   of	   origin,	  
authorized	   by	   the	   peoples	   or	   communities	   concerned”	   see	   electronic	   document	  
<http://ankn.uaf.edu/iks/protect.html>	  last	  visited	  on	  10/12/2012.	  
88	  Article	  10bis:	  “(1)	  The	  countries	  of	  the	  Union	  are	  bound	  to	  assure	  to	  nationals	  of	  such	  countries	  effective	  
protection	  against	  unfair	  competition.	  (2)	  Any	  act	  of	  competition	  contrary	  to	  honest	  practices	  in	  industrial	  
or	   commercial	   matters	   constitutes	   an	   act	   of	   unfair	   competition.	   (3)	   The	   following	   in	   particular	   shall	   be	  
prohibited:	   (i)	   all	   acts	   of	   such	   a	   nature	   as	   to	   create	   confusion	   by	   any	   means	   whatever	   with	   the	  
establishment,	  the	  goods,	  or	  the	  industrial	  or	  commercial	  activities,	  of	  a	  competitor;	  (ii)	  false	  allegations	  in	  
the	   course	   of	   trade	   of	   such	   a	   nature	   as	   to	   discredit	   the	   establishment,	   the	   goods,	   or	   the	   industrial	   or	  
commercial	  activities,	  of	  a	  competitor;	  (iii)	  indications	  or	  allegations	  the	  use	  of	  which	  in	  the	  course	  of	  trade	  
is	  liable	  to	  mislead	  the	  public	  as	  to	  the	  nature,	  the	  manufacturing	  process,	  the	  characteristics,	  the	  suitability	  




• the	  right	  of	  minority	  peoples	  to	  respect	  for	  identity	  ,	  traditions,	  language,	  and	  
cultural	  heritage;	  	  
• the	  right	  of	  a	  people	  to	  its	  own	  artistic,	  historical,	  and	  cultural	  wealth;	  and	  
• the	  right	  of	  a	  people	  not	  to	  have	  an	  alien	  culture	  imposed	  on	  it.	  
	  
The	  best	  way	  to	  preserve	  indigenous	  heritage	  and	  culture	  seems	  to	  reside	  in	  the	  
stewardship	   role	   of	   the	   guardians	   of	   knowledge.	   Once	   in	   their	   hands,	   the	  
knowledge	   is	   regulated	   by	   customary	   laws	   that	   have	   guaranteed	   for	   centuries	  
the	  preservation	  of	  the	  tangible	  and	  intangible	  heritage.	  Its	  success	  is	  proved.	  As	  
suggested	   by	   the	   recommendations	   of	   Wai	   262,	   it	   is	   by	   safeguarding	   the	  
guardians’	   special	   role,	   that	   the	   knowledge	   can	   consequently	   be	   safeguarded.	  
However,	  as	  it	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  IP	  laws	  struggle	  to	  accommodate	  
the	  needs	  and	  expectations	  of	  the	  guardians,	  and	  to	  recognise	  their	  role	  within	  
indigenous	  communities.	  	  
	  
9.3	  –	  Guardianship	  and	  Intellectual	  Property	  Laws:	  An	  Ongoing	  Struggle	  
	  
This	  section	  will	  analyse	  the	  broad	  concept	  of	  TK	  as	   inclusive	  of	  the	  knowledge	  
that	  might	  or	  might	  not	  have	  a	  commercial	  value.	  While	  this	  thesis	  is	  focussed	  on	  
the	   intangible	   sacred	   knowledge	   guarded	   by	   indigenous	   custodians,	   it	   is	  
important	   to	   briefly	   discuss	   the	   knowledge	   that	   is	   still	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	  
custodians,	  but	  is	  not	  necessarily	  sacred	  and	  therefore	  can	  be	  shared	  within	  and	  
outside	  the	  community.	  Such	  knowledge	  might	  also	  have	  economic	  value	  for	  the	  
Western	  world	  and	  indigenous	  peoples	  could	  benefit	   from	  its	  commodification.	  
In	   this	   case,	   it	   is	   up	   to	   the	   custodians	   (based	   on	   their	   experience	   and	   the	  
customary	   laws	   of	   the	   community)	   to	   decide	   which	   knowledge	   can	   be	  
commodified,	  how	  and	  for	  what	  purpose.	  
According	   to	   WIPO,	   in	   today’s	   world,	   guardians	   or	   TK	   holders	   can	   take	  
appropriate	   steps	   to	   prevent	   others	   from	   disposing	   of	   their	   knowledge.	  WIPO	  
calls	   these	   steps	   ‘positive	   protection’.89	  WIPO	   suggests	   that	   the	   best	   way	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  “Positive	   protection	  is	   the	   granting	   of	   rights	   that	   empower	   communities	   to	   promote	   their	   traditional	  
knowledge,	   control	   its	   uses	   and	   benefit	   from	   its	   commercial	   exploitation.	   Some	   uses	   of	   traditional	  
knowledge	  can	  be	  protected	  through	  the	  existing	   intellectual	  property	  system,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  countries	  




protect	  indigenous	  TK	  is	  to	  promote,	  record	  and	  control	  it.	  Again,	  the	  idea	  could	  
work	  for	  the	  TK	  that	  they	  could	  decide	  to	  share	  now	  or	  in	  the	  future,	  but	  it	  would	  
not	   be	   feasible	   for	   the	   knowledge	   that	   is	   not	   supposed	   to	   enter	   the	   public	  
domain	   (intangible	   sacred/secret	   knowledge).	   In	   the	  Milpurrurru	   and	   Others	   v	  
Indofurn	  Pty	  Ltd	  and	  Others	  case,90	  although	  the	  claimant	  succeeded	  in	  blocking	  
the	   reproduction	   on	   rugs	   of	   sacred	   images	   belonging	   to	   the	   community,	   the	  
design	   circulated	   anyway;	   its	   design	  was	   recorded	   in	   computer	   programs,	   and	  
buyers	  might	  have	  already	  stepped	  on	  the	  sacred	  images	  that	  were	  represented.	  
To	  outsiders	   the	  block	   imposed	   to	   the	   circulation	  of	   the	  design	  was	   a	   success.	  
However,	   the	   damage	   was	   already	   done	   and	   people	   of	   the	   Ganalbingu	  
community	  had	  suffered	  consequently.	  In	  addition	  to	  that,	  copyright	  law	  accepts	  
artworks	  and	  cultural	  expressions	  that	  present	  a	  recognisable	  level	  of	  innovation	  
(originality);	  this	  means	  that	  sacred	  designs	  could	  still	  be	  present	  in	  the	  TCE,	  but	  
as	   long	  as	   the	  artwork	   is	  considered	  original,	   copyright	  will	  be	  granted	  without	  
hesitation.	   The	   intangible	   intrinsic	   character	   and	   value	   of	   some	   but	   not	   all	   TK	  
makes	   it,	   in	   fact,	  non-­‐protectable	  under	   copyright	  and	  patent	   laws.91	  Copyright	  
and	  patents	  are	  both	   limited	   in	  time,	  and	  the	  creation/invention	   is	  expected	  to	  
enter	  the	  public	  domain	  after	  the	  time-­‐protection	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  world	  at	  
large.	   In	   this	   framework,	   long-­‐lasting	   TK	   does	   not	   qualify	   for	   protection.	   Both	  
copyright	  and	  patent	  laws	  are	  based	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  individual	  creator	  or	  joint	  
authorship,	  and	  recognise	  property	  rights	  to	  products	  as	  they	  exist	   in	  a	  specific	  
moment	   in	   time;	  which	  means	   that	  new	   forms	  of	  TCEs	  which	  do	  not	  yet	  exist,	  
but	  derive	  from	  traditional	  intangible	  (from	  the	  Latin	  non	  tangere	  –	  untouchable;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
not	   hold	   for	   other	   countries,	   one	   reason	   why	   many	   indigenous	   and	   local	   communities	   as	   well	   as	  
governments	   are	   pressing	   for	   an	   international	   legal	   instrument.	   WIPO’s	   work	   on	   traditional	   knowledge	  
addresses	   three	  distinct	   yet	   related	  areas:	   traditional	   knowledge	   in	   the	   strict	   sense	   (technical	   know-­‐how,	  
practices,	   skills,	   and	   innovations	   related	   to,	   say,	   biodiversity,	   agriculture	   or	   health);	   traditional	   cultural	  
expressions/expressions	   of	   folklore	   (cultural	   manifestations	   such	   as	   music,	   art,	   designs,	   symbols	   and	  
performances);	  and	  genetic	  resources	  (genetic	  material	  of	  actual	  or	  potential	  value	  found	  in	  plants,	  animals	  
and	   micro-­‐organisms)”	   see	   WIPO	   electronic	   document	   <www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/briefs/tk_ip.html>;	  
“Two	  aspects	  of	  positive	  protection	  of	  TK	  by	  IP	  rights	  are	  being	  explored:	  Preventing	  unauthorized	  use,	  and	  
Active	   exploitation	   of	   TK	   by	   the	   originating	   community	   itself.	   Negotiations	   on	   an	   international	   legal	  
instrument	   are	   taking	   place	   within	   the	  WIPO	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	  
Genetic	  Resources,	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  and	  Folklore.	   In	  some	  countries,	  sui	  generis	  legislation	  has	  been	  
developed	   specifically	   to	   address	   the	  positive	  protection	  of	   TK.	   In	   addition,	  providers	   and	  users	  may	  also	  
enter	   into	   contractual	   agreements	   and/or	   use	   existing	   IP	   systems	   of	   protection”	   see	   WIPO	   electronic	  
document	  <www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/>	  last	  visited	  on	  08/02/2015.	  
90	  Milpurrurru	  and	  Others	  v	   Indofurn	  Pty	  Ltd	  and	  Others	   case,	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Australia,	  General	  Division	  
130	  A.L.R.	  659	  [1994].	  
91	  Berne	   Convention	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Literary	   and	   Artistic	  Works	   (1886,	   last	   amended	   in	   1979);	   the	  




something	   that	   cannot	   be	   touched	   by	   hand)	   knowledge,	   are	   not	   protectable	  
under	  Western	  laws.	  Such	  staticity	  does	  not	  fit	  with	  the	  constant	  evolution	  of	  TK	  
and	   TCEs.	   Many	   TCEs	   have	   existed	   and	   evolved	   for	   many	   generations.	   In	   this	  
case,	   the	   limited	  period	  of	   protection	   guaranteed	  by	   copyright	   and	  patent	   law	  
cannot	  adequately	  safeguard	   indigenous	  evolving	  traditions.	  Another	   important	  
point	  worth	  discussing	  involves	  the	  complex	  stratification	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  
TK.	   Indigenous	  knowledge	  has	  no	  horizontal	  development,	  but	  rather	  a	  vertical	  
one,	  where	  different	  strata	  hold	  different	   information	  whose	  circulation	  can	  be	  
either	   encouraged	   or	   restricted.	   The	  more	   the	   information	   becomes	   sensitive,	  
the	  fewer	  people	  have	  access	  to	  it.92	  Spiritual	  knowledge	  is	  also	  mostly	  unfixed.	  	  
Outside	   indigenous	   communities,	   knowledge	   is	   organised	   more	   horizontally.	  
Someone	   conveyed	   the	   idea	   into	   a	   product	   and	   fixed	   it,	   while	   the	   suitable	  
protective	  mechanism	  is	  sought	  to	  implement	  exclusive	  rights	  (economic	  in	  most	  
cases)	  to	  the	   innovative	  production.93	  In	  this	  case,	   IP	   laws	  encourage	  disclosure	  
and	   information	   sharing	   on	  what	   are	   considered	   ‘fair	   terms’.	   The	   Tunis	  Model	  
Law	  for	  Copyright94	  stresses	  that	  the	  fixation	  requirement	  cannot	  be	  applied	  to	  
works	   of	   folklore	   given	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   are	   most	   of	   the	   time	   unfixed	   and	  
transmitted	  orally	  from	  one	  generation	  to	  another.	   In	  this	  case,	  the	  Model	  Law	  
comes	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   works	   of	   folklore	   (at	   that	   time	   the	   indigenous	  
knowledge	  and	  TCEs	  were	  defined	  as	  works	  of	  folklore)	  deserve	  protection,	  and	  
in	   the	   case	   of	   economic	   and	  moral	   rights	   attached	   to	   the	   cultural	   expression,	  
such	   rights	   will	   have	   no	   limit	   in	   time	   and	   shall	   be	   managed	   by	   the	   national	  
authority	  “empowered	  to	  represent	  the	  people	  that	  originated	  them”	  (Section	  6,	  
para	  39).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  creations	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  should	  be	  managed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  Graham	   Dutfield	   “TRIPS-­‐related	   Aspects	   of	   Traditional	   Knowledge”	   (2001)	   33	   Case	   Western	   Reserve	  
Journal	   of	   International	   Law	   at	   261	   electronic	   document	   <www.academia.edu/860241/TRIPS-­‐
related_Aspects_of_Traditional_Knowledge>	  last	  visited	  on	  05/01/2013.	  
93	  “It	   would	   be	   extremely	   difficult	   for	   a	   shaman	   or	   indigenous	   group	   to	   complete	   a	   patent	   specification.	  
While	   a	  useful	   characteristic	  of	   a	  plant	  or	   animal	  may	  be	  well	   known	   to	   such	  an	   individual	  or	   group,	   the	  
inability	   to	   describe	   the	   phenomenon	   in	   the	   language	   of	   chemistry	   or	   molecular	   biology	   would	  make	   it	  
almost	  impossible	  to	  apply	  for	  a	  patent,	  even	  if	  the	  fees	  could	  be	  afforded”	  see	  Dutfield	  supra.	  
94	  The	  Tunis	  Model	  Law	  on	  Copyright	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  Committee	  of	  Governmental	  Experts	  convened	  by	  
the	   Tunisian	  Government	   in	   Tunis	   from	   February	   23	   to	  March	   2,	   1976,	  with	   the	   assistance	   of	  WIPO	   and	  
UNESCO.	   The	   Tunis	   Model	   Law,	   developed	   by	   the	   UN	   Educational,	   Scientific	   and	   Cultural	   Organisation	  
(UNESCO)	   and	   WIPO	   in	   1976,	   offered	   developing	   countries	   a	   template	   for	   implementing	   the	   Berne	  
Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Literary	  and	  Artistic	  Works,	  while	  having	  regard	  to	  domestic	  legislation	  and	  
particular	   interests.	   It	  was	   “designed	   to	  be	   like	   a	   complete	   copyright	   act”	   said	   KEI	   President	   James	   Love,	  
touching	  upon	  issues	  relating	  to	  protection	  of	  folklore,	  exceptions	  and	  limitations	  to	  rights,	  fair	  use,	  and	  the	  
right	  of	  translation	  to	  reproduction	  see	  electronic	  document	  <www.ip-­‐watch.org/2014/05/01/at-­‐wipo-­‐soft-­‐




by	  national	   authorities	  whose	   legal	   structures	  are	   reflective	  of	   a	  Western	   legal	  
framework.	   What	   if	   the	   national	   authority	   in	   charge	   to	   represent	   indigenous	  
peoples’	  TK	  and	  TCEs	  or	  expressions	  of	   folklore	  has	  no	   interest	   in	  safeguarding	  
them?	  	  
The	  Model	  recognizes	  the	  issue	  at	  stake,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  concede	  any	  autonomy	  
to	   indigenous	   peoples	   to	   dispose	   of	   their	   culture	   as	   they	   wish	   outside	   the	  
national	  control.	  The	  presumption	  of	  most	  of	  Western	  IP	  laws	  (clearly	  stated	  at	  
the	  beginning	  of	   the	  Model)	  believes	   that	  “works	  of	   the	  mind	  are	   intended	   for	  
widespread	  distribution	   in	   the	  world	  beyond	  territorial	   frontiers”	   (Introduction,	  
para	  1).	  That	  is	  why,	  the	  Model	  Provisions	  for	  National	  Laws	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  
Expressions	   of	   Folklore	  Against	   Illicit	   Exploitation	   and	  Other	   Prejudicial	   Actions	  
(WIPO-­‐UNESCO,	   1985)	   underline	   how	   “in	   the	   industrialized	   countries,	  
expressions	  of	  folklore	  are	  generally	  considered	  to	  belong	  to	  the	  public	  domain.	  
This	  approach	  explains	  why,	  at	  least	  so	  far,	  industrialized	  countries	  generally	  did	  
not	   establish	   a	   legal	   protection	   of	   the	   manifold	   national	   or	   other	   community	  
interest	  related	  to	  the	  utilization	  of	  folklore”	  (para	  3).	  The	  unwritten	  form	  of	  TK	  
conflicts	   with	   the	   patent’s	   ‘enablement’	   as	   stated	   in	   Art	   27.1	   of	   the	   TRIPS	  
Agreement,95	  and	  the	  copyright’s	  fixation	  requirement	  as	  restated	  in	  Art	  9.1	  and	  
9.2	   of	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement.96	  Both	   laws	   also	   require	   the	   individuation	   of	   the	  
inventor/creator	  who,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  indigenous	  peoples,	  is	  hardly	  identifiable	  in	  
the	   communal	   and	   evolving	   development	   of	   TK.	   Additionally,	   while	   Western	  
inventors	  keenly	  apply	  to	  patent	  and	  copyright	  law	  with	  the	  premise	  to	  protect	  
and	  benefit	   from	  their	   creation/invention,	  a	  good	  part	  of	   indigenous	  TK	   is	  of	  a	  
spiritual	  and	  sensitive	  nature,	   is	  non-­‐sharable	   to	   the	  whole	  community,	  and	   its	  
disclosure	  to	  the	  uninitiated	  would	  violate	  its	  spiritual	  significance.	  In	  addition	  to	  
that,	  the	  whole	  application	  process,	  although	  it	  does	  not	  guarantee	  the	  patent,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  Article	   27.1	   TRIPS	  Agreement	   reads:	   “Subject	   to	   the	  provisions	   of	   paragraphs	  2	   and	  3,	   patents	   shall	   be	  
available	  for	  any	  inventions,	  whether	  products	  or	  processes,	   in	  all	   fields	  of	  technology,	  provided	  that	  they	  
are	   new,	   involve	   an	   inventive	   step	   and	   are	   capable	   of	   industrial	   application.	  Subject	   to	   paragraph	  4	   of	  
Article	  65,	   paragraph	  8	  of	  Article	  70	   and	  paragraph	  3	  of	   this	  Article,	   patents	   shall	   be	   available	   and	  patent	  
rights	   enjoyable	  without	  discrimination	  as	   to	   the	  place	  of	   invention,	   the	   field	  of	   technology	  and	  whether	  
products	  are	  imported	  or	  locally	  produced”.	  
96	  	  Art	  9	  TRIPS:	  1.	  Members	  shall	  comply	  with	  Articles	  1	  through	  21	  of	  the	  Berne	  Convention	  (1971)	  and	  the	  
Appendix	  thereto.	  However,	  Members	  shall	  not	  have	  rights	  or	  obligations	  under	  this	  Agreement	  in	  respect	  
of	  the	  rights	  conferred	  under	  Article	  6bis	  of	  that	  Convention	  or	  of	  the	  rights	  derived	  therefrom.	  2.	  Copyright	  
protection	  shall	  extend	  to	  expressions	  and	  not	  to	  ideas,	  procedures,	  methods	  of	  operation	  or	  mathematical	  




can	   be	   very	   onerous	   for	   indigenous	   peoples.97	  Indeed,	   indigenous	   peoples	   are	  
often	  limited	  by	  their	  unfamiliarity	  with	  the	  Western	  IP	  system,	  and	  if	  aware	  of	  
the	   legal	   mechanisms,	   they	   might	   find	   the	   expenses	   of	   acquiring	   a	   patent	  
prohibitive.	   Additionally	   patent	   and	   trade	   secret	   laws	   require	   that	   the	  
information	   protected	   be	   of	   a	   ‘commercial	   nature’.	   On	   the	   same	   logic,	   trade	  
policies	   are	   often	   a	   very	   complex	   set	   of	   rules	   which	   do	   not	   take	   into	  
consideration	   the	   needs	   and	   expectations	   of	   indigenous	   stakeholders.98 	  The	  
information	  held	  by	  guardians	  and	  TK	  custodians	  is	  not	  necessarily	  commercially	  
valuable.	  Its	  value	  derives	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  unknown	  by	  the	  public	  at	  large,	  
contrary	  to	  the	  general	  belief	  that	  TK	  is	  in	  the	  public	  domain.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  
patent	   system,	   some	   countries99	  have	   so	   far	   included	   in	   their	   jurisdiction	   the	  
requirement	   for	   ‘disclosure	   of	   origin’,	   to	   prevent	   the	   trafficking	   of	   information	  
and	  knowledge	  whose	  derivation	  is	  of	  uncertain	  nature,	  and	  they	  have	  made	  it	  a	  
formal	  condition	  of	  patentability.	  Certificates	  of	  origin	  are	  generally	  used	  in	  trade	  
as	  a	   guarantee	   that	   the	  goods	   that	  are	   supposed	   to	  be	   coming	   from	  a	   specific	  
country	   that	   enjoys	   specific	   tariff	   privileges	   are	   actually	   coming	   from	   that	  
country.	  The	  certificate	  works	  as	  an	  “official	  recognition	  of	  the	  legal	  origin	  (legal	  
access)	  of	  a	  particular	  sample	  of	  a	  genetic	  resource	  or	  piece	  of	  information	  linked	  
to	  traditional	  knowledge”.100	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  “The	  main	  practical	  difficulty	   that	  deters	   traditional	  peoples	  and	  communities	   from	  filing	  patents	   is	   the	  
expense	  of	  doing	  so,	  which	  includes	  payments	  to	  the	  patent	  attorney	  hired	  to	  complete	  the	  application,	  and	  
the	  filing,	  prosecution,	  and	  renewal	  fees.	  Legally	  enforcing	  the	  patent	  against	  infringers	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  even	  
more”	   see	   Graham	   Dutfield	   “TRIPS-­‐related	   Aspects	   of	   Traditional	   Knowledge”	   (2001)	   33	   Case	   Western	  
Reserve	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  at	  261.	  
98	  “Trade	   policies	   in	   the	   region	   have	   generally	   not	   taken	   into	   consideration	   the	   interests	   and	   needs	   of	  
indigenous	  and	  local	  communities.	  This	   is	  valid	  for	  bi	  and	  multi-­‐national	  trade	  agreements,	  some	  of	  which	  
are	   said	   to	   impose	   a	   new	   ideological,	   legal,	   and	   political	   framework	   that	   will	   determine	   the	   relations	  
between	  the	  transnational	  capital,	  the	  States,	  and	  the	  Latin-­‐American	  peoples.	  The	  complexity	  of	  the	  trade	  
policies	   and	   agreements	   makes	   it	   difficult	   for	   indigenous	   and	   local	   communities	   to	   understand	   all	   their	  
implications”	   see	   Gonzalo	   Oviedo	   and	   Flavia	   Noejovich	   “Composite	   Report	   on	   the	   Status	   and	   Trends	  
Regarding	  the	  Knowledge,	  Innovations,	  and	  Practices	  of	  Indigenous	  and	  Local	  Communities	  Relevant	  to	  the	  
Conservation	   and	   Sustainable	   Use	   of	   Biodiversity,	   Secretariat	   of	   the	   Convention	   on	   Biological	   Diversity”	  
(2005)	   11	   electronic	   document	   <www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/tk/acpow8j.../acpow8j-­‐02-­‐02-­‐add4-­‐en.pdf>	  
last	  visited	  on	  02/10/2012.	  
99	  	  “Brazil,	  Colombia,	  Peru,	  Costa	  Rica,	  Egypt,	  Switzerland	  India	  and	  China	  have	  introduced	  the	  disclosure	  of	  
origin	  for	  patentability;	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Turkey	  are	  in	  the	  process	  of	  developing	  such	  laws.	  Countries	  of	  the	  
EU	   such	   as	   Belgium,	   Denmark	   and	   Sweden	   have	   incorporated	   disclosure	   of	   origin	   requirement	   in	   their	  
national	   jurisdictions”	   see	   Tzen	   Wong	   and	   Graham	   Dutfield	   (eds)	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Human	  
Development	  (Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2011)	  at	  154.	  
100	  “In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   disclosure	   of	   origin,	   the	   objective	   is	   that	   the	   origin	   of	   the	   genetic	   resource	   or	  
traditional	   knowledge	   used	   or	   incorporated	   in	   an	   invention	   or	   a	   creation	   is	   expressively	   indicated	   in	   the	  
intellectual	   property	   filing	   procedure	   so	   as	   to	   assure	   compliance	   with	   the	   CBD	   and	   national	   access	  
legislations.	  Disclosure	  of	  origins	  is	  considered	  by	  some	  to	  be	  an	  adequate	  way	  to	  prevent	  illegal	  access	  and	  




While	  developing	  countries	  might	  have	  all	  the	  interest	  to	  respect	  the	  disclosure	  
of	   the	   origin	   clause,	   the	   same	   cannot	   be	   said	   of	   developed	   countries	   whose	  
riches	  often	  depend	  on	  the	  exploitation	  of	  knowledge	  that	  developing	  countries	  
fail	   to	   protect	   or	   use.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   developing	   countries,	   disclosure	   of	   origin	  
would	   be	   used	   as	   what	   Graham	   Dutfield101	  identifies	   as	   a	   “positive	   defensive	  
protection”	  requirement	  into	  Patent	  law	  that	  traditional	  knowledge	  holders	  and	  
guardians	  could	  invoke	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  they	  obtain	  their	  fair	  participation	  and	  
sharing	   of	   any	   benefit	   arising	   from	   the	   commercialization	   of	   their	   knowledge.	  
However,	   the	   enforceability	   of	   disclosure	   of	   origin	   seems	   incompatible	   with	  
Articles	   27.1,	   30	   and	   62	   of	   TRIPS,	   by	   placing	   a	   new	   condition	   on	   patent	   filing	  
procedure	   that	   is	   not	   included	   and	   therefore	   allowable	   under	   the	   Agreement.	  
Countries,	  in	  fact,	  and	  especially	  the	  developed	  ones,	  argue	  that	  the	  disclosure	  of	  
origin	   clause	   would	   dramatically	   affect	   the	   freedom	   of	   patent	   applicants	   and	  
holders.	  Arguably,	  it	  would	  add	  to	  the	  already	  existing	  condition	  for	  patentability	  
(novelty,	   inventive	   step	  and	   industrial	   application)	   required	  by	  Art	  27.1.	  Article	  
62	  establishes	  the	  conditions	  and	  maintenance	  of	  any	  intellectual	  property	  right	  
as	   limited	   to	   those	   introduced	   in	   Art	   27.1.102	  Dutfield	   suggests	   that,	   not	   only	  
disclosure	  of	  origin	   is	   incompatible	  with	  TRIPS,	  but	   it	  might	  not	  be	  a	  good	   idea	  
anyway.	  While,	   in	   fact,	  disclosure	  of	  origin	  may	  be	  an	  essential	   requirement	   in	  
case	   there	   would	   be	   any	   need	   to	   measure	   the	   novelty	   requirement	   and	   the	  
inventive	   step	  against	   any	   asserted	  prior	   art	   claim,	   the	   risk,	   however,	   is	   that	   a	  
patent	  applicant	  might	  decide	   to	  avoid	   risks	   and	  omit	   any	  disclosure	  of	   the	  TK	  
that	  is	  included	  in	  his	  patent	  application.	  In	  that	  case,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  reason	  
for	  an	  examiner	  to	  assume	  that	  an	  invention	  is	  based	  on	  TK	  unless	  the	  applicant	  
declares	  so,	  and	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	   the	  granting	  of	   the	  patent,	  TK	  holders	  are	  
able	   to	   document	   that	   the	   invention	   is	   not	   novel	   because	   the	   TK	   used	   has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Vivas	   Eugui	   “Requiring	   the	  Disclosure	   of	   the	  Origin	   of	  Genetic	   Resources	   and	   Traditional	   Knowledge:	   the	  
Current	  Debate	  and	  Possible	   legal	  Alternatives”	   in	  Christophe	  Bellmann	  and	  others	  Trading	   in	  Knowledge	  
(Earthscan,	  London,	  2003)	  at	  197.	  
101	  See	  Tzen	  Wong	  and	  Graham	  Dutfield	   (eds)	   Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Human	  Development	   (Cambridge,	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2011).	  
102 	  David	   Vivas	   Eugui	   “Requiring	   the	   Disclosure	   of	   the	   Origin	   of	   Genetic	   Resources	   and	   Traditional	  
Knowledge:	  the	  Current	  Debate	  and	  Possible	  legal	  Alternatives”	  in	  Christophe	  Bellmann	  and	  others	  Trading	  




already	   been	   circulating	   or	   has	   been	   ‘stolen’	   from	   their	   community.103	  Such	  
omission	   would	   not	   disqualify	   the	   patent	   application	   from	   “being	   accepted,	  
being	   granted,	   or	   being	   subsequently	   enforced”.104	  In	   the	   case	  of	   a	  mandatory	  
disclosure	   of	   origin	   requirement,	   for	   any	   dishonest	   behaviour	   (including	  
voluntary	   omission	   of	   disclosure	   of	   origin),	   the	   patent	   application	   would	   be	  
either	  not	  granted,	  rejected	  or	  revoked.	  According	  to	  experts,	  disclosure	  of	  origin	  
would	  be	  in	  conflict	  with	  TRIPS	  and,	  unless	  TRIPS	  is	  amended,	  it	  cannot	  be	  made	  
mandatory;	  however,	  disclosure	  of	  origin	  could	  be	  requested	  not	  at	  the	  stage	  of	  
the	   granting	   of	   the	   patent	   but	   as	   a	   condition	   for	   its	   enforceability	   after	   the	  
patent	  has	  been	  granted.105	  According	  to	  Eugui,106	  Art	  27.1	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  controls	  
the	  “substantive	  requirements”	  in	  the	  application	  process	  of	  a	  patent.	  Moreover,	  
Eugui	  explains	   that	  Art	  27.1	  does	  not	  prohibit	  exceptions	   that	  are	  “destined	   to	  
solve	   problems	   that	   only	   exists	   in	   certain	   product	   sectors”.107	  The	   fact	   that	  
provisions	  are	  not	   included	  within	  TRIPS	  does	  not	   imply	  that	  they	  are	  wrong	  or	  
unnecessary	   per	   se.	   The	   needs	   and	   expectation	   of	   the	   world	   in	   1994	   were	  
definitely	  different	  from	  those	  that	  societies	  are	  facing	  today.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  
indigenous	   voices	   and	   expectations	   were	   at	   a	   different	   stage	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	  
developed	   and	   developing	   countries.	   At	   the	   time	  of	   the	   negotiations	   of	   TRIPS,	  
United	   States,	   Europe	   and	   Japan	   “supported	   by	   business	   associations	  
representing	   transnational	   corporations”	   successfully	   attempted	   “to	   place	   IPRs	  
on	   the	   agenda	   of	   the	   Uruguay	   Round	   of	   GATT,	   and	   then	   to	   force	   through	   an	  
agreement	  covering	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  IPR	  standards	  going	  far	  beyond	  the	  original	  
aim	   of	   preventing	   counterfeiting	   of	   trade	   marked	   goods	   and	   piracy	   of	  
copyrighted	  work”.108	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 	  Graham	   Dutfield	   Protecting	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Folklore,	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	   and	  
Sustainable	  Development	  (UNCTAD-­‐ICTSD,	  Genève,	  2003)	  at	  3.	  
104	  See	  Graham	  Dutfield	  Protecting	  Traditional	  Knowledge:	  Pathways	  to	  the	  Future	  (ICTSD,	  Genève,	  2006)	  at	  
43-­‐44.	  
105	  According	   to	  Dutfield:	  “The	  expert	  suggests	   that	   framing	   the	  disclosure	   requirement	  as	  a	  condition	   for	  
enforcement	  could	  adopted	  multilaterally	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  WIPO	  and	  then,	  perhaps,	  incorporated	  into	  
TRIPS”	  see	  at	  2.	  
106	  Eugui	  explains	  that	  “the	  differentiation	  between	  substantive	  and	  formal	  requirements	  is	  an	  artificial	  one	  
since	   in	  both	  cases	   the	   failure	   to	   fulfil	   those	   requirements	  will	  have	   the	  same	  effect,	  which	   is	   that	  of	  not	  
granting	  the	  patent	  or	  revoking	  it	  as	  the	  case	  may	  be”	  see	  David	  Vivas	  Eugui	  “Requiring	  the	  Disclosure	  of	  the	  
Origin	  of	  Genetic	  Resources	  and	  Traditional	  Knowledge:	  the	  Current	  Debate	  and	  Possible	  legal	  Alternatives”	  
in	  Christophe	  Bellmann	  and	  others	  Trading	  in	  Knowledge	  (Earthscan,	  London,	  2003)	  at	  202.	  
107	  Supra	  at	  202.	  	  




The	  suggestion	  that	  TRIPS	  is	  in	  need	  of	  revision,	  is	  not	  new.	  In	  2002,	  Brazil,	  China,	  
Cuba,	  Dominican	  Republic,	  Ecuador,	  India,	  Pakistan,	  Thailand,	  Venezuela,	  Zambia	  
and	   Zimbabwe	   jointly	   submitted	   a	   paper	   to	   the	   Council	   for	   TRIPS.	   The	  
examination	  made	  by	  the	  mentioned	  countries	  called	  for	  TRIPS	  to	  be	  amended.	  
The	   paper	   required	   that	   member	   states	   of	  WTO	  when	   applying	   “for	   a	   patent	  
relating	  to	  biological	  materials	  or	  to	  traditional	  knowledge”109	  shall	  provide	  as	  a	  
condition	  to	  be	  granted	  the	  patent:	  
	  
§ disclosure	  of	  the	  source	  and	  country	  of	  origin	  of	  the	  biological	  resource	  and	  
of	  the	  traditional	  knowledge	  used	  in	  the	  invention;	  
§ evidence	   of	   prior	   informed	   consent	   through	   approval	   of	   authorities	   under	  
the	  relevant	  national	  regimes;	  and	  
§ evidence	  of	   fair	  and	  equitable	  benefit	  sharing	  under	  the	  national	  regime	  of	  
the	  country	  of	  origin.110	  
	  
While	  disclosure	  of	  origin	  is	  important	  for	  fairness	  in	  trade,	  it	  can	  also	  be	  argued	  
that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  identify	  how	  an	  invention	  actually	  came	  into	  existence.	  	  
But	   then	   again,	   the	   requirement	   influences	  mostly	   national	   patents.	   India,	   for	  
example,	   not	   only	   requires	   disclosure	   of	   the	   source	   and	   geographical	   origin	   of	  
biological	   material	   used	   in	   the	   invention,	   but	   considers	   it	   a	   criminal	   act,	  
punishable	  with	  imprisonment,	  to	  apply	  for	  a	  patent	  using	  a	  biological	  resource	  
originating	  from	  India	  whose	  utilization	  has	  not	  been	  previously	  approved	  by	  the	  
National	  Biodiversity	  Authority.111	  	  
Some	   countries	   are	   becoming	   more	   and	   more	   aware	   of	   the	   importance	   of	  
recognising	   the	   invaluable	   contribution	   of	   TK	   holders	   and	   guardians	   in	   the	  
development	  and	  transmission	  of	  valuable	  TK	  and	  obtain	  prior-­‐informed	  consent	  
over	  the	  knowledge	  that	  is	  developed	  and	  commodified	  in	  the	  market;	  however,	  
as	   stated	   in	   the	   Composite	   Report	   on	   the	   Status	   and	   Trends	   Regarding	   the	  
Knowledge,	   Innovations,	   and	   Practices	   of	   Indigenous	   and	   Local	   Communities	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 	  Graham	   Dutfield	   Protecting	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Folklore,	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	   and	  
Sustainable	  Development	  (UNCTAD-­‐ICTSD,	  Genève,	  2003)	  at	  16.	  
110	  Dutfield	  at	  16.	  
111	  Michael	  A	  Gollin	  and	  Thomas	  F	  Barry	  “China’s	  Disclosure	  of	  Origin	  Law	  To	  Enter	  Into	  Force	  on	  October	  1,	  
2009”	   electronic	   document	   <www.venable.com/china-­‐disclosure-­‐of-­‐origin-­‐law-­‐to-­‐enter-­‐into-­‐force-­‐on-­‐




Relevant	  to	  the	  Conservation	  and	  Sustainable	  Use	  of	  Biodiversity,112	  “the	  concept	  
of	  free,	  prior	  informed	  consent,	  considered	  by	  indigenous	  networks	  to	  be	  a	  basic	  
tool	   for	   defining	   and	   implementing	   development	  models	   that	   are	   socially	   and	  
culturally	  accountable,	  is	  still	  in	  its	  infancy”.Yet,	  there	  is	  also	  no	  mention	  of	  prior	  
informed	   consent	   in	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement.	   The	   idea	   of	   creating	   a	  
misappropriation	   regime	   could	   succeed	   in	   preventing	   the	   exploitation	   of	   the	  
most	  public	   knowledge	  within	   the	   community	  who	   freely	   circulates	  among	   the	  
members	  of	  the	  group	  and	  outside	  the	  group.	  But	  the	  misappropriation	  regime	  
should	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  fact	  that	  indigenous	  TK	  and	  TCEs	  vary	  greatly	  
from	  one	  indigenous	  group	  to	  another	  and	  from	  one	  state	  to	  another;	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  laws	  regulating	  copyrights	  and	  patents	  laws	  can	  vary	  from	  country	  to	  country	  
and	  present	  different	  levels	  of	  restrictions	  and	  protections.	  In	  fact,	  national	  and	  
regional	   patent	   laws	   have	   yet	   to	   harmonise	   their	   standards	   and	   legislation	   on	  
how	  information	  and	  material	  that	  has	  already	  entered	  the	  public	  domain	  should	  
be	  described	  to	  constitute	  novelty-­‐defeating	  prior	  art.113	  	  And	  lastly,	  how	  can	  the	  
system	   accommodate	   more	   spiritual	   forms	   of	   knowledge	   whose	   survival	   and	  
power	  rest	  in	  the	  limitation	  of	  its	  transmission?	  	  
	  
9.4	  -­‐	  The	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	  and	  Indigenous	  Intangible	  
Knowledge	  
	  
Some	   international	   instruments	   and	   agreements	   relevant	   to	   the	   safeguard	   of	  
indigenous	  culture	  and	  TK	  vary	  from	  aspirational	  (UNDRIP)	  to	  those	  that	  impose	  
on	  parties	   concrete	   legal	  obligations	   (ILO	  169,	   ICCPR,	  TRIPS).	  Among	   them,	   the	  
Convention	   on	   Biological	   Diversity114	  (CBD)	   is	   the	   first	   international	   agreement	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	  See	  Composite	  Report	  on	  the	  Status	  and	  Trends	  Regarding	  the	  Knowledge,	  Innovations,	  and	  Practices	  of	  
Indigenous	   and	   Local	   Communities	   Relevant	   to	   the	   Conservation	   and	   Sustainable	   Use	   of	   Biodiversity	  
electronic	   document	   <www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/tk/acpow8j-­‐02/official/acpow8j-­‐02-­‐02-­‐add4-­‐en.pdf>	   last	  
visited	  on	  12/12/2015	  
113	  	  Supra.	  
114	  “By	  February	  1991,	  the	  Ad	  Hoc	  Working	  Group	  had	  become	  known	  as	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Negotiating	  
Committee.	   Its	   work	   culminated	   on	   22	   May	   1992	   with	   the	   Nairobi	   Conference	   for	   the	   Adoption	   of	   the	  
Agreed	  Text	  of	  the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity.	  The	  Convention	  was	  opened	  for	  signature	  on	  5	  June	  
1992	   at	   the	   United	   Nations	   Conference	   on	   Environment	   and	   Development	   (the	   Rio	   Earth	   Summit).	   It	  
remained	   open	   for	   signature	   until	   4	   June	   1993,	   by	   which	   time	   it	   had	   received	   168	   signatures.	   The	  
Convention	  entered	  into	  force	  on	  29	  December	  1993,	  which	  was	  90	  days	  after	  the	  30th	  ratification.	  The	  first	  
session	   of	   the	   Conference	   of	   the	   Parties	   was	   scheduled	   for	   28	   November	   –	   9	   December	   1994	   in	   the	  




that	  makes	  specific	  reference	  to	  indigenous	  TK	  and	  proposes	  solutions	  on	  how	  to	  
safeguard	  it.	  The	  CBD	  (1992)	  is	  the	  result	  of	  international	  negotiations	  that	  tried	  
to	  find	  legal	  solutions	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  TK	  and	  indigenous	  peoples’	  interests.	  
Dutfield115	  recognises	  several	  aims	  inherent	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  CBD:	  	  
	  
§ national	  and	  international	  sui	  generis	  regimes;	  
§ legally	   and	   non-­‐legally	   binding	   instruments	   and	   agreements	   including	  
contracts,	  guidelines	  and	  codes	  of	  conduct;	  
§ specific	  protection	  measures	  such	  as	  TK	  databases	  and	  disclosure	  of	  origin	  of	  
genetic	  resources	  and	  associated	  TK	  in	  patent	  applications;	  
§ principles	   such	   as	   prior	   informed	   consent	   and	   respect	   for	   customary	   law;	  
and	  
§ the	  incorporation	  of	  TK	  protection	  provisions	  in	  the	  International	  Regime	  on	  
Access	  and	  Benefit	  Sharing.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  specific,	  Article	  8(j)	  of	  the	  CBD	  states	  that:	  
	  
…	  each	  contracting	  Party	  shall,	  as	  far	  as	  possible	  and	  as	  appropriate:	  subject	  to	  
national	  legislation,	  respect,	  preserve	  and	  maintain	  knowledge,	  innovations	  and	  
practices	   of	   indigenous	   and	   local	   communities	   embodying	   traditional	   lifestyles	  
relevant	   for	   the	   conservation	   and	   sustainable	   use	   of	   biological	   diversity	   and	  
promote	   their	   wider	   application	   with	   the	   approval	   and	   involvement	   of	   the	  
holders	   of	   such	   knowledge,	   innovations	   and	   practices	   and	   encourage	   the	  
equitable	  sharing	  of	  the	  benefits	  arising	  from	  the	  utilization	  of	  such	  knowledge	  
innovations	  and	  practices.	  	  
	  
In	  her	  book,	  Lewinski116	  explains	  that	  by	  requiring	  the	  “approval	  and	  involvement	  
of	  the	  right	  holders”,	  Article	  8(j)	  envisages	  some	  sort	  of	  proprietary	  rights	  of	  the	  
holders	   of	   the	   relevant	   knowledge.	   However,	   the	   terminology	   ‘right	   holder’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
commitment	   to	   sustainable	   development.	   It	   represents	   a	   dramatic	   step	   forward	   in	   the	   conservation	   of	  
biological	   diversity,	   the	   sustainable	   use	  of	   its	   components,	   and	   the	   fair	   and	   equitable	   sharing	  of	   benefits	  
arising	   from	   the	   use	   of	   genetic	   resources”	   see	   the	   history	   of	   the	   CBD	   electronic	   document	  
<www.cbd.int/history/>.	  
115	  Graham	   Dutfield	   Protecting	   Traditional	   Knowledge:	   Pathways	   to	   the	   Future’	   International	   Centre	   for	  
Trade	  and	  Sustainable	  Development	  (ICTSD,	  Genève,	  2006)	  at	  24.	  
116	  Silke	  von	  Lewinski	   (ed)	   Indigenous	  heritage	  and	   Intellectual	  Property	   (2nd	  ed,	  Kluwer	  Law	   International,	  




“cannot	  be	   readily	  understood	   to	  be	  confined	   to	   rights	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  existing	  
entitlements	  under	  applicable	  national	   law”.	   Lewinski	   carries	  on	  by	   saying	   that	  
the	  term	  “’right’	   in	  this	  context,	  very	   likely	  refers	  to	  a	  more	  general	  concept	  of	  
rights	  of	   indigenous	  and	   local	  communities	  rather	  than	  to	  existing	  entitlements	  
under	   applicable	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   in	   a	   technical	   sense”.117	  In	   other	  
words,	  the	  area	  of	  influence	  of	  the	  holders	  of	  relevant	  knowledge	  remains	  legally	  
unclear	  and,	  consequently,	  limited	  to	  ‘disapproval’.	  While	  such	  disapproval	  might	  
be	  important	  in	  the	  decision	  making	  processes	  related	  to	  indigenous	  TK,	  it	  does	  
not	  constitute	  a	  ‘right’	  per	  se	  and	  can	  be,	  therefore,	  discarded	  by	  stakeholders.	  	  
Articles	   8(j)	   and	   15	   of	   the	   CBD	   recognises	   inter	   alia	   that	   access	   to	   genetic	  
resources	  is	  subject	  to	  prior	  informed	  consent	  (PIC)	  of	  the	  provider	  country	  and	  
the	  benefit	  sharing	  (fair	  and	  equitable	  sharing).	  It	  is	  understood	  that	  this	  benefit	  
sharing	   should	   be	   based	   on	   agreements	   entered	   before	   the	   disclosure	   of	   the	  
knowledge.	  While	   the	   CBD	   recognises	   the	   sovereign	   rights	   of	   states	   over	   their	  
natural	  and	  genetic	  resources,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  links	  TK	  to	  the	  resources	  of	  a	  
country,	   leaving	   to	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   a	   state	   to	   dispose	   of	   its	   resources	   and	  
create,	   where	   necessary,	   sui	   generis	   legislation	   that	   better	   accommodate	  
indigenous	  peoples’	  needs	  and	  expectations.	  In	  addition	  to	  that,	  CBD	  is	  not	  self-­‐
executing,	  which	  means	  that	  its	  provisions	  do	  not	  automatically	  become	  part	  of	  
the	   domestic	   laws	   of	   signatory	   member	   states	   until	   they	   are	   formally	  
incorporated	  into	  domestic	  law	  through	  enactment	  of	  CBD	  compliant	  legislation.	  
Article	   6	   states	   that:	   “Each	   Contracting	   Party	   shall,	   in	   accordance	   with	   its	  
particular	  conditions	  and	  capabilities:	  
	  
(a)	  Develop	  national	   strategies,	   plans	  or	  programmes	   for	   the	   conservation	  and	  
sustainable	   use	   of	   biological	   diversity	   or	   adapt	   for	   this	   purpose	   existing	  
strategies,	  plans	  or	  programmes	  which	  shall	  reflect,	   inter	  alia,	  the	  measures	  set	  
out	   in	   this	   Convention	   relevant	   to	   the	   Contracting	   Party	   concerned;	   and	   (b)	  
Integrate,	  as	  far	  as	  possible	  and	  as	  appropriate,	  the	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  
use	   of	   biological	   diversity	   into	   relevant	   sectoral	   or	   cross-­‐sectoral	   plans,	  
programmes	  and	  policies.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




This	   obviously	   would	   necessitate	   the	   creation	   of	   national	   legal	   reforms	   and	  
measures	  that	  would	  ensure	  the	  involvement	  and	  approval	  of	  the	  holders	  of	  TK.	  
However,	  Article	   8(j)	   does	  not	   indicate	   the	   ‘prior	   approval’	   of	   the	  holders	   as	   a	  
prerequisite	   to	   access	   natural	   and	   genetic	   resources	   traditionally	   used	   and	  
safeguarded	   by	   indigenous	   TK	   guardians.	   The	   missing	   bit	   was	   consequently	  
discussed	  at	  the	  Fifth	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  to	  the	  Convention	  
on	   Biological	   Diversity	   (Nairobi,	   2000),118	  when	   the	   General	   Principles	   stressed	  
the	   importance	   to	   guarantee	   “a	   holistic	   approach	   consistent	  with	   the	   spiritual	  
and	   cultural	   values	   and	   customary	   practices	   of	   the	   indigenous	   and	   local	  
communities	   and	   their	   rights	   to	   have	   control	   over	   their	   traditional	   knowledge,	  
innovations	   and	   practices”	   (Principle	   1),	   which	   will	   consequently	   accept	   that	  
“access	   to	   traditional	   knowledge,	   innovations	   and	   practices	   of	   indigenous	   and	  
local	  communities	  should	  be	  subject	  to	  prior	  informed	  consent	  or	  prior	  informed	  
approval	   from	   the	   holders	   of	   such	   knowledge,	   innovations	   and	   practices”	  
(Principle	  5).	   In	   the	  same	  Decision	  V/16	   (Convention	  of	   the	  Parties)	  on	  Art	  8(j),	  
however,	  it	  is	  also	  stressed	  the	  importance	  to:	  	  
	  
…	   support	   the	   development	   of	   registers	   of	   traditional	   knowledge,	   innovations	  
and	   practices	   of	   indigenous	   and	   local	   communities	   embodying	   traditional	  
lifestyles	  relevant	  for	  the	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  of	  biological	  diversity	  
through	  participatory	  programmes	  and	  consultations	  with	   indigenous	  and	   local	  
communities,	  taking	  into	  account	  strengthening	  legislation,	  customary	  practices	  
and	   traditional	   systems	   of	   resource	   management,	   such	   as	   the	   protection	   of	  
traditional	  knowledge	  against	  unauthorized	  use.	  	  
	  
Paragraph	   18	   is	   particularly	   enlightening	   on	   the	   actual	   feasibility	   of	   the	  
recommendation	   when	   it	   invites	   “Parties	   and	   Governments	   to	   increase	   the	  
participation	  of	  representatives	  of	  indigenous	  and	  local	  community	  organizations	  
in	   official	   delegations	   to	   meetings	   held	   under	   the	   Convention	   on	   Biological	  
Diversity”.	  What	   the	  Decision	  actually	  does	   is	   to	   recognise	   that	   the	  Parties	   are	  
trying	   to	  address	   indigenous	  peoples’	   issues	  without	   the	   formal	   representation	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  Fifth	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  to	  the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	  (Nairobi,	  2000)	  




and	  participation	  of	  indigenous	  representatives.	  It	   is	   like	  trying	  to	  build	  a	  house	  
without	  the	  planning	  aid	  of	  an	  engineer	  and	  architect.	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that,	  at	  
the	   Sixth	   Meeting	   of	   the	   Conference	   of	   the	   Parties	   (COP-­‐6,	   2002),	   the	   Bonn	  
Guidelines	  were	  created	  to	  assist	  “Parties,	  Governments	  and	  other	  stakeholders	  
in	  developing	  overall	  access	  and	  benefit-­‐sharing	  strategies,	  and	  in	  identifying	  the	  
steps	   involved	   in	   the	   process	   of	   obtaining	   access	   to	   genetic	   resources	   and	  
benefit-­‐sharing”. 119 	  The	   Guidelines	   suggest	   that	   Parties	   that	   have	   genetic	  
resources	  under	  their	  jurisdictions	  should	  consider	  the	  adoption	  of	  “measures	  to	  
encourage	  the	  disclosure	  of	  the	  country	  of	  origin	  of	  the	  genetic	  resources	  and	  of	  
the	  origin	  of	  traditional	  knowledge,	  innovations	  and	  practices	  of	  indigenous	  and	  
local	   communities	   in	   applications	   for	   intellectual	   property	   rights”	   (Principle	  
16(d)(ii)).	   Again	   the	   Guidelines	   encourage	   the	   participation	   of	   the	   “relevant	  
stakeholders	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  provisions	  that	  would	  interest	  them	  such	  as	  the	  
implementation	  of	  access	  and	  benefit-­‐sharing	  arrangements”	  (Principle	  17).	  COP	  
Decision	  VI/24	  (to	  which	  the	  Bonn	  Guidelines	  were	  annexed),	  in	  order	  to	  address	  
indigenous	  claims,	  encouraged	  states	  to	  gather	  more	  information	  and	  analysis	  on	  
the	  role	  of	  customary	  laws	  and	  traditional	  practices	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  protection	  
of	   genetic	   resources	   and	   TK,	   innovations	   and	   practices	   and	   their	   possible	  
relationship	  with	  IPR	  law;	  prior	   informed	  consent	  disclosure,	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  
country	   of	   origin;	   evidence	   and	   role	   or	   prior	   art	   in	   the	   patent	   and	   copyright	  
examination	  process,120	  and	  grant	   fair	  access	   to	   indigenous	  stakeholders	   to	   the	  
international	  debate.	  	  
There	   are	  many	   documents	   that	   suggest	   a	   greater	   participation	   of	   indigenous	  
stakeholders	  and	  a	  better	  analysis	  and	  documentation	  that,	   internationally	  and	  
locally,	  could	  help	  understand	  holistically	  indigenous	  peoples’	  traditions	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	  “The	  Bonn	  Guidelines	  are	  intended	  to	  assist	  governments	  in	  the	  adoption	  of	  measures	  to	  govern	  access	  
and	   benefit-­‐sharing	   in	   their	   countries.	   They	   were	   adopted	   by	   the	   Conference	   of	   the	   Parties	   to	   the	  
Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	  (CBD)	  in	  2002”	  electronic	  document	  <www.cbd.int/abs/infokit/factsheet-­‐
bonn-­‐en.pdf>;	   “The	   Guidelines	   identify	   the	   steps	   in	   the	   access	   and	   benefit-­‐sharing	   process,	   with	   an	  
emphasis	  on	  the	  obligation	  for	  users	  to	  seek	  the	  prior	  informed	  consent	  of	  providers.	  They	  also	  identify	  the	  
basic	   requirements	   for	  mutually	  agreed	  terms	  and	  define	   the	  main	   roles	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  users	  and	  
providers	   and	   stress	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   involvement	   of	   all	   stakeholders”	   electronic	   document	  	  
<www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-­‐bonn-­‐gdls-­‐en.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  18/01/2013.	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  Sixth	   Ordinary	   Meeting	   of	   the	   Conference	   of	   the	   Parties	   to	   the	   Convention	   on	   Biological	   Diversity	  
Decision	   VI/24	   –	   Access	   and	   Benefit-­‐Sharing	   as	   Related	   to	   Genetic	   Resources	   electronic	   document	  




management	   of	   biologic	   resources	   and	   TK.121	  However,	   though	   the	   intentions	  
seem	   admirable,	   as	   most	   of	   the	   intentions	   are	   so	   anyway,	   the	   number	   of	  
indigenous	   stakeholders	   participating	   in	   international	   forums	   is	   today	   still	   very	  
limited;	   the	   chance	   to	   have	   their	   say	   even	   narrower,	   and	   the	   chance	   to	   vote	  
practically	   nullius!	   To	   solve	   the	   problem,	   at	   the	   Seventh	   Session	   of	   the	  
Conference	   of	   the	   Parties	   to	   the	   CBD	   (COP-­‐7,	   2004),	   the	   Working	   Group	   on	  
Access	  and	  Benefit-­‐Sharing	  (ABS	  Working	  Group)	  and	  the	  Working	  Group	  on	  Art	  
8(j)	  noted	  that	  “the	  international	  regime	  should	  recognize	  and	  shall	  respect	  the	  
rights	  of	  indigenous	  and	  local	  communities”	  and,	  in	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  “the	  Ad	  Hoc	  
Open-­‐ended	   Working	   Group	   on	   Access	   and	   Benefit-­‐sharing	   with	   the	  
collaboration	  of	   the	  Ad	  Hoc	  Open	  ended	   Inter-­‐Sessional	  Working	  Group	  on	  Art	  
8(j)	  and	  Related	  Provisions”	  should	  ensure:122	  	  	  
	  
…	   the	   participation	   of	   indigenous	   and	   local	   communities,	   non-­‐Governmental	  
organizations,	  industry	  and	  scientific	  and	  academic	  institutions,	  as	  well	  as	  inter-­‐
Governmental	  organizations,	  to	  elaborate	  and	  negotiate	  an	  international	  regime	  
on	   access	   to	   genetic	   resources	   and	   benefit-­‐sharing	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   adopting	  
an	  	  instrument\instruments	  to	  effectively	  implement	  the	  provisions	  in	  Article	  15	  
and	  Article	  8(j)	  of	  the	  Convention	  and	  the	  three	  objectives	  of	  the	  Convention.	  	  
	  
They	  also	  encouraged	  “Parties,	  Governments,	  international	  organizations	  and	  all	  
relevant	   stakeholders	   to	   provide	   the	   ways	   and	   means	   to	   allow	   for	   sufficient	  
preparation	   and	   to	   facilitate	   effective	   participation	   of	   indigenous	   and	   local	  
communities	   in	   the	   process	   of	   the	   negotiation	   and	   elaboration	   of	   an	  
international	  regime”.123	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121	  See	  all	  the	  Meetings	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  to	  the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity;	  the	  Bonn	  
Guidelines;	  WIPO	  “Examination	  of	   Issues	  Relating	   to	   the	   Interrelation	  of	  Access	   to	  Genetic	  Resources	  and	  
Disclosure	  Requirements	  in	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  Applications”	  (2005)	  Doc	  WIPO/IP/GR/05/01;	  and	  
for	   a	   summarise	   see	   Graham	   Dutfield	   Protecting	   Traditional	   Knowledge:	   Pathways	   to	   the	   Future’	  
(International	  Centre	  for	  Trade	  and	  Sustainable	  Development	  (ICTSD,	  Genève,	  2006).	  
122	  Seventh	   Ordinary	  Meeting	   of	   the	   Conference	   of	   the	   Parties	   to	   the	   Convention	   on	   Biological	   Diversity	  
Decision	  VII/19	  Access	  and	  benefit-­‐sharing	  as	  related	  to	  genetic	  resources	  (Article	  15)	  (Principle	  1)	  electronic	  
document	  <www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=7756>.	  
123	  COP	  7	  Decision	  VII/19	  Access	  and	  benefit-­‐sharing	  as	  related	  to	  genetic	  resources	  (Article	  15)	  (Principle	  6)	  




As	   Daes	   pointed	   out	   in	   her	   thorough	   research	   and	   report	   on	   indigenous	  
peoples:124	  	  
	  
National	   laws	   should	   deny	   to	   any	   person	   or	   corporation	   the	   right	   to	   obtain	  
patent,	   copyright	   or	   other	   legal	   protection	   for	   any	   element	   of	   indigenous	  
peoples'	   heritage	   without	   adequate	   documentation	   of	   the	   free	   and	   informed	  
consent	   of	   the	   traditional	   owners	   to	   an	   arrangement	   for	   the	   sharing	   of	  
ownership,	  control,	  use	  and	  benefits	  (Principle	  26).	  	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	   indigenous	  peoples	  should	  be	  responsible	  for	  their	  own	  culture	  
and	   resources	   and,	   as	   such,	   they	   should	   work	   with	   governments	   to	   find	  
regulations	   that	   would	   safeguard	   the	   management	   and	   exploitation	   of	   the	  
resources	  that	  are	  used	  by	  indigenous	  communities	  on	  a	  case	  by	  case	  basis	  and	  
without	  discrimination.	  	  
In	   2008	   at	   the	   Ninth	   Session	   of	   the	   Conference	   of	   the	   Parties	   discussed	  
provisions	  that	  should	  be	  incorporated	  within	  national	  and	  international	  regimes	  
and	  summarised	  as:	  125	  
	  
§ measures	  to	  ensure	  the	  fair	  and	  equitable	  sharing	  with	  traditional-­‐knowledge	  
holders	  of	  benefits	  arising	  out	  of	   the	  utilization	  of	   traditional	  knowledge	   in	  
accordance	  with	  Article	  8(j)	  of	  the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity;	  
§ measures	   to	   ensure	   that	   access	   to	   traditional	   knowledge	   takes	   place	   in	  
accordance	  with	  community	  level	  procedures;	  
§ measures	   to	   address	   the	   use	   of	   traditional	   knowledge	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
benefit-­‐sharing	  arrangements;	  
§ identification	  of	  best	  practices	  to	  ensure	  respect	  for	  traditional	  knowledge	  in	  
ABS	  related	  research;	  
§ incorporation	   of	   traditional	   knowledge	   in	   development	   of	  model	   clauses	   for	  
material	  transfer	  agreements;	  
§ identification	   of	   individual	   or	   authority	   to	   grant	   access	   in	   accordance	   with	  
community	  level	  procedures;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124	  Principles	  and	  Guidelines	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Heritage	  of	  Indigenous	  People	  (UN	  –	  1995).	  
125	  See	  Report	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  to	  the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	  on	  the	  Work	  of	  Its	  





§ access	  with	  approval	  of	  traditional-­‐knowledge	  holders;	  and	  
§ no	  engineered	  or	  coerced	  access	  to	  traditional	  knowledge.	  
	  
On	   the	   same	   session,	   the	   COP	   came	   up	   with	   further	   considerations	   for	   other	  
important	  elements	  to	  be	  included	  in	  international	  negotiations	  such	  as:	  126	  
	  
§ prior	   informed	   consent	   of,	   and	   mutually	   agreed	   terms	   with,	   holders	   of	  
traditional	   knowledge,	   including	   indigenous	   and	   local	   communities,	   when	  
traditional	  knowledge	  is	  accessed;	  
§ internationally	   developed	   guidelines	   to	   assist	   Parties	   in	   the	   development	   of	  
their	  domestic	  legislation	  and	  policies;	  
§ declaration	   to	   be	   made	   on	   the	   internationally	   recognized	   certificate	   as	   to	  
whether	  there	  is	  any	  associated	  traditional	  knowledge	  and	  who	  the	  owners	  
of	  traditional	  knowledge	  are;	  and	  
§ community-­‐level	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  arising	  out	  of	  traditional	  knowledge.	  
	  	  
The	  considerations	  above	  show	  that	  there	  is	  a	  new	  trend	  that	  tries	  to	  encourage	  
states	  and	  parties	  to	  international	  agreements	  to	  include	  consultations	  and	  prior	  
informed	   consent	   and	   benefit-­‐sharing	   to	   any	   discourse	   involving	   indigenous	  
peoples’	  stakeholders	  and	  guardians	  of	  knowledge.	  One	  of	  the	  ways	  indigenous	  
peoples	   have	   to	   secure	   benefit-­‐sharing	   is	   through	   Contractual	   Agreements.	  
Contracts,	   are	   legally	   binding	   documents	   between	   parties.	   In	   the	   case	   of	  
indigenous	   TK,	   contracts	   cannot	   only	   strengthen	   the	   benefit-­‐sharing	   paradigm,	  
but	   can	   also	   guarantee	   the	   protection	   of	   secrets.	   In	   this	   case	   indigenous	  
representatives	  would	  be	  able	  to	  determine:	  
	  
• who	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  agreement	  are	  (guardians	  for	  example);	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  “Components	  to	  be	  further	  elaborated	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  incorporating	  them	  in	  the	  international	  regime:	  1	  
-­‐	  Capacity-­‐building	  measures	  at	  all	  relevant	  levels	  for:	  (a)	   Development	   of	   national	   legislation	   (b)	  
Participation	  in	  negotiations,	  including	  contract	  negotiations	  (c)	  Information	  and	  communication	  technology	  
(d)	   Development	   and	   use	   of	   valuation	   methods	   (e)	   Bioprospecting,	   associated	   research	   and	   taxonomic	  
studies	   (f)	   Monitoring	   and	   enforcing	   compliance	   (g)	   Use	   of	   access	   and	   benefit-­‐sharing	   for	   sustainable	  
development;	   2	   -­‐	   National	   capacity	   self-­‐assessments	   to	   be	   used	   as	   a	   guideline	   for	   minimum	   capacity-­‐
building	  requirements;	  3	  -­‐	  Measures	  for	  technology	  transfer	  and	  cooperation;	  4	  -­‐	  Special	  capacity-­‐building	  
measures	  for	  indigenous	  and	  local	  communities;	  5	  -­‐	  Development	  of	  menus	  of	  model	  clauses	  for	  potential	  
inclusion	  in	  material	  transfer	  agreements”	  see	  Report	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  to	  the	  Convention	  on	  





• the	  duration	  of	  the	  agreement;	  
• what	  knowledge	  is	  included	  in	  the	  agreement;	  
• what	  use	  will	  be	  done	  with	  the	  knowledge;	  
• restrictions	  made	  on	  the	  use	  of	   the	  knowledge	  based	  on	  eg	  ethic,	  spiritual,	  
moral	  reasons;	  
• specific	   restrictions	   based	   on	   confidentiality	   agreements	   annexed	   to	   the	  
contract;	  and	  
• agreed	  specifics	  on	  the	  benefit-­‐sharing.127	  
	  
Though	   the	   idea	   of	   using	   contracts	   might	   seem	   valuable	   and	   worth	   further	  
exploring,	  it	  might	  only	  be	  limited	  to	  those	  indigenous	  peoples	  whose	  knowledge	  
is	   expected	   to	   enter	   the	   public	   domain	   or	   about	   to	   enter	   it	   anyway	   and	   are	  
looking	  for	  the	  best	  options	  to	  do	  so	  by	  safeguarding	  their	  interests;	  conversely,	  
contracts	   are	   less	   suitable	   in	   the	   case	   of	   knowledge	   that	   is	   held	   secret	   and	   is	  
controlled	  by	   very	   few	  within	   the	   community	  who	  have	  no	   legal	   education	   (or	  
economic	  resources)	  on	  how	  to	  best	  protect	  their	  rights.	  In	  fact,	  there	  are	  often	  
spiritual	   components	   in	   the	   specific	   TK	   of	   every	   community	   that	   cannot	   be	  
discussed	   during	   a	   contractual	   transaction.	   Customary	   laws	   would	   prevent	   TK	  
holders	   and	   guardians	   to	   do	   so.	   In	   addition	   to	   that,	   and	   as	   previously	   pointed	  
out,	  much	   of	   the	   international	   debates	   stop	   at	   the	   border	   of	   a	   state	   in	  which	  
governments	  and	  powerful	  stakeholders/multinationals	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  dictate	  
whether	  to	  include	  indigenous	  peoples	  in	  any	  discourse	  relating	  to	  national	  and	  
international	  economic	  negotiations	  and	  benefit-­‐sharing.	  	  
Today	  as	  yesterday,	  there	   is	  a	  strong	  resistance	  to	  change	  a	  mindset	  which	  has	  
been	  circulating	  for	  centuries	  that	  believes	  that	  the	  cultural,	  social	  and	  economic	  
rights	  of	   indigenous	  peoples	  are	  debatable	  and	  often	   ignorable	  for	  the	   ‘greater	  
good’.	   Some	   might	   argue	   that	   granting	   exclusive	   rights	   and	   privileges	   to	   TK	  
holders	   would	   be	   impractical	   and	   might,	   in	   the	   long	   run,	   undermine	   the	  
creativity	  and	  have	  negative	  consequences	   for	   the	  economic	  development	  of	  a	  
country.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Wai	   262,	   for	   example,	   the	   Crown	   speculated	   that	  
“providing	  additional	  protection	  to	  taonga	  works	  might	  undermine	  creativity	  and	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  For	   further	   information	   see	   Simon	   Brascoupé	   and	   Howard	   Mann	   A	   Community	   Guide	   to	   Protecting	  
Indigenous	   Knowledge	   (Published	   under	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   Minister	   of	   Indian	   Affairs	   and	   Northern	  




economic	   development”. 128 	  In	   the	   eyes	   of	   the	   Crown,	   taonga	   works	   and	  
mātauranga	  Māori	  have	  been	  freely	  circulating	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  for	  too	  long	  
to	   deserve	   any	   active	   protection	   through	   IP	   laws.	   What	   the	   Crown	   failed	   to	  
explain	   is	   the	   ‘how’	   and	   ‘why’	   Māori	   culture	   has	   become	   part	   of	   the	   public	  
domain.	   Was	   it	   consciously	   done	   by	   Māori	   people?	   Or	   was	   it	   rather	   the	  
consequence	  of	  exploitation	  and	  discrimination?	  	  
What	   the	   law	   needs	   to	   address,	   in	   most	   of	   the	   cases	   involving	   indigenous	  
peoples,	  is	  a	  fair	  deal	  or	  restorative	  justice	  that	  would	  not	  be	  needed	  if	  there	  was	  
no	  abuse	  of	  power	  and	  discrimination	  to	  begin	  with.	  In	  this	  case,	  a	  nation	  cannot	  
speak	  of	   the	  growth	  of	   its	   economy	  at	   the	  expenses	  of	   those	  who	  were	  never	  
considered	  equal	  to	  the	  mainstream.	  On	  an	  opposite	  line,	  however,	  it	  is	  true	  that	  
much	   of	   indigenous	   culture	   is	   today	   in	   the	   public	   domain.	   In	   that	   case,	   the	  
traditional	   knowledge	   associated	   with	   genetic	   resources	   should	   be	   taken	   into	  
account.	   In	   2010	   a	   supplementary	   agreement	   to	   the	   Convention	   on	   Biological	  
Diversity	   was	   created	   specifically	   referring	   to	   the	   access	   and	   benefit	   sharing	  
mechanism	   envisaged	   by	   the	   Convention.	   The	  Nagoya	   Protocol	   on	   Access	   to	  
Genetic	   Resources	   and	   the	   Fair	   and	   Equitable	   Sharing	   of	   Benefits	   Arising	   from	  
their	   Utilization	   (ABS)	   to	   the	   Convention	   on	   Biological	   Diversity129	  provides	   “a	  
transparent	   legal	   framework	   for	   the	   effective	   implementation	   of	   one	   of	   the	  
three	  objectives	  of	  the	  CBD:	  the	  fair	  and	  equitable	  sharing	  of	  benefits	  arising	  out	  
of	   the	  utilization	  of	   genetic	   resources”.130	  The	  Protocol	   covers	   TK,	  but	  only	   the	  
one	  that	   is	  covered	  by	  the	  CBD.	  Any	  other	  knowledge	  or	  sacred/secret	  practice	  
of	   indigenous	   peoples	   which	   finds	   no	   place	   in	   the	   CBD	   is	   not	   covered	   by	   the	  
Protocol	  as	  well.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128	  Wai	   262	   -­‐	   Ko	  Aotearoa	   Tēnei:	   A	   Report	   into	   Claims	   Concerning	  New	   Zealand	   Law	  and	   Policy	  Affecting	  
Māori	   Culture	   and	   Identity,	   Vol	   I	   (The	   Waitangi	   Tribunal,	   Wellington,	   2010)	   at	   72	   electronic	   document	  
<www.waitangi-­‐tribunal.govt.nz/reports/default.asp?type=wai&keywords=262>	  last	  visited	  on	  14/01/2013.	  
129	  “The	  Nagoya	   Protocol	   on	   Access	   to	   Genetic	   Resources	   and	   the	   Fair	   and	   Equitable	   Sharing	   of	   Benefits	  
Arising	  from	  their	  Utilization	  (ABS)	  to	  the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	  is	  a	  supplementary	  agreement	  
to	   the	   Convention	   on	   Biological	   Diversity.	   It	   provides	   a	   transparent	   legal	   framework	   for	   the	   effective	  
implementation	  of	  one	  of	  the	  three	  objectives	  of	  the	  CBD:	  the	  fair	  and	  equitable	  sharing	  of	  benefits	  arising	  
out	  of	  the	  utilization	  of	  genetic	  resources.	  The	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  on	  ABS	  was	  adopted	  on	  29	  October	  2010	  in	  
Nagoya,	   Japan	   and	   entered	   into	   force	   on	   12	   October	   2014,	   90	   days	   after	   the	   deposit	   of	   the	   fiftieth	  
instrument	   of	   ratification.	   Its	   objective	   is	   the	   fair	   and	   equitable	   sharing	   of	   benefits	   arising	   from	   the	  
utilization	   of	   genetic	   resources,	   thereby	   contributing	   to	   the	   conservation	   and	   sustainable	   use	   of	  
biodiversity”	  <www.cbd.int/abs/about/default.shtml/>.	  





In	   the	   case	  of	  TK	  which	   is	   in	   the	  public	  domain	  or	   it	   is	  not	   regarded	  as	   strictly	  
secret,	  Article	  5.5	  of	  the	  Protocol	  states:	  	  
	  
Each	   Party	   shall	   take	   legislative,	   administrative	   or	   policy	   measures,	   as	  
appropriate,	   in	  order	  that	  the	  benefits	  arising	  from	  the	  utilization	  of	  traditional	  
knowledge	  associated	  with	  genetic	  resources	  are	  shared	   in	  a	  fair	  and	  equitable	  
way	   with	   indigenous	   and	   local	   communities	   holding	   such	   knowledge.	   Such	  
sharing	  shall	  be	  upon	  mutually	  agreed	  terms.	  	  
	  
Article	  7	  adds	  that:	  	  
	  
In	  accordance	  with	  domestic	  law,	  each	  Party	  shall	  take	  measures,	  as	  appropriate,	  
with	   the	   aim	   of	   ensuring	   that	   traditional	   knowledge	   associated	   with	   genetic	  
resources	  that	  is	  held	  by	  indigenous	  and	  local	  communities	  is	  accessed	  with	  the	  
prior	   and	   informed	   consent	   or	   approval	   and	   involvement	   of	   these	   indigenous	  
and	  local	  communities,	  and	  that	  mutually	  agreed	  terms	  have	  been	  established.	  	  
	  
However,	  as	  for	  the	  CBD,	  it	   is	  only	  if	  the	  Protocol	   is	   incorporated	  into	  domestic	  
laws,	   that	   its	  provisions	   can	  have	  binding	  authority.	   This	  means	   that	  not	  much	  
can	  be	  done	   in	   those	   countries	   that	   have	  not	   created	   legislation	   incorporating	  
the	   CBD.	   Another	   important	   limitation	   is	   given	   by	   Art	   16	   (5)	   of	   the	   CBD	   that	  
states	  that:	  	  
	  
The	  Contracting	  Parties,	  recognizing	  that	  patents	  and	  other	  intellectual	  property	  
rights	  may	   have	   an	   influence	   on	   the	   implementation	   of	   this	   Convention,	   shall	  
cooperate	   in	   this	   regard	   subject	   to	  national	   legislation	  and	   international	   law	   in	  
order	  to	  ensure	  that	  such	  rights	  are	  supportive	  of	  and	  do	  not	  run	  counter	  to	  its	  
objectives.	  	  
	  
As	  the	  Report	  on	  Wai	  262	  specifies,	  any	  access	  and	  benefit	  sharing	  regime	  would	  
be	   severely	   limited	   by	   Art	   16(5)	   because	   it	   is	   subjected	   to	   private	   property	  
rights.131	  Compared	  to	  the	  general	  applications	  of	  the	  CBD,	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131	  131	  Ko	   Aotearoa	   Tēnei:	   A	   Report	   into	   Claims	   Concerning	   New	   Zealand	   Law	   and	   Policy	   Affecting	  Māori	  




presents	  a	  stronger	  enforcement	  mechanism	  which	   limits	   the	   force	  of	  Article	  8	  
(j).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  minimum	  IP	  standards	  set	  out	  in	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  will	  
take	  priority	  in	  every	  discourse	  concerning	  the	  access	  and	  benefit	  sharing	  rights	  
involving	   kaitiaki/guardians	   or	   TK	   holders	   because	   access	   and	   benefit-­‐sharing	  
and	  prior-­‐informed	  consent	  rights	  are	  at	  present	  unenforceable	  under	  CBD.	  The	  
prevailing	  importance	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  can	  only	  be	  trumped	  in	  case:	  	  
	  
The	   provisions	   of	   this	   Convention	   shall	   not	   affect	   the	   rights	   and	   obligations	   of	  
any	  Contracting	  Party	  deriving	  from	  any	  existing	  international	  agreement,	  except	  
where	  the	  exercise	  of	  those	  rights	  and	  obligations	  would	  cause	  a	  serious	  damage	  
or	  threat	  to	  biological	  diversity.	  (Article	  22	  (1)	  of	  the	  CBD)).	  
	  
	  
9.5	  -­‐	  Trademarks,	  Certification	  Marks,	  Geographical	  Indications	  and	  their	  
Inapplicability	  in	  Safeguarding	  the	  Intangible	  Sacred	  Knowledge	  Guarded	  by	  
the	  Custodians	  
	  
Over	  the	  years,	   IP	   law	  protecting	  distinctive	  signs	  (law	  of	  trademarks,	  collective	  
marks,	   certification	   marks	   and	   geographical	   indications)	   has	   successfully	  
safeguarded	   traditional	   signs,	   symbols	   and	   terms	   associated	   with	   indigenous	  
peoples’	   TK	   and	  TCEs.	   Certification	  marks	   are	  official	   registrations	   that	  may	  be	  
used	  by	  “anybody	  who	  complies	  with	  the	  standards	  defined	  by	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  
certification	  mark”.	  Collective	  marks,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  “may	  only	  be	  used	  by	  a	  
specific	   group	   of	   enterprises,	   eg,	   members	   of	   an	   association”; 132 	  whereas	  
trademarks	  are	  composed	  of	  distinctive	  signs	  “which	  identifies	  certain	  goods	  or	  
services	   as	   those	   produced	   or	   provided	   by	   a	   specific	   person	   or	   enterprise.	   Its	  
origin	  dates	  back	  to	  ancient	  times,	  when	  craftsmen	  reproduced	  their	  signatures,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132	  “The	   Paris	   Convention	   contains	   provisions	   on	   collective	  marks	   in	   its	   Article	   7bis.	   Those	   provisions,	   in	  
particular,	  ensure	  that	  collective	  marks	  are	  to	  be	  admitted	  for	  registration	  and	  protection	  in	  countries	  other	  
than	  the	  country	  where	  the	  association	  owning	  the	  collective	  mark	  has	  been	  established.	  This	  means	  that	  
the	  fact	  that	  the	  said	  association	  has	  not	  been	  established	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  law	  of	  the	  country	  where	  
protection	  is	  sought	  is	  no	  reason	  for	  refusing	  such	  protection.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Convention	  expressly	  
states	  the	  right	  of	  each	  member	  State	  to	  apply	  its	  own	  conditions	  of	  protection	  and	  to	  refuse	  protection	  if	  
the	   collective	   mark	   is	   contrary	   to	   the	   public	   interest”	   see	   WIPO	   Intellectual	   Property	   Handbook	   (2004,	  




or	  ‘marks’	  on	  their	  artistic	  or	  utilitarian	  products”.133	  Over	  the	  years,	  these	  marks	  
have	  “evolved	  into	  today's	  system	  of	  trademark	  registration	  and	  protection.	  The	  
system	  helps	  consumers	   identify	  and	  purchase	  a	  product	  or	  service	  because	   its	  
nature	  and	  quality,	  indicated	  by	  its	  unique	  trademark,	  meets	  their	  needs”.134	  The	  
Paris	   Convention	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Industrial	   Property	   and	   the	   revised	  
editions	   deals	   with	   trademark	   and	   certification	   marks	   (from	   Art	   6	   to	   10).	  
However,	   every	   country	   has	   developed	   national	   legislation	   regulating	  
trademarks,	   registration	   marks	   etc.	   Trademarks	   are	   symbols	   or	   signs	   that	   are	  
associable	   to	  distinctive	  “words,	  phrases,	   symbols,	  designs,	  or	  any	  combination	  
of	   these”135	  associated	   with	   a	   product.	   Article	   15.1	   of	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement	  
confirms	  that:	  	  
	  
…	  any	  sign,	  or	  any	  combination	  of	  signs,	  capable	  of	  distinguishing	  the	  goods	  or	  
services	  of	  one	  undertaking	   from	  those	  of	  other	  undertakings,	  shall	  be	  capable	  
of	   constituting	   a	   trademark.	   Such	   signs,	   in	   particular	  words	   including	   personal	  
names,	   letters,	   numerals,	   figurative	   elements	   and	   combinations	   of	   colours	   as	  
well	   as	   any	   combination	   of	   such	   signs,	   shall	   be	   eligible	   for	   registration	   as	  
trademarks.	   Where	   signs	   are	   not	   inherently	   capable	   of	   distinguishing	   the	  
relevant	   goods	   or	   services,	   Members	   may	   make	   registrability	   depend	   on	  
distinctiveness	   acquired	   through	   use.	  Members	  may	   require,	   as	   a	   condition	   of	  
registration,	  that	  signs	  be	  visually	  perceptible.	  
	  
Trademarks	  can	  be	  extended	   indefinitely	  and	  are	  normally	  used	  to	   identify	  and	  
differentiate	  products	  on	  the	  market.136	  The	  fact	  that	  trademarks	  can	  last	  forever	  
and	   be	   held	   by	   a	   community	   or	   group	   of	   people	   could	   be	   convenient	   for	  
indigenous	  peoples	  who	  hold	  knowledge	  communally.	  However,	  trademark	   law	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133	  “Trademarks	   typically	   identify	   individual	   enterprises	   as	   the	   origin	   of	   marked	   goods	   or	   services.	   Some	  
countries	  provide	   for	   the	   registration	  of	  collective	  and	  certification	  marks,	  which	  are	  used	   to	   indicate	   the	  
affiliation	   of	   enterprises	   using	   the	  mark	   or	  which	   refer	   to	   identifiable	   standards	  met	   by	   the	   products	   for	  
which	  a	  mark	  is	  used”	  supra	  at	  69.	  
134 	  See	   WIPO	   electronic	   document	   <www.wipo.int/trademarks/en/trademarks.html>	   last	   visited	   on	  
04/12/2012.	  
135	  Stephen	  A	  Hansen	  and	  Justin	  W	  VanFleet	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  and	  Intellectual	  Property:	  A	  Handbook	  
on	   Issues	   and	   Options	   for	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   Holders	   in	   Protecting	   their	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	  
Maintaining	  Biological	  Diversity	  (American	  Association	  for	  the	  Advancement	  of	  Science	  -­‐	  AAAS,	  Washington,	  
2003)	  at	  20.	  
136	  “Being	  distinct	  means	   that	   the	   trademark	  does	  not	   resemble	  any	  other	  existing	  word,	  phrase,	   symbol,	  
design,	  etc.	  associated	  with	  a	  similar	  product.	  Avoiding	  confusion	  as	  to	  the	  source	  of	  product	  is	   important	  
for	   consumers	   purchasing	   these	   products.	   Trademarks	   distinguish	   products	   in	   order	   not	   to	   mislead	  




protects	   the	  symbol	  and	  the	  products	   represented	  by	   the	  symbol	  while	   it	  does	  
not	  protect	  the	  knowledge	  or	  the	  technologies	  embracing	  the	  knowledge,	   least	  
its	   holistic,	   sacred	   character.	   While	   trademarks	   could	   be	   effectively	   used	   by	  
indigenous	  stakeholders	  who	  are	  presenting	  a	  new	  product	  on	  the	  market,	  in	  the	  
case	  of	   the	   culture	  held	  by	   the	   guardians	  of	   spiritual	   knowledge	   (TK,	   TCEs	   and	  
TMK),	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   knowledge	   often	   lies	   in	   its	   secrecy	   or	   limited	  
circulation,	  therefore,	  it	   is	  quite	  inconvenient	  for	  indigenous	  peoples	  to	  suggest	  
to	   make	   the	   knowledge	   public	   and	   create	   a	   sign	   that	   would	   represent	   it,	   or	  
disclose	  the	  knowledge	  to	  unauthorized	  people	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  customary	  laws	  
that	   prohibit	   its	   free	   circulation. 137 	  Trademarks	   can	   effectively	   be	   used	   by	  
indigenous	  artists	  who	  create	  distinctive	  products	  that	  are	  not	  bound	  to	  secrecy	  
within	   the	   community.	   According	   to	   WIPO,	   trademarks	   have	   always	   existed.	  
Since	  time	  immemorial	  people	  have	  engraved	  symbols	  or	  signs	  to	  their	  creations	  
(eg	  artworks,	  carvings).138	  	  
In	   the	   Middle	   Ages,	   the	   flourishing	   of	   trade	   encouraged	   the	   introduction	   of	  
distinctive	  signs	  to	  identify	  the	  goods	  of	  merchants	  and	  manufacturers.	  But	  it	  is	  
during	  the	  industrialization	  time	  that	  trademarks	  started	  to	  play	  a	  central	  role	  “in	  
the	   modern	   world	   of	   international	   trade	   and	   market-­‐oriented	   economies”.139	  
Today,	   trademarks	   can	   be	   used	   only	   by	   those	   TK	   holders	  who	   intend	   to	   bring	  
their	  products	  to	  the	  public	  domain	  and	  intend	  to	  prevent	  the	  counterfeiting	  of	  
their	  creations.	  Labels	  of	  Authenticity140	  have	  been,	  for	  example,	  used	  to	  identify	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137	  Scholars	  often	  make	  the	  mistake	  of	  considering	  TK	  as	  something	  created	  by	  someone	  who	  had	  a	  brilliant	  
idea	  in	  the	  art,	  medicine,	  resource	  management	  or	  similar.	  Or	  they	  might	  think	  that	  TK	  is	  just	  a	  knowledge	  
that	  happens	  to	  be	  ‘also’	  traditional.	  However,	  scholars	  often	  do	  not	  take	  into	  account	  that	  TK	  can	  present	  
itself	   at	   different	   levels	   of	   secrecy:	   openly	   shared	   by	   everyone	  within	   a	   community;	   shared	   by	   a	   specific	  
group	  with	  similar	  knowledge	  and	  skills	  (like	  healers	  and	  elders);	  or	  guarded	  by	  an	  exclusive	  group	  of	  people	  
that	   has	   given	   proof	   of	   special	   attributes	   to	   be	   endorsed	   with	   the	   right	   and	   obligation	   of	   custody	   and	  
transmission.	  Often	  very	   intense	  and	  secret	  rituals	  are	  performed	  to	  select	  these	  guardians	  of	  knowledge.	  
Their	   duty	   has	   nothing	   to	   do	  with	   fixing	   ideas	   and	   knowledge	   somewhere	   or	   having	   it	   represented	   by	   a	  
chosen	  symbol.	  	  
138	  For	  historical	  references	  on	  trademarks,	  see	  WIPO	  Intellectual	  Property	  Handbook	  (2004,	  reprinted	  2008)	  
at	  67.	  
139	  See	  WIPO	  supra	  at	  67.	  
140	  “In	  1999,	  the	  National	  Indigenous	  Arts	  Advocacy	  Association	  (NIAAA)	  launched	  the	  ‘Label	  of	  Authenticity’	  
(‘Label’)	  which	  was	  designed	  to	  provide	  a	  national	  certification	  system	  for	  the	  authenticity	  of	  Indigenous	  art.	  
The	   Label	   was	   used	   to	   show	   that	   goods	   or	   services	   were:	   …	   derived	   from	   a	   work	   of	   art	   created	   by	   an	  
Aboriginal	  or	  Torres	  Strait	   Islander	  person	  or	  people,	  [and]	  reproduced	  or	  produced	  and	  manufactured	  by	  
Aboriginal	   or	   Torres	   Strait	   Islander	   people”	   …	   “The	   NIAAA	   also	   established	   a	   second	   kind	   of	   label,	   the	  
Collaboration	  Mark	  which	  was	  used	   to	  certify	  works	  which	  were	   the	   result	  of	  a	  collaboration	   in	  which	  an	  
Aboriginal	  or	  Torres	  Strait	   Islander	  had	  a	  significant	  creative	   input	  with	  a	  non-­‐Indigenous	  manufacturer	  or	  
other	   collaborator	   under	   the	   terms	   of	   a	   fair	   agreement.	   The	   labels	   still	   have	   protection	   under	   the	   Trade	  




works	  of	  Aboriginal	  artists.	  Similarly	  in	  Aotearoa/New	  Zealand	  the	  ‘Toi	  Iho’	  Māori	  
Made	   Mark141	  has	   been	   created	   to	   protect	   the	   exclusivity	   of	   works	   of	   Māori	  
artists	   (or	   of	   Māori	   descent).	   The	   creation	   of	   trademarks	   has	   been	   mostly	  
justified	   in	   response	   to	   massive	   imitation	   of	   indigenous	   art	   that	   has	   invaded	  
markets	   all	   over	   the	  world.	   And,	   in	  most	   cases,	   the	  marks	   referred	   to	   new	   or	  
existing	  art	  that	  was	  already	  in	  the	  public	  domain.	  However,	  as	  stated	  above,	  not	  
all	  indigenous	  art	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  made	  public	  and,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  knowledge	  of	  
limited	  dissemination	  and	  transmission,	  the	  creation	  of	  distinctive	  marks	  would	  
imply	  the	  widespread	  distribution	  of	   indigenous	  cultures	  whose	   importance	  for	  
the	  community	  resides	  in	  its	  secrecy,	  or	  limited	  circulation.	  Even	  when	  the	  marks	  
are	  effectively	  representing	  a	  group	  of	  artists	  of	  indigenous	  affiliation	  or	  descent,	  
the	  question	  arises	  whether	   the	  people	  who	  registered	   the	  mark	  are	   the	  same	  
persons	   who	   created	   the	   artwork	   or	   the	   mark	   was	   created	   as	   a	   defensive	  
mechanism	   to	   protect	   art	   and	   knowledge	   that	   had	   already	   entered	   the	   public	  
domain?	  In	  this	  case,	  is	  the	  artist	  the	  person	  who	  benefit	  from	  the	  trademark,	  or	  
is	   it	   rather	   the	   person	  who	   created	   the	   trademark?	   Arguably,	   the	   person	  who	  
creates	   a	   trademark	  might,	   in	   fact,	   benefit	   from	   art	   that	   is	   already	   circulating.	  
How?	   An	   indigenous	   entrepreneur	   might	   copy	   or	   use	   shared	   knowledge	   to	  
create	   a	   distinctive	   sign	   from	  which	   he/she	  would	   be	   the	   only	   one	   to	   benefit.	  
Third	  party’s	  use	  of	   indigenous	   insignia	   is	  not	  unusual.	   Indigenous	  peoples	  and	  
local	  communities	  around	  the	  world	  are	  increasingly	  fighting	  against	  third-­‐party’s	  
use	  of	  indigenous	  and	  traditional	  marks	  (linked	  to	  a	  product	  or	  a	  service)	  which	  
contains,	   in	   part	   or	   fully,	   their	   indigenous	   traditions	   and	   knowledge.	   In	   fact,	  
trademarks	   are	   awarded	   on	   a	   first-­‐to-­‐use	   and	   first-­‐to-­‐register	   basis	   without	  
much	  consideration	  on	  how	  long	  the	  knowledge	  or	  product	  has	  been	  circulating	  
among	   indigenous	   communities.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   product	   or	   service	   has	   not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
They	   also	   reflect	   a	   recognition	   that	   consumers	   are	   keen	   to	   discriminate	   between	   ‘rip-­‐offs’	   and	   ‘the	   real	  
thing’.	   It	  was	   expected	   that	   buyers	   and	   traders	  would	   respond	   positively	   to	   the	   labels	   (as	   occurred	  with	  
other	   labels	   such	   as	   the	   ‘Woolmark’	   label	  which	   indicates	   that	   products	   are	  made	   from	  100%	  Australian	  
wool)”	   see	   electronic	   document	   <http://ab-­‐ed.boardofstudies.nsw.edu.au/go/aboriginal-­‐art/protecting-­‐
australian-­‐indigenous-­‐art/background-­‐information/protection-­‐the-­‐issues/the-­‐label-­‐of-­‐authenticity-­‐and-­‐the-­‐
collaboration-­‐mark>	  last	  visited	  on	  18/12/2012.	  
141	  “Toi	  Iho	  Kaitiaki	  Incorporated	  is	  the	  entity	  instituted	  to	  advance	  the	  authenticity	  and	  quality	  of	  Māori	  arts	  
under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  registered	  and	  globally	  recognised	  Toi	  Iho	  Māori	  trademark.	  Toi	  Iho	  is	  the	  te	  reo	  
Māori	  name	  for	  the	  registered	  trademark”	  at	  <www.toiiho.co.nz/>	  last	  visited	  on	  18/12/2012.	  
The	  Toi	  Iho	  Maori	  trademark	  was	  launched	  in	  February	  2002	  under	  the	  NZ	  Government	  arts	  body:	  Creative	  




been	  registered	  yet	  is	  a	  sufficient	  condition	  for	  the	  awarding	  of	  trademarks.142	  As	  
Wong	  and	  Fernandini143	  rightly	  explain	  in	  their	  article,	  in	  states	  where	  indigenous	  
peoples	   live	   there	   should	   be	   a	   better	   consideration	   of	   indigenous	   ‘cultural’	  
entitlement	  rights.	  They	  suggest	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  registration	  of	  marks	  that	  
are	  obviously	  of	  indigenous	  descent	  and	  attribution,	  states	  should	  implement	  in	  
their	   national	   legislations	   selection	   criteria	   that	   contains	   the	  principle	   of	   “non-­‐
distinctiveness”	   of	   mark,	   and	   assessing	   whether	   the	   mark	   is	   in	   any	   way	  
“misleading,	  deceitful,	   in	  bad	  faith,	  culturally	  offensive	  or	  scandalous”.	   In	  2002,	  
New	  Zealand	  introduced	  in	  their	  Trade	  Marks	  Act	  specific	  grounds	  for	  the	  refusal	  
of	   marks	   that	   are	   obviously	   referring	   and	   incorporating	   Māori	   symbols	   and	  
marks.	  Subpart	  2	  of	  Section	  17.1	  (c)	  reads:	  144	  	  	  
	  
The	  Commissioner	  must	  not	  register	  as	  a	  trade	  mark	  or	  part	  of	  a	  trade	  mark	  any	  
matter	   —	   the	   use	   or	   registration	   of	   which	   would,	   in	   the	   opinion	   of	   the	  
Commissioner,	   be	   likely	   to	   offend	   a	   significant	   section	   of	   the	   community,	  
including	   Māori.	   …	   A	   Māori	   Trade	   Mark	   Advisory	   Committee	   has	   been	  
established	  under	  Section	  177	  of	   the	  Act	   to	  advise	   the	  Commissioner	  as	   to	   the	  
likely	   offensiveness	   of	   trademarks	   containing	   Māori	   text	   and	   imagery	   to	   the	  
Māori.	  	  
	  
Wong	   and	   Fernandini	   suggest	   that	   there	   is	   a	   “greater	   level	   of	   objection”	   by	  
Māori	   people	   in	   New	   Zealand	   than	   for	   many	   other	   indigenous	   peoples.	   The	  
famous	  case	  Pro-­‐Football	  Inc.	  v.	  Harjo145	  clearly	  demonstrates	  how	  difficult	  it	  can	  
be	  to	  have	  a	  mark	  revoked	  on	  cultural	  offensive	  basis.	  The	  plaintiff	  requested	  the	  
Trial	   Trademark	  and	  Appeal	  Board	   (‘TTAB’	  or	   the	   ‘Board)	   “to	   cancel	   six	   federal	  
trademark	  registrations	  involving	  the	  professional	  football	  team,	  the	  Washington	  
Redskins,	  because	   it	   found	  that	  the	  marks	   ‘may	  disparage’	  Native	  Americans	  or	  
‘bring	   them	   into	   contempt,	  or	  disrepute’”.146	  Initially,	   the	  Court	   concluded	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  For	  further	  detail	  see	  Tzen	  Wong	  and	  Claudia	  Fernandini	  “Traditional	  Cultural	  Expressions:	  Preservation	  
and	   Innovation”	   in	   Tzen	  Wong	   and	  Graham	  Dutfield	   (eds)	   Intellectual	   Property	   and	  Human	  Development	  
(Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  2012)	  at	  196-­‐197.	  
143	  At	  196-­‐197	  
144	  At	  196-­‐197	  
145	  Pro-­‐Football	  Inc.	  v	  Harjo,	  50	  USPQ	  2d	  1705,	  1749	  (TTAB	  1999)	  
146	  “In	   September	   1992,	   Suzan	   Shown	  Harjo	   and	   six	   other	  Native	  Americans	   (collectively,	   ‘Defendants’	   or	  




“in	   this	   case,	   as	   to	   the	   sufficiency	   of	   the	   evidence	   before	   the	   TTAB	   and	   the	  
applicability	  of	   the	   laches	  defence,	  should	  not	  be	   interpreted	  as	   reflecting,	  one	  
way	   or	   the	   other,	   this	   Court’s	   views	   as	   to	   whether	   the	   use	   of	   the	   term	  
“Washington	   Redskins”	   may	   be	   disparaging	   to	   Native	   Americans”.147	  In	   2015,	  
District	   Court	   for	   Eastern	   District	   (of	   Virginia)	   Judge	   Gerald	   Lee	   affirmed	   the	  
decision	  of	  the	  TTAB	  (July,	  2015).	  Pro-­‐Football	   Inc	  filed	  its	  appeal	  with	  USCA	  4th	  
Circuit	  on	  30th	  October	  2015	  (decision	  pending).148	  	  
Already	   in	   2001,	   the	  United	   States	   Patent	   and	   Trade	  Mark	  Office	   (USPTO)	   had	  
created	  a	  database	  of	   the	  “official	   insignia	  of	  all	  State	  and	   federally	   recognized	  
Native	  American	  tribes	  which	  cannot	  be	  registered	  as	  trademarks”.149	  Arguably,	  
trademarks	   and	   certification	   marks	   can	   work	   to	   safeguard	   indigenous	   insignia	  
already	  disclosed	  in	  the	  public	  domain,	  and	  only	  if	  indigenous	  peoples	  act	  first	  to	  
register	  them,	  winning	  over	  third	  party’s	  applications.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  not	  all	  
indigenous	  peoples	   are	   aware	  of	   the	   fact	   that,	   to	  protect	   their	   symbology	   and	  
culture,	  they	  can	  register	  it.	  In	  the	  worst-­‐case	  scenario,	  they	  even	  might	  not	  have	  
the	  economic	   resources	   to	   apply	   for	   registration.	   In	   this	   case,	   their	   chances	   to	  
protect	  their	  knowledge	  drop	  considerably	   in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  wide	  resources	  of	  
the	  stakeholders	  of	  developed	  countries.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  indigenous	  symbols	  
are	  often	  imbued	  with	  holistic,	  sacred	  importance	  and	  their	  representation	  is	  not	  
only	   harmful	   for	   the	   community,	   but	   prohibited	   by	   the	   guardians	  who	  protect	  
such	  knowledge.	  	  	  
Among	   all	   the	   IP	   regulations,	   geographical	   indications	   (GI)150	  differ	   significantly	  
from	   trademarks	   and	   collective	   and	   certification	   marks.	   The	   Paris	   Convention	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
is	   ‘scandalous,’	   ‘may	   .	   .	   .	  disparage’	  Native	  Americans,	  and	  may	  cast	  Native	  Americans	   into	   ‘contempt,	  or	  
disrepute’	  in	  violation	  of	  section	  2(a)	  of	  the	  Lanham	  Trademark	  Act	  of	  1946	  (‘Lanham	  Act’	  or	  ‘Act’).	  Compl.	  
13	   (citing	   15	   USC	   §	   1052(a)).	   Pro-­‐Football	   raised	   several	   affirmative	   defenses	   in	   the	   TTAB	   action.	   These	  
included	  arguments	   that	   section	  2(a)	  of	   the	  Lanham	  Act	  unconstitutionally	   impinges	  on	  First	  Amendment	  
speech	   rights,	   that	   it	   also	   contravenes	   Fifth	   Amendment	   due	   process	   rights,	   and	   that	   the	   Petitioners’	  
challenge	  to	  the	  trademarks	  was	  barred	  by	  the	  equitable	  defense	  of	  laches”	  see	  Pro-­‐Football	  Inc.	  v	  Harjo,	  50	  
USPQ	  2d	  1705,	  1749	  (TTAB	  1999)	  electronic	  document	  <www.oblon.com/sites/default/files/news/156.pdf>.	  
147	  	  Supra.	  
148	  See	   electronic	   document	   <http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/Pro-­‐Football%20opening%20brief.pdf>	   last	  
visited	  on	  20/01/2016.	  
149	  Tzen	  Wong	   and	   Claudia	   Fernandini	   “Traditional	   Cultural	   Expressions:	   Preservation	   and	   Innovation”	   in	  
Tzen	  Wong	  and	  Graham	  Dutfield	  (eds)	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Human	  Development	  (Cambridge	  University	  
Press,	  Cambridge,	  2012)	  at	  198;	  see	  also	  the	  Trade-­‐marks	  Act	  (Canada),	  Section	  9	  (1)(n)(iii).	  
150	  “The	  term	  ‘geographical	   indication’	  has	  been	  chosen	  by	  WIPO	  to	  describe	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  a	  new	  
treaty	  for	  the	  international	  protection	  of	  names	  and	  symbols	  which	  indicate	  a	  certain	  geographical	  origin	  of	  
a	   given	   product.	   In	   this	   connection,	   the	   term	   is	   intended	   to	   be	   used	   in	   its	   widest	   possible	   meaning.	   It	  




does	  not	   contain	   reference	   to	   the	   term	  of	  geographical	   indication	  as	   such,	  but	  
mostly	   refers	   to	   appellation	   of	   origin	   in	   Art	   1.2.151	  WIPO	   makes	   a	   distinction	  
between	  ‘indication	  of	  source’	  and	  ‘appellation	  of	  origin’.	  In	  WIPO’s	  words:	  152	  	  	  
	  
…	   indication	   of	   source	   means	   any	   expression	   or	   sign	   used	   to	   indicate	   that	   a	  
product	  or	  service	  originates	   in	  a	  country,	  a	  region	  or	  a	  specific	  place,	  whereas	  
‘appellation	   of	   origin’	   means	   the	   geographical	   name	   of	   a	   country,	   region	   or	  
specific	   place	   which	   serves	   to	   designate	   a	   product	   originating	   therein	   the	  
characteristic	   qualities	   of	   which	   are	   due	   exclusively	   or	   essentially	   to	   the	  
geographical	   environment,	   including	   natural	   or	   human	   factors	   or	   both	   natural	  
and	  human	  factors.	  	  
	  
Under	  the	  Lisbon	  Agreement	  appellation	  of	  origin	  is	  defined	  as	  “the	  geographical	  
denomination	   of	   a	   country,	   region,	   or	   locality,	   which	   serves	   to	   designate	   a	  
product	   originating	   therein,	   the	   quality	   or	   characteristics	   of	   which	   are	   due	  
exclusively	  or	  essentially	  to	  the	  geographical	  environment,	  including	  natural	  and	  
human	   factors”	   (Art	   2.1).	   The	   idea	   of	   GI,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   was	   firstly	  
introduced	   by	   the	   EC	   Council	   Regulation	   No	   2081/92	   on	   the	   Protection	   of	  
Geographical	  Indications	  and	  Designations	  of	  Origin	  for	  Agricultural	  Products	  and	  
Foodstuffs,	   Art	   2.2(b)153	  (1992),	   and	   by	   Art	   22.1154	  of	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement	   in	  
1994.	  Like	  the	  certification	  marks,	  GI	  can	  “convey	  natural	  and	  human	  elements	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that	   the	  qualities	  of	  a	  given	  product	  are	  due	   to	   its	   geographical	  origin	   (such	  as	  appellations	  of	  origin),	  or	  
they	  merely	   indicate	   the	   place	   of	   origin	   of	   a	   product	   (such	   as	   indications	   of	   source).	   This	   definition	   also	  
covers	  symbols,	  because	  geographical	  indications	  are	  not	  only	  constituted	  by	  names,	  such	  as	  the	  name	  of	  a	  
town,	   a	   region	   or	   a	   country	   (‘direct	   geographical	   indications’),	   but	   may	   also	   consist	   of	   symbols.	   Such	  
symbols	  may	  be	  capable	  of	   indicating	   the	  origin	  of	   goods	  without	   literally	  naming	   its	  place	  of	  origin”	   see	  
WIPO	  Intellectual	  Property	  Handbook	  (2004,	  reprinted	  2008)	  at	  131.	  
151	  Art	  1.2:	  “The	  protection	  of	  industrial	  property	  has	  as	  its	  object	  patents,	  utility	  models,	  industrial	  designs,	  
trademarks,	  service	  marks,	  trade	  names,	  indications	  of	  source	  or	  appellations	  of	  origin,	  and	  the	  repression	  
of	  unfair	  competition”.	  
152	  WIPO	  Intellectual	  Property	  Handbook	  (2004,	  reprinted	  2008)	  at	  120.	  
153	  Geographical	  indication:	  means	  the	  name	  of	  a	  region,	  a	  specific	  place	  or,	  in	  exceptional	  cases,	  a	  country,	  
used	  to	  describe	  an	  agricultural	  product	  or	  a	  foodstuff:	  
–	  originating	  in	  that	  region,	  specific	  place	  or	  country,	  and	  
–	  which	   possesses	   a	   specific	   quality,	   reputation	   or	   other	   characteristics	   attributable	   to	   that	   geographical	  
origin	   and	   the	   production	   and/or	   processing	   and/or	   preparation	   of	   which	   take	   place	   in	   the	   defined	  
geographical	  area.	  
154	  Art	  22.1:	  “Geographical	  indications	  are,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  Agreement,	  indications	  which	  identify	  a	  
good	   as	   originating	   in	   the	   territory	   of	   a	  Member,	   or	   a	   region	   or	   locality	   in	   that	   territory,	   where	   a	   given	  




associated	  with	   a	   product”.155	  In	   international	   and	   national	   laws,	  GI	   serve	   four	  
recognisable	  purposes:	  
	  
• identify	  where	  the	  product	  is	  from	  (its	  source);	  
• indicate	  the	  unique	  qualities	  of	  a	  product;	  
• promote	   the	   product	   with	   a	   distinguishing	   name	   (for	   business	   purposes);	  
and	  
• prevent	  infringement	  and	  unfair	  competition	  by	  establishing	  a	  legal	  basis	  for	  
using	  a	  location	  name	  to	  avoid	  confusion	  with	  similar	  products.156	  
	  
Appellation	  of	  origin	  is	  a	  specific	  form	  of	  GI	  that	  specifies	  the	  quality	  of	  a	  product	  
based	  on	  the	  geographical	  environment	  it	  was	  created	  or	  developed.157	  In	  some	  
countries	  of	  the	  world,	  GI	  has	  been	  used	  to	  protect	  recognizable	  designs	  of	  the	  
region	  originating	  them.	   In	  Peru,	   for	  example,	  Chulucanas	  have	  obtained	  GI	   for	  
their	   ceramic	   designs.	   In	   general,	   in	   fact,	   GI	   and	   trademarks	   could	   be	   used	   by	  
indigenous	   groups	   that	   have	   already	   developed	   characteristic	   knowledge	   and	  
products	   associated	   to	   a	   specific	   territory	   or	   sign.	   However,	   as	   in	  most	   of	   the	  
cases	   involving	   indigenous	   knowledge	   and	   Western	   IPR	   laws,	   associating	   a	  
symbol	   or	   a	   region	   to	   a	   product	   of	   the	  mind	  means	   to	   bring	   it	   into	   the	  public	  
domain.	  Moreover,	   in	  order	  to	  fit	  for	  the	  application	  criteria	  of	  trademarks	  and	  
GI,	   the	   knowledge	  must	   be	   associated	   to	   a	   symbol/sign/mark	   or	   to	   a	   specific	  
place.	   Like	   in	   the	   case	   of	   many	   textile	   designs	   in	   South	   America,	   it	   is	   often	  
difficult	   to	   estimate	   where	   the	   design	   originated	   from,	   who	   developed	   it	   and	  
who	  is	  therefore	  better	  entitled	  to	  use	  it	  under	  a	  specific	  certification	  of	  origin	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155	  For	  further	  detail	  see	  Tzen	  Wong	  and	  Claudia	  Fernandini	  “Traditional	  Cultural	  Expressions:	  Preservation	  
and	  Innovation”	  in	  Tzen	  Wong	  and	  Graham	  Dutfield	  (eds)	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Human	  Development	  at	  
194.	  
156	  Art	  22.1	  TRIPS	  Agreement:	  “Geographical	  indications	  are,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  Agreement,	  indications	  
which	   identify	  a	  good	  as	  originating	   in	   the	   territory	  of	  a	  Member,	  or	  a	   region	  or	   locality	   in	   that	   territory,	  
where	   a	   given	   quality,	   reputation	   or	   other	   characteristic	   of	   the	   good	   is	   essentially	   attributable	   to	   its	  
geographical	  origin”.	  
157	  Art	   2	   of	   the	   Lisbon	   Agreement	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Appellations	   of	   Origin	   and	   their	   International	  
Registration	   (1958)	   reads	   as:	   “(1)	   In	   this	   Agreement,	   ‘appellation	   of	   origin’	   means	   the	  
geographical	  denomination	  of	  a	  country,	  region,	  or	  locality,	  which	  serves	  to	  designate	  a	  product	  originating	  
therein,	   the	   quality	  or	   characteristics	   of	   which	   are	   due	   exclusively	   or	   essentially	   to	   the	   geographical	  
environment,	  including	  natural	  and	  human	  factors.	  (2)	  The	  country	  of	  origin	  is	  the	  country	  whose	  name,	  or	  
the	   country	   in	  which	   is	   situated	   the	   region	   or	   locality	  whose	   name,	   constitutes	   the	   appellation	   of	   origin	  





mark.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   similar	   textile	   designs	   can	   be	   found	   in	   different	  
countries	   of	   South	   America	  without	   specific	   indication	   of	  which	   community	   or	  
place	  developed	  them	  first.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  knowledge	  held	  by	  the	  guardians	  
or	  custodians,	  the	  situation	  becomes	  very	  delicate.	  	  
	  
9.6	  -­‐	  Final	  Remarks	  
	  
As	   stressed	   in	   previous	   parts	   of	   this	   thesis,	   the	   very	   existence	   and	   survival	   of	  
indigenous	  knowledge	  resides	  in	  its	  limited	  circulation	  within	  the	  community	  and	  
the	  public.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  knowledge	  belongs	  to	  the	  whole	  community	  as	  part	  
of	  its	  inheritance	  of	  the	  group,	  and	  regardless	  of	  how	  many	  people	  actually	  know	  
it,	  is	  irrelevant.	  What	  is	  important	  is	  that	  most	  of	  the	  positive	  steps	  of	  protection	  
suggested	  by	  WIPO	  expect	  that	  sensitive	  knowledge	  is	  put	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  
to	   defeat	   any	   attempt	   to	   misappropriate	   it.	   In	   the	   eyes	   of	   WIPO	   and	   similar	  
forums,	   the	   fact	   that	   some	   knowledge	   must	   remain	   unshared	   with	   everyone	  
seems	   to	   be	   quite	   irrelevant.	   In	   addition	   to	   that,	   the	   licensing	   request	   of	  
providing	  the	  documentary	  evidence	  of	  the	  relevant	  genetic	  material	  associated	  
with	  TK	  and	  the	  certification	  of	  geographical	  origin	  during	  the	  patent	  application	  
process,	   while	   interesting	   in	   theory,	   would	   require	   a	   revision	   of	   the	   TRIPS	  
Agreement	  that,	  as	  of	  today,	  does	  not	  make	  the	  provision	  compulsory,	  and	  could	  
consequently	   encourage	   the	   omission	   of	   the	   disclosure	   of	   the	   relevant	   TK.	   In	  
fact,	   as	   Dutfield	   explains:	   “there	   is	   no	   particular	   reason	   for	   an	   examiner	   to	  
suppose	  that	  a	  given	  invention	  is	  based	  on	  TK	  unless	  the	  applicant	  discloses	  the	  
fact”. 158 	  In	   other	   words,	   only	   the	   public	   domain	   can	   judge	   if	   indigenous	  
knowledge	  should	  enter	  it.	  	  
As	  the	  next	  chapter	  will	  prove,	   the	  public	  domain	   is	  not	  the	  only	  parameter	  by	  
which	   indigenous	  secret	  knowledge	  can	  be	   judged.	  Secrecy	   itself	  can	  become	  a	  
fundamental	  aspect	  of	  indigenous	  cultures	  to	  be	  used	  to	  protect	  them.	  As	  such,	  
secrecy	   implies	   that	   some	  knowledge/information	  within	  a	   given	   community	   is	  
restricted	  and	  guarded	  and	   that	   there	   is	  a	  mutual	  agreement	  within	   the	  group	  
that	  the	  preservation	  of	  the	  knowledge	  is	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  limited	  knowledge	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and	   circulation	   of	   it.	   Therefore,	   the	   next	   chapter	   will	   discuss	   how,	   in	   such	   a	  
scenario,	   the	   law	   that	   has	   developed	   from	   the	   common	   law	  on	   confidentiality	  








Chapter	  10	  	  	  
	  
THE	  WAY	  AHEAD:	  Feasible	  ways	  to	  Safeguard	  Indigenous	  Peoples’	  
Secret	  Culture	  and	  Heritage	  	  
	  
After	  many	  pages	  of	  exploration	  of	  the	  various	  areas	  of	  international	  law	  which	  
can	   relate	   to	   indigenous	   peoples’	   cultural	   issues	   and	   sacred/secret	   knowledge,	  
we	  have	  seen	  how	  existing	  regulations	  fail,	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another,	  to	  guarantee	  
the	  permanent	  safeguarding	  of	  indigenous	  peoples’	  intangible	  culture	  as	  well	  as	  
the	   rights	   of	   the	   custodians	   of	   such	   complex	   knowledge	   (religious,	   esoteric,	  
biological,	  traditional	  and	  so	  forth)	  to	  carry	  on	  their	  duty	  of	  care	  undisturbed.	  
Although	   international	   law	  is	  moving	   in	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  serious	  consideration	  
of	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   their	   cultural	   rights,	   intangible	   cultural	   property	  
remains	  today	  widely	  unprotected.	  	  
Cultural	   products	   “derive	   from	   ongoing	   expression	   and	   development	   of	  
community	   symbols	   and	   practices	   and	   are	   thus	   neither	   new	   nor	   old,	   but	   in	   a	  
sense	  both”.1	  In	  addition	  to	  that,	  such	  practices	  are	  often	  limited	  in	  accessibility	  
and	   protected	   by	   custodians.	   International	   law,	   while	   fragmentally	   protecting	  
portions	   of	   indigenous	   culture	   and	   knowledge,	   fails	   to	   refer	   to	   most	   of	   the	  
hidden	   and	   sacred	   parts	   of	   indigenous	   cultures:	   the	   TK,	   TCEs	   and	   intangible	  
heritage	  that	  is	  not	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  of	  the	  community	  because	  is	  too	  sacred	  
to	  be	  shared	  with	  everyone.	  Such	  knowledge	  is	  also	  secret	  and	  needs	  strict	  and	  
close	  protection	  by	   ‘special’	  members	  of	  the	  community	  who	  have	  the	   ‘duty	  of	  
care’	  to	  maintain	  the	  knowledge	  uncorrupted.	  While	  recognising	  the	  importance	  
of	   the	   kaitiaki	   and	   the	   knowledge	   in	   their	   custody,	   even	   the	  Wai	   262	   Report	  
avoids	   any	   direct	   involvement	   with	   the	   knowledge	   that	   is	   mostly	   sacred	   and	  
secret.	   The	   only	   recommendation	   that	   the	  Waitangi	   Tribunal	   came	   up	  with	   to	  
protect	   such	   knowledge,	   whose	   intrinsic	   value	   and	   sacredness	   and	   secrecy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	  Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Genetic	  Resources,	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  
and	  Folklore	  Twenty-­‐Eighth	  Session	  The	  Protection	  of	  Traditional	  Knowledge:	  Draft	  Articles	   (Genève,	  2014)	  
Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/28/5;	   Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	   Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Genetic	  Resources,	  
Traditional	  Knowledge	  and	  Folklore	  Twenty-­‐Seventh	  Session	  The	  Protection	  of	  Traditional	  Knowledge:	  Draft	  
Articles	  (Genève,	  2014)	  Doc	  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/27/4;	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Genetic	  Resources,	  Traditional	  
Knowledge	   and	   Traditional	   Cultural	   Expressions	   (WIPO,	   2015)	   electronic	   document	  





represent	  its	  main	  key	  feature,	  is	  to	  keep	  it	  secret.	  Ideally,	  that	  would	  be	  the	  best	  
advice	   to	   be	   given	   regarding	   such	   a	   delicate	   matter;	   however,	   in	   our	  
technological	  time	  of	  mass	  consumption	  and	  exploitation,	  where	  a	  sacred	  dance	  
can	  be	  recorded	  from	  a	  plane,	  and	  a	  very	  ancient	  healing	  remedy	  copied	  in	  short	  
time,	   indigenous	   aspirations	   to	   be	   left	   free	   to	   manage	   their	   knowledge	  
traditionally	  and	  holistically	  becomes	  unrealistic.	   Indigenous	  peoples	  need	   laws	  
that	   can	   be	   enforced	   to	   prevent	   people	   from	   stealing,	   copying,	   and	   exploiting	  
aspects	  of	  their	  cultures.	  	  
How	   can	   secret	   knowledge	   be	   kept	   secret?	   How	   can	   the	   law	   support	   the	  
guardians’	  relationship	  to	  their	  knowledge?	  How	  much	  of	  that	  knowledge,	  if	  any,	  
needs	   to	   be	   disclosed	   to	   be	   protected?	   What	   happens	   when	   the	   secret	   is	  
revealed?	   Is	   there	   a	   law	   that	   can	   protect	   the	   knowledge	   that	   has	   remained	  
secret?	  If	  not,	  can	  a	  law	  be	  created?	  If	  so,	  what	  would	  such	  a	  law	  be	  like?	  	  
This	  chapter	  will	  try	  to	  propose	  practical	  solutions	  to	  these	  delicate	  issues.	  It	  will	  
try	   to	  do	  so	   in	  the	  total	  understanding	  and	  respect	   for	   indigenous	  cultures	  and	  
traditions	   while,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   contextualising	   such	   knowledge	   in	   our	  
modern	  societies	  with	  their	  profound	  contradictions.	  Setting	  aside	  any	  idealistic	  
discourse	   which	   would	   prove	   to	   be	   too	   impractical	   for	   societies	   that	   do	   not	  
understand	  and	  practice	  holism,	   this	   thesis	  will	   suggest	  practical	   solutions	   that	  
would	  guarantee	  more	  of	  a	  safeguard	   to	   indigenous	  peoples’	  cultures	   than	   the	  
legal	   systems	   currently	   in	   place.	   The	   task	   is	   not	   an	   easy	   one.	   Much	   of	   the	  
creation	   and	   implementation	   of	   such	   legal	   regimes,	   in	   fact,	   depends	   on	   the	  
willingness	  of	  states	  to	  understand	  and	  accept	  the	  importance	  of	  protecting	  the	  
traditional	  cultures	  of	  the	  world.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  indigenous	  peoples	  need	  to	  
understand	   that	   the	   changes	   that	   so	   dramatically	   affect	   them	   have	   also	   been	  
affecting	  the	  society	  at	  large.	  The	  world	  itself	  has	  changed	  and	  expecting	  staticity	  
in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  fluctuating	  change	  (not	  necessarily	  an	  improvement)	  is	  unrealistic	  
and	   would	   bring	   no	   real	   solutions	   to	   anyone	   who	   decides,	   for	   one	   reason	   or	  
another,	  to	  keep	  the	  information	  in	  his/her	  custody	  secret	  or	  shared	  only	  among	  







10.1	  –	  Secrecy	  as	  Protection	  
	  
This	   section	  will	   open	  with	   a	   short	   preamble:	   knowledge	   is	   information.	   Being	  
tangible	  or	  intangible,	  any	  culture	  is	  composed	  of	  information	  that	  can	  be	  sacred	  
or	  not,	  hidden	  or	  not,	  holistic	  or	  not.	  Any	  knowledge	  can	  be	  retained	  or	  shared.	  
And	  when	   it	   is	   shared	   it	   becomes	   information.	   The	   same	   thing	   happens	  when	  
knowledge	  is	  stolen	  or	   introduced	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  without	  formal	  consent	  
by	  the	  holder.	  	  
We	  live	  in	  a	  world	  of	  intersected	  contextualised	  information.	  For	  simplicity,	  from	  
now	   on	   the	   words	   knowledge,	   culture	   and	   information	   will	   be	   used	  
interchangeably.	   In	   this	   context,	   information	   will	   be	   understood	   as	   included	  
within	   knowledge	   and	   culture	   and	   embodying	   both	   tangible	   and	   intangible	  
characteristics.2	  The	  New	  Shorter	  Oxford	  Dictionary	   (1993)	  defines	   ‘information’	  
as:3	  
	  
• communication	  of	  the	  knowledge	  of	  some	  fact	  or	  occurrence;	  
• knowledge	   or	   facts	   communicated	   about	   a	   particular	   subject,	   event,	   etc;	  
intelligence,	  news;	  and	  
• without	   necessary	   relation	   to	   a	   recipient:	   that	   which	   inheres	   in	   or	   is	  
represented	   by	   a	   particular	   arrangement,	   sequence,	   or	   set,	   that	   may	   be	  
stored	  in,	  transferred	  by,	  and	  responded	  to	  by	  inanimate	  things	  ….	  
	  
Indigenous	   peoples	   possess	   a	   vast	   array	   of	   knowledge	   and	   information	  which,	  
like	  in	  most	  of	  the	  cultures	  of	  the	  world,	  hold	  different	  meaning	  and	  importance	  
within	  each	  community.4	  Much	  of	  this	  knowledge	  is	  kept	  secret	  and	  managed	  by	  
selected	  custodians	  and	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  such	  knowledge	  is	  justified	  by	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  “Culture	   being	   composed	   of	   knowledge	   and	   information.	   Knowledge	   being	   what	   humans	   know	   and	  
information	   being	   composed	   of	   data	   that	   expand	   our	   knowledge	   and	   consequently	   our	   culture”	   see	  
Anthony	   Liew	   “Understanding	   Data,	   Information,	   Knowledge	   And	   Their	   Inter-­‐Relationships”	   (2007)	   8	   2	  
Journal	   of	   Knowledge	   Management	   Practice	   electronic	   document	   <www.tlainc.com/articl134.htm>	   last	  
visited	  on	  10/11/2015.	  
3	  Lesley	  Brown	  (ed)	  The	  New	  Shorter	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  New	  York,	  1993).	  
4	  As	  repeated	   in	  previous	  chapters,	   intangible,	  sacred	  knowledge	   is	  often	  composed	  of	   information	  that	   is	  
meant	   to	  be	  secret	  or	   shared	  by	  very	   few	  people	  within	   the	  community.	  The	   fact	   that	   such	  knowledge	   is	  
held	   and	   guarded	   by	   guardians	   is	   a	   confirmation	   of	   the	   limitation	   imposed	   to	   the	   accessibility	   of	   such	  
information.	  Such	  practices	  involve	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  confidentiality	  among	  the	  small	  group	  of	  people	  who	  can	  
access	   specific,	   sensitive	   information.	   Though	   conceptually	   sacred/secret	   knowledge	   can	   be	   hold	   by	   only	  
one	  person,	  within	  indigenous	  communities,	  knowledge	  has	  a	  functional	  characteristic	  and	  is	  often	  shared	  





way	   in	   which	   information	   is	   meant	   to	   be	   used	   according	   to	   traditions	   and	  
customs.	  While	  it	   is	  true	  that	  the	  repercussions	  deriving	  from	  sharing	  restricted	  
information	   might	   not	   have	   the	   same	   legal	   implications	   among	   indigenous	  
peoples	   that	   they	   have	   in	   Western	   societies	   (although	   indigenous	   customary	  
laws	  often	  function	  as	  effective	  enforceable	  legal	  systems),	  the	  rationale	  behind	  
the	   limitation	   of	   secret,	   confidential	   information	   is	   very	   similar	   to	   the	   one	  
present	  in	  the	  common	  laws	  adopted	  by	  British	  and	  British-­‐derived	  legal	  systems	  
such	  as	  United	  States,	  Canada,	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand.	  	  
Common	   Law 5 	  on	   confidentiality	   is	   based	   on	   the	   common	   sense	   of	   the	  
“reasonable	   person”,6	  the	   “person	   of	   average	   intelligence	   and	   honesty”,7	  the	  
“reasonable	  person	  of	  ordinary	  sensibilities”8	  or	  the	  “sensibilities	  of	  a	  reasonable	  
person	   placed	   in	   the	   situation	   of	   the	   subject	   of	   the	   disclosure”.9	  Maybe,	   in	  
general,	   common	   law	   does	   not	   possess	   the	   esoteric	   implications	   that	  
secret/confidential	   information	   has	   within	   the	   holistic	   traditions	   of	   indigenous	  
peoples,	   but	   it	   shares	   the	   same	   moral	   and	   ethical	   principles	   that	   something	  
known	  and	  shared	  in	  confidential	  circumstances	  should	  not	  be	  disclosed	  to	  third	  
parties.	  Although	  every	  civilization	  might	  regard	  culture	  and	  secrecy	  differently,	  
the	   principles	   of	   common	   sense	   that	   regard	   secrecy	   as	   something	   that	   cannot	  
belong	   to	  everyone,	  are	  often	  universal	  and	  universally	  understood.	  Of	   course,	  
the	   specific	   cultural	   underpinnings	   of	   different	   legal	   systems	   influence	   the	  
relevancy	  of	  the	  information	  in	  different	  ways	  that	  are	  reflective	  of	  the	  milieu	  in	  
which	   they	   were	   developed;	   however,	   the	   universal	   traits	   that	   make	   certain	  
information	   secret	   and	   confidential	   remain	   fundamentally	   similar.10	  The	   idea	   is	  
to	   value	   some	   information	   to	   the	   point	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   knowledge	   is	  
protected	  by	   limiting	   its	   circulation.	  The	   reasons	   to	  expect	   such	   limitations	  can	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  For	  readings	  on	  the	  Common	  Law,	  see	  Theodore	  FT	  Pluknett	  A	  Concise	  History	  of	  the	  Common	  Law	  (Liberty	  
Fund,	  Inc,	  Indianapolis,	  1956);	  Oliver	  Wendell	  Holmes	  The	  Common	  Law	  (United	  States,	  2014).	  
6	  “It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  if	  the	  circumstances	  are	  such	  that	  any	  reasonable	  man	  standing	  in	  the	  shoes	  of	  the	  
recipient	  of	  the	  information	  would	  have	  realized	  that	  upon	  reasonable	  grounds	  the	  information	  was	  being	  
given	   to	   him	   in	   confidence,	   then	   this	   should	   suffice	   to	   impose	   upon	   him	   the	   equitable	   obligation	   of	  
confidence”	  see	  Coco	  v	  A	  N	  Clark	  (Engineers)	  Ltd	  [1969]	  RPC	  41,	  48	  (Megarry	  J).	  
7	  Printers	  &	  Finishers	  Ltd	  v	  Holloway	  [1965]	  RPC	  239,	  257	  (Cross	  J).	  
8	  Australian	  Broadcasting	  Corp	  v	  Lenah	  Game	  Meats	  Pty	  Ltd	  [2001]	  208	  CLR	  199,	  [42]	  (Gleeson	  CJ);	  Campbell	  
v	  MGN	  Ltd	  [2004]	  UKHL	  22,	  [2004]	  2	  AC	  457,	  [94]	  (Lord	  Hope).	  
9	  Campbell	  v	  MGN	  Ltd	  [2004]	  UKHL	  22,	  [2004]	  2	  AC	  457	  at	  136	  (Baroness	  Hale).	  
10	  See	  WIPO	  Glossaries	  electronic	  documents	  
<www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_23/wipo_grtkf_ic_23_inf_8.pdf>	  and	  





be	   varied:	   economic,	   spiritual,	   personal	   and,	   in	   general,	   culturally	   sensitive	   for	  
one	  reason	  or	  another.	  Every	  civilization	  might	  protect	  such	  secrecy	  in	  ways	  that	  
worked	  best	  for	  them.	  However,	  past	  isolation	  that	  maintained	  those	  traditions	  
in	   place	   are	   today,	   in	   the	   era	   of	   mass	   communication,	   threatened	   at	  
unprecedented	  pace.	  	  	  
As	  it	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  next	  pages,	  although	  the	  information	  needs	  to	  possess	  a	  
level	   of	   ‘objective’	   sensitivity	   to	   justify	   its	   confidential	   constraint	   for	   any	   judge	  
called	   in	   to	   assess	   any	   breach	   of	   confidentiality	   agreement,	   the	   assessment	   of	  
the	   ‘sensitivity	   requirement’	   can	  be	  purely	  personal	   and	   subjective.	   The	   law	  of	  
breach	   of	   confidence	   protects	   any	   confidence	   that	   has	   been	   exchanged	   in	   a	  
confidential	   context	   and	  with	   the	   intent	   to	   remain	   secret.	   The	   next	   pages	  will	  
show	   how,	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   19th	   century,	   the	   law	   related	   to	   confidential	  
information	  took	  different	  directions.	  In	  the	  United	  States	  it	  became	  privacy	  law	  
(trade	   secret	   law,	   for	   example,	   is	   today	   statutorily	   completely	   distinct	   from	  
privacy	   law),	   while	   in	   the	   nations	   of	   the	   Commonwealth,	   where	   the	   British	  
tradition	   could	   develop	  more	  harmoniously,	   confidentiality	   remained	   a	   distinct	  
concept	  inclusive	  of	  anything	  that	  could	  be	  rightly	  regarded	  as	  confidential	  (trade	  
secrets	  included).	  And	  yet,	  before	  exploring	  the	  above	  sentence	  in	  more	  detail,	  it	  
is	   necessary	   to	   shed	   some	   light	   on	   another	   important	   aspect	   of	  
confidential/secret	   information/knowledge	   that	   is	   crucial	   to	   the	   understanding	  
of	  any	   further	  argument:	  according	   to	  any	  national	  and	   international	   laws,	  any	  
information,	  regardless	  of	  its	  content,	  or	  the	  sensitive	  importance	  it	  holds	  for	  the	  
holder,	   does	   not	   constitute	   ‘property’.	  While	   it	   is	   not	   the	   aim	  of	   this	   thesis	   to	  
enter	   into	  any	  debate	  on	  why	  all	   information	  does	  not	  constitute	  property,	  the	  
next	   section	  will	   try	   to	  briefly	  explain	  how,	  as	  of	   today,	   information	   cannot	  be	  
regarded	   as	   property,	   although	   the	   term	   property	   is	   often	   present	   in	   the	  
language	  used	  for	   laws	  protecting	   information.	  This	  parenthesis	   is	   important	  to	  
remove	  confusion	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  exclude	  from	  any	  further	  analysis	  any	  
discourse	   on	   private	   property.	   It	   follows	   that	   if	   indigenous	   knowledge	   is	   not	  
property,	   because	   no	   information	   constitutes	   property,	   then	   property	   laws	  
cannot	  be	  used	  to	  safeguard	   indigenous	  cultures.	  As	   it	  has	  been	  pointed	  out	   in	  





that	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  of	  their	  culture.	  The	  guardians	  themselves	  do	  not	  
believe	  they	  own	  the	  knowledge/information	  they	  safeguard,	  because	  nothing	  in	  
the	   realm	  of	   nature	   and	   spirit	   can	  be	  owned.	   They	   are	   the	   keepers	  of	   passed-­‐
down	  knowledge.	  Their	  ‘special’	  role	  does	  not	  entail	  ownership,	  but	  preservation	  
and	  management	  of	  the	  knowledge	  they	  have	  received.	  For	  once,	  the	  indigenous	  
and	  Western	  worlds	  agree	  on	  something,	  although	  for	  very	  different	  reasons.	  	  
	  
10.2	  -­‐	  No	  Property	  Rights	  Over	  Information	  and	  Knowledge	  
	  
Private	   property	   is	   one	   of	   the	   primary	   interests	   that	   any	   legal	   system	   aims	   to	  
protect.	  Up	  until	  now,	  the	  nature	  of	  ideas	  and	  information,	  although	  confusingly	  
questioned	   in	   many	   cases	   of	   the	   19th	   century,	   have	   not	   been	   recognised	   as	  
property	   by	   the	   law.11	  According	   to	   Cornish,	   traditionally	   notions	   of	   private	  
property	   have	   evolved	   around	   tangible	   things	   –	   land	   and	  movables;12	  whereas	  
ideas	   and	   information	   have	   found	   protection	   under	   intellectual	   property	   laws,	  
which	  use	  the	  word	  ‘property’	  in	  their	  language	  but	  do	  not	  consider	  information	  
as	   private	   property.	   Thus,	   although	   information	   finds	   protection	   under	  
intellectual	   ‘property’	   laws,	   the	   reference	   to	   information,	  and	  more	   specifically	  
confidential	   information,	  as	  ‘property’	   is	  considered	  purely	  metaphorical.	  When	  
the	  courts	  describe	  a	  confider’s	  right	  as	  proprietary	  in	  context,	  they	  actually	  refer	  
such	  a	  ‘convenient	  term’	  to	  apply	  to	  the	  confider’s	  right	  as	  existing	  in	  equity	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 	  According	   to	   Robert	   Dean:	   the	   uncertainty	   surrounding	   the	   question	   “Is	   confidential	   information	  
property?”	   arose	   for	   a	   number	   of	   reasons:	   1-­‐	   Early	   cases.	   Courts	   in	   the	   18th	   and	   19th	   centuries	   showed	  
considerable	  ingenuity	  in	  the	  use	  of	  property	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  decisions	  (Prince	  Albert	  v	  Strange	  [1848]	  2	  
De	  G	  &	  Sm	  652	  at	  694;	  64	  ER	  293	  at	  311;	  Millar	  v	  Taylor	  [1769]	  4	  Burr	  2303	  at	  2340;	  98	  ER	  201	  at	  221.	  See	  
Lord	  Coleridge	   in	  R	  v	  Ramsay	  and	  Foote	   [1883]	  48	   LT	  733	  at	  735)	   including	   to	  protect	   secret	   information	  
either	   as	   equity	   under	   the	   guise	   of	   common	   law	   or	   pursuant	   to	   common	   law	   copyright	   prior	   to	   the	  
Copyright	  Act	  1911UK;	  2	  –	  Propertiness	  of	  information.	  Secret	  information,	  particularly	  trade	  secret,	  exhibit	  
many	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  property.	  It	  can	  be	  monopolised,	  bought	  and	  sold,	  constitute	  a	  valuable	  asset	  
and,	   while	   confidential,	   can	   be	   ‘owned’	   by	   individuals.	   As	   the	   value	   and	   demand	   for	   technology	   has	  
increased,	  so	  has	  pressure	  to	  turn	  an	  equitable	  obligation	  into	  property;	  3	  –	  The	  term	  ‘property’.	  Because	  of	  
its	   ‘property-­‐like’	   characteristics,	   there	   are	   repeated	   references	   to	   information	   as	   ‘property’	   but	   in	   a	  
metaphorical	   sense	   meaning	   ‘ownership’.	   It	   is	   easy	   to	   lose	   sight	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   what	   is	   at	   stake	   is	   an	  
obligation	  and	  not	  the	  information	  per	  se;	  4	  –	  Espionage,	  finder	  and	  Third	  party.	  Equity	  has	  found	  it	  difficult	  
to	  deal	  with	  the	  situations	  where,	  although	  the	  misuse	  of	  secret	  information	  is	  unconscionable,	  there	  is	  no	  
communication	   of	   the	   information	   creating	   an	   obligation	   of	   confidence,	   or	   no	   relationship	   creating	   a	  
fiduciary	  or	  contractual	  obligation.	  Examples	  include	  the	  innocent	  third	  party,	  the	  surreptitious	  thief,	  or	  the	  
lucky	   finder	   …”	   see	   Robert	   Dean	   The	   Law	   of	   Trade	   Secrets	   and	   Personal	   Secrets	   (2nd	   ed,	   Lawbook	   Co.,	  
Sydney,	  2002)	  at	  para	  2.120.	  	  
12	  W	  Cornish	  and	  D	  Llewelyn	  Intellectual	  Property:	  Patents,	  Copyright,	  Trademarks	  and	  Allied	  Rights	  (Sweet	  





contract.13	  The	  limited	  scope	  of	  the	  term	  conveniently	  used	  for	  information	  that	  
is	   of	   a	   confidential	   nature	   has	   been	   clearly	   described	   by	   Justice	   Holmes	   in	   a	  
famous	  statement:14	  
	  
The	  word	  property	  as	  applied	  to	  …	  trade	  secrets	  is	  an	  unanalysed	  expression	  of	  
certain	   secondary	   consequences	   of	   the	   primary	   fact	   that	   the	   law	  makes	   some	  
rudimentary	   requirements	   of	   good	   faith.	   Whether	   the	   plaintiffs	   have	   any	  
valuable	   secret	   or	   not	   the	   defendant	   knows	   the	   facts,	   whatever	   they	   are,	  
through	  a	  special	  confidence	  that	  he	  accepted.	  The	  property	  may	  be	  denied,	  but	  
the	  confidence	  cannot	  be.	  Therefore	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  present	  matter	  is	  
not	  property	  …	  but	   that	   the	  defendant	   stood	   in	   confidential	   relations	  with	   the	  
plaintiffs,	  or	  one	  of	  them.	  
	  
In	  Gurry	  it	  is	  specified	  that	  the	  term	  ‘property’	  is	  not	  used	  in	  “its	  normal	  sense	  as	  
conferring	  an	  exclusive	  right	  which	  operates	  against	  the	  whole	  world”.15	  The	  text	  
recognises	  that	  in	  early	  cases	  of	  the	  18th	  and	  19th	  centuries	  the	  word	  ‘property’	  
as	   applied	   to	   information	   was	   naively	   used	   as	   the	   basis	   of	   some	   courts’	  
decisions.16	  In	  those	  British	  cases	  secret	  information	  could	  find	  protection	  either	  
through	   equity	   under	   the	   guise	   of	   common	   law,17	  or	   pursuant	   to	   the	   common	  
law	  of	  copyright	  as	   it	  was	  conceived	  by	  common	  law	  prior	  to	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  
(1911). 18 	  However,	   the	   evolution	   of	   information	   into	   property	   was	   never	  
effective.	  Stanley	  writes19	  that	   it	   is	   clear	   that,	  under	  English	   law,	   information	   is	  
not	   property.	   In	   fact,	   English	   law	   “does	   not	   impose	   duties	   upon	   people	   with	  
respect	   to	   confidential	   information	   because	   it	   recognises	   some	   particular	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Tanya	   Aplin,	   Lionel	   Bently	   and	   others	  Gurry	   on	   Breach	   of	   Confidence	   (2nd	   ed,	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	  
Oxford	  and	  New	  York,	  2014)	  at	  para	  4.7.	  
14	  EI	  Du	  Pont	  De	  Nemours	  Powder	  Company	  Et	  Al	  v	  Masland	  Ee	  Al	  [1917]	  244	  US	  100,	  61	  L	  Ed	  1016,	  37	  S	  Ct	  
575.	  	  
15	  Gurry	  on	  Breah	  of	  Confidence	  at	  para	  4.71.	  
16	  See	  Prince	  Albert	  v	  Strange	  [1848]	  2	  De	  G	  &	  Sm	  652	  at	  694;	  64	  ER	  293	  at	  311;	  Millar	  v	  Taylor	  [1769]	  4	  Burr	  
2303	  at	  2340,	  98	  ER	  201	  at	  221.	  See	  also	  Lord	  Coleridge	  in	  R	  v	  Ramsay	  and	  Foote	  [1883]	  48	  LT	  733	  at	  735.	  
17	  Deta	  Nominees	  Pty	  v	  Viscount	  Plastic	  Products	  Pty	  Ltd	  [1979]	  VR	  167.	  
18	  “The	  Copyright	  Act	  1911,	  is	  known	  as	  the	  Imperial	  Copyright	  Act	  of	  1911.	  It	  is	  an	  Act	  of	  the	  Parliament	  of	  
the	   United	   Kingdom	   that	   established	   copyright	   law	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   the	   British	   Empire.	   The	   Act	   amended	  
existing	   copyright	   law	   as	   recommended	   by	   the	   Royal	   Commission	   in	   1878	   and	   repealed	   all	   previous	  
copyright	   legislation	  that	  had	  been	   in	  force	   in	  the	  UK.	  The	  act	  also	   implemented	  changes	  arising	  from	  the	  
first	  revision	  of	  the	  Berne	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Literary	  and	  Artistic	  Works	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  
1908”	   electronic	   document	   <www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/1-­‐2/46/enacted>	   last	   visited	   on	  
22/04/2015.	  






relationship	  between	  claimant	  and	   the	   information	   (a	   right,	   as	   it	  were,	   in	   rem)	  
which	   requires	  protection	  against	   strangers.	  Rather,	   it	   imposes	  duties	  between	  
individuals	  (rights	  in	  personam)	  whose	  consequence	  is	  to	  protect	  information”.20	  
Conversely,	   according	   to	   Dean,	   secret/confidential	   information	   (particularly	  
trade	   secrets)21 	  presents	   many	   of	   the	   characteristics	   of	   property:	   it	   can	   be	  
monopolised,	  bought	  and	  sold;	  it	  can	  constitute	  a	  valuable	  asset	  and	  while	  it	  is	  of	  
confidential	  nature,	  can	  be	  ‘owned	  by	  individuals’.22	  However,	  he	  agrees	  with	  the	  
authors	   of	  Gurry	   and	   current	   law	   that	   the	   reference	   to	   secret	   information	   as	  
property	   is	   and	   remains	   fundamentally	   metaphorical. 23 	  In	   fact,	   in	  
confidential/secret	   information/knowledge	  what	   is	  protectable	   is	   the	  obligation	  
and	   not	   the	   information	   per	   se.	   For	   secret	   information	   to	   be	   property,	   all	  
information	  should	  be	  considered	  property;	  and	  judges	  have	  firmly	  rejected	  such	  
a	  possibility.	  Although	  some	  scholars	  have	  commented	  that	  secret	  information	  is	  
of	   a	   different	   nature	   compared	   to	   more	   general	   information,	   courts	   have	  
rejected	  the	  possibility	  of	  considering	  secret	  information	  as	  property.24	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  “Despite	  occasional	  wobbles	  or	  confusion,	  this	  has	  been	  a	  fairly	  consistent	  theme:	  the	  equitable	  duty	  of	  
confidence	  is	  not	  equivalent	  to	  a	  right	   in	  rem	  or	  erga	  omnes	  –	  but	  is	  a	  right	  which	  exists	  between	  people”	  
see	  Stanley	  supra	  at	  149.	  
21	  Hill	   warns	   against	   the	   arguably	   untoward	   inflationary	   dynamic	   inherent	   in	   the	   rhetoric	   of	   property	   by	  
saying:	  “The	  judicial	  tendency	  to	  classify	  trade	  secrets,	  and	  ideas	  generally,	  as	  property	  has	  its	  philosophical	  
dangers.	  One	  such	  danger	  is	  that	  judges	  may	  be	  invoking	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘value	  as	  property’.	  Critics	  including	  
Felix	  Cohen	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  theoretical	  underpinning	  of	  many	  decisions	  is	  the	  following	  analysis:	  X	  
has	  ‘created	  a	  thing	  of	  value;	  a	  thing	  of	  value	  is	  property;	  X,	  the	  creator	  of	  property,	  is	  entitled	  to	  protection	  
against	  third	  parties	  who	  seek	  to	  deprive	  him	  of	  his	  property’.	  Justice	  Oliver	  Wendell	  Holmes	  was	  apparently	  
concerned	  about	  this	  equation	  of	  value	  with	  property.	  In	  International	  News	  Service	  v	  Associated	  Press	  the	  
Court	   ruled	   that	   the	   news	   was	   ‘quasi-­‐property’	   and	   enjoined	   the	   defendant	   from	   copying	   further	   news	  
stories	  from	  the	  plaintiff.	  In	  his	  concurrence,	  Justice	  Holmes	  disagreed	  with	  this	  property	  conception	  by	  the	  
Court,	  stating	  that	  ‘property,	  a	  creation	  of	  law,	  does	  not	  arise	  from	  value,	  although	  exchangeable’,	  and	  that	  
the	  existence	  of	  exchangeable	  value	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  rather	  than	  law.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  a	  thing	  has	  value,	  
that	   is	   a	   fact,	   but	   there	   is	   no	   automatic	   requirement	   that	   the	   law	   protect	   that	   thing	   as	   property.	   One	  
problem	   with	   giving	   property	   status	   to	   everything	   it	   can	   lead	   to	   social	   paralysis.	   As	   Felix	   Cohen	   first	  
observed,	   another	   problem	   is	   that	   the	   ‘property	   from	   value’	   approach	   can	   be	   circular:	   the	   approach	  
‘purports	   to	   base	   legal	   protection	   upon	   economic	   value,	  when,	   as	   a	  matter	   of	   actual	   fact,	   the	   economic	  
value	  of	  a	  sales	  device	  depends	  upon	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  will	  be	  legally	  protected’”	  see	  James	  Hill	  “Trade	  
Secrets,	   Unjust	   Enrichment,	   and	   the	   Classification	   of	   Obligations”	   (1999)	   4	   Virginia	   Journal	   of	   Law	   and	  
Technology	  2	  at	  25.	  	  
22	  Robert	  Dean	  The	  Law	  of	  Trade	  Secrets	  and	  Personal	  Secrets	  at	  para	  2.120.	  
23	  “Many	   of	   the	   references	   to	   property	   in	   20th	   Century	   cases	   concerning	   secret	   information	   can	   be	  
attributed	  to	  the	  metaphorical	  use	  of	  the	  word	  property	  to	  mean	  ownership	  (Prebble	  v	  Reeves	  [1910]	  VLR	  
88	  at	  103;	  Lamb	  v	  Evans	  [1893]	  1	  Ch	  218;	  Shallcross	  v	  Oldham	  [1862]	  2	  J	  &	  H	  6090;	  70	  ER	  1202).	  But	  in	  other	  
cases,	   the	   reference	   is	  more	  direct	   such	   as	   ‘a	   proprietary	   interest	   in	   information’	   (G	  D	   Searle	  &	  Co	   Ltd	   v	  
Celltech	   Ltd	   [1982]	   FSR	   92	   at	   105;	   Yates	   Circuit	   Foil	   Co	   v	   Electrofoils	   Ltd	   [1976]	   FSR	   345	   at	   384;	   Deta	  
Nominees	   Pty	   v	   Viscount	   Plastic	   Products	   Pty	   Ltd	   [1979]	   VR	   167	   at	   191).	   In	   some	   cases	   reference	   to	   the	  
plaintiff’s	  rights’	  suggests	  a	  property	  analysis	  (Franklin	  v	  Gidding	  [1978]	  Qd	  R	  72,	  81;	  Saltman	  Engineering	  Co	  
v	  Campbell	  Engineering	  Co	  [1948]	  65	  RPC	  203)”	  see	  Dean	  supra.	  
24	  See	  Federal	  Commissioner	  of	  Taxation	  v	  United	  Aircraft	  Corporation	   [1943]	  68	  CRL	  525	  at	  534;	   see	  also	  





On	   a	   different	   line	   of	   thought,	   scholars	   like	   Lemley	   argue	   that	   intellectual	  
property	  is	  simply	  another	  species	  of	  real	  property	  rather	  than	  “a	  unique	  form	  of	  
legal	  protection	  designed	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  public	  goods	  problem”.25	  In	  his	  broad	  
experience,	   Bently	   reiterates	   that	   confidential	   information,	   as	   any	   information	  
which	  has	  necessarily	  no	  secrecy	  element	  within	  itself,	  should	  not	  be	  classified	  as	  
property.	  Even	  if	  from	  the	  1980s	  confidential	   information	  has	  been	  classified	  as	  
part	  of	  intellectual	  property	  law,	  it	  remains	  excluded	  from	  any	  property	  right	  as	  
such.	   Confidential	   information	   is	   part	   of	   intellectual	   property	   but	   it	   is	   not	  
property. 26 	  The	   reasons	   that	   Bently	   uses	   to	   reconfirm	   that	   are	   quite	  
straightforward:	   “information	   is	   not	   easily	   demarcated	   or	   defined”;	  
“confidentiality	  does	  not	  confer	  exclusivity”;	  “confidential	  information	  can	  easily	  
be	   disseminated”	   and	   “it	   is	   frequently	   shared	   in	   ways	   that	   are	   difficult	   to	  
describe	   in	   terms	  of	  ownership”.27	  However,	  Bently	   leaves	   space	   for	   a	  possible	  
evolution	   of	   confidential	   information.	   He	   recognises	   that	  most	   of	   the	   debates	  
over	  confidential	   information	  happened	  within	  a	  common	   law	  system,	  which	   is	  
not	  representative	  of	  a	  multicultural	  legal	  system	  (such	  as	  countries	  with	  civil	  law	  
traditions	   for	   example)	   and	   does	   not	   consider	   the	   complexity	   of	   other	   legal	  
systems	  that	  evolved	  outside	  the	  common	  law	  regime.	  Because	  the	  debate	  as	  to	  
whether	   confidential	   information	   could	   be	   considered	   ‘property’	   has	   been	  
carried	   on	   mostly	   by	   jurists	   within	   the	   common	   law	   system,	   the	   legislative	  
development	   involving	   statutory	   obligations	   of	   confidence	   were	   consequently	  
dismissed.	  In	  other	  words,	  although	  information	  is	  today	  considered	  constituting	  
part	  of	  intellectual	  property,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  ‘property’,	  it	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  it	  will	  
never	  be.28	  In	  a	  multicultural	  world	  where	  different	  law	  regimes	  are	  supposed	  to	  
co-­‐exist,	  the	  future	  of	  confidential	   information	  is	  still	  open	  to	  further	  evolution.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  “This	   fundamental	   principle	   is	   under	   sustained	   attack.	   …	   They	   rely	   on	   the	   economic	   theory	   of	   real	  
property,	  with	  its	  focus	  on	  the	  creation	  of	  strong	  rights	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  congestion	  and	  overuse	  and	  to	  
internalize	  externalities.	  They	  rely	  on	  the	   law	  of	  real	  property,	  with	   its	  strong	  right	  of	  exclusion.	  And	  they	  
rely	  on	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  real	  property,	  with	  its	  condemnation	  of	  ‘free	  riding’	  by	  those	  who	  imitate	  or	  compete	  
with	   intellectual	   property	   owners.	   The	   result	   is	   a	   legal	   regime	   for	   intellectual	   property	   that	   increasingly	  
looks	  like	  the	  law	  of	  real	  property,	  or	  more	  properly	  an	  idealized	  construct	  of	  that	  law,	  one	  in	  which	  courts	  
seek	   out	   and	   punish	   virtually	   any	   use	   of	   an	   intellectual	   property	   right	   by	   another”	   see	   Mark	   Lemley	  
“Property,	  Intellectual	  Property,	  and	  Free	  Riding”	  (2004-­‐05)	  83	  Texas	  Law	  Review	  1031	  at	  1031-­‐1032	  
26	  Lionel	  Bently	  “Trade	  Secrets	   ‘Intellectaul	  Property’	  but	  not	   ‘Property’?”	   in	  Helena	  R	  Howe	  and	  Jonathan	  
Griffiths	   (eds)	   Concept	   of	   Property	   in	   intellectual	   Property	   Law	   (Cambridge	   University	   Press,	   Cambridge,	  
2013)	  at	  61.	  
27	  See	  Bently	  supra	  at	  80;	  see	  Gurry	  at	  312,	  para	  8.03.	  





As	  Keene	  L	  J	  has	  pointed	  out:29	  “breach	  of	  confidence	  is	  a	  developing	  area	  of	  the	  
law,	   the	   boundaries	   of	   which	   are	   not	   immutable	   but	   may	   change	   to	   reflect	  
changes	   in	   society,	   technology	   and	   business	   practice”.	   In	   fact,	   although	   the	  
debate	   on	   confidential	   information	   as	   ‘property’	   is	   a	   very	   complex	   and	  
fascinating	   topic,	   it	   is	   not	   the	   intention	   of	   the	   thesis	   to	   explore	   in	   detail	   the	  
current	  debate	  on	  why	  secret	  and	  confidential	  information	  cannot	  be	  considered	  
‘property’	  by	  the	  law.	  Therefore,	  the	  thesis	  acknowledges	  that	  there	  is	  a	  growing	  
resistance	   to	   applying	   the	   traditional	   dictum	   that	   secret	   information	   is	   not	  
property,	  and	  rising	  concerns	  among	  scholars	  seem	  to	  push	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  
revision	   of	   such	   dictum	   to	   include	   secret	   information	   into	   the	   conundrum	   of	  
property.	   Because	   such	   change	  has	   not	   taken	  place	   yet,	   the	   thesis	   remains	   on	  
the	   current	   line	   of	   the	   general	   rules	   of	   law	   applicable	   to	   confidential	  
information.30	  Having	   said	   this,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  point	  out	   that,	   in	  order	   to	  be	  
protected,	   secret/confidential	   information	   does	   not	   have	   to	   be	   considered	  
property.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  debate	  over	  confidential	  information	  as	  property	  is	  
not	   strictly	   relevant	   to	   further	   arguments	   on	   secret	   knowledge	   as	   confidential	  
information.	   Nonetheless	   several	   questions	   arise:	   What	   does	   Western	   law	  
consider	  secret/confidential	  information?	  How	  can	  indigenous	  secret	  knowledge	  
fit	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  confidential	  information	  laws?	  	  
The	   next	   pages	   will	   attempt	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   not	   only	   can	   indigenous	  
sacred/secret	   knowledge	   constitute	   confidential	   information,	   but	   it	   can	   be	  
protected	   under	   Western	   legal	   systems	   on	   confidentiality.	   To	   answer	   those	  
questions	   effectively,	   it	   is	   important	   first	   to	   broadly	   define	   secret/confidential	  
information	  and	   then	  demonstrate	  how	   it	   fits	  within	   the	   law	  on	  confidentiality	  
information.	   In	   order	   to	   discuss	   that,	   it	   is	   also	   important	   to	   take	   into	  
consideration	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  laws	  regulating	  the	  flow	  of	  sensitive,	  confidential	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Douglas	   v	   Hallo	   [2001]	   QB	   967,	   1011	   (CA),	   [165],	   [2001]	   EMLR	   199	   at	   251;	   this	   trend	   has	   also	   been	  
identified	  and	  endorsed	  by	  Judge	  Easterbrook,	  who	  writes:	  “Patents	  give	  a	  right	  to	  exclude,	  just	  as	  the	  law	  
of	  trespass	  does	  with	  real	  property.	  Intellectual	  property	  is	  intangible,	  but	  the	  right	  to	  exclude	  is	  no	  different	  
in	  principle	  from	  General	  Motors’	  right	  to	  exclude	  Ford	  from	  using	   its	  assembly	   line.	  …	  Old	  rhetoric	  about	  
intellectual	  property	  equating	  to	  monopoly	  seemed	  to	  have	  vanished	  [at	  the	  Supreme	  Court],	  replaced	  by	  a	  
recognition	   that	   a	   right	   to	   exclude	   in	   intellectual	   property	   is	   no	   different	   in	   principle	   from	   the	   right	   to	  
exclude	  in	  physical	  property	  …	  Except	  in	  the	  rarest	  case,	  we	  should	  treat	  intellectual	  and	  physical	  property	  
identically	   in	   the	   law	   –	   which	   is	   where	   the	   broader	   currents	   are	   taking	   us”	   see	   Frank	   H	   Easterbrook	  
“Intellectual	  Property	  is	  Still	  Property”	  (1990)	  13	  Harv	  JL	  and	  Pub	  Policy	  108.	  
30	  For	  further	  reading	  on	  the	  subject	  see	  Tanya	  Aplin,	  Lionel	  Bently	  and	  others	  Gurry	  on	  Breah	  of	  Confidence	  





information,	   in	   the	   last	   century,	   have	   taken	  different	   routes.	  While	  British	   and	  
British-­‐derived	  laws	  have	  reinforced	  the	  law	  on	  confidentiality,	  the	  United	  States	  
judicial	   system	   has	   taken	   a	   different	   path	   by	   considering	   secret/confidential	  
information	   as	   something	   personal	   and	   private	   and,	   therefore,	   preferably	  
protected	  by	  privacy	   law.	  The	  next	   sections	  will	   explain	  why	   this	  has	  occurred,	  
how	  it	  has	  affected	  the	  protection	  of	  confidential	   information	  and	  how	  it	  might	  
make	  a	  difference	  for	  indigenous	  guardians	  of	  knowledge.	  	  
	  
10.3	  –	  Secret	  Knowledge	  as	  Confidential	  Information:	  British	  v	  American	  Law	  –	  
Different	  Laws	  but	  Same	  Purposes	  
	  
The	  history	  of	  Breach	  of	  Confidence	   is	  obscure.	  There	  are	  no	  existing	  books	  or	  
articles	   on	   the	   matter	   before	   the	   nineteenth	   century.	   However,	   history	   and	  
practice	   trace	   the	   action	   for	   breach	   of	   confidence	   back	   to	   the	   16th	   century,31	  
when	   “in	   speaking	   about	   the	   general	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Chancery	   (or	  
conscience),	   Sir	   Thomas	   More	   said	   that	   ‘three	   things	   are	   to	   be	   helped	   in	  
conscience,	  Fraud,	  Accident	  and	  things	  of	  Confidence’”.32	  History,	   in	  fact,	  shows	  
that	  the	  British	  Courts	  were	  initially	  willing	  to	  protect	  confidentiality	  by	  whatever	  
mechanism	   they	   had	   then	   at	   hand	   (eg	   common	   law	   on	   copyright,	   implied	   or	  
express	  contracts,	  criminal	  law,	  trade	  and	  commercial	  secrets).33	  At	  the	  time,	  the	  
Law	  protected	  confidential	  information	  before	  ever	  existed	  an	  “action	  for”	  or	  an	  
“equitable	   tort”	   of	   breach	   of	   confidence.34	  It	  was	   after	   the	   Second	  World	  War	  
that	   the	   law	   on	   breach	   of	   confidence	   as	   a	   sui	   generis	   action	   independent	   of	  
contracts	  arose	  with	   its	  capacity	  to	  regulate	  non-­‐contractual	  situations.35	  Today	  
it	  is	  widely	  known	  that	  the	  tort	  of	  breach	  of	  confidence	  is	  a	  common	  law	  tort	  that	  
protects	  private	  information	  that	  is	  conveyed	  in	  confidence.	  A	  claim	  for	  breach	  of	  
confidence	  typically	  requires	  the	  information	  to	  be	  of	  a	  confidential	  nature,	  to	  be	  
communicated	  in	  confidence,	  and	  consequently	  disclosed	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  “The	  equitable	   jurisdiction	   in	  cases	  of	  breach	  of	  confidence	   is	  ancient:	  confidence	   is	  the	  cousin	  of	  trust.	  
The	  Statute	  of	  Users,	  1535,	  is	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘use	  confidence	  or	  trust’”	  see	  Coco	  v	  AN	  Clark	  (Engineers)	  
Ltd	  [1969]	  RPC	  41	  High	  Court	  –	  Chancery	  (England)	  –	  1	  July	  1968	  at	  46.	  
32	  See	  Bently	  at	  1138.	  
33	  See	  Gurry	  at	  13.	  
34	  Gurry	  at	  13.	  





claimant.	   According	   to	   Cornish:	   36 	  “the	   jurisdiction	   to	   restrain	   beach	   of	  
confidence	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  equity,	  partly	  because	  the	  remedy	  most	  often	  sought	  
has	   been	   the	   injunction,	   and	   partly	   because	   the	   subject-­‐matter	   occupies	   the	  
same	  moral	  terrain	  as	  breach	  of	  trust”.	  
Indeed,	  long	  ago	  it	  was	  established	  that	  equity	  will	  enforce	  obligations	  between	  
persons	  which	  had	  been	  in	  a	  relationship	  of	  confidence	  with	  each	  other.	  If	  in	  the	  
framework	  of	  a	   confidential	   relationship,	  A	   communicated	   information	   to	  B	  on	  
terms	   that	   B	   would	   keep	   the	   information	   secret,	   equity	   would	   intervene	   to	  
require	   B	   to	   comply	   with	   his	   obligations. 37 As	   such,	   equity	   would	   enforce	  
obligations	   that	  were	   consensually	   assumed	  between	   the	  parties.	   In	   that	   case,	  
the	   requirement	   of	   confidentiality	   applied	   whether	   the	   courts	   relied	   on	  
independent	   jurisdiction	   in	  equity,	  or	  on	  the	   implied	  terms	  of	  a	  contract,	  or	  on	  
the	   right	   of	   property	   in	   information. 38 	  Additionally,	   in	   case	   B	   shared	   the	  
information	  with	   C	   and	   although	   C	   had	   no	   apparent	   obligation	   toward	   A,	   if	   C	  
knew	   that	   the	   information	   was	   something	   that	   B	   had	   agreed	   to	   keep	  
confidential,	  equity	  would	  impose	  a	  similar	  obligation	  upon	  C.39	  	  
By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  “a	  robust	  body	  of	  confidentiality	   law	  protecting	  
private	   information	   from	   disclosure	   existed	   throughout	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	  
common	   law”.40	  Traditionally,	   confidentiality	   focuses	   on	   relationships.	   Its	  main	  
purpose	   is,	   in	   fact,	   to	   restrain	   others	   from	   revealing	   private	   information	   to	  
individuals	   who	   are	   not	   authorized	   to	   receive	   the	   information.	   The	   legal	  
framework	  of	  modern	  breach	  of	  confidence	  was	  set	  by	  the	  cases	  Prince	  Albert	  v	  
Strange41	  and	  Morison	   v	  Moat.42	  In	  Albert	   v	   Strange	   (1849)43	  the	  High	   Court	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  W	  Cornish	  and	  D	  Llewelyn	  Intellectual	  Property:	  Patents,	  Copyright,	  Trademarks	  and	  Allied	  Rights	  (Sweet	  
and	  Maxwell,	  London,	  2007)	  at	  311;	  “Equity	  may	  impose	  obligations	  of	  confidentiality	  even	  though	  there	  is	  
no	   importing	   of	   information	   in	   circumstances	   of	   trust	   and	   confidence.	   Attempts	   to	   describe	   the	  
circumstances	  when	  equity	  will	  act	  are	  sometimes	  couched	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  conduct,	  which	  is	  
variably	  described	  as	  surreptitious,	  improper	  or	  unconscionable,	  or	  the	  reasonable	  man	  who	  would	  see	  the	  
information	   as	   ‘obviously	   confidential’”	   see	  ABC	   v	   Lenah	  Game	  Meats	   Pty	   Ltd	   [2001]	   76	  ALJR	  1	   at	   9	   and	  
Attorney-­‐General	  v	  Guardian	  Newspapers	  Ltd	  [1988]	  Ch	  333	  at	  358.	  
37	  Paul	   Stanley	   The	   Law	   of	   Confidentiality:	   A	   Restatement	   (Hart	   Publishing,	   Oxford	   and	   Portland-­‐Oregon,	  
2008)	  at	  3.	  
38	  See	  Gurry	  at	  para	  5.0.	  
39	  See	  Stanley	  at	  3.	  
40	  Neil	  M	  Richards	  and	  Daniel	  J	  Solove	  “Privacy’s	  Other	  Path:	  Recovering	  the	  Law	  of	  Confidentiality”	  (2007)	  
96	  Georgetown	  Law	  Review	  123	  at	  125.	  
41	  Prince	  Albert	  v	  Strange	  [1849]	  47	  ER	  1302.	  
42	  Morison	  v	  Moat	  [1851]	  9	  Hare	  241;	  [1851]	  EngR	  790;	  [1851]	  68	  ER	  492	  20	  Aug	  1851.	  
43	  The	  Prince	  sought	  to	  restrain	  publication	  of	  otherwise	  unpublished	  private	  etchings	  and	  lists	  of	  works	  by	  





Chancery	   awarded	   Prince	   Albert	   an	   injunction	   restraining	   Strange	   from	  
publishing	  a	  catalogue	  describing	  Prince	  Albert’s	  etchings.	  Lord	  Cottenham	  noted	  
that	  “this	  case	  by	  no	  means	  depends	  solely	  upon	  the	  question	  of	  property,	  for	  a	  
breach	  of	  trust,	  confidence,	  or	  contract,	  would	  of	  itself	  entitle	  the	  plaintiff	  to	  an	  
injunction”.44	  In	  these	  early	  cases	  it	  remained	  an	  essential	  basis	  for	  the	  equitable	  
action	   for	   breach	   of	   confidence	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   information	   presented	   the	  
necessary	   quality	   of	   confidence,	   that	   it	   had	   been	   imparted	   in	   circumstances	  
importing	  an	  obligation	  of	  confidence	  of	  which	  the	  defendant	  was	  aware,	  or	  was	  
to	  be	   taken	  as	  having	  been	  aware	  of	   that.45	  In	   the	  United	  States,	  at	   the	  end	  of	  
the	  nineteenth	  century,	   in	  considering	  the	  confidentiality	  case	  Albert	  v	  Strange,	  
two	  lawyers,	  Samuel	  Warren	  and	  Louis	  Brandeis,	  discussed	  confidentiality	   in	  an	  
article	   –	   “The	   Right	   to	   Privacy”	   (1890)46	  -­‐	   that	   became	   history	   and	   set	   the	  
foundation	  for	  privacy	  law	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
	  
It	   is	  generally	  correct	  to	  assert	  that	  the	  history	  surrounding	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  law	  
of	   breach	   of	   confidence	   has	   been	   uncertain;	   while	   modern	   scholars	   seem	   to	  
agree	  that	  the	  action	  is	  an	  application	  of	  a	  broader	  notion	  of	  good	  faith47	  derived	  
from	  relationships.	  In	  other	  words,	  confidentiality	  recognises	  that	  “nondisclosure	  
expectations	   emerge	   not	   only	   from	   norms	   of	   individual	   dignity,	   but	   also	   from	  
norms	  of	  relationships,	  trust,	  and	  reliance	  on	  promises”.48	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
personal	  confidence	  was	  claimed.	  Held:	  The	  jurisdiction	  in	  confidence	  is	  based	  not	  so	  much	  on	  property	  or	  
on	  contract	  as	  on	  a	  duty	  of	  good	  faith.	  In	  granting	  an	  injunction	  restraining	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  catalogue	  
containing	   descriptions	   of	   etchings,	   the	   court	   said	   it	   was	   ‘an	   intrusion	   –	   an	   unbecoming	   and	   unseemly	  
intrusion.	   .offensive	   to	   that	   inbred	   sense	   of	   propriety	   natural	   to	   every	   man	   –	   if,	   intrusion,	   indeed,	   fitly	  
describes	  a	  sordid	  spying	  into	  the	  privacy	  of	  domestic	   life	  –	  into	  the	  home	  (a	  word	  hitherto	  sacred	  among	  
us).’	   The	   plaintiff’s	   affidavits:	   ‘state	   distinctly	   the	   belief	   of	   the	   Plaintiff,	   that	   the	   catalogue	   and	   the	  
descriptive	  and	  other	  remarks	  therein	  contained,	  could	  not	  have	  been	  compiled	  or	  made,	  except	  by	  means	  
of	  the	  possession	  of	  the	  several	  impressions	  of	  the	  said	  etchings	  surreptitiously	  and	  improperly	  obtained.	  To	  
this	  case	  no	  answer	  is	  made.	  .	  If	  then,	  these	  compositions	  were	  kept	  private,	  except	  as	  to	  some.	  .	  sent	  to	  [B]	  
for	   the	   purposes	   of	   having	   certain	   impressions	   taken,	   the	   possession	   of	   the	   Defendant	   .	   .	   must	   have	  
originated	   in	   a	  breach	  of	   trust,	   confidence,	   or	   contract,	   in	   [B]	   or	   some	  person	   in	  his	   employ	   taking	  more	  
impressions	   than	  were	  ordered,	   and	   retaining	   the	  extra	  number.’	   Lord	  Cottenham	  LC	   said:	   ‘privacy	   is	   the	  
right	  invaded.’	  Prince	  Albert	  v	  Strange	  [1848]	  2	  De	  G	  &	  Sm	  652.	  
44	  Prince	  Albert	  v	  Strange	  [1848]	  2	  De	  G	  &	  Sm	  652.	  
45	  Paul	   Stanley	   The	   Law	   of	   Confidentiality:	   A	   Restatement	   (Hart	   Publishing,	   Oxford	   and	   Portland-­‐Oregon,	  
2008)	  at	  4.	  
46	  Samuel	  D	  Warren	  and	  Louis	  D	  Brandeis	  “The	  Right	  to	  Privacy”	  (1890)	  4	  Harvard	  Law	  Review	  193	  at	  195.	  
47	  See	  Seager	  v	  Copydex	  (No	  1)	  [1967]	  2	  All	  ER	  415.	  
48	  Neil	  M	  Richards	  and	  Daniel	  J	  Solove	  “Privacy’s	  Other	  Path:	  Recovering	  the	  Law	  of	  Confidentiality”	  (2007)	  





It	  is	  not	  necessary	  that	  the	  parties	  are	  in	  any	  legal	  relationship	  at	  the	  time	  when	  
the	  obligation	  of	  confidentiality	  arose.49	  With	  their	  article	  Warren	  and	  Brandeis	  
focussed	   on	   individual	   dignity	   and	   pointed	   American	   common	   law	   on	  
confidentiality	  in	  a	  new	  direction:	  focusing	  on	  the	  general	  protection	  of	  ‘inviolate	  
personality’	  against	  any	  invasion	  by	  strangers.	  The	  article	  had,	  and	  still	  has,	  such	  
an	   impact	   in	   American	   law	   that,	   in	   2001,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   in	  Kyllo	   v	  United	  
States50	  cited	  Warren	  and	  Brandeis’	  words	  by	  the	  majority	  both	   in	  concurrence	  
and	  dissent.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  publication,	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  article	  rested	  
in	   its	   asserted	   request	   for	   the	   development	   of	   a	   law	   that	   would	   protect	   a	  
person’s	   feelings,	   emotional	   life	   and	   his	   right	   to	   be	   let	   alone.	   In	   their	   article,	  
Warren	   and	   Brandeis,	   inter	   alia,	  underlined	   that	   there	  was	   no	   existing	   law	   for	  
injury	  of	  personal	   feelings	   that	   resulted	   from	   insult	  and	  violation	  of	   someone’s	  
honour.	  In	  that	  regard	  they	  wrote	  that:51	  
	  
…	  our	  law	  recognizes	  no	  principle	  upon	  which	  compensation	  can	  be	  granted	  for	  
mere	  injury	  to	  the	  feelings.	  However	  painful	  the	  mental	  effects	  upon	  another	  of	  
an	  act,	  though	  purely	  wanton	  or	  even	  malicious,	  yet	  if	  the	  act	  itself	  is	  otherwise	  
lawful,	   the	   suffering	   inflicted	   is	   damnum	   absque	   injuria	   (loss	   or	   harm	   from	  
something	  other	  than	  a	  wrongful	  act	  which	  occasions	  no	  legal	  remedy).	  Injury	  of	  
feelings	  may	  indeed	  be	  taken	  account	  of	  in	  ascertaining	  the	  amount	  of	  damages	  
when	  attending	  what	   is	   recognized	  as	  a	   legal	   injury;	  but	  our	  system,	  unlike	  the	  
Roman	   law,	   does	   not	   afford	   a	   remedy	   even	   for	  mental	   suffering	  which	   results	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  “Whether	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  confidential	  communication	  a	  limited	  fiduciary	  relationship	  arises	  or	  an	  
independent	   obligation	   of	   confidence	   is	   established	   is	   a	  matter	   of	   semantics.	  What	   is	   certain	   is	   that	   the	  
confidential	   communication	  of	   the	   information	   creates	   an	   equitable	   obligation	  of	   good	   faith	   towards	   the	  
confidor;	   an	   obligation	   which	   equity	   will	   enforce,	   not	   to	   use	   or	   disclose	   the	   communicated	   information	  
except	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  wishes	  of	  the	  confidor.	  However	  the	  notion	  of	  confidence	  goes	  beyond	  the	  
communication	  of	  information	  in	  a	  fiduciary	  relationship.	  In	  recent	  years	  the	  doctrine	  has	  continued	  to	  grow	  
and	  develop	  ‘at	  an	  ever	  increasing	  rate	  of	  progress	  as	  new	  cases,	  arising	  under	  new	  conditions	  of	  society,	  of	  
applied	  science	  and	  public	  opinion	  have	  presented	  themselves’	  (see	  Douglas	  v	  Hello	  Ltd	  [2000]	  2	  WLR	  992	  at	  
1016),	  and	  it	  is	  now	  clear	  that	  where	  information	  is	  secret	  and	  is	  obtained	  in	  ‘unconscionable’	  circumstances	  
or	  circumstances	  affecting	  the	  conscience	  of	  the	  reasonable	  recipient,	  equity	  will	  intervene	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
breach	  of	  confidence”	  see	  Robert	  Dean	  The	  Law	  of	  Trade	  Secrets	  and	  Personal	  Secrets	  at	  65.	  
50	  Kyllo	  v	  United	  States	  [2001]	  533	  US	  27.	  
51	  They	  carry	  on	  by	  saying	  that	  “it	  is	  not	  however	  necessary,	  in	  order	  to	  sustain	  the	  view	  that	  the	  common	  
law	   recognizes	   and	   upholds	   a	   principle	   applicable	   to	   cases	   of	   invasion	   of	   privacy,	   to	   invoke	   the	   analogy,	  
which	   is	  but	  superficial,	   to	   injuries	  sustained,	  either	  by	  an	  attack	  upon	  reputation	  or	  by	  what	  the	  civilians	  
called	  a	   violation	  of	  honor;	   for	   the	   legal	   doctrines	   relating	   to	   infractions	  of	  what	   is	   ordinarily	   termed	   the	  
common-­‐law	  right	  to	  intellectual	  and	  artistic	  property	  are,	  it	  is	  believed,	  but	  instances	  and	  applications	  of	  a	  
general	  right	  to	  privacy,	  which	  properly	  understood	  afford	  a	  remedy	  for	  the	  evils	  under	  consideration”	  see	  





from	  mere	  contumely	  and	  insult,	  from	  an	  intentional	  and	  unwarranted	  violation	  
of	  the	  ‘honor’	  of	  another.	  
	  
According	   to	  Warren	   and	   Brandeis,	   the	   protection	   that	   should	   be	   afforded	   to	  
thoughts,	   sentiments	  and	  emotions	   “expressed	   through	   the	  medium	  of	  writing	  
or	  of	  the	  arts,	  so	  far	  as	  it	  consists	  in	  preventing	  publication,	  is	  merely	  an	  instance	  
of	  the	  more	  general	  right	  of	  the	  individual	  to	  be	  let	  alone”.52	  Their	  intent	  was	  to	  
protect	   the	   privacy	   of	   life.	   Later	   on,	   with	   his	   article	   “Privacy”	   (1960),	   William	  
Prosser53	  ‘cemented’	   the	  direction	   taken	  by	  Warren	  and	  Brandeis.	  Not	  only	  did	  
he	  establish	  the	  American	  privacy	  law	  and	  its	  four	  related	  torts	  but,	  at	  the	  same	  
time,	  he	  minimised	   the	   importance	  of	   confidentiality	   in	   the	  United	   States.	   The	  
four	  torts	  that	  had	  emerged	  with	  Prosser	  are:54	  
	  	  
• intrusion	  upon	  the	  plaintiff’s	  seclusion	  or	  solitude,	  or	  into	  his	  private	  affairs;	  	  
• public	  disclosure	  of	  embarrassing	  private	  facts	  about	  the	  plaintiff;	  	  
• publicity	  that	  places	  the	  plaintiff	  in	  a	  false	  light	  in	  the	  public	  eye;	  and	  	  
• appropriation,	  for	  the	  defendant’s	  advantage,	  of	  the	  plaintiff’s	  name	  or	  likeness.	  
	  
Prosser	  excluded	   the	  emerging	  American	   tort	  of	  breach	  of	   confidentiality	   from	  
the	  four	  torts	  on	  privacy.55	  In	   fact,	  by	  the	  1960s	  a	  group	  of	  cases,	  distinct	   from	  
those	   related	   to	   privacy,	   had	   recognised	   a	   distinct	   tort	   for	   beach	   of	  
confidentiality	   or	   breaches	   of	   express	   or	   implied	   contracts	   against	  
nondisclosure.56	  According	   to	  Beverlley-­‐Smith	   and	  others,	   Prosser’s	   third	   tort	   –	  
publicity	  placing	  a	  person	  in	  a	  false	  light	  –	  also	  “protects	  an	  interest	  in	  reputation	  
and	  is	  very	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  tort	  of	  defamation,	  although	  it	  goes	  beyond	  the	  
bounds	   of	   the	   tort	   of	   defamation	   in	   protecting	   sensibilities	   or	   feelings	   rather	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  Samuel	  D	  Warren	  and	  Louis	  D	  Brandeis	  “The	  Right	  to	  Privacy”	  (1890).	  
53	  William	  L	  Prosser	  “Privacy”	  (1960)	  48	  California	  Law	  Review	  383.	  
54	  Supra	  at	  383.	  
55	  “First	  the	  intrusion	  tort	  protected	  a	  primary	  mental	  interest	  that	  had	  been	  useful	  in	  filling	  out	  the	  gaps	  left	  
by	  trespass,	  nuisance	  and	  the	  intentional	  infliction	  of	  mental	  distress.	  Second,	  both	  the	  disclosure	  tort	  and	  
the	  false	  light	  tort	  protected	  an	  interest	  in	  reputation,	  with	  the	  same	  overtones	  of	  mental	  distress	  that	  are	  
present	   in	   defamation.	   Third,	   the	   appropriation	   tort	   protected	   “not	   so	   much	   a	   mental	   as	   a	   proprietary	  
[interest]	  in	  the	  exclusive	  use	  of	  the	  plaintiff’s	  name	  and	  likeness	  as	  an	  aspect	  of	  his	  identity”	  see	  Prosser	  at	  
406	   and	   Huw	   Beverlley-­‐Smith,	   Ansgar	   Ohly	   and	   others	   Privacy,	   Property	   and	   Personality	   (Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  2006)	  at	  55.	  	  
56	  Bazemore	  v	  Savannah	  Hospital	  155	  SE	  194	  (Ga.	  1930);	  Douglas	  v	  Stoke)	  SW	  849	  (Ky	  1912);	  Smith	  v	  Driscoll	  





than	  reputation	  stricto	  sensu”57.	  The	  initial	  intent	  of	  Warren	  and	  Brandeis	  was	  to	  
consider	   those	   tort	   laws	   that	   were	   covering	   cases	   where	   the	   harm	   was	  
emotionally	  based.	  According	  to	  Richards	  and	  Solove,58	  strictly	  speaking,	  Warren	  
and	  Brandeis	  did	  not	  give	  birth	  to	  the	  right	  of	  privacy	  but	  “shifted	  its	  conceptual	  
underpinning	   away	   from	   confidentiality	   and	   toward	  what	   they	   called	   ‘inviolate	  
personality’”.59	  By	   the	   1890s,	   a	   growing	   body	   of	   law	  had	   already	   developed	   to	  
protect	   privacy	   as	   part	   of	   confidentiality.	   The	   only	   thing	   that	   Warren	   and	  
Brandeis	  did	  was	  to	  bring	  recognition	  to	  this	  body	  of	  law	  while,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  
attempting	   to	   “steer	   the	   law	   toward	   protecting	   what	   they	   believed	   to	   be	   a	  
broader	   conception	  of	   privacy”:60	  including	   the	   right	   to	   be	   let	   alone	  –	  which	   is	  
based	   on	   the	   protection	   of	   human	   dignity	   or	   inviolate	   personality.61	  In	   other	  
words,	  the	  protection	  of	  privacy	   law	  extends	  to	  a	  “person’s	  control	  over	  access	  
to	   information	   about	   himself;	   a	   person’s	   limited	   accessibility	   to	   others;	   and	  
autonomy	  or	  control	  over	  the	  intimacies	  of	  personal	  identity”.62	  On	  analysing	  the	  
Albert	   v	   Strange63	  case,	  Warren	  and	  Brandeis	   acknowledged	   that,	   although	   the	  
Chancellor	  had	  recognised	  a	  common	  law	  literary	  property	  right	   in	  unpublished	  
work	  similar	  to	  the	  common	  law	  of	  copyright	  in	  unpublished	  works,	  the	  Courts	  of	  
the	  time	  were	  still	   too	  focussed	  on	  remedying	   injuries	  to	  property,	  such	  as	   lost	  
profit,	   to	   consider	   the	   “mere	   injury	   to	   the	   feelings”	   that	   can	   accompany	   the	  
publication	   of	   private	   facts	   about	   individuals.64	  Thus,	   the	   difference	   between	  
confidentiality	   and	   privacy	   law	   is	   that	   the	   first	   protects	   information	   from	  
disclosure	  in	  the	  context	  of	  relationships,	  while	  the	  second	  claims	  a	  right	  against	  
the	  world	  to	  protect	  hurt	  feelings,	  and	  any	  emotional	  reaction	  accompanying	  the	  
disclosure	  of	  personal	  information.	  As	  such,	  privacy	  does	  not	  arise	  from	  contract	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  Huw	   Beverlley-­‐Smith,	   Ansgar	   Ohly	   and	   others	   Privacy,	   Property	   and	   Personality	   (Cambridge	   University	  
Press,	  Cambridge,	  2006)	  at	  56.	  
58	  Neil	  M	  Richards	  and	  Daniel	  J	  Solove	  “Privacy’s	  Other	  Path:	  Recovering	  the	  Law	  of	  Confidentiality”	  (2007)	  
96	  Georgetown	  Law	  Review	  123.	  
59	  Supra	  at	  127.	  
60	  At	  127.	  
61	  At	  127.	  
62	  Huw	  Beverlley-­‐Smith,	  Ansgar	  Ohly	  and	  others	  Privacy,	  Property	  and	  Personality	  at	  53-­‐54.	  
63	  Prince	  Albert	  v	  Strange	  [1849]	  47	  ER	  1302.	  
64	  “The	  principle	  which	  protects	  personal	  writings	  and	  all	  other	  personal	  production,	  not	  against	  theft	  and	  
physical	  appropriation,	  but	  against	  publication	  in	  any	  form,	  is	  in	  reality	  not	  the	  principle	  of	  private	  property,	  
but	   that	   of	   an	   inviolate	   personality”	   see	   Samuel	   D	  Warren	   and	   Louis	   D	   Brandeis	   “The	   Right	   to	   Privacy”	  





or	  from	  special	  trust,	  but	  is	  rather	  a	  right	  that	  arises	  ‘against	  the	  world’.65	  Warren	  
and	   Brandeis	   did	   not	   seek	   to	   formally	   reject	   the	   breach	   of	   confidentiality	   as	   a	  
remedy	  for	  invasion	  of	  privacy,	  but	  aimed	  at	  expanding	  it	  to	  enforce	  the	  norms	  
and	  morality	  of	  relationships	  by	  adding	  a	  protection	  to	  the	  ‘inviolate	  personality’	  
and	  the	  feelings	  caused	  to	  the	  individual	  inflicted	  by	  a	  non-­‐physical	  injury.66	  	  
Prosser,	   who	   was	   first	   of	   all	   a	   legal	   realist,	   believed	   that	   tort	   law	   should	   be	  
understood	  as	  a	  ‘common	  sense’	  balancing	  of	  social	  interests	  rather	  than	  a	  series	  
of	   universal	   principles.67	  In	   other	   words,	   in	   his	   view,	   the	   common	   law	   should	  
secure	  “to	  each	  individual	  the	  right	  of	  determining,	  ordinarily,	  to	  what	  extent	  his	  
thoughts,	   sentiments,	   and	   emotions	   shall	   be	   communicated	   to	   others”. 68	  
According	   to	   Warren	   and	   Brandeis	   this	   right	   “is	   merely	   an	   instance	   of	   the	  
enforcement	   of	   the	   more	   general	   right	   of	   the	   individual	   to	   be	   let	   alone”	   and	  
everything	  that	  derives	  from	  it.69	  
	  
10.4	  –	  Breach	  of	  Confidence	  v	  Privacy	  Law	  
	  
Generally	  focussing	  on	  relationships	  instead	  of	  emotional	  distress,	  confidentiality	  
imposes	   duties	   of	   nondisclosure	   attached	   to	   confidential	   relationships	   which	  
prohibit	   a	   person	   from	   divulging	   confidential	   information	   to	   any	   unauthorized	  
person	   on	   pain	   of	   liability.70	  An	   obligation	   of	   confidentiality	   can	   arise	   through	  
contracts,	  containing	  express	  or	   implied	  terms,	  or	   it	  can	  arise	  independently	  on	  
an	  equitable	  basis	  (see	  section	  10.6).	  Over	  the	  years,	  the	  English	  courts	  applied	  
breach	  of	   confidence	  even	   in	   those	  cases71	  where	   there	  was	  no	  attorney-­‐client	  
relationship	   or	   direct	   confidential	   relations,	   such	   as	   the	   disclosure	   of	   personal	  
information	  and	  trade	  secrets.72	  In	  Morison	  v	  Moat,73	  the	  Court	  of	  Chancery	  held	  
that	  the	  case	  was	  a	  “breach	  of	  faith	  and	  of	  contract”	  and	  made	  clear	  that	  breach	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  See	  Warren	  and	  Brandeis	  at	  211.	  
66	  At	  211.	  
67	  See	  G	  Edward	  White	  Tort	  Law	  in	  America:	  an	  Intellectual	  History	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Oxford	  and	  New	  
York,	  2003).	  
68	  Samuel	  D	  Warren	  and	  Louis	  D	  Brandeis	  “The	  Right	  to	  Privacy”	  (1890)	  4	  Harvard	  Law	  Review	  193	  at	  198.	  
69	  At	  205.	  
70	  Walter	  F	  Pratt	  Privacy	  in	  Britain	  (Associated	  University	  Press,	  1979).	  
71	  See	  Duke	  of	  Queensberry	  v	  Shebbeare	  [1758]	  28	  Eng	  Rep	  924,	  924	  (Ch);	  Yovatt	  v	  Winyard	  [1820]	  37	  Eng	  
Rep	  425	  (Ch).	  
72	  See	  Ashburton	  v	  Pape	  [1913]	  2	  ChD	  469,	  471	  (UK)	  (Cozens-­‐Hardy,	  MR).	  





of	   confidence	   was	   to	   be	   considered	   as	   an	   equitable	   remedy	   separate	   from	  
property	   rights.74	  The	   focus	  was	   still	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   confider	   and	  
confidant	  and	  the	  confidential	  information	  that	  was	  exposed.	  
Privacy	   law,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   intends	   to	  protect	   the	  dignity	  of	   the	   individual	  
against	   the	   world.	   As	   pointed	   out	   by	   Judge	   Cooley,75 	  privacy	   law	   could	   be	  
regarded	  as	  primarily	   the	   right	  of	  one’s	  person	   to	  be	   let	  alone.76	  In	   the	  case	  of	  
privacy	   law,	   the	   courts	   do	   not	   ask	   whether	   personal	   information	   has	   the	  
‘necessary	  quality	  of	  confidence’,	  but	  whether	  the	  information	  is	  ‘private’	  and,	  in	  
this	  case,	  if	  the	  private	  information	  is	  also	  confidential.77	  In	  analysing	  privacy	  and	  
breach	  of	  confidence,	  it	  is	  the	  focus	  that	  becomes	  indicative	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
claim.	   Breach	   of	   confidence	   results	   from	   an	   existing	   relationship	   where	   some	  
information	  intended	  to	  be	  kept	  secret	  is	  shared	  with	  others;	  whereas	  breach	  of	  
privacy	   results	   from	   information	   that	   is	   deemed	   to	   belong	   to	   a	   person	  whose	  
right	   includes	   being	   let	   alone.	   The	   development	   of	   the	   law	   on	   breach	   of	  
confidence	  and	  privacy	  differ	  in	  the	  American	  and	  British	  systems	  simply	  because	  
in	   the	  United	  States,	   contrary	   to	   the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	   the	  Commonwealth,	  
the	   private	   aspect	   of	   the	   keeper	   of	   confidential	   information	   was	   considered	  
more	   important	   than	   any	   contract	   or	   relationship	   based	   on	   confidentiality.	  
Indeed,	   after	   his	   article	   Brandeis, 78 	  in	   Olmstead	   v	   United	   States	   (1928), 79	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  Supra	  at	  498.	  
75	  “Justice	  Cooley	  was	  one	  of	  the	  very	  first	  faculty	  members	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Michigan	  Law	  School	  when	  
it	   opened	   in	   1859.	   As	   a	   professor	   at	   the	   law	   school,	   he	   taught	   constitutional	   law,	   real	   property,	   trust,	  
estates,	   and	   domestic	   property.	   Justice	   Cooley	   authored	   countless	   articles	   on	   legal	   subjects	   and	   wrote	  
several	   full-­‐length	  works	   on	   constitutional	   limitations,	   Blackstone's	   Commentaries,	   Story's	   Commentaries,	  
and	  Torts.	  See,	  Commentaries	  on	  the	  Laws	  of	  England:	  In	  Four	  Books	  /	  by	  Sir	  William	  Blackstone	  ...	  together	  
with	   a	   copious	   analysis	   of	   the	   contents;	   and	  notes	  with	   reference	   to	  English	   and	  American	  decisions	   and	  
statutes	  to	  date	  which	  illustrate	  or	  change	  the	  law	  of	  the	  text;	  also,	  a	  full	  table	  of	  abbreviations,	  and	  some	  
considerations	   regarding	   the	   study	   of	   law,	   KD660	   .B52	   1884,	   Rare	   Books”	   electronic	   document	  
<www.cooley.edu/about/thomas_mcintyre_cooley.html>	  last	  visited	  on	  11/11/2015.	  
76	  Neil	  M	  Richards	  and	  Daniel	  J	  Solove	  “Privacy’s	  Other	  Path:	  Recovering	  the	  Law	  of	  Confidentiality”	  at	  156.	  
77	  This	   change	  became	  evident	   in	   the	  House	  of	   Lords	   decision	  Campbell	   v	  Mirror	  Groups	  Newspapers	   Ltd	  
([2004]	  2	  AC	  457	  (HL)	  [51]).	  In	  this	  case	  the	  defendant	  newspaper	  had	  disclosed	  that	  the	  claimant	  was	  a	  drug	  
addict	   and	   was	   receiving	   therapy	   with	   Narcotics	   Anonymous	   and	   gave	   details	   of	   the	   meeting	   she	   was	  
attending.	   Photographs	   of	   the	   claimant	   leaving	   a	   Narcotics	   Anonymous	   meeting	   in	   London	   also	  
accompanied	  the	  articles.	  The	  claimant	  alleged,	   inter	  alia,	  breach	  of	  confidence.	  In	  dealing	  with	  this	  claim,	  
the	   Lordships	   focussed	   on	   whether	   the	   information	   regarding	   the	   claimant	   was	   ‘private’,	   as	   opposed	   to	  
‘confidential’	   [Campbell	   (n	   11)	   [15]	   465	   (Lord	  Nicholls),	   [92]	   482	   (Lord	  Hope),	   [136]	   496	   (Baroness	  Hale),	  
[167]	  504	  (Lord	  Carswell)]	  and	  determined	  this	  to	  whether	  there	  was	  a	  ‘reasonable	  expectation	  of	  privacy’	  
[Campbell	   (n	  11)	  466	  (Lord	  Nicholls),	  496	  (Baroness	  Hale)	  and	  480	  (Lord	  Hope).	  However,	  at	  482	  and	  483,	  
Lord	  Hope	  appears	  to	  substitute	  this	  test	  with	  an	  ‘obviously	  private’	  test	  and	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  test	  
from	  Australian	  Broadcasting	  Corporation	   v	   Lenah	  Game	  Meats	  Pty	   Ltd	   [2001]	  208	  199,	  226	   (Gleeson	  CJ)	  
(High	  Court	  of	  Australia)].	  
78	  Samuel	  D	  Warren	  and	  Louis	  D	  Brandeis	  “The	  Right	  to	  Privacy”	  (1890)	  4	  Harvard	  Law	  Review	  193.	  





incorporated	   the	   right	   to	  be	   let	  alone	   into	   the	  Fourth	  Amendment80	  law	  when,	  
during	  his	  mandate	  as	  Supreme	  Court	   Justice,	  he	   stated	   that	   “…	   the	  makers	  of	  
our	   Constitution	   …	   conferred,	   as	   against	   the	   government,	   the	   right	   to	   be	   let	  
alone	  –	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  of	  rights	  and	  the	  right	  most	  valued	  by	  civilized	  
men”.81	  Therefore,	  while	   the	   tort	   of	   breach	   of	   confidence	   in	   the	  United	   States	  
has	   remained	  an	  “obscure	  and	   frequently	  overlooked”	  corner	  of	  American	   tort	  
law,82	  privacy	   law	   has	   flourished	   on	   that	   stance.	   According	   to	   Bloustein,83	  the	  
interests	   served	   in	   American	   privacy	   cases	   were	   more	   of	   a	   spiritual	   interest	  
rather	  than	  an	  interest	  based	  on	  property	  or	  reputation	  or	  the	  nature	  of	  an	  injury	  
in	   a	   case	   of	   invasion	   of	   privacy.84	  As	   such,	   privacy	   law	   can	   be	   intended	   as	   a	  
“social	   vindication	   of	   the	   human	   spirit	   rather	   than	   compensation	   for	   loss	  
suffered”.85	  In	  its	  essential	  traits,	  privacy	  law	  is	  highly	  individualistic.	  The	  right	  to	  
be	  let	  alone	  emphasizes	  the	  isolation	  of	  the	  individual	  who	  can	  decide	  how	  and	  
when	  to	  shut	  out	   invaders.86	  On	  the	  same	   line,	  Prosser	  provides	  that	  “the	  right	  
protected	  by	  the	  action	  for	  invasion	  of	  privacy	  is	  a	  personal	  right,	  peculiar	  to	  the	  
individual	  whose	   privacy	   is	   invaded”.87	  Bloustein,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   disagrees	  
with	   Prosser	   and	   recognises	   a	   unifying	   theme	   behind	   the	   privacy	   torts:	   the	  
individual	  dignity.88	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  four	  torts,	  according	  to	  
Prosser,	  privacy	  torts	  –	  intrusion	  upon	  seclusion,	  public	  disclosure,	  and	  false	  light	  
–	  require	  that	  the	  publicity	  given	  to	  the	  information	  disclosed	  is	  “highly	  offensive	  
to	  a	  reasonable	  person”.89	  	  
The	  general	   tort	  of	  breach	  of	   confidence,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  does	  not	   contain	  
any	  ‘highly	  offensive’	  requirement	  as	  “it	  views	  the	  injury	  not	  exclusively	  in	  terms	  
of	   the	  humiliation	  caused	  by	   the	   revelation	  of	   information	  but	  also	   in	   terms	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  “The	  right	  of	  the	  people	  to	  be	  secure	  in	  their	  persons,	  houses,	  papers,	  and	  effects,	  against	  unreasonable	  
searches	   and	   seizures,	   shall	   not	   be	   violated,	   and	   no	   Warrants	   shall	   issue,	   but	   upon	   probable	   cause,	  
supported	  by	  Oath	  or	  affirmation,	  and	  particularly	  describing	  the	  place	  to	  be	  searched,	  and	  the	  persons	  or	  
things	  to	  be	  seized”.	  
81	  Olmstead	  v	  United	  States	  [1928]	  277	  US	  478.	  	  
82	  Neil	  M	  Richards	  and	  Daniel	  J	  Solove	  “Privacy’s	  Other	  Path:	  Recovering	  the	  Law	  of	  Confidentiality”	  (2007)	  
96	  Georgetown	  Law	  Review	  123	  at	  157.	  
83	  EJ	  Bloustein	  “Privacy	  as	  an	  Aspect	  of	  Human	  Dignity:	  An	  Answer	  to	  Dean	  Prosser”	  (1964)	  34	  NYUL	  Review	  
962.	  
84	  Bloustein	  supra.	  
85	  Bloustein	  supra	  at	  1001-­‐1002.	  
86	  See	  Daniel	   J	  Solove	  The	  Digital	  Person:	  Technology	  and	  Privacy	   in	   the	   Information	   (New	  York	  University	  
Press,	  New	  York,	  2004).	  
87	  William	  L	  Prosser	  “Second	  Restatement	  of	  Torts”	  (1977)	  652	  I	  cmt	  A.	  
88	  See	  Bloustein	  supra	  at	  971.	  





the	  violation	  of	  trust	  between	  the	  parties”.90	  In	  a	  way,	  the	  torts	  of	  privacy	  and	  of	  
confidentiality	  complement	  each	  other.	  Thus,	  as	   it	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  course	  of	  
this	  chapter,	  American	  and	  English	  courts	  preferred,	  until	  more	  recently,	  to	  keep	  
the	  two	  torts	  separate.	  
	  
In	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   breach	   of	   confidentiality	   flourished,	   while	   privacy	   law	  
remained	  distinctively	  under	  developed.	  Courts	   in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  rejected	  
Warren’s	   and	   Brandeis’	   right	   to	   privacy	   and	   created	   a	   separate	   body	   of	   law	  
known	   as	   ‘confidentiality’	   or	   ‘confidence’.91	  Instead	   of	   a	   right	   to	   be	   let	   alone,	  
confidentiality	   focuses	   on	   the	   norms	   of	   trust	   within	   relationships.	   Contrary	   to	  
American	   law,	   the	   law	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   recognises	   to	   information	  
“intermediate	   states	   between	   being	   completely	   private	   (known	   only	   to	   one	  
person)	  and	  completely	  public	   (in	   the	  public	  domain)”;92	  whereas	   in	   the	  United	  
States	  privacy	   law	  has	  tended	  to	  regard	  the	  private	  and	  public	  as	  two	  opposite	  
binaries.93	  Hence,	   confidentiality	   becomes	   a	   key	  dimension	  of	   privacy.94	  As	   it	   is	  
explained	  in	  Gurry,	  confidentiality	  is	  relevant	  whenever	  “information	  is	  imparted,	  
either	   explicitly	   or	   implicitly,	   for	   a	   limited	   purpose	   …	   .	   The	   obligation	   of	  
confidence	  thus	  formed	  extends	  not	  only	  to	  those	  confidants	  who	  have	  received	  
confidential	   information	  …	  but	  also	   to	  any	   third	  parties	   to	  whom	  the	  confidant	  
discloses	  the	  information	  in	  breach	  of	  his	  obligations”.95	  Historically,	  the	  English	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  “As	  one	  court	  explained,	  whereas	  the	  public	  disclosure	  tort	  ‘focuses	  on	  the	  content	  rather	  than	  the	  source	  
of	   the	   information’,	   the	   breach	   of	   confidentiality	   tort	   focuses	   on	   the	   source	   and	   protects	   confidential	  
information	   “without	   regard	   to	   the	   degree	   of	   its	   offensiveness”	   see	  Neil	  M	  Richards	   and	  Daniel	   J	   Solove	  
“Privacy’s	   Other	   Path:	   Recovering	   the	   Law	   of	   Confidentiality”	   at	   175;	   see	   also	  McCormick	   v	   England	   494	  
S.E.2d	  431,	  438	  (SC	  Ct	  App	  1997).	  
91	  Neil	  M	  Richards	  and	  Daniel	  J	  Solove	  “Privacy’s	  Other	  Path:	  Recovering	  the	  Law	  of	  Confidentiality”	  (2007)	  
96	  Georgetown	  Law	  Review	  123	  at	  159.	  
92	  Supra	  at	  182.	  
93	  Daniel	  J	  Solove	  The	  Digital	  Person:	  Technology	  and	  Privacy	  in	  the	  Information	  (New	  York	  University	  Press,	  
New	  York,	  2004)	  at	  1177.	  
94	  “…	  it	  cannot	  be	  excised	  from	  privacy	  nor	  can	  it	  serve	  as	  the	  sum	  and	  substance	  of	  privacy	  either.	  Because	  
they	  protect	  distinct	  dimensions	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  unwanted	  disclosures	  of	  personal	  information	  can	  be	  
harmful,	  both	  confidence	  and	  American-­‐style	  privacy	  are	  worth	  protecting.	  Recent	  developments	  in	  the	  law	  
on	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   Atlantic	   suggest	   that	   both	   American	   and	   English	   law	   are	   coming	   to	   this	   realization.	  
English	   law	   seems	   to	   be	   moving	   towards	   encompassing	   privacy	   at	   the	   same	   time	   that	   the	   American	  
confidentiality	  tort	   is	  maturing.	  English	   law	  can	   learn	  much	  from	  the	  American	  privacy	  torts.	  Perhaps	  with	  
greater	   recognition,	   confidentiality	   will	   finally	   take	   its	   place	   alongside	   the	   Warren	   and	   Brandeis	   privacy	  
torts,	   and	   the	   concept	   of	   confidentiality	   will	   become	   better	   integrated	   into	   the	   legal	   and	   conceptual	  
landscape	  of	  American	  privacy”	  see	  Neil	  M	  Richards	  and	  Daniel	  J	  Solove	  “Privacy’s	  Other	  Path:	  Recovering	  
the	  Law	  of	  Confidentiality”	  at	  182.	  





tort	  of	  breach	  of	  confidence	  crystallized	  in	  the	  case	  Coco	  v	  Clark	  (1969)96	  where	  it	  
was	  stated	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  qualify	  for	  a	  breach	  of	  confidence,	  the	  plaintiff	  must	  
prove	  that:97	  	  
	  
• the	  information	  has	  the	  necessary	  quality	  of	  confidence	  about	  it;	  	  
• must	   have	   been	   imparted	   in	   circumstances	   importing	   an	   obligation	   of	  
confidence;	  and	  	  
• there	  must	  be	  an	  unauthorised	  use	  of	  that	   information	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  
the	  party	  communicating	  it.	  	  
	  
In	   Corrs	   Pavey	   Whitining	   and	   Byrne	   v	   Collector	   of	   Customs	   of	   Victoria	   and	  
Alphapharm	  Pty	  Ltd98	  Gummon	  J	  stated	  (at	  para	  443)	  that	  “it	  is	  now	  settled	  that	  
in	  order	   to	  make	  out	  a	  case	   for	   the	  protection	   in	  equity	  of	  alleged	  confidential	  
information”,	  a	  plaintiff	  must	  satisfy	  certain	  criteria.	  The	  plaintiff:	  	  
	  
• must	  be	  able	  to	  identify	  with	  specificity,	  and	  not	  merely	  in	  global	  terms,	  that	  
which	  is	  said	  to	  be	  the	  information	  in	  question;	  and	  must	  also	  show	  that:	  
1. the	   information	  has	   the	  necessary	   quality	   of	   confidentiality	   (and	   is	  
not,	  for	  example,	  common	  or	  public	  knowledge);	  
2. the	   information	   was	   received	   by	   the	   defendant	   in	   such	  
circumstances	  as	  to	  import	  an	  obligation	  of	  confidence;	  and	  
3. there	  is	  actual	  evidence	  of	  threatened	  misuse	  of	  the	  information.	  
	  
Gummon	  J	  also	  added	  that	  “it	  may	  be	  necessary	  ...	  that	  unauthorised	  use	  would	  
be	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  plaintiff”.99	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Coco	  v	  AN	  Clark	  (1969)	  RPC	  at	  47	  (opinion	  of	  Megarry	  J).	  
97	  Supra	  at	  47.	  
98	  Corrs	  Pavey	  Whitining	  and	  Byrne	  v	  Collector	  of	  Customs	  of	  Victoria	  and	  Alphapharm	  Pty	  Ltd	   [1987]	  FCA	  
266	  at	  443.	  
99	  Corrs	  Pavey	  Whitining	  and	  Byrne	  v	  Collector	  of	  Customs	  of	  Victoria	  and	  Alphapharm	  Pty	  Ltd	  at	  443;	  “The	  
first	  three	  elements	  establish	  an	  obligation	  of	  confidence.	  The	  fourth	  concerns	  the	  breach	  of	  that	  obligation	  
and	   the	   consequent	   remedies	   provided	   by	   the	   courts.	   …	   The	   remedies	   for	   both	   breach	   of	   fiduciary	  
obligation	  and	  breach	  of	  confidential	  obligation	  are	  identical.	  Equity	  acts	  to	  protect	  the	  original	  confidence	  
by	  enjoining	  the	  information	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  original	  confidence	  from	  the	  confidee,	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  are	  
aware	   of	   the	   original	   confidence.	   …	   Hence	   the	   two	   elements	   central	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   an	   obligation	   of	  
confidence	  are:	  1	  –	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  confidential	  information	  (an	  objective	  analysis);	  2	  –	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  
obligation	   of	   confidence	   (a	   subjective	   analysis)”	   see	   Robert	   Dean	  The	   Law	   of	   Trade	   Secrets	   and	   Personal	  





As	  it	  has	  been	  explained	  above,	  English	  confidence	  law	  instead	  of	  protecting	  the	  
feelings	   and	   inviolate	   personalities	   of	   the	   plaintiffs,	   justifies	   nondisclosure	   in	  
terms	   of	   the	   trust	   and	   reliance	   in	   a	   relationship.	   Consequently,	   English	   law	  
protects	   “against	   betrayal	   by	   confidants	   rather	   than	   embarrassment	   by	  
strangers”.100	  There	  are	  no	  legal	  prerequisites	  or	  parameters	  defining	  which	  type	  
of	   information	   the	   courts	   will	   protect	   because	   the	   courts	   are	   not	   protecting	  
information	  but	  rather	  a	  confidence.	  	  
On	  a	  general	  note,	  confidential	  information	  is	  that	  kind	  of	  information	  that	  is	  the	  
object	  of	  an	  obligation	  of	  confidence	  and	  it	  may	  include:	  
	  
• trade	  secrets;	  
• literary	  and	  artistic	  secrets;	  
• personal	  secrets;	  
• public	  and	  governmental	  secrets;	  101	  and	  
• cultural	  and	  religious	  secrets.102	  
	  
In	   recent	  years,	   the	  English	   law	  of	  confidentiality	  has	   ‘forcibly’	  moved	  closer	   to	  
the	   American	   right	   to	   privacy.	   The	   evolution	   was	   forced	   upon	   the	   United	  
Kingdom	   by	   its	   legal	   involvement	   in	   the	   European	   Union,	   which	   requires	   all	  
member	   states	   to	  protect	   the	   rights	   enshrined	   in	   the	  European	  Convention	  on	  
Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms	  (ECHR,	  adopted	  in	  1950	  and	  entered	  
into	  force	  in	  1953).	  In	  1998	  the	  UK	  enforced	  the	  Convention	  at	  the	  national	  level	  
by	   passing	   the	   Human	   Rights	   Act	   (1998).	   Article	   8	   of	   the	   ECHR	   provides	   that	  
“everyone	  has	   the	  right	   to	  respect	   for	  his	  private	  and	  family	   life,	  his	  home	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  Neil	  M	  Richards	  and	  Daniel	  J	  Solove	  “Privacy’s	  Other	  Path:	  Recovering	  the	  Law	  of	  Confidentiality”	  at	  166.	  
101	  See	  Dean	  at	  para	  3.20.	  
102	  	  The	  cases	  Church	  of	  Scientology	  of	  California	  v	  Kaufman	  [1973]	  RPC	  635	  at	  658	  and	  Foster	  and	  Others	  v	  
Mountford	   and	   Rigby	   Ltd	   (1976)	   14	   ALR	   71	   prove	   that	   a	   5th	   category	   of	   cultural	   and	   spiritual	   secret	  





correspondence”.103	  On	  the	  opposite	  side	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  Article	  10	  states	  that	  
“everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  expression”.104	  	  
In	  recent	  years	  English	  courts	  have	  tried	  to	  engineer	  a	  quiet	  revolution	  that	  tried	  
to	  fuse	  the	  development	  of	  common	  law	  with	  the	  aspirations	  of	  Article	  8	  of	  the	  
ECHR.	   According	   to	   Hunt,105	  what	   he	   considers	   a	   “strong	   indirect	   horizontal	  
effect”	   entails	   that	   the	   judges	   “have	   an	   absolute	   duty	   under	   section	   6106	  to	  
interpret	  and	  apply	  existing	  law	  to	  render	  it	  compatible	  with	  the	  Convention”.107	  
Others	  suggest	  that	  a	  weaker	  version	  of	  the	  Act	  exists:	  arguing	  that	  the	  Human	  
Rights	  Act	  (HRA)	  does	  not	   impose	  the	  above	  duty,	  but	  rather	  “the	  obligation	  to	  
take	   account	   of	   the	   Convention	   principles	   when	   engaging	   in	   common	   law	  
adjudication,	  affording	  them	  a	  variable	  weight,	  depending	  on	  the	  context”.108	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  Article	  8	  of	   the	  ECHR	  states	   that:	   “Everyone	  has	   the	   right	   to	   respect	   for	  his	  private	  and	   family	   life,	  his	  
home	  and	  his	  correspondence.	  2.	  There	  shall	  be	  no	  interference	  by	  a	  public	  authority	  with	  the	  exercise	  of	  
this	   right	   except	   such	   as	   is	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   law	   and	   is	   necessary	   in	   a	   democratic	   society	   in	   the	  
interests	  of	  national	  security,	  public	  safety	  or	  the	  economic	  wellbeing	  of	  the	  country,	  for	  the	  prevention	  of	  
disorder	  or	  crime,	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  health	  or	  morals,	  or	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  of	  
others”.	  
104	  Art	  10	  of	  the	  ECHR	  states	  that:	  “Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  expression.	  This	  right	  shall	  include	  
freedom	  to	  hold	  opinions	  and	  to	  receive	  and	   impart	   information	  and	   ideas	  without	   interference	  by	  public	  
authority	   and	   regardless	   of	   frontiers.	   This	   Article	   shall	   not	   prevent	   States	   from	   requiring	   the	   licensing	   of	  
broadcasting,	   television	   or	   cinema	   enterprises.	   2.	   The	   exercise	   of	   these	   freedoms,	   since	   it	   carries	  with	   it	  
duties	   and	   responsibilities,	  may	  be	   subject	   to	   such	   formalities,	   conditions,	   restrictions	  or	  penalties	   as	   are	  
prescribed	  by	  law	  and	  are	  necessary	  in	  a	  democratic	  society,	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  national	  security,	  territorial	  
integrity	  or	  public	  safety,	  for	  the	  prevention	  of	  disorder	  or	  crime,	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  health	  or	  morals,	  for	  
the	  protection	  of	  the	  reputation	  or	  rights	  of	  others,	  for	  preventing	  the	  disclosure	  of	  information	  received	  in	  
confidence,	  or	  for	  maintaining	  the	  authority	  and	  impartiality	  of	  the	  judiciary”.	  
105	  M	  Hunt	  “The	  Horizontal	  Effect	  of	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act”	  (1998)	  Public	  Law	  at	  423.	  
106	  Human	  Right	  Act	  (1998)	  Section	  6-­‐Acts	  of	  public	  authorities	  -­‐	  (1)	  It	  is	  unlawful	  for	  a	  public	  authority	  to	  act	  
in	  a	  way	  which	  is	  incompatible	  with	  a	  Convention	  right.	  (2)	  Subsection	  (1)	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  an	  act	  if—(a)	  as	  
the	  result	  of	  one	  or	  more	  provisions	  of	  primary	  legislation,	  the	  authority	  could	  not	  have	  acted	  differently;	  or	  
(b)	   in	   the	  case	  of	  one	  or	  more	  provisions	  of,	  or	  made	  under,	  primary	   legislation	  which	  cannot	  be	   read	  or	  
given	  effect	  in	  a	  way	  which	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  Convention	  rights,	  the	  authority	  was	  acting	  so	  as	  to	  give	  
effect	  to	  or	  enforce	  those	  provisions.	  (3)	   In	  this	  section	  ‘public	  authority’	   includes—(a)	  a	  court	  or	  tribunal,	  
and	  (b)any	  person	  certain	  of	  whose	  functions	  are	  functions	  of	  a	  public	  nature,	  but	  does	  not	  include	  either	  
House	  of	  Parliament	  or	  a	  person	  exercising	  functions	  in	  connection	  with	  proceedings	  in	  Parliament.(4)	  F1	  (S.	  
6(4)	  repealed	  (1.10.2009)	  by	  Constitutional	  Reform	  Act	  2005	  (c.	  4),	  ss.	  40,	  146,	  148,	  Sch.	  9	  para.	  66(4),	  Sch.	  
18	  Pt.	  5;	  S.I.	  2009/1604,	  art.	  2(d)(f))	   (5)In	  relation	  to	  a	  particular	  act,	  a	  person	   is	  not	  a	  public	  authority	  by	  
virtue	  only	  of	   subsection	   (3)(b)	   if	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  act	   is	  private.	   (6)“An	  act”	   includes	  a	   failure	   to	  act	  but	  
does	  not	   include	  a	   failure	   to—(a)	   introduce	   in,	   or	   lay	  before,	   Parliament	   a	  proposal	   for	   legislation;	  or	   (b)	  
make	  any	  primary	  legislation	  or	  remedial	  order.	  
107	  M	  Hunt	  “The	  Horizontal	  Effect	  of	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act”	  (1998)	  Public	  Law	  at	  423.	  
108	  In	  A	  v	  B	  plc,	  while	  giving	  the	  judgement	  for	  the	  Court,	  Woolf	  CJ	  stated	  that	  “under	  section	  6,	  the	  court,	  as	  
public	  authority,	  is	  required	  not	  to	  act	  ‘in	  a	  way	  which	  is	  incompatible	  with	  a	  Convention	  right’.	  The	  Court	  is	  
able	  to	  achieve	  this	  by	  absorbing	  the	  rights	  which	  articles	  8	  and	  10	  protect	  under	  into	  the	  long-­‐established	  
action	  for	  breach	  of	  confidence”	  see	  A	  v	  B	  plc	  [2002]	  QB	  195,	  202	  para	  4;	  see	  also	  Tanya	  Aplin,	  Lionel	  Bently	  
and	  others	  Gurry	  on	  Breach	  of	  Confidence	  at	  para	  6.80;	  see	  also	  Gavin	  Phillipson	  “Transforming	  Breach	  of	  
Confidence?	  Towards	  a	  Common	  Law	  Right	  of	  Privacy	  Under	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act”	  (2003)	  66	  The	  Modern	  





According	   to	   Bently,109	  it	   is	   certain	   that,	   over	   the	   years,	   English	   courts	   have	  
sought	   to	   “adapt	   the	   action	   for	   breach	   of	   confidence	   to	   give	   effect	   to	   the	  
obligation	  under	  Article	  8”	  of	  the	  ECHR	  “to	  provide	  respect	  for	  a	  person’s	  private	  
life”.	   The	   authors	   of	  Gurry	   agree	   that	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   HRA	   in	   the	   United	  
Kingdom	   “provided	   a	   powerful	   impetus	   for	   courts	   to	   develop	   the	   action	   for	  
breach	   of	   confidence	   to	   offer	   greater	   privacy	   protection”.110	  As	   a	   result	   of	   the	  
introduction	  of	  the	  HRA,	  Articles	  8	  and	  10	  of	  the	  ECHR	  have	  been	  invoked	  with	  
greater	  frequency	  in	  cases	  of	  breach	  of	  confidence	  where	  the	  HRA	  “has	  acted	  as	  
catalyst	   for	   the	   significant	   reshaping	   of	   the	   action	   in	   the	   area	   of	   private	   or	  
personal	   information”.111	  Lord	  Hoffman	  confirmed	  that	   the	  HRA	  has	   introduced	  
in	  the	  UK	  changing	  values	  by	  stating	  that:112	  	  
	  
Instead	  of	  the	  cause	  of	  action	  being	  based	  upon	  the	  duty	  of	  good	  faith	  applicable	  
to	  confidential	  personal	  information	  and	  trade	  secrets	  alike,	  it	  focuses	  upon	  the	  
protection	   of	   human	   autonomy	   and	   dignity	   –	   the	   right	   to	   control	   the	  
dissemination	  of	  information	  about	  one’s	  private	  life	  and	  the	  right	  to	  the	  esteem	  
and	  respect	  of	  other	  people.	  
	  
It	  is	  correct	  to	  assume	  then,	  that	  since	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  HRA,	  confidential	  
information	  has	  acquired	  a	  strength	  and	  breadth	  that	   it	  did	  not	  possess	  before	  
by	   including	   in	   the	   criteria	   of	   evaluation	   the	   private	   aspect	   of	   the	   information	  
and	   the	   emotional	   distress	   that	   the	   circulation	   of	   private/confidential	  
information	   can	   cause	   in	   the	  plaintiff.	   Any	   confider	   of	   confidential	   information	  
can	  therefore	  presume	  a	  ‘reasonable	  expectation	  of	  privacy’	  as	  additional	  text	  to	  
the	   claim	  of	   confidentiality.	  And	  yet,	  while	   confidence	  has	  expanded	   its	   scope,	  
for	   the	   English	   and	   English-­‐derived	   systems	   like	   New	   Zealand,	   privacy	   and	  
confidence	   remain	   two	   different	   concepts113	  whose	   “scope	   of	   the	   cause,	   or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  Lionel	  Bently	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Oxford	  and	  New	  York,	  2014)	  at	  1157.	  
110	  See	  Gurry	  at	  para	  6.74.	  
111	  Supra	  at	  para	  6.79.	  
112	  Campbell	  v	  Mirror	  Group	  Newspapers	  Ltd	  [2004]	  2	  AC	  457	  (HL)	  [51].	  
113 	  In	   Hosking	   v	   Runting	   [2005]	   1	   NLZR	   1	   (NZCA9	   [48-­‐49]	   Tipping	   J	   observed	   that	   “…	   it	   is	   more	  
jurisprudentially	   straightforward	   and	   easier	   of	   logical	   analysis	   to	   recognise	   that	   confidence	   and	   privacy,	  
while	   capable	  of	  overlapping,	  are	  essentially	  different	  concepts.	  Breach	  of	   confidence,	  being	  an	  equitable	  
concept,	   is	   conscience-­‐based.	   Invasion	   of	   privacy	   is	   a	   common	   law	  wrong	  which	   is	   founded	  on	   the	   harm	  
done	  to	  the	  claimant	  by	  conduct	  which	  can	  reasonably	  be	  regarded	  as	  offensive	  to	  human	  values.	  While	  it	  





causes	  of	  action	  protecting	  privacy	  should	  be	  left	  to	  incremental	  development	  by	  
future	  Courts”.114	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  law	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  protects	  personal	  
privacy	   as	  well	   as	   claims	   of	   confidentiality	   by	   using	   the	   same	   ‘cause	   of	   action’	  
but,	   according	   to	   Stanley,	   courts	   are	   still	   resistant	   to	   use	   a	   distinct	   ‘privacy	  
tort’. 115 	  Naturally,	   some	   cases	   (especially	   those	   of	   commercial	   confidential	  
information	   and	   those	   featuring	   the	   traditional	   confidential	   relationship)	   are	  
evaluated	  by	  confidentiality	  and	  others	  by	  privacy.116	  
	  
While	   bestowing	   interesting	   reflexions,	   it	   is	   not	   the	   intent	   of	   this	   thesis	   to	  
explore	  thoroughly	  the	  historical	  reasons	  that	  caused	  the	  development	  of	  privacy	  
and	  confidentiality	   laws.	  There	  are	  better	  avenues	   for	   that.	  The	  sections	  above	  
intended	   to	   summarise	  why	  privacy	   law	   in	   the	  United	   States	   became	  explicitly	  
distinct	  from	  the	  British	  common	  law	  on	  confidentiality.	  Essentially	  the	  two	  laws	  
complement	  each	  other	  by	   filling	   the	  gaps	  of	  what	   is	  missing	   in	  each	  one.	  And	  
yet,	  the	  fact	  that	  both	  laws	  are	  still	  evolving	  and	  expanding,	  and	  considering	  and	  
including	   aspects	   that	   each	   possesses,	   becomes	   important	  when	   analysing	   the	  
cases	   of	   indigenous	   peoples.	   It	   is	   in	   fact	   easier	   to	   include	   indigenous	   rights	   in	  
common	  law	  (case	  law)	  than	  legislation	  (statutes).	  As	  it	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  next	  
pages,	  the	  flexibility	  of	  the	  common	  law	  system	  and	  its	  evolution	  based	  on	  case	  
law	  can	  become	  an	   important	   factor	   in	   the	  choosing	  of	   the	  most	   suitable	   legal	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
consider	  it	  legally	  preferable	  and	  better	  for	  society’s	  understanding	  of	  what	  the	  Courts	  are	  doing	  to	  achieve	  
the	  appropriate	  substantive	  outcome	  under	  a	  self-­‐contained	  and	  stand-­‐alone	  common	  law	  cause	  of	  action	  
to	  be	  known	  as	  invasion	  of	  privacy”	  at	  246.	  
114	  Supra	  at	  117;	  for	  further	  reading	  see	  Gurry	  on	  Breach	  of	  Confidence.	  
115	  Paul	   Stanley	  The	   Law	   of	   Confidentiality:	   A	   Restatement	   (Hart	   Publishing,	  Oxford	   and	   Portland-­‐Oregon,	  
2008)	  at	  6.	  
116	  “Cases	  raising	  issues	  of	  personal	  privacy	  which	  might	  engage	  of	  the	  Convention	  will	  require	  special	  focus	  
on	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  concerning	  that	  article”	  supra	  at	  6;	  “Although	  it	  is	  
clear	  that	  English	  law	  protects	  personal	  privacy	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  confidentiality	  using	  the	  same	  ‘cause	  of	  
action’	   (the	  historic	   action	   for	   breach	  of	   confidence)	   and	  not	   a	  distinct	   ‘privacy	   tort’	   it	   is	   recognised	   that	  
some	  cases	  (especially	  those	  of	  commercially	  confidential	  information	  and	  those	  which	  feature	  a	  traditional	  
‘confidential	   relationship’)	   are	   more	   appropriately	   described	   using	   the	   language	   of	   ‘confidence’	   and	  
‘confidentiality’,	  and	  others	  more	  aptly	  make	  use	  of	  the	  terminology	  of	  ‘privacy’.	  …	  Cases	  asserting	  an	  ‘old-­‐
fashioned	   breach	   of	   confidence’	  may	  well	   be	   best	   addressed	   by	   considering	   established	   authority.	   Cases	  
raising	  issues	  of	  personal	  privacy	  which	  might	  engage	  Article	  8	  of	  the	  Convention	  will	  require	  special	  focus	  





10.5	  –	  Privacy	  Law	  and	  indigenous	  Cultures	  
	  
The	   importance	   of	   the	   article	   of	   Warren	   and	   Brandeis	   rests	   not	   only	   in	   the	  
successful	  attempt	  to	  create	  a	  law	  that	  would	  protect	  the	  right	  of	  a	  person	  to	  be	  
let	   alone,	   but	   also	   to	   define	   the	   philosophy	   and	   ethic	   that	   lies	   behind	   such	   a	  
request.	   Why	   should	   someone’s	   life,	   his	   or	   her	   intellectual	   production	   and	  
emotions	  be	   regarded	  as	  private	  and	   inviolable	  and	  protected	  by	   the	   law?	  The	  
answer	   is:	   because	   the	   law	   should	   be	   designed	   to	   protect	   those	   persons	  with	  
whose	   affairs	   the	   society	   has	   no	   ‘legitimate’	   concern	   to	   know.117	  Additionally,	  
any	   person	   should	   be	   protected	   from	   being	   dragged	   into	   an	   “undesirable	   and	  
undesired	   publicity”.118	  According	   to	   Warren	   and	   Brandeis,	   publications	   which	  
should	  be	  repressed	  include	  those	  on	  “private	  lives,	  habits,	  acts,	  and	  relations	  of	  
an	   individual”,119	  unless	   he/she	   is	   running	   for	   a	   public	   office	   or	   he/she	   is	   in	   a	  
public	  or	  quasi	  public	  position.	  On	  the	  subject	  they	  wrote	  that:	  120	  
	  
The	   invasion	   of	   the	   privacy	   that	   is	   to	   be	   protected	   is	   equally	   complete	   and	  
equally	   injurious,	   whether	   the	   motives	   by	   which	   the	   speaker	   or	   writer	   was	  
actuated	   are,	   taken	   by	   themselves,	   culpable	   or	   not;	   just	   as	   the	   damage	   to	  
character,	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  the	  tendency	  to	  provoke	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  peace	  is	  
equally	   the	   result	   of	   defamation	   without	   regard	   to	   the	   motives	   leading	   to	   its	  
publication.	  Viewed	  as	  a	  wrong	  to	  the	  individual,	  this	  rule	  is	  the	  same	  pervading	  
the	  whole	  law	  of	  torts,	  by	  which	  one	  is	  held	  responsible	  for	  his	  intentional	  acts,	  
even	  though	  they	  are	  committed	  with	  no	  sinister	  intent	  and	  viewed	  as	  a	  wrong	  
to	   society,	   it	   is	   the	   same	   principle	   adopted	   in	   a	   large	   category	   of	   statutory	  
offences.	  
	  
Their	   idea	   is	   based	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   personality	   rights.	   In	   Pavesich	   v	   New	  
England	   Life	   Insurance	   (1905)121	  the	   Court	   expanded	   and	   discussed	   the	   tort	   of	  
privacy	  giving	  to	  it	  a	  status	  that,	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  it	  had	  not	  reached	  yet:	  122	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  Samuel	  D	  Warren	  and	  Louis	  D	  Brandeis	  “The	  Right	  to	  Privacy”	  (1890)	  4	  Harvard	  Law	  Review	  193	  at	  200.	  
118	  Supra	  at	  201.	  
119	  At	  201.	  
120	  At	  202-­‐203.	  
121	  Pavesich	  v	  New	  England	  Life	  Insurance	  Co	  et	  al	  (1905)	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Georgia	  122	  Ga	  190;	  50	  SE	  68	  
122	  The	  Court	  carries	  on	  by	  stating	  that:	  “the	  liberty	  of	  privacy	  exists,	  has	  been	  recognized	  by	  the	  law,	  and	  is	  






The	   individual	  surrenders	  to	  society	  many	  rights	  and	  privileges	  which	  he	  would	  
be	   free	   to	   exercise	   in	   a	   state	  of	   nature,	   in	   exchange	   for	   the	  benefits	  which	  he	  
receives	  as	  a	  member	  of	  society.	  But	  he	  is	  not	  presumed	  to	  surrender	  all	  those	  
rights,	   and	   the	   public	   has	   no	   more	   right,	   without	   his	   consent,	   to	   invade	   the	  
domain	  of	   those	   rights	  which	   it	   is	   necessarily	   to	  be	  presumed	  he	  has	   reserved	  
than	  he	  has	  to	  violate	  the	  valid	  regulations	  of	  the	  organized	  government	  under	  
which	  he	  lives.	  The	  right	  of	  privacy	  has	  its	  foundation	  in	  the	  instincts	  of	  nature.	  It	  
is	   recognized	   intuitively,	   consciousness	  being	   the	  witness	   that	   can	  be	   called	   to	  
establish	   its	   existence.	   Any	   person	   whose	   intellect	   is	   in	   a	   normal	   condition	  
recognizes	   at	   once	   that	   as	   to	   each	   individual	   member	   of	   society	   there	   are	  
matters	   private	   and	   there	   are	   matters	   public	   so	   far	   as	   the	   individual	   is	  
concerned.	   Each	   individual	   as	   instinctively	   resents	   any	   encroachment	   by	   the	  
public	  upon	  his	  rights	  which	  are	  of	  a	  private	  nature	  as	  he	  does	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  
those	   of	   his	   rights	   which	   are	   of	   a	   public	   nature.	   A	   right	   of	   privacy	   in	  matters	  
purely	  private	  is	  therefore	  derived	  from	  natural	  law.	  When	  the	  law	  guarantees	  to	  
one	  the	  right	  to	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  his	   life,	   it	  gives	  to	  him	  something	  more	  than	  
the	  mere	  right	  to	  breathe	  and	  exist.	  While	  of	  course	  the	  most	  flagrant	  violation	  
of	   this	   right	  would	  be	   deprivation	   of	   life,	   yet	   life	   itself	  may	   be	   spared	   and	   the	  
enjoyment	  of	  life	  entirely	  destroyed.	  An	  individual	  has	  a	  right	  to	  enjoy	  life	  in	  any	  
way	   that	   may	   be	   most	   agreeable	   and	   pleasant	   to	   him,	   according	   to	   his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
made	  to	  accord	  with	  the	  rights	  of	  those	  who	  have	  other	   liberties,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rights	  of	  any	  person	  who	  
may	  be	  properly	   interested	   in	   the	  matters	  which	  are	  claimed	  to	  be	  of	  purely	  private	  concern.	  Publicity	   in	  
many	  cases	  is	  absolutely	  essential	  to	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  public.	  Privacy	  in	  other	  matters	  is	  not	  only	  essential	  
to	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  individual,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  society.	  The	  law	  stamping	  the	  unbreakable	  seal	  
of	  privacy	  upon	  communications	  between	  husband	  and	  wife,	  attorney	  and	  client,	  and	  similar	  provisions	  of	  
the	   law,	   is	   a	   recognition,	   not	   only	   of	   the	   right	   of	   privacy,	   but	   that	   for	   the	   public	   good	   some	  matters	   of	  
private	  concern	  are	  not	  to	  be	  made	  public	  even	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  those	   interested.	   It	  therefore	  follows	  
from	  what	  has	  been	  said	   that	  a	  violation	  of	   the	   right	  of	  privacy	   is	  a	  direct	   invasion	  of	  a	   legal	   right	  of	   the	  
individual.	  It	  is	  a	  tort,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  that	  special	  damages	  should	  have	  accrued	  from	  its	  violation	  in	  
order	  to	  entitle	  the	  aggrieved	  party	  to	  recover.	  Civil	  Code,	  §	  3807.	  In	  an	  action	  for	  an	  invasion	  of	  such	  right	  
the	  damages	  to	  be	  recovered	  are	  those	  for	  which	  the	   law	  authorizes	  a	  recovery	   in	  torts	  of	  that	  character;	  
and	  if	  the	  law	  authorizes	  a	  recovery	  of	  damages	  for	  wounded	  feelings	  in	  other	  torts	  of	  a	  similar	  nature,	  such	  
damages	  would	  be	   recoverable	   in	  an	  action	   for	  a	   violation	  of	   this	   right.	   The	   stumbling	  block	  which	  many	  
have	   encountered	   in	   the	   way	   of	   a	   recognition	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   right	   of	   privacy	   has	   been	   that	   the	  
recognition	  of	  such	  right	  would	  inevitably	  tend	  to	  curtail	  the	  liberty	  of	  speech	  and	  of	  the	  press.	  The	  right	  to	  
speak	  and	  the	  right	  of	  privacy	  have	  been	  coexistent.	  Each	  is	  a	  natural	  right,	  each	  exists,	  and	  each	  must	  be	  
recognized	  and	  enforced	  with	  due	  respect	   for	   the	  other.	  The	  right	  to	  convey	  one's	   thoughts	  by	  writing	  or	  
printing	  grows	  out	  of	  but	  does	  not	  enlarge	  in	  any	  way	  the	  natural	  right	  of	  speech;	  it	  simply	  authorizes	  one	  to	  
take	  advantage	  of	  those	  mediums	  of	  expression	  which	  the	   ingenuity	  of	  man	  has	  contrived	  for	  broadening	  
and	  making	  more	  effective	  the	  influences	  of	  that	  which	  was	  formerly	  confined	  to	  mere	  oral	  utterances.	  The	  
right	  to	  speak	  and	  write	  and	  print	  has	  been,	  at	  different	  times	   in	  the	  world's	  history,	  seriously	   invaded	  by	  
those	   who,	   for	   their	   own	   selfish	   purposes,	   desired	   to	   take	   away	   from	   others	   such	   privileges,	   and	  
consequently	  these	  rights	  have	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  provisions	  in	  the	  constitutions	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  
of	   this	   State”	   see	   Pavesich	   v	   New	   England	   Life	   Insurance	   Co	   et	   al	   [1905]	   electronic	   document	  





temperament	  and	  nature,	  provided	  that	   in	  such	  enjoyment	  he	  does	  not	   invade	  
the	  rights	  of	  his	  neighbour	  or	  violate	  public	  law	  or	  policy.	  
	  
Warren	   and	   Brandeis	   specified	   that	   mental	   suffering	   and	   emotional	   harm	   of	  
unwanted	  public	  disclosures	  exist	  and	  often	  are	  the	  consequence	  of	  an	  act	  that	  is	  
wrongful	  in	  itself	  (eg	  defamation).	  The	  invasion	  of	  someone’s	  life	  and	  the	  forced	  
publication	  or	  exposure	  of	  facts	  that	  are	  private	  and	  personal	  may	  be	  regarded	  
as	  unlawful.	  No	  public	   interest	  defence	   should	  prevail	   on	  defamation.123	  As	   for	  
indigenous	  guardians,	  the	  information	  in	  their	  custody	  can	  be	  considered	  private	  
and	  personal	  because:	  	  
	  
• it	  is	  not	  spread	  among	  the	  other	  members	  of	  the	  community;	  
• it	   is	   often	   not	   recorded	   either	   because	   it	   has	   been	   transmitted	   orally	   or	  
because	   its	   fixation	   would	   hinder	   the	   role	   of	   secrecy	   embodied	   by	   the	  
guardians;	  
• it	   is	  often	  of	  sacred/spiritual	  nature,	  which	  means	  that	   its	  disclosure	  would	  
cause	  great	  harm	  not	  only	  to	  the	  guardian,	  but	  to	  the	  whole	  community;	  and	  
• although	   there	   might	   be	   a	   public	   interest	   in	   the	   knowledge	   held	   by	  
guardians,	  its	  private	  and	  personal	  character	  should	  prevail	  over	  any	  ‘public	  
interest	  clause’.124	  
	  
Given	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  knowledge	  held	  by	  the	  guardians,	  and	  the	  importance	  
that	   their	   private,	   secret	   practices	   have	   for	   the	   community,	   the	   obnoxious	  
publication	  or	  exposure	  of	  such	  information	  should	  be	  prevented	  or	  prohibited.	  
Any	   rule	   of	   liability	   adopted	   should,	   consequently,	   have	   in	   it	   the	   elasticity	   to	  
address	   facts	   that	   are,	   not	   only	   private,	   but	   culturally,	   ethically	   and	   morally	  
highly	   diverse.	   In	   applying	   the	   four	   torts	   codified	   by	   Prosser,	   one	   can	   see	   that	  
they	  can	  all	  be	  applied	  to	  indigenous	  secret	  knowledge.125	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123	  “The	  right	  of	  one	  who	  has	  remained	  a	  private	  individual,	  to	  prevent	  his	  public	  portraiture,	  presents	  the	  
simplest	  case	  for	  such	  extension;	  the	  right	  to	  protect	  one’s	  self	  from	  pen	  portraiture,	  from	  discussion	  by	  the	  
press	  of	  one’s	  private	  affairs,	  would	  be	  a	  more	  important	  and	  far-­‐reaching	  one”	  see	  Samuel	  D	  Warren	  and	  
Louis	  D	  Brandeis	  “The	  Right	  to	  Privacy”	  (1890)	  4	  Harvard	  Law	  Review	  193	  at	  200.	  
124	  See	  previous	  chapters	  for	  the	  description	  of	  indigenous’	  culture	  and	  traditions.	  





1. intrusion	  upon	  the	  plaintiff’s	  seclusion	  or	  solitude,	  or	  into	  his	  private	  affairs:	  
• The	  role	  of	   the	  guardians	  entails	  seclusion	  and	  solitude,	  and	  affairs	  
dealt	   with	   in	   private.	   The	   protection	   of	   the	   knowledge	   rests	   in	   its	  
very	   private	   nature.	   Such	   knowledge	  was,	   in	   fact,	   transmitted	   to	   a	  
specific	  member	  of	   the	  community	  becoming	  part	  of	  his	   ‘personal’	  
heritage.	  
2. public	  disclosure	  of	  embarrassing	  private	  facts	  about	  the	  plaintiff:	  
• Any	  disclosure	  of	   information	  that	  were	  supposed	  to	  remain	  secret	  
or	  highly	  confidential	  will	  cause	  at	  least	  embarrassment,	  if	  not	  great	  
emotional	   harm	   to	   indigenous	   custodians.	   In	   some	   indigenous	  
communities	  there	  are	  very	  strict	  protocols	  that	  protect	  the	  secrecy	  
of	   such	   knowledge	   entailing	   dire	   consequences	   for	   those	   who	  
infringe	  the	  protocol/customary	  law.	  
3. publicity	  which	  places	  the	  plaintiff	  in	  a	  false	  light	  in	  the	  public	  eye:	  
• Any	   interference	   with	   indigenous	   traditions	   and	   holism	   will	   most	  
likely	  picture	  the	  guardians	  and	  the	  information	  in	  their	  custody	  in	  a	  
fashion	   that	   is	   inappropriate	   and	   harmful	   exactly	   because	   it	   is	   not	  
based	  on	  a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  what	  holism	  means	  and	  what	  the	  
role	  of	  the	  custodians	  entail	  
4. appropriation,	   for	   the	   defendant’s	   advantage,	   of	   the	   plaintiff’s	   name	   or	  
likeness:	  
• The	  acquisition	  of	  information	  that	  belongs	  to	  indigenous	  guardians	  
might	  become	  a	  resourceful	  economic	  asset	  for	  anyone	  who	  enters	  
into	   possession	   of	   indigenous	   secret	   information.	   This	   not	   only	  
exploits	   indigenous	   gaining	   over	   the	   knowledge	   (if	   indigenous	  
communities	   agree	   in	   commodifying	   the	   knowledge),	   but	   it	   will	  
bring	  great	  harm	  where	  the	  knowledge	  was	  never	  supposed	  to	  enter	  
the	  public	  domain	  in	  any	  form.	  
	  
Being	  rooted	  in	  Common	  Law,	  the	  tort	  of	  invasion	  of	  privacy	  is	  not	  composed	  of	  
firmly	  fixed	  rules.126	  Therefore,	  its	  development	  can	  and	  should	  reflect	  the	  social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  “Common	  law	  is	  the	  embodiment	  of	  broad	  and	  comprehensive	  unwritten	  principles,	  inspired	  by	  natural	  
reason,	  an	  innate	  sense	  of	  justice,	  adopted	  by	  common	  consent	  for	  the	  regulation	  and	  government	  of	  the	  
affairs	   of	  men.	   It	   is	   the	   growth	  of	   ages,	   and	   an	   examination	  of	  many	  of	   its	   principles,	   as	   enunciated	   and	  
discussed	   in	   the	   books,	   discloses	   a	   constant	   improvement	   and	   development	   in	   keeping	   with	   advancing	  





needs	  of	  a	  society.	  As	  such,	  it	  must	  change	  along	  with	  the	  changes	  of	  the	  society	  
because,	  over	   time,	  new	   rights	  arise	  and	  are	   recognised.	  Although	   there	   is	  not	  
much	   harmonization	   on	   international	   privacy	   laws,	   today	   most	   jurisdictions	  
worldwide	  recognise	  the	  tort	  of	  invasion	  of	  privacy.127	  The	  heart	  of	  our	  liberty	  as	  
human	  beings	  resides	   in	  our	  capacity	  to	  choose	  which	  parts	  of	  our	   lives	  should	  
become	   public	   and	   which	   not.	   Originally,	   the	   law	   does	   not	   determine	   what	  
privacy	   is,	   but	   rather	   “what	   situations	   of	   privacy	   will	   be	   afforded	   legal	  
protection”.128	  Yet,	  over	  the	  last	  four	  decades,	  academics	  have	  defined	  privacy	  as	  
a	  “right	  of	  personhood,	  intimacy,	  secrecy,	  limited	  access	  to	  the	  self,	  and	  control	  
over	   information”.129	  And	  yet,	  to	  define	  the	  essence	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  right	   in	  a	  
way	   that	   is	   harmonious	   for	   every	   country	   of	   the	  world	   remains	   fundamentally	  
difficult.	  Westin130	  believes	   that	   privacy	   is	   the	   “claim	   of	   individuals,	   groups,	   or	  
institutions	   to	   determine	   for	   themselves	   when,	   how,	   and	   to	   what	   extent	  
information	   about	   them	   is	   communicated	   to	   others”.	   Theorists	   have	   spent	  
considerable	   time	   in	   conceptualizing	   privacy	   by	   defining	   it	   per	   genus	   et	  
differentiam.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  have	  been	  looking	  for	  “a	  set	  of	  necessary	  and	  
sufficient	  elements	  that	  single	  out	  privacy	  as	  unique	  from	  other	  conceptions”.131	  
Solove	  argues	  that:	  132	  
	  
When	   we	   state	   that	   we	   are	   protecting	   ‘privacy’,	   we	   are	   claiming	   to	   guard	  
against	  disruptions	  to	  certain	  practices.	  Privacy	  invasions	  disrupt	  and	  sometimes	  
completely	   annihilate	   certain	   practices.	   Practices	   can	   be	   disrupted	   in	   certain	  
ways,	   such	   as	   interference	   with	   peace	   of	   mind	   and	   tranquillity,	   invasion	   of	  
solitude,	   breach	   of	   confidentiality,	   loss	   of	   control	   over	   facts	   about	   oneself,	  
search	   of	   one’s	   person	   and	   property,	   threats	   to	   or	   violations	   of	   personal	  
security,	  destruction	  of	  reputation,	  surveillance	  and	  so	  on.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
its	  principles	  demonstrate	  that	  there	  is	  in	  fact,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  theory,	  a	  remedy	  for	  all	  wrongs”	  see	  Lake	  v	  Wal-­‐
Mart	  Stores,	  Inc	  [1998]	  582	  N	  W	  2d	  231.	  	  
127	  See	   Daniel	   J	   Solove	   and	   Paul	  M	   Schwartz	   Information	   Privacy	   Law	   (Wolters	   Kluwer,	   The	   Netherlands,	  
2011).	  
128	  Hyman	  Gross	  “The	  Concept	  of	  Privacy”	  (1967)	  42	  NYU	  L	  Rev	  34	  at	  36.	  	  
129	  Daniel	  J	  Solove	  and	  Paul	  M	  Schwartz	  Information	  Privacy	  Law	  (Wolters	  Kluwer,	  The	  Netherlands,	  2011)	  at	  
42.	  
130	  Solove	  and	  Schwartz	  reporting	  Alan	  Westin	  article	  “Privacy	  and	  Freedom”	  (1968)	  25	  Wash	  and	  Lee	  Law	  
Rev	  166.	  
131	  Daniel	   J	   Solove	   “Conceptualizing	   Privacy”	   (2002)	   90	  Cal	   L	   Rev	   in	   Daniel	   J	   Solove	   and	   Paul	  M	   Schwartz	  
Information	  Privacy	  Law	  (Wolters	  Kluwer,	  The	  Netherlands,	  2011)	  at	  51.	  






Solove’s	   description	   of	  what	   constitutes	   privacy	   is	   particularly	   pertinent	   to	   the	  
issues	   faced	   by	   indigenous	   guardians.	   The	   invasion	   of	   their	   privacy	   entails	   the	  
disruption	  of	  certain	  practices	  of	  great	   spiritual	   significance	   to	   the	  point	   that	   it	  
may	   annihilate	   them.	   It	   also	   damages	   the	   whole	   community	   whose	   cultural	  
survival	  resides	  on	  the	  respect	  of	  sacred	  and	  secret	  practices.	  Solove	  recognises	  
that	  there	  are	  similarities	  and	  differences	   in	  the	  types	  of	  disruptions,	  as	  well	  as	  
the	   practices	   that	   privacy	   invasions	   disrupt	   and,	   instead	   of	   looking	   for	   the	  
common	  denominator,	  the	  law	  should	  focus	  on	  the	  web	  of	  interconnected	  types	  
of	   disruption	   of	   specific	   practices	   and	   map	   the	   typography	   of	   the	   web. 133	  
Invasion	  of	   indigenous	   secret	   practices	   should	   thus	   be	   considered	   as	   a	   type	  of	  
disruption	   that	   is	   highly	   damaging	   for	   indigenous	   cultures	   and	   traditions	   and	  
should	  be	  prevented	  or	  impeded.	  Unlike	  breach	  of	  confidence,	  breach	  of	  privacy	  
does	  not	  require	  a	  relationship	  of	  confidence,	  because	  it	  is	  not	  a	  breach	  of	  trust.	  
It	  directly	  relates	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  information	  itself	  and	  to	  private	  facts	  that	  
interest	  a	  person	  or	  a	  group	  of	  people	  but	  not	   the	  world	  at	   large.	  However,	  as	  
pointed	  out	  by	  Lai,134	  privacy	  law	  can	  protect	  ‘private	  facts’	  of	  communities,	  but	  
“could	   not	   be	   used	   to	   limit	   general,	   non	   specific	   representation	   of	   indigenous	  
culture	   by	   non-­‐members”.135	  In	  New	   Zealand	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   has	   stressed	  
that	   “the	   concern	   is	   with	   publicity	   that	   is	   truly	   humiliating	   and	   distressful	   or	  
otherwise	   harmful	   to	   the	   individual	   concerned”. 136 	  However,	   as	   for	   the	  
Australian	  cases	  Bulun	  Bulun	  &	  Anor	  v	  R	  &	  T	  Textiles	  Pty	  Ltd137	  and	  Milpurrurru	  
and	  Others	  v	  Indofurn	  Pty	  Ltd	  and	  Others138	  analysed	  in	  chapter	  three,	  the	  harm	  
done	  by	  divulging	  information	  that	  is	  considered	  sensitive	  and	  secret	  can	  be	  truly	  
great.	  The	  same	  happens	  when	  the	  knowledge	  held	  in	  custody	  by	  the	  guardians	  
is	  used	  improperly.	  The	  test	  to	  evaluate	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  a	  breach	  of	  
privacy	   occurs	   therefore	   includes	  whether	   the	   publication	   or	   circulation	   of	   the	  
sensitive	   information	   can	   be	   offensive	   to	   the	   reasonable	   person	   or	   can	   cause	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133	  See	  Solove	  at	  52.	  
134	  Jessica	  Christine	  Lai	  Indigenous	  Cultural	  Heritage	  and	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights:	  Learning	  from	  the	  New	  
Zealand	  Experience?	  (Springer,	  Switzerland,	  2014).	  
135	  Lai	  at	  187.	  
136	  Hosking	  v	  Runting	  [2005]	  1	  NZLR	  1,	  164	  P	  Gault	  and	  J	  Blanchard	  (CA).	  	  
137	  Bulun	  Bulun	  and	  Anor	  v	  R	  &	  T	  Textiles	  [1998]	  ALR	  157.	  





great	  harm.	  Obviously	  the	  meter	  by	  which	  Western	  and	   indigenous	  culture	  can	  
judge	   this	   might	   vary	   greatly.	   And	   this	   is	   the	   reason	   why,	   as	   pointed	   out	   by	  
Solove,	  Western	   law	  must	  make	   the	   space	   for	   disruptions	  which	   are	   rooted	   in	  
non-­‐Western	   contexts	   and	   respond	   to	   different	   set	   of	   values	   or	   cultural	  
affiliations.	  If	  the	  focus	  of	  privacy	  law	  is	  on	  the	  emotional	  suffering/distress,	  what	  
matters	   is	  the	  effect	  that	  the	   invasion	  of	  a	  custodian’s	  privacy	  will	  cause	  to	  the	  
person	  of	   the	  custodian	  and	   to	   the	  community	  at	   large.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  
law	   should	   address	   how	   and	   why	   the	   invasion	   of	   a	   custodian’s	   privacy	   has	  
occurred	  and	  what	  was	  the	   intent	  of	   the	  defendant	   in	  appropriating	  the	  secret	  
knowledge.	  As	  stressed	  by	  Young	  and	  Haley:	  139	  
	  
In	  determining	   the	  morality	  of	   any	   representation	  of	   another	   culture,	   a	   crucial	  
issue	   must	   be	   addressed.	   This	   is	   the	   issue	   of	   how	   outsiders	   have	   obtained	  
information	  about	  the	  culture	  they	  represent.	  We	  must	  ask	  whether	  any	  of	  the	  
information	   gained	   by	   an	   artist	   was	   obtained	   surreptitiously,	   deceptively	   or	  
coercively.	   Information	   ought	   not	   come	   through	   …	   stealth	   …	   Nor	   ought	   it	   to	  
come	  deceptively,	  as	  it	  would	  if	  someone	  were	  to	  represent	  himself	  as	  an	  insider	  
in	   order	   to	   obtain	   information.	   Neither	   should	   any	   form	   of	   coercion	   be	  
employed.	  
	  
Indeed	  while	  recent	  cases	  give	  hope	  that	  a	  strong	  tort	  of	  privacy	  might	  arise	  and	  
work	   alongside	  breach	  of	   confidence	   to	   strengthen	  and	   complete	   the	   latter,140	  
however,	   such	   shift	   still	   lacks	   of	   uniformity,	   harmonisation	   and	   general	  
consensus	  especially	  at	  international	  level.	  As	  of	  today,	  there	  is	  still	  ambivalence	  
about	  whether	  to	  continue	  to	  develop	  or	  expand	  the	  equitable	  action	  for	  breach	  
of	  confidence	  or	  to	  introduce	  a	  separate	  tort	  of	  privacy.141	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	  James	  O	  Jung	  and	  Susan	  Haley	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Cultural	  Appropriation	  (Wiley-­‐Blackwell,	  2012)	  at	  282.	  
140	  In	  the	  House	  of	  Lords,	  Lord	  Nicholls	  stated	  that	  “the	  essence	  of	  the	  tort	   is	  better	  encapsulated	  now	  as	  
misuse	  of	  private	   information’	  and	  commented	  that	   ‘there	  has	  been	  a	  shift	   in	  the	  centre	  of	  gravity	  of	  the	  
action	   for	   breach	   of	   confidence	   when	   it	   is	   used	   as	   a	   remedy	   for	   the	   unjustified	   publication	   of	   personal	  
information	   …	   Instead	   of	   the	   cause	   of	   action	   being	   based	   upon	   the	   duty	   of	   good	   faith	   applicable	   to	  
confidential	   personal	   information	   and	   trade	   secrets	   alike,	   it	   focuses	   upon	   the	   protection	   of	   human	  
autonomy	  and	  dignity	  –	   the	  right	   to	  control	   the	  dissemination	  of	   information	  about	  one’s	  private	   life	  and	  
the	  right	  to	  the	  esteem	  and	  respect	  of	  other	  people”	  see	  Campbell	  v	  MGN	  Ltd	  [2004]	  UKHL	  22	  [2004]	  2	  AC	  at	  
473.	  	  
141	  “Whether	  a	  tort	  of	  privacy	  will	   lead	  to	  more	  comprehensive	  protection	  of	  privacy	  than	   is	  presently	  the	  
case	  under	  breach	  of	  confidence	  depends	  on	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  tort	  that	  is	  recognised.	  For	  example,	  in	  New	  





On	  the	  matter,	  in	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  Tipping	  J	  stated	  that:	  142	  
	  
…	   it	   is	   more	   jurisprudentially	   straightforward	   and	   easier	   of	   logical	   analysis	   to	  
recognise	   that	   confidence	   and	   privacy,	   while	   capable	   of	   overlapping,	   are	  
essentially	  different	  concepts.	  Breach	  of	  confidence	  being	  an	  equitable	  concept,	  
is	   conscience-­‐based.	   Invasion	   of	   privacy	   is	   a	   common	   law	   wrong	   which	   is	  
founded	  on	  the	  harm	  done	  to	  the	  plaintiff	  by	  conduct	  which	  can	  reasonably	  be	  
regarded	  as	  offensive	  to	  human	  values.	  While	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  achieve	  the	  
same	  substantive	  result	  by	  developing	  the	  equitable	  cause	  of	  action,	  I	  consider	  it	  
legally	  preferable	  and	  better	  for	  society’s	  understanding	  of	  what	  the	  Courts	  are	  
doing	   to	   achieve	   the	   appropriate	   substantive	   outcome	   under	   a	   self-­‐contained	  
and	  stand-­‐alone	  common	  law	  cause	  of	  action	  to	  be	  known	  as	  invasion	  of	  privacy.	  	  
	  
Indeed,	  without	   general	   consensus	   and	  harmonization	   and	   clear	  delineation	  of	  
what	  de	  facto	  constitutes	  privacy	  law,	  it	  will	  remain	  uncertain	  how	  privacy	  can	  be	  
applied	   to	   safeguard	   indigenous	   peoples’	   interests.	   There	   is	   potential	   for	   such	  
development	  as	  shown.	  Right	  now,	  and	  especially	  in	  the	  common	  law	  system,	  it	  
seems	   that	   the	   action	   for	   breach	   of	   confidence	   better	   responds	   to	   indigenous	  
issues.	  Although	  somewhat	  marginally,	  breach	  of	  confidence	  has,	  in	  fact,	  already	  
been	   employed	   to	   protect	   indigenous	   secret	   knowledge	   and	   private	  






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the	   action	   for	   breach	   of	   confidence	   along	   similar	   lines	   to	   English	   courts.	   The	   court	   defined	   the	   tort	   as	  
relating	  to	  wrongful	  publicity	  of	  private	  facts	  and	  Gault	  and	  Blanchard	  JJ	  noted	  that	  the	  same	  result	  could	  
have	  been	  reached	  either	  by	  a	  tort	  of	  privacy	  or	  the	  breach	  of	  confidence	  route.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  former	  
approach	  was	  favoured	  because	  it	  would	  be	  ‘conducive	  of	  clearer	  analysis’	  (Hosking	  v	  Runting	  (n	  37)	  15).	  It	  
could	  also	  be	  argued	  that	  even	  if	  a	  newly	  recognised	  tort	  of	  privacy	  is	  limited	  in	  scope	  and	  covers	  the	  same	  
ground	  as	  the	  extended	  form	  of	  breach	  of	  confidence,	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  tort	  creates	  the	  potential	  for	  
its	  further	  expansion.	  For	  example	  in	  Hosking	  v	  Runting	  the	  Court	  did	  not	  exclude	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  tortious	  
remedy	  for	  ‘unreasonable	  intrusion	  into	  a	  person’s	  solitude	  or	  seclusion’,	  but	  merely	  left	  the	  issue	  open	  for	  
another	  time”	  see	  Tanya	  Aplin	  “The	  Future	  of	  Breach	  of	  Confidence	  and	  the	  Protection	  of	  Privacy”	  (2007)	  
Oxford	  University	  Commonwealth	  Law	  Journal	  137	  at	  154-­‐155.	  
142	  Hosking	  v	  Runting	  and	  Pacific	  Magazines	  NZ	  Ltd	  [2004]	  NZCA	  34	  at	  59	  (Tipping	  J).	  
143	  Campbell	   v	   MGN	   Ltd	   [2004]	   UKHL	   22,	   [2004]	   2	   AC	   457	   at	   136	   (Baroness	   Hale);	   Foster	   and	   Others	   v	  





10.6	  –	  Breach	  of	  Confidence	  and	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  
	  
As	   we	   have	   seen,	   it	   is	   generally	   believed	   that	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   breach	   of	  
confidence	  are	  quite	  obscure.	  Scholars	  have	  often	  discussed	  whether	  the	  breach	  
of	   confidence	   has	   its	   roots	   in	   contract,	   tort,	   property	   or	   equity,	   reaching	   the	  
conclusion	   that	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   action	   seems	   to	   favour	   equity.144	  In	   fact,	   a	  
‘fiduciary	  relationship’	  is	  an	  equitable	  relationship	  in	  which	  “one	  party	  has	  a	  duty	  
to	  act	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  another,145	  and	  it	  arises,	  for	  example,	  between	  solicitor	  
and	  client,	  or	   trustee	  and	  beneficiary”.146	  Modern	  commentators	  have	  adopted	  
the	   view	   that	   the	   action	   for	   breach	   of	   confidence	   is	   “an	   application	   of	   the	  
broader	   notion	   of	   good	   faith”,147	  which	   needs	   a	   sui	   generis	   action,	   being	   a	  
separate	  cause	  of	  action	  in	  its	  own	  right.148	  Thus,	  it	  is	  generally	  agreed	  that	  in	  the	  
long	   tradition	   of	   the	   common	   law,	   equity	   will	   enforce	   obligations	   between	  
people	   who	   “are	   or	   have	   been	   in	   a	   relationship	   of	   ‘confidence’	   with	   each	  
other”.149	  Consequently,	   originally	   to	   have	   an	   obligation	   of	   confidence	   there	  
must	  have	  been	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  confidential	  relationship.	  Later	  on,	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  
confidential	   relationship’s	   requirement	   was	   removed	   by	   Lord	   Goff	   in	   the	  
Spycatcher	  case.150	  Once	  freed	  from	  that	  requirement,	  “the	  law	  was	  readily	  able	  
to	   find	   a	   duty	   of	   confidence	   when	   the	   information	   was	   extracted	   not	   by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144	  See	  Gurry	   at	   Ch	   4;	   “The	   rules	   of	   equity	   arose	   in	   England	  when	   the	   strictures	   of	   common	   law	   proved	  
unable	  to	  satisfy	  the	  demands	  of	   justice.	  The	  High	  Court	  of	  Chancery	  would	  determine	  cases	  on	  behalf	  of	  
the	  King	  according	  to	  principles	  of	  equity	  or	  fairness	  and	  could	  go	  beyond	  the	  strict	  letter	  of	  the	  law.	  Whilst	  
over	   time	   the	   Courts	   of	   Chancery	   and	   the	   tenets	   of	   equity	   have	   merged	   with	   the	   common	   law,	   courts	  
exercising	   an	   equitable	   jurisdiction	   still	   serve	   their	   original	   function.	   Equity	   is	   an	   over-­‐arching	   (or	  
underpinning)	   mechanism	   to	   ensure	   just	   behaviour	   in	   relations	   between	   citizens.	   It	   is	   not	   restricted	   to	  
specific	  situations,	  and	  can	  move	  freely	  into	  areas	  where	  is	  has	  not	  previously	  been	  applied.	  Equity	  serves	  as	  
the	  legal	  basis	  for	  enforcing	  proper	  behaviour	  when	  one	  person	  is	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  dependence	  on	  another”	  
see	   Paul	   Martin	   and	   Michael	   Jeffery	   “Using	   a	   legally	   Enforceable	   Knowledge	   Trust	   to	   Fulfil	   the	   Moral	  
Obligation	  to	  Protect	  Indigenous	  Secrets”	  (2007)	  11	  1	  NZ	  J	  Envtl	  L.	  	  
145	  See	  Bristol	  and	  West	  Building	  Society	  v	  Mothew	  [1998]	  Ch	  1	  at	  18.	  
146	  See	  Boardman	  v	  Phipps	  [1967]	  2	  AC	  46.	  
147	  Lionel	  Bently	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law	  at	  1139.	  
148	  Bently	  at	  1140.	  
149	  “A	   communicated	   information	   to	   B	   on	   terms	   that	   B	  would	   keep	   the	   information	   secret,	   equity	  would	  
intervene	   to	   require	   B	   to	   comply	   with	   his	   obligations”	   see	   Paul	   Stanley	   The	   Law	   of	   Confidentiality:	   A	  
Restatement	  at	  3.	  
150	  See	  Attorney-­‐General	   v	   Guardian	   Newspaper	   (No	   2)	   [1990]	   1	   AC	   109	   at	   281;	   “Lord	   Goff’s	   Spycatcher	  
formulation	   referred	   simply	   to	   ‘confidential	   information’.	   In	   later	   cases,	   the	   courts	   grappled	  more	   closely	  
with	  what	  makes	   information	   ‘confidential’.	  A	   generally	   applicable	   standard	  was	   suggested	   in	  Campbell	   v	  
MGN	   Ltd.	   Lord	   Nicholls	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   action	   for	   breach	   of	   confidence	   had	   ‘firmly	   shaken	   off	   the	  
limiting	   constraint	  of	   the	  need	   for	   an	   initial	   confidential	   relationship’.	   English	   law	  would	  now	  protect	  not	  
only	   commercially	   confidential	   information,	   or	   information	   imparted	   ‘in	   confidence’	   but	   also	   information	  





agreement,	  but	  unwillingly	  or	  even	  without	  the	  claimant’s	  consent”.151	  Lord	  Goff	  
clarified	   that	   there	   are	   “two	   ways	   in	   which	   a	   defendant	   is	   held	   bound	   by	   an	  
obligation	  of	  confidence”:152	  
	  
• where	  he	  has	  agreed,	  or	  is	  held	  to	  have	  agreed,	  to	  be	  so	  bound;	  or	  
• where	   he	   has	   sufficient	   notice	   that	   the	   information	   in	   question	   is	  
confidential	  regardless	  of	  agreement.	  
	  
In	   fact,	   all	   information	   that	   is	   not	   generally	   known	   or,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   personal	  
information,	   everything	   that	   is	   not	   ‘notoriously’	   known,	   may	   be	   confidential	  
information. 153 	  Information	   which	   is	   ‘obvious’	   cannot	   be	   confidential. 154	  
According	   to	   Bently	   (who	   refers	   to	   the	   British-­‐derived	   legal	   systems	   based	   on	  
Common	   Law),	   the	   action	   for	   breach	   of	   confidence	   is	   “broad-­‐ranging	   and	   has	  
been	  used	  in	  relation	  to	  personal,	  commercial	  and	  technical	  information,	  as	  well	  
as	  trade	  secrets,	  know-­‐how,	  and	  information	  about	  government”.155	  Because	  the	  
action	   is	  broad-­‐ranging,	   it	   therefore	  “performs	  a	  number	  of	  different	   roles	  and	  
protects	   a	   variety	   of	   interests”. 156 	  In	   some	   circumstances	   confidentiality	  
encourages	  any	  secret	  information	  to	  be	  disclosed	  to	  a	  small	  circle	  of	  confidants.	  
Often,	   Bently	   explains,	   “the	   action	   operates	   to	   restrict	   disclosure	   in	   order	   to	  
protect	  individual	  autonomy,	  personality,	  and	  privacy”.157	  In	  order	  to	  qualify	  for	  a	  
claim	  for	  breach	  of	  confidence,	  the	  claimant	  must	  show	  that:	  
	  
• the	  information	  is	  capable	  of	  being	  protected;	  
• the	   defendant	   owes	   the	   claimant	   an	   obligation	   to	   keep	   the	   information	  
confidential;	  and	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151	  See	  Stanley	  at	  4.	  
152	  Stanley	  at	  20.	  
153	  “The	  range	  of	  information	  that	  can	  be	  protected	  is	  limited	  only	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  courts	  will	  not	  protect	  
trivial	   tittle	   tattle	  or	   ‘perfectly	  useless’	   information	   such	  as	   a	  dubious	   system	  of	  picking	  winners	   at	   horse	  
races;	  or	  information	  that	  is	  ‘pernicious	  nonsense’	  and	  ‘utterly	  absurd’.	  There	  must	  be	  sufficient	  gravity	  to	  
intervene”	  see	  Robert	  Dean	  The	  Law	  of	  Trade	  Secrets	  and	  Personal	  Secrets	  at	  para	  3.25.	  
154	  “Novelty	  will	  be	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  bestowing	  confidentiality	  where	  the	  information	  is	  a	  combination	  
of	  commonly	  known	  factors	  to	  which	  has	  been	  applied	  some	  ‘product	  of	  the	  human	  brain”	  (Linda	  Chih	  Ling	  
Koo	  v	  Lam	  Tai	  Hing	  [1992]	  23	  IPR	  607	  at	  627)	  see	  also	  Dean	  at	  para	  3.100.	  
155	  Lionel	  Bently	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law	  at	  1137.	  
156	  See	  Bently	  at	  1137.	  
157	  Lionel	  Bently	  citying	  E	  Hettinger	  “Justification	  for	  Intellectual	  Property”	  (1989)	  19	  Philos	  Public	  Aff	  31	  and	  
L	   Paine	   “Trade	   Secrets	   and	   the	   Justification	  of	   Intellectual	   Property:	  A	   Comment	  on	  Hettinger”	   (1991)	   20	  





• the	  defendant	  used	  the	  information	  in	  a	  way	  that	  breached	  that	  duty.158	  
	  
The	   circumstances	   in	   which	   a	   claimant	   has	   reasonable	   expectations	   of	  
confidentiality	  include:	  
	  
• any	   relationship	   between	   claimant	   and	   confidant	   within	   which	   the	  
information	  was	  acquired;	  
• how	   far	   access	   to	   the	   information	   was	   limited	   to	   a	   restricted	   group	   of	  
people;	  
• the	  nature	  of	  the	  information,	  and	  in	  particular	  its	  subject-­‐matter,	  form	  and	  
sensitivity	  for	  the	  claimant;	  and	  
• whether	  the	  information	  has	  been	  communicated	  for	  a	  specific	  purpose.159	  
	  
According	  to	  Bently,	  there	  are	  “no	  formal	  requirements	  relating	  to	  the	  manner	  in	  
which	   the	   information	   is	   expressed	   which	   must	   be	   satisfied	   before	   the	  
information	   can	  be	   said	   to	  be	   confidential”.160	  The	  main	   concern	  of	   the	  Courts	  
has	  been	  to	  protect	  “the	  substance	  behind	  the	  physical	  record	  of	  information	  –	  
the	  ideas	  or	  thoughts”	  and	  they	  have	  regarded	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  information	  
was	   translated	   as	   inconsequential.161	  The	   test	   to	   ascertain	   whether	   there	   is	   a	  
duty	  of	  confidence	  is	  to	  ask:	  “Would	  a	  reasonable	  recipient	  have	  realized	  that	  the	  
information	  was	  given	  to	  them	  in	  confidence?”162	  According	  to	  Gurry,	  within	  the	  
realm	  of	  confidential	  information,	  the	  term	  ‘disclosure’	  is	  used	  compendiously	  to	  
include	  all	  situations	  that	  may	  occur	  in	  which	  the	  confidant	  is	  given	  access	  to	  the	  
information	  with	   the	   knowledge	   or	   consent	   of	   the	   confider.163	  As	   seen	   above,	  
sometimes	   the	   confident	   then	   passes	   the	   information	   to	   third	   parties	   who	  
become	  then	  liable	  of	  the	  same	  tort	  of	  breach	  of	  confidence.	  Third	  party	  liability	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158	  Coco	  v	  Clark	  [1969]	  RPC	  41.	  
159	  Paul	  Stanley	  The	  Law	  of	  Confidentiality:	  A	  Restatement	  at	  7.	  
160	  See	  Gurry	  at	  para	  5.10.	  
161	  Supra.	  
162	  See	  Bently	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law	  at	  1161.	  
163	  “It	  could	   involve	  either	  some	  positive	  action,	  such	  as	  the	  direct	  communication	  of	   information,	  or	  tacit	  
consent	   to	   a	   situation	   which	   exposes	   another	   to	   confidential	   information	   …	   An	   obligation	   is	   imposed	  
because	   of	   notice	   of	   confidentiality	   of	   the	   information	   and	   this	   is	   to	   be	   judged	   objectively.	   The	   second	  
situation	  in	  which	  an	  obligation	  can	  arise	  is	  where	  confidential	  information	  is	  surreptitiously	  or	  accidentally	  
acquired.	  A	  third	  situation	  in	  which	  an	  obligation	  of	  confidence	  can	  arise	  is	  where	  a	  third	  party,	  who	  was	  not	  
privy	  to	  a	  disclosure	  by	  a	  confider,	  receives	  confidential	  information	  from	  a	  confidant	  who	  was	  …	  Finally,	  in	  
situations	  where	  a	   reasonable	  expectation	  of	  privacy	   is	   established,	   an	  obligation	  of	   confidence	  will	   arise	  





includes	   situations	   in	   which	   A	   passes	   information	   to	   B	   who,	   without	  
authorization	   from	   A	   passes	   it	   to	   C,	   the	   third	   party.	   In	   this	   case	   the	   courts’	  
intervention	  have	  mainly	  involved	  the	  reinforcement	  of	  the	  obligation	  between	  A	  
and	   B.	   Even	   when	   the	   confidence	   is	   exchanged	   in	   implied	   terms,	   such	   terms	  
restrain	   the	   confidant	   from	   sharing	   the	   information	   with	   a	   third	   party	   or	   the	  
general	   public.	   A	   third	   party’s	   breach	   of	   an	   equitable	   or	   contractual/implied-­‐
contractual	  obligation	  of	  confidence	  can	  happen	  in	  different	  ways:	  	  
	  
• where	  the	  third	  party	  receives	  the	  confidential	  information	  with	  knowledge	  
of	  the	  breach;	  or	  
• where	  the	  third	  party	  innocently	  receives	  the	  confidential	  information	  but	  is	  
later	  given	  notice	  of	  the	  breach	  of	  confidence	  through	  which	  he	  received	  the	  
information.164	  
	  
It	   is	   obvious	   that	   in	   the	   first	   case	   the	   third	   party	   has	   actual	   knowledge	   of	   the	  
breach	  at	  the	  time	  he	  receives	  the	  information	  and	  therefore	  he/she	  is	  liable	  for	  
the	   same	   breach.	   In	   this	   case,	   if	   the	   third	   party	   carries	   on	  making	   use	   of	   the	  
information,	   the	   action	   is	   aggravated	   by	   the	   presence	   of	   an	   element	   of	  
dishonesty	  that	  would,	  alone,	  be	  “a	  sufficient	  basis	  for	  his	  liability,	  irrespective	  of	  
the	   state	   of	   mind	   of	   the	   trustee	   who	   is	   in	   breach	   of	   trust”. 165 	  Although	  
dishonesty	   cannot	   be	   considered	   a	   prerequisite	   for	   establishing	   a	   third	   party	  
liability	   for	   breach	   of	   confidence,	   it	   helps	   establishing	   actual	   knowledge	   “as	  
illustrated	   in	   the	   case	   Prince	   Albert	   v	   Strange,	   where	   the	   claimant	   sought	   to	  
enjoin	   two	   third	   parties,	   Judge	   and	   Strange,	   from	   using	   confidential	  
information”.166	  In	  the	  case	  where	  the	  third	  party	  receives	  the	  information	  and	  is	  
totally	   unaware	   of	   the	   confidential	   status	   of	   the	   information	   received,	   he/she	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164	  “In	  the	  first	  situation,	  the	  assessment	  is	  directed	  to	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  third	  party	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  
receipt,	   and	   the	   knowledge	  may	   be	   actual,	   imputed,	   or	   constructive.	   In	   the	   second	   situation,	   the	   notice	  
serves	   to	   give	   to	   give	   the	   third	   party	   actual	   knowledge	   of	   past	   impropriety	   of	   which	   he	   was	   previously	  
unaware.	  It	  is	  to	  be	  differentiated	  from	  the	  existence	  of	  circumstances	  which	  at	  the	  time	  which	  at	  the	  time	  
the	  third	  party	  receives	  confidential	  information	  serve	  to	  give	  him	  constructive	  knowledge	  of	  an	  impropriety	  
in	  which	  he	  is	  participating”	  see	  Gurry	  para	  7.104	  at	  286.	  
165	  “What	  constitutes	  ‘dishonesty’	  for	  accessories	  to	  breach	  of	  trust	  has	  been	  controversial,	  but	  the	  position	  
is	  that	  it	  should	  be	  judged	  by	  the	  ‘ordinary	  standards	  of	  reasonable	  and	  honest	  people’	  and	  the	  third	  party	  
must	   have	   ‘himself	   realized	   that	   by	   those	   standards	   his	   conduct	   was	   dishonest’”	   see	   Twinsectra	   Ltd	   v	  
Yardley	   [2002]	  AC	  1664	   (HL),	   [27]	   (Lord	  Hutton	  delivering	  the	   leading	  speech	  of	   the	  majority;	  Lord	  Millett	  
dissenting)	  	  	  





will	  be	  nonetheless	   liable	   to	  be	   restrained	   from	  using	   confidential	   information.	  
Yet,	   as	   specified	   in	  Gurry,	   “the	   liability	  of	   such	  an	   ‘innocent’	   third	  party,	   arises	  
only	  from	  the	  date	  at	  which	  he	  is	  informed,	  or	  given	  notice,	  that	  the	  information	  
previously	   communicated	   to	   him	   was	   acquired	   as	   a	   result	   of	   a	   breach	   of	  
confidence”.167	  In	  other	  words,	   to	  protect	  breach	  of	   confidence,	   it	   is	   important	  
how	  the	  information	  is	  acquired	  and	  why,	  and	  what	  is	  done	  with	  the	  information	  
once	  there	  is	  valid	  knowledge	  that	  a	  breach	  of	  confidence	  occurred.	  
It	   is	   often	   argued	   that	   the	   disclosure	   of	   private,	   confidential	   information	   is	   of	  
importance	  for	  the	  public	  and	  therefore	  no	  restrictions	  should	  be	  put	  to	  prevent	  
the	  circulation	  of	  the	  information.	  As	  it	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  section	  10.8.2,	  the	  public	  
interest	  defence	  is	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  information	  is	  of	  importance	  to	  
the	  public.168	  English	  courts	  have,	  over	  the	  years,	  recognized	  the	  public	   interest	  
as	  a	  defence	  or	  as	  being	  part	  of	   the	   freedom	  of	  expression	  argument.	   In	  most	  
cases,	  the	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  information	  imparted	  contains	  elements	  that	  are	  
of	   ‘interest’	   to	   the	  wider	   community	   such	   as	   disclosing	  wrong	   deeds	  made	   by	  
public	   representatives,	   medical	   dangers	   to	   the	   public,	   disclosure	   of	   some	  
iniquity.	  These	  dangers	  to	  the	  public	  can	  be	  many	  and	  it	   is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  their	  
disclosure	   is	  of	  great	   importance.	   In	  Church	  of	  Scientology	  v	  Kaufman,169	  it	  was	  
held	   that	   the	  disclosure	  of	  unclear,	   spiritual	   and	  medical	  practices	   taking	  place	  
behind	  closed	  doors	  within	  the	  Church	  were	  considered	  dangerous	  for	  the	  public	  
and	  people	  should	  have	  known	  what	  was	  really	  happening	  inside	  the	  Church	  of	  
Scientology.	   Goff	   J	   favoured	   the	   publication	   of	   the	   book	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   the	  
defendant’s	   breakdown	  was	  obviously	  due	   to	  his	   involvement	  with	   the	  Church	  
and	   its	   practices.170	  However,	   it	   is	   not	   always	   easy	   to	   assess	   how	   tangible	   a	  
benefit	   or	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   public	  welfare	  must	   be	   in	   order	   to	   claim	   the	   public	  
interest	  defence.	  As	  it	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  course	  of	  this	  chapter,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  
secret	   information	   of	   indigenous	   peoples,	   the	   disclosure	   of	   such	   knowledge	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167	  Gurry	  para	  7.119	  at	  292;	  see	  also	  Malone	  v	  Metropolitan	  Police	  Commissioner	  [1979]	  Ch	  344,	  634;	  Fraser	  
v	  Evans	  [1969]	  1	  QB	  349,	  361	  (Lord	  Denning	  MR)	  and	  Johns	  v	  Australian	  Securities	  Commission	  [1993]	  178	  
CLR	  408,	  459-­‐460	  (Gaudron	  J).	  
168	  “The	   existence	   of	   the	   defence	   of	   just	   cause	   or	   excuse	   has	   been	   recognized	   by	   the	   courts	   in	   a	   large	  
number	   of	   cases.	   In	   certain	   situations,	   the	   defence	   operated	   to	   destroy	   any	   obligations	   of	   confidence	  
related	   to	   the	   commission	   of	   a	   crime	   or	   civil	   wrong,	   since,	   in	   these	   cases,	   it	   was	   said	   that	   ‘there	   is	   no	  
confidence	  as	  to	  the	  disclosure	  of	  iniquity’”	  for	  more	  details	  see	  Gurry	  para	  16.05,	  16.06	  at	  684-­‐685.	  
169	  Church	  of	  Scientology	  v	  Kaufman	  [1973]	  RPC	  635.	  





might	   have	   anthropological,	   commercial	   or	   cultural	   value,	   but	   it	   can	   hardly	   be	  
considered	   valuable	   to	   prevent	   any	   threat	   to	   the	   public	   welfare.	   Indigenous	  
confidential	  information	  has	  spiritual	  value	  for	  the	  community	  and	  the	  guardians	  
who	  hold	   it,	  and	  its	  protection	  has	  vital	   importance	  for	  the	  community	  and	  the	  
integrity	  of	   its	   traditions.	  Hardly	  any	   claim	  of	  public	   interest	   can	  be,	   therefore,	  
applied	  to	  indigenous	  secret	  knowledge.	  	  
	  
Having	  said	  this,	  in	  general,	  what	  kind	  of	  information	  can	  be	  then	  safeguarded	  by	  
confidentiality	  law?	  	  
Over	   the	   years,	   confidentiality	   has	   been	   established	   in	   information	   which	   “is	  
verbal,	   such	   as	   a	   list	   of	   agents	   used	   in	   business;	   diagrammatic,	   such	   as	  
production	   of	   drawings	   for	   a	  machine;	   or	   other	   equipment,	   or	   tools;	   pictorial,	  
such	  as	  photographs	  or	  etchings;	  aural	  in	  form	  of	  a	  sound	  recording;	  or	  which	  is	  
composed	  simply	  of	  figures	  …”	  and	  so	  forth.171	  In	  Argyll	  v	  Argyll	  it	  was	  stated	  that	  
“it	   is	   sufficient	   that	   the	   court	   recognises	   that	   the	   communications	   are	  
confidential,	  and	  their	  publication	  within	  the	  mischief	  which	  the	  law	  as	  its	  policy	  
seeks	  to	  avoid,	  without	  further	  defining	  the	  scope	  and	  limits	  of	  the	  jurisdiction”.	  
172	  So,	  the	  concern	  of	  the	  law	  on	  confidentiality	  focuses	  on	  the	  attributes	  of	  the	  
information,	   the	   most	   relevant	   of	   which	   remains	   its	   inaccessibility.	   In	   other	  
words,	   the	   information	   must	   not	   be	   ‘common	   knowledge’	   or	   in	   the	   public	  
domain.173	  The	   test	   for	   its	   inaccessibility	   most	   often	   involves	   any	   attempt	   to	  
reproduce	   the	   information	   itself,	   or	   whether	   any	   special	   skills	   or	   previous	  
knowledge	  are	  required	  to	  come	  up	  with	  the	  information.	  Yet,	  the	  law	  does	  not	  
require	  the	  information	  to	  be	  ‘absolutely	  inaccessible’	  to	  qualify	  as	  confidential.	  
Similarly,	   the	   information	  does	   not	   need	   to	   have	   a	   specific	   economic	   or	  moral	  
value.	  It	  can	  qualify	  as	  confidential	  even	  when	  the	  value	  and	  importance	  of	  the	  
information	   are	   understood	   only	   by	   the	   claimant.	   While	   “objective	   value	   (or	  
commercial	   attractiveness)	   should	   not	   be	   considered	   a	   precondition	   of	  
confidentiality,	   it	  may	  assist	   in	  determining	   that	   information	   is	   confidential”.174	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  For	  more	  detail	  on	  the	  cases	  see	  Gurry	  at	  para	  5.10.	  
172	  Argyll	  v	  Argyll	  [1967]	  1	  Ch	  302,	  330	  (Ungoed-­‐Thomas).	  
173	  See	  Gurry	  at	  para	  5.14.	  






By	  the	  same	  token,	  the	  simplicity	  of	  an	  idea	  is	  not	  prejudicial	  to	  considering	  it	  as	  
confidential.	  In	  Coco	  v	  AN	  Clark	  (Engineers)	  Ltd,	  Megarry	  J	  held	  that	  “the	  simplest	  
the	   idea,	   the	   more	   likely	   it	   is	   to	   need	   protection”.175	  In	   addition	   to	   that,	   the	  
information	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  necessarily	  ‘new’176	  but	  it	  cannot	  be	  ‘obvious’.	  	  
Among	  the	  categories	  that	  fit	  within	  the	  conundrum	  of	  confidentiality	  there	  are	  
artistic	   and	   literary	   information	   and	  personal	   information	   along	  with	   the	  more	  
economically	  valuable	  trade	  and	  commercial	  secrets.177	  And	  yet,	  the	  boundaries	  
between	  the	  categories	  are	  not	  necessarily	  defined	  and	  rigid.	  There	  might	  be	  an	  
overlapping	  especially	  in	  the	  information	  that	  might	  not	  have	  economic	  value	  for	  
the	   confider,178	  but	  becomes	  economically	   valuable	  once	  brought	   to	   the	  public	  
domain	  (eg	  publications,	  photographs,	  documentaries	  and	  so	  forth).179	  
In	  Foster	  v	  Mountford	  the	  information	  that	  was	  held	  to	  be	  confidential	  did	  not	  fit	  
into	  any	  of	  the	  above	  categories.	  The	  case,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  
later	   on	   in	   this	   chapter,	   opened	   the	   space	   for	   a	   new	   category	   of	  
secret/confidential	   information:	   cultural	   secrets.	   About	   the	   case,	   Gurry	   states	  
that	  “although	  the	  secrets	  were	  incorporated	  into	  a	  literary	  work,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  
categorize	   them	   as	   literary	   or	   artistic	   confidences	   because	   they	   related	   so	  
directly	   to	   aspects	   of	   the	   indigenous	   culture	   of	   the	   Pitjantjara	   people	   in	  
Australia”. 180 	  Excluded	   from	   any	   claim	   of	   confidentiality	   remain	   trivial	  
information,	   immoral	   information	   and	   all	   those	   forms	   that	   are	   too	   vague	   or	  
general	  to	  qualify,	  and	  all	  the	  information	  that	  is	  already	  in	  the	  public	  domain.181	  
The	   requirements	   for	   confidentiality	   are	   quite	   broad,	   and	   yet,	   the	   uncertain	  
tradition	   of	   breach	   of	   confidence	   can	   play	   in	   favour	   of	   indigenous	   peoples’	  
knowledge.	   Indigenous	   secret	   information	   is	   often	   of	   a	   spiritual	   and	   cultural	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175	  Coco	  v	  AN	  Clark	  [1969]	  RPC	  at	  47	  (opinion	  of	  Megarry	  J).	  
176	  “Novelty	  will	  be	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  bestowing	  confidentiality	  where	  the	  information	  is	  a	  combination	  
of	  commonly	  known	  factors	  to	  which	  has	  been	  applied	  some	  ‘product	  of	  the	  human	  brain’”	  see	  Robert	  Dean	  
The	  Law	  of	  Trade	  Secrets	  and	  Personal	  Secrets	  at	  para	  3.100.	  
177	  The	  thesis	  will	  not	  address	  neither	  the	  former	  nor	  governmental	  secrets	  because	  not	  directly	  relevant	  to	  
any	  discourse	  on	  indigenous	  confidential	  information.	  	  
178	  In	  Duchess	  of	  Argyll	  v	  Duke	  of	  Argyll	  the	  Court	  laid	  down	  a	  principle	  that	  “secret	  information	  provided	  in	  
confidence	   in	  non-­‐commercial	  relations,	  about	  non-­‐commercial	   issues,	  can	  equally	  be	  protected	  by	  equity	  
as	  commercial	   secrets”	  see	  Duchess	  of	  Argyll	  v	  Duke	  of	  Argyll	   [1967]	  Ch	  302;	   in	  Silvercrest	  Sales	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  
Gainsborough	  Printing	  Co	  Ltd	  it	  was	  accepted	  that	  “information	  which	  is	  secret	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  of	  high	  
commercial	  value	  to	  be	  protected”	  see	  Silvercrest	  Sales	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  Gainsborough	  Printing	  Co	  Ltd	  [1985]	  5	  IPR	  
123.	  
179	  See	  Gurry	  at	  para	  6.02.	  
180	  See	  Gurry	  at	  para	  6.03.	  





nature	   and	   the	   reason	   why	   it	   cannot	   be	   shared	   with	   everyone	   is	   strictly	  
dependent	  on	  traditions	  and	  customs.	  Part	  of	  indigenous	  secret	  information	  is	  of	  
an	   intangible	   nature	   (rituals,	   stories,	   songs,	   practices	   and	   so	   forth)	   and	   part	   is	  
tangible	   (eg	   special	   objects	   imbued	   with	   spiritual	   significance	   that	   are	   used	  
during	  the	  performance	  of	  specific	  rituals).	  Such	  information	  is	  not	  private	  in	  the	  
strict	   sense	   of	   the	  word,	   but	   it	  might	   be	   part	   of	   the	   personal	   heritage	   of	   one	  
person,	  and	  therefore	  regarded	  as	  private	  and	  highly	  sensitive.	  A	  guardian	  holds	  
the	  knowledge	  that	  is	  transmitted	  to	  him	  and,	  following	  the	  reasoning	  of	  privacy	  
law,	  has	  the	  right	  to	  be	  left	  alone.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  guardians	  normally	  receive	  
the	  information	  from	  third	  parties	  who	  select	  them	  as	  the	  right	  descendants	  and	  
keepers	   of	   the	   knowledge. 182 	  As	   such,	   the	   information	   is	   shared	   in	   total	  
confidence	  and	  generally	   the	  confidence	  remains	  between	  the	  parties	  until	   the	  
guardian	   decides	   to	   pass	   it	   to	   a	   chosen	   person	  who	  will	   take	   his	   place	   in	   due	  
time.	  Depending	  on	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   information	  and	   the	  duty	  attached	   to	   it,	  
the	  custodian	  can	  either	  keep	  the	  information	  for	  himself	  or	  share	  it	  with	  other	  
members	   of	   the	   community.	   Commonly,	   the	   sharing	   of	   such	   information	  
happens	  within	  a	  context	  of	  known	  and	  accepted	  confidentiality	  supported	  and	  
controlled	  by	  the	  laws	  and	  customs	  of	  the	  community.	  Generally,	  no	  one	  within	  
indigenous	   communities	   invades	   the	  privacy	  of	   the	   elders	   and	   custodians.	  And	  
yet,	   having	   said	   this,	  what	   happens	  when	   a	  whole	   group	   of	   people	   knows	   the	  
same	  information	  which	  is	  restricted	  from	  outsiders?	  What	  obligations	  does	  each	  
have	   against	   the	   other?	   In	   this	   case	   there	   is	   a	   relationship	   among	   the	   ‘co-­‐
owners’.183	  This	  joint	  secrecy	  exists	  as	  trust	  as	  long	  as	  the	  relationship	  exists	  and	  
binds	  the	  members	  even	  when	  the	  relationship	  is	  over.	  The	  same	  happens	  within	  
indigenous	  communities.	  The	  secrecy	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  held	  indefinitely	  and	  the	  
customary	   laws	   of	   the	   community	   exist	   to	   make	   sure	   that	   secret	   knowledge	  
remains	  secret.	  It	  is	  also	  true,	  however,	  that	  any	  member	  of	  the	  community	  who	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182	  According	  to	  Long:	  “In	  many	  instances,	  information	  that	  relates	  to	  generational	  innovation	  is	  kept	  secret	  
for	  a	  completely	  different	  reason.	   It	   is	  not	  the	  commercial	  value	  of	  the	   information	  which	  necessitates	   its	  
controlled	  dissemination	  and	  use.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  its	  sacred	  or	  culturally	  sensitive	  nature.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  the	  
traditional	  healer	  in	  Tumkur	  was	  careful	  to	  limit	  access	  to	  his	  methodology	  to	  family	  members.	  The	  purpose	  
for	  such	  limited	  access	  was	  not	  to	  maintain	  the	  commercial	  value	  of	  the	  knowledge,	  but	  to	  honor	  and	  hold	  
sacred	   the	   teachings	  of	   the	   goddess	  whose	   rituals	   he	   incorporated	   into	  his	   cures,	   and	  whose	   support	   he	  
invoked”	   see	   Doris	   Estelle	   Long	   “Trade	   Secrets	   and	   Traditional	   Knowledge:	   Strengthening	   International	  
Protection	  of	  Indigenous	  Innovations”	  in	  Rochelle	  Cooper	  Dreyfuss	  and	  Katherine	  Strandberg	  (eds)	  The	  Law	  
and	  Theory	  of	  Trade	  Secrecy	  (Edward	  Elgar	  Publishing,	  2011)	  at	  Ch	  9.	  





receives	   the	   confidential	   information	   can	   breach	   such	   trust;	   and	  many	   are	   the	  
cases	  in	  which	  this	  happens	  today.184	  Martin	  and	  Jeffery185	  recognise	  that	  “secret	  
knowledge	  carries	  symbolic	  value	  as	  a	  key	  to	  membership	  of	  a	  privileged	  group,	  
with	   prestige	   and	   responsibility.	   Knowledge	   has	   value	   as	   a	   currency,	   and	   as	   a	  
source	   of	   status”.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   law	   regarding	   breach	   of	  
confidence	   can	   work	   to	   protect	   information	   that	   is	   exploited	   either	   from	   the	  
inside	   as	   well	   as	   the	   outside.	   Having	   specified	   this,	   it	   is	   fair	   to	   point	   out	   that	  
today	  the	  biggest	  threat	  for	  indigenous	  keepers	  of	  secret	  information	  still	  comes	  
from	  outside	  their	  traditional	  milieu,	  and	  usually	  for	  economic	  profit.	  While	  the	  
law	   normally	   investigates	   into	   the	   motives	   why	   information	   should	   be	   kept	  
secret	   (eg	  commercial	  value	  of	   the	   information),	  confidentiality	  does	  not	   try	   to	  
control	   the	   dissemination	   of	   information	   because	   of	   its	   economic	   value.	   It	  
protects	   the	   information	   regardless,	   as	   long	   as	   the	   information	   is	   not	   trivial,	  
offensive	  and	  not	  in	  the	  public	  domain.186	  	  
In	   her	   book,	   Lai	   argues	   that	   indigenous	   knowledge	   might	   not	   possess	   the	  
“necessary	   quality	   of	   confidence”.187	  She	   explains	   that	   courts	  might	   not	   regard	  
rock	   art,	   medicines	   and	   practices	   passed	   down	   for	   generations	   as	   having	   the	  
quality	   of	   confidence	   but	   instead	   being	   regarded	   as	   information	   in	   the	   public	  
domain.188	  As	   it	   will	   be	   discussed,	   the	   context	   and	   the	   relationship	   between	  
confider	   and	   confidant	   determines	   whether	   a	   relationship	   of	   confidence	   is	   in	  
place.	   It	   does	   not	  matter	  whether	   the	   information	   has	   been	   transmitted	   from	  
one	   generation	   to	   another	   in	   a	   rock	   carving	   or	   a	   remedy;	   what	   counts	   is	   the	  
modality	   in	   which	   it	   is	   shared,	   and	   whether	   it	   possesses	   a	   quality	   of	  
inaccessibility,	   secrecy	   or	   relative	   secrecy.	   The	   law	  of	   confidentiality	   is,	   in	   fact,	  
built	  around	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘relative	  secrecy’.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  ‘secret’	  can	  be	  
known	  by	  a	  number	  of	  people	  without	  making	   it	  de	   facto	  public	  as	   long	  as	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184	  According	  to	  Martin	  and	  Jeffery	  “…	  any	  person	  in	  a	  tribal	  group	  can	  access	  common	  pool	  knowledge.	  The	  
situation	   can	   arise	   where	   one	   tribal	   member	   holds	   information	   as	   secret,	   and	   another	   is	   prepared	   to	  
disseminate	  it	  freely”	  see	  Paul	  Martin	  and	  Michael	  Jeffery	  “Using	  a	  Legally	  Enforceable	  Knowledge	  Trust	  to	  
Fulfil	  the	  Moral	  Obligation	  to	  Protect	  Indigenous	  Secrets”	  (2007)	  11	  1	  NZ	  J	  Envtl	  L	  at	  25.	  
185	  Supra	  at	  24.	  
186	  See	  Lionel	  Bently	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law	  at	  1137.	  
187	  Jessica	  Christine	  Lai	  Indigenous	  Cultural	  Heritage	  and	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights:	  Learning	  from	  the	  New	  
Zealand	  Experience?	  (Springer,	  Switzerland,	  2014)	  at	  171.	  





group	  maintains	   the	   confidentiality.	   In	  Prince	   Albert	   v	   Strange,189	  although	   the	  
‘secret’	  was	  known	  by	  relatives	  and	  friends,	  the	  confidentiality	  over	  it	  persisted.	  
In	   this	   case,	   the	   Chancellor	   concluded	   that	   Prince	   Albert	   had	   “a	   common	   law	  
literary	  property	  right	  in	  unpublished	  work	  –	  essentially,	  a	  common	  law	  copyright	  
in	   unpublished	  works.	   The	   author	   had	   the	   right	   to	   keep	   his	  works	   from	   being	  
published	   to	   protect	   his	   ‘private	   use	   and	   pleasure’”.190	  This	   means	   that	   the	  
common	   indigenous	   tradition	   to	   share	   the	   secret	   knowledge	   among	   very	   few	  
people	   will	   not	   impede	   confidentiality	   to	   be	   applied	   to	   the	   information	  
circulating	  among	  that	  selected	  group	  of	  people.	  Bently	  explains	  that	  the	  crucial	  
question	  to	  be	  asked	  is:	  how	  widespread	  must	  the	  information	  be	  for	  it	  to	  lose	  its	  
status	  as	  a	  secret	  and	  for	  it	  to	  fall	  into	  the	  public	  domain?191	  Bently	  answers	  the	  
question	  by	  specifying	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  publication	  required	  before	  secrecy	  is	  
lost	  depends	  on	  several	  factors	  that	  he	  restricts	  to:192	  
	  
• the	  type	  of	  information;	  	  
• the	   section	   of	   the	   public	   that	   has	   an	   interest	   in	   knowing	   about	   the	  
information;	  	  
• the	  domain	  in	  which	  the	  information	  was	  published;	  the	  location	  and	  extent	  
of	  publication	  within	  the	  domain;	  	  
• the	  form	  in	  which	  the	  information	  is	  published;	  	  
• the	  length	  of	  time	  for	  which	  the	  publication	  is	  accessible;	  and	  	  
• the	   vigour	   with	   which	   the	   information	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   pursued	   within	   that	  
domain.	  	  
	  
It	   also	   depends	   on	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   the	   information	   was	   acquired.	  What	  
happens	   when	   the	   information	   is	   acquired	   in	   a	   surreptitious	   way	   without	   the	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189	  Prince	  Albert	  v	  Strange	  [1849].	  	  
190	  Neil	  M	  Richards	  and	  Daniel	  J	  Solove	  “Privacy’s	  Other	  Path:	  Recovering	  the	  Law	  of	  Confidentiality”	  (2007)	  
96	  Georgetown	  Law	  Review	  123	  at	  130	  citing	  Prince	  Albert	  v	  Strange	  [1849]	  64	  Eng	  Rep	  293,	  295	  (Ch).	  
191	  Lionel	  Bently	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law	  Part	  V	  on	  Confidential	  Information.	  





10.6.1	  –	  Surreptitious	  Acquisition	  
	  
In	  1984,	  Michael	  Heller,	  a	  photographer	  working	  for	  the	  Santa	  Fe	  New	  Mexican,	  
flew	  at	  low	  altitude	  over	  a	  sacred	  ceremonial	  dance	  held	  by	  the	  Pueblo	  of	  Santo	  
Domingo.	  The	  photographs	  were	  published	  by	  the	  New	  Mexican	  on	  two	  different	  
occasions	  where,	  in	  the	  second	  occasion,	  the	  ceremony	  was	  described	  as	  a	  “pow-­‐
wow”. 193 	  Obviously,	   secret	   information	   stolen	   or	   exploited	   from	   indigenous	  
peoples	  might	  be	  of	  great	   interest	   for	   researchers	  and	  anthropologists.	  No	  one	  
discusses	   that.	   It	   is	   also	   true	   that	   parts	   or	  wholes	   of	   indigenous	   traditions	   are	  
already	   in	  the	  public	  domain.	  However,	   following	  the	   logic	  of	   ‘relative	  secrecy’,	  
much	  of	  the	  knowledge	  partially	  circulating	  could	  still	  be	  protected	  under	  the	  law	  
of	   confidence.	   In	   that	   occasion,	   the	   Pueblo	   filed	   suit	   in	   federal	   District	   Court	  
alleging	  trespass,	  violation	  of	  the	  Pueblo’s	  ban	  on	  photography,	  and	  invasion	  of	  
privacy.194	  Unfortunately,	  the	  suit	  was	  dismissed	  one	  year	  later	  without	  effective	  
relief	  granted	  because	  no	  trespass	  had	  happened	  and	  therefore	  no	  violation	  of	  
the	   Pueblo’s	   rights.	   The	   EI	   duPont	   de	   Nemours	   v	   Christopher195	  case	   presents	  
striking	  similarities	  with	  the	  one	  filed	  by	  the	  Pueblo	  people	  (apart	  from	  the	  highly	  
spiritual	   content	   of	   the	   photos	   taken)	   where	   photographs	   of	   an	   unfinished	  
facility	   (showing	  the	  plaintiff’s	  secret	  production	  of	  methanol)	  were	  taken	  from	  
the	   air.	   In	   that	   occasion,	   the	   Court	   ruled	   that	   aerial	   photography	   “constituted	  
‘improper	  means’	  of	  discovery	  of	  trade	  secrets	  under	  the	  Restatement	  of	  Torts,	  
as	  added	  by	  state	  law”.196	  Both	  cases	  are	  based	  on	  very	  similar	  instances:	  in	  both	  
cases	   the	   images	  were	   obtained	   surreptitiously197	  (in	   other	  words	   by	   improper	  
means).	   Normally,	   surreptitious	   acquisition	   of	   confidential	   information	   may	  
encompass	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  activities	  such	  as	  stealing	  a	  confidential	  product	  or	  
document;	  secretly	  photographing,	  filming,	  or	  otherwise	  recording	  the	  activities	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193	  Complaint	  for	  Damages	  and	  for	  Injunctive	  Relief	  at	  4,	  Pueblo	  of	  Santo	  Domingo	  (No	  CIV	  84-­‐0192-­‐C)	  at	  7-­‐8.	  
194	  “The	  Pueblo’s	  attorney,	  Scott	  Borg,	  added	  that	  the	  tribal	  officials	  believed	  that	  such	  interference	  ‘tends	  
to	  negate	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  dances’,	  which	  are	  intended	  to	  affect	  not	  only	  the	  tribe,	  but	  everyone.	  At	  
least	   five	   local	   religious	   leaders	   offered	   support,	   expressing	   disapproval	   of	   the	   disruption	   of	   a	   spiritual	  
accusation.	   …	   While	   the	   Pueblo’s	   legal	   counsel	   skilfully	   presented	   the	   available	   arguments,	   current	   law	  
remains	  a	  rather	  blunt	  instrument	  with	  which	  to	  protect	  a	  ceremonial	  dance”	  see	  Susan	  Scafidi	  “Intellectual	  
Property	  and	  Cultural	  Products”	  (2001)	  81	  BU	  L	  Rev	  793	  at	  829-­‐830.	  
195	  E	  I	  duPont	  de	  Nemours	  v	  Christopher	  431	  F2d	  1012	  (5th	  Cir.	  1970)	  400	  US	  1024	  (1971).	  
196	  At	  1017	  (basing	  decision	  on	  Restatement	  (First)	  of	  Torts	  (1939)	  at	  757).	  
197	  In	  Hunt	  v	  A	   [2007]	  NZCA	  332	  [77]	  surreptitious	  acquisition	  is	  considered:	  “where	  A	  obtains	  confidential	  





of	   a	   person	   or	   business;	   hacking	   into	   an	   encrypted	   computer	   to	   access	  
documents	  or	  email	   correspondence;	   tapping	  a	   telephone;	  or	   intercepting	  mail	  
in	   the	   post.198 	  Such	   activities	   can	   happen	   in	   private,	   public,	   commercial	   or	  
governmental	   contexts.	   Modern	   technology	   has	   brought	   the	   surreptitious	  
acquisition	  of	  secret	  information	  to	  a	  new	  level	  in	  efficiency	  and	  speed.	  Much	  of	  
indigenous	  secret	   information	   is	  received	  not	  only	   in	  contexts	  of	  confidentiality	  
(internal	   within	   the	   community	   and	   external	   with	   researchers	   and	  
anthropologists),	   but	   is	   then	   fixed	   on	   permanent	   records:	   often	   without	   the	  
knowledge	  or	  authorization	  of	  the	  confider.	  The	  surreptitiousness	  resides	  in	  the	  
intent	  with	  which	  a	  researcher	  or	  an	  anthropologist	  approaches	  the	  guardian	  or	  
guardians	  of	  knowledge.	  The	  trust	  established	  and	  the	  confidence	  shared	  is	  often	  
based	  on	  a	  different	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  information	  will	  be	  used	  later.	  
While	  surreptitious	  acquisition	  of	  private,	  personal	  information	  involves	  physical	  
interference	  with	  another’s	  property	  or	  person,	  the	  tort	  of	  trespass	  in	  someone	  
else’s	  property	  or	   the	   conversion	  of	   the	   information	   surreptitiously	   acquired	   is	  
recognised	  with	  difficulty	  because	  often	  the	  trespass	  is	  accepted	  and	  welcomed	  
by	   the	   guardian	   and	   the	   information	   is	   willingly	   shared	   in	   a	   mutual	  
understanding	  that	  secrecy	  and	  confidence	  are	  contextually	  in	  existence	  and,	  as	  
such,	   should	   persist	   afterwards.	   In	   1981	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   Law	   Commission	  
concluded	  in	  its	  Report	  that:199	  	  
	  
…	  under	  the	  present	  law	  it	  is	  very	  doubtful	  to	  what	  extent,	  if	  at	  all,	   information	  
becomes	   impressed	   with	   an	   obligation	   of	   confidence	   by	   reason	   solely	   of	   the	  
reprehensible	  means	   by	  which	   it	   has	   been	   acquired,	   and	   irrespective	   of	   some	  
special	   relationship	  between	   the	  person	  alleged	   to	  owe	   the	  obligation	  and	   the	  
person	  to	  whom	  it	  is	  alleged	  to	  be	  owed.	  	  
	  
According	   to	   Gurry,	   breach	   of	   confidence	   is	   broad	   enough	   to	   include	   the	  
confidential	  nature	  of	   the	   information	  acquired	  and	   the	  modality	  with	  which	   it	  
has	   been	   acquired.	   Indeed,	   the	   basis	   for	   the	   intervention	   of	   the	   courts	   is	   the	  
“knowledge	   of	   the	   acquirer	   that	   the	   information	   is	   confidential,	   and	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198	  See	  Gurry	  at	  para	  7.53.	  





reprehensible	  or	  surreptitious	  means	  used	  to	  obtain	   information	  evidences	  this	  
knowledge”.200	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  circumstances,	  the	  behaviour	  and	  the	  intent	  
of	   the	   confidant	   demonstrate	   if	   there	   is	   a	   case	   of	   surreptitious	   acquisition	   of	  
confidential	   information.	  This	  argumentation	   is	   important	  because,	  as	   it	  will	  be	  
seen	   in	   the	   next	   sections	   of	   this	   chapter,	  most	   of	   the	   confidential	   information	  
obtained	  from	  indigenous	  guardians	  and	  holders	  is	  often	  acquired	  in	  ways	  that,	  
while	   not	   always	   strictly	   surreptitious	   per	   se,	   entail	   a	   strong	   component	   of	  
asymmetry	   in	   the	   understanding	   and	   valuing	   of	   the	   confidential	   relationship	  
established	  and	  the	  future	  usage	  of	  the	  information	  acquired.	  Such	  asymmetry	  is	  
often	   based	   on	   ignorance,	   inexperience	   and	   trust;	   and	   while	   it	   damages	  
indigenous	   guardians,	   it	   works	   at	   the	   advantage	   of	   any	   confidant	   who,	   at	   the	  
time	   of	   the	   confidence	   or	   lately,	   knows	   exactly	   how	   to	   convert	   and	   use	   the	  
information	  in	  the	  public	  domain.	  	  
	  
It	   is	   true	   that	   over	   the	   centuries	   indigenous	   knowledge	   has	   had	   a	   diversified	  
destiny.	   It	   is	  also	   true	   that	   it	   is	   today	   impossible	   to	   follow	  the	  destiny	  of	  every	  
piece	   of	   knowledge	   and	   reconstruct	   when,	   how	   and	   in	   which	   way	   it	   was	  
surreptitiously	  stolen	  or	  became	  public.	  In	  the	  same	  token,	  not	  much	  in	  terms	  of	  
legal	   remedies	   can	   be	   provided	   for	   those	   aspects	   of	   indigenous	   cultures	   that	  
have	  entered	  the	  public	  domain	  surreptitiously	  or	  not.	  However,	  something	  can	  
still	   be	   done	   for	   all	   the	   information	   that	   is	   still	   protected	   by	   indigenous	  
custodians.	   As	   it	   will	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   next	   section,	   in	   the	   cultural	   context	   of	  
indigenous	  communities	  it	  becomes	  of	  great	  importance	  how	  the	  information	  is	  
kept	   secret	  and	  why,	  and	  also	  why	  confidants	   resort	   to	   surreptitious	  means	   to	  
acquire	   secret	   information.	   It	   is	   also	   important	   to	   understand	  why	   indigenous	  
people	   prefer	   to	   keep	   ‘secret’	   knowledge	   that	   might	   have	   great	   intrinsic	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





10.7	  –	  Breach	  of	  Confidence	  and	  Trade	  Secrets	  Law	  
	  
Indigenous	   traditional	   knowledge,	   secret	   or	   not,	   can	  have	   enormous	   economic	  
value	   once	   commodified.201	  As	   we	   have	   seen	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   trade	  
secrets	  laws	  restrict	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  sensitive	  information	  (subjective	  to	  every	  
community	   and	   guardian	   who	   holds	   it)	   by	   valuing	   its	   objective	   economic	  
counterpart	  (the	  economic	  value	  that	  the	  knowledge	  will	  have	  once	  entered	  the	  
public	   domain).	   Trade	   secrets	   law,	   like	   patent	   and	   copyright	   laws,	   protects	  
intangible,	  informational	  goods.	  However,	  the	  knowledge	  that	  is	  protected	  needs	  
to	  be	  of	  economic	  value.	  Confidential	   information	  and	  undisclosed	   information	  
are	   covered	   by	   two	   international	   agreements:	   TRIPS	   -­‐	   Art	   39202	  -­‐	   and	   Paris	  
Convention	   -­‐	   Art	   10bis. 203 	  In	   general,	   trade	   secrets	   law	   protects	   certain	  
confidential	   information	   that	   companies	   attempt	   to	   keep	   secret.	   This	   includes	  
‘technical’	  information	  such	  as	  mechanical	  processes	  and	  chemical	  formulae,	  and	  
business-­‐related	   information	   like	   customer	   lists,	   marketing	   plans,	   pricing	   data	  
and	  so	  forth.	  Virtually	  any	  useful	  information	  can	  be	  a	  trade	  secret,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  
information	   is	   relatively	   secret,	   economically	   valuable,	   and	   subjected	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201	  “Many	   indigenous	   and	   local	   communities	   object	   to	   the	   way	   their	   communally	   developed	   agricultural	  
strains,	  folklore,	  and	  traditional	  medicines—their	  ‘traditional	  knowledge’—serve	  as	  free	  building	  blocks	  for	  
the	  patents	  and	  copyrights	  of	  outsiders,	  often	  without	  any	  recognition,	  compensation,	  or	  control	  over	  the	  
way	  this	  information	  is	  used.	  Traditional	  knowledge	  provides	  certain	  multibillion	  dollar	  industries,	  including	  
pharmaceuticals,	   cosmetics,	   and	   agriculture,	   with	   useful	   leads	   for	   product	   discovery	   and	   development.	  
Intellectual	  property	  law	  readily	  recognizes	  these	  industries'	  ‘innovations’.	  But	  it	  often	  turns	  a	  blind	  eye	  to	  
the	  incremental	  and	  seemingly	  unscientific	  contributions	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  holders,	  who	  are	  some	  of	  
the	   world's	   poorest	   people”	   see	   Deepa	   Varadarajan	   “A	   Trade	   Secret	   Approach	   to	   Protecting	   Traditional	  
Knowledge”	   (2011)	   36	   The	   Yale	   Journal	   of	   International	   Law	   371	   at	   372	   electronic	   document	  
<www.yjil.org/docs/pub/36-­‐2-­‐varadarajan-­‐trade-­‐secret-­‐approach-­‐to-­‐protecting-­‐traditional	  
knowledge_update.pdf>	  last	  visited	  on	  27/12/2015.	  
202	  Article	   39.2	   of	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement	   reads:	   “Natural	   and	   legal	   persons	   shall	   have	   the	   possibility	   of	  
preventing	  information	  lawfully	  within	  their	  control	  from	  being	  disclosed	  to,	  acquired	  by,	  or	  used	  by	  others	  
without	   their	   consent	   in	   a	  manner	   contrary	   to	   honest	   commercial	   practices	  so	   long	   as	   such	   information:	  
(a)	  is	   secret	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   is	   not,	   as	   a	   body	   or	   in	   the	   precise	   configuration	   and	   assembly	   of	   its	  
components,	  generally	  known	  among	  or	  readily	  accessible	  to	  persons	  within	  the	  circles	  that	  normally	  deal	  
with	   the	   kind	  of	   information	   in	  question;	  	  (b)	  has	   commercial	   value	  because	   it	   is	   secret;	   and	  	  (c)	  has	  been	  
subject	  to	  reasonable	  steps	  under	  the	  circumstances,	  by	  the	  person	  lawfully	  in	  control	  of	  the	  information,	  to	  
keep	  it	  secret”.	  
203	  Article	   10bis	   of	   the	   Paris	   Convention	   reads:	   “(1)	   The	   countries	   of	   the	   Union	   are	   bound	   to	   assure	   to	  
nationals	   of	   such	   countries	   effective	   protection	   against	   unfair	   competition.	   (2)	   Any	   act	   of	   competition	  
contrary	  to	  honest	  practices	  in	  industrial	  or	  commercial	  matters	  constitutes	  an	  act	  of	  unfair	  competition.	  (3)	  
The	   following	   in	   particular	   shall	   be	   prohibited:	   (i)	   all	   acts	   of	   such	   a	   nature	   as	   to	   create	   confusion	   by	   any	  
means	   whatever	   with	   the	   establishment,	   the	   goods,	   or	   the	   industrial	   or	   commercial	   activities,	   of	   a	  
competitor;	  (ii)	  false	  allegations	  in	  the	  course	  of	  trade	  of	  such	  a	  nature	  as	  to	  discredit	  the	  establishment,	  the	  
goods,	  or	   the	   industrial	  or	  commercial	  activities,	  of	  a	  competitor;	  (iii)	   indications	  or	  allegations	   the	  use	  of	  
which	  in	  the	  course	  of	  trade	  is	  liable	  to	  mislead	  the	  public	  as	  to	  the	  nature,	  the	  manufacturing	  process,	  the	  





reasonable	  secrecy	  precautions	  by	  the	  owner.204	  The	  idea	  of	  protection	  through	  
trade	   secrets	   could	   apply	   to	   traditional	   ecologic	   knowledge	   that	   indigenous	  
peoples	   have	   developed	   over	   centuries	   of	   interaction	   with	   the	   natural	  
environment.	   That	   knowledge	  might	   be	   secret	   or	   not	   and	  may	   not	   hold	  much	  
economic	  value	  for	  the	  indigenous	  peoples	  who	  developed	  it,	  but	  it	  might	  have	  a	  
great	  economic	  value	  for	  the	  people/multinationals	  who	  aim	  to	  exploit	  it	  within	  
its	  natural	  setting.	  205	  
Generally,	   in	   case	   of	   traditional	   knowledge	  with	   economic	   value,	   trade	   secrets	  
remain	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  confidentiality	  especially	  in	  those	  laws	  that	  derive	  
from	  the	  British	  common	   law	  system.	  While	   in	  countries	   like	   the	  United	  States	  
and	  other	   jurisdictions	  based	  on	  civil	   law	  trade	  secrets	   is	  a	  distinct	  body	  of	   law	  
that	   applies	   to	   valuable	   commercial	   secrets	   and	   is	   separate	   from	   breach	   of	  
confidence	   law,	   in	   countries	   like	   England,	   Australia,	   Canada	   and	   New	   Zealand	  
trade	   secrets	   fall	   under	   the	   umbrella	   of	   breach	   of	   confidence.	   In	   other	   legal	  
regimes	  the	  appropriate	  action	  for	  invasion	  or	  publication	  of	  information	  that	  is	  
personal	  falls	  within	  the	  sphere	  of	  an	  action	  for	  invasion	  or	  breach	  of	  privacy	  and	  
use	  ordinary	  statutory	  provisions	  or	  the	  national	  jurisprudential	  development	  of	  
a	   specific	   tort	   to	   protect	   such	   invasion.206	  As	   seen	   above,	   in	   recent	   years,	   in	  
England	   breach	   of	   confidence	   has	   significantly	   mutated	   its	   customary	   aspect	  
inherited	   from	   the	   common	   law	   tradition	   to	   perform	  also	   the	   role	   of	   a	   tort	   of	  
invasion	  of	  privacy,	  while	   in	  the	  United	  States	   invasion	  of	  privacy	  has	  prevailed	  
over	   breach	   of	   confidence.	   And	   while	   the	   inherited	   British	   tort	   for	   breach	   of	  
confidence	  was	  put	  aside,	  a	  separate	  tort	  of	  invasion	  of	  privacy	  developed	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204	  See	   David	   D	   Friedman,	   Richard	   Posner	   and	   others	   “Some	   Economics	   of	   Trade	   Secret	   Law”	   (1991)	   5	   1	  
Journal	   of	   Economic	   Perspective	   61-­‐72;	   William	   Van	   Caenegem	   Trade	   Secrets	   and	   Intellectual	   Property:	  
Breach	  of	  Confidence,	  Misappropriation	  and	  Unfair	  Competition	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International,	  The	  Netherlands,	  
2014);	  Deepa	  Varadarajan	  “Trade	  Secret	  Fair	  Use”	  (2014)	  83	  Fordham	  Law	  Review;	  Robert	  Dean	  The	  Law	  of	  
Trade	  Secrets	  and	  Personal	  Secrets.	  
205	  The	  material	   covering	   indigenous	   ecologic	   knowledge	   is	   broad,	   that	   is	  why	   the	   aim	  of	   the	   thesis	   is	   to	  
address	   the	   intangible/secret	   aspect	   of	   indigenous	   culture	   and	   not	   the	   tangible	   biological	   result	   of	  
indigenous	  study	  of	  biology.	  This	  decision	  has	  been	  exhaustively	  explained	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters.	  While,	  
in	   fact,	  much	  has	  been	  written	  on	   indigenous	  ecological	   knowledge,	   less	  has	  been	  written	  on	   indigenous	  
intangible	  secret	  knowledge	  (which	  can	  be	  ecological,	  cultural	  or	  spiritual)	  as	  fitting	  within	  the	  category	  of	  
confidential	   information.	   The	   reason	   is	   quite	   simple:	   indigenous	   ecological	   knowledge	   is	   born	   from	   ideas	  
and	  experiences,	  but	   then	   translated	   into	   remedies,	   cultivation,	  and	   so	   forth,	  which	  makes	   it	  more	  easily	  
assessable	  and	  profitable,	  while	  intangible	  culture	  still	  remains	  an	  uncomfortable	  elusive	  concept	  that	  might	  
have	  no	  economic	  value	  at	  all.	  Trade	  secret	   law	  can	  relatively	  protect	   indigenous	  knowledge	  that	  is	  secret	  
and	  has	  not	  entered	  the	  public	  domain	  yet.	  This	   is	  mostly	  possible	   in	  those	  countries	  where	  trade	  secrets	  
law	  is	  part	  of	  breach	  of	  confidence.	  	  






case	   law	   to	   cover	   personal	   information.	   Although	   the	   United	   States	   have	  
inherited	  the	  common	  law	  system	  from	  England	  and	  the	  first	  settlers,	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  trade	  secrets,	  the	  law	  is	  today	  mainly	  statute	  based	  and	  it	  only	  deals	  with	  civil	  
liability.	   In	   1985	   the	   Uniform	   Trade	   Secrets	   Act	   (UTSA)	   was	   adopted	   in	   the	  
majority	   of	   the	   United	   States.	   In	   doing	   so,	   the	   United	   States	   have	   created	   a	  
separate	   right	   concerning	   commercial	   and	   technical	   secrets	   in	   place	  of	   a	  more	  
general	   tort	   of	   breach	   of	   confidence.	   UTSA	   defines	   a	   trade	   secret	   as	  
“information,	  including	  formula,	  pattern,	  compilation,	  program,	  device,	  method,	  
technique	   or	   process	   that	   derive	   economic	   value	   from	   being	   secret”.207	  For	  
UTSA,	   the	   standard	   of	   secrecy	   is	   not	   absolute;	   information	   can	   circulate	  
(although	   in	   limited	  manner),	   even	   if	   significant	   efforts	  must	   be	  made	   to	   keep	  
the	   information	   confidential. 208 	  Conversely,	   English	   law	   does	   not	   require	  
establishing	  that	  some	  commercial	  value	  or	  advantage	  derives	  from	  secrecy.209	  In	  
general,	  trade	  secrets	  presents	  specific	  features	  that	  comprise	  of:	  
	  
• the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  information	  was	  known	  outside	  the	  business;	  
• the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   trade	   secret	   was	   known	   by	   employees	   and	   others	  
involved	  in	  the	  plaintiff’s	  business;	  
• the	  extent	  of	  measures	  taken	  to	  guard	  the	  secrecy	  of	  the	  information;	  
• the	  value	  of	  the	  information	  to	  the	  plaintiffs	  and	  their	  competitors;	  
• the	  amount	  of	  effort	  expended	  developing	  the	  information;	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207	  UTSA	  Article	  2(b)	  and	  3(a).	  
208	  ‘”It	  may	  be	  that	  information	  circulates	  only	  amongst	  a	  small	  group,	  but	  if	  there	  is	  indication	  that	  this	  was	  
by	  design,	  it	  will	  be	  difficult	  to	  establish	  that	  the	  requisite	  standard	  has	  been	  met.	  The	  standard	  of	  secrecy	  is	  
also	   relative	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   even	   if	   a	  product	   is	   released	   into	   the	  public	   sphere,	   if	   reverse	  engineering	  
requires	  considerable	  effort	  it	  will	  still	  be	  considered	  sufficiently	  secret”	  see	  Caenegem	  at	  111;	  see	  also	  Julie	  
Piper	  “I	  Have	  a	  Secret?	  Applying	  the	  Uniform	  Trade	  Secrets	  Act	  to	  Confidential	   Information	  That	  Does	  Not	  
rise	  to	  the	  Level	  of	  Trade	  Secret	  Status”	  (2008)	  12	  2	  Marquette	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law	  Rev	  359.	  
209	  “English	  law	  looks	  for	  value	  derived	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  has	  kept	  information	  secret	  and	  thus	  
has	  a	  practical	  exclusivity,	  apart	  from	  whatever	  inherent	  utility	  or	  value	  the	  information	  might	  have.	  Partly	  
that	  is	  because	  the	  action	  for	  breach	  of	  confidence	  does	  not	  only	  cover	  commercially	  sensitive	  information	  
but	  also	  personal	  and	  private	  communication.	  Nonetheless,	  in	  English	  law,	  where	  a	  trade	  secret	  is	  at	  stake,	  
the	   plaintiff	  might	   have	   to	   establish	   a	   number	   of	   things	   that	   have	   a	   similar	   tendency	   as	   the	   commercial	  
value	  or	   competitive	   advantage	   requirement:	   first,	   particularization	  of	   the	   trade	   secret(s)	   concerned,	   i.e.,	  
precise	   and	   concrete	   identification;	   second,	   that	   the	   information	   is	   not	   so	   vague	   as	   to	   be	   impossible	   to	  
identify	   with	   precision,	   and	   impossible	   to	   place	   in	   the	   public	   domain	   or	   not;	   and	   lastly,	   equity	   will	   not	  
intervene	  to	  protect	  information	  that	  is	  old,	  stale	  or	  trite.	  In	  terms	  of	  reasonable	  measures,	  the	  English	  law	  
does	  not	  advance	  this	  so	  much	  as	  a	  separate	  requirement,	  but	  more	  as	  a	  factor	  in	  determining	  two	  things:	  
whether	  certain	   information	  amounts	   to	  a	   trade	  secret;	  and	  whether	  circumstances	  of	   its	  communication	  





• the	   ease	   with	   which	   the	   information	   could	   be	   acquired	   or	   duplicated	   by	  
others.210	  
	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  personal	   information,	  trade	  secrets	  hold	  the	  same	  characteristics	  
of	   confidential	   information.211	  Yet,	   contrary	   to	   the	   separate	   tort	   of	   breach	   of	  
confidence,	   jurisdictions	   protecting	   trade	   secrets	   focus	  more	   on	   the	   economic	  
value	  of	  the	  information	  than	  the	  information	  per	  se.	  Given	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  of	  
the	  times	  indigenous	  secret	  information	  has	  no	  economic	  value	  unless	  exploited	  
and	   commodified,	   trade	   secrets	   law	   is	  of	   little	  help	   to	  protect	   any	   confidential	  
knowledge	  that	  has	  been	  disclosed.	  Another	  limit	  of	  trade	  secrets	  laws	  is	  that,	  as	  
of	  today,	  while	  there	  might	  be	  harmonization	  at	  the	  national	   level,	  there	   is	  not	  
yet	   real	   harmonization	   in	   all	   the	   different	   developments	   of	   the	   law	   covering	  
secret	  information	  at	  international	  level.	  Indeed,	  in	  some	  countries	  trade	  secrets	  
law	  is	  protected	  by	  specific	  statutory	  provisions;	  while	  in	  others	  it	   is	  considered	  
as	  part	  of	  confidentiality	  law.	  In	  English	  derived	  laws,	  the	  main	  issue	  still	  remains	  
on	  what	  is	  the	  best	  way	  to	  protect	  the	  private	  information	  that	  is	  not	  necessarily	  
a	   trade	   secret.	   In	   recent	   years,	   New	   Zealand	   has	   seen	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	  
separate	  tort	  of	  invasion	  of	  privacy	  as	  a	  better	  way	  to	  progress	  things	  instead	  of	  
keeping	   expanding	   artificially	   breach	   of	   confidence;	   while	   Australia	   has	  
considered	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	   statutory	   tort	   of	   invasion	   of	   privacy,	   without	  
reaching	  a	  clear	  solution	  over	  the	  matter.212	  Thus,	  both	  jurisdictions	  still	  consider	  
trade	   secrets	   as	   part	   of	   breach	   of	   confidence.	   In	   this	   way,	   the	   economic	   and	  
spiritual	   value	   of	   indigenous	   information	   may	   remain	   included	   within	   the	  
information	   itself,	   without	   the	   need	   to	   define	   its	   economic	   value	   in	   order	   to	  
decide	  if	  the	   information	  can	  be	  protected	  by	  breach	  of	  confidence	  or	  not.	   It	   is	  
rather	   the	  context,	   the	   tradition	  and	  use	  of	   such	  knowledge	   that	  determine	   its	  
intrinsic	  value	  and	  not	   its	   commercial	   translation	   for	   the	  public.	  The	  context	   in	  
which	  the	  information	  is	  found,	  therefore,	  represents	  the	  key	  factor.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210	  See	  Dean	  at	  para	  3.115.	  
211	  They	  include:	  “the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  information	  has	  come	  to	  the	  widespread	  attention	  of	  the	  public	  at	  
large	  which	  will	   depend	  upon	   the	  medium	  of	   communication	  used;	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	  plaintiff	   had	  
sought	  to	  keep	  the	  information	  private;	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  information	  and	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  plaintiff	  
to	  the	  information”	  see	  Dean	  at	  para	  3.115.	  
212	  According	   to	   Van	   Caenegem:	   “The	   comparison	   between	   England	   and	  Australia	   is	  most	   apt	   because	   in	  
neither	  country	  does	  the	  criminal	  law	  come	  directly	  to	  the	  aid	  of	  the	  possessor	  of	  trade	  secrets	  as	  it	  does	  in	  





The	  next	  section	  will	  explain	  how	  and	  why.	  
	  
10.8	  –	  The	  Contextual	  Integrity	  of	  Indigenous	  Knowledge	  
	  
These	   days,	   researchers	   (and	   stakeholders	   who	   might	   finance	   research	   on	  
ecological	  knowledge)	  are	  still	  very	   interested	   in	   indigenous	   information.	  While	  
part	  of	  the	  humanity	  is	  going	  toward	  a	  technological	  era	  where	  everything	  seems	  
to	   be	   controlled	   by	   machines,	   many	   researchers	   are	   still	   fascinated	   by	   the	  
traditions	   of	   indigenous	   peoples.	   Indigenous	   peoples,	   indeed,	   seem	   to	   be	   the	  
ones	  placed	  in	  between	  modern	  time	  and	  ancient	  time	  when	  the	  traditions	  were	  
more	   closely	   connected	   to	   nature	   and	   the	   sense	   of	   community.	   Even	   the	  
indigenous	   communities	   that	   have	   embraced	   modernity,	   still	   have	   access,	  
through	  the	  elders	  and	  the	  guardians,	  to	  the	  knowledge	  that	  made	  their	  culture	  
and	   their	   peoplehood.	   Being	   still	   the	   object	   of	   so	  much	   attention,	   indigenous	  
peoples	   need	   to	   know	   how	   to	   protect	   themselves	   and	   which	   laws	   are	   better	  
suited	   to	   do	   so.	   The	   fact	   that	   studies	   on	   indigenous	   peoples	   are	   important	   to	  
understand	   the	   ancient	   traditions	   that	   today	   survive	   does	   not	   imply	   that	   all	  
information	   related	   to	   them	   should	  be	  brought	   to	   the	  public	   domain.	   Like	   any	  
other	   legal	   entity,	   indigenous	   peoples	   have	   the	   right	   to	   control	   what	   of	   their	  
information	  can	  or	  cannot	  enter	  the	  public	  domain	  and	  be	  known	  by	  people	  who	  
might	  be	  interested	  in	  their	  traditions.	  Mere	  cultural	  interest	  on	  alien	  traditions	  
cannot	  justify	  the	  erosion	  and	  public	  display	  of	  cultures	  whose	  sharing	  was	  done	  
in	   confidential	   contexts	   and	   not	   for	   public	   purposes.	   And	   yet,	   even	   when	  
information	  reaches	  the	  public,	  according	  to	  Gurry,	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  degree	  how	  
much	  of	  the	  disclosed	  information	  can	  destroy	  any	  claim	  of	  confidentiality.	  As	  we	  
have	   seen	   in	   section	   10.6,	   in	   some	   cases,	   even	   if	   part	   of	   the	   confidential	  
information	  has	  reached	  the	  public,	  it	  still	  retains	  its	  confidential	  status.213	  While	  
many	  indigenous	  societies	  today	  know	  the	  law,	  many	  are	  still	  quite	  unprepared	  
to	   face	  the	  possible	  exploitation	  done	  by	  researchers	  coming	  from	  the	  outside.	  
Their	   position	   is	   quite	   critical.	   Researchers	   cannot	   use	   ignorance	   to	   trump	   any	  
legal	  right	  of	  which	  these	  indigenous	  communities	  are	  totally	  oblivious.	  Whether	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





these	   communities	   know	   it	   or	   not,	   a	   trust	   of	   confidentiality	   implicitly	   exists	  
among	   researchers	   and	   indigenous	  holders	   of	   secret	   information.	  According	   to	  
Martin	   and	   Jeffery,214	  the	   legal	   position	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   in	   jurisdictions	  
based	   on	   the	   English	   common	   law	   system	   is	   far	   stronger	   than	   it	   is	   generally	  
believed	   to	   date. 215 	  In	   their	   view,	   researchers	   have	   a	   “high	   standard	   of	  
accountability	   to	   identify	   and	   remain	   within	   the	   bounds	   of	   use	   that	   are	  
consistent	  with	  (perhaps	  unstated)	  preferences	  of	  the	  Indigenous	  custodians”.216	  
In	   fact,	   conversations	   between	   researchers	   and	   indigenous	   custodians	   are	  
notably	   built	   on	   trust.217	  Although	  many	   of	   the	   elements	   of	   contract	   are	   often	  
present	   (express	  or	   implied	  contract),218	  the	   implications	  of	   the	  agreement	  and	  
of	  the	  consensual	  passing	  of	  the	  information	  is	  often	  understood	  and	  agreed	  by	  
only	  one	  party,	  notably	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  one	  who	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  equipped	  
to	   understand	   it. 219 	  Indeed,	   according	   to	   Hartzog, 220 	  “implied	   obligation	   of	  
confidentiality	   can	   protect	   people	   revealing	   harmful	   information	  when	   explicit	  
promises	  of	   confidentiality	  were	  not	  obtained”.	  He	  explains	   that	  obligations	  of	  
confidentiality	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  explicitly	  framed.	  “They	  can	  be	  implicit	  parts	  of	  
confidential	   relationships	   or	   created	   through	   implied	   agreements	   of	  
confidentiality”. 221 	  When	   researchers	   approach	   indigenous	   peoples	   to	  
investigate	   indigenous	   traditions,	   a	   ‘fiduciary	   relationship’	   is	   established.	  
Contrary	   to	   common	   law	   on	   confidentiality,	   the	   ‘fiduciary	   relationship’	   that	   is	  
established	   is	   implicitly	  embodied	  not	  only	   in	   the	  relationship	   itself,	  but	  also	   in	  
the	   ethical	   code	   of	   conduct	   that	   is	   morally	   and	   professionally	   imposed	   on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214	  Paul	   Martin	   and	   Michael	   Jeffery	   “Using	   a	   legally	   Enforceable	   Knowledge	   Trust	   to	   Fulfil	   the	   Moral	  
Obligation	  to	  Protect	  Indigenous	  Secrets”	  (2007)	  11	  1	  NZ	  J	  Envtl	  L	  1.	  
215	  According	   to	  Martin	  and	   Jeffery,	   in	   two	   jurisdictions	   such	  as	   the	  Australian	  and	   the	  America,	   although	  
there	  are	  differences,	   the	  “enforceable	  rights	  to	  protect	   Indigenous	  secrets	  arise	  from	  a	   ‘cocktail’	  of	   long-­‐
standing	   common	   law	   principles,	   combined	   with	   statutory	   instruments	   which	   refine	   and	   develop	   long-­‐
standing	  civil	  rights.	  These	  legal	  protections	  apply	  to	  many	  research	  transactions,	  the	  combined	  effect	  being	  
to	   impose	   legal	   duties	   on	   most	   occasions	   when	   researchers	   obtain	   secret	   knowledge	   from	   Indigenous	  
peoples.	  This	  network	  of	  legal	  obligations	  creates	  a	  significant	  governance	  responsibility	  for	  the	  institutions	  
who	  employ	  these	  researchers”	  at	  3.	  
216	  At	  9.	  
217	  According	   to	  Martin	   and	   Jeffery	   “at	   least	  on	  one	   side	  of	   such	   transactions	   the	   intention	   is	   to	   lead	   the	  
other	  party	   to	  disclose	   information	   that	   is	   valued	  by	  both	   the	   Indigenous	   custodians	  and	   the	   researcher”	  
supra	  at	  10-­‐11.	  
218 	  “Express	   contract	   is	   a	   contract	   in	   which	   all	   elements	   are	   specifically	   stated	   (offer,	   acceptance,	  
consideration),	  and	  the	  terms	  are	  stated,	  as	  compared	  to	  an	  ‘implied’	  contract	  in	  which	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  
contract	   is	   assumed	   by	   the	   circumstances’	   at	   <http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=703>	   last	  
visited	  on	  05/5/2015.	  
219	  See	  following	  sections	  of	  the	  chapter.	  
220	  Woodrow	  Hartzog	  “Reviving	  Implied	  Confidentiality”	  (2014)	  89	  2	  Indiana	  Law	  Journal	  763	  at	  767.	  





anthropologists	   and	   researchers.222	  Such	   codes	   of	   conduct	   imply	   a	   ‘duty	   of	  
loyalty’	  that	  is	  intrinsic	  in	  the	  role	  of	  any	  researcher.	  This	  duty	  of	  loyalty	  includes	  
an	   obligation	   not	   to	   reveal	   information,	   and	   especially	   those	   known	   to	   be	  
spiritually	   and	   culturally	   sensitive.223	  The	   circumstances	   in	   which	   these	   studies	  
are	   carried	   out	   are	   quite	   explicative	   of	   the	   terms	   that	   must	   be	   taken	   into	  
consideration.	   First	   of	   all,	  many	   researchers	   are	   aware	   of	   the	   traditions	   of	   the	  
community	   they	   intend	   to	   study;	   second,	   most	   of	   the	   time,	   they	   know	   the	  
customary	  laws	  and	  the	  protocols	  that	  regulate	  the	  life	  of	  the	  community;	  third,	  
the	   fact	   that	   some	   knowledge/information	   can	   only	   be	   obtained	   from	   the	  
guardians	   of	   knowledge,	   a	   restricted	   group	  of	   selected	  people,	   already	   implies	  
that	  the	  knowledge	  is	  under	  some	  formal	  obligation	  of	  confidentiality	  that	  binds	  
the	  whole	   community.224	  If	   that	  were	   not	   the	   case,	   the	   information	  would	   not	  
need	  to	  be	  guarded.	  The	  context	  itself	  imposes	  that	  a	  reasonable	  person	  would	  
“conclude	   that	   an	   agreement	   of	   confidentiality	   was	   implied	   or	   whenever	   a	  
fiduciary	   relationship	   exists”. 225 	  In	   other	   words,	   while	   indigenous	   guardians	  
expect	  some	  level	  of	  privacy	  and	  confidentiality	  while	  sharing	  their	  knowledge	  or	  
part	  of	   it,	  privacy	  violations	  happen	  when	  “context-­‐relative	   information	  norms”	  
are	  not	  respected	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  contextual	  integrity	  surrounding	  the	  sharing	  
of	   the	   information. 226 	  The	   idea	   of	   contextual	   integrity	   is	   posited	   by	  
Nissenbaum:227	  
	  
Whether	  a	  particular	  action	  is	  determined	  a	  violation	  of	  privacy	  is	  a	  function	  of	  
several	  variables,	  including	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  situation,	  or	  context;	  the	  nature	  of	  
the	   information	   in	   relation	   to	   that	   context;	   the	   roles	   of	   agents	   receiving	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 See	   also	   WIPO	   Resources	   for	   Researchers	   and	   Field-­‐Workers	   at	  
<www.wipo.int/tk/en/databases/creative_heritage/researchers/>	  last	  visited	  on	  03/11/2015.	  
223 	  See	   Brazilian	   Association	   of	   Anthropology	   The	   anthropologist's	   code	   of	   ethics	   (2005)	   at	  
<www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/databases/creative_heritage/docs/wcaa_brazilian_anthropology.p
df>;	   see	   also	   The	   World	   Council	   of	   Anthropological	   Association	   at	   <www.wcaanet.org>	   last	   visited	   on	  
03/11/2015.	  
224	  Woodrow	  Hartzog	  “Reviving	  Implied	  Confidentiality”	  (2014)	  89	  2	  Indiana	  Law	  Journal	  763;	  see	  also	  Paul	  
Sillitoe	  Indigenous	  Studies	  and	  Engaged	  Anthropology:	  The	  Collaborative	  Moment	  (Ashgate,	  2015);	  Laurence	  
Goldman	   Social	   Impact	   Analysis:	   an	   Applied	   Anthropology	   Manual	   (Bloomsbury	   Publishing	   Plc,	   London,	  
2000);	  John	  Monagham	  and	  Peter	  Just	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Anthropology	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  New	  York,	  
2000).	  
225	  See	  Hartzog	  at	  774.	  
226	  At	  775.	  





information;	   their	   relationships	   to	   the	   information	  subjects;	  on	  what	   terms	  the	  
information	  is	  shared	  by	  the	  subject;	  and	  the	  terms	  of	  further	  dissemination.	  
	  
Nissenbaum	   specifies	   that	   the	   context,	   actors,	   attributes	   and	   transmission	  
principles	   are	   very	   important	   in	   detecting	   whether	   there	   is	   a	   reasonable	  
expectation	  of	  confidentiality	  and	  privacy	  in	  any	  relationship	  of	  trust	  established	  
between	  a	  confidant	  and	  a	  confider	  (see	  next	  sections).228	  Secrecy	  in	  indigenous	  
rituals	   creates	   a	   context	   that	   implicitly	   implies	   that	   a	   confidence	   or	   restricted	  
information	  is	  being	  shared	  under	  the	  trust	  that	  the	  confidant	  will	  maintain	  the	  
same	   level	   of	   secrecy.	   Anthropologists	   and	   researchers	   can	   discuss	   that	   no	  
formal	  agreement	  of	  confidentiality	  was	  ever	  made	  before	  entering	   into	  secret	  
confidences.	   However,	   although	   the	   parties’	   perception	   of	   confidentiality	   are	  
important	   in	   establishing	   any	   obligation	   of	   confidence,	   the	   circumstances,	  
location	  and	  secrecy	  of	  the	  information	  that	  has	  been	  imparted	  obviously	  entail	  a	  
level	  of	  confidentiality	  that	  cannot	  be	  defeated	  by	  any	  contradicting	  arguments.	  
If	  the	  secrecy	  were	  not	  in	  place,	  most	  of	  the	  researchers	  would	  not	  need	  to	  enter	  
into	   a	   relationship	   of	   trust	  with	   indigenous	   guardians.	  Moreover,	   according	   to	  
Hartzog,	   “if	   the	   discloser	   of	   information	   was	   inherently	   vulnerable,	   had	   fewer	  
resources,	   had	   less	   bargaining	   power,	   or	   was	   less	   sophisticated	   than	   the	  
recipient,	  then	  an	  implied	  obligation	  of	  confidentiality	  was	  more	  than	  likely	  than	  
with	   similarly	   situated	   parties”.229	  In	   the	   Australian	   case	   SmithKline	  &	   French	   v	  
Department	  of	  Community	  Health230,	  the	  Court	  held	  that	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  are	  
crucial	  in	  determining	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  obligation	  of	  confidentiality:	  	  
	  
…	   whether	   the	   information	   was	   supplied	   gratuitously	   or	   for	   consideration;	  
whether	   there	  were	  any	  past	  practices	   that	  gave	   rise	   to	  an	  understanding	   that	  
the	   use	  was	   limited;	   how	   sensitive	   the	   information	  was;	  whether	   the	   confider	  
had	  any	   interest	   in	  the	  purpose	  for	  which	  the	   information	  was	  to	  be	  used;	  and	  
whether	   the	   confider	   expressly	   warned	   the	   confidant	   against	   a	   particular	  
disclosure	  or	  use	  of	  the	  information.231	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  See	  Nissenbaum	  at	  141.	  
229	  See	  Hartzog	  at	  776.	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  SmithKline	  &	  French	  v	  Department	  of	  Community	  Health	  [1990]	  FSR	  617	  at	  646.	  






As	  it	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  in	  most	  cases	  the	  cultural	  context	  in	  
which	  the	  disclosure	  of	  the	  information	  happens	  includes	  most	  of	  the	  factors	  
just	  described.	  
	  
10.9	  –	  Implied	  Obligation	  of	  Confidentiality	  
	  
Given	   the	  asymmetry	  of	   the	   cultural	   status	  of	   the	   indigenous	   confider	   and	   the	  
receiver	   of	   the	   information,	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   a	   formal	   agreement	   of	  
confidentiality	   or	   contract	   is	   stipulated	   between	   the	   parties	   prior	   to	   the	  
disclosure	  of	  the	  secret	  information.	  The	  receiver	  of	  the	  secret	  information	  might	  
therefore	   claim	   that	   no	   evident	   agreement	  was	   ever	   stipulated;	   consequently,	  
the	  confider	  and	  confidant	  were	  never	  formally	  bound	  to	  confidentiality.	  In	  this	  
scenario,	  the	  law	  of	  breach	  of	  confidence	  comes	  to	  help.	  In	  general,	  the	  test	  to	  
evince	  that	  the	  information	  was	  acquired	  in	  circumstances	  that	  ‘implied’	  evident	  
or	   assumed	   confidentiality	   indicate	   (objective)	   knowledge	   that	   the	   information	  
was	  indeed	  confidential.	  They	  include:	  
	  
• the	   nature	   of	   the	   information	   (eg	   trivial,	   banal,	   commercially	   valuable	   or	  
intimately	  personal,	  secret	  and	  inaccessible);	  
• the	  steps	  taken	  by	  the	  confider	  to	  preserve	  or	  emphasize	  the	  secrecy	  of	  the	  
information	  (eg	   if	  special	  care	  has	  been	  taken	  that	  a	  restricted	  disclosure	   is	  
not	  in	  place);	  
• the	   manner	   in	   which	   the	   information	   was	   disclosed	   or	   obtained	   (eg	  
surreptitiously	  and	  so	  forth);	  
• the	  understanding	  of	  the	  parties	  involved;	  and	  
• more	   importantly	   in	  the	  case	  of	   indigenous	  secret	   information	  –	  where	  the	  
information	  is	  “disclosed	  for	  a	  specific,	  limited	  purpose	  and	  it	  is	  understood,	  
from	  a	  legal	  and	  cultural	  context	  of	  the	  disclosure,	  that	  the	  information	  will	  
not	  be	  used	  for	  another	  purpose”.232	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Following	  the	  points	  listed	  above,	  the	  nature	  of	  indigenous	  secret	  information	  is	  
never	  trivial,	  although	  it	  might	  not	  have	  intrinsic	  economic	  value;	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  
is	  kept	  secret	  and	  managed	  by	  custodians	  indicates	  its	  sensitive	  nature;	  it	  can	  be	  
disclosed	  only	  in	  contexts	  of	  confidentiality	  regulated	  by	  customs;	  the	  parties	  will	  
probably	   be	   involved	   in	   an	   asymmetric	   relationship	   where	   the	   indigenous	  
custodian	   knows	   that	   the	   information	   is	   secret,	   but	   fails	   to	   enter	   into	   a	  
contract/agreement	  with	  the	  confidant	  who,	  however,	  can	  evince	  the	  nature	  of	  
the	  information	  by	  the	  context	  in	  which	  he	  receives	  it;	  and	  the	  information	  might	  
be	  shared	  in	  a	  private	  cultural	  context	  where	  the	  custodian	  decides,	  for	  disparate	  
reasons,	  to	  share	  the	  information.	  The	  sharing	  is	  often	  due	  to	  generosity,	  naiveté	  
or	  ignorance	  which	  may	  vary	  from	  one	  context	  to	  another.	  
Many	  of	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  scenarios	  involving	  indigenous	  confiders	  happen	  in	  
contexts	  where	  no	  formal	  confidentiality	  agreement	  was	  ever	  stipulated	  with	  the	  
confidant.	  In	  these	  scenarios,	  the	  indigenous	  confider	  can	  count	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  
‘implied	  confidentiality’	  which	  can	  a	  fortiori	  protect	  people	  revealing	  harmful	  or	  
secret/sacred	   information	   when	   an	   explicit	   confidentiality	   agreement	   was	   not	  
obtained.	  In	  this	  case,	  obligations	  arise	  out	  of	  customs,	  norms,	  and	  “other	  indicia	  
of	   confidentiality	   beyond	   explicit	   confidentiality	   agreement” 233 	  (such	   as	   the	  
ethical	  code	  of	  anthropologists,	  journalists	  and	  researchers).	  Hartzog	  states	  that	  
implied	   confidentiality	   agreements	   “arise	   when	   individuals	   actually	   objectively	  
agree	   to	   confidentiality,	   but	   the	   understanding	   is	   implied	   in	   lieu	   of	   an	   explicit	  
agreement”.234	  The	  implied	  agreement	  includes	  any	  fiduciary	  relationship	  based	  
on	  a	  duty	  of	   loyalty,	  which	   includes	   an	  obligation	  not	   to	   reveal	   information.235	  
McClurg	   specifies	   that	   “promises	   can	   be	   made	   orally	   or	   in	   writing,	   or	   can	   be	  
inferred	   from	   conduct”;236	  as	   such,	   he	   carries	   on,	   “no	  difference	   in	   legal	   effect	  
between	  express	  and	  implied	  contracts	  exists.	  The	  distinction	  lies	  in	  how	  assent	  
to	   the	   contract	   is	   manifested”. 237 	  The	   implied	   obligation	   of	   confidentiality	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233	  See	  Hartzog	  at	  768.	  
234	  At	  770.	  
235	  Roy	   Ryden	   Anderson	   “The	  Wolf	   at	   the	   Campfire:	   Understanding	   Confidential	   Relationships”	   (2000)	   53	  
SMU	  L	  Rev	  315	  at	  317.	  
236	  Andrew	  J	  McClurg	  “Kiss	  and	  Tell:	  Protecting	  Intimate	  Relationship	  Privacy	  Through	  Implied	  Contracts	  of	  
Confidentiality”	  (2006)	  74	  Cin	  Law	  Rev	  887	  at	  912.	  
237	  “The	   central	   features	   of	   an	   implicit	   promise	   of	   confidentiality,	   shared	   by	   all	   [intimate,	   fiduciary,	   and	  
otherwise	   confidential]	   relationships,	   include	   (1)	   confidentiality	   is	   reasonably	   expected	   as	   a	   matter	   of	  





includes	   two	   fundamental	   aspects:	   party	   perception	   and	   inequality.	   In	   other	  
words,	   how	   the	   parties	   perceive	   their	   fiduciary	   relationship	   and	   how	   they	   use	  
any	  existing	  asymmetry	  or	  inequality	  to	  impair	  the	  relationship	  at	  the	  advantage	  
of	   one	  of	   the	  parties,	   and	  usually	   the	   strongest	   one.	   The	   context	   in	  which	   the	  
relationship	   of	   confidence	   happens	   is	   a	   key	   factor	   in	   defining	   the	   relationship	  
itself.	   The	   theory	   of	   ‘contextual	   integrity’238	  created	   by	   Nissenbaum	   (briefly	  
introduced	   above),	   not	   only	   expands	   and	   clarifies	   aspects	   of	   privacy	   that	   have	  
traditionally	  been	  obscure	  or	  uncertain,	  but	  explains	  how	  a	  fiduciary	  relationship	  
of	   confidentiality	   should	   be	   assessed.	   She	   defines	   the	   parameters	   that	   every	  
civilized	  society	  should	  take	  into	  account	  when	  evaluating	  cases	  involving	  privacy	  
and	  confidentiality.	  	  
This	  thesis	  makes	  use	  of	  her	  theory	  not	  only	  because	  it	  is	  very	  thorough,	  precise,	  
ethically	  and	   legally	  correct,	  but	  also	  because,	  by	  taking	   into	  account	  the	  social	  
and	   cultural	   circumstances	   in	  which	   a	   confidential	   agreement	   takes	   place,	   the	  
theory	   gives	   contextualized	   discernments	   by	   which	   the	   facts	   and	   the	   parties	  
involved	  should	  be	  assessed.	  In	  her	  book	  Nissenbaum239	  laid	  down	  a	  theory	  that,	  
once	  adopted,	  would	  bring	  broader	  parameters	   to	  evaluate	  cases	   involving	   the	  
laws	  of	  privacy	  and	  confidentiality.	  According	  to	  her,	  privacy	  and	  confidentiality	  
violations	  happen	  when	  “context-­‐relative	  information	  norms”	  are	  not	  respected	  
during	   confidential	   sharing. 240 	  The	   framework	   laid	   down	   by	   Nissenbaum	  
responds	  to	  four	  basic	  questions:	  
	  
• what	  was	  the	  context	  surrounding	  the	  disclosure?	  
• what	  was	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  information?	  
• who	  were	  the	  actors	  and	  what	  was	  their	  relationship?	  
• what	  were	  the	  internal	  and	  external	  terms	  of	  disclosure?	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(in	  many	   cases,	   detrimentally	   changing	   their	   position	   in	   doing	   so);	   and	   (3)	   trust	   in	   the	   confidentiality	   of	  
private	  information	  is	  necessary	  to	  make	  the	  relationship	  function	  properly”	  see	  McClurg	  at	  913.	  
238	  “Context-­‐relative	   information	  norms	  function	  descriptively	  when	  they	  express	  entrenched	  expectations	  
governing	  the	  flows	  of	  personal	  information,	  but	  they	  are	  also	  a	  key	  vehicle	  for	  elaborating	  the	  prescriptive	  
(or	  normative)	   component	  of	   the	   framework	  of	   contextual	   integrity”	   see	  Helen	  Nissenbaum	  “Privacy	  and	  
Contextual	   Integrity”	   (2004)	   74	  Washington	   Law	   Review	   119	   at	   129	   and	   Helen	   Nissenbaum	   Privacy	   in	  
Context:	  Technology,	  Policy	  and	  the	  Integrity	  of	  Social	  Life	  (Stanford	  University	  Press,	  Stanford,	  2009).	  
239	  Helen	  Nissenbaum	  Privacy	  in	  Context:	  Technology,	  Policy	  and	  the	  Integrity	  of	  Social	  Life.	  





Nissenbaum	   identifies	   the	   variables	   that	   form	   contextual	   integrity	   as:	   context,	  
actors,	   attributes	   and	   transmission	   principles.	   These	   variables	   “prescribe,	   for	   a	  
given	  context,	   the	   types	  of	   information,	   the	  parties	  who	  are	   the	  subject	  of	   the	  
information	  as	  well	  as	  those	  who	  are	  sending	  and	  receiving	  it,	  and	  the	  principles	  
under	   which	   this	   information	   is	   transmitted”.241	  Hartzog	   adjusts	   Nissenbaum’s	  
definition	  of	  context	   to	  apply	   to	   indigenous	  peoples.	  According	   to	  him,	  context	  
should	  be	  defined	  as	   “the	   relationship	  between	   the	  actors	   to	  a	  disclosure;	   any	  
external	   circumstance	   affecting	   the	   actors	   to	   a	   disclosure;	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  
information	  disclosed;	  or	   the	   terms	  of	  disclosure”.242	  In	  other	  words,	   the	   focus	  
should	   be	   on	   the	   relationship	   of	   confidentiality	   (as	   seen,	   it	   is	   obviously	  
asymmetrical	   in	   the	   case	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   researchers)	   and	   the	  
external	  circumstances	  that	  surround	  the	  confidence.	  Long-­‐standing,	  developed	  
relationships	   are	   generally	  more	   likely	   to	   give	   rise	   to	   an	   “implied	   obligation	   of	  
confidentiality	   because	   a	   developed	   relationship	   likely	   involves	   trust	   and	  
custom”. 243 Nissenbaum	   defines	   contexts	   as	   “structured	   social	   settings	  
characterized	   by	   canonical	   activities,	   roles,	   relationships,	   power	   structures,	  
norms	   (or	   rules),	   and	   internal	   values	   (goals,	   ends	  or	  purposes)”.244	  Limiting	   the	  
circulation	   of	   knowledge,	   secrecy	   and	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   custodians	   within	  
indigenous	   societies	   create	   an	   obvious	   context	   in	   which	   is	   inferred	   that	   any	  
information	  obtained	   is	   restricted	  and	  can	  be	   imparted	  only	  confidentially.	  The	  
fact	   that	   researchers	  meet	   the	   guardians	   in	   their	   environment	   prove	   that	   the	  
information	  they	  are	  seeking	  is	  not	  naturally	  accessible	  (eg	  in	  the	  public	  domain),	  
but	  needs	  to	  be	  acquired	   in	  a	  specific	  and	  culturally	  sensitive	  environment	  and	  
after	   some	   relationship	   based	   on	   trust	   or	   confidence	   has	   been	   established	  
between	   the	   parties.	   In	   this	   scenario,	   any	   ‘reasonable	   person’	   receiving	   the	  
information	   must	   have	   been	   aware	   that	   the	   information	   was	   disclosed	   in	  
confidence	  and	  received	  in	  trust.245	  Additionally,	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  ‘secrecy’	  is	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241	  Helen	  Nissenbaum	  “Privacy	  and	  Contextual	  Integrity”	  (2004)	  74	  Washington	  Law	  Review	  119	  at	  155.	  
242	  See	  Hartzog	  at	  776.	  
243	  See	  Hartzog	  at	  777.	  
244	  Helen	  Nissenbaum	  Privacy	  in	  Context:	  Technology,	  Policy	  and	  the	  Integrity	  of	  Social	  Life	  at	  132.	  
245	  According	   to	  Hartzog	   “if	   confidentiality	  was	   a	   regular	   and	   accepted	  practice	   in	   a	   given	   context,	   courts	  
often	   found	   a	   discloser’s	   reliance	   on	   that	   custom	   reasonable.	   This	   reliance	   was	   reasonable	   because	   the	  
common	   knowledge	   of	   a	   custom	   make	   it	   likely	   that	   the	   recipient	   of	   the	   information	   was	   aware	   of	   an	  
expectation	  of	  confidentiality	  before	   the	   information	  was	  disclosed,	  or,	   in	  any	  event,	   the	  recipient	  should	  





well-­‐known	  and	  established	  custom	  in	  every	  society	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  claim	  that	  
the	   receiver	   did	   not	   know	   that	   the	   secret	   was	   imparted	   in	   a	   context	   of	  
confidentiality	   cannot	   be	   accepted	   as	   a	   reasonable	   argument,	   because	   the	  
context	   itself	   proved	   that	   secrecy	   attached	   to	   the	   information	   existed. 246	  
Moreover,	   in	   researches	   involving	   indigenous	   custodians,	   receivers	   enter	   into	  
negotiations	  or	  relationships	  of	  trust	  with	  the	  discloser	  before	  the	  information	  is	  
actually	   shared.	   Such	   relationships	   can	   last	   months	   or	   years.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	  
actors	   are	   well	   known	   and	   play	   important	   roles.	   Nissenbaum	   states	   that	  
“informational	  norms	  have	  three	  placeholders	  for	  actors:	  sender	  of	  information,	  
recipients	   of	   information,	   and	   informational	   subject”.247	  In	   her	   view,	   the	   roles	  
performed	  by	  the	  actors	  are	  among	  “those	  critical	  variables	  that	  affect	  people’s	  
rich	   and	   complex	   sensibilities	   over	   whether248	  privacy	   has	   been	   violated	   or	  
properly	   respected”.249	  As	   introduced,	   normally	   courts	   consider	   the	   perception	  
of	   confidentiality	   as	   the	   most	   important	   factor	   in	   determining	   implied	  
confidentiality.	  However,	  second	  to	   the	  perception	   factor,	   the	  other	  parameter	  
usually	   analysed	   in	   great	   detail	   in	   any	   confidentiality/privacy	   case	   is	   whether	  
there	  is	  any	  inequality	  between	  the	  parties/actors.	  According	  to	  Hartzog,	  in	  fact,	  
“if	   the	   discloser	   was	   inherently	   vulnerable,	   had	   fewer	   resources,	   had	   less	  
bargaining	  power,	  or	  was	   less	  sophisticated	  than	  the	  recipient,	   then	  an	   implied	  
obligation	   of	   confidentiality	   was	   more	   likely	   than	   with	   similarly	   situated	  
parties”.250	  Mentioning	  Wildearth	  Guardians	  v	  US	  Forest	  Service	  case,251	  Hartzog	  
states	  that	  “vulnerability	  and	  an	  imbalance	  of	  power	  or	  sophistication	  were	  the	  
most	   significant	   actor-­‐related	   factors	   for	   courts	   analysing	   obligation	   of	  
confidence”.252	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  role	  played	  by	  the	  actors	  involved	  becomes	  even	  
more	  crucial.	  Nissenbaum	  believes	  that	  the	  “capacities	   in	  which	  actors	  function	  
are	   crucial	   to	   the	  moral	   legitimacy	  of	   certain	   flows	  of	   information”.253	  In	   other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246	  See	  next	  section	  of	  this	  chapter.	  
247	  “Sender	  and	  receiver	  placeholders	  might	  be	  filled	  respectively	  by	  single	  individuals,	  multiple	  individuals,	  
or	   even	   collectives	   such	   as	   organizations,	   committees,	   and	   so	   forth”	   see	   Helen	   Nissenbaum	   Privacy	   in	  
Context:	  Technology,	  Policy	  and	  the	  Integrity	  of	  Social	  Life	  at	  141.	  
248	  At	  142.	  
249	  Supra.	  
250	  See	  Hartzog	  at	  776.	  
251	  Wildearth	   Guardians	   v	   US	   Forest	   Service	   High	   Country	   Conservation	   Advocates	   v	   United	   States	   Forest	  
Service,	  52	  F	  Supp	  3d	  1174	  (D	  Colo	  2014).	  
252	  See	  Hartzog	  at	  791.	  





words,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   examine,	   case	   by	   case,	   the	   way	   actors	   behave	   in	  
contexts	   entailing	   confidentiality.	   Behaviours	   and	   attitudes	   might	   indeed	   vary	  
depending	   on	   the	   situation	   and	   the	   ‘attributes’	   possessed	   by	   the	   information.	  
Aside	  from	  the	  role	  played	  by	  actors,	  Nissenbaum	  gives	  great	  importance	  to	  the	  
attributes	  (type	  or	  nature)254	  of	  information.	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  information	  is	  
about.	  The	  attributes	  assess	  the	  level	  of	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  information	  and	  explain	  
why	  it	  is	  kept	  secret	  or	  guarded	  by	  the	  discloser.	  The	  attributes	  also	  include	  the	  
reasons	   why	   the	   information	   needs	   to	   be	   kept	   confidential	   and	   why	   it	   can	  
possibly	  be	  harmful	  if	  disclosed.	  If	  the	  information	  is	  of	  a	  spiritual	  nature	  (which	  
is	   mostly	   the	   case	   in	   indigenous	   communities),	   its	   disclosure	   would	   obviously	  
cause	  moral	  and	  spiritual	  harm	  to	  the	  guardian	  and	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  community	  
which	   was	   customarily	   excluded	   from	   such	   knowledge.	   Hartzog	   explains	   that	  
implied	   obligations	   of	   confidentiality	   exist	   “in	   situations	   involving	   information	  
that,	   if	   disclosed,	   could	   harm	   a	   vulnerable	   party”. 255 	  The	   attributes	   of	   the	  
information	   determine	   the	   harm	   that	   a	   vulnerable	   party	  might	   receive	   by	   the	  
disclosure	  after	  a	  transmission	  of	  information	  has	  occurred.	  In	  this	  scenario,	  the	  
‘transmission	   principles’	   represent	   the	   way	   the	   information	   is	   distributed,	  
disseminated	  or	  transmitted	  from	  party	  to	  party	  within	  a	  confidential	  context.256	  
In	   the	   case	   of	   indigenous	   peoples,	   the	   discloser	   shares	   his	   knowledge	  because	  
the	   receiver	   has	   won	   some	   level	   of	   trust.	   The	   information	   is	   mostly	   orally	  
transmitted	   or	   recorded	   in	   photographs,	   images	   or	   videos	   if	   the	   discloser	   had	  
previously	  agreed	  to	  be	  photographed,	  recorded	  and	  so	  forth.	  The	  transmission	  
is	  based	  on	  the	  sharing	  of	  information.	  Often,	  like	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  rituals	  that	  are	  
performed	  within	  indigenous	  communities,	  the	  sharing	  might	  be	  represented	  by	  
the	   active	   participation	   of	   the	   receiver	   in	   the	   ceremonies.	   Again	   the	   context	  
comes	   to	   help.	   If	   no	   verbal	  warning	   has	   been	  made	  before	   the	  beginning	   of	   a	  
ceremony,	  for	  example,	  the	  receiver	  can	  evince	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  information	  
to	  which	  he	  is	  about	  to	  be	  revealed	  by	  the	  secrecy	  surrounding	  the	  occasion	  and	  
the	  limitations	  that	  the	  custodians	  impose	  on	  other	  members	  of	  the	  community	  
who	  are	  denied	  participation.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  “potential	  recipient’s	  vague	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254	  At	  142.	  
255	  See	  Hartzog	  at	  786.	  





reassurance	  to	  the	  discloser	  that	  the	  information	  will	  be	  protected	  could	  form	  an	  
implied	  obligation	  of	  confidentiality’	  to	  the	  discloser	  who	  allows	  the	  participation	  
in	  the	  ceremony”.257	  	  
In	   conclusion	   it	   can	   be	   agreed	   with	   Hartzog	   when	   he	   suggests	   that	   “the	  
expectations	  of	  the	  parties	  are	  typically	  determined	  by	  examining	  ‘the	  totality	  of	  
the	  circumstances’	   and	  may	  be	   ‘shown	  by	   the	  acts	  and	  conduct	  of	   the	  parties,	  
interpreted	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   subject	   matter	   and	   of	   the	   surrounding	  
circumstances”.258	  In	  this	  regard,	  Foster	  v	  Mountford259	  contains	  all	  the	  elements	  
and	  parameters	  analysed	  above.	  
	  
10.9.1	  -­‐	  Foster	  v	  Mountford:	  A	  Ground-­‐breaking	  Case	  
	  
Foster	  v	  Mountford	  is	  the	  first	  Australian	  decision	  in	  which	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  
the	   Northern	   Territory	   took	   into	   account	   “Aboriginal	   customary	   rights	   to	  
culturally	   defined	  notions	   of	   secrecy”.260	  In	   brief:	  Mountford	  was	   an	  Australian	  
ethnographer	   who	   began	   his	   work	   without	   much	   formal	   education	   in	  
anthropology.261	  During	  most	  of	  the	  1940s	  Dr	  Mountford	  was	  allowed	  access	  to	  
sacred/secret	  ceremonies	  performed	  by	  the	  Pitjantjatjara	  tribe	  with	  the	  mutual	  
understanding	   that	   the	   access	   was	   granted	   in	   a	   context	   of	   secrecy	   and	  
confidence.	  Unfortunately,	  years	   later,	  Mountford	  published	  an	  anthropological	  
text,	  Nomads	  of	  the	  Australian	  Desert,	  in	  which	  he	  disclosed	  many	  of	  the	  secret	  
practices	  of	  the	  Pitjantjatjara	  people	  that	  he	  had	  learnt	   in	  a	  secret,	  confidential	  
context.	  The	  Pitjantjatjara	  people	  brought	   the	  case	   to	  court	   specifying	   that	   the	  
text	  was	  reporting	  information	  which	  had	  been	  imparted	  in	  confidence	  and	  the	  
spreading	   of	   Pitjantjatjara	   secret	   and	   spiritual	   ceremonies	   would	   cause	   great	  
harm	   to	   the	   community.	   To	   their	   advantage,	   in	   his	   book,	   after	   the	  
acknowledgment,	  Mountford	  had	  written	  a	  few	  lines	   in	  which	  he	  confirmed	  his	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  secret	  and	  confidential	  nature	  of	  the	  information	  he	  was	  about	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  See	  Hartzog	  at	  797.	  
258	  See	  Hartzog	  at	  800.	  	  
259	  Foster	  and	  Others	  v	  Mountford	  and	  Rigby	  Ltd	  (1976)	  14	  ALR	  71.	  
260	  Supra	  at	  110.	  
261	  For	  detailed	  reading	  on	  the	  subject,	  see	  Christoph	  Antons	  “Foster	  v	  Mountford:	  Cultural	  Confidentiality	  in	  
a	  Changing	  Australia”	  in	  AT	  Kenyon,	  M	  Richardons	  and	  others	  Landmarks	  in	  Australian	  Intellectual	  Property	  





to	  unfold	  in	  the	  book.	  While,	  he	  did	  not	  mention	  whether	  any	  formal	  agreement	  
on	  confidentiality	  was	  ever	  stipulated,	   from	  his	  words	   it	   is	  obvious	  that	  he	  was	  
aware	   of	   the	   sacred/secret	   nature	   of	   the	   information. 262 	  Through	   those	  
introductory	   lines,	   the	   Court	   acknowledged	   that	   Mountford	   had	   admittedly	  
participated	   in	   secret	   ceremonies	   in	   a	   confidential	   context	   and	   that	   the	   book	  
would	   reveal	   secret	   information	   that	   could	   cause	   great	   damage	   of	   a	   serious	  
nature	  to	  the	  community.	  Consequently,	   the	  Supreme	  Court	   (NTSC)	  granted	  an	  
injunction	  to	  stop	  the	  disclosure,	  publication	  and	  sales	  of	  Nomads	  of	  the	  Desert	  
in	   the	   Northern	   Territory. 263 In	   granting	   an	   injunction,	   Justice	   Muirhead	  
recognised	   the	  confidential	  nature	  of	   the	  disclosure	  and	   the	  cultural	  harm	  that	  
such	  disclosure	  could	  bring	  to	  the	  Pitjantjatjara	  people.	   In	  this	  regard	  he	  stated	  
that:264	  
	  
…	  the	  defendant,	  Dr	  Mountford,	  many	  years	  ago,	  was	  shown	  things	  and	  places,	  
and	  given	  information	  in	  confidence,	  by	  people,	  and	  on	  occasions	  which	  perhaps	  
cannot	  now	  be	   identified,	  save	   in	  terms	  of	  general	  community,	  and	   in	  terms	  of	  
the	   period.	   I	   find	   the	   plaintiffs	   have	   made	   out	   a	   prima	   facie	   case	   that	   these	  
secrets	  may,	  by	  continuing	  publication	  of	  the	  book	  in	  the	  Northern	  Territory,	  be	  
revealed	  to	  those	  to	  whom	  it	  was	  always	  understood	  it	  would	  not	  be	  revealed,	  
and	  that	  continuance	  of	  such	  publication	  in	  the	  Northern	  Territory	  and	  of	  course	  
perhaps	  elsewhere,	  may	  cause	  damage	  of	   serious	  nature,	  damage	  of	  a	   type	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262	  “Where	   Australian	   aborigines	   are	   concerned,	   and	   in	   areas	   where	   traditional	   aboriginal	   religion	   is	   still	  
significant,	  this	  book	  should	  be	  used	  only	  after	  consultation	  with	  local	  male	  religious	  leaders.	  This	  restriction	  
is	  important;	  it	  is	  imposed	  because	  the	  concept	  of	  what	  is	  secret	  or	  may	  not	  be	  revealed	  to	  the	  uninitiated	  
in	   aboriginal	   religious	   belief	   and	   action,	   varies	   considerably	   throughout	   the	   Australian	   Continent	   and	  
because	  the	  varying	  views	  of	  aborigines	  in	  this	  respect	  must,	  on	  all	  occasions	  be	  observed”	  see	  Foster	  and	  
Others	  v	  Mountford	  and	  Rigby	  Ltd	  [1976]	  14	  ALR	  71	  WL	  46	  225,	  46	  235.	  
263	  According	  to	  Antons	  “the	  anthropologist	  gave	  evidence	  that	   in	  his	  experience	  the	  information	  revealed	  
could	  only	  have	  been	   supplied	  and	  expose	   in	   confidence.	   The	   judge	   took	  Mountford’s	  own	  caveat	   at	   the	  
beginning	   of	   the	   book	   as	   confirmation	   that	   the	   author	   was	   well	   aware	   that	   the	   book	   contained	   secret-­‐
sacred	  materials.	  It	  was	  this	  understanding	  rather	  than	  ‘evidence	  by	  document	  or	  conversation	  or	  indeed	  by	  
recognized	   legal	   relationship’	   that	   persuaded	   the	   judge	   to	   grant	   the	   injunction	   based	   on	   breach	   of	  
confidentiality.	   Neither	   Nomads	   of	   the	   Australian	   Desert	   nor	   the	   description	   of	   the	   1940	   expedition	   in	  
Mountford’s	  biography	  expressly	  refer	  to	  restrictions	  imposed	  on	  Mountford	  at	  the	  time	  the	  knowledge	  was	  
revealed.	   However,	   Nomads	   of	   the	   Australian	   Desert	   contained	   detailed	   sections	   on	   ‘sacred	   objects’.	  
Further,	   both	   Nomads	   of	   the	   Australian	   Desert	   and	   Mountford’s	   biography	   mention	   that	   during	   the	  
expedition	  Mountford	  and	  his	  young	  companion	  Lauri	  Sheard	  were	  allotted	  totems	  and	  tribal	  relationships	  
within	   the	   organisation	   of	   the	   Pitjantjatjara;	   the	   became	   totemically	   associated	   with	   the	   land.	   This	  
association,	   in	  the	  view	  of	  the	  Pitjantjatjara,	  would	  have	  brought	  him	  rights	  as	  well	  as	  responsibilities	  and	  
obligations	   towards	   maintaining	   and	   observing	   their	   customs	   and	   laws”	   see	   Christoph	   Antons	   “Foster	   v	  
Mountford:	  Cultural	  Confidentiality	  in	  a	  Changing	  Australia”	  at	  121.	  





which	  monetary	  damages	  are	  irrelevant,	  and	  to	  which	  are	  not,	  in	  fact,	  claimed	  in	  
this	  action.	  
	  
More	   importantly,	   Justice	  Muirhead’s	   judgement	   is	   of	   great	   relevance	  because	  
he	  formally	  recognised	  that	  the	  plaintiffs,	  in	  the	  persons	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  
Council,265	  were	  entitled	  to	  proceed	  in	  the	  action	  for	  breach	  of	  confidence.266	  
According	   to	   Gurry,	   although	   Muirhead’s	   conclusion	   is	   not	   clear,	   it	   might	   be	  
identifiable	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  “entitlement	  to	  know	  the	  secrets	  brought	  with	  it	  an	  
entitlement	   to	   sue	   to	   protect	   them”.267	  In	   other	  words,	   in	   Foster	   v	  Mountford	  
there	   is	  a	  “shared	  entitlement	  to	  knowledge	  and	  use	  of	  the	  community	  secrets	  
and	  this,	  in	  turn,	  gave	  rise	  to	  obligations	  of	  confidence	  owed	  to	  individuals	  within	  
that	  community”.268	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Council	  could	  rightfully	  
bind	  Mountford	   to	   a	   confidentiality	   agreement	   he	   was	   requested	   to	  maintain	  
over	   the	   years.	   After	   the	   hearing,	   the	   Northern	   Territory	   Supreme	   Court	   of	  
Australia	   granted	   an	   ex	   parte	   injunction	   which,	   although	   only	   limited	   to	   the	  
Northern	   Territory,	   remains	   of	   fundamental	   importance	   because	   it	   recognised	  
the	  ‘relative	  secrecy’	  nature	  of	  the	  information	  which	  was	  known	  and	  distributed	  
among	   ‘insiders’	  but	   remained	   restricted	   to	   ‘outsiders’.	   In	  addition	   to	   that,	   the	  
case	   also	   demonstrated	   that	   an	   appropriate	   remedy	   for	   breach	   of	   confidence	  
could	   be	   granted	   in	   cases	   presenting	   a	   breach	   of	   ‘cultural	   privacy’	   whose	  
disclosure	   could	   greatly	   harm	   the	   community	   involved.269	  It	  was	   also	   a	   case	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265	  “The	   Pitjantjatjara	   Council	   Aboriginal	   Corporation	   is	   an	   organisation	   of	   all	  Ngaanyatjarra,	   Pitjantjatjara	  
and	   Yankunytjatjara	   people	   and	   their	   communities	   and	   outstations	   in	  Western	   Australia,	   South	   Australia	  
and	   the	   Northern	   Territory,	   covering	   an	   area	   of	   around	   350,000	   square	   kilometres.	   Communities	   and	  
homelands	   extend	   from	  Coober	   Pedy	   in	   South	  Australia	   to	  west	   of	  Warburton	   in	  Western	  Australia,	   and	  
include	   Docker	   River,	   Mutitjulu,	   Imanpa	   and	   Finke	   in	   the	   Northern	   Territory.	   The	   Ngaanyatjarra,	  
Pitjantjatjara	  and	  Yankunytjatjara	  people	  formed	  the	  Pitjantjatjara	  Council	  in	  1976.The	  Council	  became	  the	  
focal	   point	   for	   political	   and	   land-­‐based	   discussions	   and	   negotiations	   with	   governments	   and	   the	   mining	  
industry.	  It	  was	  the	  group	  through	  which	  decisions	  were	  made	  and	  negotiations	  conducted	  with	  the	  South	  
Australian	   Government	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   Pitjantjatjara	   Land	   Rights	   Act.	   The	   primary	   objective	   of	   the	  
Pitjantjatjara	  Council	  is	  to	  aid	  wherever	  and	  whenever	  possible,	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  its	  Members	  (NPY	  people	  
and	  communities)	  and	  their	  culture.	  The	  Council's	  objectives	  are	  to	  develop	  appropriate	  means	  of	  managing	  
their	  traditional	  land	  within	  the	  Council	  area	  and	  in	  so	  doing	  to	  assist	  in	  alleviating	  the	  significant	  social	  and	  
economic	  problems	  of	  Members.	  It	  also	  aims	  to	  arrest	  the	  social	  disintegration	  within	  NPY	  Communities	  by	  
ensuring	   that	  programs	  and	  actions	  are	   in	   accordance	  with	  Members'	   cultural	   values	  and	  practice'	   and	   it	  
promotes	   improved	   educational	   opportunities	   for	  Members	   and	   their	   families”	   see	   electronic	   document	  
<http://pitjantjatjaracouncil.com.au/>	  last	  visited	  on	  12/11/2015.	  
266	  Foster	  and	  Others	  v	  Mountford	  and	  Rigby	  Ltd	  (1976)	  14	  ALR	  71	  at	  75.	  
267	  Gurry	  citing	  Mid-­‐City	   Skin	  Cancer	  and	  Laser	  Centre	   v	  Zahedi-­‐Anarak	   [2006]	  NSWSC	  844;	   (2006)	  NSWLR	  
569	  at	  206.	  
268	  See	  Gurry	  at	  para	  8.19.	  
269	  “The	  contention	  that	  the	  plaintiffs	  as	  individuals,	  and	  their	  people,	  will	  suffer	  damage	  and	  dislocation	  if	  





which	  the	  public	  interest	  defence	  did	  not	  justify	  disclosure,	  or	  that	  the	  argument	  
that	   the	   book	  was	   of	   ‘public	   interest’	   (see	   next	   section)	   as	   a	   document	  which	  
would	  preserve	  the	  justice	  of	  a	  dying	  and	  vanishing	  culture,	  proved	  to	  have	  little	  
standing.	  According	  to	  Muirhead,	  “despite	  Mr	  Mountford’s	  prognosis	   that	  their	  
life	   and	   beliefs	   ‘are	   quickly	   vanishing’,	   there	   is	   still	   an	   urgent	   desire	   in	   these	  
people	  to	  preserve	  those	  things,	  their	  lands	  and	  their	  identity,	  and	  the	  existence	  
of	   the	   council	   [of	   the	   elders]	   itself	   illustrates	   these	   objectives”.270	  In	   1985	   a	  
second	   suit	   was	   filed	   by	   the	   Pitjantjatjara	   Council	   for	   the	   removal	   of	   images	  
taken	  by	  Mountford	  during	  sacred	  and	  secret	  ceremonies.	  Also	   in	  that	  case,	  an	  
injunction	  was	  awarded.	  271	  
	  
10.9.2	  –	  The	  Public	  Interest	  Defence	  and	  the	  Freedom	  of	  Expression	  Argument	  
Do	  Not	  Apply	  to	  Indigenous	  Secret	  Knowledge	  
	  
In	   general,	   the	   ‘public	   interest’	   is	   distinct	   from	   something	   that	   interests	   the	  
public	  or	  that	  the	  public	   is	  curious	  about.	  As	  such,	  the	  information	  must	  not	  be	  
just	   interesting	   to	   the	   public,	   but	   properly	   within	   the	   public	   interest.	   In	   other	  
words,	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   information	   must	   be	   of	   legitimate	   concern	   to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
not	  only	  because	  of	  one’s	  lay	  recognition	  gained	  by	  service	  in	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  significance	  and	  purpose	  of	  
initiation,	   but	   also	   because	   of	   the	   possible	   consequences	   of	   even	   accidental	   acquisition	   of	   knowledge	   of	  
such	  matters	  by	  women	  and	  uninitiated	  …”	  see	  Foster	  and	  Others	  v	  Mountford	  and	  Rigby	  Ltd	  (1976)	  14	  ALR	  
71	  WL	  at	  46	  236;	  Christoph	  Antons	  “Foster	  v	  Mountford:	  Cultural	  Confidentiality	  in	  a	  Changing	  Australia”	  at	  
116.	  
270	  Foster	  and	  Others	  v	  Mountford	  and	  Rigby	  Ltd	  [1976]	  14	  ALR	  71,	  72.	  
271	  “Representatives	  of	  the	  Pitjantjatjara	  Council	  came	  to	  Melbourne	  on	  25	  March	  and	  on	  the	  afternoon	  of	  
that	   day	   issued	   a	   generally	   endorsed	   writ	   (No	   1796	   of	   1982)	   and	   a	   summons	   in	   chambers	   seeking	  
injunctions	  to	  restrain	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  slides	  (Mr	  Lowe)	  and	  the	  auctioneer	  from	  displaying	  or	  selling	  the	  
slides.	   The	   general	   endorsement	   pleaded	   that	   the	   slides	   were	   taken	   by	   Dr	   Mountford	   as	   confidential	  
information	  for	  his	  own	  personal	  use,	  and	  not	  otherwise.	  Affidavits	  in	  support	  of	  the	  application	  were	  made	  
by	  Peter	  Nganingu,	   the	   second-­‐named	  plaintiff	   and	  a	  member	  of	   the	  Pitjantjatjara	  people,	   and	  by	  Daniel	  
Vachon,	  an	  anthropologist	  employed	  by	  the	  Pitiantiatiara	  Council.	  Interlocutory	  orders	  were	  made	  requiring	  
the	  defendants	  to	  deliver	  up	  possession	  of	  any	  slides	  that	  related	  to	  or	  recorded	  any	  of	  the	  philosophical	  or	  
religious	   traditions	   of	   the	   Pitjantjatjara	   people	   to	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   Prothonotary	   and	   restraining	   the	  
defendants	   from	   selling	   or	   displaying	   the	   slides.	   These	   orders	   enabled	   the	   slides	   to	   be	   inspected	   by	  
representatives	   of	   the	   Pitjantjatjara	   Council	   who	   selected	   the	   slides	   dealing	   with	   secret/sacred	  material,	  
Subsequently	  final	  orders	  were	  made	  declaring	  that	  the	  property	  in	  and	  ownership	  of	  these	  selected	  slides,	  
photographs	   and	   negatives	   vested	   in	   the	   Pitjantjatjara	   Council	   for	   and	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   Pitjantjatjara,	  
Yankuntjatjara	   and	  Ngaanyatjara	   peoples”	   see	   Pitjantjatjara	   Council	   Inc	   and	  Peter	  Nganingu	   v	   John	   Lowe	  
and	  Lyn	  Bender	  (Injunction	  to	  prevent	  display	  and	  sale	  of	  photographic	  slides	  -­‐	  slides	  from	  collection	  of	  late	  
Dr	  C	  Mountford	  -­‐	  slides	  showing	  secret	  ceremonies)	  [1982]	  Aboriginal	  Law	  B	  30;	  (1982)	  1(4)	  Aboriginal	  Law	  






public.272	  In	  Woodward	  v	  Hutchins	  Lord	  Denning	  MR	  argued	  that	  “in	  these	  cases	  
of	   confidential	   information	   it	   is	   a	   case	   of	   balancing	   the	   public	   interest	   in	  
maintaining	  the	  confidence	  against	  the	  public	   interest	  in	  knowing	  the	  truth”.	  273	  
In	  other	  words,	  the	  court	  should	  engage	  in	  an	  unstructured	  balancing	  exercise	  in	  
which	  the	  general	  discretion	  of	  the	  court	  to	  enforce	  or	  not	  confidentiality	  would	  
become	   of	   crucial	   importance.	   On	   the	   public	   interest	   clause,	   the	   Law	  
Commission	  commented	  that:274	  
	  
The	   range	  of	   circumstances	   in	  which	   the	  defence	  might	  properly	  be	  used	   is	   so	  
wide	  and	  so	  variable	  that	   it	   is	  not	  practicable	  to	  define	   in	  general	  terms	  all	   the	  
criteria	  to	  be	  used	  and	  it	  would	  be	  misleading	  to	  single	  out	  particular	  issues	  …	  for	  
consideration	  …	  The	  public	  interest	  is	  a	  developing	  concept	  which	  changes	  with	  
the	  social	  attitudes	  of	  the	  times.	  
	  
Public	   interest	   is	   today	   the	   strongest	   defence	   available	   to	   defendants	  who	   are	  
accused	  of	  breach	  of	  confidential	  relationships.	  A	  defendant	  can,	  in	  fact,	  escape	  
liability	   if	   he/she	   can	   establish	   that	   the	   disclosure	   was	   justified	   in	   the	   public	  
interest.275	  According	   to	  Bently,	  while	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  circumscribe	  what	  can	  be	  
rightly	  claimed	  to	  be	  in	  the	  public	  interest,	  there	  are	  a	  few	  factors	  that	  come	  to	  
aid	   in	  determining	   if	   the	   ‘public	   interest’	   justification	   can	  be	   rightly	   claimed	  by	  
any	  defendant:	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  information	  (reporting	  misdeeds	  or	  information	  
which	   are	   important	   to	   the	   country);	   criminal	   offences,	   civil	   wrongs,	   non-­‐
compliance	   with	   a	   legal	   obligation,	   miscarriage	   of	   justice;	   behaviours	   likely	   to	  
endanger	  health	  or	  safety;	  damage	  to	  the	  environment	  and	  so	  forth.276	  While	  a	  
level	   of	   flexibility	   is	   justifiable,	   however,	   the	   law	   does	   not	   permit	   “the	  
unauthorized	   disclosure	   of	   information	   that	   is	   merely	   ‘interesting	   to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272	  Jessica	  Christine	  Lai	  Indigenous	  Cultural	  Heritage	  and	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights:	  Learning	  from	  the	  New	  
Zealand	  Experience?	  (Springer,	  Switzerland,	  2014)	  at	  175	  citing	  Hosking	  v	  Runting	  [2005]	  1	  NZLR	  1	  para	  133	  
Gault	  Paul	  and	  Blanchard	  J;	  TV3	  v	  Broadcasting	  Standard	  Authority	  [1995]	  2	  NZLR	  720,	  933;	  see	  also	  Lionel	  
Bently	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law	  Part	  V	  on	  Confidential	  Information;	  see	  Gurry	  at	  Chapter	  13	  para	  13.35	  and	  
Chapter	  8.	  
273	  Woodward	  v	  Hutchins	  [1977]	  1	  WLR	  760	  (CA).	  
274	  Law	  Commission	  Working	  Paper	  on	  Breach	  of	  Confidence	  No	  58	  (1974)	  at	  para	  93.	  
275	  In	  Campbell	  v	  Frisbee	   [2002]	  EMLR	  31	  Lord	  Phillips	  stated	  that	  “the	  right	  of	  confidentiality,	  whether	  or	  
not	  founded	  in	  contract,	  is	  not	  absolute.	  That	  right	  must	  give	  way	  where	  it	  is	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  that	  the	  
confidential	  information	  shall	  be	  made	  public”	  at	  23.	  





public’”.277	  In	   other	   words,	   the	   law	   does	   not	   protect	   information	   that	   has	   no	  
direct	  social	  relevance	  or	  prevent	  and	  report	  any	  misdeed.	  In	  Fraser	  v	  Evans	  Lord	  
Denning	   specified	   that	   “no	   person	   is	   permitted	   to	   divulge	   to	   the	   world	  
information	   which	   he	   has	   received	   in	   confidence,	   unless	   he	   has	   just	   cause	   or	  
excuse	   for	   doing	   so”.278	  The	   type	   of	   obligation	   involved	   in	   the	   confidence	   is	  
another	  important	  factor	  that	  is	  likely	  to	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  determining	  if	  
the	   public	   interest	   clause	   is	   acceptable	   as	   a	   defence.	   Stanley	   recognises	   five	  
overlapping	  ways	   in	  which	   it	   can	  be	  assessed	  whether	  a	  public	   interest	   can	  be	  
claimed:	  279	  
	  
• where	   there	   is	   a	   contract	   between	   the	   claimant	   and	   the	   defendant,	   as	   a	  
principle	   employed	   in	   construing	   an	   express	   contractual	   obligation	   of	  
confidentiality;	  
• where	   there	   is	   a	   contract	   between	   the	   claimant	   and	   the	   defendant,	   as	   a	  
principle	  employed	  in	  deciding	  whether	  an	  express	  contractual	  obligation	  of	  
confidentiality	  is	  contrary	  to	  public	  policy;	  
• where	   there	   is	   a	   contract	   between	   the	   claimant	   and	   the	   defendant,	   in	  
deciding	   the	  extent	   to	  which	   the	   claimant	  has	  a	   reasonable	  expectation	  of	  
confidentiality;	  and	  
• where	   the	   claimant	   seeks	   an	   equitable	   remedy,	   in	   deciding	   whether	   that	  
remedy	   should	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   discretion	   be	   awarded,	   or	   in	   applying	   the	  
maxim	  that	  the	  equitable	  claimant	  must	  have	  ‘clean	  hands’.	  
	  
Another	  factor	  of	  great	  importance	  in	  determining	  if	  the	  disclosure	  in	  the	  public	  
interest	   is	   acceptable	   depends	   on	   the	   party	   to	   whom	   the	   information	   is	  
disclosed.	  Some	  information	  can,	  in	  fact,	  be	  disclosed	  to	  one	  person	  or	  group	  but	  
not	  to	  another.	  In	  Foster	  v	  Mountford,	  it	  might	  have	  been	  acceptable	  that	  Foster	  
disclosed	  the	  information	  to	  selected	  colleagues	  interested	  or	  involved	  in	  similar	  
research,	  but	  not	  to	  the	  public	  at	  large	  whose	  lives	  would	  not	  be	  in	  danger	  if	  the	  
information	   were	   not	   disclosed,	   or	   were	   in	   great	   need	   to	   acquire	   such	   secret	  
information.	   It	   is	   clear	   that	   one	   of	   the	   reasons	   for	   publishing	  Nomads	   of	   the	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  At	  1181;	  see	  also	  Paul	  Stanley	  The	  Law	  of	  Confidentiality:	  A	  Restatement	  at	  Chapter	  11.	  
278	  Fraser	  v	  Evans	  [1969]	  1	  QB	  349	  at	  361.	  





Desert	  was	  mostly	  based	  on	  the	  economic	  remuneration	  and	  the	  possible	  fame	  
that	  would	  result	  from	  its	  publication.	  In	  this	  case,	  while	  receipt	  of	  remuneration	  
cannot	  preclude	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  defence,	  “it	  may	  indicate	  that	  a	  defendant	  
confused	   their	   own	   interests	  with	   those	   of	   the	   public”.280	  On	   the	   same	   line	   of	  
thought,	   Foster	   could	   not	   claim	   freedom	   of	   expression	   as	   defence.	   As	   seen	   in	  
previous	  sections,	  while	  freedom	  of	  expression	  is	  today	  an	  important	  argument	  
to	   be	   used	   as	   a	   defence	   for	   circulating	   information	   that	   should	   be	   kept	  
confidential,	   it	  must	  always	  be	  asked:	   is	   there	  an	   interference	  with	  the	  right	  of	  
respect	   for	   one’s	   private	   life?	   And	  whether	   the	   interference	  with	   that	   right	   is	  
justified.	   Copying	   and	   reporting	   private,	   secret	   information	   of	   sacred,	   spiritual	  
and	  cultural	  value,	  which	  are	  not	  of	  public	  importance	  or	  general	  interest	  cannot	  
be	   justified	  by	   freedom	  of	   expression.	  Article	   8	  of	   the	  ECHR	   clearly	   states	   that	  
“everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  respect	  for	  his	  private	  and	  family	  life,	  his	  home	  and	  his	  
correspondence”.	   While	   Article	   10	   recognises	   freedom	   of	   expression	   as	  
fundamental	  foundation	  of	  any	  civil	  society	  at	  10.2	  it	  states	  that:	  
	  
The	  exercise	  of	  these	  freedoms,	  since	  it	  carries	  with	  it	  duties	  and	  responsibilities,	  
may	   be	   subject	   to	   such	   formalities,	   conditions,	   restrictions	   or	   penalties	   as	   are	  
prescribed	  by	   law	  and	  are	  necessary	   in	  a	  democratic	  society,	   in	  the	   interests	  of	  
national	   security,	   territorial	   integrity	   or	   public	   safety,	   for	   the	   prevention	   of	  
disorder	  or	   crime,	   for	   the	  protection	  of	  health	  or	  morals,	   for	   the	  protection	  of	  
the	   reputation	  or	   rights	  of	  others,	   for	  preventing	   the	  disclosure	  of	   information	  
received	   in	   confidence,	  or	   for	  maintaining	   the	  authority	  and	   impartiality	  of	   the	  
judiciary.	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  such	  liberties	  are	  not	  absolute	  but	  subjected	  to	  legal	  restrictions	  
where	  the	  reputation	  or	  rights	  of	  others	  are	  violated.	  
	  
Western	  jurisdictions	  (especially	  in	  the	  United	  States)281	  value	  individual	  rights	  to	  
the	   detriment	   of	   collective	   rights.	   As	   such,	   freedom	  of	   expression	   is	   protected	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  Lionel	  Bently	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law	  at	  1188.	  
281 	  See	   Article	   10	   of	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   (supra);	   and	   First	   Amendment	   of	  
Constitution	   of	   the	   United	   States.	   “The	   First	   Amendment	   guarantees	   freedoms	   concerning	   religion,	  
expression,	  assembly,	  and	  the	  right	  to	  petition.	   It	  forbids	  Congress	  from	  both	  promoting	  one	  religion	  over	  





above	  all	  because	  it	  represents	  a	  tool	  in	  the	  search	  for	  truth.	  However,	  as	  stated	  
in	   Art	   10.2	   of	   the	   ECHR,	   the	   law	   not	   only	   protects	   free	   speech,	   but	   it	   is	   also	  
designed	   to	   prevent,	   among	   other	   things,	   the	   perpetration	   of	   racial	   prejudice,	  
misunderstanding	   and	   misrepresentation	   of	   indigenous	   peoples’	   traditions.282	  
Consequently,	   the	   law	  must	   take	   into	  account	   the	   fact	   that	   free	  speech	  cannot	  
win	  over	  the	  private	  life	  and	  expectations	  of	  any	  reasonable	  person	  who	  aims	  to	  
protect	   his	   sensitive	   information	   from	   public	   scrutiny.	   Case	   law	   analysed	   in	  
Springer,283	  von	  Hannover	  (No	  2)	  and	  von	  Hannover	  (No	  3)284	  demonstrates	  that	  
while	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   draw	   the	   line	   dividing	   freedom	  of	   speech/public	   interest	  
from	  private	   interests,	   it	  also	  highlighted	  a	   few	  factors	   that	  are	   relevant	   to	   the	  
balancing	  of	  the	  competing	  interests:	  
	  
• the	  public	  profile	  of	  the	  claimant;	  
• the	  claimant’s	  conduct	  prior	  to	  the	  threatened	  publications;	  
• the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  information	  about	  the	  claimant’s	  private	  affairs	  was	  
obtained;	  and	  	  
• the	  content,	  form	  and	  potential	  for	  harm	  of	  the	  publication.285	  
	  
Obviously,	   the	   publication	   of	  Nomads	   of	   the	   Australian	   Desert,	   along	  with	   the	  
detailed	   descriptions	   of	   the	   Pitjantjatjara	   sacred/secret	   ceremonies,	   do	   not	  
respond	   completely	   to	   the	   factors	   above	  mentioned.	   The	  Pitjantjatjara	   are	  not	  
public	   figures;	   although	  well-­‐known	   in	   Australia,	   they	   have	   always	   kept	   a	   very	  
private	  life;	  the	  information	  was	  obtained	  in	  an	  obvious	  context	  entailing	  secrecy	  
and	   confidentiality;	   and	   the	   harm	   caused	   by	   the	   disclosure	   of	   the	   information	  
would	   greatly	   surpass	   the	   public	   interest	   clause.	   Indeed,	   the	   harm	   was	  
undoubtedly	  proven.	  As	  such,	  the	  disclosure	  of	  secret	  knowledge	  of	   indigenous	  
peoples	   cannot	   be	   justified	   either	   by	   the	   public	   interest	   or	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  
freedom	  of	  expression.	  Nomads	  does	  not	  make	  any	  contribution	  to	  any	  existing	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  Congress	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  the	  press	  or	  the	  rights	  of	  individuals	  to	  speak	  freely.	  It	  also	  guarantees	  
the	   right	   of	   citizens	   to	   assemble	   peaceably	   and	   to	   petition	   their	   government”	  
<www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/first_amendment>	  last	  visited	  on	  12/05/15.	  
282	  See	  chapter	  on	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  international	  law.	  
283	  Axel	  Springer	  v	  Germany	  App	  No	  39954/08	  [2012]	  55	  EHRR	  6.	  
284	  Von	  Hannover	   (No	  2)	   App	  No	  40660/08	   [2012]	   (ECtHR);	  Von	  Hannover	   (No	  3)	   App	  No	  8772/10	   [2014]	  
EHRLR	  61.	  





debate	  of	   general	   interest.	   Although	  not	  many	  people	   around	   the	  world	   know	  
who	  the	  Pitjantjatjara	  people	  are	  and	  what	  their	  traditions	  are	  about	  and	  might	  
not	  be	  interested	  in	  knowing	  the	  secret	  details	  of	  their	  knowledge,	  they	  are	  well	  
known	   in	   Australia	   and	   the	   sharing	   of	   their	   secret	   traditions	   could	   be	   very	  
harmful	   for	   the	   community.	   Apart	   from	   the	   advancement	   of	   very	   traditional	  
knowledge	   whose	   disclosure	   might	   interest	   specialists	   and	   anthropologists,	  
indigenous	   information	   might	   be	   ‘curious	   and	   unusual’	   but	   have	   no	   social	  
relevance	   for	  our	  modern	  global	  society.286	  Such	  knowledge	  does	  not	  endanger	  
our	  society	  or	  prevent	  harms	  of	  any	  kind.	  The	  only	  harms	  that	  the	  disclosure	  can	  
cause	   are	   the	   ones	   inside	   the	   community	   that	   holds	   the	   information	   secret.	  
Indigenous	   information	   is	   mostly	   intangible	   and	   is	   imbued	   with	   spiritual	   and	  
traditional	  significances	  which	  could	  be	  exploited	  by	  defendants	  only	  for	  financial	  
gain	  or	  personal	   interests.	  And	   these	  are	  not	   serious	  enough	   reasons	   to	   justify	  
freedom	   of	   expression	   or	   public	   interest	   outweighing	   the	   protection	   of	   the	  
confidential	   information.	   Having	   said	   this,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   remember	   that	  
appropriation	   of	   indigenous	   culture	   often	   entails	   a	   level	   of	   deception,	  
surreptitious	  appropriation	  and	  unlawful	  acquisition	  of	  traditional	  information	  or	  
later-­‐on	   breach	   of	   mutual	   terms	   of	   confidentiality	   that	   never	   entailed	   public	  
disclosure	   of	   the	   information.	   The	   secrecy	   and	   the	   difficulty	   of	   acquiring	   the	  
information	   prove	   that	   the	   information	   is	   private	   and	   only	   an	   established	  
confidential	  relationship	  can	  convince	  the	  confider	  to	  reveal	  his	  knowledge.	  If	  the	  
confidentiality	  was	  not	  in	  place,	  information	  sharing	  would	  not	  happen.	  Indeed,	  
in	   indigenous	   societies	   sensitive	   confidential	   information	   does	   not	   circulate	  
freely	   outside	   its	   original	   context.	   The	   best	   solution	   to	   prevent	   uncontrolled	  
circulation	   of	   indigenous	   secret	   knowledge	   is	   to	   stop	   as	   soon	   as	   possible	   the	  
disclosure	  and	  circulation	  of	  the	  information	  outside	  the	  original	  milieu.	  How	  can	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286	  It	   is	   true	   that	  biological	   knowledge	  of	  natural	   remedies	  used	  by	   indigenous	  peoples	  might	  be	  of	   great	  






10.10	  –	  Remedies:	  Interim	  and	  Final	  Injunctions	  
	  
Historically,	   the	   injunction	  was	  an	  equitable	   remedy	  and	  could	  only	  be	  granted	  
by	   the	   High	   Court	   of	   Chancery.	   Today,	   courts	   can	   grant	   an	   interim	   or	   final	  
injunction	  “in	  all	  cases	  in	  which	  it	  appears	  to	  the	  court	  to	  be	  just	  and	  convenient	  
to	   do	   so”.287	  There	   is	   one	   overriding	   requirement:	   “the	   applicant	  must	   have	   a	  
cause	   of	   action	   in	   law	   entitling	   him	   to	   substantive	   relief”.288	  This	   because	   an	  
injunction	   “is	   not	   a	   cause	   of	   action	   (like	   a	   tort	   or	   a	   breach	   of	   contract)	   but	   a	  
remedy	   (like	  damages)”.289	  Given	   that	   injunctions	   are	  discretionary,	   rules	   apply	  
when	  the	  granting	  of	  an	  injunction	  is	  under	  consideration:	  
	  
• the	   claimants’	   behaviour	  must	   be	   based	   on	   truthfulness	   and	  must	   not	   use	  
deplorable	  means	  in	  pursuing	  an	  objective;290	  
• the	   relevance	   of	   malice	   from	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   defendant	   may	   properly	  
influence	   the	   court	   to	   exercise	   its	   discretion	   in	   favour	   of	   granting	   an	  
injunction;291	  
• “an	  injunction	  will	  not	  be	  granted	  if	  it	  would	  be	  pointless	  or	  ineffective,	  but	  it	  
is	  not	   the	  habit	  of	   the	  court,	   in	   considering	  whether	  or	  not	   it	  will	  make	  an	  
order,	  to	  contemplate	  the	  possibility	  that	  will	  not	  be	  obeyed”;292	  
• “the	  very	  first	  principle	  of	  injunction	  law	  is	  that	  prima	  facie	  you	  do	  not	  obtain	  
injunctions	  to	  restrain	  actionable	  wrongs	  for	  which	  damages	  are	  the	  proper	  
remedy”;293	  
• conversely,	   an	   injunction	  will	   be	   considered	  necessary	   if,	   for	   instance,	   “the	  
injury	  cannot	  fairly	  be	  compensated	  by	  money	  –	  if	  the	  defendant	  has	  acted	  
in	  a	  high-­‐minded	  manner	  –	  if	  he	  has	  endeavoured	  to	  steal	  a	  march	  upon	  the	  
claimant	  or	  evade	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court”.294	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287	  David	  Bean	  Injunctions	  (Sweet	  and	  Maxwell	  Ltd,	  London,	  2004)	  at	  4.	  
288	  Supra	  at	  4.	  
289	  At	  4.	  
290	  “It	  is	  said	  that	  ‘he	  who	  comes	  to	  equity	  must	  come	  with	  clean	  hands’	  which	  means	  that	  the	  application	  of	  
a	   party	  with	   unclean	   hands	   is	   likely	   to	   fail”	   see	  Armstrong	   v	   Sheppard	  &	   Short	   Ltd	   [1959]	   2	  QB	   384;	   see	  
Hubbard	  v	  Vosper	  [1972]	  2	  QB	  84.	  
291	  See	  Bradford	  Corp	  v	  Pickles	  [1895]	  AC	  587.	  
292	  See	  Romer	  L	  J	  in	  Re	  Liddell’s	  Settlement	  Trusts	  [1936]	  Ch	  365	  at	  374,	  approved	  by	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  in	  
Costanho	  v	  Brown	  &	  Root	  (UK)	  Ltd	  [1981]	  AC	  552	  at	  574.	  
293	  See	  Lindley	  L	  J	  in	  London	  &	  Blackwall	  Railway	  Co	  v	  Cross	  [1886]	  31	  Ch	  D	  354	  at	  369.	  





Equity	   law	   can	   award	   compensation	   for	   disclosure	   which	   has	   caused	   great	  
emotional	   distress	   to	   the	   confider.	   In	   most	   of	   the	   cases	   emotional	   distress	   is	  
associated	  with	  serious	  invasions	  of	  privacy	  and	  breach	  of	  contract	  under	  normal	  
contractual	   principles.295	  Yet,	   under	   common	   law,	   damages	   are	  mostly	   applied	  
where	   the	   obligation	   of	   confidentiality	   is	   contractual	   and	   involves	   obvious	  
economic	   interests.	   In	  cases	   involving	  damages,	  the	  claimant	  desires	  a	  financial	  
remedy	   or	   equitable	   compensation	   on	   account	   of	   profits	   involved	   in	   the	  
disclosure	   of	   confidential	   information.	   However,	   as	   pointed	   out	   by	   Bently,	   the	  
“measure	  of	  damages	  for	  breach	  of	  confidence	  should	  be	  tortious,	  reflecting	  loss	  
to	  the	  claimant”.296	  	  
In	  general,	  damages	  should	  be	  assessed	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  market	  value	  of	  the	  
information.297	  In	  some	  cases,	  courts	  can	  award	  damages	  on	  account	  of	  distress	  
and	  injury	  to	  feelings.298	  However,	  reputation	  and	  the	  dignity	  of	  an	  individual	  are	  
fundamental	  aspects	  of	  a	  person’s	  dignity	   in	  a	  democratic	   society,	  and	   there	   is	  
no	   monetary	   compensation	   that	   can	   restore	   the	   dignity	   and	   reputation	   of	   a	  
person	   once	   it	   is	   lost.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   indigenous	   peoples,	   the	   harms	   that	   the	  
disclosure	  of	  confidential	  information	  can	  cause	  are	  multifaceted	  and	  complex	  in	  
nature.	   While	   there	   are	   obvious	   components	   of	   embarrassment,	   humiliation,	  
shame	   and	   guilt	   associated	   to	   the	   disclosure	   of	   secret	   information,	   the	   harm	  
caused	   is	  not	  necessarily	   economic	  nor	   linked	   to	   intellectual	  property	   rights	   as	  
such.	  The	  disclosure	  of	  the	  information	  outside	  the	  customary	  context	  has	  social,	  
cultural	   and	   spiritual	   (sometimes	   esoteric)	   repercussions	   for	   the	   whole	  
indigenous	   community	   whose	   damage,	   in	   many	   cases,	   cannot	   be	   restored	   by	  
economic	   compensation.	  Often,	   in	   fact,	   the	   circulation	  of	   sensitive	   information	  
can	   be	   as	   severe	   as	   to	   cause	   the	   undermining	   and	   loss	   of	   the	   identity	   of	   an	  
indigenous	  community.	   In	   those	  cases	  where	   the	   information	   is	  already	  spread	  
out,	   and	   injunctions	   could	  be	  of	  no	  use,	  damages	   can	  at	   least	   compensate	   the	  
claimant	  of	   the	  part	  of	   the	  economic	  value	   that	   the	   information	  acquired	  once	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295	  Lionel	  Bently	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law	  at	  1195.	  
296	  Bently	  at	  1195;	  “the	  most	  common	  financial	  remedy	  for	  infringement	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  is	  an	  
award	  of	   damages.	   The	  damages	   recoverable	   are	   the	   same	  as	  with	  other	   torts:	   the	   aim	   is	   to	   restore	   the	  
victim	   to	   the	   position	   in	  which	   they	  would	   have	   been	   had	   no	  wrong	   been	   committed;	   the	   aim	   is	   not	   to	  
punish	  the	  defendant”	  at	  1256.	  
297	  See	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  Seager	  v	  Copydex	  (No	  2)	  [1967]	  2	  All	  ER	  415.	  





out	  in	  the	  market.299	  Nonetheless,	  given	  the	  highly	  sensitive	  nature	  of	  indigenous	  
secret	   knowledge,	   most	   of	   the	   time,	   and	   especially	   in	   those	   cases	   where	   the	  
information	   is	   not	   already	   widely	   circulating,	   damages	   do	   not	   constitute	   an	  
appropriate	   remedy.	  Whereas	   injunctions	  can	   represent	   the	  most	  valuable	  and	  
effective	   alternative.	   Generally,	   applications	   for	   injunctive	   relief	   to	   restrain	  
publication	  and	  disclosure	  of	   information	  are	  commonly	  used	  in	  cases	   involving	  
defamation	  and	  breach	  of	  confidence.	  They	  represent	  the	  primary	  remedy	  that	  a	  
claimant	   is	  more	   likely	   to	  pursue	   in	   case	  of	  disclosure	  or	  possible	  disclosure	  of	  
private/confidential	  information;	  the	  injunction	  restrains	  the	  use	  or	  disclosure	  of	  
the	   information.	   In	   the	   American	   Cyanamid 300 	  case	   the	   general	   test	   for	  
injunctions	  was	  established	  to	  define	  that,	   in	  case	  of	  breach	  of	  confidence,	   the	  
courts	   will	   exercise	   their	   discretion	   to	   grant	   or	   withhold	   interim	   relief	   on	   the	  
basis	   of	   the	   ‘balance	   of	   convenience’.301	  The	   first	   test	   was	   to	   assess	   whether	  
there	  was	  a	  serious	  question	  to	  be	  tried	  and,	  secondly,	  whether	  damages	  would	  
be	  an	  adequate	  remedy	  for	  the	  injured	  party.302	  According	  to	  Bently,	  the	  balance	  
of	  convenience	  requirement	  “almost	  always	  favours	  restraint	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  
that	   the	   information	   concerned	   retains	   its	   confidential	   quality	   until	   trial”.303	  In	  
this	  case,	  in	  order	  for	  an	  interim	  or	  interlocutory	  injunction	  to	  be	  accorded,	  the	  
claimant	   must	   have	   established	   a	   strong	   prima	   facie	   case,	   which	   would	   most	  
likely	  win	  during	  trial.	  The	  tests	  introduced	  by	  American	  Cyanamid	  have	  proved	  
to	  be,	  over	   the	   years,	   limiting;	   the	   risk	  being	   that	   the	   importance	  given	   to	   the	  
tests	   could,	   de	   facto,	   decide	   the	   case	   at	   the	   interim	   stage.	   In	   any	   preliminary	  
proceeding,	   in	   fact,	   the	  court	  should	   try	   to	  avoid	  pre-­‐judging	   the	  outcome	  of	  a	  
case,	  “aiming	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  position	  which	  will	  be	  as	  fair	  as	  possible	  (or	  as	  little	  
unfair	   as	   possible)	   to	   both	   parties,	   whichever	   way	   the	   matter	   is	   finally	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299	  “When	   considering	   the	   adequacy	  of	   damages	   in	   cases	   of	   commercial	   information	   the	   court	   takes	   into	  
account	  a	  number	  of	  factors.	  These	  factors	  include	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  information	  has	  been	  circulated,	  
the	  state	  of	  the	  market,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  confidential	  information,	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  disclosure	  or	  misuse	  on	  
the	  claimant	  or	  defendant’s	  business,	  as	  well	  as	  some	  minor	  factors:	  the	  extent	  of	  circulation;	  the	  state	  of	  
the	  market;	  the	  protection	  of	  abstract	  ideas;	  the	  going	  out	  of	  business”	  see	  Bently	  at	  738-­‐39.	  
300	  American	  Cyanamid	  v	  Ethicon	  [1975]	  AC	  396.	  
301	  See	  Bently	  at	  1193.	  
302	  See	  Gurry	  at	  para	  18.11.	  
303	  However,	  “this	   test	   is	  widely	  used	   in	  other	  areas	  of	   intellectual	  property,	   in	  some	  circumstances	  …	  the	  
courts	  have	  decided	  not	   to	  apply	   this	   test	   in	  breach	  of	   confidence	  actions.	  This	   is	  particularly	   the	   case	   in	  
relation	  to	  personal	   information,	  for	  which	  the	  courts	  have	  said	  that	  the	  threshold	  for	   injunction	   is	  higher	  





decided”.304	  In	  A	   v	   B305	  the	   Court	   decided	   on	   a	   set	   of	   guidelines	   based	   on	   the	  
balancing	  of	  the	  facts,	  rather	  than	  a	  general	  technical	  application	  of	  the	  law.	  By	  
analysing	  the	  facts	  case	  by	  case,	  the	  theory	  of	  a	  contextual	  integrity	  that	  defines	  
the	  events	  of	  the	  case,	  acquires	  formal	  importance	  in	  deciding	  which	  solution	  is	  
better	   tailor-­‐made	   for	  each	  case	   involving	  breach	  of	  confidence.	  The	  new	  tests	  
have	  the	  scope	  to:	  
	  
• determine	   whether	   the	   applicant	   will	   suffer	   irreparable	   harm	   if	   the	  
injunction	  is	  refused;	  and	  
• find	   where	   the	   balance	   of	   inconvenience	   lies	   in	   granting	   or	   denying	   the	  
injunction,	   or	   in	   other	   words,	   who	   between	   the	   applicant	   and	   the	  
respondent	   will	   be	   most	   disadvantaged	   by	   the	   grant	   or	   denial	   of	   the	  
interlocutory	  injunction.306	  
	  
The	   importance	  of	   interim	  or	   interlocutory	   injunctions	  rests	   in	  their	  capacity	  to	  
prevent	   the	   use	   and	   circulation	   of	   the	   information	   while	   the	   breach	   of	  
confidence	   is	   being	   considered	   by	   a	   court. 307 	  According	   to	   Gurry,	   once	   a	  
confidence	  is	  breached	  it	  is	  lost	  forever;	  therefore	  it	  becomes	  imperative	  for	  the	  
confider	  to	  take	  swift	  action	  to	  restrain	  the	  disclosure	  or	  misuse	  of	  confidential	  
information	   before	   the	   trial.308	  Interim	   injunctions	   prevent	   wrongdoers	   from	  
benefiting	  from	  their	  wrongful	  acts	  prior	  to	  and	  during	  the	  trial;	  it	  also	  prevents	  
defendants	   from	   benefiting	   from	   their	   acts	   during	   the	   time	   their	   actions	   are	  
being	   assessed.	   In	   other	   words,	   an	   interim	   injunction	   is	   a	   temporary	   solution	  
which	  freezes	  the	  facts,	  stops	  the	  circulation	  of	  any	  allegedly	  unlawfully	  acquired	  
information	  while	  the	  breach	  of	  confidence	  is	  being	  considered	  by	  a	  court.309	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304	  Paul	  Stanley	  The	  Law	  of	  Confidentiality:	  A	  Restatement	  at	  123.	  
305	  A	  v	  B	  [2003]	  QB	  195	  (CA),	  204-­‐210	  [11].	  
306	  Jean-­‐Philippe	  Groleau	   “Interlocutory	   Injunction:	   Revisiting	   the	   Three-­‐pronged	   Test”	   (2008)	   53	   2	  McGill	  
Law	  Journal	  269	  at	  270.	  
307	  In	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  right	  holder’s	  interests	  are	  not	  undermined	  during	  the	  period,	  provisions	  exist	  
for	  interim	  orders.	  	  
308	  “Not	  only	  can	  a	  confidence	  broken	  never	  really	  be	  restored,	  but,	  without	  an	  interim	  remedy,	  particularly	  
where	  the	  information	  is	  personal,	  pursuing	  such	  claims	  may	  actually	  add	  to	  the	  embarrassment	  caused	  by	  
the	  revelation”	  see	  Gurry	  at	  para	  18.01.	  
309	  “By	  their	  nature,	  interim	  injunctions	  are	  a	  separate	  action	  within	  a	  larger	  claim,	  but	  they	  can	  be	  essential	  
in	   circumstances	   where	   a	   party	   wishes	   to	   preserve	   the	   status	   quo”	   electronic	   document	   <www.out-­‐






request	   for	   an	   interim	   injunction	   implies	   that	   there	   is	   a	   serious	  question	   to	  be	  
considered.	   It	   also	   implies	   that	   the	   defendant’s	   actions,	   if	   unrestrained,	   could	  
cause	  irreparable	  and	  immeasurable	  damage	  by	  continuing	  the	  conduct	  that	  has	  
lead	   to	   the	   dispute.	   The	   court	   will	   not	   prejudge	   the	   likely	   outcome	   of	   the	  
litigation,	  and	  it	  has	  the	  discretion	  to	  grant	  the	  interim	  injunction	  or	  not.	  Based	  
on	  common	  law,	  in	  Gurry	  it	  is	  specified	  that	  there	  are	  restrictions	  on	  the	  granting	  
of	  interim	  injunctions	  and	  these	  restrictions	  are	  not	  based	  on	  jurisdiction,	  but	  on	  
discretionary	  principles.310	  In	  other	  words,	  before	  granting	  an	  interim	  injunction,	  
the	  court	  should	  first	  decide	  whether	  the	  question	  to	  be	  tried	  is	  serious	  enough	  
and,	   if	   this	   threshold	   has	   been	   passed,	   the	   court	   should	   consider	   whether	   it	  
would	  be	   fair	   to	  grant	   the	   interim	  relief	  while	  considering	   the	  strength	  of	  each	  
party’s	   case.311	  In	   granting	   the	   interim	   injunction,	   the	   court	   also	   has	   power	   to	  
assess	  whether	  the	  information	  will	  cause	  serious	  damage	  or	  not.312	  In	  the	  cases	  
where	  there	  is	  a	  breach	  of	  confidence,	  the	  importance	  to	  take	  action	  before	  the	  
wrong	   has	   actually	   been	   committed	   is	   of	   crucial	   importance.	   Normally,	   in	   the	  
history	   of	   interim	   injunctions,	   their	   importance	   as	   a	   remedy	   has	   been	   highly	  
influenced	   by	   the	   possible	   effects	   that	   the	   granting	   or	   not	   granting	   of	   the	  
injunction	  would	  cause	  to	  each	  party	   involved	   in	   the	  case	  at	   trial.	  As	  such	  they	  
are	  still	  today	  based	  on	  discretionary	  principles.	  An	  injunction	  requires	  the	  proof	  
that	   “there	   is	   a	   legal	   right	   which	   is	   threatened	   with	   infringement,	   and	   that	  
common	   law	  damages	  would	  be	  an	   inadequate	   remedy”.313	  Having	  said	   this,	   in	  
general,	  interim	  injunctions	  are	  based	  on	  disputes	  that	  involve	  strong	  economic	  
interests,	  but	  in	  general	  they	  are	  used	  to	  prevent:	  
	  
• publication	  of	  obvious	  and	  defamatory	  lies;	  
• infringement	  of	  copyright,	  trademarks	  and	  other	  intellectual	  property	  rights;	  
• wrongful	  use	  of	  confidential	  information	  and	  trade	  secrets;	  
• on-­‐going	  breach	  of	  contract;	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  See	  Gurry	  at	  para	  18.03.	  
311	  See	  Bently	  at	  1240.	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  “Any	   injunction	  may	  be	  drafted	   to	  prevent	  both	   improper	  disclosure	  and	   improper	  use.	   It	  may	  also	  be	  
extended	   to	   the	  delivery	  up	  of	  documents	  which	  contain	  confidential	   information,	  even	   though	   they	  also	  
contain	  information	  in	  the	  public	  domain.	  Any	  injunction	  to	  protect	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  see	  Gurry	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• activities	  which	  constitute	  a	  nuisance;	  and	  	  
• dealings	  with	  particular	  customers	  and	  suppliers.	  
	  
In	  the	  case	  Foster	  v	  Mountford,	  the	  interim	  injunction	  was	  ordered	  by	  reason	  of	  
the	   particular	   cultural	   and	   religious	   significance	   of	   the	   information.	   In	   light	   of	  
this,	   the	   list	   above	   can	   be	   expanded	   by	   adding	   a	   new	   clause	   of	   particular	  
importance	  to	   indigenous	  peoples:	  breach	  of	  cultural,	   secret	  confidence.	   In	   the	  
case	  of	  indigenous	  peoples,	  in	  fact,	  an	  interim	  injunction	  represents	  a	  very	  useful	  
tool	  to	  block	  the	  diffusion	  of	  very	  sensitive	  information	  that,	  customarily,	  cannot	  
be	   revealed	   to	   outsiders.	   In	   weighing	   the	   case	   presented	   by	   indigenous	  
custodians	   against	   defendants	   who	   have	   allegedly	   obtained	   the	   secret	  
information	  in	  breach	  of	  a	  duty	  of	  confidentiality,	  the	  court	  should	  consider	  the	  
cultural	   asymmetry	   of	   the	   parties	   involved	   and	   the	   resources	   they	   possess.	   In	  
addition	  to	  that,	  it	  is	  morally	  and	  ethically	  unjust	  to	  attribute	  more	  value	  to	  the	  
publication	   of	   a	   book	   (or	   photographs,	   videos	   and	   so	   forth)	   compared	   to	   the	  
cultural	   harm	   that	   such	   disclosure	   would	   bring	   to	   the	   indigenous	   community.	  
Financial	   gain	   should	   never	   be	   used	   to	   trump	   any	   claim	   for	   a	   breach	   of	  
confidence	   that	   undermines	   the	   fundamental	   cultural	   rights	   of	   any	   given	  
community.	  The	  same	  applies	   to	   the	  public	   interest	  defence	  analysed	  above.	  A	  
cultural	   and	   anthropological	   ‘curiosity’	   cannot	   be	   considered	   in	   the	   interest	   of	  
the	  general	  public.	  	  
There	  is	  no	  need	  for	  pragmatic,	  philosophical	  arguing	  to	  support	  the	  importance	  
that	  an	   interim	   injunction	  possesses:	   it	   simply	  blocks	  sensitive	   information	  that	  
cannot	   circulate	   while	   a	   case	   for	   breach	   of	   confidence	   is	   being	   assessed	   by	   a	  
court	  and	  a	  permanent	  injunction	  is	  pending.	  Obviously	  the	  claimant	  must	  bring	  
a	   substantial	   case	  demonstrating	   that	   the	   information	  was	  unlawfully	  obtained	  
by	  the	  defendant	  and	  that	  the	  circulation	  of	  the	  information	  during	  and	  after	  the	  
trial	  would	  bring	  great,	   irreparable	  harm	  to	  the	  claimant.	  Any	  trial	  on	  breach	  of	  
confidence	  involves	  a	  level	  of	  disclosure	  that	  might	  not	  be	  desired	  by	  indigenous	  
claimants	   but,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   confidential	   information,	   the	   context	   and	  
circumstances	   in	   which	   the	   information	   was	   acquired	   are	   crucial	   for	   the	  





indigenous	  peoples	  seek	  to	  preserve	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  disclosed	  in	  order	  to	  be	  
protected.	  The	  important	  facts	  to	  be	  analysed	  are	  whether	  a	  relationship	  of	  trust	  
involving	  secret/confidential	  information	  existed,	  and	  whether	  such	  relationship	  
was	  broken.	  Realistically,	  what	   could	  be	  prejudicial	   in	   judging	   any	  of	   the	   cases	  
brought	  to	  a	  court	  by	  indigenous	  custodians	  of	  knowledge	  might	  be	  represented	  
by	  any	  discriminatory	  consideration	  existent	  within	  the	  court.	   It	   is	  undisputable	  
that,	   in	   the	   past,	   many	   cases	   brought	   by	   indigenous	   representatives	   were	  
dismissed	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   discriminatory	   considerations	   that	   undermined	   the	  
result	  of	  trials;	  however,	  while	  such	  behaviours	  were	  possible	  years	  ago,	  today	  it	  
has	   become	   more	   difficult	   to	   discriminate	   against	   indigenous	   peoples	   on	   the	  
basis	   of	   their	   underdeveloped	   culture	   and	   traditions.	   International	   law	   and	  
human	   rights	   law	  have	   evolved	   to	   a	   point	  where	  not	   only	   indigenous	   peoples’	  
legal	  personality	  is	  widely	  recognised,	  but	  their	  cultural	  rights	  are	  acknowledged	  
and	  endorsed	  at	  the	  national	  and	  international	  levels.314	  Therefore,	  it	  should	  be	  
possible	   nowadays	   for	   indigenous	   peoples	   to	   bring	   a	   claim	   for	   breach	   of	  
confidence	   and	   win	   their	   case	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   their	   secret,	   sensitive	  
information	   shared	   in	   confidence	  was	   unlawfully	   disclosed	   in	   breach	   of	   a	   pre-­‐
existing	   confidence.	  Once	   the	   interim	   injunction	   is	   granted	  on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  
seriousness	  of	   the	   case	   that	  will	   go	   to	   trial,	   indigenous	  peoples	  might	  obtain	  a	  
permanent	   injunction	   that	   would	   reconfirm	   the	   interim	   injunction	   and	   block	  
completely	   the	   circulation	   of	   the	   confidential	   information.	   A	   final	   or	   perpetual	  
injunction	   “will	   order	   the	   defendant	   not	   to	   carry	   on	  with	   certain	   activities.	   As	  
such,	   it	   is	   directed	   at	   future	   activities,	   whereas	   financial	   remedies	   operate	   in	  
relation	   to	   past	   acts”.315 	  It	   is	   an	   equitable	   remedy	   and	   remains	   within	   the	  
discretion	   of	   the	   court.	   It	   can	   be	   granted	   whether	   the	   case	   is	   based	   on	  
contractual	   confidence	   or	   on	   an	   equitable	   obligation. 316 	  Generally,	   the	   law	  
employs	  the	  type	  of	  remedies	  that	  balance	  the	  rights	  that	  were	  infringed.	  There	  
is	   a	   difference	   between	   economic	   rights	   and	   cultural	   rights	   of	   sensitive/secret	  
nature	   that	  might	   undermine	   the	   identity	   of	   a	   group	  of	   people.	   In	   this	   case,	   a	  
permanent	   injunction	  would	  be	  advisable	  to	  stop	  the	  circulation	  of	   information	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that	   are	   of	   proved	   secret	   nature.	   The	   limitedness	   of	   the	   information	   and	   the	  
restricted	  circle	  in	  which	  it	  is	  known	  should	  prove	  the	  importance	  of	  maintaining	  
the	   status	   quo	   and	   stop	   the	   circulation	   of	   information	   that	   was	   previously	  
completely	   unknown	   to	   the	   general	   public	   (or	   a	   portion	   of	   it).	   In	   case	   the	  
confidential	   information	  was	   imparted	  orally	  but	   transferred	   into	  physical	   form	  
(like	  a	  book,	  record,	  photographs	  and	  so	  forth),	  the	  permanent	  injunction	  might	  
order	   the	   destruction	   of	   the	   material.	   In	   such	   a	   case,	   the	   loss	   faced	   by	   the	  
defendant	   might	   be	   purely	   economic.	   However,	   given	   that	   the	   reason	   for	  
recording	   and	   selling	   the	   secret	   information	   was	   unjust	   enrichment,	   the	  
destruction	  of	  any	  material	  that	  was	  never	  meant	  to	  be	  recorded,	  would	  simply	  
bring	   the	   defendant	   to	   his	   initial	   position	   prior	   to	   the	   anticipated	   enrichment	  
that	  the	  disclosure	  of	  the	  information	  was	  expected	  to	  bring.	  	  
	  
Common	   Law	   is	   a	   constant	   evolving	   process	   in	   which	   cases	   determine	   the	  
evolution	   of	   the	   law.	   In	   this	   rich	   context	   of	   contrasting	   forces	   the	   law	   is	   not	  
regarded	  as	  a	  rigid	  set	  of	  rules,	  but	  as	  a	  flexible	  set	  of	  principles	  and	  criteria	  that	  
can	   be	   amended	   or	   changed	   case	   by	   case.	   Foster	   v	   Mountford	   is	   proof	   that	  
cultural	  privacy	  and	  indigenous	  secret	  information	  can	  be	  protected	  in	  court	  and	  
permanent	   injunctions	   can	   be	   granted	   (although	   in	   this	   case	   geographically	  
limited	  to	  the	  Northern	  Territory	  of	  Australia).	  The	  case	  demonstrates	  that	   it	   is	  
not	   impossible	   to	   protect	   indigenous	   secret	   information	   using	   breach	   of	  
confidence.	  From	  now	  on,	  it	  is	  up	  to	  scholars,	  courts	  and	  the	  law	  to	  evolve	  in	  the	  
direction	   of	   a	   more	   inclusive	   system	   of	   rules	   that	   could	   better	   accommodate	  
indigenous	   peoples’	   interests	   and	   expectations.	   This	   is	   not	   impossible.	   As	  
Beverley-­‐Smith	  clarifies	  in	  his	  book:317	  
	  
…	   leaving	   aside	   the	   controversial	   role	   of	   rules	   and	   principles	   in	   general	  
jurisprudence,	  it	  is	  perfectly	  possible	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  master	  rule	  by	  which	  principles	  
as	   well	   as	   rules	   of	   law	   may	   be	   identified.	   Accordingly	   a	   court	   must	   apply	  
statutory	  provisions,	  rules	  of	  precedent	  and	  the	  rationes	  decidendi	  of	  cases,	  but	  
in	  a	  case	  to	  which	  no	  statutory	  provision	  or	  ratio	  decidendi	  applies,	  in	  coming	  to	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  Huw	  Beverley-­‐Smith	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  Privacy,	  Property	  and	  Personality	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  New	  York,	  





its	  decision,	  the	  court	  must	  take	  into	  account	  principles	  derived	  from	  legislation,	  
rationes	   decidendi	   of	   relevant	   cases	   and	   from	   relevant	   dicta.	  While	   legislation	  
and	   binding	   precedent	   are	   the	   only	   ultimate	   sources	   of	   law,	   principles,	   which	  
embody	   the	   persuasive	   sources,	   should	   not	   be	   excluded	   if	   only	   for	   the	   reason	  
that	  they	  play	  a	  considerable	  part	  in	  the	  solution	  of	  legal	  problems	  to	  which	  no	  
rule	  is	  directly	  applicable	  …	  .	  
	  
10.11	  -­‐	  Final	  Recommendations	  
	  
As	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  show,	  while	  there	  is	  a	  growing	  consideration	  and	  respect	  
for	   indigenous	   rights,318	  the	   way	   ahead	   for	   a	   ‘real’	   protection	   of	   indigenous	  
cultural	   rights	   and	   holistic	   way	   of	   living	   is	   still	   uncertain	   and	   left	   to	   the	  
willingness	   of	   states	   to	   act.	   That	   is	   why	   the	   common	   law	   and	   common-­‐law-­‐
derived	   systems	   (as	   systems	   of	   laws	   historically	   and	   legally	   diverse	   from	  
countries	  with	  a	  civil	  law	  tradition319)	  today	  represent	  one	  of	  the	  best	  avenues	  to	  
protect	   indigenous	   secret	   knowledge.	   While	   it	   is	   up	   to	   countries	   to	   accept	  
developments	   in	   the	   common	   law	   system,	   however,	   evolution	   of	   the	   law	  
discussed	  by	  case	  law	  cannot	  be	  discarded	  as	  uninfluential.	  	  
Civil	   law	  and	   common	   law	   countries,	   in	   fact,	   share	   a	  distinctive	  heritage	  and	  a	  
different	  legal	  tradition.320	  Common	  law’s	  main	  focus	  was	  originally	  on	  resolving	  
the	   disputes	   at	   hand	   rather	   than	   creating	   legal	   principles	   that	   would	   be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318	  See	  Chapter	  5	  of	  the	  thesis.	  
319	  “Parliamentary	   legislation	   is	   the	   principal	   source	   of	   law	   in	   civil	   law	   countries.	   This	   legislation	   includes	  
codes,	   separate	   statutes	   and	   ancillary	   legislation	   (e.g.	   Police	   Implementing	   Regulations	   to	   provide	   more	  
details	  on	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Police	  Act).	  Within	  civil	  law	  countries,	  there	  is	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  laws.	  At	  the	  top	  
of	  the	  hierarchy	  is	  the	  Constitution,	  followed	  by	  codes	  and	  other	  legislation	  (emanating	  from	  the	  executive	  
or	   parliamentary	   branches	   depending	   upon	   the	   legal	   system),	   then	   executive	   decrees,	   then	   regulations,	  
followed	  by	  local	  ordinances.	  Customs,	  as	  a	  rare	  source	  of	  law	  sits	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  pyramid	  and	  would	  
rarely	  be	  relied	  upon	  in	  court.	  The	  reliance	  on	  codes	  and	  laws	  is	  a	  central	  characteristic	  of	  the	  civil	   law.	  At	  
the	  heart	  of	  the	  civil	  law	  lies	  a	  belief	  in	  codification	  as	  a	  means	  to	  ensure	  a	  rational,	  logical,	  and	  systematic	  
approach	   to	   law.	  Many	  civil	   law	  proponents	  believe	   that	  a	  code	  can	  address	  all	   circumstances	   that	  might	  
need	  legal	  regulation,	  without	  the	  need	  for	  judicial	  interpretation	  and	  without	  the	  need	  for	  judges	  to	  refer	  
to	   case	   law.	   Judges	   generally	   interpret	   codes	   and	   laws	   very	   strictly;	   the	   kind	   of	   expansive	   readings	   of	  
existing	  legal	  provisions	  to	  create	  new	  interpretations,	  and	  by	  extensions,	  new	  law,	  is	  not	  done.	  Traditionally	  
case	   law	  did	  not	  play	  any	  role	   in	  civil	   law	  countries	  as	  a	  source	  of	   law.	  The	   judge	  would	  decide	  each	  case	  
based	   on	   codes	   or	   legislation	   and	   would	   not	   look	   to	   another	   case	   for	   guidance	   even	   if	   the	   facts	   were	  
identical”	   see	  Vivienne	  O’Connor	  Common	   Law	  and	  Civil	   Law	  Tradition	   INPROL	   (International	  Network	   to	  
Promote	   the	   Rule	   of	   Law)	   at	   11-­‐12	   electronic	   document	   <http://inprol.org/publications/11042/common-­‐
law-­‐and-­‐civil-­‐law-­‐traditions>	  last	  visited	  on	  04/11/2015.	  
320	  “Legal	  tradition	  refers	  to	  a	  set	  of	  deep	  rooted,	  historically	  conditioned	  attitudes	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
law,	  about	  the	  role	  of	  law	  in	  the	  society	  …	  about	  the	  proper	  organization	  and	  operation	  of	  a	  legal	  system,	  
and	  about	  the	  way	  the	   law	  is	  or	  should	  be,	  applied,	  studied,	  perfected	  and	  taught”	  see	  John	  H	  Merryman	  





articulated	   in	   a	   generally	   applicable	   code.321	  As	   such,	   common	   law	   is	   generally	  
uncodified	  and	  is	  based	  on	  precedent.322	  Although	  common	  law	  has	  traditionally	  
coexisted	  with	  other	  systems	  of	   law	  (canon	  law,	  urban	  and	  rural	  courts	  applied	  
local	  customary	  laws,	  Chancery	  and	  maritime	  courts	  applied	  Roman	  law),323	  it	  is	  
largely	  based	  on	  precedent	  –	  stare	  decides;	  in	  other	  words,	  on	  judicial	  decisions	  
that	  have	  already	  been	  made	  on	  similar	  cases.324	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  role	  of	  judges	  
becomes	   of	   fundamental	   importance	   in	   interpreting	   the	   law	   and	   basing	   their	  
decisions	  on	  precedent	  cases.	  It	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  in	  common	  law	  systems	  judges	  
can	  de	  facto	  develop	  the	  law.	  Cases	  might	  indeed	  raise	  novel	  questions,	  and	  the	  
judges	  must	  answer	  them.	  Their	  answers	  will	  often	  make	  law,	  whatever	  answers	  
they	  make.325	  This	  happened	  in	  Foster	  v	  Mountford,	  where	  the	  decision	  could	  not	  
be	   based	   on	   precedents	   strictly	   related	   to	   indigenous	   cultural	   sensitive	  
information	   because	   there	   was	   no	   existing	   precedent;	   however,	   the	   case	  
presented	   features	   common	   to	   existing	   breach	   of	   confidence	   cases	   and	   could,	  
therefore,	   be	   judged	   regardless	   and	   an	   injunction	   was	   discretionally	   awarded.	  
Injunctions	  are	  not	  rewarded,	  they	  are	  ordered	  or	  awarded.	  
A	   civil	   law	   system	   could	   not	   contemplate	   such	   a	   result	   because	   its	   desire	   for	  
certainty	  and	  purity	  of	  the	   law	  brings	  with	   it	  a	   level	  of	  rigidity	  that,	  contrary	  to	  
common	  law	  systems,	  could	  not	  be	  melded	  to	  respond	  to	  changed	  circumstances	  
or	  to	  be	  bent	  to	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  particular	  case	  as	  happened	  with	  Foster	  v	  
Mountford.326	  On	  the	  same	  logic,	  breach	  of	  confidence	  and	  trust	  was	  employed	  
because	  of	  its	  sui	   juris	  nature	  of	  contract	  or	  implied	  contract,	  proprietary	  rights	  
and	  the	  principle	  of	  equity.	  Traditionally	  equity	  “refers	  to	  the	  power	  of	  the	  judge	  
to	  mitigate	  the	  harshness	  of	  strict	  application	  of	  a	  statute,	  or	  to	  allocate	  property	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321	  “Common	  law	  developed	  historically	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis	  from	  the	  bottom-­‐up	  (namely	  from	  judges),	  
rather	   than	   the	   civil	   law	   that	   has	   always	   been	  developed	   top-­‐down	  by	   the	   legislature	  based	  on	   codes	  or	  
legislation	  and	  would	  not	   look	  to	  another	  case	  for	  guidance	  even	   if	   the	  facts	  were	   identical”	  see	  Vivienne	  
O’Connor	  Common	  Law	  and	  Civil	  Law	  Tradition	  INPROL	  at	  11-­‐12.	  
322	  “This	  means	   that	   there	   is	  no	  comprehensive	  compilation	  of	   legal	   rules	  and	  statutes”	   see	  The	  Common	  
Law	   and	   Civil	   Law	   Traditions,	   the	   Robbins	   Collection,	   University	   of	   Berkeley	   electronic	   document	  
<www.law.berkeley.edu/library/robbins/CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.html>	  last	  visited	  on	  04/11/2015.	  
323	  Supra.	  
324	  For	  more	  information	  on	  the	  historical	  origins	  of	  common	  law	  see	  John	  H	  Merryman	  and	  Rogelio	  Pérez-­‐
Perdomo	  The	  Civil	  Law	  Tradition	  (3rd	  ed,	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  Stanford,	  2007)	  at	  Chapter	  8.	  
325	  Tom	  Bingham	  The	  Rule	  of	  Law	  (Penguin,	  London,	  2011)	  at	  45.	  
326	  “In	   the	   common	   law,	   certainty	   and	   flexibility	   are	   seen	   as	   competing	   values,	   each	   tending	   to	   limit	   the	  
other.	  In	  the	  civil	  law	  world,	  the	  supreme	  value	  is	  certainty,	  and	  the	  need	  for	  flexibility	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  series	  of	  






or	   responsibility	   according	   to	   facts	   of	   the	   individual	   case”. 327 	  Breach	   of	  
confidence,	  being	  rooted	  in	  equity,	  covers	  the	  secrecy	  and	  confidentiality	  of	  the	  
information	   and,	   once	   proved	   that	   a	   confidential	   relationship	   existed,	   that	   the	  
knowledge	  shared	  was	  secret	  and	  of	  high	  sensitive	  nature	  and	  would	  cause	  great	  
harm	   if	   disclosed,	   the	   judge	   could	   exercise	   discretion	   to	   decide	   to	   grant	   an	  
injunction	   to	   restrict	   the	   publication	   of	   the	   book	   Nomads	   of	   the	   Desert.	   The	  
message	  conveyed	  by	   the	  Foster	  v	  Mountford	   case	  proves	   that	   in	  common	   law	  
systems	  judicial	  decisions	  exist	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  law	  has	  recognised	  and	  
agreed	  (to	  a	  certain	  extent)	  that	   indigenous	  secret	   information	   is	  unequivocally	  
important	  and	  can	  be	  protected	  by	  breach	  of	  confidence.	   In	  doing	  so,	  common	  
law	   has	   recognised	   the	   existence	   of	   new	   category	   of	   confidential	   information:	  
cultural	  and	  spiritual	   information.	  In	  countries	  where	  civil	   law	  is	  very	  strong	  (eg	  
France,	   Germany	   and	   Italy),	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   protection	   of	   indigenous	  
secret	  information	  is	  left	  to	  legislation,	  which	  must	  be	  created	  ex	  novo	  to	  include	  
and	   protect	   indigenous	   cultures	   and	   the	   role	   played	   by	   the	   guardians.	   The	  
creation	  of	  such	   legislation	   is	   therefore	   left	   to	  the	  willingness	  of	  states	  and	  the	  
efforts	  of	   scholars	   specialised	   in	   legal	   science.	  Yet,	   civil	   law	  countries	  may	   take	  
into	  account	  evident	  development	  of	  the	  law	  happening	  in	  common	  law	  systems	  
and,	   vice	   versa,	   statutory	   legislation	   can	   be	   created	   in	   countries	   based	   on	  
common	   law.	  Where	   breach	   of	   confidence	   is	   unsuitable	   to	   protect	   indigenous	  
secret	   knowledge,	   new	   statutes	   can	   come	   in	   help	   to	   guarantee	   protection	   to	  
indigenous	  cultures.	  Noteworthy	  is	  the	  case	  of	  The	  Northern	  Territory	  Aboriginal	  
Sacred	   Sites	   Act	   (1989)328	  where	   a	   new	   law	   was	   created	   to	   acknowledge	   the	  
indigenous	   holistic	   way	   of	   living	   and	   guarantee	   the	   preservation	   of	   Aboriginal	  
traditions.	  With	  the	  Act	  it	  became	  an	  offence	  “to	  enter,	  remain,	  carry	  out	  works	  
on	   or	   desecrate	   a	   sacred	   site	   anywhere	   in	   the	   Northern	   Territory”.329	  Initially	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327	  “It	  is	  a	  recognition	  that	  broad	  rules,	  such	  as	  those	  commonly	  encountered	  in	  statutes,	  occasionally	  work	  
harshly	  or	  inadequately,	  and	  that	  some	  problems	  are	  so	  complex	  that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  for	  the	  legislature	  to	  
dictate	  the	  consequences	  of	  all	  possible	  permutations	  of	  the	  facts.	  Where	  problems	  like	  these	  are	  involved,	  
it	  is	  thought	  better	  to	  leave	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  trier	  of	  the	  case	  for	  decision	  according	  to	  equitable	  principles.	  
Equity	  thus	  is	  the	  justice	  of	  the	  individual	  case.	  It	  clearly	  implies	  a	  grant	  of	  discretionary	  power	  to	  the	  judge”	  
see	  Merryman	  and	  Pérez-­‐Perdomo	  at	  49.	  
328	  The	  Northern	  Territory	  Aboriginal	  Sacred	  Sites	  Act	  (1989)	  entered	  into	  force	  on	  3	  March	  2004.	  
329	  “Other	   enduring	   aspects	   of	   today’s	   legal	   protections	   for	   Northern	   Territory	   sacred	   sites	   were	   also	  
established,	  such	  as	  a	  board	  largely	  made	  up	  of	  Aboriginal	  custodians	  nominated	  by	  the	  Northern	  Territory’s	  
Aboriginal	   Land	   Councils,	   and	   a	   clear	   definition	   of	   a	   sacred	   site”	   see	   electronic	   document	  





conceived	   as	   Aboriginal	   Land	   Rights	   (Northern	   Territory)	   Act	   1976330	  in	   August	  
1986,	   it	   was	   decided	   to	   revise	   the	   existing	   legislation	   relating	   to	   territories	   of	  
spiritual	   significance	   for	  Aboriginal	  people.	   In	  1986	   the	   then	  chief	  Minister,	  Mr	  
Stephen	  Hatton,	  appointed	  a	  committee	  to	  review	  legislation	  relating	  to	  sites	  of	  
significance	   to	   Aboriginal	   people.	   These	   legislation	   included	   the	   Aboriginal	  
Sacred	  Sites	  Act,	   the	  Aboriginal	   Land	  Act	  and	   the	  Native	  and	  Historical	  Objects	  
and	  Areas	  Preservation	  Act,	  and	  these	  were	  included	  into	  the	  revision.	   In	  1988,	  
the	  Territorial	  Legislature	  came	  out	  with	  new	  recommendations	  including:	  	  
	  
• establishing	  a	  statutory	  authority	  to	  coordinate	  requests	  for	  protection	  and	  
initiate	  prosecutions;	  	  
• giving	   power	   to	   the	   Authority	   to	   grant	   access	   and/or	   carry	   out	   work	   on	  
sacred	   sites,	   only	   after	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   wishes	   of	   Aboriginal	  
people;	  	  
• accept	   in	  principle	  that	  sites	  of	  significance	  to	  Aboriginal	  women	  should	  be	  
dealt	  with	  by	  Aboriginal	  women;	  and	  	  
• developers	   should	   be	   encouraged	   to	   consult	  with	   the	   Authority	   on	   sacred	  
sites	  at	  an	  early	  stage	  in	  their	  planning	  processes.331	  
	  
The	   Northern	   Territory	   Aboriginal	   Sacred	   Sites	   Act	   stands	   as	   a	   keystone	  
legislation.	   Not	   only	   did	   it	   increase	   the	   presence	   of	   Aboriginal	   representatives	  
within	   the	   Authority	   Board,	   but	   the	   Authority	   was	   requested	   to	   collaborate	  
closely	  with	  Aboriginal	  custodians	  on	  every	  issue	  directly	  related	  to	  sacred/secret	  
sites	   of	   spiritual	   significance. 332 	  The	   Act	   follows	   the	   logic	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330	  Aboriginal	  Land	  Rights	  (Northern	  Territory)	  Act	  1976	  No	  191,	  1976,	  last	  amended	  in	  2013.	  
331 	  The	   Government	   continued	   negotiations	   with	   the	   Authority	   and	   Aboriginal	   Land	   Councils	   over	  
amendments	   to	   the	   sacred	   sites	   legislation.	   The	   Authority’s	   independence	  was	   seen	   as	   important	   in	   the	  
resolution	  of	  difficult	  issues	  in	  relation	  to	  sacred	  sites	  and	  any	  proposed	  development	  in	  and	  around	  sites.	  
These	  were	  difficult	   negotiations,	   and	   in	   the	   end	   the	   final	   product	  was	   the	  Northern	   Territory	  Aboriginal	  
Sacred	  Sites	  Act	  1989	  which	  was	  passed	  on	  26	  May	  1989	  and	  came	  into	  force	  on	  15	  August	  1989.	  
332	  “The	   Act	   increased	   Aboriginal	   membership	   on	   the	   Authority	   Board	   to	   twelve	   members,	   with	   the	  
specification	  that	  men	  and	  women	  be	  equally	  represented.	  As	  recognised	  in	  the	  Martin	  Review	  there	  was	  a	  
need	   to	   include	   women	   on	   the	   Board	   so	   that	   the	   Board	   could	   consider	   sites	   specifically	   significant	   to	  
women.	   In	   accordance	   with	   traditional	   law	   it	   would	   be	   culturally	   inappropriate	   for	   men	   to	   consider	  
women’s	  sites	  as	  it	  would	  be	  inappropriate	  for	  women	  to	  consider	  men’s	  sites.	  Since	  the	  new	  Sacred	  Sites	  
Act	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  women’s	  sites	  have	  been	  registered	  by	  the	  Authority.	  The	  new	  Act	  prescribed	  





recommendations	   given	   by	   the	  Waitangi	   Tribunal	   on	  Wai	   262	   that	   indigenous	  
peoples’	   lives	   and	   cultures	  must	   be	   respected	   in	   all	   their	   holistic	   features	   and	  
steps	   must	   be	   taken	   to	   recognise	   and	   respect	   the	   fundamental	   role	   of	   the	  
guardians	  of	  knowledge.	  Such	  respect	  must	  be	  extended	  to	  indigenous	  practices,	  
and	  especially	  to	  those	  practices	  that	  are	  sacred	  and	  secret	  and	  strictly	  guarded	  
by	  the	  custodians.	  In	  analysing	  indigenous	  sacred	  knowledge,	  the	  Wai	  262	  Report	  
advises	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  protect	  the	  knowledge	  that	  is	  mostly	  sensitive	  and	  
secret	  is	  to	  keep	  it	  secret.	  This	  means	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  indigenous	  peoples	  
should:	  
	  
• restore	  and	  enforce	  the	  customary	  laws	  that	  safeguard	  indigenous	  peoples’	  
most	  spiritual	  and	  secret	  knowledge;	  
• control	   the	   knowledge	   by	   allowing	   the	   guardians	   to	   perform	   their	   duty	   of	  
care	  according	  to	  the	  customary	  laws;	  and	  
• avoid	  sharing	  the	  knowledge	  with	  people	  who	  are	  not	  entitled	  to	  enter	  into	  
contact	  with	  the	  secret	  knowledge.	  
	  
According	  to	  the	  Wai	  262	  Report	  the	  key	  to	  successfully	  do	  this	  in	  Aotearoa-­‐New	  
Zealand	  rests	  in	  the	  key	  figure	  of	  the	  kaitiaki.	  By	  allowing	  the	  kaitiaki	  to	  perform	  
correctly	   their	   role	   as	   traditionally	   mandated,	   the	   secret	   knowledge	   can	   be	  
protected.	  	  
The	   fact	   that	   still	   today	   indigenous	   representatives	   can	   hardly	   enter	   the	  
international	  forums	  that	  discuss	  their	  issues	  and	  rights	  is	  illogical,	  shameful	  and	  
discriminatory.	   The	   same	   applies	   to	   the	   selection	   of	   such	   representatives	   and	  
their	   level	   of	   knowledge	   of	   the	   traditions	   of	   the	   community	   they	   intend	   to	  
represent.	   Such	   selection	   cannot	   be	   random,	   or	   discretionary	   or	   influenced	   by	  
the	   interests	   of	  multinationals.	   The	   guardians	   and	   elders	   should	   be	   constantly	  
informed	  of	  what	  happens	  within	  the	  state	  and	  at	  international	  level	  and	  decide	  
whom	  to	  send	  to	  attend	  those	  forums.	  The	  participation	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
operations.	  The	  Authority,	  where	  requested	  was	  now	  required	  to	  carry	  out	  surveys	  and	  consultations	  with	  
custodians	   to	   determine	   the	   constraints	   imposed	   by	   the	   existence	   of	   sacred	   sites	   to	   work	   on	   land	   and	  
waters	  anywhere	  in	  the	  Northern	  Territory.	  An	  Authority	  Certificate	  specifying	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  
work	  may	  be	  undertaken	  in	  the	  vicinity	  of	  a	  sacred	  site	  would	  then	  be	  issued.	  A	  time	  limit	  was	  placed	  on	  the	  
commencement	   of	   consultations”	   see	   electronic	   document	   <www.aapant.org.au/about-­‐us/history>	   last	  





the	  affairs	  of	  a	  state	  cannot	  be	  discretionary	  as	  it	  has	  been	  so	  far.	  States	  should	  
also	  recognise	  that	  although	  the	  special	  relationship	  between	  the	  guardians	  and	  
sacred/secret	  knowledge	  cannot	  be	  considered	  as	  constituting	  ownership	  of	  the	  
information	  held	  in	  custody,	  such	  ‘special’	  relationships,	  as	  suggested	  by	  Wai	  262	  
recommendations,	  must	   be	   taken	   into	   ‘special’	   consideration,	   especially	   when	  
assessing	  indigenous	  peoples’	   issues	  related	  to	  the	  most	  secret	  and	  sensitive	  of	  
their	   knowledge.	   The	   same	   respect	   should	   be	   extended	   to	   the	   guardians’	  
decisions	   on	   when	   and	   how	   (if	   ever)	   sharing	   their	   knowledge.	   The	   ‘context’,	  
‘circumstance’,	   ‘reasons’	   and	   ‘consequences’	   of	   such	   sharing	   should	   be	  
considered	  while	  assessing	  indigenous	  claims.	  
	  
We	  live	  in	  a	  society	  where	  confidences	  are	  shared	  all	  the	  time	  and	  many	  of	  them	  
are	   disclosed	   afterwards.	   Technology	   has	   facilitated	   the	   circulation	   of	  
information	   at	   an	   unprecedented	   pace.	   Hardly	   any	   secret	   remains	   secret	   for	  
long.	  Yet,	  the	  circulation	  of	  confidential	  information	  can	  have	  dire	  consequences.	  
That	  is	  why	  states	  should	  protect,	  expand	  and	  enforce	  confidentiality	  and	  create	  
laws	   that	   better	   protect	   any	   keeper	   or	   confider	   of	   secret	   information.	  
Agreements	   specifically	   treating	   sensitive,	   spiritual	   matters	   as	   confidential	  
should	   be	   enforced	   when	   no	   public	   policy	   has	   been	   violated;	   and	   contractual	  
confidential	  agreements	  (express,	  implied	  etc)	  should	  be	  enforced	  like	  any	  other	  
contract.	  Additionally,	  once	  in	  court,	  very	  sensitive,	  spiritual	   information	  should	  
be	   treated	   differently	   and	   holistically,	   and	   indigenous	   claimants	   should	   be	  
accorded	  by	  the	  law	  exemption	  from	  the	  obligation	  to	  give	  any	  evidence	  at	  all	  in	  
certain	  proceedings	  where	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  no	  public	  policy	  has	  been	  violated	  and	  
it	  is	  evident	  that	  the	  confidence	  is	  highly	  sensitive	  and	  could	  cause	  great	  harm	  to	  
the	  community	  and	  its	  members.	  
In	   light	   of	   what	   is	   stated	   in	   the	   UNDRIP,	   confidentiality	   law	   (and	   the	   law	   in	  
general)	   should	   help	   indigenous	   peoples	   “to	   maintain,	   control,	   protect	   and	  
develop	   their	   cultural	   heritage,	   traditional	   knowledge	   and	   traditional	   cultural	  
expressions”	  (Art	  31).	  How?	  By	  allowing	  indigenous	  holders	  of	  secret	  knowledge	  
to	   manage	   their	   secret	   information	   according	   to	   their	   traditions;	   by	   granting	  





very	   sensitive	   information.	   In	  assessing	   issues	  on	  a	   case	  by	   case,	   courts	   should	  
develop	  an	  understanding	  and	  respect	  for	  indigenous	  culture	  while:	  	  
	  
• taking	  into	  account	  the	  holistic	  nature	  of	  most	  of	  indigenous	  knowledge;	  
• fully	  recognising	  the	   ‘special’	   relationships	  that	  the	  guardians	  of	  knowledge	  
have	  with	  the	  culture	  held	  in	  their	  custody;	  
• supporting	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  relationship;	  
• consulting	   with	   indigenous	   guardians	   and	   elders	   in	   those	   cases	   where	   the	  
protection	  of	  sacred/secret	  knowledge	  is	  decided;	  
• enforcing	   a	   duty	   of	   confidence	   over	   the	   individual	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  
community	  to	  which	  he/she	  belongs;	  
• encouraging	   the	   introduction	  of	  mandatory	   interlocutory	   injunctions	   for	   all	  
the	  secret	  information	  which	  might	  be	  of	  a	  very	  sensitive,	  spiritual	  nature;	  	  
• making	   more	   use	   of	   permanent	   injunctions	   in	   those	   cases	   where	   the	  
divulgation	   of	   confidential	   secret	   information	  might	   cause	   great	   harm	   to	   a	  
community;	  
• redefining	   and	   harmonising	   all	   those	   statutes	   that,	   like	   the	   tort	   of	   privacy,	  
are	  today	  still	  ill	  defined;	  
• recognising	  a	  new	  confidentiality	  law:	  the	  one	  on	  cultural	  secrets;	  
• giving	   greater	   importance	   to	   the	   contextual	   integrity	   of	   any	   information:	  
how	  and	  why	  the	  information	  is	  secret	  and	  why	  it	  should	  remain	  as	  such;	  
• giving	   strict	   consideration	   for	   any	   surreptitious	   acquisition	   of	   secret	  
knowledge;	  
• considering	   any	   knowledge	   acquired	   surreptitiously,	   deceitfully	   or	   in	   a	  
manner	   contrary	   to	   the	   customary	   laws	   of	   a	   community	   and	   preventively	  
block	  its	  circulation	  by	  an	  interlocutory	  injunction	  while	  the	  case	  is	  analysed	  
and	  discussed	  by	  the	  court;	  
• if	   the	   information	   is	   acquired	   surreptitiously,	   deceitfully	   or	   in	   a	   manner	  
contrary	   to	   the	   cultural	   and	   human	   rights	   and	   the	   customary	   laws	   of	   a	  
community,	  the	  ‘public	  interest’	  clause	  should	  be	  automatically	  dismissed	  by	  
any	  court	  and	  the	  publication	  blocked	  or	  denied;	  and	  	  
• declining	   to	   apply	   the	   public	   interest	   defence	   in	   those	   cases	   where	   the	  







Our	  modern	  world	  thinks	  in	  numbers.	  Everything	  that	  has	  economic	  value	  should	  
be	  exploited	  for	  the	  greater	  good.	  The	  truth	  is	  that	  such	  exploitation	  is	  never	  for	  
the	   greater	   good	   and	   only	   few	   benefit	   financially	   from	   the	   exploitation	   of	  
indigenous	   resources	   and	   cultures.	   Unfortunately,	   most	   of	   our	   modern	   laws	  
protect	  the	  economic	  interests	  of	  the	  few	  at	  the	  disadvantage	  of	  the	  many.	  The	  
fact	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  might	  think	  and	  live	  holistically	  must	  be	  recognised	  
and	  accepted	  once	  and	   for	  all.	  At	   the	  same	  time,	   recognition	  must	  be	  given	   to	  
their	  secret	  practices	  and	  their	  desire	  to	  keep	  them	  secret.	  It	  is	  possible	  in	  some	  
jurisdictions	  to	  use	  legislation	  already	  in	  existence	  to	  meet	  these	  goals	  or,	  where	  
necessary,	  expand	  or	  create	  new	  laws.	  As	  seen	  in	  this	  chapter,	  the	  law	  on	  breach	  
of	  confidence	  is	  today	  at	  a	  promising	  stage.	  However,	   it	  needs	  to	  be	  protected,	  
expanded	   and	   harmonised	   to	   become	   a	   clear	   body	   of	   law.	   Privacy	   law	   and	  
breach	  of	  confidence	  should	  be	  either	  harmonised	  and	   integrated	  or	  revised	  to	  
include	  the	  protection	  that	  the	  other	  is	  lacking.	  In	  those	  states	  where	  privacy	  and	  
confidentiality	   law	   use	   distinct,	   different	   rules,	   the	   dividing	   line	   should	   be	  
identified	  and	  the	  moral,	  ethical	  and	  legal	  factors	  identified	  or	  clarified.	  Leaving	  
too	   much	   interpretation	   to	   judges	   might	   create	   contradicting	   precedents	   and	  
consequently	  prevent	  uniformity.	  	  
Yes,	  the	  way	  ahead	  seems	  long.	  However,	  things	  seem	  to	  be	  moving	  in	  the	  right	  
direction.	  Only	   time	  and	   the	  willingness	  of	   states	   can	  determine	  how	   long	   it	   is	  
going	   to	   take	   to	   finally	   amend	   laws	   that	   will	   be	   considerate	   and	   inclusive	   of	  







This	   thesis	   has	   taken	   an	   interdisciplinary	   and	   comparative	   approach	   to	   the	  
complex	  topic	  of	  indigenous	  secret	  knowledge	  and	  guardianship.1	  	  
In	   the	   initial	   part,	   this	   thesis	  has	  historically	   contextualized	   indigenous	  peoples	  
and	  described	   indigenous	   cultures	   and	   traditions	   from	  a	  holistic	   point	   of	   view,	  
explaining	  why	  the	  role	  played	  by	  the	  guardians	  is	  essential	  for	  the	  preservation	  
of	  indigenous	  culture.	  	  
In	   this	   context,	   framing	   colonization	   from	   a	   philosophical	   and	   anthropological	  
point	   of	   view	   proved	   to	   be	   important	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   many	   of	   the	  
ideologies	   that	   brought	   colonisers	   to	   subjugate	   indigenous	   peoples	   somehow	  
persist	   today	   in	   the	  resistance	  of	  states	   to	  creating	  and	   implementing	  effective	  
laws	   that	   would	   safeguard	   indigenous	   cultures.	   In	   many	   places	   of	   the	   world,	  
indigenous	   peoples	   are	   still	   marginalized	   minorities	   and	   subject	   to	  
discrimination.	  	  
Indeed,	   indigenous	   claims	   cannot	   be	   dismissed	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   fading	  
peculiar	   nature.	   Indigenous	   peoples	   are	   here	   to	   stay,	   and,	   like	   any	   other	   legal	  
entity,	  are	  seeking	  responses	  that	  are	  inclusive	  of	  the	  contextual	  integrity	  of	  their	  
claims.	   The	   fact	   that	   sacred/secret	   information	   of	   an	   intangible	   nature	   is	   still	  
today	   in	  the	  hands	  of	   indigenous	  custodians	   is	  essential	   for	  the	  preservation	  of	  
the	  knowledge.	  However,	  what	  the	  law	  needs	  to	  do,	  and	  what	  the	  law	  is	  slowly	  
doing,	   is	   including	   indigenous	   reasoning	   in	  any	  general	   legal	  discourse	   that	  can	  
be	   relevant	   to	  any	   legal	   entity.	   The	  aim	  of	   the	   thesis	  has	  been	   to	   show	   that	   it	  
does	   not	   matter	   who	   the	   legal	   entity	   is:	   what	   is	   important	   is	   to	   listen	   and	  
accommodate	   the	  needs	  and	  expectations	  of	   any	  member	  of	   the	  global	   family	  
who	  might	  have	  any	  issue	  regarding	  the	  system	  regulating	  it.	  	  
The	  international	  legal	  system	  today	  acknowledges	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  
custodians	   who	   take	   care	   of	   their	   most	   sacred/secret	   knowledge;	   the	   same	  
system	  must	   accommodate	   indigenous	   custodians’	   needs	   and	   expectations	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In	   the	   case	   of	   indigenous	   secret	   knowledge,	   complexity	   has	   been	   mainly	   due	   to	   the	   limited	   existing	  





have	   their	   secret	   information	   respected	   and	   protected	   against	   external	  
disclosure.	  The	  thesis	  proposes	  how	  this	  can	  be	  done.	  	  
In	   the	   last	   few	   decades,	   the	   law	   has	   slowly	   moved	   to	   accommodate	   some	  
aspects	   of	   indigenous	   claims	   and	   expectations.	   The	   Chapters	   4-­‐9	   of	   the	   thesis	  
have	  reviewed	  legal	  progress	  to	  date,	  and	  established	  what	  still	  needs	  to	  be	  done	  
to	   effectively	   protect	   indigenous	   peoples’	   traditions	   in	   relation	   to	   secret	   and	  
sacred	   knowledge.	   Chapter	   4	   is	   dedicated	   to	   explaining	   who	   the	   guardians	   of	  
knowledge	   are	   and	   why	   their	   role	   is	   so	   important	   in	   the	   preservation	   of	  
indigenous	  traditions.	  Chapter	  5	  discusses	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  international	  
law	   with	   the	   intent	   of	   analyzing	   the	   role	   played	   by	   indigenous	   peoples	   in	  
international	   law.	   Chapter	   6	   explains	   and	   contextualizes	   indigenous	   peoples’	  
culture	  within	  human	  rights	  and	  intellectual	  property	  law	  systems	  preparing	  the	  
reader	  for	  the	  complex	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  study	  on	  Wai	  262	  (chapter	  7).	  
The	  chapter	  on	  Wai	  262	  provided	  what	  is	  today	  the	  best	  example	  and	  the	  most	  
thorough	   study	   of	   how	   states	  might	   accommodate	   indigenous	   peoples’	   needs	  
and	   expectations	   within	   their	   national	   borders.	   The	   Wai	   262	   report	   is	   very	  
thorough	   in	   describing	   the	   delicate	   and	   multifaceted	   role	   of	   the	  
guardians/kaitiaki,	  and	   it	  explains	  how	  the	  state	  and	  kaitiaki	  can	  work	  together	  
to	  protect	  Maori	  secret	  knowledge.	  In	  the	  Wai	  262	  report	  the	  Waitangi	  Tribunal	  
does	   not	   deny	   that	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   assess	   and	   protect	   the	   knowledge	   that	   is	  
mostly	  sacred	  and	  secret,	  however,	  by	  giving	  great	  importance	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
kaitiaki,	  such	  protection	  can	  become	  more	  effective.	  Once	  kaitiaki	  are	  left	  free	  to	  
manage	   their	   knowledge,	   they	   will	   traditionally	   know	   how	   to	   safeguard	   the	  
knowledge	   they	   hold	   in	   custody.	   Wai	   262	   suggests	   that	   it	   is	   the	   relationship	  
between	  guardians	  and	  secret	  knowledge	  that	  must	  be	  protected.	  The	  same	  idea	  
is	   embodied	   in	   the	  action	   for	  breach	  of	   confidence.	  As	   chapter	  10	  has	  proven,	  
secret	  information	  is	  strictly	  bound	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  holder	  of	  the	  knowledge.	  	  
Chapters	  8	  and	  9	  have	  explained	  why	  intellectual	  property	  law	  systems	  are	  today	  
still	   inadequate	  instruments	  to	  protect	  secret	  knowledge.	  While	  IP	  law	  is	  slowly	  
addressing	   indigenous	  peoples’	   issues,	  when	   it	  comes	  to	  secret	  knowledge,	  not	  




focused	  on	  new	   inventions	  and	   the	   fixation	  of	   ideas	   in	  material	   form,	   IP	   rights	  
remain	  unsuitable	  for	  all	  the	  information	  that	  is	  secret	  and	  intangible.	  
	  
Essentially,	  it	  is	  true	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  still	  widely	  discriminated	  against	  
and	   that	   our	  modern	   world	   is	   driven	   by	   economic	   reasoning	   that	   ignores	   the	  
cultural	  values	  that	  survive	  in	  many	  indigenous	  communities.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  
true	   that	   ‘secrecy’	   and	   ‘confidentiality’	   are	   common	   to	   every	   society	   of	   the	  
world.	  	  
In	   this	   regard,	   this	   thesis	   has	   proven	   in	   chapters	   6,	   8	   and	   9	   that,	   while	  
international	  human	  rights	  instruments	  seem	  at	  present	  to	  better	  respond	  to	  the	  
violation	  of	   indigenous	  cultural	   rights	  than	  the	   intellectual	  property	   law	  system	  
as	   currently	   configured,	   breach	  of	   confidence	   is	   at	   present	   the	  best	   avenue	   to	  
address	   secrecy	   and	   protect	   information	   shared	   by	   indigenous	   guardians	   in	  
confidence.	  Undeniably,	  while	   the	  best	  way	  to	  preserve	  any	  secret	   information	  
might	  be	   to	  keep	   it	   secret	   (as	  suggested	  by	   the	   recommendations	   in	  Wai	  262),	  
nonetheless	   indigenous	   secret	   information	   entails	   a	   level	   of	   disclosure	   that,	  
although	   limited	   to	   a	   restricted	   group	   in	   a	   given	   community,	   is	   still	   shared	   in	  
confidence	   and	   under	   the	  mutual	   understanding	   that	  will	   remain	   confidential.	  
Strict	   legal	   codes	   customarily	   enforced	   within	   indigenous	   communities	   make	  
sure	   that	  no	  disclosure	   to	   the	  uninitiated	   takes	  place.	  However,	   disclosure	   can	  
happen	  even	  in	  secretive	  contexts.	  In	  this	  case,	  by	  focusing	  on	  ‘secrecy’	  itself	  and	  
not	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   information	   held	   secret,	   breach	   of	   confidence	   can	  
protect	  indigenous	  secret	  information	  from	  harms	  that	  can	  come	  from	  within	  the	  
community	  as	  well	  as	  from	  outside.	  	  
The	   final	   chapter	   of	   the	   thesis	   has	   shown	   that	   the	   action	   for	   breach	   of	  
confidence	   can	   include	   indigenous	   peoples’	   claims,	   needs	   and	   expectations.	  	  
There	   is	   space	   for	   flexibility	   and	   inclusiveness	   within	   the	   common	   law	   on	  
confidence	   and	   its	  moral,	   ethical	   and	   cultural	   contextual	   integrity	   to	  make	   it	   a	  
valuable	   and	   effective	   instrument	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   indigenous	   secret	  
knowledge.	   The	   law	   on	   confidence	   is	   also	   structured	   in	   a	   way	   that	   not	   only	  
protects	  the	  secret	  itself,	  but	  recognizes	  the	  role	  played	  by	  the	  holder	  in	  keeping	  




be	  protected,	  but	  also	  the	  confidential	   relationship	  between	  the	  guardians	  and	  
the	  knowledge	  in	  their	  custody.	  As	  such,	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  law	  on	  confidence	  
is	   extended	   to	   the	   privileged	   role	   of	   the	   guardian	   of	   knowledge	   as	   keeper	   of	  
secret	  information.	  
	  
The	  thesis	  argues	  that	  indigenous	  custodians	  (and	  their	  advocates)	  should,	  in	  the	  
current	  climate,	  work	  within	  the	  existing	  system	  regardless	  of	  how	  imperfect	  it	  is	  
to	   create	   compromises	   that	   would	   make	   it	   inclusive	   of	   indigenous	   peoples’	  
expectations.	   Breach	   of	   confidence	   and	   privacy	   law	   might	   not	   be	   the	   ideal	  
solution	  to	  indigenous	  issues,	  but	  they	  have	  a	  very	  long	  tradition	  in	  the	  Common	  
Law	  system.	  As	  Foster	  v	  Mountford	  has	  clearly	  demonstrated,	  the	  common	  law	  
of	   breach	   of	   confidence	   has	   potential	   to	   evolve	   to	   meet	   the	   needs	   and	  
expectations	   of	   our	   global	   society.	  What	   the	   thesis	   suggests	   is	   that	   there	   are	  
today	   avenues	   in	   which	   indigenous	   claims	   have	   been	   presented	   with	   some	  
success,	   and	   that	   there	   is	   potential	   for	   the	   law	   to	  develop	  and	  be	  used	   to	   the	  
advantage	  of	  all	  the	  indigenous	  custodians	  who	  wish	  to	  retain	  their	  control	  over	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